[Senate Hearing 111-289]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-289
THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 24, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
MARK UDALL, Colorado DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The President's Decision on Missile Defense in Europe
september 24, 2009
Page
Flournoy, Hon. Michele A., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 11
O'Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency.. 17
Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 22
(iii)
THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Wicker, Burr, Collins, and LeMieux.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; and Gerald J. Leeling, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Christine G.
Lang and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator
Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher
Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa
Steffen Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Roger Pena,
assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Young, assistant to Senator
Begich; Nathan Davern, assistant to Senator Burris; Anthony J.
Lazarski and Rob Soofer, assistants to Senator Inhofe, Lenwood
Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde
A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator
Burr; Rob Epplin and Chip Kennett, assistants to Senator
Collins; and Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. The committee meets today to receive
testimony on the President's recent decision concerning missile
defense in Europe. We're joined today by Michele Flournoy, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General James
Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA). We're delighted to have you with
us. We thank you for your service to the Nation.
I see that Senator Lemieux is also with us today. We're
delighted that you are here. We give you a very warm welcome to
a committee which works on a very bipartisan basis. I think
you'll enjoy your service on this committee and we very warmly
welcome you.
We also, if we have a quorum here, are going to take up
military nominations when we have that quorum.
Last Thursday, President Obama announced that he had
accepted the unanimous recommendations of Defense Secretary
Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff to restructure the plan for
missile defense in Europe. President Obama put it this way:
``Our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide
stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and
American allies.''
Secretary Gates called the new approach ``vastly more
suitable and a far more effective defense'' than the previous
plan to deploy 10 long-range interceptors in Poland and a radar
in the Czech Republic.
I believe this decision will enhance our national security
and the security of our allies and partners in the region. It
will deploy demonstrated technology sooner to defend against
the number one existing threat in the Middle East, the threat
of Iranian short- and medium-range missiles that can reach our
forward-deployed forces and allies in Europe and Israel.
Secretary Gates has said the existing Iranian threat ``was not
addressed by the previous plan.''
The new European missile defense architecture will evolve
an increasing capability as Iran's missile capabilities evolve.
It is flexible and adaptable to circumstances. It will counter
future Iranian missile threats, including long-range missiles
that could reach the United States if Iran develops them. So it
will offer supplemental protection of the United States to
augment the missile defense security we now have deployed in
Alaska and California.
Instead of abandoning missile defense in Europe, as some
have suggested, the new approach expands and enhances our
missile defense capabilities in Europe compared to the previous
plan. Secretary Gates summarized the issue well by saying: ``We
are strengthening, not scrapping, missile defense in Europe.''
The new architecture will be deployed sooner than the
previously proposed third site would have been. Secretary Gates
has said that the new system will be deployed starting in 2011,
whereas the previously planned system would not have been
deployed until at least 2017, assuming then that it met all the
conditions required in our law, such as ratification by the
Czech Republic and Poland and demonstrating that the system
would be operationally effective.
As to the suggestion that the administration is abandoning
some of our European allies, the administration's plan would
involve more allies than the previous plan and would defend all
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Europe rather
than only a portion of Europe. Poland and the Czech Republic
are being offered the first opportunity to participate in the
new architecture.
The NATO view is positive. Last Thursday NATO Secretary
General Rasmussen said: ``I welcome that the United States
today has discussed at NATO how we can develop a missile
defense which can include all allies and protect all allies. I
welcome in fact that NATO will play a more prominent role in
the U.S. plans for missile defense in Europe. That is a
positive step.''
Now, the reason that he reacts that way is that the new
plan would defend all of our NATO allies and our forward-
deployed forces against that existing threat, rather than
defending only a portion of NATO Europe that is not within the
range of Iran's existing missiles, as was the case with the
previous plan. This is a substantial improvement for NATO.
Now, while some early statements from some Polish and Czech
leaders were critical, later statements were supportive. For
instance, last Friday Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski said:
``Poland will be an element of a new missile defense security.
There is no question of the United States abandoning our
region. If the scenario outlined yesterday by the U.S.
President, State Department officials, and the Secretary of
State is implemented, it will be a significant reinforcement of
Poland's defense potential,'' he said. On Polish TV he said:
``We will have what we wanted.'' This is the Polish Foreign
Minister Sikorski. ``We will have what we wanted. The presence
of American troops and Patriot missiles is guaranteed.''
Czech President Vaclav Klaus earlier this week says he
``fully accepts the decision.''
To those who say the new approach stems from Russian
pressure, Secretary Gates wrote in The New York Times:
``Russia's attitude and possible reaction played no part in my
recommendation to the President on this issue.'' Secretary
Gates added that ``if Russia's leaders embrace this plan, that
will be an unexpected and welcome change of policy on their
part.''
Now, it would be an additional benefit if the new plan
opens the door to cooperation with Russia on missile defense.
If Russia were to cooperate with the United States and NATO, it
would send a powerful signal to Iran. It could also, if Russia
were to share the data from its Armavir radar, improve the
capability of our defenses against Iran.
NATO has repeatedly supported missile defense cooperation
between the United States and Russia. In April I traveled to
Warsaw, Prague, and Moscow with Senator Bill Nelson and Senator
Collins. We had frank discussions with government officials in
each country. We came back I think with the view that there
appeared to be a possibility for a new approach to missile
defense that might be acceptable to all and which might show
Iran that its pursuit of missiles and nuclear weapons will
bring countries, including Russia, together in opposition. This
plan creates the possibility for missile defense to be a
uniting issue, rather than continuing as a dividing issue.
I would add that it was clear from that trip that the
Polish Government was focused, as Foreign Minister Sikorski
said, on the deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery and in U.S.
personnel in Poland, rather than on deployment of the
previously proposed long-range interceptors in Poland. It
appears that now both nations are moving steadily toward such a
deployment and I hope Secretary Flournoy will discuss the
status of the Patriot issue.
The new plan is also consistent with the direction that was
provided by Congress over each of the last 3 years under both
Democratic and Republican leadership. Congress in our
legislation told the Defense Department to buy more Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) interceptors to defend against the existing short- and
medium-range missile threat. Congress established a policy to
develop, test, and deploy effective missile defenses to defend
our forward-based forces, our allies, and our Homeland against
the threat of Iran's existing and possible future ballistic
missiles, and Congress directed that the Defense Department
place a priority on developing, testing, and fielding near-term
effective missile defense securities, including the Aegis
ballistic missile defense (BMD) with its SM-3 interceptor,
THAAD and Patriot (PAC-3).
In summary, I believe this new approach is a three-fer. It
addresses more directly and effectively Iran's missile threat,
it maintains and expands our security commitment to Europe,
including Poland and the Czech Republic, it opens the door to
working cooperatively with Russia on a missile defense security
system that could not only provide greater protection to
Europe, but also make a strong statement to Iran that Europe,
including Russia, will take unified action against Iran's
threat.
The balance of my statement will be placed in the record,
and before calling on our witnesses let me recognize Senator
McCain.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the President's
recent decision concerning missile defense in Europe.
We are joined today by the Honorable Michele Flournoy, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy; General James Cartwright, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Lieutenant General Patrick
O'Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. We are glad to
have you with us, and we thank you for your service to the Nation.
Last Thursday, President Obama announced that he had accepted the
unanimous recommendations of Defense Secretary Gates and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to restructure the plan for missile defense in Europe.
President Obama put it this way: ``our new missile defense
architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter
defenses of American forces and American allies.'' Secretary Gates
called the new approach ``vastly more suitable'' and ``a far more
effective defense'' than the previous plan to deploy 10 long-range
interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic.
I believe this decision will enhance our national security and the
security of our allies and partners in the region. It will deploy
demonstrated technology sooner to defend against the number 1 existing
threat in the Middle East, the threat ofIranian short- and medium-range
missiles. They can reach our forward-deployed forces and allies in
Europe and Israel. Secretary Gates has said that the existing Iranian
threat ``was not addressed by the previous plan.''
The new European missile defense architecture will evolve and
increase in capability as Iran's missile capabilities evolve. It is
flexible and adaptable to circumstances. It will counter future Iranian
missile threats, including long-range missiles that could reach the
United States, if Iran develops them. So it will offer supplemental
protection of the United States, to augment the missile defense system
we now have deployed in Alaska and California.
Instead of abandoning missile defense in Europe, as some have
suggested, the new approach dramatically expands and enhances our
missile defense capabilities in Europe compared to the previous plan.
Secretary Gates summarized the issue well by saying that ``we are
strengthening--not scrapping--missile defense in Europe.''
The new architecture will be deployed sooner than the previously
proposed ``third site'' would have been. As Secretary Gates has said,
the new system will be deployed starting in 2011, whereas the
previously planned system would not have been deployed until at least
2017-assuming that it met all the conditions required in our law, such
as ratification by the Czech Republic and Poland, and demonstrating
that the system would be operationally effective.
As to the suggestion that the administration is abandoning some of
our European allies, the administration's plan would involve more
allies than the previous plan, and would defend all of NATO Europe,
rather than only a portion of Europe. We are offering both Poland and
the Czech Republic the first opportunity to participate in the new
architecture.
The NATO view is also positive. Last Thursday, NATO Secretary
General Rasmussen said: ``I welcome that the United States today has
discussed at NATO how we can develop missile defense which can include
all allies and protect all allies. . . . I welcome in fact that NATO
will play a more prominent role in the U.S. plans for missile defense
in Europe. That is a positive step.''
The new plan would defend all of our NATO allies and our forward-
deployed forces against that existing threat, rather than defending
only the portion of NATO Europe that is not within range of Iran's
existing missiles--as was the case with the previous plan. This is a
substantial improvement for NATO.
While some early statements from some Polish and Czech leaders were
critical, later statements were supportive.
For instance, last Friday, Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski said:
``Poland will be an element of a new [Missile Defense] system.'' . . .
``There is no question of the United States abandoning our region. If
the scenario outlined yesterday by the U.S. President, State Department
officials, and Secretary of State is implemented, it will be a
significant reinforcement of Poland's defense potential.'' On Polish
TV, he said: ``We will have what we wanted: the presence of American
troops and Patriot missiles is guaranteed.''
Czech President Vaclav Klaus earlier this week said: he ``fully
accepts'' the decision.
As to those who say the new approach stems from Russian pressure,
Secretary Gates wrote in the New York Times, ``Russia's attitude and
possible reaction played no part in my recommendation to the President
on this issue.'' He added that ``if Russia's leaders embrace this plan,
then that will be an unexpected--and welcome--change of policy on their
part.''
It will be an additional benefit if the new plan opens the door to
cooperation with Russia on missile defense. If Russia were to cooperate
with the United States and NATO, it would send a powerful signal to
Iran. It could also, if Russia were to share the data from its Armavir
radar, improve the capability of our defenses against Iran. NATOhas
repeatedly supported missile defense cooperation between the United
States and Russia.
In April, I traveled to Warsaw, Prague, and Moscow with Senator
Bill Nelson and Senator Collins. We had frank and constructive
discussions with government officials in each country. We came back
with the view that there appeared to be a possibility for a new
approach to missile defense which could be acceptable to all sides, and
which might show Iran that its pursuit of missiles and nuclear weapons
will bring countries--including Russia--together in opposition. This
plan creates the possibility for missile defense to be a uniting issue,
rather than continuing as a dividing issue.
I would add that it was clear from that trip that the Polish
Government was focused, as Foreign Minister Sikorski said, on the
deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery and U.S. personnel in Poland,
rather than on deployment of the previously proposed long-range
interceptors in Poland. It appears that both nations are moving
steadily toward such a deployment, and I hope Secretary Flournoy will
discuss the status of the Patriot issue.
It was also clear that the Czech Government was not moving toward
ratifying the missile defense agreements before its national elections,
now scheduled for next year, and appeared likely not to do so after
those elections, either.
The new plan is consistent with the direction provided by Congress
over each of the last 3 years, under both Democratic and Republican
leadership:
Congress told the Defense Department to buy more Standard
Missile-3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors
to defend against the existing short- and medium-range missile threat;
Congress established a policy to develop, test, and
deploy effective missile defenses to defend our forward-based forces,
our allies, and our Homeland against the threat of Iran's existing and
possible future ballistic missiles; and
Congress directed the Defense Department to place a
priority on developing, testing, and fielding near-term effective
missile defense systems, including Aegis BMD with its Standard Missile-
3 interceptor, THAAD, and Patriot PAC-3.
In its report to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act
last year, this committee told the Defense Department that its highest
missile defense priority should be to buy significantly more Standard
Missile-3 and THAAD interceptors in order to defend against the
existing threat of short- and medium-range missiles from nations such
as Iran and North Korea. That is the essence of the new plan.
Two years ago, in section 229 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), Congress established the
policy of the United States to develop, test, and deploy, as soon as
technologically feasible, in conjunction with allies and other friendly
nations whenever possible, an effective defense against the ballistic
missile threat from Iran, to protect the forward-based forces of the
United States and allies in Europe and the surrounding region, as well
as to protect against possible future long-range Iranian missiles that
could eventually threaten the United States. That, in a nutshell, is
what the President and Secretary Gates announced last Thursday.
Three years ago, this committee initiated, and Congress adopted,
legislation making it the policy of the United States to place a
priority in its missile defense programs on developing, testing,
deploying, and improving near-term, effective missile defense systems,
including the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system with its Standard
Missile-3 interceptor, the THAAD system, and the Patriot PAC-3 system,
and their sensors. Those are, of course, the three systems that form
the core of the administration's new missile defense plan for Europe.
In summary, this new approach is a ``three-fer:'' It addresses more
directly and effectively Iran's missile threat. It maintains and
expands our security commitment to Europe, including Poland and the
Czech Republic. It opens the door to working cooperatively with Russia
on a missile defense system that could not only provide greater
protection to Europe, but also make a strong statement to Iran that
Europe, including Russia, will take unified action against Iran's
threat.
Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General O'Reilly, thank
you for joining us today.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd also like to
acknowledge Senator George LeMieux of Florida and welcome him
to the committee. Despite the fact that he is an attorney, I
look forward to working with him on the many issues we face
today. This committee does work in a bipartisan fashion, but I
also might say a very spirited fashion from time to time. So
welcome, George.
I welcome the witnesses today. Since the end of the Cold
War, we've prided ourselves on the strong and enduring
relationships we've forged with our European allies,
particularly in Eastern Europe. At a time when Eastern European
nations are increasingly wary of renewed Russian aggression in
the region--Georgia, attempts to intimidate Ukraine, other
actions that have been taken--the administration is adopting a
new European missile defense strategy that has clearly bruised
some of our staunchest allies in Europe while encouraging hard-
liners in my view.
The decision by the administration to back away from its
missile defense commitment to the Czech Republic and Poland can
only demonstrate to the rest of Europe that the United States
is not prepared to stand behind its friends, that the United
States views resetting its relations with Russia more important
than commitments made to close friends and allies, and that the
administration is willing to let Russia have veto power over
the disposition of our missile defense architecture.
Missile defense in Europe is not and should not be viewed
in Moscow as some new form of post-Cold War aggression. It's
rather a reasonable and prudent response to the very
belligerent threats the Iranian regime continues to pose to the
United States and the world.
One of the troubling rationales for this new approach is
based on the assumption that the long-range Iranian ballistic
missile threat is not materializing as quickly as previously
assessed and that the real threat is in the short- and medium-
range missiles. I agree the short- and medium-range missile
threats are a significant and growing threat, but I question
the notion that we don't have to be as vigilant in developing
our defenses against long-range Iranian ballistic missiles.
Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under
Secretary Gates during the Bush administration, recently said
that intelligence reports on the Iranian threat as recently as
January of this year were more troubling than what is being
portrayed by the current administration. He said: ``Maybe
something really dramatic changed between January 16 and now in
what the Iranians are doing with their missile securities, but
I don't think so.''
We all know the threat's real of Iranian ballistic
missiles, real and growing. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses on both exactly what has changed threat-wise and why
the new and old strategies are mutually exclusive, why we can
wait until 2020, at least 3 to 5 years later than originally
planned, to field a long-range security capable of defending
both the United States and Europe.
Interesting about this whole decisionmaking scenario, which
in my view was incredibly amateurish and ham-fisted: Months of
negotiations were dedicated towards reaching an agreement with
the Poles and Czechs in 2008, but a late night phone call was
all it took to tell our friends to take a hike. According to
news reports, the Polish Prime Minister was called at midnight,
only hours before the administration formally announced its new
strategy. I suppose that Prime Minister Tusk shouldn't be all
too upset because he, unlike Members of Congress, didn't have
to wait to read about it in the morning papers.
I must say the timing was exquisite, while the Poles were
commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Russian invasion of
Poland--exquisite timing. Poland headlines read: ``Betrayal.
The U.S. sold us to Russia and stabbed us in the back.'' In the
Czech Republic: ``No radar. Russia won.''
I urge the administration to take every step necessary
above and beyond proceeding forward with the planned European
missile defense strategy to not downplay the long-range Iranian
threat and reassure our allies.
Also, I think it's worth noting the Czech Republic
currently have NATO forces deployed, as well as 100 personnel
deployed in Kandahar. The Polish currently have 2,000 troops in
Afghanistan. I'll be very interested in the future to see how
firmly the Poles and the Czechs stand behind those commitments.
There is very little doubt that in most of the world that
this is viewed as an attempt to gain Russian concessions on the
Iranian nuclear issue. That's the interpretation. It was
Machiavelli who said it's not what you do, it's what you appear
to do. I am sure that the witnesses today will make a strong
technical case for abandonment of the long-range missiles to
short- and medium-range missile defenses. I have to tell you
that there's more to this, far more to this, than a change in
policy. This is a signal to our East European friends, who are
very nervous about aggressive Russian behavior in the region,
and they have a rich history which to base their concerns on
that we have sent the wrong message at the wrong time.
As far as this decision having significant beneficial
effect on Russian attitudes towards Iranian nuclear buildup,
we'll see. History shows us that unilateral concessions very
rarely gain anything except increased demands from our
adversaries.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'd like to take a moment to acknowledge
Senator George S. LeMieux of Florida and welcome him to the committee.
Despite the fact that he is an attorney, I look forward to working with
him on the many issues that we face today, and I thank him and his
family for their willingness to serve.
Since the end of the Cold War we have prided ourselves on the
strong and enduring relationships we have forged with our Eastern
European allies. At a time when Eastern European nations are
increasingly wary of renewed Russian aggression in the region, the
administration in adopting a new European missile defense strategy has
clearly bruised some of our staunchest U.S. allies in Europe while
encouraging Russian hardliners.
The decision by the administration to back away from its missile
defense commitment to the Czech Republic and Poland can only
demonstrate to the rest of Europe that the United States is not
prepared to stand behind its friends; that the United States views re-
setting its relations with Russia more important than commitments made
to close friends and allies; and that the administration is willing to
let Russia have veto power over the disposition of our missile defense
architecture.
Missile defense in Europe is not, and should not, be viewed in
Moscow as some new form of post-Cold War aggression. It is, rather, a
reasonable and prudent response to the very real belligerent threats
the Iranian regime continues to pose to the United States, Europe, and
the world.
One of the troubling rationales for this new approach is based on
the assumption that the long-range Iranian ballistic missile threat is
not materializing as quickly as previously assessed and that the real
threat is in short- and medium-range missiles. I agree that short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles are a significant and growing threat
but question the notion that we don't have to be as vigilant in
developing our defenses against long-range Iranian ballistic missiles.
Eric Edelman, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Secretary
Gates during the Bush administration, recently said that intelligence
reports on the Iranian threat as recent as January of this year were
more troubling than what is being portrayed by the current
administration. Mr. Edelman maintains that ``maybe something really
dramatic changed between January 16 and now in terms of what the
Iranians are doing with their missile systems, but I don't think so.''
We all know that the Iranian ballistic missile threat is real and
growing and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on both
exactly what has changed threat-wise and why the new and old strategies
are mutually exclusive. Why we can wait until 2020, at least 3 to 5
years later than originally planned to field a long-range system
capable of defending both the United States and Europe?
Months of negotiations were dedicated towards reaching agreement
with the Poles and Czechs in 2008, but a late night phone call was all
it took to tell our friends to ``take a hike.'' According to news
reports, the Polish Prime Minister, was called at midnight, only hours
before the administration formally announced its new strategy. But, I
supposed Prime Minister Tusk shouldn't be all too upset. He, unlike
Members of Congress, didn't have to read about it first in the morning
newspaper.
In Poland, headlines read ``Betrayal! The U.S. sold us to Russia
and stabbed us in the back'' and in the Czech Republic, ``No Radar.
Russia won.'' I urge the administration to take every step necessary
above and beyond proceeding forward with the planned European missile
defense strategy to not downplay the long-range Iranian threat and
reassure our allies and the rest of the world that the U.S. stands
behind its commitments. Given the global threats we face today, we
cannot afford to lose friends or real estate in the region.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
There is a quorum now present so I would ask the committee
to consider a list of 2,559 pending military officer
nominations. Included in this list is Admiral Mullen for
reappointment to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Of these nominations, 25 do not meet the committee's 7-day
requirement by only 1 day. No objection has been raised to
these nominations. I recommend the committee waive the 7-day
rule in order to permit the confirmation of the nominations of
these 25 officers.
Senator McCain. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Lieberman. Second
Chairman Levin. All those in favor say aye.
[A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nay.
[No response.]
The ayes have it.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending With the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on September 24,
2009.
1. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Michael H. Mittelman) (Reference No. 77).
2. ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, to be admiral and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Reference No. 489).
3. BG Joseph B. DiBartolomeo, ARNG, to be major general (Reference
No. 725).
4. In the Air Force, there are 40 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Lance L. Annicelli) (Reference No.
771).
5. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Robert J. Schultz) (Reference No. 825).
6. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Andrea J. Fuller) (Reference No. 826).
7. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel
and below (list begins with Peter H. Guevara) (Reference No. 827).
8. In the Army, there are eight appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with James Bane) (Reference
No. 828).
9. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, to be general and Commander, U.S.
Joint Forces Command (Reference No. 830).
10. In the Army Reserve, there are 46 appointments to be colonel
(list begins with John A. Blankenbaker) (Reference No. 853).
11. In the Army Reserve, there are 307 appointments to be colonel
(list begins with William L. Abernathy, Jr.) (Reference No. 854).
12. In the Army Reserve, there are 237 appointments to be colonel
(list begins with Gregory T. Adams) (Reference No. 855).
13. In the Navy, there is one appointment to be lieutenant
commander (Erik J. Modlo) (Reference No. 856).
14. In the Navy, there are two appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Josh A. Cassada) (Reference No. 857).
15. In the Navy, there are 72 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Matthew J. Acanfora) (Reference No. 858).
16. In the Navy, there are 49 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Ron J. Arellano) (Reference No. 859).
17. In the Navy, there are 41 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Benjamin I. Abney) (Reference No. 860).
18. In the Navy, there are 38 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Christopher D. Addington) (Reference No.
861).
19. In the Navy, there are 22 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Kelly W. Bowman, Jr.) (Reference No. 862).
20. In the Navy, there are 32 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Hasan Abdulmutakallim) (Reference No. 863).
21. In the Navy, there are 12 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Denise G. Barham) (Reference No. 864).
22. In the Navy, there are 17 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Guillermo R. Amezaga) (Reference No. 865).
23. In the Navy, there are 157 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Christopher W. Anderson) (Reference No.
866).
24. In the Navy, there are 907 appointments to be lieutenant
commander (list begins with Matthew L. Abbot) (Reference No. 867).
25. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Cameron D. Wright) (Reference No. 893).
26. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Andre L. Brown) (Reference No. 894).
27. In the Army Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Kathleen E. Coffey) (Reference No. 895).
28. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with Paul C. Kerr) (Reference No.
896).
29. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Scott A. Anderson) (Reference No. 897).
30. In the Navy, there are 38 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Keith R. Barkey) (Reference No. 898).
31. In the Navy, there are 30 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Paul S. Anderson) (Reference No. 899).
32. In the Navy, there are 51 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Robin M. Allen) (Reference No. 900).
33. In the Navy, there are 50 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with James D. Abbott) (Reference No. 901).
34. In the Navy, there are 28 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Jason T. Baltimore) (Reference No. 902).
35. In the Navy, there are 61 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Joel R. Bealer) (Reference No. 903).
36. In the Navy, there are 21 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Martin J. Anerino) (Reference No. 904).
37. In the Navy, there are 144 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Roger S. Akins) (Reference No. 905).
38. MG Ralph J. Jodice II, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Allied Air Component Command Headquarters, Izmir and
Commander, 16th Air Expeditionary Task Force, U.S. Air Forces in Europe
(Reference No. 912).
39. MG William J. Rew, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Vice
Commander, Air Combat Command (Reference No. 913).
40. MG Christopher D. Miller, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters, U.S.
Air Force (Reference No. 914).
41. LTG Benjamin C. Freakley, USA, to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, U.S. Army Accessions Command (Reference No. 915).
42. LTG John D. Gardner, USA, to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commander, US European Command (Reference No. 916).
43. LTG Frank G. Helmick, USA, to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg (Reference No.
917).
44. MG Mark P. Hertling, USA, to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commanding General, Initial Military Training, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (Reference No. 918).
45. In the Army, there are 38 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Robin B. Akin) (Reference No. 919).
46. MG Frank A. Panter, Jr., USMC, to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Reference No. 920).
47. MG Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC, to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps (Reference No. 921).
48. Capt. Charles A. Rainey, USNR, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 922).
49. Capt. Jonathan W. White, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 923).
50. RADM(lh) David W. Titley, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 924).
51. Col. David J. Conboy, USAR, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 938).
52. Col. James V. Young, Jr., USAR, to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 939).
53. Col. Ivan N. Black, USAR, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 940).
54. MG John F. Kelly, USMC, to be lieutenant general and Commander,
Marine Forces Reserve and Commander, Marine Forces North (Reference No.
941).
55. RDAM(lh) Gregory J. Smith, USN, to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 942).
56. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Thomas M. Anderson) (Reference No. 943).
57. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Ricky B. Reaves) (Reference No. 944).
58. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Jose R. Pereztorres) (Reference No. 945).
59. In the Air Force, there are seven appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Loyd A. Graham)
(Reference No. 946).
60. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Sonnie D. Deyampert) (Reference No. 947).
61. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel
(Douglas Lougee) (Reference No. 948).
62. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(James Peak) (Reference No. 949).
63. In the Army, there are 12 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Joyvetta Lewis)
(Reference No. 950).
64. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Brian J. Ellis) (Reference No.
951).
65. In the Navy, there are 12 appointments to the grade of captain
and below (list begins with Anthony T. Cowden) (Reference No. 952).
66. VADM Bruce W. Clingan, USN, to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy, N3/N5, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 965).
67. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Derek D. Brown) (Reference No. 966).
68. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Stephanie Latimer) (Reference No. 967).
69. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Michelle H. Martin) (Reference No. 968).
70. In the Army, there are nine appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Robert E. Powers)
(Reference No. 969).
71. In the Navy Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Neri B. Barnea) (Reference No. 970).
72. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Anita Aminoshariae) (Reference
No. 971).
73. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with Tracy D. Emerson) (Reference No.
972).
Total: 2,559.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Flournoy.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Ms. Flournoy. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
and other distinguished members of the committee. We very much
appreciate the opportunity to discuss the administration's new
approach to missile defense in Europe with you today.
We are confident that our new approach represents a
dramatic improvement over the program of record. Under the old
plan, we were not going to be able to deploy a European missile
defense system capable of protecting against Iranian missiles
until at least 2017. Under our new plan, we'll be able to
protect vulnerable parts of Europe and the tens of thousands of
U.S. troops stationed there by the end of 2011. We'll be
creating a far more flexible and adaptive missile defense
system, one that can adapt to provide better protection against
emerging threats.
The previous administration had planned to deploy 10
ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland, a European
midcourse radar in the Czech Republic, and a TPY-2 radar
elsewhere in the region. The decision to move forward with that
particular configuration was made several years ago and it was
based on threat information and technologies available at that
time. But circumstances have changed significantly since then.
First, we now have a rather different intelligence picture;
and second, we have made major strides in missile defense
technologies in just the last few years. We are now in a
position to put a far more effective missile defense system in
place more rapidly than just a few years ago.
So let me start by discussing the current threat
assessments. The Intelligence Community now assesses that the
threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the
threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) has been somewhat slower to develop than previously
estimated.
In the near term what this means is that the greatest
missile threats from Iran will be to our allies and our
partners and U.S. deployed personnel and their families in the
Middle East and in Europe. Needless to say, this concern is all
the more urgent in light of Iran's continuing uranium
enrichment program.
But as Secretary Gates has noted, we understand that
intelligence projections can be wrong and can change over time.
Iran's priorities and capabilities may indeed change in ways
that we can't predict. So our new approach also hedges against
the possibility that threats from Iranian long-range missiles
will evolve more rapidly than we currently predict. We would
still have 30 GBIs deployed in the United States by the end of
2010, which will provide the United States with a sufficient
capability to deal with any Iranian ICBM threat for many years
to come. What's more, the information from the European
forward-based TPY-2 radar that does remain part of our new plan
will significantly enhance the performance of our existing
U.S.-based GBIs. We will also continue to develop the two-stage
GBI.
Let me now turn to highlight some of the technological
changes that have allowed us to develop an improved approach to
missile defense. As General O'Reilly and General Cartwright
will describe in much more detail, improved interceptor
capabilities developed in the last 5 years now offer us a more
flexible and capable missile defense architecture. We've also
significantly improved our sensor technologies. That means we
have a variety of better options to detect and track enemy
missiles and guide interceptors in flight to enable successful
engagements. As a result, we now have missile defense options
that were not previously available.
Our new approach, which the President has adopted on the
unanimous recommendation of both the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will rely on a distributed network
of sensors and proven SM-3 interceptors, which can be fired
from both Aegis ships and from land. This means greater
geographic flexibility, greater survivability, and greater
scalability in response to an evolving threat. That's exactly
what we mean by a phased, adaptive approach.
But before I turn it over to my colleagues to describe the
system in more detail, I want to say a few words about how our
new approach has been received by our allies. For us, one of
the many advantages of this new architecture is that it greatly
increases our ability to work with our European allies and our
partners to strengthen extended deterrence and our mutual
defenses. The new architecture we are creating provides many
more opportunities for alliance-building and burden-sharing
between the United States and our NATO partners.
Indeed, the reactions we have received from our allies have
ultimately been quite supportive. NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen has hailed the decision as a positive step and Polish
Prime Minister Donald Tusk has described it as a real chance to
strengthen Europe's security.
We began general discussions earlier this spring and now
we're in quite specific consultations--with both Poland and the
Czech Republic about their potential roles in a new missile
defense architecture. Our Polish allies understand that they
have the option of replacing the GBIs from the previous plan
with land-based SM-3 interceptors in the new plan, and we will
continue to seek Polish ratification of the missile defense
basing agreement and the supplemental Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA). We are also on track once the SOFA is agreed
to begin the regular rotations of Patriot batteries to Poland,
as agreed by the previous administration.
We are also in discussions with the Czech Republic to
ensure that they continue to play a critical and leadership
role on missile defense within the alliance. We have several
joint projects already under way with our Czech partners and
those will continue. We are already discussing several more,
including the possibility of having the Czech Republic host
some of the new system's elements, such as the command and
control.
In short, we are standing by our allies in Central and
Eastern Europe and we are in fact increasing our commitment to
their defense in very real terms.
While we certainly welcome Russian interest in the new
approach, as well as potential Russian cooperation in sharing
data from their radars, this is not about Russia. It's never
been about Russia. Regardless of Russian reaction, we will
continue to do whatever it takes to ensure the security and
defense of our European allies.
Let me end here by underscoring this point. Our new
approach to missile defense in Europe allows us to provide
coverage to vulnerable parts of Europe much faster than the old
approach, and when fully deployed in phase four it will be even
more capable than the program of record against the full range
of threats, including longer range systems. Our new approach
will also allow us to augment our current homeland defense
against ICBMs that may evolve in the future. In sum, we are
strengthening, not scrapping, missile defense in Europe. We
look forward to working with members of this committee to make
this new architecture a reality.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and we look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy and General
Cartwright follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Michele A. Flournoy and Gen. James E.
Cartwright, USMC
Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the
committee. We appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
administration's new approach to missile defense in Europe, and to set
the record straight that the Obama administration is committed to
deploying timely, cost-effective, and responsive missile defenses to
protect the United States, our deployed forces, as well as our allies
and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges.
We are confident that our new approach represents a dramatic
improvement over the program of record. Under the old plan, we were not
going to be able to deploy a European missile defense system capable of
protecting against Iranian missiles until at least 2017. Under our new
plan, we'll be able to protect vulnerable parts of Europe and the tens
of thousands of U.S. troops stationed there by the end of 2011. We'll
also be creating a far more flexible missile defense system, one that
can be adapted to provide better protection against emerging threats.
Before going into details, I would like to place this decision
about European missile defense in context. We are in the midst of
several major defense reviews, one of which is a congressionally-
mandated review of our approach to ballistic missile defense. The
Department of Defense is leading that review, with active participation
from the Intelligence Community and a number of other agencies. That
review is comprehensive and ongoing; it examines our strategic and
operational approach to missile defense not just in Europe but around
the world.
The review is moving forward based on four key principles:
(1) We must ensure that U.S. missile defenses are responsive
to the threats we face today and are likely to face in the
future, that the technologies we use are proven and effective,
and that our defenses are cost effective;
(2) We must maintain and improve defenses for the United
States and our allies against potential missile attacks from
countries such as Iran and North Korea;
(3) We must renew our emphasis on protecting U.S. deployed
forces and their dependents in theater, as well as U.S. allies
and friends against regional threats; and
(4) We must continue to make missile defense an important
feature of our international cooperation efforts.
The results of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review are not due
back to Congress until January, but as we began our in-depth analysis,
it became clear very early that circumstances had changed fundamentally
with regard to missile defense in Europe, so that we would need to make
some significant adjustments to the previous administration's plan.
In early 2007, the previous administration decided to seek
deployment of ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland, a European
Mid-Course Radar (EMR) in the Czech Republic, and an AN/TPY-2 radar
elsewhere in the region. The decision to move forward with that
particular configuration was made nearly 3 years ago, and had been
considered for several years prior to that, based on the threat
information and the technologies available at that time.
Circumstances have changed significantly since early 2007. First,
we now have a rather different intelligence picture than we had 3 years
ago, particularly with regard to Iranian capabilities. Second, we have
made major strides in missile defense technologies and capabilities in
just the last few years. We are now in a position to put an effective
missile defense system in place far more rapidly than we were a few
years ago, one that will be far more flexible, adaptable, and capable.
The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran's
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly
than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower
to develop than previously estimated. In the near-term, the greatest
missile threats from Iran will be to U.S. allies and partners, as well
as to U.S. deployed personnel--military and civilian--and their
accompanying families in the Middle East and in Europe.
Iran already possesses hundreds of ballistic missiles capable of
reaching neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey and the Caucasus, and is
actively developing and testing missiles that can reach further into
Europe. Our intelligence assessments indicate that the continued
production and deployment of these more capable medium-range missiles
has become one of Iran's highest missile priorities.
In the near-to mid-term, this means that the primary threat posed
by Iranian missiles will be to U.S. allies, our 80,000 deployed forces
in Europe, our civilian personnel and their families. Needless to say,
this concern is all the more urgent in light of Iran's continued
uranium enrichment program. Iran continues to defy international
obligations, and there continues to be reason to fear that Iran is
seeking a nuclear weapons option. We hope that won't come to pass. But
obviously it increases the urgency of developing a truly effective
missile defense system in Europe for the protection of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) territory and populations and the
U.S. Homeland.
As the Secretary of Defense has noted, we understand that the
intelligence projections can be wrong, which makes it all the more
important for us to have a flexible and adaptable missile defense
system that can evolve with the threat. So we remain very concerned
about Iran's potential to develop ICBMs, and part of our new approach
in the later phases is to provide a more effective addition to our
already existing GBIs based in Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force
Base, which we will address in detail in a minute.
Let us turn now to the opportunities for improved capabilities.
Technological developments over the past several years have led to
new capabilities, demonstrated in multiple tests. Improved interceptor
capabilities now offer us more flexible and capable missile defense
architecture, and we have also significantly improved our sensor
technologies. That means we now have a variety of better options to
detect and track enemy missiles and guide the interceptor in-flight to
enable a successful engagement. As a result, we now have new and proven
missile defense options that were not previously available.
The previous plan, approved in early 2007, relied on 2 large, fixed
missile-defense sites, with 10 GBIs in Poland and the EMR in the Czech
Republic. It was designed to identify and destroy up to about 5 to 10
long-range missiles, and as noted, the radar and interceptors called
for under the old plan would not have been in place until at least
2017.
Our new approach, which the President adopted on the unanimous
recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, will rely on a distributed network of sensors and SM-3
interceptors. The SM-3 IA is a proven capability with eight successful
tests since 2007, and it is more than capable of dealing with current
threats from even multiple short- and medium-range missiles. It and
future variants also have many advantages over a GBI. The SM-3 is much
smaller, weighing only about 1 ton compared to the GBI's 25 tons.
Because it is smaller and fits inside a vertical launch canister, it
can be fired from Aegis capable ships. Starting with the SM-3 Block IB,
it will also be able to be fired from land.
The capability of having a missile defense system that can
integrate interceptor sites located both at sea and on land offers us
geographic flexibility that was unavailable under the previous plan.
Furthermore, the resulting distributed network is more survivable in
the case of an attack than the single large radar and single missile
field of the previous plan. The SM-3 IA and IB, at around $10 million
per interceptor, are also much cheaper than a GBI, which costs around
$70 million per interceptor. This means that we can deploy scores of
SM-3 interceptors, again enhancing our defensive capabilities. Since
Iran already possesses hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles, this is critical.
The SM-3 will be upgraded over time. Each upgrade will provide more
capability for countering Iranian threats, meaning each upgrade will be
able to defend an increasingly larger area.
Our planned European missile defense architecture includes both
sea- and land-based missile defense systems, encompassing both
interceptors and a range of sensors. As our capabilities and
technologies continue to improve, the architecture will evolve and
become ever more capable.
Now to describe our phased adaptive approach. Phase 1 is
essentially underway; the SM-3 Block IA is already deployed in the
fleet. In the first phase of our plan, we can provide SM-3 Block IA
capable warships when necessary for the protection of parts of southern
Europe. To enhance protection in Phase 1, we will need a forward based
sensor, probably a TPY-2 radar.
By including the forward based sensor, we are retaining one of the
most significant contributions to the defense of the United States from
the previously proposed architecture. The forward based sensor
contributes to the defense of the United States by providing early and
precise track data to our GBIs in Alaska and California. We expect that
full Phase I missile defense capability will be possible in 2011.
In Phase 2, to be completed by 2015, we intend to use a more
advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 Block IB, which is
already under development. We will deploy this at sea and on land. By
adding the land-based sites, we will significantly increase coverage of
NATO against ballistic missiles from Iran without having to increase
the number of Aegis BMD ships--a much more cost-effective approach.
In Phase 3, we will introduce a new, more capable version of the
SM-3, the Block IIA. This interceptor is currently under development.
The SM-3 Block IIA will provide full coverage of NATO against short,
medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles. We expect to deploy
the SM-3 Block IIA by 2018.
In the final phase, Phase 4, we expect to field an even more-
improved SM-3 missile that has anti-ICBM capabilities. This ascent-
phase intercept capability will further augment the defense of the U.S.
Homeland from potential Iranian ICBM threats. This phase is planned for
2020.
It is important to note that the SM-3 based defense against any
Iranian ICBMs will be additive to the GBI-based defense we already have
deployed in the United States, at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB. As
noted previously, these U.S.-based defenses will be made more effective
by the forward-basing of a TPY-2 radar--which we plan by 2011. We
currently have the ability to defend the United States, including the
east coast, against any Iranian ICBM, and with the TPY-2 deployment
planned in Phase 1 and continued improvement of the GBIs, this defense
will grow even stronger in the next several years. While we expect the
SM-3 based approach to ICBM defense to work, we also will continue to
improve our existing GBI-based system here in the United States and
conduct tests of the 2-stage GBI in the near-term.
The SM-3's ascent-phased intercept capability in Phase 4 would mean
that, unlike the previous administration's GBI-based system, Iranian
missiles would have to defeat not one, but two very different kinds of
missile defenses.
Over time, we plan on one land-based site in southern Europe and
one somewhere in northern Europe. Given the flexibility of the
architecture, there are a number of options for land-based sites that
would provide the same capability, including in Poland. The mix of sea-
and land-based systems makes our new approach far more capable and
adaptable; we can move sensors and interceptors from region to region
as needed. This approach allows us to scale up our defenses, if
necessary, by deploying additional SM-3 interceptors much faster and at
lower costs than adding the much heavier GBIs, and their associated
silos. In times of crisis, the system can ``flex'' by surging Aegis
capable ships to the area for more protection and to serve as a visible
deterrent. This approach also allows us to deal with a wider range of
potential missile tactics, such as salvo launches. The previous GBI
architecture could intercept about five to ten missiles at most; the
new plan's distributed network will be able to cope far more
effectively should an adversary fire many missiles simultaneously.
Similarly, replacing the fixed radar site with a mix of sensors
that are airborne, seaborne and ground-based will allow us to gather
much more accurate data, and will offer better early warning and
tracking options combined with a stronger networking capacity. Finally,
because it relies on a distributed network of sensors and interceptors,
the new approach is more survivable--less vulnerable to destruction or
disruption--than the previous plan, which relied on a single large
radar and a single interceptor field.
It should be crystal clear that those who say we are ``scrapping''
missile defense in Europe are, as Secretary Gates has said, ``either
misinformed or misrepresenting the reality of what we are doing.'' In
fact, we are replacing the previous plan with a phased approach that
delivers more effective and more robust capability sooner.
To sum up: the Phased Adaptive Approach offers many advantages over
the previous plan for European missile defense. We will now be able to
defend the most vulnerable parts of Europe 6-7 years earlier than the
previous plan. Our new approach will be also able to cover all NATO
territory and populations, rather than leaving some allies exposed to
short- and medium-range threats. We will move toward a new additive
approach to defending the United States against any future Iranian
ICBM--while continuing to enhance our existing GBI-based defenses.
Overall, our new approach allows us to better respond to existing
threats now--and to better prepare for future threats as they emerge.
