DATE=6/30/2000
TYPE=ON THE LINE
TITLE=ON THE LINE: THE CASE FOR MISSILE DEFENSE
NUMBER=1-00861
EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037
CONTENT=
THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE
Anncr: On the Line - a discussion of United
States policy and contemporary issues. This week,
"The Case for Missile Defense." Here is your host,
Robert Reilly.
Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line.
On July 7th, the United States will conduct its
next test of a national missile defense system.
Previous tests have produced mixed results. The
information provided by the new test will help
President Bill Clinton decide whether to proceed
with the preliminary stages of deployment.
Joining me today to discuss the case for missile
defense are three experts. Milnor Roberts, a
former major general in the U.S. Army, is
president of High Frontier, an educational
foundation promoting missile defense. Stephen
Young is deputy director of the Coalition to
Reduce Nuclear Dangers. Ivan Eland is director of
defense policy studies at the Cato Institute.
Gentleman, welcome to the program. Mr. Roberts, do
you think the United States is on the right track
today in developing missile defense?
Roberts: We are on the right track for
development. We are not on the right track for
deployment because of the policy of this
administration, which is not to deploy anything
along this line, with the exception of a statement
by Mr. Clinton within a last few weeks, which I
think was made for political reasons, to put a
defense in the Aleutian Islands, at a cost of,
according to the newspapers, sixty billion
dollars, which somebody must have gotten badly
twisted around. But anyway, that in some respects
would be better than nothing.
Host: But why deploy before the tests are
completed?
Roberts: Well, I do not think they would propose
to deploy before the test.
Host: You wouldn't either, would you?
Roberts: No. Assuming that the test would be
successful, it is not our choice anyway for
initial deployment of the missile defense. We
think it is far better to proceed with the Navy
system. Because the Navy cruisers and destroyers
which would have these defenses on them are
already there. The money has been spent for it.
Now you can put the system of missile defense on
these cruisers and destroyers, and deploy them
around the world wherever needed. And in fact, if
we had had one in the Sea of Japan, the Japanese
might have wanted to have one there when the North
Koreans fired that missile over them, which shook
them up pretty badly.
Host: Stephen Young, what do you think about the
current status of development and possible
deployment?
Young: Well, in my experience I think it is
pretty clear that this program is being rushed
ahead far too quickly. This is simply the third
test planned this July, of nineteen scheduled
tests. Yet Clinton has said he will decide this
fall whether or not to deploy this system. So I
think we are far too early in the game to decide
we should deploy this system, Primarily because we
don't know if it works or not. And not only are
Russia and China opposed, our allies at this point
are opposed as well. This is just going too
quickly.
Host: Let's say that the system did work, would
you oppose it or would be for it?
Young: Well, it is not the matter of the system
working or not. If the system works is one
question. And if the system did work, then perhaps
yes. But the problem is that you have to look at
the overall U.S. security. Would having a limited
defense, which is what this system is planned to
be against a small threat, be worth the cost in
terms of other threats to U.S. security? Russia
and China have been very clear that they will
react very negatively to U.S. plans to deploy
missile defenses. And the threat may actually
increase if we do that.
Host: I think you have just asked a great
question. Let's hear Ivan Eland answer it.
Eland: Well, I am for the system, but I also
agree with Stephen that we should not rush it. I
think every weapons system that we build, and this
is a very complex one, needs to be thoroughly
tested before we deploy it. I am for the land-
based system rather than for the sea-based system
because I have real concerns about [the fact] that
the navy system is a mid-course interceptor. And
they want to do a boost phase, which means when
the missile comes off the land. And that is much
more difficult. I think it is not going to be easy
to do. And the navy is going to want more ships.
And the ships cost a billion dollars. So, I have
questions about the navy system, but I am for a
land-based system. But I think it needs to be
thoroughly tested before we deploy it.
Host: We do not actually have the time to debate
which system ought to be deployed. I am sure that
everyone agrees that no one should deploy a system
that does not work. But is it fair to say there is
a consensus, because this is a Democratic
administration proposing national missile defense?
