Statement by Robert J. Einhorn
Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation
"Nonproliferation Challenges in Asia"
The Asia Society, Hong Kong, June 7, 2000
In the latter half of the 20th century, it was the Cold War
struggle between rival blocs led by the United States and Soviet
Union that posed the most acute threat to international security.
While this essentially bipolar contest had its manifestations in
various parts of the world, it was a confrontation centered in
Europe and it involved primarily the nations of the Euro-Atlantic
region.
As the new century begins, our security concerns have changed. We
are no longer preoccupied by the prospect of a global nuclear
conflagration or of a massive land battle in the heart of Europe.
Today, and for the foreseeable future, our most pressing security
challenge is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their missile delivery systems. It is a challenge that is not
confined to any region of the world; nor is it confined to nation
states. Among its most worrisome dimensions is the risk that
terrorists and other sub-national groups will get their hands on
these devastating weapons.
As Asia has assumed an increasingly prominent role in the world's
political, security, and commercial affairs, so too has it
emerged as a focus of proliferation concern. I would like to take
this opportunity to outline what the U.S. considers to be the
most important of the nonproliferation challenges facing us today
in Asia and discuss what my government and other interested
governments are doing to meet them.
North Korea
In Northeast Asia, the critical challenge is to eliminate the
threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as we
seek over time to build normal and constructive relations with
the long-isolated regime in Pyongyang.
The decades-old military standoff on the Korean Peninsula took on
a much more menacing dimension in 1993 when the International
Atomic Energy Agency's discovery of North Korea's clandestine
nuclear weapons program precipitated a major international crisis
that was only alleviated in October 1994 with the conclusion of
the U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework.
Then in August 1998 came another jolt. The North Koreans flight
tested the Taepo Dong I, a medium-range ballistic missile
configured to boost a small satellite into orbit. Even though the
test failed to place its payload into space, its overflight of
Japan shocked the Japanese and its demonstration of certain
critical rocket technologies raised the specter of North Korea
soon having the capability to deliver significant military
payloads to the United States.
Compounding the missile proliferation threat was North Korea's
indiscriminate sales of missiles and missile technology to states
in regions of tension. It sold the No-Dong medium-range missile
to Pakistan -- which renamed it the Ghauri and flight tested it
in April 1996 -- and to Iran -- which incorporated technology
from other suppliers, named it the Shahab-3, and flight tested it
in July 1998. North Korea has peddled its missile technology far
and wide to potential customers of disparate political stripes
located from northern Africa to South Asia.
These unsettling developments prompted a fundamental review of
U.S. policy on North Korea. Led by former Secretary of Defense
William Perry and carried out in full coordination with the
Republic of Korea and Japan, the Perry review resulted in a new
framework for U.S. policy. The U.S. would be prepared to proceed
step by step to a full normalization of its relationship with the
D.P.R.K., but it would do so only if the North Koreans were
willing to deal constructively with its concerns, mainly the
elimination of their nuclear and missile programs.
This engagement strategy has begun to pay off. We have had our
ups and downs, in large part because North Korean tactics often
involve provoking crises in an attempt to acquire additional
negotiating leverage and because the regime in Pyongyang is wary
about the domestic implications of engagement. But the overall
trend is positive.
The Agreed Framework is working. Plutonium production remains
frozen under continuous IAEA monitoring. The sealing in canisters
of spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor is complete. Work is
underway on the light water reactor project in the North. And the
U.S. is meeting its commitment to provide heavy fuel oil.
Our concerns about a large underground facility at Kumchang-ni in
North Korea have been satisfactorily addressed. Troubled that the
site might be used for plutonium production, we negotiated access
arrangements, visited the site in May 1999, and found that it was
not suitable for the suspected proscribed activities. Last month,
we completed a second visit to Kumchang-ni, received full
cooperation from the North, and learned that the site remains an
extensive, empty tunnel complex.
