Space

DATE=08/11/2001

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-00976

TITLE=ON THE LINE: BUILDING MISSILE DEFENSES

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Anncr: On the Line a discussion of United States policy and contemporary issues. This week, "Building Missile Defenses." Here is your host, Robert Reilly.

Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line. After a successful test in July of an interceptor that destroyed an intercontinental ballistic missile high over the Pacific Ocean, the United States is proceeding with plans to develop and deploy a limited national missile defense system. These plans run counter to the thirty-year-old Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which President George Bush has said it is time to "move beyond." The A-B-M treaty was negotiated with the Soviet Union and prohibits nationwide defenses against long-ranged missiles. At their meeting in Genoa, Italy, however, President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to work toward a new "strategic framework" that would embrace both missile defense and substantial cuts in the two countries' nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, critics say missile defenses are unnecessary, unworkable, and may set off a new arms race.

Joining me today to discuss building missile defenses are three experts. Frank Gaffney is executive director of the Center for Security Policy. Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and co-author of the new book, Defending America: the Case for Limited National Missile Defense. And Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and author of the book, Best of Intentions: America's Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation.

Gentleman, welcome to the program. Frank Gaffney, you have for years been one of the most enthusiastic proponents of national missile defense. Is your dream now coming true?

Gaffney: We are getting closer. I hope that it will, in fact, translates into reality by the President not only deciding to move beyond the A-B-M treaty [Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty] in the very near future and move aggressively through development of effective missile defenses, but to begin deployment. And that really will be the moment at which I think the work that I and many others have been putting in on this issue for many years will, in fact, come to fruition.

Host: Michael O'Hanlon, is that what the United States should be doing, abrogating the A-B-M treaty and deploying?

O'Hanlon: I would rather see a new framework with either modification to the treaty or some kind of alternative, perhaps less formal, less long-term arrangement. But I would encourage people who, like myself, may have disagreed with Frank at one time to think afresh about the need for missile defense today. I think the situation is much different. I think the case for missile defense is pretty compelling. I think it should be a limited defense in my own view. But it should be deployed. And it should be deployed some time this decade, within preferably a few years.

Host: But I didn't detect a disagreement there.

Gaffney and O'Hanlon: We'll get there.

Host: We'll get to the disagreement after Henry Sokolski gets to opine on this question.

Sokolski: Anything that gets you away from this idea that's popular among strategists to promote mutual assured destruction, that is the explicit idea of targeting large numbers of innocents is a good idea. And it's a good idea not just because it's good for missile defense proponents but because, if you popularize that idea, you popularize the idea of getting nuclear weapons as a good way to secure your security. And I am against that.

Host: What does the "new strategic framework" mean? Because that phrase has been repeated by almost every administration official, from the president to the national security adviser, to the State Department. Condoleeza Rice did say recently, and I'll quote her. "We think maximum flexibility is necessary and that's why we're talking about moving beyond the A-B-M treaty and not going line by line in trying to get a little flexibility here and there," she said. That sounds like moving out of it entirely. So what does the new strategic framework consist of? Any guesses?

Gaffney: I think, at the moment, it's a work in progress. To some extent, clearly, the administration hopes that the Russians will agree to something. By definition, that means that they will have a hand in shaping this framework. But I am very comfortable with what the administration has said it envisions this framework to be, which is basically an exchange of information, of ideas and even plans as to how they propose to proceed with respect to missile defense.

Host: That's the first step?

Gaffney: That's the critical step, establishing that there really is a new relationship between the United States and the Russians when, under the old regime, the A-B-M treaty regime, the Cold War regime, the mutual assured destruction regime, we would have withheld information about our defense plans. The administration said, look, we can share information with you because we don't think you are a threat; we think you could, in fact, over time become a friend. They also are clearly interested in talking about how both sides, ideally from my point of view in a unilateral and independent fashion, but both sides might reduce the offensive nuclear weapons to lower levels that make sense for each of them.

