Subject: Re: How prompt should [spysat] BDA be?
From: thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson)
Date: 1996/09/17
Message-Id: <thomsonaDxvy9J.sC@netcom.com>
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military,sci.military.naval,sci.space.policy
In article <51kqmg$gbu@news.asu.edu> aufsj@imap2.asu.edu writes:
>Allen Thomson (thomsona@netcom.com) wrote:
>: A question has come up here about how soon after an attack like the
>: first one in Desert Strike the US likes to get BDA imagery. Basically
>: the issue is whether significant effort is made to get pictures promptly
>: (minutes to tens of minutes) after the attack. I'd assume the answer might
>: be different for SAR, which can see through post-attack dust and smoke than
>: for optical systems, which can't.
>: If anyone has any real but unclassified information which bears on this
>: question, I'd appreciate seeing it.
> Well, everyone *likes* it immediately and with certainty
>(like all intelligence). But at what expense, and at what
>priority? That is a very controversial matter.
[various acts of excision committed on subsequent quoted text]
> Having said that, I will toss out the "It depends" caveat.
>In the case of a preplanned strike modern technology/
>capabilities virtually always allow for the planning of an
>overlap of the combat and a coverage window. This is typical
>because most such strikes are technology demonstrators and
>provide data for statistical studies (especially if it works!).
This is really the essence of the present question. If you
look at the table of coverage by putative optical/IR and radar
reconnaissance satellites at the end of this message, you can
see that spysat BDA after the two Desert Strike attacks wasn't
"prompt" on the timescale of minutes to tens of minutes. Indeed,
the first pass was about an hour and half after the missiles
hit.
One school in the discussion holds that the lack of morning
coverage and the age of the radar satellites may indicate that
the system is somewhat broken (or that the system is more
extensive than generally recognized). The other school holds
that reasonable explanations can be found for the
constellation's configuration and that the observed interval
between strike and BDA is normal, acceptable, and not indicative
of anything out of the ordinary. A third possibility is, of
course, that there were aircraft or UAVs around to provide
"prompt" BDA, with the satellites filling in the gaps later.
(Disclosure of bias: I tend to the "this looks strange" side,
but the "this looks not unreasonable" party has good arguments
too. Hence the call for facts and insight concerning real-
world BDA practices.)
> If a target is considered important enough to hit again if it
>isn't destroyed the first time, and is protected well enough to
>make losses a good possibility, then BDA is considered important
>because it will allow commanders to avoid risking a re-strike.
>Really important targets usually merit their own tasked aircraft
>(if manned aircraft are used) to do the BDA. If aircraft are
>not available, however, national systems will usually give such
>targets a high priority.
Yes, it's what this would have meant in the Desert Strike
context that's of interest. Would one have expected prompt
aircraft coverage, keeping in mind that some of the targets were
SAM sites and might not have been destroyed? Or, if aircraft
were not used, would the strike have been expected to be timed
closer to the time of good satellite radar and optical/IR
coverage (i.e., noon and after)?
> In less time-critical cases BDA tasking is done on an as
>available basis. Modern air campaigns (our kind) run on
>"cycles" and the length of a cycle will determine to a large
>extent how routine BDA is tasked. In the case of a "lengthy"
>(several day) systematic attack, BDA usually becomes much less
>of a factor.
Desert Strike I and II were on a short cycle -- ca. twenty
hours between them. What does this imply about BDA
requirements?
> Imagery tasking is *fairly* straightforward. Coverage times
>for national systems are usually not adjustable, and in this day
>and age it is not a matter of collecting enough data, but rather
>analyzing it.
Presumably planning for at least the first strike included
consideration of BDA collection and analysis. Your observation
that the LEO spysats can't be maneuvered radically in short
periods of time -- the radar satellites apparently not at all,
the optical ones only at the expense of considerable reduction
in available fuel -- is important. If there is to be any
coordination between strike and overpass, it's the strike that
has to be adjusted to the satellites' schedule, rather than
vice-versa. This is thesis of a (profoundly important, IMHO)
paper in the Russian General Staff journal "Military Thought" in
October 1992.
Here's a table of overflights of Iraq during Desert Strike I
and II. USA 86 and USA 116 are in orbits characteristic of
optical/IR systems, the Lacrosses are believed on the basis of
RUMINT to be synthetic aperture radar imagers (AFAIK, there
aren't any other good SAR candidates among the classified LEO
satellites).
