Segment 2 Of 2 Previous Hearing Segment(1) SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
Page 176 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
Q1. Please provide the FY 2003 appropriation in full cost format and the structure of the FY 2004 request:
A1.
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Q2. According to GAO, NASA's Inspector General, and NASA's independent auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), the Agency lacks adequate controls to ensure that Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) and Materials accounts are presented accurately in the financial statements.
Q2a. What actions are you taking to address these problems, and how long will it take to correct them?
A2a. NASA is taking several actions to enhance the internal controls over PP&E and Materials for the FY 2003 financial reporting and audit cycle. Actions include improving contractor-held property reporting by establishing quarterly reporting requirements for detail property data, including work-in-process and materials, establishing contractor working groups, strengthening documentation requirements, and increasing guidance to contractors. Further, NASA will increase reviews and validations of contractors' data, provide additional training to NASA property accountants, and hold training seminars for contractors. All actions are expected to be completed in FY 2003 and result in improved reporting for the FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report.
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Q2b. Will the changes be implemented in time for the fiscal year 2003 audit?
A2b. Yes, NASA and its auditors have spent considerable time reviewing NASA planned corrective actions during FY 2003 in response to the audit recommendations. NASA expects to complete these planned corrective actions during FY 2003 and result in the removal of the material weakness associated with PP&E and Materials.
Q2c. Will the Integrated Financial Management Plan (IFMP) core financial model, if used properly, address the weaknesses related to NASA's internal controls over, 1) materials and property, plant and equipment, particularly that held by contractors and, 2) processes for preparing financial statements and the Performance and Accountability Report? If not, which specific problems cannot be addressed by the core financial module, and will other modules address these problems?
A2c. NASA's problems with the contractor held property were not a direct result of NASA's accounting system, but rather with the frequency and quality of the data received from contractors. As discussed above, NASA's planned corrective actions will require quarterly reporting (compared to the previous year-end reporting only) and include quality control reviews of the data submissions. NASA does expect the implementation of IFMP, along with other planned corrective actions, including additional NASA staff, training and quality control processes to result in the removal of the material weakness rendered on the process for preparing the Performance and Accountability Report.
Q3. The National Space Transportation Policy issued by the White House on August 5, 1994, states that U.S. government payloads will be launched on space launch vehicles manufactured in the United States, unless exempted by the President. It goes on to state this policy does not apply to the use of foreign launch vehicles on a no-exchange-of-funds basis, subject to certain limitations, and that such use will be subject to interagency coordination procedures.
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Q3a. What projects is NASA planning or performing that require an exemption to the restriction on use of foreign launch vehicles?
A3a. NASA utilizes domestic launch services as the prime mode of space access for all NASA primary payloads requiring a NASA-provided launch. NASA has no primary missions base-lined that require NASA to acquire a foreign launch service. NASA has only one secondary payload under consideration that may require an exemption request (see answer 3b).
Q3b. Please provide a list of the projects and the status of any requests for exemption.
A3b. NASA has been evaluating the potential need for an exemption to the policy for the Space Technology 5 (ST–5) mission. The mission was designed for launch as a secondary payload aboard a U.S. Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV), but is also compatible with flight on an Ariane V secondary adapter. NASA notified the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) that it was having difficulty in the identification of a domestic secondary opportunity and initiated an exemption request for the ST–5 payload. NASA issued an RFP to domestic sources for the ST–5 mission and is currently evaluating a possible opportunity for ST–5 to fly on a domestic vehicle as a secondary payload.
Q3c. Please explain the interagency coordination process for seeking approval for this type of exemption.
A3c. The process: NASA provides OSTP a request for exemption with appropriate justification. OSTP then coordinates with the affected agencies and provides its decision.
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Q4. Section 126 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–391), requires the Administrator to give public notice anytime NASA conducts a space mission in which a foreign entity will participate as a supplier of the spacecraft, spacecraft system, or the launch system. Notice must be given at least 45 days prior to entering into an obligation. Please provide the date when public notice will be given pursuant to P.L. 106–391 section 126 for each project listed in question 3 above.
A4. As noted in the response to number 3 above, NASA is currently evaluating a domestic launch opportunity for the ST–5 mission as a secondary payload. Should NASA be unsuccessful in negotiating this domestic launch opportunity, public notice would be provided when the solicitation for a secondary launch service from a foreign supplier is released. This notification would be at least 45 days prior to any contractual award.