Host: As recent as his meeting with Kim Jong-il from North Korea, President [Vladimir] Putin has said that we're opposed to U-S national missile defense. Nonetheless, these series of three meetings are taking place, Michael O'Hanlon, between the Russian and U-S experts on the subject. Is that a deal that you think would be a good one, missile defense plus radical reductions in nuclear warhead arsenals?

O'Hanlon: I like the basic concept. I do think it's important to try to reach some kind of understanding or, at least, limit our misunderstanding and our disagreement with Russia. I don't want to do something that they find fundamentally threatening. I am prepared to say we should deploy defense even if they don't renegotiate a treaty. I would have just wanted to do a limited defense because I want to reassure them, at some level. And we can't defend against their whole arsenal, anyhow. But it's going to be tough to come up with the kind of framework Frank mentions. I have no problem trying for it, trying to get that kind of information exchange. But I think we're going to need something that's a little more constraining to get Russia to agree and to feel reassured.

Host: Henry Sokolski?

Sokolski: I think the idea of coming down in the numbers of things that you have a hard time figuring out how to use and target, if Russia is not an enemy, is a useful thing generally. It will allow us to put the emphasis on newer technologies that don't rely on such indiscriminate explosions as these large warheads that are in our arsenal currently. And if we can figure out some way to maintain our ability to project force without relying on unrealistic threats, I am all for that as well.

Host: What are the realistic threats which this limited national missile defense is supposed to be addressing?

Sokolski: Even the Clinton intelligence community concluded that, within a little more than a decade now, we will face I-C-B-M [Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile] threats surely from China still, Russia still, accidental or intentional, and North Korea, and probably from Iran, and possibly even from Iraq. So, that's I-C-B-Ms.

Host: And North Korea?

Sokolski: That too. They claimed back in 1999 to have I-C-B-M capability in another ten to thirteen years. In addition, you have at least fifteen countries that have ballistic missiles of shorter ranges. Some of these include the kinds of countries we might have to confront in another [Persian] Gulf incident, or in Korea, or in North Africa.

Host: Let me see if I can start an argument between the two of you because you keep mentioning "as long as it's strictly limited." Frank Gaffney, should it be strictly limited because the technology is limited to do this, or should it be limited for political or military reasons?

Gaffney: I think the Untied States ought to have the latitude to deploy the defenses it considers to be necessary. We believe at the moment, the president has made it very clear that he thinks that can be done with a limited defense.

Host: And "limited" means?

Gaffney: "Limited," again, is somewhat in the eyes and minds of the beholders here. "Limited," I think, as far as the administration is concerned, means not having the capability to stop the kind of attack that the Soviet Union, for example, could have mounted back during the Cold War, or maybe even Russia could mount today. We wouldn't even try to do that. But that would be as a matter of policy, not necessarily because the technology wouldn't permit us to do it, as Michael feels, but because we don't think that's necessary at this moment. What we think we need, and need urgently, is the capacity to stop the kinds of missile threats both of the longer range that are coming along and of the shorter range that are in place right now.

Host: Do you disagree with any of that, Michael O'Hanlon?

O'Hanlon: To focus on the areas of disagreement, I think that whether we need and should try to defend against a Chinese missile strike is a big part of what you're going to see debated in this country. We tend not to be very explicit about that probably because we don't want to provoke China unnecessarily. We all agree we're trying to have a good relationship with them, if possible. I would tend to argue it's not worth trying because I think China can counter any defense we can build. And I think the sheer act of entering into that competition will be harmful to other security cooperation with China, let's say vis-a-vis North Korea, vis-a-vis Taiwan. However, there is an argument to be made that, since there's some chance of going to war against China over Taiwan, we would want to have a every defense possible And we would want China to feel like they didn't have any momentum and any coercive leverage against us. You can see the arguments on both sides. I really think, in my judgement, the defense won't work against China. Therefore we shouldn't try. But I can certainly see the other point of view even if, at the end of the day, I disagree with it.