Those who assert that the new plan doesn't uphold U.S. security
commitments to friends and allies, particularly Poland and the Czech
Republic, are far off the mark. This is a better defense for Europe as
well as for the United States. All of our missile defense efforts will
be complementary of and interoperable with those being developed by
NATO, and the new architecture we are creating provides many
opportunities for alliance-building and burden-sharing between the
United States and our NATO partners. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen
has hailed our decision as ``a positive step''; Polish Prime Minister
Donald Tusk said it offers a real ``chance to strengthen Europe's
security.''
We remain firmly committed to strong bilateral relationships with
both Poland and the Czech Republic and have already begun discussions
with both nations about their potential roles in the new missile
defense architecture. In the coming weeks, we will have numerous
strategic discussions with the Poles on missile defense and our
security arrangements. It is prudent that we continue to seek Polish
ratification of the missile defense basing agreement and supplemental
Status of Forces Agreement.
We are also in discussions with the Czech Republic to ensure that
they continue to play a leadership role on missile defense within the
Alliance. We have several joint projects already underway with our
Czech partners, and are discussing several more.
Last week, in addition to visiting Warsaw and Prague to discuss the
Phased, Adaptive Approach, Under Secretary Flournoy briefed the North
Atlantic Council on our new approach and emphasized that we will pursue
missile defense in a NATO context. The response was very positive, as
evidenced by the NATO Secretary General's comments last week that ``It
is my clear impression that the American plan on missile defense will
involve NATO . . . . to a higher degree in the future. . . . This is a
positive step in the direction of an inclusive and transparent process,
which I also think is in the interest of . . . the NATO alliance.''
This phased adaptive approach better meets our security needs, and
our security commitments to our European allies and partners. Russia's
positive response to date is a useful collateral benefit, though we are
not sure whether and how it will affect their perspective on missile
defenses. We welcome Russian interest in our new approach as well as
potential cooperation in sharing data from their radars. But Russian
reactions notwithstanding, we will continue to do whatever it takes to
ensure our security and that of our European partners and allies.
In closing, it is important to note that the strategic thinking
behind our new approach to European missile defense will also be
valuable as we continue to address missile defense issues in other
regions.
Because the type of system we are planning in Europe can be easily
adapted to different geographic constraints, it can be applied in
various regions around the globe, if necessary. In fact, a scaled-down
version of this approach is already being used for the defense of Japan
against North Korean missile threats, and for the defense of Israel
against an Iranian missile attack. Because the assets of this system
are either mobile or transportable, the new approach provides future
flexibility to reposition interceptors and sensors if the geopolitical
environment changes. Because the systems will be upgraded over time,
the new approach provides a natural evolution to match the threat.
As the President said, ``our new missile defense architecture in
Europe will provide a stronger, smarter, and swifter defense of
American forces, and America's allies. It is more comprehensive than
our previous program. It deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-
effective. It sustains and builds upon our commitment to protect the
U.S. Homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats. It ensures
and enhances the protection of all of our NATO allies.''
Thank you for your time. We will continue to work with you as we
move forward on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and we look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Flournoy.
General Cartwright.
General Cartwright. Sir, we'd ask if General O'Reilly could
go second.
Chairman Levin. Sure, of course. General O'Reilly.
STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
General O'Reilly. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the
technical aspects of the President's decision to use a phased,
adaptive approach to provide missile defense in Europe. This
new proposal is a more powerful missile defense of NATO,
enhances U.S. Homeland defense, is deployable to theaters
around the world, and is more adaptable to respond to threat
uncertainties.
The previous proposed missile defense of Europe consisted
of four components: a command and control system, 10 GBIs, in
Poland; an X-band discrimination radar in the Czech Republic;
and an X-band precision tracking forward-based radar in
southeastern Europe. Assuming a shot doctrine of two
interceptors against each threat missile, this previous missile
defense architecture had a maximum capability to engage five
intermediate-range ballistic missiles or medium-range ballistic
missiles aimed at Europe, or five ICBMs aimed at the United
States from the Middle East.
The most valuable component of the previous architecture to
the defense of the U.S. Homeland was the forward-based X-band
radar in southeastern Europe, which would provide early and
precise tracks of threat missiles from the Middle East heading
towards the United States, thus increasing the accuracy of the
fire control instructions to our GBIs based at Fort Greely, AK,
and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.
We remain concerned about the future Iranian ICBM threat.
Therefore we are retaining the forward-based sensor component
in our new phased adaptive approach proposal. Moreover, we will
also continue to develop the GMD, ground-based midcourse
defense system, and begin testing against ICBM targets using
representative Iranian trajectories.
A significant limitation of the previous European
architecture was that the GBIs were being used in ICBM,
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and Medium Range
Ballistic Missile (MRBM) defense roles. Although we have only
tested the GBIs against IRBMs, that is in ranges less than
5,500 kilometers, it is currently our only interceptor designed
against intercontinental ballistic missiles. The earliest
operational date of the previous architecture is now 2017.
Given the current threat estimate, by 2017 the European-
based GBIs could be rapidly consumed by an attack of five IRBMs
or MRBMs aimed at NATO countries, leaving no GBIs to contribute
to U.S. ICBM defense.
Therefore, the previously proposed European defense
architecture was insufficient to counter the quantity of
ballistic missile threat faced by NATO and our forward-deployed
forces and still provide redundant coverage of the U.S.
Homeland.
The area of greatest opportunity for increased missile
defense capability is our achievements in developing faster and
more accurate command and control, battle management, and
communications systems which combine data from a network of
different sensors, especially sensors that track missiles in
the early phases of their flight, rather than using a large
radar in a region. For example, our successful intercept of the
ailing satellite in February 2008 was based on our ability to
combine data from sensors around the world and provide a highly
accurate track of the satellite to an Aegis BMD ship and launch
the modified SM-3 IA prior to the ship's radar even seeing the
satellite. Although this is a very limited capability against
an inoperable satellite, it demonstrated the great increase in
capability of networking sensors to a missile defense
architecture.
Fortunately, we have made significant advances over the
last several years in missile defense technologies that enable
the phased adaptive approach. The Aegis Standard Missile Block
IA, or SM-3 IA interceptor, is a very capable weapon due to its
high acceleration, velocity, and its proven track record, and
our ability to rapidly increase to over 80 interceptors at any
one launch site.
Since we began testing the operationally configured SM-3
Block IA missile in June 2006, we have successfully intercepted
a target eight out of nine times in which we had launched an
interceptor. We also are developing the next generation kill
vehicle for the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 IB, which uses the
same rocket motor as the SM-3 IA, but has a more advanced
seeker and fire control system that uses external sensors as
well as the Aegis shipborne radar.
We have already demonstrated the higher risk components of
the new kill vehicle and are planning the first intercept test
in the winter of 2011. We have had many demonstrations of using
networks of sensors, including the most recent intercept by the
ground-based midcourse defense system last December, when we
combined the tracks of satellites, early warning radars, sea-
based X-band radars, and forward-based radars on land and at
sea to provide the GBIs with a very accurate track.
Additionally, we have demonstrated unmanned aerial vehicles
as highly accurate forward-based defense sensors in intercept
tests last spring.
Tomorrow morning we are scheduled to launch a pair of
demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance System Satellites
from the Kennedy Space Center that will detect and track
ballistic missiles over their entire flight.
Finally, at our External Sensors Laboratory at Schriever
Air Force Base, CO, we continue to develop new algorithms and
demonstrate combining their sensor data to achieve even more
accurate tracks than any individual sensor could produce. A
more advanced variant of the SM-3, the SM-3 IIA, has been under
development since 2005. This interceptor will have more than
twice the range of an SM-3 Block IB. SM-3s are also more
affordable than GBIs since you can procure four to seven
production variants of an SM-3 for the cost of one GBI.
But the key attribute is that we can launch SM-3s from sea
or land, which gives us great flexibility in locating the
interceptor launch point between the origin of the threat
launch and the area that you are trying to protect. This is a
key enabler in intercepting threat missiles early in their
flight.
We propose defending NATO in phases. Phase one would
consist of Aegis ships with SM-3 Block IA missiles deployed in
the eastern Mediterranean and a forward-based sensor in
southeastern Europe. We propose by 2015 deployment of the SM-3
Block IB missile, which will have greater capacity to use the
network of sensors and greater ability to discriminate threat
objects. Scores of SM-3 IBs would be deployed at land and sea-
based locations.
By 2018, the deployment of the SM-3 IIA missile, which
could defend all of NATO from two land-based locations and one
sea-based location. By 2020, our goal is to leverage the
lightweight kill vehicle technology to develop a higher
velocity SM-3 Block IIB missile to destroy MRBMs, IRBMs, and
ICBMs early in flight from launch locations within the theater
of the threat launch location. Two land-based SM-3 Block IIB
sites would protect all of NATO.
The timetable which I have presented allows for these
missile defense technologies to be tested and proven prior to
deployment decisions. An additional advantage to a phased
adaptive approach is the applicability to missile defenses
outside of Europe. As an example, if the land-based SM-3 site
were in Hawaii, it would provide significant protection of
those islands.
We are committed to fully funding this program as we
prepare for the next budget submission to Congress. However, it
is important that we have relief from rescissions and
flexibility to spend the unused fiscal year 2009 Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation and some Military
Construction dollars associated with the previous European site
proposal. I note that both the House and Senate authorizing
committees have very presciently included provisions in this
year's National Defense Authorization bill that permit the
Department to use fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funding
for an alternative architecture once the Secretary of Defense
certifies that this architecture is as cost-effective,
technically reliable, and operationally available as the
previous program. With this relief and some redirection of
fiscal year 2010 funds, we can pursue this architecture within
our fiscal year 2010 budget request.
Finally, I was very gratified last Thursday when I was
given the opportunity to personally meet with the members of
the delegations of Poland and the Czech Republic that I have
been working closely with for the past 3 years and explain that
we were not backing out of our commitments, we would still
honor our ballistic missile agreements for them to host our
components of a missile defense architecture and other allies
would also have that opportunity. Likewise, in addition to the
radars in Armavir, Russia, or Gabala, Azerbaijan, the
cooperative development of missile defense technologies by
Russia and other countries are not necessary, but they would be
welcome.
My assessment is that executing this approach is
challenging, but no more challenging than the development of
our other missile defense technologies. Technically challenging
endeavors endure setbacks, but the engineering is executable
and the development risks are manageable.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Reilly follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and distinguished
members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before you today on the technical and programmatic details of the
President's decision to use a Phased Adaptive Approach to enhance
missile defense protection for the United States and Europe for our
friends, allies, our forward-deployed forces, civilian personnel, and
their families there. This new proposal would provide a more powerful
missile defense capability for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), enhance U.S. Homeland defense, and would be applicable in other
theaters around the world to counter a growing ballistic missile
threat, and would more adaptable to respond to threat uncertainties and
developments. With the Phased Adaptive Approach, we are not scrapping
or diminishing missile defense--rather we are strengthening it and
delivering more capability sooner.
In 2006 the Defense Department proposed a long-range missile
defense of Europe that consisted of four components: a command and
control system; 10 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland; an X-
band discrimination radar in the Czech Republic; and an X-band
precision doctrine of two interceptors against each threat missile, the
2006 proposed missile defense architecture provided an upper-tier
missile defense to intercept five Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
(IRBMs) aimed at Europe, or it could intercept five Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) aimed at the Continental United States from
the Middle East. The most important component of the 2006 proposed
architecture to the defense of the U.S. Homeland was the forward based
X-band radar in Southeastern Europe, which was to provide early and
precise tracks of threat missiles from the Middle East, increasing the
accuracy of the fire control instructions to our GBIs based at Fort
Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. We remain concerned
about a future Iranian ICBM threat; therefore, we are retaining the
forward-based X-band radar of the 2006 proposed European missile
defense architecture in our new Phased Adaptive Approach proposal. We
will also continue to improve our domestic GBI-based system and conduct
research and development for the two-stage GBI in the near term.
Under the Phased, Adaptive Approach, we propose defending Europe in
phases starting with the area most vulnerable to today's Iranian
missile threat: southern Europe. Phase 1 would consist of Aegis ships
with sea and a forward-based sensor in southern Europe. This will
provide protection across much of the southern tier of Europe against
Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles.
We propose by 2015 the deployment of the SM-3 Block IB missile,
which will have a greater capacity to use a network of sensors and
greater ability to discriminate threat objects. Once this technology is
proven in our test program these interceptors would be deployed at
land- and sea-based locations and extend protection against medium-
range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.
By 2018, the deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA missile, an
interceptor with greater range currently being developed, could defend
all of Europe from land- and sea-based locations. By 2020, our goal is
to leverage the lightweight kill vehicle technology developed in the
now terminated Multiple Kill Vehicle program to develop a higher
velocity SM-3 Block IIB missile that would destroy ballistic missiles
early in flight, during the ascent phase, from many hundreds of
kilometers from the threat launch location. This missile would still
fit on today's Aegis launch system. With that capability, two land-
based SM-3 Block IIB sites could protect all of Europe. The tested and
proven prior to deployment decisions.
A significant limitation of the previous European architecture was
that the GBIs were used in both ICBM and IRBM defense roles. Although
we have only tested the GBIs against IRBMs (ranges less than 5,000 km),
it is currently our only interceptor designed against ICBMs. The
earliest operational date of the 2006 proposed architecture is 2017 and
more likely 2018 considering the host nation approvals that would have
been required to construct the facilities. When deployed in 2017 the
European based GBIs could be consumed by an attack of 5 IRBMs aimed at
NATO countries, leaving no two-stage GBIs to contribute to U.S. ICBM
defense. Therefore, the previously proposed European Defense
architecture is insufficient to counter large raid sizes. Under the
Phased, Adaptive Approach, the SM-3 Block IIB would be able to
accommodate a large IRBM and ICBM missile threat and diversify the
technology that we are using to counter Iranian ICBMs, providing a
layered defense.
We have made significant advances in missile defense technologies
that enable the Phased Adaptive Approach. First, the interceptors we
are developing are smaller, faster and have greater on-board
discrimination capability. The sea-based Aegis BMD SM-3 interceptor
would provide a burn out velocity, proven track record (for the SM-3
IA), and our ability to rapidly increase the number of interceptors at
any launch site. Since we began testing the operationally configured
SM-3 Block IA missile in June 2006, we successfully intercepted the
target in eight out of the nine times we have launched the interceptor.
We are also taking a deliberate approach to the development and testing
of the next generation kill vehicle for the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3
IB, which has a more advanced seeker and a fire control system that
uses external sensors as well as its ship's radar. We have already
demonstrated the higher risk components of the new kill vehicle: the
solid propellant Divert and Attitude Control System, new seeker, and
fire control system with good results. The first test of the SM-3 IB is
scheduled for the winter of 2011.
The area of greatest opportunity for increased missile defense
capability involves our achievements in developing faster and more
accurate Command Control, Battle Management, and Communication
capabilities, which combines data from a network of many different
sensors (especially sensors that track missiles in the early phases of
their flight), rather than using single large radars in a region. Key
to our successful intercept of the ailing satellite in February 2008
was our ability to combine the satellite to an Aegis ballistic missile
defense ship and launch the modified SM-3 IA prior to the ship's radar
seeing the satellite. We have had many other demonstrations of these
capabilities to date, to include the most recent intercept test of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system last December, when we combined
the tracks of satellites, early warning radars, Sea Based X-band radar
and forward-based radars on land and at sea to provide the GBIs with a
very accurate track. Additionally, we have also demonstrated the
capability of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as highly accurate forward-based
missile defense sensors in the Navy's ``Stellar Daggers'' series of
intercept tests last spring. Tomorrow we are scheduled to launch a pair
of demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
satellites that will detect and track ballistic missiles over their
entire flight. Over the next few years we will conduct several tests
using the tracking capabilities of these STSS demonstration satellites,
including the launching of an interceptor from an Aegis ship, to
intercept ballistic missile targets. Finally, at our External Sensors
Laboratory at Shriever Air Force Base, CO, we continue to develop new
algorithms and combine new sensor data to achieve even more accurate
tracks than any individual sensor could produce.
A more advanced variant of the SM-3, the SM-3 IIA has been under
development with our Japanese partners since fiscal year 2006. This
interceptor will have the range to defend all of NATO from only a few
small sites. SM-3s are also more affordable than GBIs (you can buy four
to seven production variants of the SM-3s, IA or IB, for the cost of
one GBI). But the key attribute is that we can launch SM-3s from sea or
sites on land, which gives us great flexibility in locating the
interceptor launch point between the origin of the threat launch and
the area we are trying to protect a key enabler to intercepting threat
missiles early in flight. One advantage of land-based SM-3s over the
previous GBI missile field proposal is that they can be relocated if
the direction of the threat changes rather than waiting the more than 5
years needed to construct a new GBI missile field.
I would note that the new Phased Adaptive Approach offers greater
opportunities for our close allies, including Poland and the Czech
Republic, to collaborate on the missile defense architecture--by
hosting sites or providing funding or capabilities that could be linked
to provide a network of missile defenses. Likewise, the radars at
Armavir and Gabala could augment the proposed sensor network and that
type of collaboration could perhaps be a catalyst for Russia to join
countries participating in our cooperative development of missile
defense technologies.
An additional advantage of the Phased Adaptive Approach is that
efforts over the next several years to develop, test, and procure the
sensor, command and control, and interceptor upgrades for deployment of
this architecture have application in the United States and theaters
other than Europe. As an example, if the land-based SM-3 is tested in
Hawaii, it would also provide continuous protection of those Islands.
We are committed to fully funding this program as we prepare for
the next budget submission to Congress. However, it is important that
we have relief from rescissions and the flexibility to spend the unused
fiscal year 2009 RDT&E and some MILCON dollars associated with the
previous European Site proposal. With relief from some of the
constraints placed on our fiscal year 2009 budget and support for
redirection of some fiscal year 2010 funds, we believe we can start
work on components of this new architecture within our fiscal year 2010
budget request.
I would note that both House and Senate authorizing committees very
presciently included provisions in this year's National Defense
Authorization bill that permit the Department to use fiscal year 2009
and fiscal year 2010 funding for an alternative architecture once the
Secretary of Defense certifies that this architecture is expected to be
consistent with the direction from the North Atlantic Council,
operationally effective and cost-effective, and interoperable with
other missile defense components. I believe the President's new plan
meets these criteria and would strongly reinforce NATO's overall
approach to missile defense.
My assessment is that executing this approach is challenging, but
no more challenging than the development of other missile defense
technologies. It is more adaptable, survivable, affordable, and
responsive than the previous proposal, while enhancing the defense of
the U.S. Homeland and our European allies. There will be setbacks, but
the engineering is executable and development risks are manageable.
I look forward to discussing the specifics of the Phased, Adaptive
Approach with Members and staff in this and other forums.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General O'Reilly.
General Cartwright.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, VICE CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Cartwright. Chairman Levin and Senator McCain,
thank you for this opportunity. I've had the privilege of
working in the missile defense architecture and warfighting
requirements for over 10 years now, both on the Joint Staff as
a combatant commander and now as the Vice Chairman.
The congressionally-directed BMD review has provided the
opportunity to review our objectives, the threat, the combatant
commander's needs, and the technologies available to fulfill
their needs. Our recommendations are not a departure from the
objectives. The needs of the combatant commanders, however,
reflect an adjustment in the balance of our capabilities in
response to the threats they face today and the threats that
are clearly visible on the horizon.
My colleagues have laid that case before you. You asked me
to address the architecture and the broader implications of our
recommendations across all of our combatant commanders. First
in the objectives, we remain solid in defense of the homeland,
deployed forces, friends and allies. The architecture remains
associated with the phases of flight of a ballistic missile:
boost, midcourse, and terminal. Integration of the midcourse
and the terminal is probably our most recent demonstrated
capability. Midcourse is associated with the GBIs that are
currently based in Alaska and California and usually associated
with ICBMs. The terminal phase, that phase in which the missile
comes back down into the atmosphere towards its target, was
demonstrated in our deployment of the Theater High Altitude
Area Defense ( THAAD) capabilities in the SM-3 to Hawaii last
July when we were defending against a potential launch of a TD-
2 from North Korea. This was the initial integration and,
rudimentary as it was, started to demonstrate the value of
being able to integrate across the architecture the phases of
flight, the weapons, and the sensors.
We still remain committed to addressing all of the range of
ballistic missiles from short to ICBMs, and all of the various
launch venues, from pads to silos to mobile launchers. These
are critical to our combatant commanders in their addressal.
We also remain committed to what has been referred to as
rudimentary threats, the two, three to five missiles
potentially coming out of a rogue nation. But in addition to
that, the combatant commanders need the ability to defend our
forces deployed in the field and our allies against raids. We
have seen in the video clips over the last couple of years the
raid-type demonstration, salvo launches out of Iran. These are
troubling.
Current systems developed for point defense can handle two
or three inbound missiles. We need to move forward to be able
to handle these raids. They are critical to the defense and
they are critical to our combatant commanders.
On the other side of the coin here, as a friendly, we
remain committed to the defense of the homeland, a theater
capability, which is emerging with the SM-3 and the THAAD
systems, and our point defense capabilities, which are handled
by our Patriot PAC-3 systems. The point defense systems that we
have deployed today are capable of handling large population
areas, seaports, airports, bases where our forces are deployed.
Theater systems are for the general area associated with a
combatant commander's area of operations and they are necessary
and they are emerging as the greatest need that we have today,
that we face out there against these short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles.