Is there a national consensus that United States
ought to move forward with a limited defense?
Roberts: Well, I think that Clinton has taken a
position, and I'm sure Gore will also, that yes we
do need missile defense because they realize
politically this is the thing to do. As far as the
prospective presidential candidate of the
Republican side, Bush, he has already come out and
said yes, he wants to see missile defenses, when
they are properly prepared, deployed.
Host: Does this mean, then, the United States
will have some form of limited missile defense
system?
Young: Well that's exactly the point. It is a
political question at this point. It's a campaign
issue. It's not an issue about U.S. security. It's
an issue about the U.S. campaign.
Host: But isn't it more than that? Hasn't a law
been passed requiring deployment by the year 2005?
Young: No. The 2005 is actually the date that the
Clinton administration says that a threat from
North Korea, which is the so-called rogue state,
formerly rogue state, now the state of concern,
might be able to have a missile that could hit the
U.S. with a long-range warhead. The fact that
Russia already has six thousand such warheads is
being ignored in the debate almost entirely. The
decision being made this fall is a political
decision trying to protect Clinton and Gore from
attacks on the right. And the fact that there
might be, down on the road, a new limited threat
to the U.S., at that point, if we had a system
that worked, it might make sense to deploy it. But
we are not there yet.
Eland: I think a consensus is building for a
limited missile defense. I think, like Stephen
says, that the 2005 date is really artificial. But
I think things have been moving in the political
arena towards a limited missile defense. I do
think it is important, maybe it is past the scope
of this show, but it's very important as to what
kind of defense we get. There have been all sorts
of proposals from Bush for a more comprehensive
defense to Clinton's more limited defense, towards
a sea-based option. So, I think we are going to
have to face that issue at some point in the
future.
Roberts: We really need a boost phase defense to
be most practical. A boost phase defense
intercepts that missile while it's on the way up
or it's up to its apogee, rather than trying to
knock it down on descent. And for that reason we
favor a laser system, an airborne, space-based or
an airborne laser in a [Boeing] 747, which is less
practical. But if you have laser defenses in
space, then you do not have to be concerned about
being at right place at right time, as you would
with airplane. And this system has been tested and
a lot of money has been spent on it. It has not
been perfected yet but, in our opinion, we ought
to have boost phase defense first. We think that
is better. I think you gentlemen agree with that
one, boost phase defense?
Eland: No, I would not agree with that. I think
there are problems with the mid-course defense
because you have to discriminate the warheads that
come off. One missile can generate many warheads.
Host: That's why he asked, are you for boost
phase?
Eland: But I am not. I think there are problems
with the mid-course phase defense. But I think
there are also a lot of problems with boost phase.
I think putting stuff into space is extremely
expensive, and I do not think it is justified by
the eliminated threat. I propose a limited defense
for a limited threat. That is what I propose.
Host: Let's talk about the threat because that's
what this is supposed to be in response to. Where
is that threat coming from?
Young: The current totals are roughly that the
Soviet Union, now Russia, still has about six
thousand long-range warheads on submarine-launched
missiles and bombers that could hit the U.S.
within fifteen minutes to two hours, depending on
how it is delivered. China has perhaps twenty
long-range missiles that could hit the U.S. with a
single warhead each. This system is not in theory
designed to respond to either of those threats,
but to even smaller threats from a country like
North Korea, which has yet to even launch a single
missile that could hit the U.S. with a nuclear
warhead. They have a development program. That
program is currently frozen in negotiations with
the U.S. And it may actually never develop. Just
last week North Korea and South Korea had their
first ever summit between the two countries. There
is a good chance that the threat the system is
designed to respond to may never emerge.
Eland: I think that just because the North Korean
leader smiled into the camera -- I do not want to
overstate the North Korean threat, but I do think
there is a threat of accidental launch from rogue
nations, which I think we may want to invest a
certain amount of money to combat. I am not for
spending a lot of money on this, because, as I
said, I think the threat is limited and it does
not cover bombs smuggled into a port on a ship or
delivered by an aircraft, or whatever. And those
are more likely threats than a missile. But I do
think there is some threat and we should have some
expense to combat it.
