Subject: Former D/NRO on NRO management practices From: thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson) Date: 1995/11/30 Message-Id: <thomsonaDIvr3I.Mx1@netcom.com> Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,alt.politics.org.cia Here's the promised section on NRO management practices from John McLucas' paper at a recent (US)AF Historical Foundation symposium. Mr. McLucas was D/NRO in the early 70s. Space Policy - A Personal Assessment by John L. McLucas Given at the Session on The U.S. Military Space Program Since 1961 USAF Air Force Historical Foundation Symposium on Space Andrews Air Force Base September 21-22, 1995 [excerpted with author's permission] ...NRO's Corona program was giving us the knowledge necessary for the high-level policy discussions on just where we stood vis-a- vis the Soviet threat. We could pursue our ICBM and FBM [SLBM] programs with confidence that we were not being hopelessly outdone by the Russians. Because of NRO's special classified treatment, not as many people had access to its products as would have been desirable, so there were both good and bad effects of creating something called NRO. Creation of the NRO in 1961 at the end of the Eisenhower term established a de facto separate space activity to which various layers of the military had only limited access. The NRO modus oprandi developed a technique of streamlined procurement which was worthwhile in its own right. But it also bifurcated the military space program, taking a huge bite out of total space activity and shrinking the amount of space work still under normal military development procedures and control. I believe that this arrangement -- while accomplishing its main purpose of expediting space intelligence gathering -- had a lot to do with turning off many senior Air Force military from spending enough thought, time, energy and effort on what space had to offer the regular Air Force. The NRO has always been controversial. About two years ago I wrote a paper on "Lessons Learned through Thirty Years of NRO Management". Before writing it, I canvassed several senior Air Force officials to get their views on the advantages and disadvantages of having created the NRO when we did. By and large, they supported the need for the NRO but cited several serious disadvantages to having done what we did. The summary list follows. Good features of NRO: 1. Ability to move swiftly 2. Stable budgets and generally well-managed programs within budgets (smaller overruns) 3. Ability to offset AF tendency to short-change space programs 4. Staffing continuity, good corporate memory 5. Limited visibility to nay-sayers, thus achieving efficiency 6. Generally high quality people 7. Loyalty of staff: many people stayed with the program at the cost of promotions 8. Staff included multi-service representation, providing benefits to other services 9. Some progress on TENCAP (tactical exploitation of national capabilities) Not-so-good or negative features of NRO 1. Split space program when unified program would have been better (conceptually) 2. Allowed CIA to dominate collection activities including building hardware 3. Frequently overclassified work, resulting in too little distribution of results 4. Hamstrung AF learning how to apply space assets to tactical needs 5. Bred jealousy and negative attitudes in some key AF people 6. Some viewed NRO as extravagant with too easy access to funds While there were many good results from creating NRO, especially in its success at delivering the necessary intelligence to its customers, it obviously was not all positive. The pros and cons of NRO management practices and NRO procurement procedures versus standard Air Force practice have not, in my view, ever been properly debated and resolved. I understand John Deutch had plans to conduct such a review before he changed jobs to head the CIA. It remains to be seen whether he or anyone else will take an initiative to change the NRO. (The subject has come up in recent discussions about reorganizing space responsibilities and decisions to create a space architect but I know of no pending review.)
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