Adaptive and responsive are two attributes that we find
critical. As General O'Reilly said, the first leverage point
that we have in our technologies is the common command and
control system. This is a global system. This is not a regional
system. This is not a platform system. This is a global system
that integrates sensors, weapons, puts them together in a way
that optimizes their use in the theater and across the globe.
Fixed, relocatable, and mobile systems are also critical to
us. The fixed systems are the easiest to operate. They are the
most permanent. They give you an enduring capability. The
relocatable systems accept the fact that the threat may change,
that the enemy may change their approach to the problem, and in
days or weeks we are able to move these relocatable, mostly
sensors, some weapons, to places that are more advantageous
based on the threat that emerges. Our mobile systems are the
most adaptable. They are available to reinforce. They are
available to fill in which threats change quickly, and they are
globally deployable, most notably on the Aegis platform.
Any weapon, any sensor, is where we're headed. Our ability
to net together any weapon and any sensor and create the
opportunity for a fire control solution is critical to the
architecture as we build it.
We are in the process here, as we demonstrate in the
European architecture and the phases, moving to a construct
that General O'Reilly alluded to when we shot down the errant
satellite, which is to understand that, particularly with our
SM-3 and our Patriot, the weapons are far more capable than
their organic sensors. They have greater kinematic ranges, they
have better ability to intercept if they're put with a more
capable sensor.
So what you see in the early phases, phases one and two of
this Europe capability and moving to phase three, is really the
acknowledgment that we are pairing longer range sensors with
weapons that are capable of flying longer ranges, but are
currently paired with sensors that can't see far enough to get
them out there. That's probably the biggest advantage and the
biggest differentiation between phases one, two, and three.
There are hardware differences, but the reality is what
we're doing here is taking advantage of systems that we already
have, pairing them up with sensors that can reach out further
and address the threats. They also, these new sensors, are able
to address raid-sized threats. Organic sensors can handle a
very limited number of inbound targets. These newer, larger
sensors that are relocatable, that we are putting out, are
capable of handling raids and capable of seeing much further
out, and therefore give us a much greater defended space.
Another attribute that we're very interested in with this
new architecture is the idea of a collective defense. This is
not a U.S.-only approach. In other words, first and foremost
many nations have bought the Patriot system. Many nations have
bought the Aegis system. They can be integrated and are being
integrated into this architecture and this command and control
system. Probably the most visible example are the Japanese and
their integration of their Aegis systems. The South Koreans are
following very quickly behind that.
The many Patriot systems that are deployed, particularly
throughout Europe and the rest of the world, are easily
integrated into this system. That to us is a very high leverage
issue. In other words, we don't have to buy all of these
weapons, nor do we have to buy all of these sensors.
In the case of indigenous systems, for instance the Arrow
associated with the Israelis, we are integrating that weapons
system into this architecture. That opportunity gives us a
great amount of flexibility as we move to the future. We're
also integrating other nations' sensors into this system. So
this opportunity has a much broader leverage point in its
collective nature and its ability to integrate both U.S.
systems that have been sold abroad and indigenous systems from
other countries into the architecture.
That allows us also to adapt to the threat as it emerges
and where it emerges, and we are not locked to any one single
location to address the threat that evolves over the next few
years.
The last attribute that I'd like to talk to in this
architecture is the multi-mission attribute. Today we are
focused on ballistic missiles. The reality is that we have
challenges with cruise missiles. This command and control
system, these weapons systems, can be adapted, can handle
cruise missile type capabilities. They also are capable of
handling air threats, and we can adapt this into our warning
system and we can also bring this system--and are about to
demonstrate over the next couple of months--online to be able
to handle space situation awareness, something that is the
number one issue associated with U.S. Strategic Command's
(STRATCOM) space mission, our ability to do space situation
awareness. These sensors, based on software programming, can
handle that mission as well.
So we get several bangs for the buck, as the chairman said,
more than a three-fer really here, sir, I believe, out of this
system. It is adaptable, it is resilient. It has the ability
and the flexibility to go after the threats as they emerge, to
lead turn the threats when necessary, and to reinforce in areas
where we did not plan to be.
I thank you for this opportunity and I stand ready for your
questions, sir.
Chairman Levin. General, thank you.
Why don't we try a 7-minute first round for questioning. We
have a number of Senators here.
General Cartwright, is it correct that the new approach
that was approved by the President has the unanimous support of
the Joint Chiefs?
General Cartwright. It does, sir, and also the combatant
commanders.
Chairman Levin. Would you say that this is a strong support
from the Chiefs?
General Cartwright. It is unwavering.
Chairman Levin. Did the Chiefs have a role in developing
this recommendation?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. We did this under the aegis
of the BMD review that was directed by Congress. We had started
this review actually 3 years ago when we adjusted many of our
buy rates towards the SM-3 and the development of the THAAD.
That was an input from the combatant commanders that came in
during one of our defense senior leader conferences. We have
worked that hard with the combatant commanders, and the Chiefs
and the commanders believe this is the right way to go.
Chairman Levin. Now, there's been a suggestion that this
new approach represents a reduction in our security commitment
to our allies, particularly to Poland and the Czech Republic.
My question is this, General. Would you and the Chiefs make a
recommendation that diminishes our commitment to our NATO
allies?
General Cartwright. I can't forecast what we wouldn't do,
but I've never seen that trend.
Chairman Levin. It's also been suggested and stated that
this is a better, faster way to deal with the Iranian threat.
Is it?
General Cartwright. It is, and also the North Korean
threat.
Chairman Levin. You've described as to why it is, so I'm
not going to ask you to go through that again. But do the
Chiefs agree that this is a better, faster way to deal with the
Iranian missile threat?
General Cartwright. They do. There is particularly solid
support both from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the
Chief of Naval Operations as they move forward. The Chief of
Naval Operations has a very large play in this as we move to
the SM-3. His support, both at sea and now on land, of that
system is solid. He is a strong advocate for that approach.
Chairman Levin. Now, it's also been suggested that this
recommendation and decision was aimed at placating Russia. Is
that at all a factor in the Chiefs' recommendation?
General Cartwright. Not in the Chiefs' recommendation, no,
sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, Secretary Flournoy, you quoted Prime
Minister Tusk of Poland, and there were some early comments
from some Polish leaders which were very critical. It seems
that the later comments, as I quote in my opening comments, are
much more supportive. But nonetheless, you've quoted Tusk as
saying that this represents a real chance to strengthen
European security. Is that the Polish position or is the
earlier position the Polish position?
Ms. Flournoy. I believe that what I quoted from the Polish
prime minister is the Polish position. I think that some of the
early reactions, frankly, were based on erroneous and
speculative press reporting. It was before they had actually
been briefed by us on the full degree of the plan. It was
before they had a chance to talk with President Obama,
Secretary Clinton, and others. I think once they understood
what it was we were actually proposing, they're quite pleased
with the proposal.
Chairman Levin. Why was there not an earlier briefing or
conversation with them?
Ms. Flournoy. There were earlier briefings on missile
defense in general and some of the ideas we were thinking
about, going back to the spring. I think as we got closer to a
decision one of the challenges we faced was that we started to
have a number of leaks from various discussions, and again that
led to speculative reporting. So I think that accelerated the
timeline for actually making the decision public. We wanted to
set the record straight.
Chairman Levin. You say that you met with the Poles and the
Czechs recently?
Ms. Flournoy. Last week. A team of us went out last week,
yes, before the President announced his decision.
Chairman Levin. That was before?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Is that the same meeting, General O'Reilly,
that you made reference to?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. What was the reaction or the response at
that meeting to what you told them?
Ms. Flournoy. I think at those meetings they were taking in
a lot of information. It was somewhat contrary to what they had
read in the press and therefore expected. But literally over
the course of the day, I think the reaction became quite
positive. Particularly by the time we got to the North Atlantic
Council (NAC), and were able to brief all of the NATO permanent
representatives there, we got a uniformly positive response.
Chairman Levin. Were the Poles and the Czechs part of the
NAC meeting?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes.
Chairman Levin. They were at that NAC meeting?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, they were.
Chairman Levin. That was a uniform response?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes. They were all very supportive and then,
by then, looking to discuss, well, how do we actually solidify
our continued participation in the new architecture.
Chairman Levin. Were you at that meeting at the NAC also?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes.
Chairman Levin. No, no. I'm asking General O'Reilly.
General O'Reilly. Yes. Secretary Flournoy and I briefed the
NAC that afternoon.
Chairman Levin. Would you describe the reaction at the NAC,
including the representatives from the Czech Republic and
Poland, as she did?
General O'Reilly. Yes, very positive.
Chairman Levin. In terms of the Russia issue, General
O'Reilly, about the possibility of U.S.-Russian missile defense
cooperation. Is there any advantage in that technically to us
if there were such cooperation? If we can work out something
with the Russian radar, for instance, is that of value to us?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, it would be. Again, as I stated
before, it's not necessary. However, both the geographic
locations of Gabala and Armavir provide different views of the
Iranian missile space and that would enhance our accuracy of
our early tracks. Not only that; those are very large radars
and they have significant power to not only observe Iran, but
the entire region way beyond what our smaller forward-based
radars would. So there would be a technical enhancement of
that.
Chairman Levin. Now, in terms of that radar, have you had
discussions with the Russians? Have you had technical
discussions with the Russians? Have you met with them?
General O'Reilly. Over the past several years, yes, sir.
The last was May of this year.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Flournoy, if we were able to
involve the Russians somehow in a missile defense system and
gain the benefit of their radar information, for instance, in
addition to being useful technically, not necessary but
advantageous, as General O'Reilly has just told us, would there
be a positive powerful political signal to Iran if we could
involve Russia in a joint missile defense?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes. I think anything we can do to show Iran
a united front would be very helpful. I also think it would
help to get the Russians over the hump of not viewing any of
our missile defense activities as threatening to them. It's
never been the case and it shouldn't be viewed as such.
Chairman Levin. Did we cave to the Russians in doing this
in any sense?
Ms. Flournoy. No. I was part of many of the decisionmaking
meetings. That was not the driving factor. This has never been
about Russia.
Chairman Levin. General Cartwright, do you agree with that?
General Cartwright. I do. I've been in most all of those
decisionmaking processes with the Secretary.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses, and I won't take too
long because the issue has been decided in really remarkable
fashion, in the category you can't make it up.
For Czech Prime Minister Jan Fischer, the news came in a
call hastily placed by President Barack Obama shortly after
midnight on Thursday in Prague. In Warsaw, his Polish
counterpart Donald Tusk initially declined to answer the phone
from the White House as he guessed the purpose from the unusual
timing and wanted to prepare a response.
I'm so pleased to hear that our allies now are pleased and
happy, but I guess the report of yesterday that says
``President Kaczynski has said that if he meets President Obama
at today's U.N. General Assembly he will not try to hide his
disappointment over the anti-missile shield decision.''
Kaczynski, presently in New York, is quoted on TV in 24 News as
saying ``I do not intend to say that we are satisfied.'' It
goes on.
The Foreign Minister of Poland said: ``I hope this will
prove a salutary shock, especially for the right end of
Poland's political spectrum,'' Sikorski told TOK-FM Radio,
adding ``It could lead some to rethink the dream of basing
everything on a bilateral alliance with the United States. We
are a European country and here first and foremost we must seek
our security guarantees.'' I think that message is very clear,
so I'll ask to have included in the record these many comments.
Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, I have over a long life had
many, many contacts and relationships with individuals and
leaders and former leaders of both Poland and the Czech
Republic and I can tell you their comments to me are not that
they are satisfied. In fact, they were surprised--midnight
phone calls--and very much disturbed by what is perceived to be
by them and in the world a unilateral concession to the
Russians in order to hope that we can get cooperation from the
Russians in trying to address the Iranian nuclear issue.
So I guess I should have to comment also that, as short a
time ago before this committee on March 10, 2009, Lieutenant
General Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
testified: ``Iran's 2 February 2009 launch of the Sofir space
launch vehicle shows progress in mastering the technology
needed to produce ICBMs. Iran has boosted the lethality and
effectiveness of existing missile systems with accuracy
improvements and new sub-munition payloads.''
In 2009, NDA stated: ``Iran continues to develop ballistic
missiles capable of striking Israel and Central Europe and
could have an ICBM capability of reaching the United States''--
this was just last May--``the United States before 2015.''
General Cartwright, you stated back in February that the
technologies for boosting satellites into space ``are
compatible with an ICBM-type capability.'' You did clarify that
this was not a long-range missile, but it was the path towards
that, and that we should be concerned with it.
I don't have access to intelligence information, but I
think perhaps one would interpret your remarks today as a
significant shift from testimony a short time ago, this past
May. Is that an accurate assumption, General Cartwright?
General Cartwright. I think from the standpoint of the
space launch that the Iranians conducted and their
demonstration of the ability to stage, that they are getting at
the early phases of an ICBM capability. I still believe that to
be the case. But they have several phases that they must go
through yet that will take them measured in years rather than
months to accomplish.
Those phases are very visible, and that's one of the key
considerations for us to watch. Any time you start to work with
reentry vehicles, any time you start to move in that direction,
that is very visible activity and generally takes a nation
several years to accomplish. That doesn't include mating it to
a weapon.
So we are concerned about the progress and the technologies
that the Iranians are demonstrating them. The pace at which
they're demonstrating them has been stretched out more than we
originally believed was going to be the case.
Senator McCain. Then I guess, General Cartwright, isn't it
true that the North Koreans were not anticipated by the
Intelligence Communities? I think I can provide a factual
record to substantiate that.
General Cartwright. I think the twist in the North Korean
case in the Taepodong 2 systems has been the movement toward
the space capability, which demonstrates again probably the
same or similar----
Senator McCain. The question, General Cartwright, is did we
miss? Did we have wrong intelligence information about the
progress that the North Koreans had made, both in their nuclear
capability and their missile capability?
General Cartwright. I think that the intelligence, as you
say, sir, has been wrong on that.
Senator McCain. I have one more question. I understand that
now it will be sea-based, part of our missile defense shield
will be in sea-based missile defense weaponry; is that correct?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Does that mean that we could anticipate a
budget request for more ships?
General Cartwright. I'd have to go back and look. Right now
we are modifying existing ships and existing classes of ships.
[The information referred to follows:]
Full analysis of the long-term programmatic impact of the Phased
Adaptive Approach on shipbuilding requirements is ongoing, but it is
unlikely to require additional ships be built to support Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD). With 80 Aegis ships in the fleet today, we have
outfitted 19 with a BMD capability and have programmed funding to
convert up to 27 total. Should the need for additional Aegis BMD assets
be determined, some additional existing ships could be upgraded with
BMD capabilities.
Senator McCain. We're certainly giving them additional
missions.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright,
General O'Reilly. Based on previous conversations that I've
been privileged to have with the three of you and based on a
sense of the Senate amendment that Senator Sessions and I
presented to the Senate that was adopted on our defense
authorization bill just 2 months ago in July, I would guess
that you will not be surprised to hear that I am disappointed
by the administration's decision to scrap the Polish-Czech
ground-based midcourse defense and go to this new system.
I am disappointed and frankly troubled because I believe
that it opens a much greater risk of a period of time during
which we, the United States, will not have an adequate defense
against an ICBM, long-range missile, fired, launched, from Iran
against the United States. That's serious stuff.
I understand every strategy that one adopts has risks, but
to me in making this judgment to change direction based on the
intelligence, which I'll get to in a minute, to give a somewhat
greater protection than the Polish-Czech system to our allies
in Europe and the Middle East, we are giving less protection to
the continental United States if we are targeted by an Iranian
long-range ballistic missile.
Let me come back and just explain why I get to this point.
What's the Iranian threat? I understand the intelligence that
you've described. I was going to quote General Maples and
General Craddock earlier this year talking about their concerns
about an ICBM program development by the Iranians. I want to
take a look at some of the intelligence that you base this on.
I'm going to ask for a briefing on it.
But here's my concern. If we now have reached, based on an
updated threat assessment, the conclusion that the short- and
medium-range missile programs, ballistic missile programs of
Iran, are further developed than we thought, to me that
suggests even more likelihood that their ICBM program may break
out sooner than we currently estimate, which is 2015, and face
the U.S. with a threat.
There was a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report which
I know I've discussed with you before, which had a big effect
on me. It just came out in February of this year, and it had
two maps. I have it too small here, but one basically shows the
protection that the silo-based GBIs in Poland would give to the
United States. It covers the entire United States. What's the
significance of this? Some people call it redundant.
``Redundant'' is a word that may to some people mean
unnecessary. We properly build redundancy into our planes, our
helicopters, our ships, our tanks. Why? Because if one system
fails we want to make sure that there's a backup system to
protect us.
We're talking here about the potential of a ballistic
missile attack on the United States of America. Fortunately, we
have the two sites in California and Alaska. But the GBI in
Poland gave us what I believe is our desired, our best strategy
here, which is the so-called shoot, look, and shoot option. A
missile is launched from Iran, we have a first shot from Poland
as it's ascending. If we miss it, we have a second shot from
California and Alaska.
With the alternative that you're proposing here, most of
the United States west of the Mississippi only has protection
from those two sites in California and Alaska. They don't have
that first shot at that incoming missile from the Polish site.
Now, I know you've said in the proposal you've made that the
SM-3 Block IIA variant will be expected to be ready in 2018 and
it will increase the defensive capability to include long-range
missile threats to the United States. SM-3 Block IIB hopefully
will be ready by 2020, will provide a significant defense
against the ICBM threat.
But here's my concern. The GBI is built, the ones that
we're going to put in Poland. It's ready to be tested.
Something we may want to deal with on the floor when the
defense appropriations bill comes up, they've taken a lot of
the money out for the testing of those GBIs.
Incidentally, they were supposed to be ready in 2015.
I think they still can be ready in 2015 at the Polish-Czech
sites if we give it adequate money. What's holding it up is not
the technology developments; it's Congress holding back on
money.
So the GBI we're going to put in Poland is done. It just is
ready to be tested. Those two other systems that are part of
the new proposal, which would give us the redundant protection
of the United States against an ICBM from Iran, the SM-3 Block
IIA and Block IIB--I may be overstating it by saying they're
paper missiles, but they're in an early development stage.
They're nowhere near where the GBI is. So that's why I am so
concerned about the impact of this decision on the protection
of the United States from an Iranian ICBM.
I suppose one question I'd ask, and I think if folks were
here from the previous administration they might say, although
maybe you'd quibble, or maybe even I would quibble a little
bit, that their program was to do both of these things, their
program was to develop systems to protect Europe and the Middle
East from the short- and medium-range missiles, but also with
the Polish-Czech system to protect the continental United
States from a long-range missile shorter.
So I guess I had a lot to say, so I used most of my
question time. But why not do both? Why not accept your
proposal for the improved defense of Europe and the Middle East
from the short- and medium-range missiles from Iran and
continue the Polish-Czech system, which provides the redundant,
but I think all of us would like to feel that we have two shots
at a missile coming toward the United States from Iran, rather
than putting all our hopes in one.
General Cartwright?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. Much of what you say was in
the calculus of at least my perspective and the Chiefs as we
worked our way through this. I'll defer to General O'Reilly,
but the addition of the ten GBIs in Poland from a mathematical
standpoint--everybody worries about the ambiguity of that, but
the difference in probability of success was somewhere between
a .92 as it stands and using the interceptors from the United
States. Adding the interceptors from Poland got us up maybe as
high as .96, but probably in the .95, .94 area. That's a major
investment.
What it did not do was twofold, what worries us the most.
The first is----
Chairman Levin. I'm not sure what you mean. You say it
added very little, is that the point?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. In probability of success of
the engagement, it added very little.
Senator Lieberman. Very little to the defense of the United
States against a long-range missile?
General Cartwright. To the defense of the United States
against an ICBM threat from Iran.
Senator Lieberman. I'm surprised to hear that. That's not
what the CBO stated.
General Cartwright. I'll defer to General O'Reilly to go
through the data.
The two things that were most troubling for us was the
potential for building more than three to five of these
missiles, ICBMs, by Iran, that we would need to have scale and
be able to address at an affordable price a large number of
missiles. Now, maybe that's ten. I don't know what they're
going to do.
You referred to the last administration, and the second
piece that was very compelling to us was that in the discussion
of a boost, midcourse, and terminal. We now have a terminal.
The GBIs give us a midcourse. We have no boost, no credible
boost capability. What this development program does--and I
agree with you, it is more than paper, but in that class--it
gives us the potential to get at the boost phase, which is by
all accounts and all analysis the most effective way to take on
the threat. The threat is most vulnerable as it is ascending.
It can't defend itself, it can't maneuver. It is very ballistic
at that stage. If we can get it at that stage, we can thin out
the threat substantially, if not eliminate it.
That was the most compelling discussion about the
technology to be that weighed in our decision process, sir. So
I don't disagree with you and redundancy is something that
we're looking for. We went with the redundancy of getting all
three phases of flight as a balancing activity that was
available to us now, rather than putting all of our eggs into
the midcourse, very expensive, very sophisticated intercepts.
I take your criticism.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate what you've said.
My time is up. I just want to say that my hope would have
been, of course I'd like to see us develop a boost phase
capability to knock down a missile, but the consequences of an
Iranian long-range ballistic missile attack on the United
States are catastrophic. We're just a day after Ahmadinejad
speaks to the United Nations with the most poisonous, primitive
attacks on the United States and Israel. The United States is
what we're talking about and really the west. I would have
preferred to see us go with parts of the new system, with the
whole new system, and continue the Polish-Czech development,
because that would have given us the midcourse, shoot-look-
shoot, and an investment in a capacity we'd like, we really
need to have, which is the boost phase as well.