Q5. According to NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan, NASA will make a decision about whether to extend the Space Shuttle program in the 2010 timeframe.
[Please note that the following answers are based on current policy. The report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board may lead NASA to make changes to the Integrated Space Transportation Plan, including the Shuttle Life Extension Program.]
Q5a. When assessing candidate projects for inclusion into the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), what planning horizon is NASA using as the expected service life of the Shuttle?
Page 180 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2A5a. We are currently using 2020 as the planning horizon for incorporating potential projects in the SLEP.
Q5b. If the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) is developed to provide for crew transport by 2012, when will the shuttle system be retired?
A5b. No decision has been made regarding the retirement of the Space Shuttle. We currently plan to use the Shuttle through at least the middle of the next decade.
Q5c. When the Gehman Board makes its final recommendation, will the SLEP budget be used to fund the required Shuttle modifications?
A5c. The President's budget for FY 2004 reflects our current budget estimates for NASA's Shuttle investments. However, we do not yet know the magnitude of the Shuttle modifications that will be required to respond to the Gehman Board and thus have not determined exactly how the modifications will be funded. Gehman Board recommendations that focus on Shuttle system modifications needed in the long-term (rather than on return-to-flight issues) may well be incorporated into the SLEP program.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
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Q1. NASA's fiscal year 2004 budget request for Project Prometheus is $279 million with an estimated $3 billion over the next five years.
[NASA Clarification: The budget for Project Prometheus includes funding for radioisotope power system advanced technology development; for research on reactor, power conversion, and advanced propulsion systems; and to initiate planning for the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) mission and begin the technology development that will lead to a flight decision.]
Q1a. If the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) flies in 2013, what is the estimated total cost of the program (using full cost accounting)?
A1a. We are managing the Project Prometheus program, including JIMO, within full cost accounting requirements, and the FY 2004 budget submission reflects full cost for FY 2004 through FY 2008. Given that we are in the early planning phase for JIMO, we are just now developing program life cycle cost estimates, which will be validated by independent cost estimates prior to confirmation.
Q1b. Please provide a breakdown of the cost for Project Prometheus including design, development, and operations. Provide a separate breakdown for the funding required for nuclear power and propulsion research and development, and the JIMO orbiter.
A1b. Project Prometheus is a nuclear systems program with three primary components: a radioisotope power system development program, an advanced technology research and development program for fission-based nuclear electric power and propulsion, and a proposed flight mission, JIMO. The total Project Prometheus program budget through FY 2008:
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The nuclear power, or Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) development program, focuses on developing advanced radioisotope power systems to significantly enhance the capability of future space science missions. The Prometheus budget includes funding for the design and development of a Stirling Radioisotope Generator, a new technology that is predicted to achieve major increases in efficiency over older model radioisotope thermoelectric generators, and is a candidate for flight on the 2009 Mars Science Laboratory mission. The budget also funds technology research into even more advanced technologies, almost all of which are being selected competitively. There is no funding for operations in this budget element. The budget is as follows:
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Please note that the design and development of the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) is funded within the Mars program as a primary technology candidate for flight on the 2009 mission. The MMRTG activity is managed in close coordination with the Project Prometheus RPS technology work.
The nuclear propulsion program will conduct advanced technology research to support development of fission-based reactors, power conversion systems and advanced propulsion systems. Part of this technology research development work will support both JIMO and relatively near-term, follow-on missions; other parts will support even longer-term technology development, aimed at much more efficient and powerful nuclear-fission-powered missions for future decades. There is no funding for operations in this budget element. The budget for the nuclear propulsion program element is as follows:
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Project Prometheus also has a proposed mission, the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter mission, which is currently in initial design phase. The cost estimates are being developed as part of Phase A, which includes funded industry estimates. The current budget profile is as follows:
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Q1c. What is the proposed radioactive material and estimated quantity to be used in the power system of the Prometheus spacecraft?
A1c. For the radioisotope program, the fuel requirements will be based on the mission and spacecraft design. Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) use plutonium 238 in a ceramic form. The heat generated by an RPS is converted to electricity for spacecraft use. The amount of fuel, and indeed the choice of power supply, would be dependent on the requirements of the mission and the design of the spacecraft. As of this writing, there are no missions currently at a stage of development where we could state exact fuel requirements for the RPS under current development.
