[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-97]
PRESIDENT OBAMA'S NEW PLAN FOR MISSILE DEFENSES IN EUROPE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 1, 2009
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ADAM SMITH, Washington J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Rudy Barnes, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Zach Steacy, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, October 1, 2009, President Obama's New Plan for Missile
Defenses in Europe and the Implications for International
Security....................................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, October 1, 2009........................................ 51
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2009
PRESIDENT OBAMA'S NEW PLAN FOR MISSILE DEFENSES IN EUROPE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 11
Flournoy, Hon. Michele A., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 6
O'Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense
Agency, U.S. Department of Defense............................. 8
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State... 16
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cartwright, Gen. James E., joint with Hon. Michele A.
Flournoy................................................... 55
O'Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J................................. 63
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O....................................... 73
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Turner................................................... 89
Mr. Wilson................................................... 87
PRESIDENT OBAMA'S NEW PLAN FOR MISSILE DEFENSES IN EUROPE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, October 1, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:07 a.m., in room
HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Committee meets today to
receive testimony on the President's new plan for missile
defenses in Europe and the implications for international
security.
Joining us today is a formidable panel of witnesses,
General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; the Honorable Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy; the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security;
and Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency.
I have to give a special welcome to our friend, former
colleague, Ellen Tauscher. It is a thrill to have you back. And
we know that you are doing exceedingly well. We appreciate you.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.
The Chairman. We thank each of you for appearing.
Two weeks ago, the President announced that he had accepted
the unanimous recommendations of Defense Secretary Gates and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to restructure the plan for missile
defense in Europe. He said, ``Our new missile defense
architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and
swifter defenses of American forces and American allies.''
And I must say, the new plan sounds familiar. It sounds
like very much it came from the bipartisan direction provided
by Congress. In 2006, our bill established the policy of the
United States to accord priority to developing, testing,
fielding the near-term effective missile defense systems,
including Aegis, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD), and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
system.
In our bill two years ago, we made it the policy of the
United States to develop, test, and deploy effective missile
defenses for our forward-based forces, our allies, and our
homeland against the threat of Iran's existing and potential
ballistic missiles.
Last year, we told the Department to buy more SM-3s and
THAAD interceptors to defend against short- and medium-range
missiles. In a nutshell, that is what the President and
Secretary Gates announced two weeks ago.
In my view, the new plan is comprehensive, it is flexible,
it is designed to counter the most immediate threats posed by
Iran first, and more quickly protect our allies and our
forward-deployed troops in the region than previously planned.
And, notably, it contains important hedges, so if our
intelligence estimates are wrong, we will be in a position to
fortify the defense of Europe as well as our homeland.
We know that Iran is deploying significant numbers of
short-range missiles more quickly than we had previously
expected, and deploying some medium-range systems, such as the
Shahab-3, that can reach Israel. Also, Iran is developing
medium- and intermediate-range missiles that can reach Europe.
We have a moral responsibility to do more rapidly and to
deploy defenses that can protect our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies and our forward-deployed forces in
places like Aviano Air Base in Italy against the growing
threat.
On the other hand, Iran's ability to field an ICBM--that
is, an intercontinental ballistic missile--that can reach the
United States is still in the future, according to our
intelligence professionals, maybe as far away as 2020.
That said, we know that intelligence estimates can be
wrong. For that reason, I am pleased that the plan continues
the testing of the two-stage Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) interceptor that would have been deployed in Poland under
the previous plan. And the Administration plans to continue
negotiating with the Poles and the Czechs to reach cooperative
agreements to base missile defense systems in those nations in
the third or fourth stage of the plan.
Finally, before turning to our ranking member, as well as
our witnesses, let me just make a few comments about how this
new plan might affect our relations with Russia. While I find
it unlikely that calculations concerning our relations with
Russia played no part in the decision, I am hopeful, as
Secretary Gates wrote in the New York Times, that ``if Russia's
leaders embrace this plan, then that will be an unexpected--and
welcome--change of policy on their part.''
It would be an additional benefit if the new plan opens the
door to cooperation with Russia on missile defense. Russian
cooperation could send a powerful signal to Iran, a point of
great importance on the day when negotiations are to begin with
Iran.
So a key question for our witnesses this morning is whether
the Russians will support this new approach and whether the
decision will help create a united front in negotiations with
Iran.
Before calling on our distinguished panel, let me recognize
my good friend, the Ranking Member, Mr. McKeon from the State
of California.
Mr. McKeon.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a privilege to welcome our distinguished witnesses
here today: General Cartwright, Secretary Flournoy, General
O'Reilly. In particular, I would like to extend a warm welcome
back to the gentlelady from California, our colleague and now
Under Secretary of State, Ellen Tauscher, and my native
Californian friend.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. McKeon. Our hearing today focuses on the
Administration's decision to scrap plans for deploying a
European missile defense capability in Poland and the Czech
Republic to protect Europe and the United States.
My colleague has voiced broad support for the
Administration's new proposal. Let me say I am skeptical. I
think it has some merit but, as I weigh all the costs and
benefits of the decision, both quantitative and qualitative, I
do not come to the same conclusion. I think there are
questionable assumptions, a lot of ``ifs,'' and considerable
geopolitical consequences.
A key justification for the Administration's decision is a
new threat assessment, which suggests that the threat from
Iran's longer-range ballistic missiles has been slower to
develop, while its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) are growing more rapidly than previously expected. It
is a sudden change and inconsistent with the frequent
briefings, intelligence reports, and testimony the committee
has received from intelligence and defense officials.
In March of 2009, General Craddock, then-Commander of U.S.
European Command, testified before the committee. And I quote,
``By 2015, Iran may also deploy an intercontinental ballistic
missile capable of reaching all of Europe and parts of the
U.S.''
In May 2009, an unclassified intelligence report issued by
the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) stated,
``With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and
test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.''
Despite this expert testimony and information, there seems
to be this certainty within the Administration that the
Iranians can't develop an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
(IRBM) or ICBM by 2015, and that these are not real threats to
be worried about.
Does this certainty consider foreign assistance? Because,
as we all know, Iran continues to work closely with North Korea
who, themselves, appear to be pursuing ICBMs.
Does this certainty account for uncertainty? Intelligence
is a fickle business, especially when a country is determined
to mask its activities. Friday's revelation that Iran is
building a covert uranium enrichment facility is a case in
point. A December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
judged that covert uranium enrichment efforts were ``halted.''
Less than two years later, they are not. The NIE also
highlighted intelligence information gaps and shortfalls. So I
am skeptical when I hear Administration officials talk in such
absolute terms that the long-range missile threat isn't as
quick to develop.
We are all concerned by the proliferation and growth in
short- and medium-range missiles. They are a threat to our
allies, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, and to our
forward-deployed troops. Thus, increasing our theater missile
defenses is incredibly important.
However, as I understood the previous plan, the 10
interceptors in Poland and radar in Czech Republic would be
complemented by expanding theater missile defense capabilities
such as Aegis, THAAD, Patriot, and Allied systems to cover the
shorter-range areas. All NATO heads of state and governments
signed on to this basic approach at the April 2008 Bucharest
summit.
The testimony submitted by our witnesses also emphasized
that the new Phased, Adaptive Approach is more cost-effective,
with proven technology, and provides more comprehensive
coverage of Europe sooner than the previous plan. I would like
to understand these assertions because, frankly, with the
information I have before me, I am having a hard time believing
them.
According to a 2008 independent report required by this
committee, the Czech and Polish proposal was the most cost-
effective solution to protect the U.S. and Europe. Another
study done earlier this year by the Congressional Budget Office
examined sea- and land-based alternatives and came to the same
conclusion.
As I understand it, Phase One and Phase Two of the new
approach provide only modest coverage of Europe. Of course,
this depends on the number of ships available and locations
where those ships would be deployed. Given the demands on the
Navy's surface fleet and United States Central Command
(CENTCOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM), and United
States African Command (AFRICOM) and others, dedicating those
ships to the European theater will be challenging, to say the
least.
These phases also require the development and acquisition
of new sensor technologies.
Let's make one thing clear about this policy: if this new
approach is to match its predecessor in terms of dedicated
coverage, we will either need new ships or we will have to take
ships away from other missions. Protections for most of Europe
against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles isn't
provided until 2018, and protection of the U.S. against ICBMs
until 2020.
Protection of the U.S. requires a new interceptor, the SM-3
Block IIB that I would characterize as a ``paper'' missile.
Should Iran have an IRBM or ICBM capability by 2015, or even
2018, this new approach could leave parts of Europe and the
U.S. vulnerable for several years. Are we offering Tehran an
open invitation to focus on longer-range missile development?
Aside from the technical and cost concerns, I am
particularly troubled by the geopolitical consequences of the
Administration's decision, starting with its effect on our
relationship with friends and allies. The Czech Republic and
Poland, who have troops in Afghanistan fighting alongside U.S.
forces, went out on a limb. The U.S. Government made a
commitment, and we backed out. I can't express how strong my
disappointment is over this.
So how did the Administration inform Prague and Warsaw of
its decision? Reportedly by late-night phone calls and hastily
assembled diplomatic envoys. Apparently the Czech Prime
Minister was woken out of bed after midnight, and the Polish
Prime Minister refused to answer the phone, suspecting what the
news might be.
On top of all this, the announcement came on the 70th
anniversary of Russia's invasion of Poland at the start of
World War II. For a President who has repeatedly stressed the
importance of multilateralism and diplomatic reengagement with
the world, this unilateral action was abrupt and sloppy,
occurring without the consultations promised to both
governments.
What will be the second- and third-order effects of this
decision? There is what we believe, and then there is what
others perceive. The headline of a daily paper in the Czech
Republic read, ``No Radar. Russia Won.'' An editorial in a
respected pro-business Czech newspaper said, ``An ally we rely
on has betrayed us and exchanged us for its own, better
relations with Russia, of which we are rightly afraid.''
Are we signalling to allies that we are willing to
compromise our relationships with them in order to better our
relationship with Russia or, perhaps, Iran or North Korea? Will
allies and friends view U.S. commitments more skeptically in
the future? Will Russia and Iran use this decision as an
opening to be more assertive in their foreign policy?
The Administration's Russia ``reset'' policy now seems to
have morphed into a Russia ``retreat'' policy that unsettles
our allies and does nothing to discipline Russian behavior.
Though the administration has stated this decision is not a
concession to Russia, it sure looks like one. Whether the
timing was intentional or not, on the eve of Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations in Geneva, the
Administration gave Russia the concession it wanted and got
nothing in return.
The President has also sought Russian assistance to stop
Iran's nuclear programs, signalling that such assistance would
lessen the need for the Czech and Polish sites that Moscow has
opposed. Yet we have no indications that Russia will cooperate
on Iran, and history should teach us to have very low
expectations.
In fact, Prime Minister Putin remarked the day after, ``The
latest decision by President Obama . . . has positive
implications, and I very much hope that this very right and
brave decision will be followed by others.'' What is clear is
that the Kremlin expects shifts in U.S. policy without taking
any equivalent action. Ceding to Russia in areas that affect
our national security interests is dangerous and unwise.
During his April 5th speech in Prague, the President
stated, ``As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go
forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective
and proven.'' Let's take stock of where we are at. The threat
clearly persists, and I am as yet unconvinced that the new
approach is lower-risk and more cost-effective at protecting
the U.S. and Europe. Meanwhile, the geopolitical implications
resulting from the decision are significant.
Finally, perhaps the ultimate litmus test for the
Administration's new approach will be whether it is funded.
Will program investments match the Administration's new policy?
They are not off to a good start, with a $1.2 billion reduction
to the missile defense program in this year's budget. I wait
with keen interest the fiscal year 2011 budget request.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important
hearing.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
We are in the mechanical age today. We have to punch the
right button.
I understand the order of witnesses today was requested by
the witnesses, who will be out of the proper seniority manner.
But we will follow the suggestions of the witnesses today and
will be in this order: Secretary Flournoy, General O'Reilly,
General Cartwright and, finally, Secretary Tauscher. Again,
thank you for being with us.
Secretary Flournoy.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Flournoy. Thank you, Chairman Skelton,
Congressman McKeon, and other distinguished members of the
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
Administration's new approach to missile defense in Europe with
you today.
We are confident that our new approach represents a
dramatic improvement over the program of record. Under the old
plan, we were not going to be able to deploy a European missile
defense system capable of protecting against Iranian missiles
until at least 2017. Under the new plan, we will be able to
protect vulnerable parts of Europe, and the tens of thousands
of U.S. troops stationed there, by the end of 2011. And we will
also be creating a far more flexible missile defense system,
one that can be adapted to provide better protection against
emerging threats.
As you know, the previous administration had planned to
deploy 10 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland, a
European mid-course radar in the Czech Republic, and a Army
Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance-Model 2 (AN/TPY-2) radar
elsewhere in the region. The decision to move forward with that
particular configuration was made nearly three years ago, based
on threat information and the technologies available at the
time.
But circumstances have changed since then. First, the
intelligence picture has evolved. And second, we have made
major strides in missile defense technologies and capabilities
in the last few years. We are now in a position to put in place
a far more effective missile defense system more rapidly than
just a few years ago.
Let me just start by discussing our current threat
assessment. The intelligence community now assesses that the
threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
is developing far more rapidly than previously projected, while
the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic
missiles has been somewhat slower to develop than previously
estimated.
In the near term, what this means is that the greatest
missile threats from Iran will be to U.S. allies and partners,
as well as to our deployed personnel, military and civilian,
and their families in the Middle East and in Europe. And,
needless to say, this concern is all the more urgent in light
of Iran's continued uranium enrichment program.
I just want to underscore, this is the key change in the
intel assessment that drove our action: the very real threat of
short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles that is
developing faster and must be dealt with sooner.
However, as Secretary Gates has noted, we understand--
particularly, he understands, given his background--that
intelligence projections can be wrong. Iran's priorities and
capabilities may change in ways that we can't predict. So our
new approach does not discount the potential future threat of
an Iranian ICBM. In fact, it accounts for that possibility, the
possibility that threats from Iranian long-range missiles will
evolve more rapidly than we currently predict.
We will have 30 GBIs deployed in the United States by the
end of 2010, which will provide the United States with full
protection of the homeland against an Iranian ICBM threat for
many years to come.
What is more, the information for the European forward-
based TPY-2 radar that remains part of our Phase One plan will
significantly enhance the performance of our existing U.S.-
based GBIs. And we will also continue to upgrade the GBI over
time.
Let me turn to highlight some of the technological changes
that have allowed us to develop an improved approach to missile
defense. As General O'Reilly and General Cartwright will
describe in more detail, improved interceptor capabilities
developed in the last few years now offer more flexible and
capable missile defense architectures. And we have also
significantly improved our sensor technology. This means we
have a better variety of options to detect, track, and engage
enemy missiles. And, as a result, we have new missile defense
options that were simply not previously available.
Our new approach, which the President adopted on the
unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, will rely on a distributed network of
sensors and SM-3 interceptors which can be fired from both
Aegis-capable ships and from land. This means greater
geographic flexibility, greater survivability, and greater
scaleability in response to an evolving threat. That is exactly
what we mean by a Phased, Adaptive Approach.
Before I close, let me just say a few words about how our
new approach has been received by our allies. For us, one of
the many advantages of the new architecture we are building is
that it greatly increases our ability to work with our European
allies and partners, and to strengthen extended deterrence and
mutual defense. The new architecture provides many more
opportunities for alliance-building and burden-sharing between
the United States and our NATO partners.
Indeed, the reactions we have gotten from our allies have
been quite supportive. NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen has
hailed the decision as a positive step, while Polish Prime
Minister Tusk described the offering as ``a real chance to
strengthen Europe's security.''
We have already begun our discussions with both Poland and
the Czech Republic about their potential new roles in the new
architecture. And our Polish allies know, they understand that
they have the option of replacing the GBIs from the previous
plan with land-based SM-3 interceptors in the new plan. We
will, thus, continue to work with our Polish friends to seek
ratification of the Missile Defense Basing Agreement and the
Supplemental Status of Forces Agreement.
We are also in discussions with the Czech Republic to
ensure that they continue to play a leadership role in missile
defense within the alliance. We have several joint projects
that are already under way, and those will continue, with our
Czech partners. And we are discussing several more, including
the possibility of having the Czech Republic host some of the
new system's command and control elements.
We certainly welcome Russian interest in the new approach,
as well as potential Russian cooperation in sharing data from
their radars. But this is not about Russia; it never has been
about Russia. Regardless of the Russian reaction, we will
continue to do whatever it takes to ensure our security and
those of our partners and allies.
Let me end here by underscoring this point. And this is a
point that was absolutely critical to Secretary Gates, who had
previously, as you recall, championed the program of record.
And this point was critical to his deciding to support what he
believes is a better new way forward. And that is this: our new
approach to missile defense in Europe allows us to provide
coverage to vulnerable parts of Europe much faster than the old
approach. And when fully deployed in Phase Four, it will be
even more capable than the program of record, both for European
missile defense and for U.S. homeland defense.
And let me be clear: our new approach allows us to augment
our current protection of the U.S. homeland against the long-
range ballistic missile threats that may evolve in the future,
starting in Phase One with the addition of the forward-based
radar.
So, in sum, we are not scrapping missile defense in Europe;
we are strengthening it. And we look forward to working with
this committee to make this ballistic missile architecture a
reality.
Thank you once more for this opportunity to testify, and we
look forward to your questions. I am going to hand it over to
General O'Reilly. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy and
General Cartwright can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. General O'Reilly, please.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR,
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General O'Reilly. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
McKeon, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate
the opportunity to testify before you today on the technical
aspects of the President's decision to use the Phased, Adaptive
Approach for missile defense in Europe.
