Subject: Congressional oversight of NRO
From: thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson)
Date: 1995/08/28
Message-Id: <thomsonaDE1KzG.AzG@netcom.com>
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,alt.politics.org.cia
The recent discussion here and in e-mail about the degree to which
the NRO does or does not have adequate congressional oversight prompted
me to reread the transcript* of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) hearing concerning the miniflap over NRO's new
headquarters at Westfields near Dulles airport. Several of the comments
of the senators, all serving members of the committee, are apposite;
I've made some comments which are enclosed in curly {brackets}.
Sen. DeConcini, Chairman
(p.1)
... The price tag of this headquarter complex is about $350 million.
And the minimal -- and I emphasize minimal -- notification to this
Committee by the NRO has outraged this member.
(p.77)
But to present to you what complaints, if any we had, in the spirit
of good will that you [Roger Marsh, Director of NRO Management
Services] mention here and that you mention, Mr. Hill [DD/NRO] and
Mr. Harris [D/NRO] that you want a better relationship. So do we [the
SSCI]. But it is no secret to anybody that I think the relationship is
pretty lousy.
Sen. Warner, Vice-Chairman
(p.7):
We simply do not have, nor should we have, the institutional
infrastructure in the Congress to go over every single item in the
detail that is necessary. It is incumbent upon the Executive branch to
be forthcoming in providing those budget details. We do not have, as I
said, the resources to conduct in-depth investigations on every item in
the budget.
(p.23)
...quite candidly, I do believe the shortcoming [in this affair] is on
the Executive branch side, some perhaps on the Congress, but certainly
on the Executive branch -- for not being more forthcoming in details.
I mean we put it in Committee reports, our staff repeatedly asked
questions. And maybe if we asked them [NRO officials] particular
specific questions, the answer came, but not the broader picture to
enable the relatively small staffs in the Congress, compared to those
in Executive branch, to analyze in sufficient manner and perform our
responsibility to the satisfaction to the Members of this Committee, and
indeed the Senate as a whole.
{This illustrates parts of the problem; the committee staffs are
relatively small, generally overworked, and frequently not
substantive experts. If programs are hidden in other budget lines,
if questions always answered in the narrowest possible terms, then
it's going to be very difficult for the Congress to find out what's
going on. On top of that, if staff access is effectively denied
for some "waived" programs, the situation becomes hopeless -- which
is the desired result.}
Sen. Metzenbaum
(p.8 ff):
...this project is a good example of what happens when a government
does business in the dark. I think we need to understand how the culture
of secrecy eats away at people's common sense and warps even the most
sensible efforts...
{Quite correct. The walls around the "security enclave," to
use John Pike's term, are at least as effective in keeping reality
out as secrets in. One of the frightening things one sees inside the
black world is the degree to which presumably initially sane people
come to accept the most bizarrely, ah, contrafactual, notions.}
We in this committee were not allowed to say the NRO's name or even
the initials, even though the press knew about it and wrote about it. We
play the most stupid games in the intelligence area of probably any
governmental agency around...
[The NRO has wonderful achievements, satellites and aircraft, to its
credit, b]ut these benefits did not come without significant costs. One
cost was a cozy relationship between the NRO and a small group of major
contractors. At times the relationship has been abused. Some programs
have had truly horrendous cost overruns and have taken far too many
years. And my guess is that many of the cost overruns and many of the
expenditures are totally unknown to any Member of this Congress. Even
that was a secret from the Members of the Congress, and certainly from
the American people.
Another cost has been the culture of secrecy, a belief that the best
way the NRO could serve the country was to minimize all outside
interference. That belief was rooted in the NRO's successes, but it also
reflects an arrogance and a close-mindedness that is, frankly,
detrimental to the national security...
The NRO treated its new headquarters project the same way it treats
many a technical program. It took a father-knows-best attitude and gave
the Committees of Congress only the simplest information, and, in some
instance, no information. If we really wanted more information, it was
up to us to ask the right questions.
...we were not given all the facts, certainly not in a form that
would readily permit us to judge the wisdom of the NROs decision.
...we need to root out the obsession with secrecy that treats
legitimate overseers within the government as enemies rather than
partners.
Sen. Baucus
(p.27)
After careful review, it seems to me that this investigation has
raised two important issues.
One is extensive secrecy. We, of course, must protect classified
information when it is critical to our national security. We need to
protect sources and methods. But there's a limit. Too much secrecy is
both foolish and harmful. In this case, foolish because it could never
work. As the Chairman says, hiding a million square feet of office space
in the middle of a commercial complex in Northern Virginia is like
trying to hide an elephant on a football filed [sic]. And harmful
because it has apparently wasted huge amounts of taxpayers' money.
And the other is a question of priorities. In an era of big deficits
and defense cutbacks -- the Vice Chairman was just addressing this
point-- we need to answer some serious questions. We need to cut
spending. At the same time, we need to made [sic] sure our armed
services. It is not an easy task to do both, and gold-plated pleasure
domes like the National Reconnaissance Office headquarters, do not help
us a bit. From now on, let us leave them in the world of poetic
fantasy.
{A rather insightful assessment which could be applied to
programs costing an order of magnitude more than Westfields
by changing a few nouns.}
Sen. D'Amato
(p.30)
While the NRO has done much good for this nation, it is clear that it
has become too used to operating without scrutiny or strict oversight.
That must end...
The public explanations offered so far for this extended disclosure
process [concerning Westfields] show an abiding disregard for NRO's
responsibilities to be forthcoming with Congress and a dismissive
attitude toward the oversight process...
Now, this Committee and the other committees with some oversight
responsibility over the NRO and its budget and appropriations bear some
responsibility for missing this problem. This is one of the risks that
comes from conducting business in secret.
{Yes, and Congress should have realized this long ago and
exercised far greater diligence.}
However, the Congressional oversight process is one that depends to a
certain degree on trust and candor -- more so where secret matters are
concerned than in other areas that are open to general public scrutiny.
I am amazed that the NRO so disregarded its responsibilities to the
American people and so lacked candor in its explanations and
presentations on the project. I am left to wonder what else they haven't
told us....
{If taken at face value, this shows shocking naivete in someone
who has an obligation to know better. "Trust and candor" are just
what one _shouldn't_ expect in the Legislative-Executive
relationship, especially where secret matters are concerned. If
the Committees have been expecting the black programs to be friendly
and forthcoming, we're in deeper trouble than I thought.}
{Well should the Senator have wondered about rocks not yet turned
over. One thing to remember is that during the 1980s secrecy was
emphasized, the leaders of defense and intelligence agencies had
a barely-disguised contempt for Congress, and money flowed freely.
Such an environment was ideal for the flourishing of black mega-
projects and hostile to review and scrutiny.}
If the protections afforded to the NRO by secrecy based on national
security considerations are misused or abused, maybe there need to be
some adjustments.
{One adjustment would be to remove the "don't contact Congress"
features from security agreements and polygraph examinations.
And eliminate waived programs, of course.}
* NRO Headquarters Project
Hearing before the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the United States Senate
Wednesday, August 10, 1994
S. HRG. 103-997
ISBN 0-16-046870-1
Available from
U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents,
Congressional Sales Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
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