The fission reactors that will be developed by Project Prometheus would use uranium 235. Since we have not designed the reactor and spacecraft yet, we are not in a position to state exactly how much fuel we will need. Calculations of fuel mass are based on the amount of energy required and the level of fuel enrichment. The reactor system will provide power to the spacecraft, including the propulsion system.
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Q1d. What is the proposed radioactive material and estimated quantity to be used in the propulsion system of the Prometheus spacecraft?
A1d. For both types of system, radioisotope and fission reactor, the radioactive fuel is used to create heat that, in turn, is converted into electricity that can be used to provide power to the electric propulsion system and any other spacecraft electrical needs. The amount of fuel would be dependent on mission requirements and spacecraft design. Various options are being considered, but the exact fuel has not yet been determined.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Representative Gil Gutknecht
Q1. What significant science objectives have been realized as a result of research performed aboard the International Space Station? What are the specific findings that could not have been gained by ground-based research?
A1. The past year included a major increase in research productivity on the International Space Station, as construction and outfitting advanced towards completion of Node 2 (also known as ''U.S. core complete''). NASA has now performed 72 new experiments on the ISS through Increment 6. Many of these investigations span more than one increment. Astronauts conducted the first materials science research on the ISS, tested medical procedures for controlling the negative effects of space flight, deepened our understanding of changes to bone and the central nervous system that occur in space, studied plant growth in microgravity, conducted advanced cell culturing research, and broke new ground in the study of dynamic systems made up of tiny particles mixed in a liquid (colloids).
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a. The Physics of Colloids In Space (PCS) experiment returned information about the development and dynamics of colloid materials. Colloids are mixtures of very small particles suspended in a liquid—paint and toothpaste are both usually made of colloids. Physicists studying colloids in space are exploring the processes by which particles in colloids arrange themselves into regular patterns (crystal lattices). PCS researchers report that they have been able to observe significant phenomena that have never been observed on Earth, only in a microgravity environment. These data are important to the future production of materials for storing, transferring and processing of information using optical switches, filters, and lasers for advanced telecommunication networks and displays. Other potential uses include improvements in the shelf life of foods, cosmetics and paints, common products made of colloid-based materials.
b. NASA and Baltimore-based biotechnology research company StelSys, LLC, teamed up to test the function of human liver cells in the microgravity environment aboard the International Space Station, comparing the results to the typical function of duplicate cells on Earth. Growing cells outside the body is an important element of biomedical research on Earth; cells grown on Earth tend to settle to the bottom of their container and generally do not form the same three-dimensional tissues that they would form in the body. ISS cell culturing equipment allows researchers to observe cell cultures that can develop without settling out of solution. The findings of the StelSys experiment will provide unprecedented information about the effects of microgravity on the proper function of human liver cells, offering new insight into maintaining the health of humans living and working in space. The StelSys liver cell (hepatocyte) study was performed in the ISS by the Expedition 5 crew. Cells grown on board in a cell culturing apparatus onboard the ISS were frozen and returned to researchers on Earth. Researchers at StelSys are now analyzing microanatomical, biochemical, and molecular genetic properties of the samples compared with ground controls.
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c. The ''Photosynthesis Experiment and System Testing Operation'' experiment conducted on Increment 4, provided the first replicated data obtained from plants, grown under good environmentally controlled conditions, to demonstrate that existing models using plants for advanced life support applications can be used without significant modification. While this has been the operating hypothesis for many years, the space station has provided the first opportunity to directly test this hypothesis in a scientifically credible manner. The objectives of the experiment were to determine the effects of microgravity on photosynthesis and carbohydrate metabolism of wheat. Initial assessment of the data indicates that there was no difference in growth rate or dry mass of wheat grown on the ISS. In addition, there was no difference in daily photosynthesis rates, leaf responses to canopy CO concentration, or light intensity. Six on-orbit plantings, and 7 on-orbit harvests of wheat were conducted during Increment IV. Over 280 individual plants were harvested and frozen for analysis upon return to Earth, 18 plants collected for microscopic analysis, four plants for genetic analysis, and over one gigabyte of data was collected. The experiment was fully replicated in a 14-day ground control. Over 3000 video images of developing plants were obtained through the flight hardware.
The above are but three examples of the value of space-based research in zero gravity conditions. However, it is well known that for every space experiment, dozens to hundreds of preliminary experiments, ground controls and related studies must be conducted in laboratories on Earth. For the various OBPR research disciplines, accounting for the phase of the research in these disciplines, a range of 5–10 ground projects for each flight project is generally appropriate. For example, currently, radiation research is primarily a ground-based OBPR program.