In September 1999, in response to strong urging by the
international community, especially the U.S. and Japan, the North
Koreans stated authoritatively that they would refrain from
flight testing long-range missiles of any kind as long as
discussions were underway on improving U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations.
In Rome in late May, U.S. and D.P.R.K. teams launched a new
negotiation on further steps to implement the Agreed Framework
and held a preparatory session to set the stage for a new, formal
round of missile talks in the near future. The moratorium on
flight testing long-range missiles remains in place, and we
expect soon to have an announcement on the implementation of the
President's decision last September to ease certain economic
sanctions against North Korea.
While bilateral U.S.-D.P.R.K. engagement remains on track and is
producing results, we believe that the engagement of other
countries with Pyongyang is also essential. That is why we are
encouraged by the current North Korean policy of expanding its
international contacts. In recent months, North Korea has resumed
its normalization dialogue with Japan, established or held
discussions on establishing diplomatic relations with Italy,
Australia, Canada, and the Philippines, consulted with the
European Union, hosted Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, and
explored membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Just over a week
ago, Kim Jong Il paid an unpublicized visit to Beijing and showed
that Sino-D.P.R.K. relations, heavily strained in recent years,
are apparently mended.
The expansion of Pyongyang's interactions with the outside world
can bring important benefits for the North Korean people,
especially in addressing their pressing humanitarian needs. At
the same time, they give interested countries the opportunity to
convey their concerns directly about North Korean activities, and
they give Pyongyang a strong and growing incentive to respond to
those concerns and to avoid actions that could put those
beneficial relationships at risk.
By far the most dramatic development in North Korea's policy of
expanding contacts is the decision to host next week's
North-South summit. This historic event is largely the result of
Kim Dae Jung's courageous and far-sighted engagement policy aimed
at bringing reconciliation, peace, and economic well-being to the
entire Peninsula. The United States fully supports President
Kim's efforts and regards them as complementary with our own. We
have always believed that, ultimately, the problems of peace and
security on the Peninsula must and should be resolved by Koreans.
Moreover, we are confident that an improvement in North-South
relations will advance the goal shared throughout Asia of
eliminating the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile
programs.
China
A second nonproliferation challenge is encouraging China to
become a more consistently reliable partner in the global fight
against proliferation.
China has come a long way in its attitudes toward
nonproliferation. In the 1960s, its declared policy was to
support the spread of nuclear weapons as a means of "breaking the
hegemony of the superpowers." Since then -- as it has come to
recognize its own security interest in impeding the proliferation
of dangerous military capabilities and as it has assumed greater
international responsibilities as a Permanent Member of the UN
Security Council -- its position has evolved in a positive
direction.
The most marked change came in the 1990s. China acceded to the
Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992, pledged not to export complete
ground-to-ground missiles in 1994, signed the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty in 1996, and became an original party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention in 1997.
In 1996 and 1997, in the wake of public controversy over the sale
of ring magnets by a Chinese company to Pakistan's uranium
enrichment program, China pledged not to assist unsafeguarded
nuclear programs in Pakistan or anywhere else, agreed to phase
out all nuclear cooperation with Iran, developed and implemented
a national system of export controls, and joined the Zangger
Nuclear Suppliers Committee.
In the area of regional nonproliferation, China played a leading
role in encouraging a strong international reaction to the Indian
and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998. We believe it has also
worked behind the scenes with North Korea to encourage restraint
in both the nuclear and missile fields.
However, despite these encouraging developments, China's
evolution is still incomplete and its record on nonproliferation
is mixed.
The Chinese leadership has demonstrated that it takes very
seriously its recent commitments to restrain nuclear-related
exports. Beijing has also abided by its 1994 pledge not to export
complete missiles. But Chinese entities continue to provide
equipment, technology, and materials to missile programs of
concern in Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
Chinese authorities have made substantial headway on their export
control system. But in important respects, that system does not
yet meet international standards; the controls should be more
comprehensive and their enforcement should be more rigorous. The
further strengthening of that control system would be facilitated
by a closer association between China and the various
multilateral export control regimes.
