Subject: Re: AFP-731/1990-019B/NORAD-20516 Where Are You?
From: thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson)
Date: 1995/08/21
Message-Id: <thomsonaDDoKHv.DnH@netcom.com>
Newsgroups: sci.astro,sci.space.policy,alt.politics.org.cia,alt.war
In article <david-1908951607350001@192.0.2.1>, david@sternlight.com
(David Sternlight) wrote:
>1. Suppose John Pike were cleared to examine "black" programs after the
>government satisfied itself that he wouldn't reveal classified details,
>but simply comment on effectiveness and the appropriateness of funding
>levels. Then what about the next "John Pike" and the next, and the next?
The question of how to ensure believably independent and
technically competent oversight of classified programs is an
important one, and deserves to be discussed here. My current
opinion is that an oversight board composed of both substantive
experts (preferably with no strong institutional ties to the
national security world) and citizen representatives would be
the best solution. Similar boards have been set up to oversee,
for example, genetic engineering programs at universities, and
seem to work acceptably well. (It's a pity there aren't any more
Richard Feynmans around -- he'd be perfect.)
Short of that, it would be desirable to eliminate the waived
programs, and make it mandatory that all programs be briefed to
the full oversight committees. Enlisting OTA (if it survives) to
provide technical input would help, but would mean that the
staff would have to be cleared in a timely manner -- something
that won't happen as long as the program offices control the
clearances. Finally, ombudsmen within the committee staffs
should be designated as the approved and legal channel for
reporting suspected abuse, no matter what the level of
classification.
>That approach won't work as long as the effectiveness of such programs
>depends on secrecy.
The need for secrecy in those programs is much less than the
program offices would have you believe. General characteristics and
missions of reconnaissance satellites have been known for many years,
all the more so after Desert Storm. As then-DDCI Adm. Studeman wrote
in the Nov 1994 issue of Aerospace America, "The good news is that we
were able to use reconnaissance satellites effectively as a force
multiplier; the bad news is that everyone else, including potential
adversaries, knows it."
The orbital elements of U.S. reconnaissance satellites have
been routinely derived and reported by amateur visual observers,
mostly outside the United States, for many years. Indeed, it
isn't apparent that the U.S. has _ever_ launched a LEO
reconnaissance satellite that wasn't tracked by that community.
To think that the Iraqs of the world couldn't duplicate this
binoculars-and-stopwatch work is giving them less credit than
they deserve, IMHO. We are, after all, worried about them
building nuclear weapons production facilities, and it's
possible that people who are at that level of technical ability
could move a step or two beyond binoculars. Even if we did
manage to make a satellite disappear (returning the discussion
to the missing AFP-731), it would probably make little
difference to people planning to do Wicked Things: they would
assume that they were under constant overhead observation and
design their concealment and deception programs accordingly.
It may be relevant to note that the U.S. has made current
orbital elements of Russian, Chinese, and now European spysats
publicly available for many years. None of those entities seem to
be particularly upset about such disclosure, even though the U.S.
professes to believe that to reveal similar information about its
own satellites imperils the national security.
It's only when we get to the level of system technical
specifications that a reasonable case can be made for keeping
some secrets (exactly as we keep some things secret about F-15s,
MXs, submarines, etc., and for the same reasons). Even then,
it's necessary to consider what can be kept secret vs what might
be desirable if possible. The usual example is the resolving
power of photoreconnaissance satellites: while we might wish to
keep this secret, it can be derived from the diameter of the
optics, and this can be deduced to within a factor of two by a
variety of means, such as observing shrouds on launch vehicles
or direct imaging once the satellite is on orbit.
In bringing this overly long post to a close, I'll point to a
subtle danger which excessive reliance on secrecy can create: we
could fool ourselves into believing that we've been successful in
hiding our capabilities, plan accordingly, and thus set ourselves up
for catastrophic surprises if the opponent discovers our secrets but
doesn't let on until the shooting starts. Given the number of spies
with TS/SCI/whatever clearances we know have been active over the past
decades and rapidly advancing technical intelligence capabilities in
the rest of the world, dependence on total, long-term secrecy for a
program's success doesn't seem to be a good idea. (I've often wondered
how much Aldrich Ames told the Russians about our satellite programs;
it could have been a lot.)
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