Page 187 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2It is NASA's policy that what can be done on Earth, can and will be done on Earth. If the research can be done by other agencies or the private sector, it is done there. When a researcher proposes a flight experiment, peers review it, and the same two questions are asked: Does it need microgravity? Will it add significantly to the scientific field of knowledge? Only when the answer is ''yes'' to both questions does an experiment fly in space.
The work that is done on the ground is in service to flight research—you do not get one without the other. From the ground program, our sponsored researcher Wolfgang Ketterle at MIT won the Nobel Prize in physics in 2001 for atom lasers—he specifically thanked NASA's program—our human spaceflight program—for our sponsorship. Similarly, five other Nobel Prize winners wrote to the President's Science Advisor noting the benefits of spaceflight for their field of fundamental physics.
Q2. How much money has NASA received in fiscal 2001 and 2002 from commercial licensing agreements for NASA developed research and technology?
A2. The following royalties and fees were received by NASA (excluding JPL/California Institute of Technology) from commercial patent and copyright licenses:
FY 2001: $1,007,740
FY 2002: $1,081,170
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Page 188 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Representative Rob Bishop
Q1. What are the technical risks and milestones to successfully develop the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) crew transfer capability by 2012? What are the barriers to accomplishing crew transfer capability by 2012, and what is the plan for managing and reducing the risk?
A1. Some of the top risks involved in successfully executing the OSP Program include:
The design and integration of the Orbital Space Plane flight vehicle(s) onto an Expendable Launch Vehicle including the associated human rating of the system and ground launch processing needs.
The ability to define the OSPP (Orbital Space Plane Program) Level 2 requirements in support of the Systems Requirements Review at the appropriate level to properly reflect the OSPP objectives without excessively driving the design solution.
The ability to meet the OSPP Level 1 Requirements within the cost and schedule constraints.
The ability to perform the required technology demonstrations in a timely manner to support the OSPP design.
Page 189 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2Key near-term milestones include:
The System Requirements Review, scheduled to be complete in December 2003.
The System Design Review, scheduled to be complete in June 2004 followed by the Full Scale Development Decision in September 2004.
The Preliminary Design Review, scheduled to be complete in FY 2005.
The Critical Design Review, scheduled to be complete in FY 2007.
The OSP Program is implementing a risk management process to identify and track the top program risks and ensures the risks are adequately mitigated. This will include using Probabilistic Risk Assessment as a tool for managing the risks. External review teams and independent review teams are being used to ensure the program remains on track. An independent cost validation will be performed utilizing a Cost Analysis Requirements Document prior to the Full Scale Development decision. In addition, we are ensuring fiscal accountability by using a proven Earned Value Management system to track actual cost and schedule performance as compared to plans.
Q2. The OSP Level I requirements make specific comparisons to other systems, including the Space Shuttle and Russian Soyuz. The OSP requirements specify that the risk of crew loss shall be lower than the Soyuz vehicle for crew return, and lower than the Space Shuttle for crew transport. The Program Interpretation Document (PID) specifies the minimum Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) targets. Please provide an explanation summary of how the PRA targets stated in item 4b and 6 of the PID were derived.
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A2. PRA targets are defined for the Crew Rescue Vehicle (CRV) and the Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV). The PRA target for the CRV is that the minimum threshold probability for the loss of crew be below 1/800 with a 50 percent confidence with an objective probability of being below 1/800 with an 80 percent confidence. The PRA target for the CTV is that the minimum threshold probability for the loss of crew be below 1/400 with 50 percent confidence with an objective probability of being below 1/400 with an 80 percent confidence. The PRA target for the CTV is twice that for the CRV since there are two involved crew transfers for the CTV and one for the CRV.
These targets were selected based on three considerations—1) they represent significant reductions in risk exposure over the Space Shuttle and the Soyuz, 2) they are believed to be achievable with high quality design and operation, and 3) they are able to be meaningfully demonstrated using current PRA technology. Lower target values would be artificial in that unrealistic assumptions would be needed to demonstrate their compliance. The PRA target values that were selected accommodate contributions from human errors, dependent failures (termed common cause failures), and phenomenological events such as fires and explosions. When these contributions are ignored, then lower risk values can be calculated, but these lower calculated values are unrealistic because of their omissions. The PRA targets thus represent significant risk reductions that are meaningful, achievable, and demonstrable.