This new proposal is a more powerful missile defense of
NATO. It enhances U.S. homeland defense and is deployable to
theaters around the world and is more adaptable to respond to
threat uncertainties.
The previous proposed missile defense of Europe consisted
of four components: a command and control system; 10 ground-
based interceptors, or GBIs, in Poland; an X-band
discrimination radar in the Czech Republic; and an X-band
precision tracking radar forward-based in southeastern Europe.
Assuming a shot doctrine of two interceptors against each
threat missile, this previous missile defense architecture had
a maximum capability to engage five intermediate-range
ballistic missiles or medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at
Europe, or five intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at
the United States from the Middle East.
The most valuable component of the previous architecture to
the defense of the U.S. homeland was a forward-based sensor in
southeastern Europe, which would provide early and precise
tracks of threat missiles from the Middle East heading towards
the United States, thus increasing the accuracy of the fire
control instructions at our GBIs based at Fort Greely, Alaska,
and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
We remain concerned about the future Iranian ICBM threat.
Therefore, we are retaining the forward-based sensor component
in our new Phased, Adaptive Approach proposal to enhance the
defense of the U.S. homeland. Moreover, we also continue to
develop the GMD system, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, and
begin testing against ICBM targets using representative Iranian
trajectories.
A significant limitation of the previous European
architecture was that the GBIs were used in intercontinental
ballistic missile, intermediate-range ballistic missile, and
medium-range ballistic missile defense roles. Given the current
threat estimate, by 2017 the European-based GBIs could rapidly
be consumed by an attack of five Iranian medium-range ballistic
missile or intermediate-range ballistic missiles aimed at NATO
countries, leaving no GBIs to contribute to U.S. ICBM defense.
Therefore, the previously proposed European defense
architecture was insufficient to protect NATO and our forward-
based forces and provide redundant coverage of the United
States homeland.
Fortunately, we have made significant advances over the
last several years in missile defense technologies that enable
a Phased, Adaptive Approach to defending Europe. The area of
greatest potential is developing faster and more accurate
command and control, battle management, and communications
systems using a network of many different sensors, especially
sensors that can track missiles in the early phases of their
flight.
For example, our intercept of the ailing satellite in
February 2008 was made possible by combining data from sensors
around the world to provide a highly accurate track of the
satellite to a modified Aegis weapons system and its SM-3 Block
IA missile prior to the ship's radar even seeing the satellite.
Although this was only a very limited capability against an
inoperable satellite, it demonstrated the significant benefit
of networking sensors in a missile defense architecture.
Another example is the most recent intercept test of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense System last December, when we
combined the tracks of satellites, early warning radars, Sea-
Based X-Band radars, and forward-based radars on land and sea
to provide the GMD System with a very accurate track.
Additionally, earlier this year, we demonstrated unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) as highly accurate forward-based missile
defense sensors and intercept tests.
Furthermore, last Friday, we successfully launched a pair
of demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
satellites that will detect and track ballistic missiles over
their entire flight for the first time.
Finally, at our External Sensors Laboratory at Schriever
Air Force Base, Colorado, we continue to develop new algorithms
and demonstrate combining new sensor data to achieve even more
accurate tracks than any individual sensor could produce.
We propose the Aegis Standard Missile-3 Block IA as our
primary interceptor in this architecture. It is a very capable
interceptor due to its high acceleration, velocity, its proven
track record, and our ability to rapidly increase to over 80
interceptors at any one site.
Since we began testing the operationally configured SM-3
Block IA missile in June 2006, we have successfully intercepted
a target in eight out of nine times that we have launched the
interceptor. Of note, the SM-3s are also more affordable than
Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors since you can buy
four to seven production variants of the SM-3 for the cost of
one GBI.
Finally, a key attribute is that we can launch SM-3s from
sea or sites on land, which gives us great flexibility in
placing the interceptor launcher between the threat and the
area you are trying to protect, a key enabler in intercepting
threat missiles early in flight.
We are developing a new kill vehicle for the SM-3
interceptor, the SM-3 IB, which uses the same rocket motor as
the SM-3 but has a more advanced seeker and fire control system
that uses external sensors as well as the Aegis radar. We have
already demonstrated the higher-risk components of the new kill
vehicle and are planning the first intercept test in the winter
of 2011. A more advanced variant of the SM-3, the SM-3 IIA, has
been under develop since 2005. This interceptor will have more
than twice the range of an SM-3 Block IB.
We propose defending NATO in phases. Phase One would
consist of Aegis ships with SM-3 Block IA missiles deployed in
the eastern Mediterranean Sea and a forward-based sensor in
southeastern Europe. We propose, by 2015, the development and
deployment of the SM-3 Block IB missile, which will have
greater capacity to use a network of sensors and greater
ability to discriminate threat objects. Scores of SM-3 IBs
could be deployed at land- and sea-based locations.
By 2018, the deployment of the SM-3 IIA missile, which
could defend all of NATO from two land-based site locations and
one sea-based location. By 2020, our goal is to develop a
higher velocity SM-3 IIB missile to destroy MRBMs, IRBMs, and
ICBMs early in their flight from interceptor launch locations
within the theater of the threat launch location.
Two land-based SM-3 Block IIB sites would protect all of
NATO. The timeline I have presented allows for these missile
defense technologies to be tested and proven prior to
deployment decisions. An additional advantage of the Phased,
Adaptive Approach is its applicability to missile defenses
outside of Europe.
Finally, the addition of radars at Armavir, Russia, and
Gabala, Azerbaijan, and cooperative development of missile
defense technologies by Russia and other countries are not
necessary, but would be welcome.
We are committed to fully funding this program as we
prepare for the next budget submission to Congress. However, it
is important that we have relief from rescissions and the
flexibility to spend unused fiscal year 2009 Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and some MILCON--
military construction--dollars associated with the previous
European site proposal.
I note that both the House and Senate authorizing
committees have very presciently included provisions in this
year's national defense authorization bill that permit the
Department to use fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funding
for an alternative architecture once the Secretary of Defense
certifies that this architecture is as cost-effective,
technically reliable, and operationally available as the
previous program.
With this relief and some redirections in the fiscal year
2010 funds, we can pursue this new architecture with our fiscal
year 2010 budget request.
Executing this approach will be challenging. There will
likely be setbacks. But this architecture is no more
challenging than the development of other missile defense
technologies in which we have been successful. The engineering
is executable, and the development risks are manageable.
I thank you and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Reilly can be found in
the Appendix on page 63.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
General Cartwright.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, VICE CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Cartwright. Thank you, Chairman Skelton and
Congressman McKeon. And thank you for this opportunity.
I have had the privilege of working on the missile defense
architecture and the war fighting requirements for over 10
years now, on the Joint Staff as a combatant commander and,
now, as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
The congressionally directed Ballistic Missile Defense
Review has provided the opportunity to review our objectives,
the threat, the combatant commanders' needs, and the
technologies available. Our recommendations are not a departure
from the objectives. The needs of the combatant commanders,
however, reflect an adjustment to the balance of our
capabilities in response to the threats that they actually face
today and the threats that are clearly visible on the horizon.
My colleagues have laid that case before you. Allow me to
address the architecture and the broader implications of our
recommendations across all of the combatant commanders.
The objectives have not changed, as I said. They remain:
defense of the homeland, defense of our deployed forces,
friends, and allies. We still have a three-tier approach here.
We defend the homeland, and the principal weapons systems that
we use to defend the homeland are the ground-based interceptors
currently based in Alaska and California. We defend the
theaters. And this is probably the newest capability that we
are starting to field, with the Standard Missile-3 and with the
Theater High Altitude Air Defense missile, called THAAD. And we
defend point defenses, which are our critical bases,
infrastructure where our forces are, population centers, things
like that, with the Patriot system. So we have a three-layered
approach: the homeland, the theater, and the point defense for
critical assets. That is still in place.
What we have now, with the emergence of SM-3 and the THAAD
system, is a robust capability at the theater level, which we
did not have before. Each of these systems tend to bleed over
into each other, so the GBI can, in fact, work at the theater
level, which is what would have happened with the system that
we would have put in Europe. It would have had the capabilities
to work against medium-range ballistic missiles and defend that
theater. But it is principally designed in a very sophisticated
capability to defend the homeland. THAAD and SM-3 can, in fact,
defend the homeland if we put them there; can, in fact, defend
at the theater level; and can, in fact, defend at the point
level at bases and stations.
So each has a bleed-across. And that is some of the
redundancy that is absolutely essential and is critical in the
capability that the combatant commanders are asking for. In
other words, they don't want to be required to rely on one
system for each approach.
The emergence of the PAC-3 and these theater capabilities
really started about three years ago. And we started to shift,
with the help of this committee, our investment structure
across into SM-3 and THAAD, most recently as it has started to
emerge. And so the buying out of the PAC-3, so our forces had
sufficient of those. Now the investment heavily in SM-3
quantities and in THAAD is critical to our ability to field
these Phased, Adaptive Approaches.
We look at the threat from the basis of three points, also.
It is a military thing; we have to do everything in threes.
But, primarily, we start with the terminal defense, the ability
to defend something at the end game. So, as the missile
reenters the atmosphere and goes toward the target, that is the
terminal phase, principally handled by Patriot, by THAAD, and
by SM-3.
The midcourse is the most challenging, generally done
outside of the atmosphere for long-range ballistic missiles.
That is the terrain of the ground-based interceptor. That is
where it works. That is a very difficult place to work because
you have to navigate and be able to operate in the atmosphere,
leave the atmosphere, deploy the weapon, and then close on the
target at very, very high speeds, without the advantage of the
air.
And then the terminal is the reentry, a very difficult
phase. And we use the Patriot in principle to work that end,
along with the SM-3 and the THAAD.
The boost is where we have the most opportunity to be
effective. And it is the most difficult to field as a
capability. The boost is considered that phase from launch
until we generally leave the atmosphere. If you can catch a
missile in the boost phase, from an operational standpoint, it
is before it can do much of anything. Any threat missile is
most vulnerable in the boost phase. There are many studies out
there talking about the boost phase. But it is very short. It
is a very kinetically active point; in other words, the missile
motors are running at that time. They are staging through. It
is a very difficult phase to be in, and you have to close very,
very quickly.
What is standing before us out in the 2020 time frame is an
operationally relevant capability to start to close the boost
phase. That, as the congressman said, is to some extent paper
today. But we are on the breadboard. We are testing the
sensors, and we are testing the missiles that we believe will
give us the capability as a Nation to get at these missiles in
the boost phase.
In the boost phase, the missile doesn't care whether it is
a short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, or
intercontinental range. It doesn't matter. If you can catch it
in the boost phase, you can do something about it there very
early in the game. And that, for us, holds the greatest
possibility. We are focusing our Research and Development (R&D)
to try to come up with a relevant way--an operationally
relevant way--to get at the boost phase. That is the thrust of
a lot of our work as we move to the future.
We still remain and seek the capability, though, to go
after missiles that are either on a pad, which is probably the
easiest target and for which most ICBMs--all ICBMs right now
associated with Iran and North Korea are pad-launched. In other
words, they are very visible, they are up above the ground, and
you can go after them before launch if you so desire. We are
not advocating preemptive, but it is a physical capability that
we possess.
There is also the silo-based. That is a very difficult way
and generally reserved for ICBMs of sophisticated countries.
But you put them in the ground, and you launch them from silos,
and they come out of the ground. It is very difficult to go
after that. They can be hardened, and that is a difficult
target.
And the more prevalent, now, direction that we see
countries going is the mobile capability. In other words, we
put these missiles on a tail, drive them around to a point of
advantage, and then launch them from someplace remote.
So we still retain, and want to retain, the capability to
go after pad-based, mobile-based, and silo-based missiles. We
believe that is essential, from the combatant commander's
perspective, to be able to get at all three types of missiles.
This architecture allows us to do that.
And probably, for the combatant commander, the most
significant change in the intelligence that is relevant to them
and important to them is this idea of raid, the number of
missiles. The systems that we have today, such as Patriot, were
designed to engage three, maybe five missiles coming in. Same
for our ground-based interceptor. And yet what we are facing
today in the short-range fight is hundreds. And what we think
we are going to face in the medium-range fight in the very near
future is hundreds.
None of the systems that we have today were really built
for hundreds. And that includes the SM-3 system, which is the
Aegis radar; that includes the Patriot radar and the THAAD
radars. What is fundamentally different here is that we have
added radar sensors in to take the existing weapons systems and
make them effective against raids, to be able to sort out and
make sure that you are not wasting rounds, multiple rounds
against the same target because you are in different locations,
et cetera, but to actually distinguish against raids.
This is what the combatant commanders most seek. And this
is what this radar in the southeastern part of Europe, the same
radar that we deployed two years ago into Japan and the radar
we deployed this year into Israel, that is the capability of
this X-band radar, is to sort through large raid numbers,
provide then to either the Patriot or the SM-3 or the THAAD or
the GBI exactly which target is assigned to which missile. That
is absolutely critical and something we have never had before.
That is fundamentally different. And that is why it is so
essential to the combatant commanders.
Let me talk a little bit about adaptive and responsive. The
command and control system that we have put together is not a
command and control system for Europe only. It is a command and
control system that is global.
One of the biggest challenges we have today in the physical
infrastructure and the physical industrial ability to field
these systems is that the missiles have far greater range than
the sensors that are organic to them. So an Aegis system and
the SM-3, the SM-3 can fly much further than that system can
see and guide it. The same is true for Patriot, the same is
true for THAAD; obviously, for the GBI because it goes around
the Earth.
What we are able to do today in this command and control
system is use a sensor that is dislocated from the weapon to
actually guide it to the interceptor. That is the capability
that will be fundamentally put together as we field this system
in 2011, mature as we get to 2015. So, a sensor completely
dislocated from the system. That is what we demonstrated when
we shot down the errant satellite. The sensor on the ship never
saw that satellite until the last second or two. Okay?
And being able to do that means that we do not now have to
try to build on every ship or airplane or land base a huge, as
we call it, ``aperture'' in order to see targets that are very,
very far away. We can use netting of these sensors in a way
that we could never do, because we are in this digital age, and
move that data to the missile in an operationally relevant way.
That is absolutely critical.
We want to be able to continue to hold that risk, all of
those targets that are fixed or relocatable or mobile, but we
also want to bring those attributes to our own capability. Once
you fix a site, it can only address a certain range of threats,
whether it is the missile or the sensor. And so, the system
that we are looking at today in differentiation from the
ground-based interceptor is called ``relocatable.'' In other
words, these SM-3s that would be land-based, can be moved over,
probably, think in terms of a couple of months and relocated if
the threat has been relocated. So we can move them around.
By putting the system on the mobile platform, which is the
Aegis system and the ship, we can move to that threat if it
emerges someplace that the intelligence didn't predict it would
emerge. And I love my intelligence counterparts, but the one
thing I have to live by as a rule is I can't rely on it. I have
a thinking enemy out there. They have a vote. They may emerge
in someplace that we don't predict. By having the system on
Aegis, on the ship, we can close with the threat wherever it
emerges, no matter what the intelligence may have thought two
or three years prior. And that is just a fact of life. We have
to be able to do that. You will hold me accountable for doing
that if we have to defend this Nation.
And so we have to have a mixture between mobile,
relocatable, and fixed sites. The fixed sites, actually, are
the cheapest. Once you build them, it is much easier to, in
fact, sustain them. And I think the congressman's point about
ships and the cost of ships and their multiple missions is a
fair point. But understand that most of the Aegis systems--
depends on which one you look at--have about 140 tubes. And in
those tubes can be this kind of missile, can be cruise
missiles, can be all sorts of different armaments. It is a very
versatile and capable ship. It depends on what mission you
assign it to, as to what it goes and does, but it is almost
always ready to go do two or three other types of missions at
any point in time.
We do not like to anchor a mobile ship to a fixed location
for any extended period of time because it does, in fact,
diminish its capability broader on a global scale. But if that
is what we need, if that is what we need to get redundancy, if
that is what we need to move to a threat we didn't predict, it
is the most capability that we have.
Let me talk just a little bit more about weapons and
sensors. There is another thing here that is very fundamentally
different for the combatant commander about this approach to
weapons and sensors. It is the ability to pair the right weapon
with the right sensor and not have them owned by any one
service, not have them owned by any one country, not have them
owned by any one who may have been an ally yesterday, may not
be an ally today. We can mix and match in ways that,
historically, we have never been able to do.
We are trying to move to a system that we call ``any
weapon, any sensor.'' We are not there yet. But that is where
we want to be for the vagaries of the intelligence that we have
to deal with, the real-life fact that the enemy gets a vote in
this, and the reality that we are never sure who we are going
to have to defend against tomorrow. I mean, I would not have
predicted that we were going to be in Afghanistan 5, 10 years
ago. It is a fact that we have to deal with on the combatant
commander side.
The other part of this that is very powerful, from our
perspective, is today many countries own the Patriot system.
Those Patriots can be integrated into these sensors and this
command and control very easily. Many countries own the Aegis
system. We can integrate these missiles and their fire controls
into this system very easily.
And the reality is many countries have sensors, radars, et
cetera, and have weapons that we can bring in. For instance, in
Israel we are integrating their Arrow weapon into this system.
We are integrating other countries' radars into this system. We
talked briefly about the potential to get the two Russian
radars.
This system is agnostic to the source. It basically
converts the data into something that can be used, no matter
how it was developed and off of what system. The bulk of our
radars that we are using for this system were fielded in the
1970s. And we are using them today for modern weapons and
modern threats because we can do that in the digital age.
And this starts to realize for us the ability to bring
allies together in fundamentally different ways. Think about a
system that you could not afford as a single nation but,
because you can band together with your neighbors, you can
build a defense. That is a different way of thinking about
deterrence. That is what this system starts to offer us.
