Subject: Satellite vulnerability: a view from the USAF
From: thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson)
Date: 1995/11/22
Message-Id: <thomsonaDIGsG3.I99@netcom.com>
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,alt.war,alt.politics.org.cia
Thanks for D_Day for calling my attention to this article. Of
course, I let my membership in the USNI lapse this year...
We Can Reduce Satellite Vulnerability
by Major Jeffrey L. Caton, U.S. Air Force
Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute
November, 1995, pp. 81-83
[excerpts]
Can the United States cope with a space war of attrition?
Recent experience indicates that it cannot. During the Falklands
Conflict, the Soviet Union launched 29 satellites within 69 days
-- an extraordinary surge capability. In contrast, it took the
United States 113 days to replace a defense weather satellite
after an emergency call.
Future regional conflicts may be won or lost in much less
time -- and the United States cannot afford to assume that its
space assets will be left untouched: planners must consider
satellite attrition.
We took for granted that our satellites were not attacked
during Operation Desert Storm, the first space war. Military
satellites were the first systems on scene, and they supported
Coalition missions that included theater ballistic missile
defense, Scud hunting, interdiction missions, navigation and
intratheater and intertheater communications.
Military operations will continue to depend heavily on
support provided by satellites... but present U.S. space systems
are neither responsive nor flexible enough for the future,
especially if confronted with an adversary that has space
capabilities...
On-orbit reconstitution and rapid space force reconstitution
are two current options [to address the problem]...
On-orbit Reconstitution[:] [The concept of] on-orbit storage
and repositioning is flawed... [because it] makes the spares as
vulnerable as the active satellites. Enemy space forces can
monitor and selectively target critical satellites and take them
out at once.
[Several other lesser disadvantages of on-orbit spares
deleted.]
Rapid Space Force Reconstitution[:] ... General Thomas
Moorman, vice chief of staff of the Air Force, noted in 1992
that "our current launch vehicles and their associated processes
do not provide the responsiveness needed to rapidly replace or
augment on-orbit assets." In addition to being too slow, the
U.S. launch infrastructure is vulnerable, inflexible, and
expensive.
This shortfall points to the need for a rapid-response
spacelift system as an essential element of future combat
forces. The development of rapid response space-lift could
change fundamentally U.S. space operations, but only if it is
coupled with a parallel change from complex, heavy, long-life
satellites called LightSats.
In war fighting terms, the big satellites are like B-17s in
space: self-defending [sic; ???], capable -- and easy targets
for a determined foe. In contrast, the use of LightSats coupled
with a rapid-response spacelift system could dramatically
increase space combat capability. This combination of
systems -- rapid-response spacelift and LightSats -- is rapid
space force reconstitution.
The U.S. military's growing dependence on space systems
presents a vulnerability that a competent foe cannot afford to
ignore. Planners and commanders must recognize that the
operating conditions in space will change significantly in the
future. Lieutenant General S. Bogdanov, chief of the former
Soviet Union general staff's operational research center, points
out that because "Iraq did not have the necessary
countermeasures, U.S. space means functioned under test-bed
conditions." Simply put, no one challenged our high ground
during Desert Storm. This was an anomaly; more potential
adversaries are gaining space capability.
[Much discussion of the advantages of Pegasus- and Taurus-
like launch vehicles and compatible smallsats deleted.]
In choosing the status quo approach to spacelift, the
Pentagon is sentencing spacelift to remain unresponsive and man-
power-intensive into the 21st century... Future studies
concerning spacelift options, especially those that make cost
the primary measure of merit, also must consider the
consequences faced by peacetime space systems in a combat
environment.
Major Caton is Deputy Commander, Space Control Center Delta
Crew, U.S. Space Command, Cheyenne Mountain Air Station,
Colorado. He has served as Chief, Launch Vehicle Test Branch,
6595th Test and Evaluation Branch at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California, where he directed test operations for the small ICBM,
Peacekeeper, Minuteman and the Taurus space launch vehicle. A
graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB,
Alabama, the author condensed this article from a detailed
research paper (AU-ARI-94-4) published by the Air University
Press.
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