We'll continue the discussion. My time is up. Thank you.
Ms. Flournoy. May I add a response? Is that okay, sir?
Chairman Levin. Yes. I think you're entitled.
Ms. Flournoy. Thank you.
I just wanted to say that our boss, Secretary Gates, as a
former Director of Central Intelligence is very aware of how we
can be wrong in our intelligence estimates. He's also the
Secretary that signed the program of record. So as I watched
him go through this decision----
Chairman Levin. What does that mean, ``program of record''?
Ms. Flournoy. Meaning he is the person who put forward the
previous plan in the previous administration.
So as I watched him go through this decisionmaking process,
he asked a lot of the same questions that you've raised. In
order to support the new system, he had to be convinced of a
couple things: first, that we could still defend the U.S.
Homeland should an Iranian ballistic ICBM threat develop
earlier than what was being predicted; second, that we would
have options, technical options, should the development of the
later blocks, Block II of SM-3 missile, either fail or be
delayed.
He raised those specific issues. I think in designing the
new architecture, by putting in the TPY-2 radar early that
closes the notch in our coverage for the homeland and gives you
that extra ability to see what's coming at you and makes the
GBIs in the United States more effective. Second, we are going
to continue the development of the two-stage GBI as a
technological hedge.
So he asked exactly the questions that you're asking,
Senator. But he, working through the details, became convinced
that this system could and would adequately protect, fully
protect, the U.S. Homeland even as we move towards a more cost-
effective way to protect Europe over time as well.
Senator Lieberman. I have the greatest respect for
Secretary Gates. I'm reassured that he asked the same
questions. But I'm not reassured by the answers, as he
apparently was.
Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman's comment about the
poisonous rhetoric of Ahmadinejad I think would be shared by
probably every member of this committee. Poisonous indeed they
were, and I think we all recognize what the Iranian threat is
and want to deal with it.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess I would agree with the last two questioners,
particularly when Senator McCain said this thing's done anyway.
You guys have made up your mind. We'll do all we can through
our process to change that.
I just want to get in the record a couple of things that I
observe. I coincidentally happened to be in Poland when
President Kaczynski made the statement, when he said that he
believes the United States will honor the agreement to build
the missile defense in this country. ``A deal was signed''--I'm
quoting now--``and I think that, regardless of which
administration is in power in the United States, agreements are
going to be honored.''
He asked me the question, are these agreements going to be
honored? I said yes, these agreements are going to be honored;
America doesn't do this.
In addition to the statements that were entered into the
record by Senator McCain, the betrayal, no radar, Russia won,
one of them he overlooked was in the second largest newspapers:
``An ally we rely on has betrayed us in exchange for its own
better relations with Russia.''
Just one comment. We were talking about the significance of
the boost phase and yet this budget virtually kills one of the
things we were working on, the kinetic energy interceptor, and
then the second test of the Airborne Laser.
What I want to do is, when we talk about the fact that
we're somehow going to do a better job for Western Europe and
Eastern Europe by accelerating our activity and becoming more
aggressive with the SM-3 and the THAAD, it's interesting
because this budget calls for the termination or at least no
more THAADs and cuts the SM-3s down from 24 to 18.
Just real quickly, for a yes or no question: Are you going
to make an amended request in terms of the THAAD and the SM-3
in light of this new development that apparently happened since
the budget request?
General O'Reilly. No, sir, we're not, and the reason----
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Well, could he explain it?
General O'Reilly. The reason is the policy, the funding
policy up until now, sir, was we would buy missiles in pieces.
That's an exception to the rule for the Department of Defense
and MDA was allowed to do that. Starting this year, we no
longer have that option, and when we fund we're actually
funding $400 million more for SM-3 and THAAD missiles this year
than before, because we're buying those missiles in their
totality.
So we are spending $400 million more than previously on
those interceptors and we're buying them in full-up, full
production price that we pay for.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that's fine. I heard that before and
I don't agree with that.
Of the people at this table up here, the one I think should
be most concerned would be the Senator from Maine, because as I
look at the overlay map that Senator Lieberman was using, but
mine's a little bit larger, as to what our capability, what our
protection is right now with what we have in Alaska and
California, it even cuts Maine in half up there. I want you to
know that, I say to Senator Collins. You should be concerned.
But it shows that the capability is from the western United
States. So obviously something coming from the west, that gives
us a good capability. Something from the east, obviously it
does not give us the capability that makes us comfortable.
During the Bush administration--and all of you were around at
that time--they emphasized, this is not just for Europe; this
is for a potential ICBM that comes to the United States.
Now, with that in mind, I want to get a couple of things in
the record just to show what is happening over there. I've said
this several times up here and there's not time to give the
whole story, but when we were talking about the Taepodong 1
capability that we thought was developing in North Korea, our
intelligence estimate said on August 24, 1998, that it would be
another couple or 3 years, and they fired one 7 days later, on
August 31.
On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a three-stage
Taepodong 2. The current range of North Korea's missiles is
five times further than it was in 1990. North Korea has sold
ballistic missiles to several countries, and technology. I
don't think there's anyone in this room on either side of this
table who doesn't believe that anything that North Korea has
can very easily end up in Iran.
This is very significant--a satellite, three-stage liquid-
fueled rocket demonstration, the same propulsion that it takes
to send up a satellite could be used, as you have said and I
think someone else, I think Senator McCain, already quoted you,
General Cartwright, when you stated on February 10 that that
same technology could be used. So we all understand that.
Now, this is what I'm getting around to. The Department of
Defense in the 2009 MDA, they said: ``Iran continues to develop
ballistic missile capability of striking Israel and Central
Europe and could have the ICBM capability of reaching the
United States in 2015.'' I think several of us have said that
now, so let's assume that that's a fact.
Let's assume also that the SM-3 IIB would have the same
capability as a GBI would have had as originally designed. I
don't think anyone's going to disagree with those two things.
So the question to me is very similar to the question, but I'm
asking it a little different way, of Senator Lieberman. That
is, if we were to have stayed with the GBI--it was going to be
2013, we all understand that. Well this is what the estimates
say. This was put together and I'm always gone on that
assumption.
Then they said, well, maybe, since we slipped a year, it
could be 2015. So let's just say 2015, or if you want to go all
the way to 2017.
Now, shift over to the SM-3 IIB. I think we discussed and I
think it was in the written testimony of one of the three of
you because I saw it, that that would be 2020, and that was
repeated by Senator Lieberman. So regardless, if you put those
three things together, if they have that capability by 2015 and
we could have had the capability of knocking it down by that
time or even a year later, no matter how you match these up
it's another 3 years of exposure that we would have as a result
of shifting from the GBI to potentially the SM-3 IIB.
Where am I wrong?
General O'Reilly. First of all, sir, it's always been that
once we start construction it's 5 years to build the missile
field. That's been consistent for the last several years. It's
when that start point will occur has always been what has moved
those dates 4\1/2\ years for the European midcourse radar.
For the IIB, it is not a brand-new development. I was
responsible for the development of the GBI and the THAAD and
the Patriot and now I'm responsible for the SM-3. Looking at
that, the SM-3 is more of an evolutionary technical growth,
built on existing components and built on more mature models
than what we've had before. We also, as we testified earlier
this year, have a much more extensive test program in order to
validate this. Our decision process previously was we were
deploying the GBIs, but, as we stated earlier, most of the
testing, including all of the testing against ICBMs, remains to
occur.
In this approach, those timelines were extended because we
were laying out a program that tests first. Then decisions are
made based on those tests, including operational assessments:
Should we go forward? Yes, sir, that does extend time, and
that's when we arrived at the 2020 timeframe.
Could it occur earlier? Yes, it could, but we have laid in
that significant amount of testing.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired,
but, as Senator Lieberman said, when we're looking at the GBI
capability, it's ready to test, ready to go. I still believe
that as a result of this that we are exposing ourselves in the
eastern part for probably 3 years. Any way you line up these
numbers, I think it comes to that conclusion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Cartwright, in countering potential threats like
the potential threat from Iran, do we solely rely on our anti-
missile defense?
General Cartwright. No, sir. There is a robust program by
Central Command (CENTCOM) to address them across a myriad of
different capabilities. So missile defense is but one element.
There is an offensive force element, obviously, and a credible
one, that is represented by CENTCOM. There are also activities
associated with counter-proliferation, nonproliferation,
consequence management, both here in the United States and
overseas, to protect our forces and to protect populations.
So we try to go at this as holistically as possible. This
is but one element of that deterrent strategy.
Senator Reed. It's your professional judgment that this
approach strengthens that holistic approach to the defense of
the Nation and also our forces in the field against missiles?
General Cartwright. It does from a technical standpoint. I
believe that it also does from a standpoint of what most
warfighters would talk to, which is in the eyes of your enemy
have you presented a credible case that would potentially
influence their decision process. When you bring all your
allies in line and you're able to speak with one voice and they
can see that that is mounting against them, that has to have an
influence on their decision calculus.
Senator Reed. Let me follow up with another question.
Unfortunately, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as has
been suggested in some of the questions, is a current problem.
If for example a threat would either shift away from Iran or
another threat would arise, this system has I think inherently
more flexibility because of its sea-based and its mobile
sensors to be shifted onto that threat; is that correct?
General Cartwright. That is correct, sir. That is why we
retain the mobile. It is probably the most expensive, but it
gives us the greatest opportunity to hedge against an enemy who
obviously has a vote in how they represent the threat. We're
not exactly consistent on always being able to predict who
we're going to fight with next.
Senator Reed. Right. It's been raised here and it's a very,
very sobering and legitimate point--through proliferation of a
Taepodong to a country that now is not on our list, that site
in Poland might be of absolutely no use to us.
General Cartwright. That's true, sir.
Senator Reed. General O'Reilly, can you just give us an
idea of the tactical risks associated with bringing on the SM-3
Block IIA? You described it's building on a proven product, not
a completely new system, but what are the technical risks you
will have to look for?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we are applying the same type of
seeker technology that we are developing for the IIB, and we've
actually tested it on aircraft. We've observed missile
launches. We have a very well characterized design for that,
for the IB. That is also, that design is going to be carried
forward for the IIA. We might say, it's a very good design and
it also has applicability, if not exact use, for a IIB.
The second is the booster itself. It's a 21-inch booster.
The GBI for reference is a 25-ton missile. The SM-3 IA is a 1-
ton missile, 25 times smaller. The IIB is 2 tons, twice as big.
But that technology, the way we steer it, the way we operate
it, gives it aerodynamic control, is a direct scale from what
we are doing with the current missile.
We understand the flight environments. So we're able to
qualify the components on the ground before we fly them.
Senator Reed. Are you reasonably confident that you can
overcome any technical issues and come in on time, as well as
on target, we hope?
General O'Reilly. Sir, absolutely, because the timelines we
have laid out take into account having problems and having
failed flight tests and recovering from those problems. So this
is not a very aggressive timeline, given where we are in the
development of this.
Senator Reed. Let me ask another question. If intelligence
developed that would suggest the threat period is moving
forward, you have the opportunity to accelerate the program?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. In fact, just to give an idea
of the maturity of these technologies, our first time we fly
the IB next year we will actually intercept. Typically, you
have four or five flights, but we understand this technology to
the point we don't see the benefit there. We could always go
back to a contingency deployment, where the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense will tell me to
deploy a capability that hasn't been fully characterized. We do
that today in Japan and Israel and we could do that here.
Senator Reed. Just a final question, General Cartwright. It
goes to the number of ships that the Navy will need to carry
out this strategy. You've indicated you're in the process of
converting Aegis destroyers or destroyers----
General Cartwright. The Spruance class. There are cruisers
and destroyers there that are capable of this.
Senator Reed. You're doing it. Part of that also would
involve forward basing, I presume?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. What we're working on right
now is the early stages, what we were calling phase one, is
mostly associated with ship-based capability. Then we move to
land-based because that's infinitely cheaper and doesn't tie
down a multi-purpose ship to one function. But we always retain
the capability to surge.
What we're thinking right now--and this is early stage
concept of operations--is that we would like to see the ability
to have two ships per station for three stations, so a total of
six. That's generally the way we operate in Japan versus North
Korea. That allows one off station, one on station. A magazine
on any one of these ships is 100, plus or minus, the capability
of 100, plus or minus, missiles.
Senator Reed. I know, I think, that Spain and Norway, as
well as South Korea, Australia, and Japan, have Aegis systems,
and you're actively talking to them to augment our efforts?
General Cartwright. That'll be part of the way forward over
the next year, is to sit down and talk. The burden-sharing
opportunities here are significant. Many countries have
Patriot, as I said. I would ask General O'Reilly also--the
financial contributions of countries like Japan towards our R&D
have been significant.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. In the case of the Block IIA,
they have invested $1 billion.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
your warm welcome to the committee here today, and I will
strive to work in a bipartisan way, but also, as Senator McCain
said, be spirited when appropriate.
I also want to thank Senator McConnell and my Republican
colleagues for the opportunity to serve on this committee, and
say good morning to Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright
and General O'Reilly. I haven't had a chance to meet you yet,
but I look forward to working with you.
The first thing that I'd like to discuss this morning--and
I'm very impressed with your testimony--is to talk about when
the change of intelligence occurred and when the new technology
became available that would dictate a change in policy. In
preparing for today's hearing, I saw the comments from
Secretary Gates originally recommending this ground-based
missile defense system to the prior administration back in
December 2006, and I have comments that are here before me
which I'd like to read to you from Secretary Gates when he
appeared before this committee in January 2009. He was asked by
Senator Wicker: ``Is it your view that in any event it's
essential that the United States continue its current plan for
missile defense deployment in Eastern Europe?'' The Secretary
said: Well, as I said earlier, we have not had the opportunity
to pursue this in the new administration and discuss the
administration's policy on it. I will say this: All of the NATO
heads of government unanimously last April in Bucharest
endorsed the importance of a NATO-wide European missile defense
capability. So this is a commitment that has been made by the
alliance and so I think we at least need to take it very
seriously.''
There was also discussion in that same meeting from the
Senator from Alaska, Senator Begich, concerning the ground-
based missile defense system that's placed in Alaska. Secretary
Gates, in responding specifically to Alaska, added that ``I
think having a layered defense such as we are building, that
includes the GBIs, is very important.''
So my first question to you goes to, when did this new
intelligence occur? Secretary Flournoy, you said in your
opening statement that the Intelligence Community now assesses
that the threat from Iran's short- and medium-based ballistic
missiles is developing more rapidly and that the longer range
has been slower to develop than previously estimated. So if you
could answer my questions on when did we have this change in
intelligence, and then also we can maybe speak to when did the
technology improve so much that you would have this change in
policy?
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, thank you for the question. I want
to be careful since we're in open session, but there have been
three national intelligence estimates to my knowledge on this
issue. There was one in 2001, one in 2006 that informed the
development of the program of record, the old approach, and
then one that was done, that was completed in the spring, after
Secretary Gates testified, of this year, in 2009.
It's drawing from that most recent estimate, that's where
we're basing our judgment. I am sure that our colleagues from
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence would be
happy to come brief members on that in detail in a closed
session.
But I would just say that, on Secretary Gates's comments
about NATO's endorsement of a BMD system and the importance of
GBIs, I think he would not have agreed--since he is the one who
signed the program of record, who presented it to our NATO
allies, he would not have agreed to this new architecture and
in fact championed it if he were not convinced that we are not
breaking, we are strengthening, our commitment to the defense
of our allies, and that the new system offers both the coverage
that we need for homeland defense and better and faster
coverage that we need of our forces and allies in Europe.
Senator LeMieux. In terms of technology, the two parts of
your assessment of why to have the policy change is: one, this
change of intelligence, which I understand I guess from your
comment is this year, spring 2009; and then also there seems to
be this convergence of a technology change that happens. When
does that occur, that we now believe that this sea-based system
is better than the ground-based system?
General O'Reilly. Sir, first of all, we are proposing both
ground and sea-based in this capability.
But in 2006, and before, when this design was developed, we
had only flown one GBI, not in a test. We had very few actual
flight tests. Since then we've had I believe it's 19 flights,
17 have been successful intercepts. We had not deployed our
most powerful radars and our sensors. We did not demonstrate
until a few months ago, until April of this year, the great
capability, far greater than was estimated, for unattended
aerial vehicles.
So we have in fact executed the program, the technology
program. But we learned from it, and as we learned from it,
number one, it became evident we did not have to rely on the
assumptions that we were making in 2006 that you had to have
very large missiles, they had to be at a fixed site, and you
had to have large radars in order to track, precisely track,
complex clusters that are associated with a missile in flight.
So based on what we have learned, a tremendous amount over
the last 4 years, when you relook at what is a more survivable
network of missile defense capability, it became evident to us
that this was in fact not only more survivable, gave you
greater capability, but what really surprised us back then,
because I was part of that, was looking at the number of
threats we'd have to handle simultaneously.
So what we have observed is the fact that very large
numbers of missiles can be simultaneously launched. As I said
in my earlier testimony this year, it is my primary concern. So
by intercepting early, we're going after the countermeasures,
which we have always been worried about. But the amount of raid
size was what drove us to a different type of architecture to
handle and grow and respond to those raid sizes.
Senator LeMieux. When did you come to that conclusion,
General?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I've been continuously working this
since the early part of this decade. It became evident as we
completed each test, this became more evident to us, our post-
flight reconstructions of what's occurred. So I don't believe
that it's a well characterized representation that there was
some sudden decision. I would say that we executed the
technical program that was laid out over the last 5 years and
we were continually updating our assessments as we went through
that.
Senator LeMieux. I'm just looking for a timeframe, General.
My time has expired. I just wanted to make the point and
understand that when the intelligence change happened and when
the technology change happened and when you had come to those
decisions that would lead to this policy shift and when
Congress was notified based upon those decisions. So I don't
have any further time to ask those questions, but I think the
point that I'm trying to make is that I believe, in echoing
Senator McCain, that there was a need for this body to know
that there was a significant change in policy. It looks like
you made those decisions some time earlier this year without
this body knowing.
But I appreciate your comments today and thank you very
much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCaskill has a
commitment, so I would switch places with her here.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. It's coming at a price. Just kidding.
I think the way this was rolled out is problematic. I think
it's a problem that this appears to have appeared to come out
of whole cloth all of a sudden. The fact that I think that
Czech and Poland were notified, what, at midnight, and we were
not notified at all that this was coming--I think you get
everyone agitated by the way this was rolled out. I would just
say that as an opening comment. I think it was not done as well
as it should have been done for this kind of major shift in our
missile defense policy in this country.
I noticed in the 2010 budget you have asked for a cut of
$1.2 billion in missile defense. But yet clearly by scrapping
this I know you're talking about--I know Secretary Gates talked
about this being more economical. Obviously, General O'Reilly,
you know the kind of record we've had on bloated costs as it's
related to the missile defense program.
I think the SM-3 costs around $65 million apiece. I'm
trying to understand and reconcile, if you were working this
over the last few months, how do you reconcile the request for
cuts to the missile defense program if we are going to be
adding SM-3s? How is the money going to work out here?
General O'Reilly. Ma'am, first of all, our cost estimate is
around $10 million and is what we're paying today for SM-3s,
versus $65 million. Now, a GBI is, the latest estimate, is $70
million, which is closer to the cost you have. But the SM-3 is
a much smaller missile. That class of missile, it's very
reasonable that that's the right cost. That's very similar to a
THAAD cost.
Senator McCaskill. What were you envisioning cutting with
the $1.2 billion? When that figure was submitted, where was
that money supposed to be coming from? The GBIs or the SM-3s?
General O'Reilly. No. The reduction in the cost consists of
three major parts. First of all was the termination of the
Kinetic Energy Interceptor program. Second was the termination
of the Multiple Kill Vehicle program. Third, the largest, was
funding which we were not able to propose that we had
previously envisioned for the European site, due to the
congressional restrictions on using that money. That covered
actually more than the $1.2 billion.
There was additional funding added by Secretary Gates again
to address, to procure more SM-3s and more THAADs.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. Let me turn to Russia for just a
minute. This I think, whether it is intended or unintended,
clearly pleases Russia. As usual, we have no assurances that
they're going to cooperate any more or do anything in addition
in terms of our policies towards Iran, Afghanistan, or NATO.
I never really understood Russia's concerns as to what we
were doing there, and obviously we now have projection as to
Russia conducting operations and missions off the east coast.
We get no substantive offers from Russia in terms of dealing
with the Iranian threat and the ballistic missile threat from
Iran. They have a dominant foothold in Central Asia and in many
ways we have to rely on their approval to get the stuff for our
troops coming through the northern distribution network into
Afghanistan.
Have we gotten anything from Russia for this?
Ms. Flournoy. We did not seek anything from Russia for
this. This was not about Russia. Our going through the BMD
review, this was about how do we ensure that we can deal with
Iranian missile threats to our forces and allies in Europe and
also to our Homeland. So this has never been about that. In
fact, we've been very clear, for example in the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty negotiations, that our negotiations on
offensive forces are not connected to anything we're doing on
missile defense.
We haven't made that linkage and so we have not sought
that. I think there is a broader question about how reset in
the relationship is going, whether that's possible, whether
we're seeing reciprocity on the other side. But that's a
different conversation.
Senator McCaskill. What have the Israelis expressed to you
about the policy change?