TRAKSAT Version 2.80
Analytical Solution
Tracking Station: AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ
[ Line Of Sight (LOS) Visibility ]
Input File: SPYSAT.TXT
Twenty degree horizon mask assumed for radar satellites;
zero degrees for optical/IR
Satellite UTC Time Local Time Azimuth Max Min Duration
Date HR:MN:SC Date HR:MN:SC Ele Range HR:MN:SC
TWILIGHT/NIGHT
Lacrosse 1 01Sep96 16:53:04 01Sep96 20:53:04 NW TO SE 78 676 00:13:04
USA 86 01Sep96 20:22:39 02Sep96 00:22:39 SE TO N 18 1055 00:08:39
Lacrosse 2 01Sep96 21:16:40 02Sep96 01:16:40 N TO SE 63 732 00:13:40
USA 116 01Sep96 21:48:45 02Sep96 01:48:45 S TO NW 27 552 00:07:45
USA 86 01Sep96 22:01:27 02Sep96 02:01:27 SW TO NW 9 1468 00:07:27
------------------------FIRST STRIKE ~ 09:30 LOCAL----------------------------
DAYTIME
Lacrosse 1 02Sep96 07:04:49 02Sep96 11:04:49 S TO NE 32 1110 00:13:49
USA 116 02Sep96 08:06:53 02Sep96 12:06:53 NE TO SE 3 3194 00:07:53
USA 86 02Sep96 08:26:11 02Sep96 12:26:11 NE TO SE 18 2061 00:14:11
Lacrosse 1 02Sep96 08:46:26 02Sep96 12:46:26 SW TO NE 27 1240 00:12:26
USA 116 02Sep96 09:39:36 02Sep96 13:39:36 N TO S 53 1091 00:15:36
USA 86 02Sep96 10:03:17 02Sep96 14:03:17 N TO SW 52 1121 00:15:17
USA 116 02Sep96 11:16:43 02Sep96 15:16:43 N TO SW 18 1977 00:13:43
Lacrosse 2 02Sep96 11:29:39 02Sep96 15:29:39 SW TO N 58 776 00:13:39
USA 86 02Sep96 11:44:05 02Sep96 15:44:05 NW TO W 3 3070 00:07:05
TWILIGHT/NIGHT
Lacrosse 1 02Sep96 15:41:48 02Sep96 19:41:48 NW TO SE 26 1262 00:12:48
Lacrosse 1 02Sep96 17:23:17 02Sep96 21:23:17 NW TO S 33 1079 00:13:17
USA 86 02Sep96 19:33:20 02Sep96 23:33:20 E TO NE 1 2229 00:03:20
USA 116 02Sep96 20:35:54 03Sep96 00:35:54 SE TO N 6 1312 00:05:54
USA 86 02Sep96 21:07:15 03Sep96 01:07:15 S TO N 73 441 00:10:15
Lacrosse 2 02Sep96 21:48:55 03Sep96 01:48:55 NW TO S 38 1010 00:13:55
USA 116 02Sep96 22:11:50 03Sep96 02:11:50 SW TO NW 10 1065 00:06:50
----------------------SECOND STRIKE ~ 05:30 LOCAL-----------------------------
DAYTIME
Lacrosse 1 03Sep96 07:34:14 03Sep96 11:34:14 SW TO NE 81 670 00:13:14
USA 86 03Sep96 07:37:01 03Sep96 11:37:01 NE TO E 2 3302 00:06:01
USA 116 03Sep96 08:27:35 03Sep96 12:27:35 NE TO SE 9 2652 00:11:35
USA 86 03Sep96 09:10:45 03Sep96 13:10:45 N TO S 50 1145 00:16:45
USA 116 03Sep96 10:02:02 03Sep96 14:02:02 N TO S 87 905 00:16:02
Lacrosse 2 03Sep96 10:21:52 03Sep96 14:21:52 S TO NE 33 1077 00:13:52
USA 86 03Sep96 10:49:17 03Sep96 14:49:17 N TO SW 19 1969 00:13:17
USA 116 03Sep96 11:39:55 03Sep96 15:39:55 N TO SW 10 2458 00:11:55
TWILIGHT/NIGHT
Lacrosse 1 03Sep96 16:11:48 03Sep96 20:11:48 NW TO SE 73 681 00:13:48
USA 86 03Sep96 20:15:35 04Sep96 00:15:35 SE TO N 15 1211 00:08:35
Lacrosse 2 03Sep96 20:40:37 04Sep96 00:40:37 N TO SE 51 813 00:13:37
USA 116 03Sep96 20:57:23 04Sep96 00:57:23 SE TO N 17 810 00:07:23
USA 86 03Sep96 21:53:35 04Sep96 01:53:35 SW TO NW 12 1311 00:08:35
USA 116 03Sep96 22:35:32 04Sep96 02:35:32 SW TO NW 3 1605 00:04:32
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