Roberts: The thing that has happened are third
world missiles; everybody wants missiles. Iraq,
Iran -- you name it around the world. And in some
cases, they are getting weapons of mass
destruction, not limited to nuclear, chemical, or
biological. The Israelis now have got some
protection -- the only people in the world who
have it. That is the Arrow System that has been
put in place in Israel, eighty percent financed by
the United States. It's a land-base system very
similar to THAAD. THAD is a theater high altitude
air defense that we were talking about for the
Aleutians. And so they have got one.
The Chinese are threatening Taiwan. They have got
coastal batteries right along the coast a hundred
and twenty miles away. North Korea has threatened
Japan. So there are threats around the world. So
the idea of not progressing to develop an
effective system does not make any sense for our
security or the security of our allies.
Eland: I think we need to -- when we say national
missile defense that does not sound like a
national missile defense to me. That sounds like
an international missile defense. I would prefer
to create a more limited system that will address
U.S. concerns. And if other countries want to
develop systems, like Israel or whatever -
Israel's is more of a theater system -- but if
other countries want to develop their own national
systems, that is fine. I think the U.S. should
fund a limited system that protects our territory.
Host: Let me just quickly ask a question about
that because isn't one of the objections made by
the allies of the United States in Western Europe
that "your system," that is the national missile
defense, "only protects the United States and it
won't protect us"?
Young: Precisely.
Eland: I think that is one of the objections that
they make. But I mean we have provided their
security for a long time. We contributed heavily
to their security. I think it is time that they
were more independent. And if they want to fund a
system like this, then they can pay for it.
Roberts: I think we can protect them if we wanted
to do and they agree to it. Britain is upset about
the idea of putting a radar installation, assuming
one of these programs went forward, into the
British Isles. And I do not blame them for being
concerned because that would be, in effect,
inviting some reprisal against them. On the other
hand, I think they are concerned about the
possibilities of rockets with nuclear warheads or
other weapons, chemical and biological. I think
they would look with favor if we can establish a
very effective defense, which would protect them
as well as ourselves.
Eland: There is a vast difference in expenditures
if you are protecting them because you have to use
space-based assets, and they cost a lot of money.
I think a layered space-based system, for instance
that presidential candidate [George] Bush was
talking about, would cost up to two hundred
billion [dollars], whereas the Clinton
administration's program would cost thirty to
sixty [billion]. And so it is much cheaper to
build a defense that will defend [only] our own
country.
Host: I now want to ask Stephen Young. We have
talked about the allies. What about the concerns
Russia raised in the recent summit between
President Clinton and President [Vladimir] Putin?
And what about the Chinese reaction to this
prospective deployment?
Stephen: Both have been very, very negative and
strongly opposed. And the wild card is China, as
you indicated. There are real questions about what
China would do. China currently has a very small
arsenal, perhaps twenty long-range missiles. It is
not very modern. It is actually liquid fueled
missiles that don't even have the warhead on them.
It is hours or even days from delivery. If the
U.S. built a missile defense system, trying to
intercept a small number of missiles, as China
already has, in order to preserve its deterrent,
China might be likely to increase its arsenal
greatly, perhaps to go to forty, sixty, eighty, or
two hundred warheads. Who knows how much they
could do if they were forced to by U.S. defenses?
So, in fact, by building defenses, the U.S. would
actually increase the threat to itself.
Roberts: Many people, including ourselves, feel
that we ought to tell the A-B-M treaty "bye-bye."
Host: China is not a member of that treaty.
Roberts: I know.
Host: Could you respond to Mr. Young's point on
that. Would defending ourselves provoke China into
this huge buildup?
Roberts: I am not sure it would provoke them. I
think they are planning to do it anyway. They
certainly have stolen or otherwise acquired our
latest technology. Are they doing that for fun?
No.