Ms. Flournoy. I have not had any specific conversations
with the Israelis about this. But I would say that--and I would
just underscore General Cartwright's point--that the kind of
BMDs that they're building will be able to be very integrated
with the architecture that we're envisioning as well.
Senator McCaskill. Were they informed of this policy change
contemporaneously with Congress or with Czech and Poland? When
were they informed of the policy change?
Ms. Flournoy. I know that it was discussed last week when
Minister Barak was here to meet with Secretary Gates. I do not
know if they had any prior consultation before that.
Senator McCaskill. Are we reassuring the emerging
democracies in the Ukraines and the Georgias and the Polands of
the world that we're really committed? I just worry about their
perceptions of this move. Do you have any comments about the
emerging democracies and what this says to them about our
commitments?
Ms. Flournoy. Again, I think when we went to the North
Atlantic Council one of the things that became clear as the
permanent representatives got beyond the erroneous press
reports and started digesting what we were actually presenting
to them, the reason we got such a positive reaction is they saw
this as a strengthening of U.S. Article 5 commitment to the
defense of Europe and to extended deterrence.
So I think that that has been the intention. That is in
fact the reality of what's in this program. I would hope that
the others on the periphery of Europe would see that same
signal.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
I believe Senator Collins is next.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Cartwright and General O'Reilly, two of my
colleagues have brought up what I believe to be the key issue
for us. That is, does this new strategy provide less protection
to the continental United States? Now, I will tell you that it
was never clear to me that the third site was primarily
intended to strengthen the protection of the United States. I
was under the impression that the two sites in California and
Alaska were adequate to provide protection to the entire
continental United States from an ICBM attack launched by
either the Iranians or the Koreans.
But I must say that the map given to me this morning by
Senator Inhofe does cause me to question the assumption under
which I was operating and the lens through which I was viewing
this new strategy, because, as he has pointed out, it just
barely covers most of my State of Maine. So could you address
this issue, which is, after all, a very important issue to this
committee, of whether or not the two sites that we have now in
California and Alaska provide sufficient coverage to the
continental United States? General O'Reilly?
General O'Reilly. Yes, ma'am. Our analysis indicates we do
have coverage. I've testified and my predecessors have
testified to that. I will have to look at and understand the
details of this new analysis that I'm hearing about today that
we don't.
Senator Collins. General Cartwright?
General Cartwright. I'll let us go back through the
analysis, because we haven't seen the chart. But I would also
say that as we move forward on the SM-3 Block II development,
those ships certainly can protect our deployed forces and
friends and allies overseas. They can also come home. They live
here, and they can be moved to areas that we think have some
sort of increased vulnerability in the future, for which we
don't know why today, but could emerge. So part of what we're
trying to understand here as we move forward is how do we
accommodate something that, either through an analytic process,
through a test process, or through a new threat, somehow
disadvantages any part of the United States, and how can we
ensure that that's taken care of?
We talked a little earlier about defending Hawaii and the
challenges of Hawaii. The same applies as we look at the rest
of the United States, whether it be Alaska or Maine or down in
the southern end of Texas and Florida.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I would ask that you get back
to the committee with an analysis of the CBO study since the
maps do give me pause.
[The information referred to follows:]
Our analysis indicate that Maine is fully protected against both
liquid- and solid-fueled Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
originating in Iran.
Senator Collins. Madam Secretary, you've said three times
this morning: This is not about Russia. You've literally said
that three times. Are you saying then that you do not expect
that this new approach will enhance Russia's willingness to
cooperate to deter Iran? I had thought that would be an
advantage of this new approach, but you've said very
emphatically three times this morning: This is not about
Russia; this has nothing to do with Russia; we haven't asked
anything of Russia. I find that very troubling.
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, we would certainly welcome both
Russia's new view of our missile defense efforts. We would
welcome their willingness to cooperate in things like the
radars and sharing radar data and so forth. We would welcome
strengthened cooperation on things like on Iran and
proliferation writ large.
What I was trying to communicate is that those things that
we would welcome did not drive the substance of this decision.
That's what I was trying to say.
Senator Collins. But do you in fact expect that this new
approach will encourage the Russians to be more cooperative
with us in deterring the Iranians?
Ms. Flournoy. We have never believed that our missile
defenses posed a threat to the Russians.
Senator Collins. No one who has looked at it believes that.
Ms. Flournoy. No, I know. But for whatever reason, they
did. So if they now look at this, this architecture, new
architecture, and finally understand this doesn't pose a threat
to you, and that opens the door for further cooperation, we
would welcome that.
Senator Collins. Finally, as a Senator who participated in
the trip with the chairman this spring, I have to tell you
that, while I think there is merit in the decision the
administration has reached, assuming we can clear up this map,
I am appalled at the poor communication and consultation with
our allies. That clearly could have been done in a far better
way.
When I look at the public comments by the Polish officials,
it seems evident to me that what they did is first give their
real impression of alarm and shock and then, when they realized
that this was the decision and they were going to have to live
with it, they then modified their public comments to try to
accept the reality. I'm just at a loss why there wouldn't have
been better consultation with two allies whom we value so
greatly.
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, if I could, we had begun
consultations in the spring. We certainly would have liked to
have had more time for consultations and for the rollout. One
of the things that happened is as we got more detailed in our
consultations, things started to leak. There started to be a
lot of erroneous discussion in the press. I think the
decisionmaking was proceeding on an analytic basis, that we
were getting ready for a decision. But in terms of the rollout,
it made us try to get the decision and the facts out sooner
rather than later, so that we could correct the record on what
this decision actually involved and what it was about and why
it was being made.
So we too would have preferred a longer period for
consultation and rollout. But leaks and speculation in the
press sort of forced us to go sooner to set the record
straight.
Senator Collins. General, did you want to add to that?
General Cartwright. I think the Secretary has it about
right. I would love to have had a lot more time. We believed
that we were on a path both analytically and politically to
explain alternatives, and we looked through a very broad range
of alternatives as we've worked through this missile defense
review. Some of that was taken away by just the fact that the
information leaked early and then was developed into a position
that was erroneous from a factual standpoint.
I think that we have gone back to our allies and we
continue to go back to our allies, which I would say is another
positive opportunity where we're dealing with preparing the
fiscal year 2011 budget. One of the things we wanted to do was
to give Congress a full year of review of this activity. So in
other words, this is a budget that the Services are just now
submitting to the Department, and we will bring up and have
opportunity with the Hill for a full year of debate about this
way forward.
We lost some of that in this rushed, accelerated release.
But we still are on a path to have a full year of debate about
the fiscal year 2011 budget and its support of this concept.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As one of five Senators who voted against the original
proposal to put the systems into Poland and the Czech Republic,
I think this is just a very important step forward in terms of
how we approach our National defense and also our international
relations. The reason that I was opposed to the original
proposal was due to the cost and the static nature of the
technology, at the same time that it was widely being viewed as
provocative of Russia, at a time when the Russians actually, as
I recall, were offering to cooperate on alternate sites such as
the site in Azerbaijan; and also that it was not really as
proposed doing the job that we were expecting it to do in terms
of the threat from Iran.
What I'm seeing in this particular proposal is really the
way things need to be done, and I congratulate all three of
you. We're putting mobility into a system. We're putting
maneuverability into a system, so that it can address not
simply multiple operational threats, but multiple strategic
threats, at a time when we are really bogged down resources-
wise because of our commitments in places like Iraq and
Afghanistan. Importantly, it allows the adaptation and the
innovation of new technologies as these concepts move forward.
I quite frankly would hope we can start thinking in this
way when it comes to the disposition of troops in places like
Afghanistan, which worry me very much, that we're going to be
bogged down, local defense, when we are facing an enemy that is
highly mobile and loves to take advantage of the fact that we
get in these static positions.
So conceptually, and strategically, I think this is a very
strong step forward. I think it's very important for us as we
consider this to consider also the letter that General Jones
sent. Mr. Chairman, I had to step out of this hearing. I'm not
sure if it was mentioned in terms of the hearing, but General
Jones, the National Security Adviser, former Commandant of the
Marine Corps, former Commander of NATO, under his own signature
wrote a very strong letter in support of this, talking about
how this new architecture will protect Europe sooner, will have
greater capability, greater survivability, flexibility, be cost
effective, and will provide an added layer of defense to
augment the United States. I think that's a pretty strong
statement.
General Cartwright, your testimony I think was very
powerful today in terms of the background that you've had in
this and the conceptual observations you brought to the table.
I think this is something that we've been needing. The
major comment that I would have, Secretary Flournoy, goes to
the point that you've now heard four or five times, about the
need to do a better job explaining the linkage, quite frankly,
to our larger relations with Russia. You've just made the
point, I think quite well, in terms of the response you gave to
Senator Collins. I think the message needs to be very clear as
we're moving forward here that this clearly was not done in
response to any demand from Russia, but at the same time, in
the context of overall relations, it's not necessarily a bad
thing as long as we're acting clearly and solely in the
National interest of the United States.
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, I would agree completely.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, and that letter will be made
part of the record that you made reference to. It has not been
referred to before and I'm glad you raised it.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, you said the GBI would take 5 years to deploy,
which I think makes Senator Inhofe's point. The same year that
we predict Iran will have an ICBM capability that could reach
the United States is 2015. The SM-3 IIB won't be fielded until
2020. Doesn't that expose us for that 5-year period between
2015 and 2020?
General O'Reilly. Senator, once we're given the approvals
to begin the construction, yes, sir, it's 5 years. The issue
we've had is the current restrictions I have require us to go
through testing that will take us to 2013 before the Secretary
of Defense is in a position, with the Director of the
Operational Test and Evaluation Agency, to then certify that
the ground-based midcourse defense system will work in a
European scenario.
So 2013 would be the earliest we can see programmatically
where we could begin, and that actually takes you to 2018.
Chairman Levin. Is that for the previous system? It's
unclear. What are you referring to?
General O'Reilly. The current program, the GBI's in Europe.
Chairman Levin. Before the change?
General O'Reilly. Before the change, yes, sir. I'd clarify.
Also what is clear is that's pure construction time. We do
need the approval of the countries, and there are extensive
implementing agreements also required before you can begin
that. So we saw the 2017-2018 timeframe as optimistic based on
the approvals necessary in order to begin.
Senator Thune. I don't know how much this has been covered
already. But Secretary Flournoy and General O'Reilly, the new
approach to European missile defense calls for sea-based
defenses to be deployed to theater in the 2011 timeframe. But
the CBO in their report from February of this year found that
deploying sea-based defenses is the most expensive option. In
fact, the CBO wrote: ``That system would cost almost twice as
much as the original European missile defense proposal, a total
of about $18 billion to $26 billion over 20 years.''
The CBO study assumed the Department would need to buy
additional ships to permanently station three Aegis cruisers in
the region. So how does the new proposal for European missile
defense meet President Obama's stated goal of having a system
that's cost effective? You said earlier in your remarks that
this is the cost effective approach, when CBO says that a
system like that would cost twice as much compared to the
system that you're intending to scrap.
General O'Reilly. Sir, what they were referring to as I
recall, but I'll go back and verify, was protection of all of
Europe at one time. In the phased approach, what we're looking
at is pacing technology and pacing our current capabilities
with the threat that we know exists today, which is a focus in
phase one on the southeastern part of Europe that we know is
threatened today by Iran.
Their study was looking at today's technology, if you had
to proliferate it over all of Europe, and that caused a
significant higher number of ship stations that would be
required. Also, we are in fact combining the greater range of
the SM-3 IIA and the IIB with land-basing, which optimizes the
coverage that you can have of Europe. So as the threat grows we
would deploy in phases, as we said, and that would
significantly reduce the costs and extend the coverage that we
would have from much fewer bases than what they were assuming
in their study.
Senator Thune. Do you have that analysis? Does that include
cost estimates of this proposal relative to the third site?
Because CBO is the only number that I've seen. I assume in your
analysis--you say it's more cost effective to do it this way.
Is that something that's available?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, we do have that. As we were
going through the BMD review, cost analysis is part of that
review for these different options.
Ms. Flournoy. Again, if I could just underscore, the CBO
and the Institute for Defense Analysis studies both costed out
a sea-based only architecture, which would be very expensive.
Once you move the majority of the interceptors onto land, which
is what we envision doing, the cost effectiveness goes way up.
It's much less expensive. So the sea-based piece of the
architecture really plays a role in the initial phases while
we're developing the land-based sites, and that's just to cover
the southern part of Europe that's currently under threat.
Then, as a surge sort of flexibility element, should, under
a particular contingency, a part of Europe is under threat, or
a part of the United States is under threat, we can surge sea-
based assets to complement the land-based systems.
But they really costed out a totally different concept,
which is different than what we're proposing.
Senator Thune. The 2010 defense budget request, there was a
request for funds that would be included to convert six Aegis
ships to provide missile defense capability. I guess my
question is what other funds were going to be required to field
sea-based defenses in accordance with the new European missile
defense approach?
General O'Reilly. Sir, as I said in my statement, we are
asking for the opportunity to utilize fiscal year 2009 funding
for European defense which has not been released to us because
of the criteria of the BMD agreements being ratified in both
Poland and in the Czech Republic and the constraint on testing.
So if we had access to that funding in fiscal year 2009,
then we'd have sufficient funding in which to meet the
timelines, especially the earlier timelines, of developing the
unmanned aerial vehicles, all the research and development that
we've referred to, the long-term development, and get it
started now, as well as the short-term deployments focused on
2011 and the testing which we are proposing that goes with
this.
Senator Thune. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just echo what
some of my colleagues previously have said. That is, I think
this is a real abrupt change which sort of kind of got dropped
on everybody. Probably the most notable example of that are
some of our allies in Europe. I think it's interpreted, at
least there, as the U.S. sort of betraying their interests
after we'd made commitments, that we're not following through
and honoring those commitments.
So I have questions about these cost issues. I have
questions about coverage issues, some of which were raised
earlier in Senator Lieberman's discussion and questions. But I
also have a lot of questions about the perception that this
creates among people who have been very friendly to us and very
reliable, and also the issue that's been broached about whether
or not this was designed to curry some favor with the Russians
in dealing with the Iranians.
All that I guess is sort of conjecture. But I certainly
hope that at the end of the day that these decisions weren't
predicated on those, that we have good sound criteria that will
enable us to protect the United States and protect our allies
and do it in a cost effective way. But many of the concerns
that have been voiced today are concerns that I share.
So thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
When you made reference, General, to constraint on testing,
you were referring, I believe, to the requirement in the laws
that there be operational effectiveness shown by testing before
deployment; is that correct?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, that's exactly right.
Chairman Levin. That's what you were referring to?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to ask a question talking about defending
against the Iranian short- and medium-range missiles. I agree
with the Department's renewed emphasis on countering the short-
and medium-range missiles. I understand that Iran's short and
medium-range missile capability not only poses a threat to our
strategic assets and allies in Europe, but also our allies'
strategic assets and forces in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility; and the Iranians' short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles can have drastic effects to our soldiers in
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as our forward operating bases in
theater that are critical to our logistical supply lines. Our
partners in the Arabian Gulf I think are very concerned about
these ballistic missile capabilities, particularly as it
pertains to defending their critical infrastructure, obviously,
the oil facilities. This has numerous implications for our
efforts to provide our forces with the fuel that they need to
consider and carry out their missions in theater.
I applaud Secretary Gates's initiative to use the annual
Manama Dialogue in Bahrain as a multilateral forum to discuss
the development of a shared early warning and air and missile
defense framework amongst his counterparts in the Gulf area.
But can you provide the progress the Department's made in
utilizing our Arab Gulf partners to build this strategic
framework for a BMD shield that would protect our forces and
strategic assets against the Iranian ballistic missile threat?
General Cartwright. Yes, ma'am. Manama was but one
dialogue. CENTCOM is currently running a center of excellence
to ensure that the countries have the opportunity to see in
detail what the opportunities of an architecture similar to
what we're proposing here could offer to them. We put in Israel
one of these new X-band radars for just that reason.
One of the most difficult activities associated with the
Gulf is that everything is on a bilateral basis. The reality is
no one single country can mount either the defense or the
offense alone to protect against this kind of threat. So much
of what CENTCOM is working on in the Gulf is the understanding
amongst them of how they can leverage off of each other.
Whether they buy Patriot systems, indigenous systems that are
built, other countries' systems, netting them together will get
them a much more effective defense than working on a pure
bilateral basis.
General Petraeus is having significant progress, making
significant progress, in that dialogue. As we start to
introduce these new systems, I think most of those countries
are very interested in buying additional Patriots, and we are
moving our Patriots around, demonstrating to them what the
capabilities are, not only in the modeling and simulation, but
in the actual physical presence of those weapon systems, and
moving them quite a bit so that multiple countries see it, but
also so that Iran watches those movements. Quite frankly, these
are very powerful steps as we move forward. The more we can
layer that further out to the Israelis, the Jordanians, other
countries out beyond the Gulf in the Middle East, to start to
demonstrate a collective approach to this problem, the more
valuable the deterrent aspects of this capability are.
Senator Hagan. Let me ask one other question. I understand
that the Department of Defense plans to field the land-based
SM-3s by 2015 and is in the process of consulting with our
allies, once again particularly Poland and the Czech Republic,
about hosting a land-based version of the SM-3. But given the
problems that we've experienced with Poland and the Czech
Republic in the ratification process with regards to stationing
radars and GBIs, and in addition the extra communication
problems just recently, what lessons can we utilize to expedite
this process?
Ms. Flournoy. I think we have begun discussions with Poland
about hosting, being a potential site to host SM-3s. What we've
made clear to them is that we are not falling off the agreement
that the previous administration signed with them, which
covered a very broad range of security cooperation, to include
the Patriots, to include a U.S. garrison in Poland, and so
forth. So that is all still under way.
In fact, we could go ahead with the ballistic missile
agreement that we signed with a minor modification to the annex
that simply substituted SM-3 for GBI as a referred-to system if
they choose to proceed with us along this path.
So I think with Poland the path is very clear should they
decide to continue on down that path with us. In the Czech
Republic, the discussion is not about hosting land-based
missiles, but it is--because of this networked system, there
are many other kinds of data fusion, command and control, ops
center. There are all kinds of ways to participate in this
system, and we are actively in discussions about that with the
Czech Republic, who have already expressed to us that they very
much want to remain a leading partner with us in the new
architecture. We're just in the process of figuring out the
details of what that will look like.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
Just one question. I guess we can take one question each on
a second round if it's needed.
General O'Reilly, you gave a speech in Boston on Monday and
you said that the new European missile defense plan is a ``much
more powerful missile defense proposal than the previous one.''
Can you just succinctly tell us why in your judgment? You've
given us I think the essence in your earlier testimony this
morning, but kind of just sum up: Why do you believe that this
approach presents a much more powerful missile defense proposal
than the previous one?
General O'Reilly. Sir, in that discussion, which was to an
international audience, the point I was making was that, as
I've testified before, my greatest concern as the Director of
the MDA is to be able to counter the proliferation of missiles
that we see and the large, specifically the large raid sizes.
That is becoming more evident around the world as more
launchers, more missiles, and more exercises show that many
countries are demonstrating and practicing that capability.
In the previous defense architecture we had, we had a
limited number of missiles that we could intercept at any one
time. So this proposal allows you to put significantly more and
rapidly expand the firepower of a missile defense system.
That's a term that hasn't been used often, ``firepower'' in
this case. But it is; it's firepower against missiles that have
been launched against you.
The firepower of this system is significantly higher. As
General Cartwright and others have said--and we are all
concerned about the threat predictions--we would like to move
from a more rigid missile defense to one that's more adaptable
and quickly flexible, so that if the threat changes we can very
quickly increase that firepower and increase the orientation of
it.
Chairman Levin. We will also insert in the record your
remarks of September 21.
We will also insert in the record Secretary Gates'
September 20 op-ed in The New York Times.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Levin. If there are no other questions, with our
great thanks for your testimony this morning and all your work
on this, we will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
nato allies
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Flournoy, what is the status of U.S.-
Polish discussions on deployment of a U.S. Army Patriot air and missile
defense battery in Poland?
Ms. Flournoy. The United States and Poland will discuss the
upcoming rotations of a Patriot battery to Poland at the High Level
Defense Group (HLDG) consultations in Warsaw on October 15-16. The
United States will begin these rotations upon entry into force of the
U.S.-Poland Supplemental Agreement to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Status of Forces Agreement, which is currently
being negotiated.
2. Senator Levin. Secretary Flournoy, specifically, does the United
States plan to deploy such a battery in Poland in accordance with the
U.S.-Polish Declaration of Strategic Cooperation and, if so, is there a
schedule for such a deployment?
Ms. Flournoy. The United States will begin the Patriot battery
rotations upon entry into force of the U.S.-Poland Supplemental
Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.
3. Senator Levin. Secretary Flournoy, there have been suggestions
that our NATO allies are not supportive of the new missile defense plan
announced by President Obama on September 17. Can you explain whether
our NATO allies support the new plan?
Ms. Flournoy. The response of almost all of our NATO allies to the
Phased Adaptive Approach has been positive. When we briefed the North
Atlantic Council in Brussels on September 16, there were expressions of
support for the new approach and a general appreciation that this is a
change in the way we plan to address the threat, but not a change in
America's commitment to Europe. It is understandable that our decision
to use a different approach to missile defense would cause some concern
in Warsaw and Prague, but both Poland and the Czech Republic have
already communicated their interest in participating in the Phased
Adaptive Approach.