We have valued China's role on North Korea and South Asia. But
proliferation is a global problem, and China -- as a Permanent
Member of the UN Security Council and a leading party to the NPT
-- should be a more active partner in dealing with those and
other proliferation trouble spots around the world, including
Iraq.
China has often seen cooperation with the U.S. on
nonproliferation largely through the prism of bilateral
U.S.-Chinese relations. Thus, when relations were improving -- as
they clearly were in the period preceding the Clinton-Jiang
summits in Washington and Beijing -- progress on the
nonproliferation agenda was significant. But when bilateral
relations were more difficult and China wanted to show
displeasure toward the United States or its particular actions,
China tended to reduce or even shut off cooperation in the area
of nonproliferation. After the accidental bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade, for example, a regular bilateral dialogue on
nonproliferation that had proved quite productive was suspended
for over 16 months.
China should not view positive steps on nonproliferation as a
favor or concession to the United States or anyone else.
Preventing the proliferation of destabilizing military
capabilities, whether in China's neighborhood or farther away, is
in China's national interest no less than in America's. It is
inevitable that differences will arise from time to time between
the U.S. and China. But if China is to become a fully committed
and reliable partner in the global effort to prevent
proliferation, these differences should not be allowed to stand
in the way of working together to avert what is truly a common
danger.
South Asia
In South Asia, the key nonproliferation challenge is to encourage
India and Pakistan to heed the advice of the international
community by exercising maximum restraint in their nuclear and
missile programs, joining the international nonproliferation
mainstream, and resolving their differences peacefully.
Before the nuclear tests of May 1998, the nuclear weapons
programs of India and Pakistan were hardly a secret. What the
tests did was to turn an unacknowledged arms creep into an overt
and robust arms race. Since then, the South Asian rivals have
each pursued several ballistic missiles programs, with
tit-for-tat flight testing of medium-range versions. Each has
observed a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear tests, which
is significant in light of domestic pressures for resumed
testing, especially in India; but neither has so far made good on
its 1999 promise to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And
both are actively producing more fissile material for nuclear
weapons, arguing that they cannot afford to join a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty until their stocks of such materials are
larger.
Despite repeated statements by Indian and Pakistani leaders that
they wish to avoid an arms race and are determined to meet their
security needs at the lowest possible levels, the nuclear and
missile programs of the two sides show no signs of letting up.
Strategic thinkers in India and Pakistan used to predict
confidently that nuclear weapons would bring deterrence and
stability to the Subcontinent and even promote better bilateral
relations. The opposite appears to be the case, as last summer's
conflict around Argil demonstrated. The situation in Kashmir
remains tense, and the risks of miscalculation and escalation
have risen. With mutual mistrust and recriminations perhaps at
their highest levels since independence, dialogue between the two
sides has not resumed.
In March, President Clinton visited India and laid the foundation
for a qualitatively different and more promising relationship
between the U.S. and the world's largest democracy. While
painting the picture of a much more cooperative future, the
President also spoke frankly and respectfully to the Indian
people about the importance the U.S. attaches to India's
adherence to international nonproliferation goals. He
acknowledged that it was India's sovereign right to decide what
was necessary for defense. But he pointed out that, unless
Indians decided to exercise restraint -- consistent with the
Indian Government's own stated policies -- the full potential of
U.S.-Indian relations could not be realized.
During the President's brief stop in Islamabad, the agenda was a
more difficult one, addressing such issues as restoration of
democracy and support for the militants in Kashmir. But on the
question of nonproliferation, the message was essentially the
same.
