Subject: Former D/NRO on NRO management practices
From: thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson)
Date: 1995/11/30
Message-Id: <thomsonaDIvr3I.Mx1@netcom.com>
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,alt.politics.org.cia
Here's the promised section on NRO management practices from
John McLucas' paper at a recent (US)AF Historical Foundation
symposium. Mr. McLucas was D/NRO in the early 70s.
Space Policy - A Personal Assessment
by John L. McLucas
Given at the Session on The U.S. Military Space
Program Since 1961
USAF Air Force Historical Foundation
Symposium on Space
Andrews Air Force Base
September 21-22, 1995
[excerpted with author's permission]
...NRO's Corona program was giving us the knowledge necessary for
the high-level policy discussions on just where we stood vis-a-
vis the Soviet threat. We could pursue our ICBM and FBM [SLBM]
programs with confidence that we were not being hopelessly
outdone by the Russians. Because of NRO's special classified
treatment, not as many people had access to its products as
would have been desirable, so there were both good and bad
effects of creating something called NRO.
Creation of the NRO in 1961 at the end of the Eisenhower term
established a de facto separate space activity to which various
layers of the military had only limited access. The NRO modus
oprandi developed a technique of streamlined procurement which
was worthwhile in its own right. But it also bifurcated the
military space program, taking a huge bite out of total space
activity and shrinking the amount of space work still under
normal military development procedures and control. I believe
that this arrangement -- while accomplishing its main purpose of
expediting space intelligence gathering -- had a lot to do with
turning off many senior Air Force military from spending enough
thought, time, energy and effort on what space had to offer the
regular Air Force.
The NRO has always been controversial. About two years ago I
wrote a paper on "Lessons Learned through Thirty Years of NRO
Management". Before writing it, I canvassed several senior Air
Force officials to get their views on the advantages and
disadvantages of having created the NRO when we did. By and
large, they supported the need for the NRO but cited several
serious disadvantages to having done what we did. The summary
list follows.
Good features of NRO:
1. Ability to move swiftly
2. Stable budgets and generally well-managed programs within
budgets (smaller overruns)
3. Ability to offset AF tendency to short-change space programs
4. Staffing continuity, good corporate memory
5. Limited visibility to nay-sayers, thus achieving efficiency
6. Generally high quality people
7. Loyalty of staff: many people stayed with the program at the
cost of promotions
8. Staff included multi-service representation, providing
benefits to other services
9. Some progress on TENCAP (tactical exploitation of national
capabilities)
Not-so-good or negative features of NRO
1. Split space program when unified program would have been
better (conceptually)
2. Allowed CIA to dominate collection activities including
building hardware
3. Frequently overclassified work, resulting in too little
distribution of results
4. Hamstrung AF learning how to apply space assets to tactical
needs
5. Bred jealousy and negative attitudes in some key AF people
6. Some viewed NRO as extravagant with too easy access to funds
While there were many good results from creating NRO, especially
in its success at delivering the necessary intelligence to its
customers, it obviously was not all positive. The pros and cons
of NRO management practices and NRO procurement procedures
versus standard Air Force practice have not, in my view, ever
been properly debated and resolved.
I understand John Deutch had plans to conduct such a review
before he changed jobs to head the CIA. It remains to be seen
whether he or anyone else will take an initiative to change the
NRO. (The subject has come up in recent discussions about
reorganizing space responsibilities and decisions to create a
space architect but I know of no pending review.)
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