It takes all three parts: it takes the command and control,
it takes the weapons, it takes the sensors. But as we now start
to talk to our partners in the Pacific, and you watch the
Japanese field their Aegis systems, which are basically joining
into this, as you watch the South Koreans do the same, it sends
a very powerful message to the North Koreans. As you watch the
same thing in the Gulf states, as we now deploy the Patriot
systems and as we deploy the SM-3, it is fundamentally changing
how they think about their neighbor and how they think about
collective defense vis-a-vis Iran.
That is a very powerful approach. NATO has embraced this
for that very reason. It is not a U.S.-only approach. It allows
them to build their indigenous systems, it allows them to
decide who they want to partner with, but it builds a
collective defense that no one nation is going to be able to
afford.
I appreciate this opportunity. We stand ready for your
questions. I really do believe, as do the chiefs, that this is
the way to the future. It is also the way to the present and
the threats that the combatant commanders are facing today.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of General Cartwright and
Secretary Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. General, thank you so much.
The gentlelady from California, who made a multiyear study
of this subject and did so well while she was a Member here, we
would love to hear from you, Secretary Tauscher.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Chairman Skelton and Ranking
Member McKeon. Thank you very much for the warm welcome.
To my distinguished members of the House Armed Services
Committee, it is an honor to testify before you today. Let me
say before the questions start that I miss you professionally
and personally very much, and I thank you very, very much for
your service. And I thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today on the President's approach to missile defense
in Europe.
I know that the President's decision has prompted much
discussion, especially on the cable talk shows and on some
editorial pages. Besides restating what my very distinguished
colleagues from the Department of Defense have already said, I
want to bring a sense of balance to this discussion and focus
my remarks on the foreign policy implications of this
initiative.
Let me begin by stating very strongly that the Obama
Administration is fully committed to deploying operationally
effective and cost-effective missile defenses to protect the
United States, our deployed forces overseas, and our allies.
After months of review and with the full support of his
national security team, President Obama decided to bolster our
national security and renew our approach to missile defense in
Europe today based on the latest intelligence and what we
understand the threat to be today.
The Intelligence Community found that the threat of a
potential Iranian ICBM had been slower to develop than
previously estimated, while the threat from Iran's short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more quickly than
previously projected. The Iranian missile launches earlier this
week visibly demonstrate the nature of this threat. Our
approach provides more effective defenses today against the
threat.
The allegations that we decided to cancel or shelve plans
for U.S. European based missile defense deployments are simply
not true. From a foreign policy perspective, our new approach
has a number of advantages over the previous plan.
First, as the threat evolves, the system will evolve to
protect all of our European NATO allies. We can't protect some
and leave others vulnerable.
Second, our plan will put more interceptors in Europe.
Instead of 10 interceptors in 2018, this new plan will deploy
scores more. Under the previous plan, if two interceptors were
fired at each Iranian ICBM, Iran would need only six missiles
to overwhelm the system. The greater number of interceptors
under our new plan will complicate Iran's plans to use or
threaten to use their balance missiles as coercive weapons.
Third, this system is more mobile and can be deployed more
quickly than the previous system, plus we can tailor the number
of deployed interceptors to the threat.
Fourth, placing an emphasis on proven capabilities, such as
the SM-3 interceptor, will increase the credibility of the
United States' commitment in the eyes of our allies and, I
might say, our adversaries. Deploying missile defenses with a
demonstrated track record of success means that our allies will
not have to wonder whether a system can be reliable in
defending against a threat.
Again, this new architecture provides an improved
opportunity for other allies to participate in the defense of
Europe, so it is not a surprise that foreign leaders like
Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown
have praised our new approach.
We believe the response from the Polish and Czech
governments has been positive since our trip to Europe. We will
continue our efforts to strengthen our strategic relationship
with them. Our bilateral relationships have expanded in both
depth and breadth, and we consider both countries, both of whom
have participated in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, to be
among our closest and staunchest allies. We remain committed to
implementing a range of security and defense dialogues and we
have offered both countries the opportunity to participate in
elements of our new missile defense architecture.
When we visited Warsaw last month, we offered Poland the
opportunity to host a land based SM-3 interceptor site. We will
further demonstrate our commitment to Poland by ensuring in the
near future that we have boots on the ground, which is what the
Polish government really wants. This could include plans to
rotate a U.S. Army Patriot unit to Poland.
With respect to the Czech Republic, the United States will
continue to identify areas where our military cooperation could
be strengthened and broadened. We hope to conclude soon an
agreement that will provide a means for defense cooperation in
many areas, and we will continue to work on ballistic missile
defense research with the Czech industry.
I want to make a final point regarding Russia. Nothing that
we did had anything to do with Russian saber-rattling or their
consternation about the ground-based interceptors or the Czech
radar. The decision was not part of any trade-off or quid pro
quo. As someone who participated in the senior level
interagency meetings as part of the decision-making process, I
can tell you that President Obama based his decision on the
latest intelligence, which calls for a stronger missile defense
program that can be deployed sooner. If, as a consequence of
President Obama's decision, relations with Russia improve, then
we should embrace that benefit.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McKeon, the Obama
Administration has made the right choice for the right reasons.
As we implement this new program, including the fiscal 2011
budget, I hope you will support our efforts.
I thank you much for your time and I would be happy to take
any questions you have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Tauscher can be found
in the Appendix on page 73.]
Chairman Skelton. I certainly thank you.
I will limit my questions because there are so many here
who wish to ask of you today.
As I understand it, three of you, excluding General
Cartwright, were part of a delegation to Europe two weeks ago
to discuss the President's decision with Polish and Czech and
NATO officials. Can you give us a summary of that discussion
and the issues raised, particularly by the Poles and the
Czechs?
Secretary Flournoy, we will ask you to lead off on that. If
the others have comments, we would appreciate it.
Secretary Flournoy. Yes, we did go over to Europe and went
first to Prague--I am sorry, went first to Warsaw and then to
Prague and then to brief the North Atlantic Council.
I think one of the things we had to deal with when we
arrived is that there had been a number of leaks in the press,
or erroneous and speculative stories in the press, so that we
found--despite previous consultations--we found our allies
expecting something different than what we were actually going
to suggest to them.
So I think part of our meetings was really focused on
explaining the new approach to them and correcting
misimpressions of what exactly the proposal was.
I think once they understood that, particularly in Poland,
we very quickly got into discussions about how they could
participate in the new architecture and reaffirmed to them that
other elements of previous agreements related to, say, the
Patriot rotation and other aspects of our security cooperation
remained fully valid and we, in fact, planned to pursue even
broader and deeper cooperation with them.
I think in the Czech Republic, I think that we certainly
delivered the news to them that the radar would not be part of
the new architecture, but we also hastened to reaffirm the fact
that the agreement for cooperation on missile defense would
continue, we have a number of ongoing projects with them, and
that we would welcome finding new ways for them to participate
in the new architecture, and we are already having follow-on
discussions with them to identify specific ways that they could
play a leadership role in the new system.
Lastly, when we went to the NAC, the North Atlantic
Council, I would say that the response was uniformly positive.
I think people understood the benefits of the system, they saw
greater opportunities for countries to participate, and they
saw a real potential for linking and integrating what we are
proposing with the work that NATO has already begun on their
own missile defense command and control architecture.
I would defer to General O'Reilly and Secretary Tauscher to
see if they have anything to add.
General O'Reilly. Sir, I was part of the negotiating teams
for the last couple of years and the personnel that we met with
in both countries--Poland and the Czech Republic--were the same
that I have been sitting across the table from for years. I
believe they were greatly comforted from the fact that what we
are proposing is very minor changes to the ballistic missile
defense agreements that we have already agreed to that we are
waiting ratification for.
In the case of Poland, it is changing literally the
reference to a ground-based interceptor, capital letters, to a
ground-based interceptor, lower case, and other than the
annexes, that is the gist of the changes in order for us to
continue on with Poland participating in the architecture.
In the Czech Republic, again, we no longer see a
requirement for the radar, but there are many opportunities,
including facilities which they could host as we have a more
distributed system across Europe, especially in our area of
command and control, and we have been following up with
discussions with the Czech government as they ask more
questions about that and seem very interested.
Secretary Tauscher. I think that my colleagues won't be
surprised to find out that the press got it wrong and that the
press speculation, which was generated beginning in the United
States and then into Europe, was completely wrong about what
the Obama Administration was going to do. So when we arrived
very early in the morning in Poland, we found ourselves having
to reorient everyone to the fact that we were not killing
missile defense in Europe but, in fact, enhancing it and
improving it. So that took a couple of minutes.
But I think what you can see, I met with my Polish
counterparts just earlier this week. They are in town to finish
the negotiations on both the agreement on the basing and on the
supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which are
important for not only PAC-3 installations, but for this future
SM-3 installation that we hope they are going to agree to, and
they are increasingly enthusiastic about this. Our friends in
the Czech Republic are very interested in the number of
different things that we are talking to them about.
But I think the most important thing was very late in the
day, after now going to two cities, we arrived in Brussels to
meet with the NAC, and I think what you see is that our North
Atlantic Council members, our NATO allies, are very happy to
see we are NATO-izing this system. They are seeing that this is
a system that is now not going to protect some in NATO but all
of NATO, and it is going to do it sooner against the current
threat with proven technologies. And I think it is very clear
that they are enthusiastic about this, that they are happy to
see that the command and control system that they are
developing dovetails very nicely with what we are proposing.
So I think there is a net benefit to everyone. It is being
recognized. I think the statements out of Prime Minister Tusk
in Poland and Foreign Minister Sikorsky really state that this
is something that they are very, very happy to see and that we
are working closely with them to go forward and provide more
information.
The Chairman. Thank you. I will limit my questions on that
until later.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, I will hold my questions until
later to give our colleagues an opportunity to ask theirs now.
The Chairman. John Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Chairman, I have been following ballistic
missile defense since the days of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI). I will tell you how long that has been.
General O'Reilly was a Captain at West Point teaching physics
in the photon lab when I first started taking an interest in
it. You have come a lot farther than I have, sir, with three
stars on your shoulder.
This is one of the finest presentations I have heard from
both the policy making, foreign policy making realm and from
the military realm as well. It is an excellent presentation.
Let me just hit the highlights with you as to the cost-
effectiveness of the decision you are making.
It is my understanding that the GMD has a cost of around
$70 million a copy, is that correct?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt. And the SM-3 IA, Block IA, you ought to come up
with a different designation for that so it is easier is easier
to get out. In any event, the cost per copy is $10 to $15
million apiece?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. The IA versions are $10
million, they are slightly less than that, actually, and then
the projected cost of the II series, the IIA and IIB would be
$15 million.
Mr. Spratt. The IIB would be $15 million? It is still about
three or four times less expensive than the GMD.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Spratt. So the cost of the chosen system is
substantially less. Are you confident in that cost?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, we are, because we have
produced the SM-3 IA, we are in production now, and a lot of
that missile is being duplicated in the IB, and we have a lot
of history that we can rely on for the accuracy of our cost
estimates for the projected cost.
Mr. Spratt. And is the sea-based variant about the same
cost as the land-based mobile variant?
General O'Reilly. Sir, they are two different variants
obviously, but they are identical in their fire control system
and the radar and the launcher components. They are the same.
There is some integration costs we spend when we integrate it
onto a ship. It is about $45 million to upgrade an Aegis ship,
of which there are over 80 today, to upgrade them to have
ballistic missile defense capability. And a land-based SM-3, to
prepare the site, there is about $150 million for site
preparation. And then to buy the same components in total, it
is about $350 million for one of those sites without the
missiles, which right now we are projecting a minimum of 24
missiles at each site. So that would be $240 million
additional.
Mr. Spratt. In terms of mobility and the effectiveness
associated with being able to move, the GMD, as I understand
it, is about 25 tons and the SM-3 is about 2 tons?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. The GMD is a 25-ton missile. It
is 50 feet long. The SM-3 I series missiles are 1.2 tons and
the SM-3 II would be a 2-ton missile. All of those SM-3
variants will fit and be integrated into today's Aegis weapons
system.
Mr. Spratt. Are you confident we can find locations in
southeastern Europe where these can be optimally deployed?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, because the actual capability
that we believe we have, our simulations verify that, and our
independent assessments show that it actually covers parts of
the water around Europe, so that means we have flexibility of
where we can place them. It doesn't have to be in one
particular country, it just needs to be in the southeastern
part of Europe and in the north-central part of Europe, and it
can be in many different countries. We have options.
Mr. Spratt. This is because you have got forward-based
radar and sensors?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, that is key, having that
forward based radar in the southeastern part, or airborne
sensors, which we are developing, or satellites.
Mr. Spratt. For some time we have talked about having a
midcourse discrimination system, tracking and discrimination
system, Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRs-Low) at one
time, I think the acronym now is STSS, and you just launched
two STSS's. Does that mean that some of the many problems we
have coped with with respect to these SBIRs-Low and the later
variants have been overcome now? And to what extent is the STSS
a key component of your forward based sensor system?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the STSS is a demonstrator system.
We want to demonstrate the engineering required in order to
build another system which would be far simpler. The STSS was
designed against an old threat, designed where there would be
hundreds of ICBMs in the air at any one time, and it was able
to cover the entire Earth. We are using these satellites now
because they are available, the two of them, to be doing an
extensive amount of testing over the next couple of years to
verify the requirements to build a much simpler system that is
focused on missile defense and would only cover certain bands
of the Earth that we are concerned about, which cover the
threat, obviously, as we see it. That would be a far simpler
system and we believe much more producible, much more reliable.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you all for your testimony.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Akin, the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of quick
questions. I guess it was a little more than a year ago that we
were on the ships and I asked the question, can that SM-3 stop
an ICBM? And they said maybe 1 in 100, if you are lucky but,
really, you can't do that. So to stop an intercontinental,
really long-range, three-stage kinds of missiles, you have to
go to your SM-3 Block IIB that you are planning?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. And that missile is going to be ready about what
time, 2020?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we have used very conservative
planning factors, that we completely test that system. We would
start testing the booster portion of it in 2013, 7 years ahead
of time. So we have laid in an extensive amount of time to test
and deploy this. But we would conduct much of the testing in
the 2016 timeframe, a decision in 2018, and then two more years
we are projecting before we would deploy it. It is very
conservative.
Mr. Akin. So in a way, the first thing I am hearing is that
there is a gamble in what you are proposing, and the gamble is
that Iran isn't going to develop an ICBM before 2020?
General O'Reilly. No, sir. We have the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense System in Alaska and Vandenberg to protect us
today against an Iranian threat.
Mr. Akin. Will the GBIs in Alaska or California, can they
protect against a launch from Iran to hitting our country?
Could they go that other way? I thought they were mostly aimed
toward--they can go both ways?
General O'Reilly. They can go both ways. Sir, if you look
at the Earth from a polar projection from the North Pole, you
will see that actually the closest part of the United States to
Iran is Alaska, and it is in a prime location for both threats.
And that forward-based sensor, that is why it was proposed in
the previous architecture and we are keeping it in this one,
significantly contributes to our ability to track anything
coming out of Iran for missiles being launched, interceptors
out of Alaska.
Mr. Akin. Would the missile, if the missile were launched
at, say, a European ally from Iran, would that be an ICBM or
would that be more just a ballistic missile?
General O'Reilly. The southeastern part of Europe today is
within the range of medium range ballistic missiles. Literally,
the range is between 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers, is that class
of missile, and that stretches over more than half of NATO.
The threats that we see, the ones we are most concerned
about right now, are 2,000 kilometer threats, which today cover
most of southeastern Europe. And that is the threat we want to
address, as General Cartwright said.
Mr. Akin. The SM-3 works okay for that?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. The second question I had is, it seems like it is
tremendously effective, I mean it is very expensive to have
whatever it is, five or six ships on station all the time
providing this kind of coverage. It seems like that would be
far more expensive.
I have been here nine years, and I keep hearing, ``boy, we
don't have the ships that we need.'' And particularly our Aegis
class, our missile destroyers, Aegis on the destroyers, there
is a tremendous number of requirements for having those working
in different places. And now, all of a sudden, we are
absorbing, what is it, six of these ships in order to do this
particular proposal, as opposed to a ground-based kind of
approach.
Doesn't that seem to be very cost-ineffective?
General Cartwright. I will jump in, if it is all right,
sir. For the last five years, we have been doing this in the
Sea of Japan. We don't put them on station permanently. Because
what we are dealing with is a pad launch system, we can see
that very visibly, and so we give ourselves a cushion. We
generally send two ships out. It only takes us a couple of days
to get them out there, so we don't tie down a mobile system,
which is very versatile. We put it there when we know we need
it.
The two ships are there, one is on station and the other
one is protecting the ship, and they just swap back and forth
for relief. But that is generally the way we approach it.
We intend to do the same for this 2011 system; have three
different sites, have them able to close in a couple of days to
the site once we see something moved to the pad.
Mr. Akin. You are assuming you are going to have a day or
two-warning so you can get in position.
General Cartwright. What we have seen to date, even with
the most responsive systems, is we generally have five or six
days.
Mr. Akin. One last question. That is, my understanding was
that you were going to network all of these sensors and radars
anyway in SM-3. Is this anything new than what we were planning
to do anyway?
General Cartwright. It is only a maturation of the
technology now to move it towards a production capability and
an operational capability versus a pure testing.
Mr. Akin. So this has always been on the drawing board to
do this.
General Cartwright. The scale has changed. And the one
thing that has technically changed, as you alluded to earlier,
is the 2020 capability, that is new. The ability to get at the
boost, or the early flight phase, is new.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Tauscher, good to see you again. We also miss you
around here. This place has never been the same since you left.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Ortiz. Let me ask both Secretaries if you believe there
is a potential opportunity for cooperation with Russia,
including the possibility of Russia providing radar data, and
do you believe that such cooperation would be in the best
interests of us and NATO? Do you think there is a possibility
now that we know they do have missiles, the Iranians? So if you
could elaborate a little bit on that?