Q3. The Level I requirements compare the time to execute an OSP mission with the time to execute a Space Shuttle mission. What is used as the baseline time to plan, process the vehicle, and execute a Space Shuttle flight?
Page 191 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2A3. Level I requirement #9. Compared to the Space Shuttle, the system shall require less time to prepare and execute a mission and have increased launch probability.
A baseline time to execute a Space Shuttle mission was not defined in the Level 1 requirement formulation. Quantitative requirements for launch probability will be defined in lower level requirements documents. We will use the formulation period to specifically define the requirement in support of the Systems Requirements Review this fall. As a reference, planning a Shuttle mission can take several years, and the shortest time to process the vehicle between missions is 3–4 months.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Representative Jo Bonner
Q1. Please provide a description of the research that NASA has performed, in conjunction with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), on the effects of ''Red Tide'' including goals, objectives, and funding expended as well as anticipated to perform this research.
A1. NASA's contributions are in two types. Several of the Earth Observing Satellites NASA has launched over the past five years are used by researchers in other government agencies and in academia to study the biology in the coastal oceans. In addition, NASA funds some peer reviewed scientific investigations in the context of its broader research strategy.
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NASA's Earth Science Enterprise's (ESE) research on ''Red Tides'' and other forms of Harmful Algal Blooms (HAB) is coordinated through the multi-agency program ECology and Oceanography of Harmful Algal Blooms (ECOHAB). Other members of ECOHAB include the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Office of Naval Research (ONR).
The agencies formed ECOHAB in 1997 to collaborate on the collective goals for the detection, understanding, monitoring, modeling, and management of HABs. ECOHAB sponsors an interagency solicitation of research proposals each year. Each agency has their respective research goals for participation in ECOHAB, and each funds proposal that align with their respective goals and missions.
NASA's research goals and activities in ECOHAB include: development of remote sensing techniques for detection and tracking of HABs in near-shore coastal environments, differentiation of HABs from suspended sediments and organic compounds in optical sensors, quantification of pigment concentration and understanding of optical properties associated with HABs in near-shore waters.
NOAA conducts research through ECOHAB on the relationship of HABs to the surrounding environment in order to apply effective techniques for prevention, control, and mitigation to communicate and reduce the impacts of HABs. Through ECOHAB, NASA and NOAA coordinate research on development and use of remote sensing data and techniques and characterization of HABs for detection and tracking.
Page 193 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2NOAA and EPA are the primary Federal Government agencies funding HAB research, and these agencies have specific HAB-related programs. NASA's ESE funds HAB activities through existing Earth science programs, rather than through a separate program dedicated to HABs.
ESE funded a project entitled ''Eco-physiology of sub-populations of Alexandrium tamarense,'' for $512 thousand (covering FY 1998–FY 2002), through the ECOHAB solicitation. The objective of this project was to examine the factors that cause the Alexandrium tamarense alga to bloom.
Prior to FY 2003, the proposals submitted to the ECOHAB solicitation that aligned with NASA's objectives were judged ''low'' by the ECOHAB peer review process. However, three proposals submitted to the ECOHAB FY 2003 solicitation align with NASA's objectives.
1. NASA has selected two proposals for funding: ''Satellite Analysis of the Physical Forcing of Algal Blooms in the Pacific Northwest Coastal Ocean'' (approximately $387 thousand over three years) by the Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington—seeks to integrate and analyze satellite data sets to identify and monitor physical conditions that favor HABs in Pacific Northwest coastal waters.
2. ''Role of mycosporine amino acids in UV photoecology of harmful dinoflagellates'' (approximately $388 thousand over three years) by Scripps Institute of Oceanography, University of California San Diego—seeks to improve early detection of harmful algal bloom formation and predict growth of species of concern.
3. In addition, NASA and ONR have selected the following three-year proposal for funding: ''Optical Detection and Assessment of the Harmful Alga, Karenia brevis'' (approximately $595 thousand) by the University of Southern Mississippi—to refine and evaluate optical approaches to detect and monitor bloom events of the red tide alga, Karenia brevis.
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Q2. Please describe the roles and responsibilities of NASA and NOAA in this research.
A2. As described above, NASA and NOAA are partners in the ECOHAB program, and all the ECOHAB partners coordinate activities.