Eland: I think the Chinese are modernizing their
arsenal anyway. Even if there is a reaction by
China, even up to two hundred warheads, we have
six thousand warheads. They are not going to be
competing with us like the Soviet Union was during
the Cold War because I do not think they ever had
any inclination to do that. And so, I think even
if there is a reaction to our limited defense, it
would be fifty to one-hundred warheads. And that
certainly is not the six-thousand warheads we
have. But I think they are going to modernize
their arsenal no matter what.
Host: The Under Secretary of Defense, Walter
Slocombe, made the point that a limited defense
system might dissuade a country with a nuclear
arsenal from checking the United States in a
certain region where we would wish to deploy
troops because they could not convincingly deter
us with the threat of a nuclear strike.
Young: This is an ironic thing. In fact, in my
book, if North Korea, for example, wants to attack
us with a nuclear warhead, please use a missile.
It's most likely to fail. If they decide to attack
us, and put it on a boat or on a plane, it is
going to get here and Americans are going to die
because we have no defense possible against that.
If you use a missile, it is going to be more
likely to fail by itself than any other attack you
could possibly use. In that scenario, they are
just not likely to use a missile. They have not
been tested. They don't have a program. The fact
is that the U.S. has never been deterred by
anybody because we have such vast superior forces,
conventional and nuclear. During the [Persian]
Gulf war, Iraq did not use chemical and biological
weapons because the U.S. would wipe out Iraq if
they did. That is very clear.
Host: But at the same time Iraq was not in a
position to hit the mainland of the United States.
Eland: No, not at the time. I think that is a
significant difference. However, I think we ought
to question the U.S. intervention in the first
place. The reason that a lot of these countries
are developing long-range missiles is because they
are afraid of U.S. intervention. So aren't we
contributing to the proliferation of long-range
missiles? I mean, they would develop intermediate-
range or short-range missiles to deal with
countries in their theater. But why are they
developing long-range missiles? Because they are
afraid of U.S. intervention. I think we really
need to ask: is our strategic interest served by
doing all these interventions? Isn't it leading to
the proliferation that every one is scared about?
Host: Let me just you this question, General
Roberts. By not building a missile defense, isn't
the United States inviting rogue nations or
nations of concern to construct missiles?
Roberts: The primary concern is rogue nations or
an accidental launch. There was an accidental
launch in Siberia about five years ago. It
traveled several thousand miles. So to remain
defenseless against any kind of missile attack,
when we do have the resources -- it would cost
money -- but we want to defend this country
against the possibility of a rogue nation, an
accidental launch, or, God help us, a deliberate
attack by the Chinese. It isn't likely, but they
have got the capability.
Eland: I think the accidental launch is the real
reason to build this. I am not convinced that we
can deter rogue state leaders just like we deter
everyone else. Getting incinerated by the most
powerful nuclear arsenal in the world, I do not
think, keeps any leader in power. I think they
will be deterred by our offensive deterrent. I
think a limited defense is a back-up system in
case that somehow would fail and also, more
importantly, for an accidental launch. These
countries do not have well-developed nuclear
doctrines. They do not have nuclear weapons or
long-range missiles yet. But when they get them,
their nuclear doctrine will be non-existent, and
the safeguards will be limited, and they won't
have a good command and control.
Host: Just very quick question and reaction from
you. Can the United States develop a limited
national missile defense with a modified A-B-M
treaty, or should the United States withdraw?
Roberts: I think we would have to give them six
months notice and withdraw.
Host: Stephen Young, what do you think?
Stephen: It is possible and it is better than the
alternative of withdrawing. But I still think it
is the wrong course entirely.
Eland: I think we need to amend the treaty
because I think we do need to consider that Russia
is still the only society that can wipe out our
society with nuclear weapons. They are the only
country that can do it. And I think we really need
to pay some attention to their sensitivities.
Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have
this week. I would like to thank our guests -
Milnor Roberts from High Frontier; Stephen Young
from the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers; and
Ivan Eland from the Cato Institute - for joining
me to discuss the case for missile defense. This
is Robert Reilly for On the Line.
Anncr: You've been listening to "On the Line" - a
discussion of United States policies and
contemporary issues. This is --------.
30-Jun-2000 14:01 PM EDT (30-Jun-2000 1801 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