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.
I want to restate that nothing that we did had anything to
do with Russia, but we were obviously knowledgeable of the
ancillary benefits of working more closely with Russia.
The Russians have an agreement with us right now to go
forward on a joint threat assessment and a number of things
that President Medvedev and President Obama agreed to when they
met in July. I will be meeting with my Russian counterparts in
about 10 days in Moscow to talk about a number of things, but
missile defense is one of those issues.
We have a Russian NATO council that has been moribund but
now has been restarted. Our NATO allies are very interested in
working and engaging with Russia. Russia shares the same threat
we do from short- and medium-range and long-range from Iran. So
there are a number of pieces from this.
But I want to make it very clear that while we have an
ambitious agenda with Russia, we are negotiating a New START
Treaty right now, it is very clear that nothing that we did had
anything to do with getting something from Russia. There was no
quid pro quo. But it is obvious as there are many things
happening that there are ancillary benefits to them.
Clearly the ``reset button'' that Secretary Clinton had
talked about and the relationship between President Medvedev
and President Obama is one where we are going to try to work
cooperatively on those things we can, and missile defense is
one of those things, and we will be talking to them about it in
the next few weeks.
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I would just invite General
O'Reilly perhaps to comment on the technical aspects of what
would be gained from data from Russian radars as part of this
system.
General O'Reilly. Sirs, I visited Gabala two years ago and
had a firsthand review of the capability of that very large and
powerful radar. The frequency is one that allows a great amount
of surveillance. It is a very good surveillance radar for an
extensive part of that part of the world, very powerful, very
large aperture. It is very good for observing missile tests. It
is very good for preliminary tracking.
More detailed tracking, you require a more precise radar,
and the Russians are building one in Armavir, Russia, and that
capability is similar to what we have in the U.K. and our other
early warning radars.
So our architecture was designed without those radars in
consideration, but they are in a very good location for
observing any missile activity in southwest Asia and conducting
tracking on the same order of capability, especially from
Armavir, early in a missile's flight heading towards the United
States.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First off, I want to
thank all of you for being here. I want to recognize Secretary
Tauscher. We do miss you, and we are glad to have you here.
I want to start off with talking of some differences and
some agreement. I talked to General Cartwright yesterday and I
told him that I agree with what the two generals are saying, I
just don't agree with the conclusion. And I think that it is
important for us, though, when we have a difference of
conclusion, that we at least go down the things that we agree
on. I think some of the disagreement comes from, also, a lack
of understanding because the terms get confused.
We have short-range and medium-range and intermediate-range
and ICBM missiles that are faced towards us. We have Aegis and
THAAD and SM-3, IA, IB, IIA and IIB that don't quite exist yet,
and the ground-based interceptors. The problem is you get in a
discussion of what matches with us what and I think that
confuses the discussion somewhat.
So let's go with what we agree on. I think we all agree
that Iran has a missile program. They are seeking ICBM missile
technology that would reach the United States. They are seeking
missiles that are capable of reaching the major population
centers of Europe. We all agree. I think we all agree, and I
think we believe, that Iran is seeking nuclear weapon
capability. So we are looking at the future of missile
technology that, perhaps, is nuclear capable.
General Craddock testified that he believed the
intelligence indicated that by 2015, they could have the ICBM
technology that reaches the United States. Now, I have read the
new National Intelligence Estimate that, supposedly, all this
new threat assessment is based upon, and I think we could all
agree that there is nothing in that intelligence that says that
they won't get that by 2015. They could get it earlier, and the
intelligence certainly says that.
For the ground-based missile system, General O'Reilly, you
previously testified that, upon ratification, it is four years
for the radar to go in, five years for the interceptors to go
in. I believe nobody believes that that has changed.
So we can all agree that, under the best scenarios, we
could have had that system in place by 2015. I believe it could
have been 2014 if we had moved a little quicker, but at least
by 2015. So the 2015 for GBI and the 2015 for Iran's possible
capability match.
Let's go further, then. The White House plan, though,
doesn't address ICBMs until 2020. It is right up on their web
site. Now, that is not accounting for existing systems and
existing programs; that is just the alternate system to the one
that was scrapped. That is the comparative. The comparative is
what is being scrapped, 2015, and what is going to be provided
as an alternative, and by the White House's own statements,
that is 2020. Major European population centers don't receive
protection until 2018. Again, their 2020 of the White House and
2018 is all compared to 2015.
Now, I love the words ``proven'' and ``tested.'' We hear
that all the time, we need systems that are ``proven'' and
``tested.'' We all know the SM-3 Block IIA has not been
completed and has not been tested. It is intended in this new
proposal to be the population centers for Europe protection.
And we also know the SM-3 Block IIB, which is supposed to
provide the protection to the United States, doesn't even
currently exist. Again, the comparative being to the GBI that
would have been going into Europe, which does exist, is a
tested system and expected in the two states to have its
completed testing by 2012.
We all know, and we agree, that the International Atomic
Energy Agency says that Iran has the capability to produce a
nuclear weapon. They issued their statement on the same day
that the President scrapped this system. We all agree that the
missile defense assets that we have in Alaska were intended to
be 40 previously, has been cut this year to 30, so as a backup
for our protection from ICBMs from Iran it has been reduced
from 40 to 30. Its capability has been reduced. And we all
agree that it is not really sufficient to protect the United
States solely, or the alternative from the White House wouldn't
include another plan that bolsters it. The White House is still
proposing a system that would, with the SM-3 IIB, that would
support it.
So what I want to know is in the 2009 budget, if you look
to the 2009 budget, what is new, and what is not new, in what
you are proposing? Because it looks as if that what was
forecast in 2009 includes substantially what the White House is
now touting as a new system. Could you do that comparative for
me, please? 2009 until now, and this system.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. First of all, the way our
architecture is laid out, the GBIs in Alaska are not the
backup; they are actually the primary system to defend the
United States, the homeland defense.
Second, in 2009, we were not investing in the technologies
such as the sensor ones that we have referred to several times
as so critical, our UAVs and our integration of that with the
rest of our sensored network.
We also were not procuring the THAADs and the Aegis
systems, and the number of Aegis systems and numbers of missile
that we are investing in now. The investment was $400 million
less than it is in the fiscal year 2010 budget for procuring
those missiles alone, and then another $200 million for further
investment into the Aegis system. So there is an acceleration
that wasn't there before that is now, in a greater quantity of
both of those.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome all of
you and thank you for the work you do for the United States. Of
course, I have a couple of questions for our former Member and
Under Secretary.
You know, a lot has been said in the papers, and I have
been really reading them, about how this is a new direction,
how President Obama is changing everything. I think in the 13
years I have sat on this committee, 11 of them have been on the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee. The last three years or so were
chaired by you, Ms. Tauscher. And I think the Congress actually
began to change the course of what was going on with respect to
missile defense and, in particular, our short- and medium-range
partners and seeking partners.
I remember going to Russia, to Poland and to the Czech
Republic with you to discuss these issues with our allies and
with those that we wanted to help with this real threat of
short and medium range missiles coming to Europe or to the
southern portion of Russia. So as I read the newspapers, it
surprises me that people think this is a new direction.
I am sorry, I missed part of this because I am also on
Homeland and we have had some other meetings going on. But
could you just talk a little to what were the last three years
and how the Congress actually changed this direction, rather
than just one man walking into the room and making a change?
Secretary Tauscher. Well, Congresswoman, I will say that
President Obama does stand for change and, in the end, it is
the President's decision to make the change that has been made.
And I think that the Congress certainly in a bipartisan way
over the last few years realized that there was a current
threat of short- and medium-range missiles targeting our NATO
allies, our forward-deployed troops and our friends and family
members, and that is why the Congress, who looked at the
previous administration's budget submission, made some changes
in the investment strategy to increase both the investment in
THAAD and in targets and in SM-3.
But I think the reality is that, when this new
Administration came in, there were two factors that were real
change agents for what has become this new architecture. The
first was the intelligence. Every administration comes in and
orders a new intelligence assessment on many different things.
There are lots of reviews that go on. The President ordered new
intelligence and he ordered a new Ballistic Missile Defense
Review (BMDR).
When he did that, it was very clear that there were two new
data points. The first was that the assumptions that the
Intelligence Committee had made about the maturation of the
long-range ballistic missile capabilities of Iran had not moved
as expected. In fact, the short- and medium-range had moved
dramatically further than the long- and medium-range.
Knowing we are protected by Fort Greely and by Vandenberg
for both the Korean and the Iranian threat, the other second
piece was that the maturation of the technology--especially
sensor technology--over the arch of the last few years, made it
clear that there was a way to protect now with current proven
technology, current threats, our NATO allies indivisibly as
opposed to about a third of them being left out in the previous
system.
So I think it was the intelligence and the ballistic
missile review that really took the President to the place
where--the review also included for the first time the
combatant commanders, which I think was very fundamentally new.
And as General Cartwright has spoken, the combatant commanders
have a list of requirements that they wanted to have missile
defense meet.
So I think that those are the three different things that
caused us to look at a change, and I think the President was
compelled by the fact that you could take the architecture to
meet the threat, to do it faster, to do it more cost-
effectively, you could bring NATO in, you could do all of NATO
and you could do it in a way that still protected the United
States against the current threats and the emerging threats.
Ms. Sanchez. And, Ms. Tauscher, were there meetings held
all along for the last two, three or four years with our
allies, with our NATO allies, with Poland, with the Czech
Republic, at the congressional, at the administration level, to
talk about some of these changes that might occur if, in fact,
the data came back and told us there might be a smarter way to
do this, or did our allies just get surprised by this?
Secretary Tauscher. Well, as I said in my testimony, I
think that there was lots of pre-consultation, and there was
also lots of speculation and there was also lots of fueling by
domestic press and others that, potentially, there might be a
change. I think people got ahead of themselves, and the reality
is that this is a better system for the current threat and the
future threat, one that protects the United States and our
allies in a way that is more cost-effective.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to have
you all here today. This is for either one of the Under
Secretaries.
To an outside observer, the timing of this announcement is
curious. It was done before the Administration's Ballistic
Missile Defense Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review were
completed. It occurred on the eve of negotiations with Russia
on the START follow-on treaty, and we know that President
Medvedev has suggested progress on START could hinge on the
U.S. giving up its European missile defense plans.
Why didn't we wait to make this announcement until after
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review or the Quadrennial Defense
Reviews were complete?
Secretary Flournoy. Sir, let me take a stab at that. I
think the most pressing reason was that we felt that there had
been extensive interagency discussion and the architecture that
General O'Reilly and General Cartwright have described so well
was really emerging as the strongest possible option, and we
realized we had an opportunity to not only shape the fiscal
year 2011 budget, but to also try to influence where things are
right now.
We didn't want to miss either of those budget
opportunities. The truth is, if we had waited all the way into
early next year when things were formally due, we wouldn't have
the same opportunity to make sure the money is flowing in the
right direction in support of a new architecture. So that was
the primary driver.
But with regard to relationship to START, I think that both
President Obama and, actually, it was agreed by Medvedev in
issuing instructions to the START negotiators, there is no
linkage between START and ballistic missile defense. We refused
to acknowledge or accept that linkage from the get-go in these
negotiations.
The truth is, any time between now and December is a bad
time in terms of that perceived linkage, because the START
negotiations are ongoing, and any time we roll out this
decision between now and the end of the review, there are some
people who would link it to START, even though that is not what
drove the decision.
So there was no good time from that perspective. What we
did is we said, ``look, it is too important not to miss the
window.'' It is very important not to miss the window on
influencing the 2010 and 2011 budgets appropriately in this
regard.
Mr. Lamborn. Under Secretary Tauscher.
Secretary Tauscher. START is a strategic offensive weapons
negotiation, not defensive, and we have a very, very big bright
white line that stops anybody from going on that side, and
START expires on December 5th. So we are good Americans, we can
multitask. Things are happening in a very crowded channel. But
we made it very clear that START was not an environment or
forum to discuss missile defense, and that is the way we have
kept it.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Now, you have referred to the
budget several times. I have a budget question. Why couldn't we
have funded both the 10 interceptors in Poland and the radar in
the Czech Republic and continued, at the same time, because we
can multitask, with expanded theater missile defense? These are
not mutually exclusive programs.
If it is a budgetary issue, why are we cutting missile
defense by $1.2 billion in the fiscal year that is just
starting today, when in the last fiscal year that ended
yesterday, we have an annual deficit of about $2 trillion,
1,500 times this $1.2 billion.
Secretary Flournoy. Let me clarify. I think the timing of
the decision to go ahead and roll out this piece was influenced
by the budget calendar. The architecture was not driven by
budgetary considerations. It was driven by what General
Cartwright and General O'Reilly have described is what best
meets both the needs of the combatant commanders and the needs
of the Nation in the most cost-effective way possible.
But I will defer to either of you, if you want to add
comment on that.
General Cartwright. My sense here is that from a budget
standpoint, to lose a year by not giving you the opportunity to
review gave us a window that we wanted to get this to you. Did
it have to be the exact day? No. As the other members here have
said, the little bit of the misinformation that got out there
drove us to believe we needed to clear up some misperceptions.
But we clearly have taken several issues out of the QDR,
out of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and out of the
space review, and brought them forward to get us to not lose a
year in the debate in moving to any direction change that the
department might want to take.
So that really gave us this opportunity. We took advantage
of it from the standpoint of the budget calendar, not from the
standpoint of cost.
To your issue of concern about should we do both. We are
conscious. Even though our numbers are large, we are conscious
about being good stewards of the resources that you give us. We
are going to continue, or we plan to continue, to do the
testing necessary to ensure that that two-stage ground-based
interceptor, in fact, is real, not just paper, and that if all
else fails, as Congressman Turner talked about, we do, in fact,
have a way to look at this which was along the lines of the
original program.
Also, that radar that we were going to put in the Czech
Republic physically exists. It is sitting on Kwajalein Island.
We understand the technology to take it from its current
technology to what we need if we had to deploy it. So we have
not ceded or given up, but we have, in fact, changed our focus.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Spratt [presiding]. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To our former
colleague, we miss you too, but we are terribly proud of the
job you are doing in your new position. Welcome to all of you
and thanks for your work.
I have a question for both General Cartwright and General
O'Reilly. The United States has already deployed a forward-
based radar in Israel, and we have cooperative missile defense
programs with that country. The main missile threat to Israel
comes from Iran's growing number of medium range missiles. The
new architecture is intended to defend against these same kind
of Iranian missiles.
So my questions are, overall, how would you describe the
impact of this new strategy, the new architecture, on Israel's
security? That is number one. And, number two, can you tell us
whether the new architecture will help improve the ability to
defend Israel against an Iranian missile threat or missile
attack?
General Cartwright. I will start, and then I will let
General O'Reilly chime in.
The system was put there last year to allow us to begin to
do the testing and the integration work that is going on, not
only with the Patriot systems that we have historically
deployed to Israel, but as we start to move, as we speak today,
the command and control system for the THAAD has also now been
moved out so we can start to integrate those pieces and the
Aegis piece.
So what that radar brings to the capability to defend
Israel as we move to the future is, as I talked about in my
statement, this ability to get at the large raids, number one,
so multiple missiles coming in towards Israel; and then, number
two, to be able to see further than the organic sensors of any
of those systems.
So now they can see out much farther, assign inbound
threats to specific weapons and specific sensors within
Israel's footprint, and defend the country much more
effectively. That would also reduce the number of missiles that
we have to build, because now we don't have to build two and
three for every threat coming in. We can actually be much more
efficient. So from a warfighting standpoint, that is what this
is going to do.
The second piece is as we looked at the future, that
ability to see further than the organic sensors is the testing
and the integration that will go on. So a sensor not
necessarily associated with a weapon, being able to see
farther, pass that information to the weapon or the sensor that
supports that weapon, and get that missile off sooner so that
it is destroyed before it gets anywhere near the friendly
nation is the second piece that brings.
I will defer, then, to General O'Reilly.
General O'Reilly. Sir, I would just like to add the fact
that this architecture, one of the fundamental capabilities and
attributes of this architecture to protect Europe is applicable
to any theater in the world. It is mobile, and our capability
on Aegis ships can quickly move into that region. We are
already proposing them to be in the eastern Mediterranean, and
they can provide an entire additional layer of defense over
Israel, as well as the enhanced sensor capability that General
Cartwright was referring to.
Mr. Reyes. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
The Chairman [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
the panel. You are obviously very engaged and very expert on
this information. I thank you for your preparedness on this.
I hear what you are saying, and I will let you sort out who
should answer this question, by the way. I hear what you are
saying about, perhaps, the lagging development of ICBMs from
Iran and also the need to kind of shift towards the mid-range.
But, you know, our intelligence has never been 100 percent, and
there needs to be a margin of error. I hear what you are saying
about, we have got the backup systems in Alaska. We also know
that no system is 100 percent, things do get through.
So that brings us to the question of North Korea. Some
believe that North Korea is pursuing ICBM capability. It has
also been reported that North Korea supplied Iran with 18 BM-25
IRBMs in 2005. Does this new threat assessment account for the
possibility that Iran could receive foreign assistance and that
that, through osmosis, could occur a lot faster than predicted,
and do you believe North Korea would share any IRBM or ICBM
technology it has developed with Iran?
General Cartwright. I would be happy to start and then let
members join in here.
For the ICBM threat, our primary capability still resides
in Alaska and California. That we have never ceded and are not
going to.
The systems that the Iranians and the North Koreans have
demonstrated thus far are pad-based. So in other words, there
is only a certain number of pads, two in North Korea, three or
four in Iran, so their ability to generate large numbers is
still very nascent and will take time.