India and Pakistan are not rogue states; they are our friends. We
want to improve relations with both of them. Moreover, we
recognize that their strategic choices will be based not on
outside pressures but on their own independent judgments of what
best serves their national interests. We ask them to appreciate,
however, that those strategic choices have major consequences --
not just for themselves, but also for the security of their
neighbors and for the viability of international nonproliferation
regimes. So even as the U.S. strengthens and expands relations
with them, we will keep our nonproliferation goals high on the
agenda.
Export Controls
The final challenge I will address applies not to a single
country or region but to all countries of Asia; it is the
challenge of developing and strengthening export controls, which
are one of the most critical tools for impeding proliferation.
Asia is now a leader in the high-technology field. Many of the
sensitive technologies used in weapons of mass destruction and
missile delivery systems are produced or traded here. Asia's
manufacturing centers and trading hubs therefore provide tempting
targets for countries seeking unconventional military
capabilities.
North Korea and other proliferators have developed elaborate
means of acquiring the goods and technologies they seek. They
establish front companies to augment existing procurement
networks and use brokers and other cutouts to disguise their
transactions. They will look for weak links in the chain of
control, such as relatively uncontrolled transit points.
If Asia is to avoid becoming a supermarket for countries of
proliferation concern, the governments of the region must put in
place rigorous export control systems that meet international
standards. If they are interested in a good example to follow in
the area of export controls, they need look no farther than Hong
Kong.
It is essential that Hong Kong, as a leader in world trade and a
major transshipment point, have first-rate controls. All
indications are that it has. In her recent report to Congress,
Secretary of State Albright noted that "Hong Kong has maintained
what is widely considered one of the world's finest export
control regimes."
In light of concerns often expressed by authorities in other
major shipping hubs, it is important to point out that Hong
Kong's conscientious approach to controlling strategic trade does
not come at the expense of Hong Kong's commercial interests.
Indeed, Hong Kong is proof that economic and nonproliferation
interests are fully compatible. Hong Kong also appreciates that
the best guarantee that it will continue to gain access to high
technology, particularly from the United States, is its ability
to ensure that goods headed to Hong Kong will be used only for
their intended use by the intended end-user.
Hong Kong is not alone among Asian nations in pursuing effective
national export controls. Others in the region, notably Japan and
Australia, have also created effective systems. But given the
growing tendency of proliferators to look to Asia as a source of
supply for their programs, it is important that all Asian
governments give increased priority to this aspect of the fight
against proliferation.
Beyond the general task of establishing legally-based,
transparent systems to control strategic trade, governments
should ensure that their systems are capable of controlling
"in-transit" goods, regulating brokering activities, and
conducting pre-license checks and post-shipment verification to
make sure that goods arrive and remain where they are intended.
An effective system should also have so-called "catch-all"
authority to provide the legal basis to stop items not contained
on any control list if they are headed to especially risky
destinations, and it should have rigorous enforcement mechanisms
with tough penalties for violators. And because we have entered a
stage where the most serious acts of proliferation may involve
transfers of know-how rather than hardware, it is crucial that
authorities have the ability to control technology, including
"intangible technology" that can be passed via the fax machine or
internet.
The United States has worked with several Asian countries to help
them develop and strengthen their export control systems, and we
are prepared to do more in that regard. Others with
well-developed control systems, including some in the Asian
region, are also ready to provide assistance. The multilateral
export control regimes are another possible source of support and
advice. Participating in some of those regimes, programs and
adopting their control lists and guidelines would be major steps
by Asian nations toward effective control of sensitive trade.
Conclusion
No security issue receives higher priority in Washington than
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their missile delivery systems. The nonproliferation challenges
of Asia will therefore remain high on the U.S. agenda in the
months and years ahead.
But nonproliferation is not just a U.S. concern. In terms of
security as well as commercial interests, the countries of Asia
have just as great a stake in the success of international
nonproliferation efforts as does the U.S. We therefore will look
to the countries of Asia to join us, as energetic and committed
partners, in countering the most dangerous threat the world will
face in the 21st century. And we fully count on Hong Kong to
continue showing us the way.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