In addition to the research described above, NASA and NOAA coordinate and share satellite remote sensing data for the detection and tracking of Harmful Algal Blooms. Currently, NOAA operates the HAB Bulletin and the HAB Mapping System to provide forecasts and information to the public on algal blooms in the Gulf of Mexico. To support the HAB Bulletin and Mapping System, NOAA uses data from SeaWiFS and QuikSCAT satellites related to ocean color (detection of algae) and ocean surface winds (transport of algae). NASA and NOAA are examining the use of other NASA research and satellite data, such as MODIS, for further augmentation of the HAB Bulletin and Mapping System.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1. Please list the studies that NASA has conducted or asked a contractor to conduct within the last five years of potential Space Shuttle crew survivability systems for use in case of an accident. Please provide the specific objectives, cost, and the specific conclusions of each study.
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A1. Crew survivability has been studied continuously since the Challenger accident; however, in 1999 the Space Shuttle Program was provided $5 million for additional studies on crew escape/survivability. The Orbiter Project, together with United Space Alliance and Boeing Company, studied 11 different concepts including ejection and extraction options. The guidelines for the concepts included: using a seven-person crew as the model; incorporating the changes into the fleet by 2005; and considering only the ascent phase of the mission in the studies. The estimated costs of the proposals ranged from $1.2–5 billion and required four to six years of development after authority to proceed before an option could be incorporated into the fleet. Several of the options were technically viable, however, none could meet the requirement for a seven-person crew or be incorporated by 2005. It is doubtful whether any of the options would have offered a successful recovery of the Columbia crew.
Q2. At the February 12, 2003 joint hearing on the Columbia accident, you indicated that NASA would take another look at potential Space Shuttle crew survivability systems. What are your specific plans for that review? Please note that I am not asking about your plans for the Orbital Space Plane or your plans for Space Shuttle safety upgrades. I am asking about potential crew survivability systems for use in the event of another Space Shuttle accident.
A2. The evaluations of crew escape systems technology continues. At the March 2003, Space Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) summit, the Space Flight Leadership Council directed that Crew Survivability be added as project. It should be noted, however, that no crew escape system has been demonstrated as viable above 85,000 feet or above Mach 3. Columbia was traveling at a much higher altitude and speed when the accident occurred.
Page 196 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2Q2a. When do you plan to begin the study of potential Space Shuttle crew survivability systems?
A2a. The crew survivability study is currently underway.
Q2b. What will be the specific objectives of the study?
A2b. The current activity is focused on better defining the benefits, cost, schedule and potential impacts of adding ejection seats to the flight deck of the Orbiter. We are also collecting and summarizing previous survivability studies for review by senior management.
Q2c. What do you anticipate will be the cost of the study?
A2c. The team estimates that the study will cost approximately $1 million.
Q2d. When will the study be completed?
A2d. Results of the study will be presented to senior management at the 2004 SLEP summit, which is tentatively scheduled for February.
Q2e. Will the study be conducted by NASA employees or by contractors, or by both?
A2e. The study team includes both NASA and industry representatives.
Q3. Prior to the Columbia accident, NASA's revised Integrated Space Transportation Plan indicated that the Space Shuttle would continue operations in support of the Space Station at least until 2015. Is that still your assumption or has the date changed as a result of the likely delay in completing the Space Station due to the accident?
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A3. The current NASA Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP), formulated in late 2002, assumes that the Space Shuttle will operate through at least the middle of the next decade or until a replacement is available. Through the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), NASA is planning its investments in the Space Shuttle system to ensure that it is able to sustain safe operations through 2020. NASA will continue to assess the requirements of ISS operations and the ability of alternative transportation systems, such as the Orbital Space Plane, to meet those requirements. Based on this assessment, NASA will decide to extend Space Shuttle operations further or to retire the Shuttle.
In light of the Columbia accident, NASA is reassessing the ISTP. NASA is awaiting the final findings and recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board with respect to the Space Shuttle program. Until NASA can determine the implications for the Board's immediate and long-term recommendations for the Space Shuttle, and our implementation strategy for responding to them, it would be premature to draw conclusions about specific changes to the Agency's Integrated Space Transportation Plan. Current planning suggests that NASA will be able to complete the U.S. core assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) within one to two years of Shuttle return to flight. As the CAIB concludes its work, we will keep the Committee informed of NASA's implementation of the CAIB recommendations and adjustments to the ISTP.