The capability to move from where they are today, even with
assistance--and I am a worry wart, so I am where you are on
worrying about this--the next steps are extremely visible. In
other words, they have to occur up above the atmosphere where
everybody in the world can watch them. Those are the steps that
allow you to take that last stage, separate a weapon from that
last stage, get it to a stable configuration, find a place over
the Earth to penetrate the atmosphere, survive that penetration
with both the reentry vehicle (RV), the vehicle and the
contents, and that is a very violent activity, survive the heat
in the reentry, and then actually find something you would
impact. Each of those steps is very visible, so we will know
when they move forward.
The one that I probably worry the most about is their
ability to move from a pad system to a mobile system, to an
erector. Then they can be in places that we don't necessarily
watch every day. So if I am to worry about something, that
would be it. But, again, they would have to go through these
other steps before they can move to the mobile configuration.
As we set this new system up----
Dr. Fleming. Could I clarify something? When you say it is
very visible, are you talking about in terms of testing and
predicting?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. So, unlike what we have done
up until today, where much of this engineering occurs in labs
or in test places, this is something that has to be a launch,
it has to occur, it is very visible, and everybody in the world
can pretty much watch it and watch the progress there.
Because we can see that, and because this system is leading
anything else that we have had, the system we are proposing, by
five to seven years, I am much more comfortable that if they
surprise us, one, we will see it, two, we will have the lead
time to actually field it. And I will let General O'Reilly jump
in, but we are being conservative. If we field, much as we did
with the GBI because of the threat earlier than all testing is
complete, then we will have to do that. I will certainly come
here and recommend that, because something is better than
nothing to defend. But the next steps tend to be very visible.
Secretary Flournoy. If I could just add, given my boss's
background in the intelligence world, he asked exactly these
questions: What if the intelligence is wrong? What if they gain
assistance and the ICBM threat emerges earlier? So he was very
keen on, A, ensuring that the GBI defense we have of the
homeland now remains; two, that we go ahead and put forward in
Phase One, the earliest part of this new architecture, the
forward-based radar to enhance seeing what is coming from Iran;
and, three, that we really focus on developing this new
capability in Phase Four that should give us the ascent phase
capability, which is a game changer.
And, finally, that we keep the development of GBI, the two-
stage GBI on the books as a hedge in case things come earlier,
in case there is any kind of technological challenge with the
later models of the SM-3.
So those things together are what made him comfortable in
answering your question and going forward with this new
architecture.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Cartwright, I am not surprised but heartened to
hear that you are a worry wart. I am glad we have a panel of
worry warts that are eminently qualified. Certainly our friend
and colleague, Secretary Tauscher, welcome back.
The public record of our intelligence suggests that Iran
has not demonstrated the capability to use an intermediate
range missile. Let's assume that that is wrong. Let's assume we
are completely wrong about that and that Iran either is quickly
developing that capability or has it now.
I want to compare the old plan that we were operating under
to meet our obligations to our interests and allies in Europe--
Central Europe--and then the new plan under which we are going
to meet our obligations to our allies and interests in Central
Europe.
If it were 2012 and the Iranians launched an intermediate-
range missile with a nuclear warhead at Central Europe, under
the old plan, what could we do about it?
General Cartwright. Nothing.
Mr. Andrews. Nothing. My understanding is, the reason for
that is that the deployment date for the old plan was around
2017, is that correct?
General Cartwright. We started originally at the 2015
timeline. Because of challenges that we have had in basing and
other things, 2017 to 2018 now would be realistic.
Mr. Andrews. There is a history of slippage on that date,
isn't there?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir, there is.
Mr. Andrews. And under the new plan you are proposing, we
would have deployable capability in 2011, is that correct?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. So we would have in place in 2012 some assets
that would help us deal with this threat, if I understand it.
So let's talk about what those assets are.
It is my understanding that under the old plan, it was
essentially 10 missile silos, is that correct?
General Cartwright. Ten silos that would be based in Poland
was the plan.
Mr. Andrews. Ten silos based in Poland. And the new plan
relies upon Aegis ships, which have SM-3 block IA missiles, it
relies on the AN/TPY-2 radar and a THAAD element as well. Is
that essentially correct?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. So it is sea-based and it is mobile land-
based.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. Which of those two do you think is more
vulnerable to attack from the enemy if, in fact, it had the
ability to do these intermediate changed missiles?
General Cartwright. A fixed site.
Mr. Andrews. So the fixed site wouldn't be deployed until
2017 or 2018 and, in your opinion, it is more vulnerable than
the sea-based and mobile land-based system. I want to ask you,
is that a fair statement?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. Then the other thing I want to ask you is
about cost. Now, I will say this to you. It is my view--and I
think it is almost universally held here--that if there is an
imminent threat to this country and its people and its
interests and its allies, cost should not be a consideration.
We need to do what we need do.
But since there are options that we have, it is my
understanding--and maybe Secretary Tauscher would be the best
person to answer this--that is there is a qualitative
difference in cost between the new plan that you are presenting
and the old plan. My understanding is that the cost is about
$70 million per missile? Or is it per silo?
Secretary Tauscher. Actually, it is General O'Reilly that
is better at this, but it is about $70 million for the GBIs.
Mr. Andrews. And it is about $10 million----
Secretary Tauscher. $10 million to $15 million for the
Block IIA, yeah.
Mr. Andrews [continuing]. For the new plan.
I want to talk about flexibility, as well. My understanding
is that the weight of the missiles under the old plan, the
system under the old plan, is about 25 tons. Is that right?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. And the new? What does the new one weigh?
General O'Reilly. 1.2 tons for an SM-3 Block I series and 2
tons for an SM-3 II.
Mr. Andrews. So if the Iranians ramped up their capability
in a hurry and we had to be more flexible in a hurry to deal
with that capability, which of these two options is best, from
your point of view, General O'Reilly?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the new option.
And the reason I proposed as my recommendation to go
forward with this Phased, Adaptive Approach was the rigidity,
which you are referring to, of the previous approach. The
threat does change, and our ability to react to it. If there
are intermediate-range missiles, even if we had the system in
2012, the first five missiles would consume those GBIs.
Mr. Andrews. And the final question I would ask is that
this is the first phase of, if I understand, a four-phased
approach that would further buttress and bulk up this. Is that
right, Secretary Tauscher?
Secretary Tauscher. Yes, it is. This is why it is phased
and adaptive, is to deal with not only the threat but the
emerging technologies and to match those as best we can.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank all of you for being here. General Cartwright,
I have just a profound respect for you. And, General O'Reilly
and Secretary Flournoy and, of course, Secretary Tauscher, I am
grateful that you are here.
I want you to know that I believe all of you are committed
to the cause of human freedom in America, and so I hope you
will grant me diplomatic immunity. There is no intent on my
part to challenge anyone's motivation here because I believe
you are all committed to this country.
Let me just start by saying, General Cartwright, I
completely embrace all that you are saying, in terms of the
geometric increase in the threat of short- and medium-range
missiles and the complexity and the array that we face, and
some of the array challenges. That is one of the reasons why
some of us have been a little bit upset that one of our boost-
phase systems in Airborne Laser (ABL) has been cut back. That
is a real system turned into a paper one. It is almost the
opposite of what we have been talking about today.
But I think probably the thing that is of the greatest
concern to me today is that this new approach has been
juxtaposed with the old approach. And I think that is a false
dynamic, because the new approach was essentially anticipated
by the previous administration. We have been moving in this
direction. I find, quite sincerely, very little in the new
approach that is truly new. I think we have been moving in this
direction, again, thanks a lot to General Cartwright and the
philosophy that he has embraced, and along with General
O'Reilly. And so I don't see a great deal of new.
I think really what the debate here is, is the elimination
of the GBI site in Europe which, essentially, was to provide a
redundancy protection for the U.S. homeland. And to be able to
throw in some potential protection for Europe was a freebie and
a good thing.
And my greatest concern is Iran's march toward becoming a
nuclear-armed nation. And I truly believe that one of their
great goals, of course, strategically and tactically, is to be
able to threaten and hold at risk American assets, American
homeland. And that if, indeed, we were able, within the
timeline offered, to demonstrate to them that we could
intercept those both at the level of Poland--which, if you draw
a line right between Iran and New York, you go right across
Poland. And that may say something about your physics, Mr.
O'Reilly. They may have been correct.
The reality is that I believe that this new system that we
talk about that was already on the books will still come too
late to play much role in the calculus that Iran has in moving
forward with their nuclear program. And I think that the
European site would have devalued their program to an extent
that perhaps--perhaps--some of our sanctions might have had
some effect.
So I guess then the concern that I have--let me just quote
General O'Reilly. ``The ballistic missile defense system is
daily becoming more global. The defense of deployed forces,
allies, and friends against short- to medium-range ballistic
missiles in one region, theater, will be buttressed by
additional standard SM-3 interceptors, more Aegis BMD
engagement-capable warships, the addition of initial THAAD fire
units, additional sea-based terminal interceptors.'' Tying
these assets together, as Mr. Cartwright said, ``will be a
global command and control battle management and communications
capability.''
And, of course, the Bush Administration's budget turned
over to the Obama transition team includes plans to field over
400 SM-3 and THAAD interceptors by 2016. And I don't see in
this new approach that there is going to be a lot above that by
2016.
So my greatest concern is simply this: in terms of
protecting the homeland, the European site would have offered
us some redundancy protection from long-range Iranian missiles.
I think we all agree with that.
And I am asking you, General O'Reilly, in terms of the
timeline, are we having an additional risk to this country for
any period of time because of the loss of the European site?
General O'Reilly. Sir, no, I don't believe we are at
greater risk because of the insufficiency, as I just testified,
I believe, of our previous architecture.
Mr. Franks. Let me interrupt you. You testified that 2015
in the last situation. So you think that this new system is
going to be able to provide the redundancy that the European
site would by 2015?
General O'Reilly. I don't think the old system would
provide the redundancy that you are referring to. It is very
questionable. And the concern is, as the intelligence
assessments are showing, the number of intermediate-range
missiles and medium-range missiles has grown to an extent that
just having 10 interceptors over there would very quickly be
consumed. And the secondary launch at the United States, those
GBIs would--I am very concerned that they would ever be
available for us.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Spratt mentioned that his history with this issue went
back to SDI. And I have to acknowledge that my history goes
back to my father having General O'Reilly's job when I was in
Vietnam and right after I got back from Vietnam. So my history
is longer; certainly not as informed as Mr. Spratt's. But I
have been in favor of missile defense for years and years now,
and I happen to be a Democrat.
And I think the good news that comes from this debate is
kind of like mayors--I was a former mayor--we used to talk
about how there is not a Republican or a Democrat way to fill a
pothole. The good news that comes from this debate and that
should be clearly understood by the country is that both
Democrats and Republicans are in favor of missile defense. The
technology has matured to the point where we don't argue about
whether we should spend our money doing this. We argue about
what is the best system, how should we spend our money doing
this?
I think it is extremely unfortunate that the Administration
made the mistake--well, I guess it wasn't the Administration. I
think we here in the House made the mistake of cutting the
Administration's request for missile defense for this year's
budget. That was a real tactical error. Because, you know, to
ordinary folks out there, it simply suggests that the current
Administration, or at least the current Congress, isn't as
committed as the prior Congress was to the subject of missile
defense. And that is just not so. But there is no way you can
explain the cut any other way, at least to ordinary Americans,
than this current Congress is just not as committed. So it is
really unfortunate that we did that.
It would be great if somehow we could reverse that in the,
sort of, waning days here and free up the money to let you all
do what you want to do. I accept from this testimony that you
are all sincere, that you sincerely think this is the direction
we should be headed in.
And, frankly, General Cartwright, you have been in your
post now for, what, three years? So you were a pre-Obama
Administration person. Ms. Flournoy--you know, General
O'Reilly, you have been doing this, and so you are pre-Obama
Administration. And I accept that you are sincere in your
description of having rethought all of this. I just think it is
really unfortunate that we managed to cut the budget.
If I could, I would like to ask how the new architecture--
and I know this is focused principally on Europe--how the new
architecture protects us from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
threat, a Scud missile launch from a scow somewhere in the
ocean. I think that that is something that we really need to be
thinking about a lot.
It is one of the reasons why I requested language in the
current authorization bill asking that the Department of
Defense conduct a study of putting small nukes, nuclear power
facilities, hardened nuclear power facilities, in all of our
military bases around the country. I think that can be done,
actually, with the private sector paying for it if they are
sized in a way that gives power back into the grid. So I think
it is a win-win, basically, for America. But from a national
security perspective, I think it is very important, given the
EMP threat.
So, comments about what the, sort of, new world that you
all are talking about here that most folks couldn't possibly
understand unless they spent years studying this subject, this
new world will enable us, as far as protection against EMP
threats, rogue missiles, just one missile.
General Cartwright. I would like to touch on, kind of, both
of those issues, and then I will cede to the other members
here.
I worry about this because the reality is, the spectrum
that we are dealing with is an ICBM to a terrorist. The weapon
and the lethality is now exportable at both ends. And it is
actually easier to deliver, unfortunately, at the more
rudimentary end. And so, much of what we are trying to
accomplish in the Quadrennial Defense Review is to make sure
that we are, in fact, looking at both ends of this spectrum.
At the terrorist end, which is generally the most
challenging, how do you handle someone who really doesn't value
their own life, much less the value of anyone else's life? And,
generally, Clausewitz, you know, Sun Tzu, it is ``take that
objective away from the enemy.'' And so, much of what we are
doing we put in the role of consequence management, of
protection, just by the daily way we do business, how we build
our buildings now, these kinds of initiatives that would talk
about protected and hardened power, protected and hardened
communications that would allow us to make sure that, even if--
God forbid, that occurs--any enemy of the United States would
understand that would not change our resolve or our ability to
carry out that resolve.
And that is the way I approach every day. Much of what we
are doing in the Quadrennial Defense Review on this side of the
equation goes to these issues about, how do you take the
objective away?
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Wilson, please.
There is a series of votes, a 15-minute and two 5-minutes.
These will not be the last votes for the day, however. There is
a possibility we can finish. But, if not, we will come right
back.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership in
this important hearing.
Madam Secretaries, General, thank you for being here.
Under Secretary Tauscher, I was grateful to be the first
Member of Congress in the Congressional Record to praise your
confirmation.
I am just so concerned. I support a strong missile defense.
I was taught by my predecessor, the late Congressman Floyd
Spence, chairman of this committee, Armed Services Committee,
that we have real threats; they need to be addressed. I
believe, as Ronald Reagan said, that we can develop a bullet to
hit a bullet. I am concerned this Administration is weakening
missile defense.
At the same time, Iran is proving its capabilities of
developing nuclear weapons. Over the weekend, what a message,
as they sent missiles with their new technology. I believe the
fanatics who have hijacked the country of Iran--a great
country, a historic country, ancient Persia--when they carry
signs that say, ``Death to Israel, Death to America,'' they
mean it.
And I am particularly concerned--particularly Secretary
Tauscher knows--I have a deep, personal affection for the
people of Bulgaria, Romania, for Greece, for India. And with
the missile tests this week, all of them are at risk. They are
concerned. Ordinary Americans, as Congressman Marshall said,
are concerned. Why are our enemies rejoicing?
I would like to point out--and, Madam Secretary, I
understand you recently returned from a trip to Europe to
discuss missile defense. And while you were there, I would like
to know the concerns of NATO officials, particularly from
Eastern Europe, our new courageous allies.
I have a personal interest. My daughter-in-law, Jennifer
Miskowitz-Wilson, from New Jersey, is a very proud Polish-
American.
What did our allies, our great courageous allies, say?
Secretary Tauscher. Well, Congressman Wilson, let me first
say, I don't think that this should be a question of false
choices. Let me say that what President Obama has put forward
is a system that will deal with current threats now, will deal
with our European allies now and protect them against what we
saw just this week is a robust Iranian short- and medium-range
threat.
The sense that we either have GBIs or we have this, is a
false choice. The United States is currently protected against
a long-range--and the North Korean threat by this system that
is in Fort Greely and in Vandenberg. So, as General O'Reilly
testified last year, the GBIs in Poland were a redundancy. The
system is going to include the opportunity to deal with a
future Iranian long-range threat against the United States as a
redundancy.
So I think that these false choices have got to be put
aside in favor of what we think is a very robust system that
deals with the current threat now and protects NATO allies
first, in a phased way, and then indivisibly.
When we saw our European allies, it was very clear that
they had no idea what the Obama Administration's plan was going
to be. We explained it to them. And, as you can see from the
comments by Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy, our NAC
members were very, very enthusiastic about it.
Our Polish and Czech friends had to absorb what we told
them, and we are in consultations with them. We have offered
the Poles a future piece of the SM-3 deployment. The Czechs we
are working on on a number of different things.
So I think that what you see is, universally, our European
allies have moved past the debate about what is going on and
have absorbed and really appreciate what we are doing. And I
think that that is really the opportunity for us to move
forward on a system that can deal with current threats now.
Mr. Wilson. General O'Reilly, our missile defense
cooperation with Israel and with India have been mutually
beneficial with technology. We know how talented the people are
of Israel and India--large number of engineers.
In your view, will the new missile defense architecture
improve our ability to defend Israel and India from an Iranian
missile attack?
General O'Reilly. Sir, yes, from the point of view that
this is a mobile system and it is very flexible. So it has
applicability for deployments around the world.
What is key is our ability to integrate with the host-
nation command and control systems and what they are trying to
contribute to missile defense.
And, in the case of Israel, we have clearly shown over the
last year that we have a fully interoperable system, between
our radar and their Arrow system. And we have shown that again
off the coast of California earlier this year when we were
testing, with all of our systems that we are proposing here
working with the Israeli systems.