Sokolski: I think you've got a very interesting problem in the case of Taiwan. Everyone talks about how well missile defenses will work against nuclear strikes. And if you think of enough missiles, you could get very nervous about whether it would work well enough. Honestly, missile defense probably for some time will be like air defense. Something will get through. But in the case of Taiwan, what the Chinese have trying to do is intimidate not with nuclear weapons on missiles, but with conventionally armed missiles. And that's where missile defense, even if it's only twenty or thirty percent effective, totally louses up their calculations. And I think it's precisely there that we should get cracking.

Host: Let me just take a quick moment to remind our audience that this is On the Line, and this week we're discussing building missile defenses with Frank Gaffney from the Center for Security Policy, Michael O'Hanlon from the Brookings Institution; and Henry Sokolski from the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Mr. Gaffney?

Gaffney: It does seem to me that we can certainly defend against the twenty or so missiles that China has today. They have made clear that, with or without missile defenses, they are going to build more. But I think the technology and, certainly, the resources of this country are sufficient to defeat even an order-of-magnitude increase in China's military offensive potential, should that materialize. But two things need to be borne in mind. One is: maybe by deploying effective missile defenses we can discourage China from the kind of proliferation that they're doing with their own arsenal and that they're doing by selling technology to some rather dubious characters around the world. The other thing Michael is overlooking that is very troubling to me is that China is the one country that I can think of that has, in recent years, not once but, at least twice, explicitly threatened the United States with nuclear attack. And they frequently talk about war being inevitable between our countries. They frequently talk about the United States being the main enemy. These are the kinds of things that I think demand the United States to have a missile defense that may be limited, but is, at least, capable of protecting us against the kind of threat that is clearly in place today and maybe emerging from China.

O'Hanlon: Some of those arguments I agree with. But first of all, I do not think, as a matter of historical record, the Chinese were quite so blunt in threatening us. What they basically said was back in the 1950s, when you had nuclear weapons and we did not, you could make nuclear threats against us with impunity. That's no longer the case. It's a more complicated environment. It was not a friendly statement, but it was not a threat out of the blue that they would necessarily initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

Host: However, in 1999, the senior Chinese general did say to an American envoy, regarding Taiwan, that you're not going to trade Los Angeles for Taipei.

O'Hanlon: The context of that was when you go back and look at the broader. . . I am not trying to defend that statement. I don't like that statement myself. But I think it's more complicated because the historical context that he was referring to as the way things used to be was wrong. We had nuclear weapons and they didn't. His point was: now, we're not going to be so quick to threaten nuclear weapons against them, because they could retaliate. At least the statement could be read that way. That's much different than saying we will initiate the use of nuclear weapons ourselves. The broader argument I would have with Frank's point is that I just do not think, technologically, the issue is our defense tomorrow against their nuclear arsenal today, or even their nuclear arsenal of today built up to be larger. They're going to develop counter measures. They are going to develop decoys. This is a fairly substantial military power. They can do a lot of testing, a lot of laboratory development. And I really think the technology favors the attacker when you are talking about long-range missiles with nuclear warheads on them where only a few need to get through to be very effective. So that's the fundamental reason why I would not try to defend against the Chinese capability.

Sokolski: I'd like to complicate things a bit because I think even what you've raised doesn't go the full mile of what you think about. China is facing not just the United States, but Japan. It has kept the numbers of its warheads, although it's improved them, pretty stable for that reason. It does not want to provoke Japan into militarizing beyond what it's done. So I'm kind of in the department, you do what you can. I am a skeptic about whether or not missile defenses can cure the common cold, or deter. But I am not a skeptic about defending against threats. And it seems to me that China has many more complications than technological ones in trying to militarize. And we need to be willing to play this out to see where it goes.