4. Senator Levin. Secretary Flournoy, there has been confusion over
the reaction of the Czech and Polish Governments to the new missile
defense plan. Can you explain the position of the Czech and Polish
Governments on the new plan?
Ms. Flournoy. It appears that both governments are becoming
increasingly receptive to the new plan as they understand the rationale
behind the changes and know that they can be part of the new
architecture should their governments desire.
5. Senator Levin. Secretary Flournoy, can you explain what steps
the United States is taking with Poland and the Czech Republic to give
them an opportunity to participate in the new missile defense
architecture?
Ms. Flournoy. We are reaching out to both countries via new HLDG
dialogues. The HLDG with Poland will take place on October 15-16 in
Warsaw and the one with the Czech Republic will occur on November 5-6
in Prague. During these and future discussions we will provide
necessary details to allow these allies to determine how they want to
continue to partner with the United States in the European Missile
Defense plan.
capabilities of new system
6. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, there were suggestions at the
hearing that the United States currently has no ballistic missile
defense (BMD) against a long-range Iranian ballistic missile. Can you
describe the degree of coverage provided by the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system currently deployed in Alaska and California
against long-range missiles that Iran might have in the future?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
7. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, can you describe how the
recently announced European missile defense architecture will enhance
the capability of the currently deployed GMD system, particularly with
the planned deployment of an AN/TPY-2 X-band radar in the Caucasus
region?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
8. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, the new missile defense plan
for Europe includes, in Phase 4, a land-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
Block IIB system using enhanced sensor capabilities. Can you compare
the planned capabilities of this Phase 4 system to those of the
previously planned two-stage Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) proposed
for deployment in Poland? For example: would the Phase 4 SM-3 IIB
system be able to defend against as many (or more) potential future
Iranian long-range missiles as the European Interceptor Site; would it
cover a similar defended area; and what are the advantages of the
planned SM-3 Block IIB in providing defense against long-range
missiles?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, please describe how Phase 4 of
the newly announced missile defense plan will augment or supplement the
existing GMD system deployed in Alaska and California.
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Levin. General Cartwright, at the hearing it was
mentioned that one of the benefits of the new missile defense plan is
that it will be able to defend against Iranian missile attacks
employing large raid sizes. Why is this important, and how does it
relate to the existing threat of Iranian short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles?
General Cartwright. The Iranians are developing and testing more
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, as demonstrated again
recently by multiple test launches in September. These systems exist
now. Based on the potential for larger raid sizes, the Phased Adaptive
Approach is better suited to counter that threat by providing the
ability to launch more interceptors.
11. Senator Levin. General Cartwright, of what value is this
benefit to our regional combatant commanders?
General Cartwright. The value of this benefit is that it provides
more comprehensive protection sooner for our forward-based and deployed
forces from known, existing, and emerging ballistic missile threats.
12. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, Iran recently launched a
series of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, reportedly
including the Shahab-3 and the Sejil medium-range missiles that could
reach as far as Israel and Turkey. Would the new missile defense
architecture be able to defend against these missiles?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Levin. General Cartwright, there has been a suggestion
that the new European missile defense architecture somehow represents a
worse capability than the previous plan. Secretary Gates has said the
new architecture is ``vastly more suitable'' and would be a ``far more
effective defense'' than the previous plan. Do you agree with Secretary
Gates? If so, what is your view of how the new architecture will
provide a better capability to defend our forward-based forces and
allies in Europe than the previously planned system?
General Cartwright. Yes, I do agree with Secretary Gates. The
Phased Adaptive Approach is better suited than the previously planned
system to meet the current and projected threat. The previous GBI plan
was designed to meet an ICBM threat that has not developed as expected
and contained a limited number of interceptors from a fixed location.
The Phased Adaptive Approach will allow us to pace the threat, engage
more inbound threats, and provide flexibility to surge additional
capabilities as required. This allows us to better protect our forces
oversees, as well as contribute to NATO's overall defense.
impact of new architecture on israel's security
14. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and General O'Reilly, the
United States has already deployed a forward-based radar in Israel, and
we have cooperative missile defense programs with Israel. The main
missile threat to Israel comes from Iran's growing number of medium-
range missiles. The new architecture is intended to defend against
these same Iranian missiles. Overall, how would you describe the impact
of the new architecture on Israel's security?
General Cartwright. Although the architecture proposed for Europe
does not provide any specific coverage to Israel, the missile defense
capability that we deploy to Europe can potentially improve security
for all of our allies as we leverage technological advances and lessons
learned.
General O'Reilly. The recent additions and cooperative improvements
to the Israeli missile defense architecture have provided improved
early warning for the Israeli systems, and have added an additional
layer of defense. The AN/TPY-2 X-band radar provides earlier detection
and discrimination of ballistic missile attack than was previously
available to the Israeli Arrow Weapon System. In addition, when Aegis
BMD ships are operating in the theater, they can use the AN/TPY-2
information to conduct exo-atmospheric ``upper tier'' intercepts
against ballistic missiles targeting Israel. These improvements give
Israel better defensive capabilities against Iranian ballistic
missiles, as well as the ability to defend against attacks with greater
raid size.
15. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and General O'Reilly will the
new architecture help improve the ability to defend Israel against an
Iranian ballistic missile attack?
General Cartwright. Although the architecture proposed for Europe
does not provide any specific coverage to Israel, the missile defense
capability that we deploy to Europe can potentially improve security
for all of our allies as we leverage technological advances and lessons
learned.
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
review process
16. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright,
you were both involved in the process by which the administration
conducted its review of options for missile defense in Europe.
Can you describe that process? For example, when did the review
start, how was it conducted, who was involved, who was consulted, and
so on?
Ms. Flournoy. As part of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR) required in part by section 234 of the Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Pub. L. 110-417), the
Department of Defense (DOD) is reviewing the U.S. strategy and policy
for BMD. Among other topics, the BMDR includes an in-depth
consideration of our strategic and operational approach to European-
based BMD.
The review began in early April and includes representatives from
multiple BMD stakeholders, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff; the Secretaries of the Military Departments; Combatant
Commanders; the Missile Defense Agency (MDA); the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, with responsibilities for national and
international BMD policy; the intelligence community; the Department of
State and the National Security Council staff. The review has included
opportunities for allies and partners abroad to comment on and shape
the BMDR. Although the review is still ongoing, the analysis conducted
and conclusions reached to date informed the joint recommendation by
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to pursue a revised approach for missile defense in Europe. The
President accepted their recommendation and announced the decision on
September 17, 2009.
Consistent with congressional direction, the BMDR will be finalized
and provided to Congress in January 2010.
General Cartwright. As part of the BMDR required in part by section
234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S.
3001), DOD is reviewing the United States' strategy and policy for BMD.
Among other topics, the BMDR includes an in-depth consideration of our
strategic and operational approach to European-based BMD.
The review began in early April and includes representatives from
multiple BMD stakeholders, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
combatant commanders, as the end-user of the BMDS; the MDA, as the
developer of the missile defense system; the Office of the Secretary of
Defense responsible for national and international BMD policy; the
Intelligence Community; the Department of State; and NATO. While the
review is still ongoing, the analysis conducted and conclusions reached
to date informed the joint recommendation by the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a revised approach for missile
defense in Europe. The President accepted their recommendation and
announced the decision on September 17, 2009.
Consistent with congressional direction, the BMDR will be finalized
and provided to Congress in January 2010.
additional capability to defend the united states
17. Senator Bill Nelson. General O'Reilly, Secretary Gates has said
that the new architecture will have the ability to provide additional
defense of the United States against a possible future Iranian long-
range missile, using a land-based version of the SM-3, in Phase 4 of
the new system. Can you describe how this capability will work, and how
it will augment the existing capability we already have deployed in
Alaska and California to defend the Homeland against long-range missile
attacks from nations like North Korea and Iran?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
funding impact of new approach
18. Senator Bill Nelson. General O'Reilly, given the President's
decision on the new missile defense architecture for Europe, do you see
any funding impacts for fiscal years 2009 or 2010 funds to implement
the new architecture? If so, what are they?
General O'Reilly. MDA is committed to fully funding this program as
the Agency prepares for the next budget submission to Congress.
However, it is important that MDA have relief from rescissions and the
flexibility to spend the unused fiscal year 2009 Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and some Military Construction (MILCON)
dollars associated with the previous European Site proposal. With
relief from some of the constraints placed on the Agency's fiscal year
2009 budget and some redirection of fiscal year 2010 funds, MDA
believes it can pursue this new architecture within its fiscal year
2010 budget request.
MDA also would note that both the House and Senate authorizing
committees very presciently included provisions in this year's National
Defense Authorization bill that permit the Department to use fiscal
year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funding for an alternative architecture
once the Secretary of Defense certified that this architecture is as
cost-effective, technically reliable, and operationally available as
the previous program.
overarching missile defense approach
19. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, you have described the
need for the United States to have flexible and agile military
capabilities that can adapt to rapidly evolving security challenges and
threats. How does this new approach to missile defense in Europe fit
into that construct?
General Cartwright. The phased adaptive approach utilizes systems,
such as AEGIS, that are already available and have the ability to
deploy and provide limited protection much sooner than the previous
program of record (EMR/EIS). With additional radar assets and land
based SM-3s we will have the capability to meet that need as the threat
evolves.
20. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, do you agree that this
new architecture can be used in other regions, besides Europe, as well?
General Cartwright. Yes. Although the elements may vary from region
to region, the concept of a flexible, adaptable architecture can be
applied to other regions of concern.
czech view of x-band radar
21. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Flournoy, on a trip in April
with Chairman Levin and Senator Collins, I had the distinct impression
that the Czech Government was not moving toward ratification of its
agreements on deploying the previously proposed European Midcourse
Radar, and that a new Czech Government might not ratify the agreements.
Do you share that view?
Ms. Flournoy. The BMD Agreement and the Supplemental Status of
Forces Agreement were approved by the Czech Senate in November 2008.
Approval of the two agreements in the lower chamber was suspended after
the collapse of the governing coalition in March 2009. We do not expect
any further consideration of the agreements until after elections,
probably in the first half of 2010.
22. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Flournoy, do you believe the
Czech Government is interested in participating in the new missile
defense architecture?
Ms. Flournoy. The Czech Government has communicated its interest in
discussing possible opportunities for participation in the newly
announced missile defense architecture. We look forward to examining
proposals for their potential participation during the HLDG in
November.
capabilities of the standard missile-3
23. Senator Bill Nelson. General O'Reilly, much of the new missile
defense architecture approved by the President would rely on the SM-3,
both on Aegis ships and on land.
Can you describe your level of confidence in the ability of the SM-
3 to evolve to have increased capability to accomplish its intended
missions?
General O'Reilly. Operational since late 2004, the Aegis BMD SM-3
system is MDA's only Element that has been assessed to be operationally
suitable and effective by an independent test agent. This assessment
was earned as a result of rigorous system engineering, a knowledgeable
U.S. Government/industry team, and a stressing, realistic test program.
It is upon this foundation that we place our confidence that the SM-3
system will evolve and meet future BMD challenges. Through the first
half of fiscal year 2009 the SM-3 Block IA has a stellar record of
performance in its flight test program, successfully engaging 8 of 11
ballistic missile targets. The SM-3 has consistently delivered
capabilities that meet, and many times exceed, requirements, e.g., the
20 February 2008 satellite intercept demonstrated interceptor
capability far beyond that required by design specifications. SM-3
Block IA missiles deployed in Phase One of the European Phased Adaptive
Architecture on Aegis BMD-capable ships will provide flight test proven
near-term defense of Europe and our Deployed Forces against short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles.
The successful SM-3 Block IA flight test program will be followed
by the initial flight test of the follow-on interceptor, the SM-3 Block
IB, in calendar year 2011. The Aegis BMD Project Office follows a
disciplined system engineering process to test and verify weapon
capabilities through risk management activities and extensive ground
testing and simulations. The design process is planned to build
confidence through flight test demonstrations of intercept capability.
The SM-3 Block IB will be subjected to the same rigorous verification
program that the successful SM-3 Block IA missile was. Since the SM-3
Block IB uses the same rocket motors and other kill vehicle components
that have already been demonstrated, MDA is confident that technical
risks are mitigated. When certified for fielding, the SM-3 Block IB
will be the basis for upgrading the European defense in Phase Two with
deployment both at sea on Aegis BMD-capable ships and at a land-based
Aegis Ashore site. The SM-3 Block IB will provide extended capability
against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
While still in its early design phase of development with our
international partner Japan, the SM-3 Block IIA will be deployed to
provide broader coverage of Europe against intermediate range ballistic
missiles as well as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in Phase
Three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Currently seven flight
tests are planned for the SM-3 Block IIA to demonstrate its ability to
meet five joint United States/Japan knowledge points leading to
verification of its intercept performance. Following the joint flight
test demonstrations there will be additional tests to verify
integration with Aegis Weapon System upgrades and the rest of the BMDS.
Finally, to further extend our coverage of Europe against all
ranges of ballistic missiles and provide additional defense from long
range ballistic missiles threatening the U.S. mainland in Phase Four,
MDA is exploring design concepts for an SM-3 Block IIB missile to be
based at Aegis Ashore sites. As plans mature for this new developing
capability, the same disciplined, success-oriented process will be
followed to deliver or exceed requirements.
revised iranian missile threat assessment
24. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, one of the issues
highlighted by both President Obama and Secretary Gates in explaining
the new missile defense architecture is a revised assessment of the
Iranian ballistic missile threat. The conclusion of this assessment is
apparently that Iran is putting more effort into its short- and medium-
range missile program--and increasing the number of those missiles--and
is not proceeding as quickly with the development of long-range
ballistic missiles as previously predicted. Can you explain the new
threat assessment and describe the impact of this revised threat
assessment on the development of the new architecture?
General Cartwright. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
ballistic missile defense review
25. Senator Begich. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, since March 2009, the MDA has discussed conducting a
BMDR. Reference a presentation given to our office in May 2009 by MDA,
the BMDR was going to be conducted from August through December 2009
and provided to Congress in January 2010. During the hearing, the BMDR
was referenced several times as justification for recent decisions
concerning missile defense. At one point, it was said that the BMDR has
been going on for 3 years. However, both Secretary Flournoy and General
Cartwright's joint testimony states the BMDR will not be completed
until January 2010.
There seems to be several inconsistencies with the timing and
execution of the BMDR and the decisions being made based on interim
findings. DOD and the administration have made significant changes to
the missile defense program of record based on findings from what they
say are results of the BMDR. These changes include reduction from 44
GBIs based in the United States to 30 GBIs. Most recently, the decision
to cancel the deployment of the 10 GBIs deployed in Europe while
proposing an entirely new means of intercept through the ascent phase
using SM-3 missiles. When will Congress receive the BMDR?
Ms. Flournoy. Consistent with section 234 of the Duncan Hunter
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the BMDR will
be finalized and provided to Congress no later than January 31, 2010.
General Cartwright. The analysis required to support the
President's decision on European missile defense was front-loaded in
the review. There is more work to be done in other areas of the review.
Consistent with congressional direction from section 234 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the BMDR will
be finalized and provided to Congress in January 2010.
General O'Reilly. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is
responsible for conducting the BMDR, which is still ongoing. MDA has
participated by providing critical technical and engineering data
needed to inform the discussion. The results of the BMDR will be
submitted to Congress not later than January 31, 2010 as required by
Sec. 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009. But regarding your concerns about the number of GBIs, 30 highly
ready operational GBIs will provide the United States with adequate
operational interceptors considering the limited number of ICBM capable
launch complexes in North Korea and Iran. The fiscal year 2010 budget
reflects our commitment to procure the complete buy of 44 GBIs on
contract, of which some will go to the replacement and refurbishment of
the 14 oldest interceptors to improve the operational readiness of the
fleet and extend the U.S. GBI production capacity.
26. Senator Begich. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, were conclusions from this review used in the
administration's change of direction in the European site? If so, why
has the BMDR and supporting documentation not been provided to
Congress?
Ms. Flournoy. Although the BMDR is not due to Congress until
January 2010, we already have reached some important conclusions. We
have decided to move forward now on selected conclusions from the
review so we do not delay the process of improving defenses for
ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners, many of
whom are facing an immediate, near-term threat from large inventories
of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. This is an important
issue to some of our allies and partners, and we wanted to inform them
as soon as possible.
Consistent with congressional direction as outlined in Section 234
of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009, the BMDR will be finalized and provided to Congress no later than
in January 31, 2010.
General Cartwright. Although the BMDR is not due to Congress until
January, we already have reached some important conclusions. We have
decided to move forward now on selected conclusions from our review so
we don't delay the process of improving defenses for ourselves, our
deployed forces, and our allies, many of who are facing an immediate,
near-term threat from large inventories of short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles. This is an important issue to some of our allies
and we wanted to inform them as soon as possible.
Consistent with congressional direction as outlined in section 234
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the
BMDR will be finalized and provided to Congress in January 2010.
General O'Reilly. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is
responsible for conducting the BMDR, which is still ongoing. MDA has
participated by providing critical technical and engineering data
needed to inform the discussion. The results of the BMDR will be
submitted to Congress not later than January 31, 2010, as required by
section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009.
27. Senator Begich. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, the administration and DOD have consistently agreed
to work in conjunction with Congress. Was it the intent of DOD to
submit the BMDR to Congress for review before decisions were made on
changing the policies and programs of record for missile defense in the
United States and around the world? If so, what prompted accelerated
decisions?
Ms. Flournoy. It was not our intent, nor were we required, to
submit the BMDR report to Congress for review before decisions were
made. The BMDR is one of several reviews, including the Space Policy
Review and the Nuclear Policy Review, being conducted in conjunction
with the Quadrennial Defense Review. These reviews will form the basis
for DOD policy and strategy over the next 10-15 years, and will inform
the preparation of the fiscal year 2011 budget.
Section 234 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2009 directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a
review of the BMD policy and strategy of the United States and, upon
completion, provide that report to Congress. Consistent with those
requirements, the Secretary of Defense will submit to Congress the
final results of the review no later than January 31, 2010.
We have decided to move forward now on selected conclusions from
the review so we do not delay the process of improving defenses for
ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners, many of
whom are facing an immediate, near-term threat from large inventories
of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. This was an important
issue to some of our allies and partners, and we wanted to inform them
as soon as possible.
General Cartwright. It was not our intent, nor were we required, to
submit the BMDR report to Congress for review before decisions were
made. The BMDR is one of several reviews, including the Space Policy
Review and the Nuclear Policy Review, being conducted in conjunction
with the Quadrennial Defense Review. These reviews will form the basis
for DOD policy and strategy over the next 10-15 years, and will inform
the preparation of the fiscal year 2011 budget.
Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009 directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of the
BMD policy and strategy of the United States and, upon completion,
provide that report to Congress. Consistent with those requirements,
the Secretary of Defense will submit to Congress the final results of
our review in January 2010.
We have decided to move forward now on selected conclusions from
our review so we don't delay the process of improving defenses for
ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies, many of who are facing
an immediate, near-term threat from large inventories of short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles. This was an important issue to some of
our allies and we wanted to inform them as soon as possible.
General O'Reilly. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
State who are in a better position to respond to questions that have
policy or diplomatic implications.
28. Senator Begich. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, were the decisions to reduce the number of
interceptors deployed in the United States (Alaska and California) from
44 to 30 based on having 10 GBIs deployed in Europe as indicated by the
2010 President's budget submission?
Ms. Flournoy. The decision to reduce the number of operational
interceptors emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska, was driven by the current
assessment of the long-range ballistic missile threat from countries
like Iran and North Korea. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the MDA, determined
that the current force of 30 operational GBIs provides the warfighter a
sufficient defense against possible long-range ballistic missile
threats to the homeland from rogue nations like Iran and North Korea.
This determination was not dependent on having 10 additional GBIs
deployed in Europe.
General Cartwright. The recent decision on European-based BMD was
independent of force-structure considerations concerning GBIs in Alaska
and California.
The decision to reduce the number of operational interceptors
emplaced at Fort Greely, AK, was driven by the current assessment of
the long-range ballistic missile threat from countries like Iran and
North Korea. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the MDA, determined that the current force of 30
operational GBIs provides the warfighter a sufficient defense against
possible long-range ballistic missile threats to the homeland from
rogue nations like Iran and North Korea.
It should also be noted that the decision to cap the emplacement of
operational interceptors at 30 will allow the Department to provide a
more reliable and effective capability for the defense of the homeland
by decommissioning the older ``test-bed'' Missile Field 1 at Fort
Greely, and instead begin fielding GBIs in the new Missile Field 2.
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
gbi silos and silo interface vaults
29. Senator Begich. General Cartwright and General O'Reilly, in the
September 17 joint press conference between Secretary Gates and General
Cartwright, General Cartwright, you stated: ``We're continuing the
effort that we have ongoing today on the ground-based interceptor,
which is to build a two-stage capability . . . those steps are funded
and will continue.'' We have already constructed and paid for the last
seven silos and silo-interface vaults to be fielded in Alaska at a cost
of approximately $62 million. It had been discussed that since the
decision to not field the final seven interceptors in Alaska, these
systems would be used in Europe. Since deploying a silo-based GBI
system in Europe is no longer planned, will DOD reevaluate the decision
about fielding the final seven silos in MF 2 at Fort Greely? Why or why
not?