Mr. Wilson. I am concerned for Israel and India.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
We will recess until the third vote is over and come right
back, and we will take up and hopefully finish very quickly.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is
recognized. We are back in session. So you are recognized for
five minutes, Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I hope I am not redundant on these questions. I
had to step over to the Education Committee.
Can I ask you a question? You had spoken about, when
missiles take off they are pretty similar. It is kind of like a
telephone pole going up. It is a pretty easy shot.
Now, let's say that this system that the Bush
Administration wanted to have in Europe--which, it wasn't going
to shoot it as it goes up. When the Russians shoot a missile,
they have a lot of decoys in them.
My understanding is that, if the Iranians happened to put a
bunch of decoys on this missile and you don't get it in the
ascent phase, that the Bush Administration's proposal in the
Czech Republic and Poland wouldn't be able to handle that
threat. Is that correct?
General Cartwright. The radar, first in the----
Mr. Sestak. The combination of the radar--the 2017 system.
General Cartwright. You are exactly right, in that in the
ascent phase you can't really deploy a bunch of decoys, and
that is why the missile is so vulnerable--I mean, among other
things. It is relatively predictable.
In the system that was originally planned, which would be
the ground-based interceptors in Poland and the radar in the
Czech Republic, the radar in the Czech Republic had one
function, and that was to discriminate between the RV and
decoys as it left the atmosphere when they would be deployed.
And so that was the value of that radar at the time. It
really had no other function. And just to put one more piece on
there, that intercept had to occur while it was in the range of
that radar.
Mr. Sestak. Correct. Well, my understanding is you would
have had to need a second radar site in order to do that
discrimination, not just one. Is that correct, General?
General Cartwright. Only from the standpoint that that
radar has to be queued. And that is what the radar down in the
southeastern part----
Mr. Sestak. Correct. So you would have had to have had two
radar sites. So the system you were originally going to plan
would have had to have another radar, then, for that
discrimination.
General Cartwright. When we got to the point at which the
Iranians would be able to----
Mr. Sestak. To do that.
General Cartwright [continuing]. Decoys.
Mr. Sestak. The second question I have is multi-mission
tasking. My understanding is Navy ships tend to be able to
handle submarine threats, missile threats from aircraft,
surface threats, and others. Is this just one more threat that
a well-planned crew could do, multi-mission?
General Cartwright. It is. But to be fair also, when you
dedicate the radar, when they set up the--technical, but when
they set up the energy fences, this mission consumes all of the
radar's activity. So that is why we keep the second ship out
there, is to make sure that we have----
Mr. Sestak. And if I am not wrong, is it a flip of the
switch, basically, that switches it from----
General Cartwright. Speed of light.
Mr. Sestak. Speed of light. So it is a nanosecond to go
from one mission to the other.
General Cartwright. Yes.
Mr. Sestak. My third question is, General, you had
mentioned there was a shoot-shoot-look-shoot strategy. You
know, I think you take two shots or something?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. This architecture supports
that. And our focus is to have that first shot as early as
possible.
Mr. Sestak. I guess my question is, as you go further down
the road--you have 30 GBIs in Alaska, correct?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sestak. If you wanted to, I mean--to get those two
shots, if you had to, could you just add another 30 to get 3
shots? Or do you just want to get the ascent phase?
General O'Reilly. What you are referring to are two
different systems, sir. The one in Alaska is a midcourse system
that only engages after apogee.
Mr. Sestak. I understand.
General O'Reilly. So it only engages at the end. The GBI
system that we were proposing for Europe also is a midcourse.
We would have to wait until after the apogee, the highest part
of the flight of a missile even coming into Europe. So if we
had two opportunities, the first opportunity is a very limited
one, only against certain trajectories towards the United
States that you could have had that intercept.
Again, as I testified before, I am very concerned about
having those missiles available, because there is a very large
number of missiles that are threatening Europe now that you
would want to use every missile you possibly had. And under the
old architecture, you would be engaging those shorter-range
missiles actually with the GBIs. And it is very quick to set up
a scenario where they wouldn't be there for either shot.
Mr. Sestak. So if I were to walk out of this hearing--I
think I have only have four seconds--I could walk out saying
that in the first two years we will now cover Israel, the
Middle East, troops, southeastern Turkey, from short-range and
medium-range, which we wouldn't do under the 2017 system of the
Bush Administration.
General O'Reilly. Sir, southeastern Europe--not just
Turkey, but Europe.
Mr. Sestak. Southeastern Europe. And that we are going to
basically use a multi-task ship that, with a nanosecond, can go
from one mission to the other.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sestak. And that radar is only against missile threats.
You could still move around and use its other systems for
antisubmarine at the same time, even if you are doing ballistic
missile threats. Correct?
General Cartwright. That is correct.
Mr. Sestak. And then move them anywhere you want in the
world.
General Cartwright. That is correct.
Mr. Sestak. And then the key is the second radar site for
the discrimination.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In looking at the maps for the coverage of Phase One in
2011, Phase Two in 2015, the coverage that would provide for
Europe, do Phases One and Two provide full coverage to those
European countries within range of Iran's short- and medium-
range missiles?
General O'Reilly. For the short- and medium-range during
this period of time, yes, the coverage would be there.
Mr. Coffman. You wouldn't need Aegis in the Black Sea to be
able to provide that coverage?
General O'Reilly. Not for the NATO countries that we are
referring to.
Mr. Coffman. Uh-huh. Given Moscow's nonsensical concern
that ground-based interceptors in Poland could be fitted with
nuclear warheads and pose a threat to Russia, what is to say
they are not going to be concerned with having a greater
inventory of mobile SM-3 interceptors capable of intercepting
all ranges of ballistic missiles deployed throughout Europe?
Will this new approach be equally problematic for Russia?
General O'Reilly. Sir, if you are referring to the ability
to--their concern that these GBIs could be used offensively?
Mr. Coffman. No. Let me go in another direction.
Tell me if--the Administration's focus has now shifted over
to address the intermediate-range concerns, saying that they
are the first capability that Iran will have. So now you have
shifted in that direction.
Now, tell me what the environment will look like when you
go to long-range--I mean, when they do develop long-range
ballistic missiles, which we have intelligence that they are
developing, then what, then, are you proposing to address that
threat scenario?
General Cartwright. I think, you know, kind of start from a
technical side, is the SM-3 IIB, in particular, because it will
have a capability of getting them before they get out of the
ascent phase. So that is the first shot.
The second shot, then, is to be able to use this missile,
the ground-based interceptors that are in the United States, to
catch them in the exo-atmospheric portion of the architecture.
If we were very convinced and very threatened in the United
States--in other words, they fielded a large number of them
very quickly--we could add the SM-3 or the Patriot or the THAAD
to defending the United States in areas that we felt were
appropriate for that, based on the threat.
So we would be able to cover it in all three regimes of
flight.
Secretary Flournoy. Let me just add, though, I would not
characterize this as a shift of focus. We are pursuing what we
think will be a more effective enhancement of the homeland
defense piece, both with the radar in Phase One and the ascent
phase capability in Phase Four. But, in the meantime, to deal
with threats that are already in existence, we are adding a
more responsive set of systems that can deal with the shorter-
and medium-range threats that are there now.
Mr. Coffman. What will the Administration be asking for in
subsequent budgets, in terms of missile defense? What can the
Congress expect to see?
Secretary Flournoy. I defer to General O'Reilly. He is the
keeper of our program.
General O'Reilly. Well, sir, we are in development, as I
said, in the preparation for this next budget. But you will see
investment continue that we started in the fiscal year 2010
proposal for the sensors and the networks and the SM-3 variants
and the development of the unmanned aerial vehicles that are
key to this architecture, continued development in that area.
At the same time, expanded testing of the land-based SM-3
options and of the SM-3 IB will begin flight-testing a year
from now.
And in the area of developing the SM-3 IIA, we will
continue that work. We are having a flight test. Our work with
the Japanese is to have our first flight test in 2014. So there
will be funding for that program, as well as the other aspects
of the missile defense capability, including enhancing the
capability of the GMD system in Alaska and Vandenberg.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you for being here and for your
expertise.
And, of course, I also want to welcome, as all my
colleagues have, our great friend and colleague, Secretary
Tauscher. And I know she knows how prideful I feel in her being
here.
And it is great to have you all.
I want to turn for a second, because we are very pleased, I
think, that we have this interagency approach today. And there
is a strong diplomatic piece to it, and we understand that. And
I wonder, then, if, Secretary Tauscher, you could particularly,
I think, respond, and if others want to join in.
We know, through your prepared remarks quoting NATO
Secretary-General Rasmussen, the role that NATO will be
playing. And I think part of the question is, how is that going
to be different? What has changed? What do we anticipate in
their involvement? And, also, what role do we think the NATO
allies will be playing in a kind of cost-sharing effort to
ensure the wealthier nations are contributing to the success of
this strategy? Could you comment on that for us?
Thank you.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Congresswoman Davis.
I want my colleagues from the defense department to talk
about some of the burden-sharing opportunities, which are
important. But I think, suffice it to say, there was a lot of
criticism of the Bush Administration for what was considered to
be bilaterally negotiating with the Poles and the Czechs. We
are very grateful that the Poles and the Czechs stepped up.
That was a criticism, I think, that was overblown. The
truth of the matter is that we have Article V considerations
that are very, very important to us. We believe that the
defense of New York is the same as the defense of Warsaw. An
attack on Prague is an attack on Peoria.
So we know now, because of the threat analysis that we have
and the assessment that we have, that these short- and medium-
range threats that are holding at risk American forward-
deployed troops, American assets and NATO allies are
significant. Just the test this week of the Iranian short- and
medium-range missiles show that we have risks right now that we
have got to put assets against.
And I think that we have a very robust engagement with our
NATO allies. So NATO-izing this process not only gives us a
chance to use indigenous technologies developed by our allies,
but also burden-sharing, but the kind of centralized command
and control that is very necessary to protect our assets, to
work with our allies, and to have, we hope, future cooperation
with Russia, through the Russia-NATO Council, so that we have a
very big network system that can protect everybody, including
our forward-deployed troops, against these threats.
Perhaps Michele would add.
Secretary Flournoy. I would just add, I mean, one of the
real strengths, or appeals, of this new system is that it has a
broad variety of ways that other countries can participate.
There are NATO countries that already have the Aegis ships.
They could choose to upgrade those with ballistic missile
defense capability and contribute that way. There are countries
who are interested in acquiring the kind of UAVs that could be
used as sensor platforms. There are countries that may step up
and become SM-3 missile sites.
There are countries that are already contributing to NATO's
command and control system, the all-BMD system that is being
designed, which is going to link the, sort of, lower-tier
defense to the, sort of, middle- and upper-tier defense. And,
of course, there is opportunity for a co-development of systems
going forward, as other countries in Asia have already
participated with us.
So there are just a lot of different ways that countries
can chip in, both individually and as part of----
Mrs. Davis. One of the questions might be whether we, in
fact, gain greater leverage with this new architecture in
bringing--certainly, there are many technologies already in
place and efforts. But I think what would be helpful to know is
whether--and we may not know that for a while--but whether this
really does even truly enhance, as you are saying, the
relationships in a new way. I don't know whether----
Secretary Flournoy. We got very strong feedback from the
NAC that they like the fact that this is truly about the
indivisibility of NATO in terms of a defense for all. I don't
want to name names because it is premature, but there were a
number of representatives who came up and said, ``We want to be
part of this and we want to talk about how.'' So I think that
was very positive.
Mrs. Davis. And do we know whether that changes the message
that this is also sending to our adversaries?
Secretary Flournoy. Absolutely. I mean, I think General
Cartwright has spoken before about how this contributes to
deterrence.
I don't know if you want to jump in on that point.
General Cartwright. If you are a single country and
everybody around you is contributing to a defensive capability,
it has to affect you. That is point one.
And then point two is their opportunity to contribute in
ways that are so different than a U.S.-only system.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Langevin.
I have Mr. Langevin, Dr. Snyder, Mr. Taylor and, I believe,
Mr. McKeon, who withheld his questions earlier, should be
recognized.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome the panel here today. And thank you
all for your very thoughtful, comprehensive testimony and for
this very flexible and comprehensive plan on missile defense
that you presented to us today.
I particularly, like my other colleagues, want to welcome
back Secretary Tauscher and thank her for her great service on
this committee for so many years. And I am honored to have
followed her as the chairman of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee and hope to follow in the very high standard that
you set, Secretary. So, welcome.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. We have touched on a number of important
things already that I had questions about, or concerns, and
some of them have been already answered, in particular how we
will interact now with Poland and with Czechoslovakia. And,
clearly, you laid out that there will be ongoing involvement on
missile defense with them, so that should allay any fears that
people have that we are not continuing on in our cooperation
with missile defense with them.
We have also talked about cost. And I want to talk a little
more about capabilities of the system and comparisons. Just to
recap again, for one GBI, $70 million; for an SM-3, depending
on which version, anywhere from $10 million to $15 million.
Could we also talk about, in terms of the site, if it was a
land-based SM-3 site versus a GBI site, the cost and personnel
required for either one of those sites? I think that is
something important to highlight.
General O'Reilly. Sir, the previous GBI site that was
proposed, it was a large complex, it was a missile field, had
missile assembly buildings and so forth, had a large contractor
support team that was there. So the total number of the site
personnel was around 450 people at any one time manning that
site.
In contrast, the land-based SM-3 site is much smaller. As
far as site prep goes, it is pads of concrete, primarily and
fences, security, and so forth. Its population--and this is
very early--but our estimate is it is somewhere around 70
people. So it is a significantly smaller footprint even though
you could have upwards of 80 interceptors at the same site
where we previously had 10.
To build one of those missile fields, for example, a GBI is
a five-year construction period. This, to prep the site, would
be less than a year.
Mr. Langevin. And let's talk about, were there to be an
attack--obviously we are primarily concerned about Iran--but if
there were to be an attack, they are obviously not going to
launch one, two, or three missiles. You talk again about the
number of short- and intermediate-range missiles and how
quickly the system could be overwhelmed if we only had 10 GBIs.
You laid out how we would launch two GBIs for each missile that
is launched, so how quickly it would be overwhelmed and what
flexibility the SM-3 system would offer to meet the threat.
General Cartwright. Well, the raid size issue is something
that we worry about, particularly from the standpoint that it
would overwhelm the sensors and then overwhelm the weapons very
quickly and then leave them vulnerable, or leave that area
vulnerable.
The new system, both in the affordability side of the
equation but more from an operational standpoint and the
ability to address large raids, as we have watched the Prophet
series exercises which are ongoing right now in Israel--I am
sorry, in Iran--you generally are seeing half a dozen or so,
similar to what we see on the 4th of July from North Korea,
where they will launch half a dozen to a dozen missiles. That
could quickly overwhelm the GBI system.
And what we will be able to do with the SM-3 in the early
stages is to address those weapons with SM-3s in Europe. When
we move to the 2020 system, we will not only be able to address
them in the terminal phase and in the exo-atmospheric, trans-
atmospheric areas, but we will start to go after them in the
ascent phase, very early in the game, which allows the problem
to be simplified substantially and allows us to get at those
systems very early in the flight, which means we don't waste
second and third missiles going after them.
Mr. Langevin. General O'Reilly, could I ask you, the
testing--where and how you test the SM-3 missile as its
development continues. And do you have the range facilities and
authorities you need to conduct the planned testing? And can
you talk about how this would protect Hawaii, if that is a test
site?
General O'Reilly. Well, sir, Hawaii is where we do most of
our testing in the Pacific. And that would be the likely
location for this, because we want to integrate that testing
with THAAD and Aegis on ships and our GMD system. So all of
those systems come together in the central Pacific, so the
Pacific Missile Range would be an ideal site for this testing.
And, as you said, it has a redundant--or it has an
additional attribute, that if you are there and you have this
capability you are testing, it would be there for other uses
for defense also, as we have done in the past with our systems
that we test there in the Pacific.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. As I have listened to this
this morning and read through the testimonies earlier, it
brings home, once again, that you all are doing a great job in
working through this very difficult challenge.
But the reality for Iran is they are not safer by pursuing
the nuclear program, they are not safer by pursuing their
missile program. You know, I am one of those people that think
there is a lot that, eventually, Americans and Iranians will do
together as people that will be very, very productive. But
somehow they are off on this tangent that it will somehow help
their national aspirations for their people by pursuing these
programs. And I think it is very clear from the work you all
are doing that it will not help them. And I think that is the
unfortunate side of what they are doing. But I hope at some
point their leadership will recognize they are not safer by
pursuing these programs.
General O'Reilly, in his written and oral statement, used
the phrase that what you are all about is that this will
enhance U.S. homeland defense. And there are some people on the
committee today that have said they are concerned it will
weaken it. I don't get that. I just don't see where what you
are saying here in any way puts us at risk of weakening U.S.
homeland defense.
Somehow we think that when we set up a program, even though
it is a--all these programs are multiyear, that we can never
learn from a changing world or changing technology, I mean, I
just don't get it, why we would think that somehow you all are
going to make changes that you are going to sit there and
testify, after years and years of service to your country, that
this enhances U.S. homeland defense when, in fact, it weakens
it. I don't get it. I mean, I don't get it. I think a lot of
this is just technological change.
I wanted to ask, Secretary Tauscher, I think I will address
you, put these questions to you, with regard to the discussion
that has been going on about Poland and Russia. And I
understand what you all have testified to, that you have
reached out to folks, that there was some misinformation, and
you feel like it is moving in the right direction.
But there are clearly some voices being heard from Poland
that think they were mistreated. And so, would you explain to
me why they might think that?