Q4. Is there any requirement for the Orbital Space Plane to do any other missions besides taking crew and limited cargo to and from the International Space Station? If so, what in specific terms are those missions?
Page 198 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2A4. No. The Orbital Space Plane Program Mission Needs Statement is ''The vehicle(s) and associated systems will support U.S. ISS requirements for crew rescue, crew transport, and cargo.'' There is no language in the Level 1 Requirements for any missions other than those mentioned above.
Q5. Regarding the future of the Space Shuttle program:
Q5a. Under your Integrated Space Transportation Plan, how many more Shuttle flights are anticipated before they are replaced by a new transportation system?
A5a. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) calls for sustaining the Space Shuttle through at least the middle of the next decade, aggressively pursuing a crew transfer vehicle (the Orbital Space Plane) and developing the technologies that will enable future launch systems. In order to provide flexibility, the ISTP does not specify exactly when the Shuttle will be phased out. Under the ISTP, Shuttle lifetime could be extended to 2020 or beyond, or the Shuttle's phase-out could begin when the Orbital Space Plane becomes operational in the 2012 time frame. The date of the Shuttle's return to flight is also uncertain. For these reasons, it is impossible to say how many more Shuttle flights are anticipated before the Shuttles are replaced by a new transportation system.
Q5b. What is your current estimate, in light of the Columbia accident, of the risk of losing another Shuttle during the course of those remaining missions?
A5b. NASA is reevaluating its estimates of the probability of losing a Shuttle after the Columbia accident. The new probability numbers should be available in October 2003.
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Q5c. From your answers to (a) and (b), one may calculate the chance of another Shuttle loss before the system is retired. Is that an acceptable level of risk to assume? If not, what would be an acceptable level of risk, and how much should be willing to spend to achieve the acceptable risk level?
A5c. NASA will address the questions of acceptable level of risk and additional cost as part of the return to flight process. However, until we have seen the totality of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations, and determined what process changes or potential redesigns are required, we will not be able to adequately address these questions.
Q6. On several occasions, the Associate Administrator for Space Science has been quoted as saying that the cost of Project Prometheus, including the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter, would cost on the order of $8 billion to $9 billion through 2012. The FY 2004 budget requests states that Project Prometheus will cost $3 billion through 2008.
What will the additional $5–6 billion for the years FY 2009 to FY 2012 be used for?
What is the estimated cost profile for Project Prometheus over that period?
Please provide as detailed a breakdown as possible of the $8–9 billion into cost categories and the levels of funding for each category.
Page 200 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2A6. The quote was not intended to provide a confirmed budget estimate, but rather was an extrapolation, based on mid-decade funding levels, of what the total program costs might be when Project Prometheus, and its required technology research and development elements, reaches maturity. At that time, significant efforts will be underway on follow-on missions using these systems.
With regard to the budget for the proposed Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter mission, which is part of Project Prometheus, NASA has just begun preliminary spacecraft design, mission planning, and cost estimation efforts. When we complete the initial mission studies (in early FY 2005), we expect to be able to provide accurate and complete project life cycle cost estimates. NASA will also submit an independent life cycle cost estimate to Congress.
Q7. What does NASA assume the operational lifetime of the International Space Station (ISS) to be?
A7. The current operational lifetime for the ISS was projected out to 2016 for budget planning and ISS structural certification purposes. ISS operations could continue well past 2020 based upon instrumentation and data collection capabilities in place to support ISS structural life extension, in conjunction with implementation of an ISS service life extension program. The ISS Program will continue to assess the requirements in this area to ensure that structural life and functionality can be extended, if supported by NASA strategic requirements.
Q7a. What are the annual upmass requirements over that assumed lifetime, and what is the composition of that upmass?
Page 201 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2A7a. Projected upmass requirements and the composition of the upmass are provided in Attachment A–1 and Attachment A–2. Over the lifetime of the ISS, annual upmass requirements fluctuate based on assumptions about crew, vehicle, and science requirements. Current projections are based on a crew of three. ISS traffic models assume five Space Shuttle missions beginning in 2006, and four Progress and two Soyuz vehicles per year. Beginning in 2004, the International Partners expect to launch one Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) each year, and beginning in 2007, one H–II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) per year. These traffic models may change in response to the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
Additional crew supply upmass will be required if we are able to take advantage of an enhanced configuration and increase the size of the crew beyond three. In an enhanced configuration, the ISS would require two additional Soyuz launches per year beginning in 2007 until an Orbital Space Plane Crew Return Vehicle/Crew Transfer Vehicle is available. The upmass requirements identified through 2008 are considered to be high confidence numbers. The upmass requirements numbers post 2008 are best estimates.