Host: Let's ask the question the critics often raise about the cascade effect of building missile defenses -- that you're just going to encourage either China or other explicitly hostile powers to build more to try to overwhelm the system. And others say if, for instance, China builds more missiles, that inevitably is going to affect what India does. And what India does is going to affect what Pakistan does. So you will have a new arms race. What do you say to that, Frank Gaffney?

Gaffney: It could be that it works out that way, but I don't think it's foreordained. I think it's at least as likely, as I said a moment ago, that as countries look at how they allocate limited resources -- and Pakistan for sure, India to a somewhat lesser degree, China to a somewhat lesser degree than that have limited resources to apply to military capabilities. And I think anybody looking at reasonable investment strategies for military programs is going to say, you know, building more ballistic missiles may not be a sensible investment. And therefore, instead of it being a catalyst for vastly increased proliferation of precisely those kinds of weapons, it maybe that they look for other means. Maybe, ideally, they look for peaceful uses of their resources instead. But it does seem to me that we've never tried this as a deterrent to proliferation. We've tried arms control. We've tried missile technology control regimes. We've tried moral suasion. And we've tried handshakes and diplomacy. None of them has actually had the desired effect. I think it's time for trying this.

Host: Do you think that will serve to deter, Michael O'Hanlon?

O'Hanlon: I basically agree with Frank on this point when you're talking especially about North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. I think we can compete with them in an offense-defense way. And I think there is a chance they will simply concede the competition once they see we are serious. I also don't worry much about India and Pakistan because, frankly, India has lived with inferiority vis-a-vis China for a very long time. My prediction is that it will continue to do so, even if China built up, and vice versa. It's same sort of thing for Pakistan and India. They want some kind of parity in their overall arsenals, but they are not really in the same kind of long-range ballistic missile competition that we've had with other nuclear powers. My concern is really, specifically, on the case of China. I don't want to go too far out of my way to reassure China. I think we need a missile defense. I think there is a chance that North Korea, or Iraq, really could make the mistake of provoking a war against the United States or our allies again. And in that kind of situation, I want a missile defense to reassure allies in the region, to reassure Americans, to reassure the Congress, and to make sure we have all options in a war to even overthrow an enemy regime, if necessary. China has got to learn to accept that we have a legitimate interest in that kind of an arsenal, that kind of a defensive arsenal. I want to try to work with these two countries, Russia and China. But at the end of the day, I am prepared to deploy a defense even without a treaty.

Sokolski: It's not missile defense as a substitute for any other kind of effort, as well. Frank even made a point about those, who, maybe, will turn to peaceful things. I think the whole point that Bush has made is that we want to make reductions. And indiscriminate weaponry is very important to making sure that people are on the defensive if they try to militarize in response to what we do. If all we do is build more missile defenses, keep all of our weapons, or make more in the way of nuclear weapons, yes, I think people will get a little edgy. I don't think that's what Mr. Bush is talking about, though.

Host: And is that why, in fact, the mood seems to have changed, Frank Gaffney, when he first mentioned pulling out of the A-B-M treaty? There was some hysteria in the air. Not only was it opposed by Russia, but some of our NATO allies. And now everyone seems to have considerably calmed down, including Mr. Putin.

Gaffney: I think the hysteria was overrated, frankly. I think the big change has been the perception around the world that President Bush is going to go ahead. That's caused everybody to start trimming sail accordingly.

O'Hanlon: I'll acknowledge that. I agree that you have to make it clear that you are serious about doing this. And even though I am a Democrat and I supported Clinton and Gore, I think they went too far toward wanting to work with Moscow. And they essentially gave Moscow a veto. You have to be careful not to do that even if you're working to reassure Russia.

Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have this week. I would like to thank our guests Frank Gaffney from the Center for Security Policy; Michael O'Hanlon from the Brookings Institution; and Henry Sokolski from the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center - for joining me to discuss building missile defenses. This is Robert Reilly for On the Line.

Anncr: You've been listening to "On the Line" a discussion of United States policies and contemporary issues. This is --------.