Secretary Tauscher. Well, Congressman Snyder, I can't speak
for them, but I will tell you that every effort was made to
pre-consult and to consult, but there was a lot of leaking
going on. And there was a sense that, once the President made
the decision, that we had to get out there and do it. And,
literally, within hours of the President making the decision,
we were on planes going to see them.
We are enormously grateful that the Polish Government and
the Czech Government worked with the previous administration on
what was called the program of record. But things have changed.
They have changed significantly. The threat has changed. We
have a big commitment to our NATO allies and forward-deployed
troops. It is clear that the current threat is from short- and
medium-range. The United States is currently protecting----
Dr. Snyder. And I understand all that. But I want us to
be--I mean, when some of us met yesterday, and we have had
discussions through the last several weeks with Poles, and
there are, at a minimum, some misunderstandings that are
persisting.
And so I want to understand better why they may have the
view--which you all don't agree with, and you are going to try
to rectify and, I think, will get straightened out--I think the
relationship between Poland and the United States is and will
be very strong for decades to come--but why they might be
thinking that this was not helpful to their foreign policy.
Secretary Tauscher. Well, I will tell you that, under the
previous administration, the Polish Government and the Czech
Government stepped up smartly to support the United States in
our ambitions to put both the 10 GBIs in Poland and the radar
site in the Czech Republic against public opinion. Public
opinion in both countries was significantly against it. So both
governments used a lot of political capital to support the
ally, the United States, and have had a lot of dissension
politically domestically.
Dr. Snyder. So they took their political hits domestically.
They also took some hits from Russia, which wasn't very excited
about these missiles there.
Secretary Tauscher. That is right.
Dr. Snyder. So is the basic underlying problem they paid
the price and now we are backing off? Is that how you perceive
the----
Secretary Tauscher. Well, I think what happened was, in
anticipation of the BMD Review being released, there was a lot
of domestic U.S. speculation as to what the characterization of
that would be, and they were wrong. The characterization coming
out of the United States, picked up by the press in Europe, was
that we were canceling the program. If you remember, in the
first 24 hours, there was completely misinformation
disseminated, and it was affecting the political environment in
Poland.
Dr. Snyder. Which gets back to the basic point that this,
in fact, enhances security both for Europe and the United
States.
Secretary Tauscher. Exactly. And I think that is the
message that everyone has now.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, like everyone else, I want to welcome back our former
colleague. And I, as an American, think we are very lucky to
have you first as a congresswoman and now serving in this
capacity.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor. You know, in the past 20 years, under both
Democratic and Republican presidents, we have seen the Spanish
ask us to give up a huge air base at Torrejon. We have seen the
Philippine Government ask us to give up tens of billions of
dollars of infrastructure in their country. The Panamanians
asked us to give up tens of billions of dollars of
infrastructure in their country. Our fellow Americans in Puerto
Rico asked us to give up Vieques, and then we made the
decision, ``Well, there is no reason to have Roosevelt Roads if
we can't have Vieques.'' And, most recently, the Government of
Ecuador that, just 10 years ago, begged us to build an airfield
at Manta is now asking us to give that airfield back to them.
And in each instance they are our host, and in each
instance as the guest, when they ask us to leave, as the good
guys we are as a Nation, we leave. And we leave all those
things behind.
So, going to the decision for more mobile units, initially
going to a sea-based unit, I commend you. Because these nations
that are now asking us to spend a lot of money in their
countries are one regime away from asking us to leave. Those
huge investments on the part of the American people, just like
we saw in Spain, the Philippines, Panama, Puerto Rico, which
are fellow Americans, just go to waste.
Obviously, I come from shipbuilding country. Obviously, I
support putting as many of these things on ships as you can
because you don't have to ask someone's permission to use the
ocean. And if you look at every potential threat out there, it
is on an ocean.
And for my colleagues who are rightfully concerned about
Iran, I would remind you that the Iranians don't have any
carriers anywhere near our country. The Iranians don't have any
submarines anywhere near our country. The Iranians don't have
troops on two countries bordering our country. And I would
think that the Iranians are very much aware of the three things
that I just said and that that should be on their thoughts
every day if they ever think of doing something as foolish as
sending a missile towards the United States of America or any
of our troops.
So having said that, I am just curious how much, if any,
did those things we gave up in Spain, Panama, the Philippines,
Puerto Rico, play into the decision not to make huge capital
investments in somebody else's country where they could ask us
to leave at any moment?
General Cartwright. I will start, Congressman.
For me, diversity is just absolutely essential, because you
do not know tomorrow where you will be, who your friend will
be, exactly what the right posture towards a threat will be.
The mobile aspect of this and then the relocatable aspect of
this gives us a really powerful blend.
And we are talking today about Europe, but I am equally
focused on the Pacific. The North Korean threat, obviously, is
a part of this dialogue. But there is not a lot of land mass
out there. And to be in the right place to defend this country
is going to, probably, have to be from the sea.
And so, as we look at the entire globe, these mobile
systems, both in their flexibility to adjust to changes in the
geopolitical side of the house but also to adjust to changes in
the threat and where that threat will come from, are absolutely
an essential element that, for me, can't be compromised.
We have to have a mobile--yes, a mobile system costs more
than a fixed-base infrastructure. But that investment is
generally easily returned in its flexibility.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher, do you want to comment on that?
Secretary Tauscher. Well, Mr. Taylor, thank you for those
warm remarks. But I think that I can only echo what General
Cartwright has said.
But I will say that, once again, we are very aware of how
our allies have stepped up, and we are very aware of our
Article V commitments to our NATO allies. The program of record
would not have protected, even in its final stages, all of our
European allies. And our system begins to protect them now.
So I think that we shouldn't get into the job of picking
false choices. This is a very comprehensive, flexible system
that is adaptive, that deals with the current threat, with
proven technology now. And I think that that is a
characteristic that the President understood. I think that we
hope that we get support from the Congress.
But, in the end, it gives us the kind of flexibility not
only to deal with the basing issues but also to the threat,
which is really, I think, what the American people need to have
confidence in.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. McKeon, the gentleman from California, wrap it up.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think this has been a very, very good hearing. And I
think there are lots of things we agree on, as Mr. Turner
pointed out. I think there are lots of things we disagree on,
as has also been pointed out. But, as Mr. Spratt and Mr.
Marshall said, I think we have come a long way on the debate.
I remember when Reagan talked about SDI and how loony-tune
he was and how crazy he was. It would be very interesting if he
could come back and hear the debate we just had today and how
both sides are supporting missile defense.
We still have differences. Sadly, I think some of them are
partisan. Sometimes I sit here thinking, could a Republican say
something, one thing nice about President Clinton, could a
Democrat say one thing nice about President Bush that they did
in their eight years, respectively?
I still have some concerns, and, you know, we will work on
those, we will address those as we move forward. I do have
concerns about how we treated Poland and Czechoslovakia in
this. I know the Poland Ambassador yesterday said that he felt
they had been knifed in the back. So we haven't completely
salved that problem yet. I think we still need to work on that,
and hopefully we will.
I think people that are our allies should feel good about
being our allies. And I understand that sometimes you have to
move in ways that don't take care of all the problems. But I
hope we can reach out to them and make sure that they fully
have bought into this and can feel good about it. And I hope
that we can continue talking about this and move forward.
I, again, like Mr. Marshall, wish that we had not cut
missile defense by $1.2 billion in the budget if these new
programs--as General Cartwright just said, the mobile system is
going to cost more. Now, there has been a lot of talk about it
is cheaper, but it is going to cost more. And if there was a
change made in direction, we should have kept the money in
there and put it toward that, because we haven't totally
handled all of the money situation.
So thank you. Thank you for what you are doing. Thank you
for your service to America. And we will continue to talk about
this.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. McKeon, thank you very much.
A special thanks to the panel for your outstanding remarks
today in answering the questions. I think that this has been
one of the best hearings that we have had.
We have one 15-minute vote and two 5-minute votes.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to indicate that I
will be sending a letter expressing concern about the new plan
for Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
Thank you.
The Chairman. With that, we thank you again.
[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 1, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. As we discuss the current threat of ballistic missile
attacks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East or Persian Gulf, how will
the redeployment of sea-based missile defense systems from the Pacific
affect the United States' ability to protect its interests in the
Pacific, such as Guam, and its allies, including the countries of
Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan? What feedback have you
received from government officials in these countries since President
Obama's decision to recommit missile shields from the Pacific?
Secretary Flournoy. The new European-based ballistic missile
defense (BMD) program--the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA)--in no way
abandons or degrades our commitments to our important friends and
allies in East Asia, nor does it compromise the missile defense
capabilities provided to our military commanders in the Pacific. The
PAA will leverage missile defense assets that in some cases have yet to
be permanently assigned to a particular region and, in other cases,
will be purchased in future budget requests. European-based BMD would
not rely on assets and capabilities already in place in the Pacific.
The decision to pursue this new European BMD architecture was
driven, in part, by early conclusions from the ongoing Ballistic
Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The BMDR, which will be presented to
Congress in January 2010, will address the central aspects of our
ballistic missile defense program, including the methodology for the
allocation of BMD assets. As we move forward with decisions on where to
deploy those assets, we will ensure that the Combatant Commanders in
the Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere are fully involved.
We will also continue to consult with our Allies.
Mr. Wilson. Further, the United States has over 325,000 American
military personnel, not to mention their dependents, stationed in the
Pacific. I am concerned that the re-allocation of sea-based missile
defense platforms away from our nation's largest area of responsibility
jeopardizes their safety. As the President's new missile defense
architecture was developed, what consideration was given to the safety
of Americans in the Pacific Theater, including in Guam, Alaska, and
Hawaii? It would be a severe risk management mistake to sacrifice
security in the Pacific in order to attempt to realize the potential
cost savings attributed to a new missile defense architecture, some
elements of which are not even invented yet.
Secretary Flournoy. The new European-based missile defense program
in no way abandons or degrades our commitments to our important Allies
in East Asia, nor does it compromise the missile defense capabilities
provided to our commanders in the Pacific. Missile defenses in Europe
will leverage assets that in some cases have yet to be permanently
deployed to a particular region or, in other cases, will be purchased
with future budget requests. European-based missile defense will not
rely on assets and capabilities already fielded in the Pacific.
Mr. Wilson. As we discuss the current threat of ballistic missile
attacks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East or Persian Gulf, how will
the redeployment of sea-based missile defense systems from the Pacific
affect the United States' ability to protect its interests in the
Pacific, such as Guam, and its allies, including the countries of
Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan? What feedback have you
received from government officials in these countries since President
Obama's decision to recommit missile shields from the Pacific?
General O'Reilly. As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am
responsible for technical aspects of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System including the development, testing, and fielding of the
architecture's components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Department of State who are in a better
position to respond to questions that have policy or diplomatic
implications.
Mr. Wilson. Further, the United States has over 325,000 American
military personnel, not to mention their dependents, stationed in the
Pacific. I am concerned that the re-allocation of sea-based missile
defense platforms away from our nation's largest area of responsibility
jeopardizes their safety. As the President's new missile defense
architecture was developed, what consideration was given to the safety
of Americans in the Pacific Theater, including in Guam, Alaska, and
Hawaii? It would be a severe risk management mistake to sacrifice
security in the Pacific in order to attempt to realize the potential
cost savings attributed to a new missile defense architecture, some
elements of which are not even invented yet.
General O'Reilly. As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am
responsible for technical aspects of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System including the development, testing, and fielding of the
architecture's components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Department of State who are in a better
position to respond to questions that have policy or diplomatic
implications.
Mr. Wilson. As we discuss the current threat of ballistic missile
attacks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East or Persian Gulf, how will
the redeployment of sea-based missile defense systems from the Pacific
affect the United States' ability to protect its interests in the
Pacific, such as Guam, and its allies, including the countries of
Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan? What feedback have you
received from government officials in these countries since President
Obama's decision to recommit missile shields from the Pacific?
General Cartwright. The new European-based BMD program--the Phased,
Adaptive Approach (PAA)--in no way abandons or degrades our commitments
to our important Allies in East Asia, nor does it compromise the
missile defense capabilities provided to our military commanders in the
Pacific. At this point, no redeployment decisions have been made, and
no orders have been given to redeploy Pacific-based ships based on the
Presidential decisions on European Missile Defense.
The decision to pursue this new European BMD architecture was
driven in part by early conclusions from the ongoing Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR). The BMDR, which will be presented to Congress in
January 2010, will address the central aspects of our ballistic missile
defense program, including the methodology for the allocation of BMD
assets. As we move forward with decisions on where to deploy those
assets, we will ensure that the Combatant Commanders in the Pacific,
Europe, Middle East, and elsewhere are fully involved.
Mr. Wilson. Further, the United States has over 325,000 American
military personnel, not to mention their dependents, stationed in the
Pacific. I am concerned that the re-allocation of sea-based missile
defense platforms away from our nation's largest area of responsibility
jeopardizes their safety. As the President's new missile defense
architecture was developed, what consideration was given to the safety
of Americans in the Pacific Theater, including in Guam, Alaska, and
Hawaii? It would be a severe risk management mistake to sacrifice
security in the Pacific in order to attempt to realize the potential
cost savings attributed to a new missile defense architecture, some
elements of which are not even invented yet.
General Cartwright. At this point, no redeployment decisions have
been made, and no orders have been given to redeploy Pacific-based
ships based on the Presidential decisions on European Missile Defense.
Future decisions regarding the deployment of Missile Defense assets
will be made in full consideration of all U.S. responsibilities for the
defense of citizens, forces, friends and allies, and with input from
the Combatant Commanders in the Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and
elsewhere.
Mr. Wilson. As we discuss the current threat of ballistic missile
attacks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East or Persian Gulf, how will
the redeployment of sea-based missile defense systems from the Pacific
affect the United States' ability to protect its interests in the
Pacific, such as Guam, and its allies, including the countries of
Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan? What feedback have you
received from government officials in these countries since President
Obama's decision to recommit missile shields from the Pacific?
Secretary Tauscher. Our plans will in no way reduce our missile
defense capabilities in the Pacific. The Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)
does not take sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities
deployed in the Asia/Pacific region and re-deploy them to Europe. Under
the President's plan, we will substantially increase the deployment of
proven missile defense capabilities to counter the most likely missile
threats. The President's FY 2010 budget requests increased funding
beyond the Bush Administration's plan for key missile defense assets to
include making six additional Aegis ships BMD-capable.
We have received positive feedback from government officials in the
Pacific region about the President's plan. We believe that the proposed
``Phased, Adaptive Approach'' architecture has applicability to other
regions of the world. The United States will discuss with our allies
and friends worldwide about how we can further enhance regional
security and stability by countering the threat of ballistic missiles
with effective, timely, and responsive defensive capabilities.
Mr. Wilson. Further, the United States has over 325,000 American
military personnel, not to mention their dependents, stationed in the
Pacific. I am concerned that the re-allocation of sea-based missile
defense platforms away from our nation's largest area of responsibility
jeopardizes their safety. As the President's new missile defense
architecture was developed, what consideration was given to the safety
of Americans in the Pacific Theater, including in Guam, Alaska, and
Hawaii? It would be a severe risk management mistake to sacrifice
security in the Pacific in order to attempt to realize the potential
cost savings attributed to a new missile defense architecture, some
elements of which are not even invented yet.
Secretary Tauscher. I understand, and fully share, your concern for
the protection of U.S. citizens who live in the Pacific region and our
military forces deployed there. Our plans will in no way reduce or
degrade our missile defense capabilities in the Asia/Pacific region. We
will maintain our Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California to
protect the continental United States and Alaska and Hawaii against
long-range missile attacks from Iran or North Korea. The Phased
Adaptive Approach (PAA) does not take sea-based Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) capabilities deployed in the Asia/Pacific region and re-
deploy them to Europe. Under the President's plan, we will
substantially increase the deployment of proven missile defense
capabilities to counter the most likely missile threats. The
President's FY 2010 budget requests increased funding for key missile
defense assets to include making six additional Aegis ships BMD-
capable.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-
phased approach:
a. What were the specific locations (or are the planned locations)
for missile defense assets in Europe, including ship stations and land-
basing sites, and interceptor inventories required to provide coverage
for each of the four phases?
b. What level of coverage (e.g., percentage) is provided for
Europe in each of the four phases?
Secretary Flournoy. The new European-based ballistic missile
defense (BMD) program--the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA)--will be
fielded over four phases between now and 2020.
Phase I, to be deployed in 2011, will use existing missile defense
systems to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Phase I will focus on the protection of Southern Europe by utilizing
sea-based Aegis missile-defense-capable ships and interceptors (the SM-
3 Block IA). The first phase will also include a forward-based radar
that will augment homeland defense capabilities already in place in
Alaska and California.
Phase II, to be deployed in the 2015 timeframe, will enhance our
capabilities by fielding a more advanced interceptor (the SM-3 Block
IB) and additional sensors. In addition to sea-based locations, Phase
II will include a land-based site in Southern Europe.
Phase III, to be deployed in the 2018 timeframe, will improve
coverage against medium- and intermediate-range threats. Phase III will
rely on an upgraded Standard Missile-3 (the SM-3 Block IIA), which is
already under development, at sea- and land-based sites, and will
extend coverage to all of Europe.
Phase IV, to be deployed in the 2020 timeframe, will provide a
capability against a potential intercontinental ballistic missile
threat to the United States. This phase will leverage yet another
upgrade to the Standard Missile-3, the Block IIB. All four phases will
include upgrades to the missile defense Command and Control system.
Although specific interceptor inventories and locations for the
sea- and land-based sites have yet to be determined, the Administration
is working these matters as part of several internal processes,
including the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, studies on the global
allocation of ballistic missile defense assets, and formulation of the
Administration's budget request for fiscal year 2011. Although it is
premature to discuss the specific force structure of missile defense
capabilities around the world, it is important to understand that the
PAA will field a significantly larger number of interceptors and
sensors in Europe by leveraging proven, mobile, and more cost-effective
platforms like AN/TPY-2 radars, airborne infrared sensors, and Standard
Missile (SM)-3s.
