26 June 2002
Byliner: Aldridge on Tight Security for Missile Defense
(Op-ed column from the USA Today 06/26/02) (440)
(This byliner is by Pete Aldridge, who is the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The column first
appeared in USA Today on June 26, 2002 and is in the public domain. No
republication restrictions.)
Tight Security Makes Sense
By Pete Aldridge
Recent articles and columns in some of America's major newspapers have
focused on Defense Department policy concerning the secrecy of our
ballistic missile defense (BMD) program. They report that the Missile
Defense Agency (a department overseen by my office of Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics) will now classify certain aspects of that
program. With varying degrees of directness, they imply sinister
motives for these new precautions. Though the underlying reports are
accurate, the consequent charges are groundless.
The charges common to these articles are first, that planning and
reporting requirements customary for past acquisition programs have
been suspended; second, that congressional oversight will now be
hindered; and third, that information concerning the targets and
decoys used during testing will henceforth be restricted.
Internal BMD planning and reporting have not been suspended. They
have, however, been modified to accommodate the peculiarities of a
development program without precedent. As for congressional reporting,
those requirements are mandated by laws with which we will always
comply. Additionally, there is not now, and can never be, any
component of this program classified beyond the reach of the security
clearances of its congressional overseers. The charge of oversight
evasion thus borders on the preposterous. Congress' constitutionally
mandated oversight will always be respected.
Notably, those objecting the loudest to these precautions are not even
in Congress. They are predominantly members of advocacy groups long
opposed to BMD. But the shrillness of their complaints is muted by the
stakes. And those stakes insist that we restrict non-congressional
access to data on targets and decoys. As this program matures, as the
system's strengths gain definition and as we address those terrorist
states racing to perfect their ballistic missiles, it would be base
negligence to facilitate the countermeasures of our adversaries.
These precautions reflect the common-sense evolution of any national
defense program making rapid progress in time of war. On June 14, our
obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ended, and our
testing program can now proceed. What could be a more appropriate time
to tighten security? Doing so is sensible, not sinister.
(end text)
(Pete Aldridge is the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics.)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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