DATE=5/30/2000
TYPE=BACKGROUND REPORT
TITLE=MISSILE DEFENSE-TWO
NUMBER=5-46402
BYLINE=ED WARNER
DATELINE=WASHINGTON
CONTENT=
VOICED AT:
INTRO: The debate in the United States over ballistic
missile defense concerns both its technology and its
strategic impact. Supporters are sure it will work;
critics say it will not. Supporters contend it is
crucial to protect the United States against rogue
states that may eventually acquire long-range nuclear
missiles. Critics say that threat is much
exaggerated. In this second segment of a three-part
series, V-O-A's Ed Warner reports on the debate.
TEXT: The confidence of supporters of ballistic
missile defense is matched only by the skepticism of
opponents.
Jack Spencer, defense and national security analyst at
the Heritage Foundation, a Washington research group,
is fully confident:
/// Spencer Act ///
I feel we are technologically able right now to
move ahead with missile defense. The only thing
stopping us now is a policy decision. Once the
policy is made to go forward with missile
defense, and all the constraints on testing and
developing all missile defense systems are
lifted, then our scientists and technicians can
move ahead, applying technologies that exist
today to field the most effective ballistic
missile defense system.
/// End Act ///
Barry Blechman -- Chairman of the Stimson Center,
another Washington research group -- has his doubts
about a large-scale system, but is confident a more
modest one will work:
/// Blechman Act ///
The technology is maturing to the point where we
can defend ourselves effectively and reliably
against very small missile threats, the kind of
threat that could be posed by North Korea or
Iran in the not too distant future. It is better
to defend yourself if the technology is at hand
than to try to deter an attack, which is the way
we deal with a much larger Russian force.
/// End Act ///
As one who has closely studied nuclear weapons issues,
Mr. Blechman says continuing to rely on deterrence in
an increasingly fragmented world with a variety of
irrational rulers is highly dangerous.
Still, skeptics of missile defense point out that
deterrence has worked and ask why should it not work
in the future. Does a country want to commit suicide
by launching a missile at the United States, they ask.
Retaliation would be swift and massive.
It would be a crazy act, says Kurt Gottfried, chairman
of the Union of Concerned Scientists and professor of
physics at Cornell University:
/// Gottfried Act ///
We would know before it landed where it came
from. We have satellites that have missile
launch information within less than a minute of
launch with very high reliability. So using
other means of delivery -- say a cruise missile
launched from a merchant ship from a few hundred
miles offshore -- would be much more accurate,
and we might not know who did it.
/// End act ///
The missile threat is overblown, says Joseph
Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project
at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington. He points
out that the number of long-range missiles in the
world has been reduced by half in the last 15 years.
He says a mere handful of states are trying to develop
such weapons, and adds that it is a very demanding
technology.
Even more demanding is the technology to defend
against them:
/// Cirincione Act ///
It is simply too easy for an adversary to fool
or to overwhelm the kind of land-based system
the president wants to deploy. It attempts to
find and target warheads in the cold of outer
space when they are surrounded by hundreds of
decoy objects. It is a very, very difficult
mission. I personally doubt that the system can
ever be made to work, even though preliminary
test results might indicate that we can do some
of the simple tasks.
/// End act ///
Many physicists emphasize the difficulty of
distinguishing among decoys such as dozens of
aluminum-coated balloons, only one of which carries a
nuclear warhead.
Theodore Postol, a weapons expert and physicist at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M-I-T), charges
the U-S Defense Department has deliberately covered up
test results showing an inability of the system to
detect decoys. The Defense Department says Mr. Postol
lacks the information to make such a charge.
There is pressure to deploy the system before it has
been proved to work, says Professor Gottfried. He
notes proponents insist: "We have to learn to crawl
before we run:"
/// Gottfried Act ///
That is a fine description of a research and
development program, but it is not a description
of a deployment program. You do not put a plane
into the deployed air force if you are not sure
it is going to be able to land after it takes
off. You only do that after you have gone
through enough testing to make sure the pilot
will come back alive -- in peacetime. I'm not
even talking in wartime.
/// End Act ///
Jack Spencer responds that the scientists are not
being very scientific when they condemn the system for
test failures to date:
/// Spencer Act ///
They call it a failure because it missed the
warhead. Now granted, it did miss the warhead,
but that was only the second in a series of 19
tests. What we are talking about is a very
complex system. It has to be tested many times.
There will be more misses, but with each test
you learn and you learn and you learn.
/// End Act ///
But critics ask if the lesson will ever be learned.
(Signed)
NEB/EW/JP
30-May-2000 13:39 PM EDT (30-May-2000 1739 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
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