Mr. Turner. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-
phased approach, were any cost estimates on the new approach conducted?
If so, what are the estimated costs of the new four-phased approach?
Secretary Flournoy. Several factors were taken into consideration
when revising the approach to European-based ballistic missile defense,
including the cost of the system in relation to the capabilities it
will provide. The bottom line is that given the capabilities required
to be responsive to the threat that we face today, the revised approach
utilizes mature, proven sea-based and land-based missile defense
capabilities that are more cost-effective than the components of the
previous plan.
As General Cartwright and General O'Reilly stated in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 24th and the
House Armed Services Committee on October 1st, the Standard Missile-3
(SM-3), at around $10 million apiece, is much cheaper than the Ground-
Based Interceptor, which costs approximately $70 million per
interceptor. The SM-3 also provides the flexibility to deploy the
system on sea, land, or both. Inherent in this flexibility is the
ability to manage the costs associated with maintaining a deployed
system more effectively.
Mr. Turner. Given the increased reliance on Aegis ships in the
European theater, what additional requirements are expected to be
placed on the U.S. Navy and what impact would this increased reliance
have on the Navy's ability to meet its worldwide missions and needs?
Secretary Flournoy. The new European missile defense program in no
way abandons or degrades our commitments to other important friends and
allies around the world. In particular, the revised approach in Europe
does not compromise the missile defense capabilities provided to our
military commanders in the Pacific, where Aegis ships and Standard
Missile-3s are an integral part of our missile defense architecture.
As the Department works through the global allocation of missile
defense assets to meet the warfighter's needs, the Military
Departments, including the Navy, and the Combatant Commanders
responsible for individual regions around the world are all fully
involved in the planning for employing these assets. We are also
working closely with the Military Departments--in particular the Navy--
to ensure that their mission requirements are fully funded.
Mr. Turner. Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright, you both
indicated that development and testing of the two-stage Ground-Based
Interceptor (GBI) that was planned for Poland will continue. For how
long (or until what specific milestones) does the Department plan to
continue development and testing of the two-stage GBI? Will it be a
hedge should the SM-3 Block IIA or IIB interceptors run into problems
or delays, and if so, will there be a down-select in the future between
the two-stage GBI and SM-3 Block IIA or IIB interceptors based on the
progress made on each?
Secretary Flournoy. Development and testing of the 2-stage Ground
Based Interceptor (GBI) will continue in order to provide a hedge
against long-range threats that could potentially emerge in the future.
However, we believe, as does the Joint Staff and the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA), that the Standard Missile-3s (SM-3) currently under
development, as well as the SM-3 Block IIB that will be developed as
part of the European-based missile defense system, will provide a
sufficient capability against all ranges of ballistic missile threats.
Although MDA can better address the specific development and
testing schedules for the 2-stage GBI, I will note that there is
currently no plan for a ``down-select'' between it and the SM-3 Block
IIA or IIB, primarily because there is no plan at this time to enter
into production of the GBIs. Currently, all planned activities for the
2-stage GBI are developmental in nature.
Mr. Turner. NATO's missile defense architecture efforts to-date
assumed that the previous approach would be ``linked'' with other NATO
missile defense efforts. What is the schedule and plan for revising
NATO's missile defense architecture to incorporate this new approach
and, with the U.S. now providing ``more comprehensive'' coverage of
Europe, what role and contribution will our European allies have? Does
the Administration intend to seek NATO support for its new approach
similar to that expressed in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit
declaration?
Secretary Flournoy. Work is underway at NATO to examine the
possible expansion of the scope of NATO's Active Layered Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) system beyond the defense of
deployed forces, to include the defense of Allies' territory and
populations. The U.S. plan for gaining NATO support includes asking
Allies at the December Meeting of Foreign Ministers to affirm that
missile defense for NATO territories and populations is an appropriate
and viable mission for the Alliance and, in the same spirit as the
Bucharest Summit declaration, that the new U.S. Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA) is a valuable contribution to that mission. The role and
contribution of European Allies would be to expand ALTBMD's common-
funded C2 backbone to include coverage of NATO territory and
populations into which U.S. and other Allied national contributions
would be connected. An Alliance decision on the expansion of ALTBMD
could come at the fall 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. The United States
will encourage Allied contribution of national systems already acquired
or that may be acquired in the future, such as various types of
interceptors, sensors, and sites for the deployment of missile defense
assets.
Mr. Turner. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-
phased approach:
a. What were the specific locations (or are the planned locations)
for missile defense assets in Europe, including ship stations and land-
basing sites, and interceptor inventories required to provide coverage
for each of the four phases?
b. What level of coverage (e.g., percentage) is provided for
Europe in each of the four phases?
General O'Reilly. With the exception of Poland, which has recently
agreed to begin negotiations over hosting a land-based site during
Phase 3 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), determinations
for specific locations for European missile defense components are
pending conclusion of consultations with potential host nations and
NATO. It would be premature to announce EPAA locations prior to the
completion of these discussions. Similarly, specific interceptor
inventories necessary to provide missile defense capabilities in each
of the four phases are subject to internal Defense Department
deliberations which will closely consider operational, programmatic and
budgetary requirements for the EPAA.
Assuming continued growth in Iranian ballistic missile
capabilities, the EPAA will unfold in the following stages over the
coming years:
Phase 1--2011 timeframe; existing/maturing systems v.
SRBM/MRBM threat
Use ship-based SM-3 Block IA interceptors operating in
the Mediterranean Sea to provide missile defense coverage for
Southern Europe.
Deploy an AN/TPY-2 sensor in the region to detect,
identify and track incoming threats.
Phase 2--2015 timeframe; enhanced missile defense systems
v. SRBM/MRBM threat
Use the more advanced SM-3 Block IB interceptor,
deployed in the Mediterranean Sea and on a land-based site in
Southern Europe, to enhance coverage of Southern Europe.
Begin deploying a distributed network of sea-, land-,
and air-based sensors to augment the AN/TPY-2 or the Airborne
Early Infrared Sensor.
Phase 3--2018 timeframe; improved area coverage v. MRBM/
IRBM threat
Use SM-3 Block IIA interceptors, deployed on sea and on
two land-based sites (this phase adds a second site, which
Poland has agreed to host), to provide coverage for all of
Europe.
Continue to deploy forward based sensor(s).
Phase 4--2020 timeframe; capability v. potential ICBM
threat
If the ICBM threat evolves:
Use SM-3 Block IIB interceptors, deployed on two land-
based sites, to augment the defense of the U.S. against a
potential ICBM threat and protect all of Europe.
Sea-based SM-3 Block IIA would provide surge capacity
Mr. Turner. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-
phased approach, were any cost estimates on the new approach conducted?
If so, what are the estimated costs of the new four-phased approach?
General O'Reilly. MDA is currently building the FY11-15 Future Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) and out-year funding profiles to reflect the new
architecture. These will be available with the release of PB11. The
below chart reflects MDA's proposed plan for FY09 and FY10 RDT&E
European Component funding.
Section 235 of the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization act
authorizes MDA to use RDT&E funds for the President's new Phased
Adaptive Approach that were authorized and appropriated in FY09 and
requested in FY10 for the former European Missile Defense program of
record, following the submission of a report to Congress from the
Secretary of Defense certifying certain conditions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY09 RDT&E Unobligated Funds $M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Interceptor Site 173
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Midcourse Radar 64
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Communication Support 22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY10 RDT&E Budget Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Component 51
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY09 Unobligated and FY10 Request Total 309
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current FY10 RDT&E Requirements $M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis Ashore Development and Test 244
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Systems Engineering 26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Current FY10 RDT&E Required 270
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Turner. Given the increased reliance on Aegis ships in the
European theater, what additional requirements are expected to be
placed on the U.S. Navy and what impact would this increased reliance
have on the Navy's ability to meet its worldwide missions and needs?
General O'Reilly. As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am
responsible for technical aspects of the new architecture including the
development, testing, and fielding of the architecture's components. I
defer to my colleagues in the Department of the Navy who are
responsible for answering questions that concern the Navy's ability to
meet its missions.
Mr. Turner. NATO's missile defense architecture efforts to-date
assumed that the previous approach would be ``linked'' with other NATO
missile defense efforts. What is the schedule and plan for revising
NATO's missile defense architecture to incorporate this new approach
and, with the U.S. now providing ``more comprehensive'' coverage of
Europe, what role and contribution will our European allies have? Does
the Administration intend to seek NATO support for its new approach
similar to that expressed in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit
declaration?
General O'Reilly. As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am
responsible for technical aspects of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System including the development, testing, and fielding of the
architecture's components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Department of State who are in a better
position to respond to questions that have policy or diplomatic
implications.
Mr. Turner. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-
phased approach:
a. What were the specific locations (or are the planned locations)
for missile defense assets in Europe, including ship stations and land-
basing sites, and interceptor inventories required to provide coverage
for each of the four phases?
b. What level of coverage (e.g., percentage) is provided for
Europe in each of the four phases?
General Cartwright. a. Specific asset locations were not determined
during the development of the four-phased approach. The flexibility
inherent in the approach allows for a range of options regarding asset
placement and ship stations. Specific shore locations will be
determined during bilateral and NATO negotiations. Similarly,
interceptor inventories were not specified, as these can be adjusted to
provide the desired capacity as the threat evolves.
b. Coverage areas vary based on threat missile type and launch
site. However, NATO strictures direct 100% protection of all member
nations from anticipated threats and the four-phased approach to
missile defense in Europe is designed with that goal in mind.
Phase I, to be deployed in 2011, will use existing missile defense
systems to defend against the assessed threat from short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles. Phase I will focus on the protection of
Southern Europe by utilizing sea-based Aegis missile-defense-capable
ships and interceptors (the SM-3 Block IA) and a forward-based radar
that will augment homeland defense capabilities already fielded in
Alaska and California.
Phase II, to be deployed in the 2015 timeframe, will field a more
advanced interceptor (the SM-3 Block IB) and additional sensors. In
addition to sea-based locations, Phase II will include a land-based
site in Southeast Europe.
Phase III, to be deployed in the 2018 timeframe, will improve
coverage against medium- and intermediate-range threats with a second
land-based site and an upgraded Standard Missile-3 (the SM-3 Block
IIA), and will extend coverage to all of Europe.
Phase IV, to be deployed in the 2020 timeframe, will provide a
capability against a potential intercontinental ballistic missile
threat to the United States. This phase will leverage yet another
upgrade to the Standard Missile-3, the Block IIB.
Mr. Turner. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-
phased approach, were any cost estimates on the new approach conducted?
If so, what are the estimated costs of the new four-phased approach?
General Cartwright. The initial stages of the four-phased approach
were designed to be met within current FYDP allocations for MDA and the
Services. In coordination with the Joint Staff, Military Services,
Missile Defense Agency, and other missile defense stakeholders, the
Department of Defense is currently building next year's budget request.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request that will be released to Congress
in February will include estimated funding profiles through fiscal year
2015 to reflect the new European missile defense architecture. The
below chart reflects MDA's proposed plan for FY09 and FY10 RDT&E
European Component funding.
Section 235 of the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization act
authorizes MDA to use RDT&E funds for the President's new Phased
Adaptive Approach that were authorized and appropriated in FY09 and
requested in FY10 for the former European Missile Defense program of
record, following the submission of a report to Congress from the
Secretary of Defense certifying certain conditions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY09 RDT&E Unobligated Funds $M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Interceptor Site 173
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Midcourse Radar 64
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Communication Support 22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY10 RDT&E Budget Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Component 51
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY09 Unobligated and FY10 Request Total 309
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current FY10 RDT&E Requirements $M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis Ashore Development and Test 244
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Systems Engineering 26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Current FY10 RDT&E Required 270
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
While we are still working through the total estimated costs for
the revised European-based missile defense system, we will begin buying
many of the components in the Administration's budget request for
fiscal year 2011.
Mr. Turner. Given the increased reliance on Aegis ships in the
European theater, what additional requirements are expected to be
placed on the U.S. Navy and what impact would this increased reliance
have on the Navy's ability to meet its worldwide missions and needs?
General Cartwright. The new European missile defense program in no
way abandons or degrades our commitments to other important Allies
around the world. In particular, the revised approach in Europe does
not compromise the missile defense capabilities provided to our
military commanders in the Pacific, where Aegis ships and Standard
Missile-3s are an integral part of our missile defense architecture.
As the Department works through the global allocation of missile
defense assets to meet the Warfighter's needs, the Military Services,
including the Navy, and the Combatant Commanders responsible for
individual regions around the world are all fully involved in the
planning for employing these assets. We are also working closely with
the Services--in particular the Navy--to ensure that their mission
requirements are fully funded.
Mr. Turner. Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright, you both
indicated that development and testing of the two-stage Ground-Based
Interceptor (GBI) that was planned for Poland will continue. For how
long (or until what specific milestones) does the Department plan to
continue development and testing of the two-stage GBI? Will it be a
hedge should the SM-3 Block IIA or IIB interceptors run into problems
or delays, and if so, will there be a down-select in the future between
the two-stage GBI and SM-3 Block IIA or IIB interceptors based on the
progress made on each?
General Cartwright. MDA intends to continue to develop and test the
two-stage GBI. Future decisions on the program will be informed by the
results of those tests. The SM-3 program is a separate effort from 2-
stage GBI. There are currently no plans to make adjustments to the SM-3
development program based on the results of 2-stage GBI testing or
development, primarily because there is no plan to enter into
production of 2-stage GBI's.
Mr. Turner. NATO's missile defense architecture efforts to-date
assumed that the previous approach would be ``linked'' with other NATO
missile defense efforts. What is the schedule and plan for revising
NATO's missile defense architecture to incorporate this new approach
and, with the U.S. now providing ``more comprehensive'' coverage of
Europe, what role and contribution will our European allies have? Does
the Administration intend to seek NATO support for its new approach
similar to that expressed in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit
declaration?
General Cartwright. The United States will provide Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA) capabilities over time and will seek a NATO decision to
provide a C2 backbone through expansion of the Active Layered Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to link Allies' missile
defense assets. If NATO adopts the mission of missile defense of
Allies' territory and populations, the PAA would be the U.S.
contribution to that effort. Allies will have opportunities to
contribute national systems already acquired, or that may be acquired
in the future, such as Aegis sea-based systems, PATRIOT, MEADs, THAADs
additional upper-tier interceptors, sensors, sites for the deployment
of missile defense assets, and support or defense functions for PAA
assets. The PAA is consistent with the Strasbourg-Kehl tasking to
address threats in a prioritized manner and aligns to 2008 and 2009
NATO summit declarations, and we therefore anticipate support for the
PAA in NATO communique language from the upcoming NATO Foreign
Ministerial in December 2009.
Mr. Turner. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-
phased approach:
a. What were the specific locations (or are the planned locations)
for missile defense assets in Europe, including ship stations and land-
basing sites, and interceptor inventories required to provide coverage
for each of the four phases?
b. What level of coverage (e.g., percentage) is provided for
Europe in each of the four phases?
Secretary Tauscher. The Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) is
responsive to the existing threat and will incorporate relevant
technologies quickly and cost-effectively to respond to evolving
threats. Upon completion of Phases One and Two, the PAA will be able to
defend NATO members threatened by short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. Phase Three will counter the threat from intermediate-range
ballistic missiles and enhance protection against short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles. Phase Four will add coverage against the
potential future intercontinental ballistic missile threat to the
United States.
Details regarding specific locations of Ballistic Missile Defense
assets, the required inventory of interceptors, and the level of
defensive coverage provided to Europe would need to be provided by the
Department of Defense in a closed session.
Mr. Turner. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-
phased approach, were any cost estimates on the new approach conducted?
If so, what are the estimated costs of the new four-phased approach?
Secretary Tauscher. The Department of Defense is working through
the total estimated costs for the four-phased approach, which will be
reflected in the President's Budget Request for FY 2011.
Mr. Turner. Given the increased reliance on Aegis ships in the
European theater, what additional requirements are expected to be
placed on the U.S. Navy and what impact would this increased reliance
have on the Navy's ability to meet its worldwide missions and needs?
Secretary Tauscher. The Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) does not
take sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities deployed in
the Pacific and re-deploy them to Europe. Under the President's plan,
we will substantially increase the deployment of proven missile defense
capabilities to counter the most likely missile threats. The
President's FY 2010 budget requests increased funding for key missile
defense assets to include making six additional Aegis ships BMD-
capable.
Mr. Turner. NATO's missile defense architecture efforts to-date
assumed that the previous approach would be ``linked'' with other NATO
missile defense efforts. What is the schedule and plan for revising
NATO's missile defense architecture to incorporate this new approach
and, with the U.S. now providing ``more comprehensive'' coverage of
Europe, what role and contribution will our European allies have? Does
the Administration intend to seek NATO support for its new approach
similar to that expressed in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit
declaration?
Secretary Tauscher. At the April 4, 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg/
Kehl, Heads of State and Government tasked NATO to develop
recommendations comprising architectural alternatives for a possible
NATO missile defense system. They also requested an evaluation of the
policy, military, and technical work related to a possible expanded
role of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD)
program beyond the protection of deployed forces to include territorial
missile defense. This work remains on schedule; responses to these
taskings will be considered at the Lisbon Summit in 2010.
We have offered the Phased Adaptive Approach as a U.S. contribution
to a potential NATO missile defense effort. At the upcoming NATO
Foreign Ministerial on December 3-4, we will seek NATO endorsement of
the PAA. We have asked NATO members to consider contributing their own
missile defense capabilities to a potential missile defense system for
the protection of NATO territory and populations.
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