General Cartwright. MDA plans to field the final 7 silos to
complete Missile Field-2 in a 14-silo configuration. While this will
not affect the number of GBIs emplaced at Fort Greely, it will allow
for the decommissioning of Missile Field-1 and provide future
flexibility for an increase in the number of interceptors, if the
threat evolves.
General O'Reilly. MDA plans to complete Missile Field-2 in a 14
silo configuration. This will allow for the decommissioning of Missile
Field-1 and provide future flexibility for an increase in the number of
interceptors, if the threat evolves.
30. Senator Begich. General Cartwright and General O'Reilly, could
the final seven silos and silo interface vaults be installed in Alaska
and accept the two-phase interceptors?
General Cartwright. Yes. The launch silo and handling equipment are
the same for two-stage and three-stage interceptors, as these
interceptors share the same external dimensions as well as the same
structural and mechanical interfaces with the silo. Emplacement of two-
stage interceptor would require development of changes to GMD Fire
Control and Command Launch Equipment software, with requisite testing.
However, MDA currently has no plans to emplace more than 26 GBIs at
Fort Greely. Additional silos at Fort Greely by themselves would not be
cause to increase the number of GBIs without a change in the threat
assessment leading to a decision to emplace additional interceptors.
General O'Reilly. Yes. The launch silo and handling equipment are
the same for two-stage and three-stage interceptors, as these
interceptors share the same external dimensions as well as the same
structural and mechanical interfaces with the silo. Emplacement of two-
stage interceptor would require development of changes to GMD Fire
Control and Command Launch Equipment software, with requisite testing.
However, MDA currently has no plans to emplace more than 26 GBIs at
Fort Greely.
threat
31. Senator Begich. General Cartwright, in your joint prepared
testimony with Secretary Flournoy, you state that Iran has increased
production of short-medium range missiles and is slower to develop
ICBMs. However, you caveat this statement with the fact that our
intelligence projections can be wrong. I understand that a report from
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) believes Iran is much
closer today to marrying their ballistic missile arsenal and its
nuclear program to fashion a system capable of carrying a nuclear
warhead. It has been stated construction of a missile field takes 5
years and as a result of the fiscal year 2010 shortfalls, production
base capabilities will most likely be lost or otherwise negatively
impacted. What is your assessment in how close Iran is to materializing
a system capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to attack Europe and the
United States?
General Cartwright. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Begich. General Cartwright, has the construction and
production aspect necessary for deploying additional GMD capabilities
to meet the materializing threat been considered?
General Cartwright. Construction and production aspects for
deploying additional GMD capabilities have been considered. Should
future changes to the assessed threat so warrant, the Combatant
Commands, in collaboration with the Services and the Joint Staff, will
document the requirement for additional GMD capabilities.
33. Senator Begich. General Cartwright, what level of strategic
risk has been accepted by decisions not to deploy a European site or
field 44 interceptors in CONUS?
General Cartwright. First, there was no decision to ``not deploy a
European Site''. Rather, the new Phased Adaptive Approach reaffirms the
strategic value of European-based missile defense. The new approach
revises the previous plan in order to better leverage recent
advancements in technologies and capabilities, and to better respond to
the threat that our forward-deployed forces face now. The new approach
will still field shooter, sensor and command and control elements in
Europe.
The decision to field 30 operational GBIs in Alaska and California,
rather than the previously planned 44, was the result of a careful and
deliberative process by which the Department determined the best way to
provide missile defense capabilities. This year's budget request,
including the decision to field 30 GBIs, places a greater emphasis on
defending against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM/
MRBM), which comprise the most significant ballistic missile threat to
our forces and allies today. The sheer inventory of SRBM's and MRBM's
that exist today in countries like Iran require us to focus on
deploying regional and theater capabilities now, while also developing
defenses against long-range missiles should such a threat materialize
in the future.
The decisions reflected in the administration's fiscal year 2011
budget request and the recent decision on European BMD substantially
decreases the risk to our forward-deployed forces, including their
families, and our friends and allies.
34. Senator Begich. General Cartwright, how does the Department
justify that risk?
General Cartwright. As noted above, the decisions reflected in the
administration's fiscal year 2011 budget request and the recent
decision on European BMD substantially decreases the risk to our
forward-deployed forces, including their families, and our friends and
allies.
funding
35. Senator Begich. General O'Reilly, we have seen several cost
estimates for the various options for a missile defense system in
Europe. The two main systems discussed were a silo-based plan, recently
cancelled by the administration, and a sea-based plan. According to a
February 2009 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, the silo-based
plan would cost between $9 billion to $14 billion over 20 years. The
CBO report says the sea-based plan in which the United States would
deploy SM-3 interceptors on Navy ships and station them permanently at
three locations in European waters would cost almost twice as much as
MDA's original proposal--a total of about $18 billion to $26 billion
over 20 years--largely because CBO assumed that the Navy would need to
buy additional ships to operate it. However, testimony today indicated
the Department has not yet fleshed out the details of requirements
necessary to execute this plan. Is there proper funding in fiscal year
2010 and planned in fiscal year 2011 to begin to implement the
administration's new plan? Please describe in detail.
General O'Reilly. MDA is committed to fully funding this program as
the Agency prepares for the next budget submission to Congress.
However, it is important that MDA have relief from rescissions and the
flexibility to spend the unused fiscal year 2009 RDT&E and some MILCON
dollars associated with the previous European Site proposal. With
relief from some of the constraints placed on the Agency's fiscal year
2009 budget and some redirection of fiscal year 2010 funds, MDA
believes it can pursue this new architecture within its fiscal year
2010 budget request. We are currently building the fiscal years 2011-
2015 Future Years Defense Plan and out-year funding profiles to reflect
the new architecture, and they will be available with the PB11 release.
MDA also would note that both the House and Senate authorizing
committees very presciently included provisions in this year's National
Defense Authorization bill that permit the Department to use fiscal
year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funding for an alternative architecture
once the Secretary of Defense certified that this architecture is as
cost-effective, technically reliable, and operationally available as
the previous program.
ascent phase intercept technology
36. Senator Begich. General O'Reilly, following the April 6, 2009,
administration announcement to cut certain missile defense systems and
increase funding in other areas, MDA briefed a new layer to the
Integrated BMD plan, Ascent Phase Intercept. When should Congress
expect a detailed brief on this technology and plan for how this will
be integrated into the BMD architecture?
General O'Reilly. The House Armed Services Committee directed the
Secretary of Defense to submit a Report to Congress on Ascent Phase
Missile Defense Strategy (``Early Intercept''). The Report to Congress
is due 180 days after enactment of National Defense Authorization Bill
for Fiscal Year 2010 (est April 2010).
sm-3 missiles in europe
37. Senator Begich. Secretary Flournoy and General O'Reilly,
Secretary Gates has said that we will deploy ``scores'' of SM-3
missiles in Europe to defend against a growing Iranian threat of short-
to medium-range missiles. Can you better define ``scores'' of missiles?
Ms. Flournoy. The ability to augment future land-based sites with
Aegis-capable ships will allow the United States to rapidly increase
defensive capabilities when needed. The Phased Adaptive Approach will
field a significantly larger number of interceptors and sensors by
leveraging proven, mobile, and more cost-effective platforms like AN/
TPY-2 radars, airborne infrared sensors, and SM-3s.
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
allied reactions
38. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, when were our allies
notified of the President's decision on missile defense in Europe?
Ms. Flournoy. The President phoned the Czech Prime Minister on the
evening of September 16 to inform him of the decision, and he reached
his Polish counterpart on the morning of September 17. I led an
interagency team to Warsaw, Prague, and NATO Headquarters in Brussels
on September 17 to provide details on the basis for the decision and
our new proposed BMD architecture.
39. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, were they consulted in
advance of the notification, and if so, on what date(s)?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes. Consultations with allies and friends on the
BMDR began in May in various bilateral and multilateral settings. We
consulted with NATO as well as a number of European countries. During
these consultations we listened and offered allies the opportunity to
share their ideas and suggestions for consideration during our review.
40. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, Secretary Gates said
during his press conference: ``We would prefer to put the SM-3s in
Poland, in place of the GBIs.'' Does this mean that we have not yet
gained Poland's support to field land-based SM-3 missiles in exchange
for the GBIs?
Ms. Flournoy. We have offered Poland the ``first right of refusal''
to host a land-based SM-3 site in Poland in large part due to Poland's
willingness to be part of our previous European Missile Defense plans.
We expect that Poland will make its intentions known later this fall.
41. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, what is the likelihood
that Poland and the Czech Republic as well as other NATO countries will
agree to host land-based SM-3s and associated sensors?
Ms. Flournoy. We are confident that NATO countries will support our
efforts as they begin to realize that the intent of the system is to
protect not only U.S. forces, dependents, and military facilities in
Europe, but all NATO member countries as well.
NATO's initial response to our briefing on September 17 was very
positive. Since then, several allies have contacted us to express their
interest in hosting elements of the new architecture.
42. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, under the Bush concept,
our NATO allies were encouraged to contribute to Europe's defense
against short- and medium-range threats. Your plan suggests the United
States will assume this mission. How do we now ensure our allies
contributions to their own defense?
Ms. Flournoy. Under the Phased Adaptive Approach, there will be
more opportunities for allies to participate in their own defense. For
example, the Phased Adaptive Approach will be interoperable with NATO
systems and with the lower-tier BMD systems that are already being
acquired by some allies. Also, several allies already have Aegis and
Patriot capabilities that could contribute to the Phased Adaptive
Approach.
russian reactions
43. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, when were the Russians notified of the President's
decision on missile defense in Europe?
Ms. Flournoy. Ambassador Kislyak of the Russian Federation was
notified of the President's decision on the morning of September 17,
EST.
General Cartwright. My understanding is that the Russian Government
was notified of the President's decision on September 17. I cannot
offer additional clarity on the meeting as neither I nor any Joint
Staff representatives were present.
General O'Reilly. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
State who are in a better position to respond to questions that have
policy or diplomatic implications.
44. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, were they told before or after we spoke with our
allies and if so, what has been their reaction?
Ms. Flournoy. The Russians were told after the Czechs and Poles
were notified. The Russian reaction has been cautious, but generally
positive. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the decision ``correct
and brave.'' President Dmitri A. Medvedev hinted that Russia would
respond favorably to the decision to replace the program of record with
a missile shield that is seen as less threatening to Moscow. Foreign
Minister Lavrov has also made positive comments on the decision,
stating it ``creates good conditions for dialogue.''
Other Russian officials such as Dmitriy Rogozin and the Chief of
the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, have been less than
enthusiastic since the announcement was made, indicating that they want
guarantees that the system in no way threatens Russia.
General Cartwright. We notified our Czech and Polish allies prior
to the U.S. Government's notification to the Russian Government. The
Russian President and Prime Minister made public statements that were
generally supportive of the decision. Of course, the Russians remain
interested in learning the details associated with our plans for
missile defense in Europe, and we are committed to meeting with them to
determine their willingness to play a constructive and cooperative role
in the process.
General O'Reilly. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
State who are in a better position to respond to questions that have
policy or diplomatic implications.
45. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, what has been their reaction?
Ms. Flournoy. Russian reaction has been cautious, but generally
positive. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the decision ``correct
and brave.'' President Dmitri A. Medvedev hinted that Russia would
respond favorably to the decision to replace the program of record with
a missile shield that is seen as less threatening to Moscow. Foreign
Minister Lavrov has also made positive comments on the decision,
stating it ``creates good conditions for dialogue.''
Other Russian officials such as Dmitriy Rogozin and the Chief of
the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, have been less than
enthusiastic since the announcement was made, indicating that they want
guarantees that the system in no way threatens Russia.
General Cartwright. Following the President's announcement on the
new ``phased adaptive approach'' to missile defense in Europe, Russian
official statements by the President and Prime Minister were cautiously
optimistic that the new approach would address Russian security
concerns. The Russian President indicated that ISKANDER missiles would
no longer need to be deployed to Kaliningrad. In addition, following
the presidents' meeting on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly
meeting, President Medvedev announced a greater willingness to consider
sanctions as part of the diplomatic process with respect to Iran. I
anticipate that a more in-depth substantive dialogue between U.S. and
Russian experts will occur in the near-term with a view toward
exploring areas of cooperation in this area.
General O'Reilly. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
State who are in a better position to respond to questions that have
policy or diplomatic implications.
46. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, has the administration received assurances that the
future deployment of different missiles with the same intended
capability as the GBI to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles
will not be met with future resistance and objection?
Ms. Flournoy. No, the Russians have not provided such assurances,
nor did we expect them to do so. An important aspect of the new Phased
Adaptive Approach is its adaptability in the face of uncertainty over
the development of the Iranian ballistic missile threat. That
uncertainty may require future deployment of different systems, and we
hope Russia would cooperate with the United States in the face of a
common threat. Russia seems to be reviewing the new approach, and its
position could evolve. We are hoping that our efforts to be transparent
with the Russians and to encourage Russian participation and
cooperation on missile defense will result in a greater amount of trust
and Russian cooperation with us.
General Cartwright. No assurances have been received. We have yet
to have a detailed experts-level exchange with the Russians on this
aspect of our missile defense plans. However, the reaction from the
Russian political leadership has been very positive and we anticipate
that response to factor into a constructive dialogue with our Russian
colleagues at the expert level.
General O'Reilly. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
State who are in a better position to respond to questions that have
policy or diplomatic implications.
47. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, what will we do if they change their minds and
object?
Ms. Flournoy. The decision on missile defense was not based on any
expectations about the Russian reaction. The United States changed its
European BMD plans because of an updated threat assessment and the
availability of new capabilities. Although the new Phased Adaptive
Approach approved by the President does not pose a threat to Russia,
there will likely be elements of the system in Central Europe to which
the Russians may object. Although we sincerely desire Russian
participation and cooperation in addressing this common threat, Russia
cannot and will not be able to divert the United States from the
strategic goal of protecting Europe and the United States from Iranian
ballistic missile attacks.
General Cartwright. We will closely consult with Russia on our
missile defense plans in Europe with a view toward enhancing their
understanding of the approach and soliciting their inputs on potential
areas of cooperation. At this point in time, it would be premature to
engage in speculation on the Russian reaction or the prospective U.S.
response to that reaction. We will seek to address on a case-by-case
basis on any objections the Russians might raise.
General O'Reilly. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
State who are in a better position to respond to questions that have
policy or diplomatic implications.
48. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, how do you expect this decision to impact U.S.-
Russian relations?
Ms. Flournoy. Although the decision to change our approach to
missile defense was not made to placate the Russians, if removing an
irritant to the relationship can result in better cooperation on the
wide range of issues on which we would like to cooperate with Russia,
then I would view this as an added benefit. We see missile defense as
an opportunity for multilateral cooperation against a common threat.
General Cartwright. I would anticipate that resolving this issue in
a way that addresses both our countries' security concerns will provide
tangible momentum to the broader relationship. Our presidents have
committed to working together on security issues of mutual concern.
Cooperation on missile defense in Europe is fully aligned with these
principles.
General O'Reilly. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
State who are in a better position to respond to questions that have
policy or diplomatic implications.
49. Senator Sessions. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and
General O'Reilly, do you agree that this decision creates in the minds
of many that the United States has offered a concession to the
Russians?
Ms. Flournoy. As Secretary Gates wrote: ``Those who say we are
scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed or
misinterpreting what we are doing.'' Although the Russian media may
have put a positive spin on the decision initially, the Russian
professional elite understand that the decision was taken after careful
study and consideration, and that we decided upon the best system to
meet our needs.
General Cartwright. It would not be accurate to characterize this
decision as a ``concession'' to the Russian Government. Our
decisionmaking with respect to European deployments has been based on
an extensive technical assessment and projection of the threat as it
has evolved over the past several years. Detailed Russian security
concerns were expressed to U.S. representatives during various
consultations we had over the past several years. While these inputs
certainly informed the process, they were by no means a determining
factor in our internal decision-making.
General O'Reilly. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
State who are in a better position to respond to questions that have
policy or diplomatic implications.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
reaction in europe
50. Senator Vitter. Secretary Flournoy, I have deep reservations
about the administration's recent decision to cancel the planned BMD
installations in Eastern Europe. This decision is particularly
troubling in light of the continuing threat posed by the Iranian
regime's development of ballistic missile systems. In what ways does
the cancellation of the European BMD program increase the security of
the United States or her allies from the threat posed by long-range
ballistic missiles from Iran or other hostile regimes?
Ms. Flournoy. The revised European-based BMD program does not
``cancel'' the fielding of BMD capabilities in Europe. Rather, it
revises the planned system to provide a significantly better and more
adaptive defense of the United States, our deployed forces, and our
friends and allies and partners.
This phased approach starts by protecting those most at risk from
current Iranian missile threats and grows in later phases to protect
all of our European allies and U.S. forces, civilians and their
families stationed in NATO countries, and the U.S. Homeland. As
planned, the approach will leverage proven capabilities with SM-3
interceptors and forward-based X-band radars, while still providing our
military commanders the ability to adapt quickly to new and emerging
threats. There are also greater opportunities for our allies and other
partners to participate--sensors and interceptors of international
allies and partners can be interoperable with this approach.
The Phased Adaptive Approach significantly improves our ability to
meet near-term requirements for our warfighters. Today our forward
deployed forces face a range of potential missile threats, including
increasing numbers and types of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles, ongoing Iranian development programs to field more capable
missiles, and the ability of the enemy to conduct salvo launches in an
attempt to overwhelm the system. This phased approach deliberately
addresses the threats we see today, while also augmenting the defense
of Europe and the U.S. Homeland against threats we may face in the
future.
51. Senator Vitter. Secretary Flournoy, are you concerned that this
decision in any way increases the vulnerability of U.S. forces
stationed in Europe or our allies in the region?
Ms. Flournoy. On the contrary, the Phased Adaptive Approach will
provide U.S. forces in Europe and our allies in the region protection
sooner against the missile threats they face now. The new approach is
also flexible in that it augments existing defenses of the U.S.
Homeland should a long-range ballistic missile threat from a country
like Iran suddenly surface, and creates another layer of long-range
defenses that will be deployed in future phases.
52. Senator Vitter. Secretary Flournoy, Russian leaders have
indicated that they view the decision to cancel the European BMD
program favorably. Do you believe that the United States and Russia
share the same long-term objectives regarding deterrence of Iran's
ballistic missile capabilities?
Ms. Flournoy. It is important for the Russians and others to
understand that we did not cancel the European BMD program. We
redesigned it to be more immediately responsive to the projected threat
and more adaptive to the future threat.
The Russians share our concern over the possibility of a potential
Iranian nuclear weapon capability, and they have made it clear that
they prefer a diplomatic solution to this issue. However, President
Medvedev stated in New York that sanctions may be inevitable in certain
situations. We appreciate his comments and hope that the new positive
atmosphere in our relations will be reflected in how we deal with the
issue of Iran.
53. Senator Vitter. Secretary Flournoy, do you believe that the
cancellation of the European BMD program in any way affords Russia a
strategic advantage in the region, particularly in regard to former
Soviet bloc states including the Czech Republic and Poland?
Ms. Flournoy. The President did not cancel European missile
defense. The President opted for a Phased Adaptive Approach that takes
advantage of new technology to addresses the short- to medium-range
threats sooner than the GBIs and European Mid-course Radar (EMR) would
have been emplaced in Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland has first
right of refusal on hosting land-based SM-3s in a later phase. We are
exploring potential roles for the Czech Republic in the new
architecture. I believe this new architecture, which can better protect
Europe from the current and future Iranian missile threats, improves
stability and is a win-win for all of Europe including Russia.
54. Senator Vitter. Secretary Flournoy, was the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty follow-on negotiation ever mentioned in the context of
this decision by you or anyone by the administration that you are aware
of?
Ms. Flournoy. We are moving to a Phased, Adaptive Approach because
it will be more effective against current and emerging missile threats
to Europe and the United States. From the beginning of the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty Follow-on Treaty negotiations, we have made it
clear to the Russians that the treaty should not include any
limitations on missile defenses and that discussions on missile defense
should be conducted through other bilateral contacts.
strategic shift
55. Senator Vitter. General O'Reilly, I am frankly very concerned
about this shift in our approach to missile defense, particularly the
sudden reversal of our plans to cooperate with our Polish and Czech
allies in establishing BMD installations. Broadly speaking, what is
your opinion of the role of permanent, theater-based BMD installations
in our overall missile defense strategy?
General O'Reilly. There is a high degree of flexibility in where
elements of the revised Phased, Adaptive Approach can be based--sea-
and land-based at locations in northern and southern Europe. By mixing
sea- and land-based missile defense, the war fighter will be able to
leverage both ``theater-based BMD installations,'' such as the land-
based SM-3 sites, and sea-based assets, that are mobile and can be
surged to the region as the threat develops, to provide a more powerful
and responsive missile defense capability.
56. Senator Vitter. General O'Reilly, you recently expressed
support for a shift toward sea-based mobile BMD systems over the fixed
land-based systems in Eastern Europe. In as much detail as possible,
can you describe how the sea-based system represents an improvement
over the land-based system?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
57. Senator Vitter. General O'Reilly, are you at all concerned that
the cancellation of the European BMD installations will serve the
strategic interests of Russia at the expense of the long-term interests
of the United States?
General O'Reilly. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for
technical aspects of the new architecture including the development,
testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I defer to my
colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
State who are in a better position to respond to questions that have
policy or diplomatic implications.
[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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