Q7b. What are the annual downmass requirements over that assumed lifetime, and what is the composition of that downmass?
A7b. The annual downmass requirements over the assumed lifetime of the ISS are based on requirements for flight hardware return and repair, science research products and payload racks, and some crew support returnable items.
Specific downmass or ''U.S. Operating Segment (USOS) recoverable cargo'' requirements and the composition of that downmass under the above requirements are provided in Attachment B.
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Q7c. What are the annual numbers of crew member transfers to and from ISS over that assumed lifetime, and what is the assumed stay-time on ISS for each crew member visit?
A7c. Currently, ISS crews are rotated every four to six months (two to three times per year). Factors influencing planned expedition durations include training, increment objectives, crew baseline data collection, and Shuttle flight schedules.
Q8. Is it true that NASA is planning to terminate 10 of the 17 Commercial Space Centers over the next year without Congressional consultation or review? If so, what is the reason for the planned terminations? Which Centers are to be terminated?
A8. As a part of the FY 2004 budget request, the Space Product Development and Research Partnership Centers programs (formerly known as the Commercial Space Centers) are being significantly refocused to directly contribute to the agency vision and mission. The current 15 Research Partnership Centers are engaged in areas such as biotechnology, biomedicine, advanced materials processing, agribusiness, and spacecraft technology and communication development. NASA remains committed to ensuring diversity of research on the International Space Station, including market-driven, commercial research. However, the Research Partnership Centers, which generally need a higher degree of certainty and shorter research time frames than academia, have been hard hit by lack of access to space; therefore, we are phasing down this effort and focusing the program consistent with efficient on-orbit utilization. The directors of the Research Partnership Centers are supportive of this approach.
NASA will continue to facilitate the commercialization of space, and will ensure that commercial researchers have efficient access to space. The proposed reduction will be undertaken through a comprehensive and objective assessment of the present commercial research program, including feedback from an ongoing independent review of the Research Partnership Centers program to be completed in FY 2004. The Research Partnership Centers Center Directors are fully engaged and will actively participate in the program restructure. A recommendation regarding the refocused program will be submitted with the FY 2005 budget proposal.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. What specific financial arrangements are in place to ensure that all needed Soyuz and Progress vehicles will be available to support the International Space Station (ISS) for a period up to the 32 months that the Shuttle fleet was grounded after the Challenger accident? Have all of the International Partners agreed to the terms of those arrangements?
A1. The ISS Multilateral Coordination Board (MCB), chaired by NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory, on February 26, 2003, approved an option to maintain a continued crew presence on ISS until the Space Shuttle is able to return to flight. This option required that the ISS crew size be reduced from three to two, that the April 2003 Soyuz flight be used for crew exchange, and that the Russian Progress flight schedule be accelerated to support crew and ISS consumable needs until the Space Shuttle returns to flight. This option also required the addition of two Russian Progress logistics vehicles to the ISS manifest (one in 2003 and one in 2004) and assumes that the Space Shuttle and the European Space Agency's (ESA's) Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) will be flying in 2004. This option was adopted by the ISS Partnership contingent upon provision of funding to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) necessary to meet additional ISS support requirements in 2003 and 2004.
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Rosaviakosmos has informed NASA that the Russian government is advancing all of the 2003 Rosaviakosmos ISS funding into the first half of 2003 to assist in the acceleration of logistics vehicles. Further, the Russian government will consider providing supplemental 2003 funding in the September time-frame, and also will examine what increases might be necessary for the 2004 Rosaviakosmos budget. ESA, CSA, and NASDA have each made commercial proposals to Rosaviakosmos that are currently being evaluated.
The Russian willingness to provide additional support to ISS during the hiatus in Space Shuttle operations does not require financial compensation under the ISS agreements. The ISS implementing arrangements list the logistics contributions that NASA and Rosaviakosmos plan to provide to ISS. Given that these arrangements were developed on the basis of preliminary estimates of ISS logistics requirements, there are provisions for ongoing adjustment of each party's logistics contributions as the ISS Partners determine actual logistics requirements based on ISS operations.
Q2. If either the April Soyuz crew rotation flight to the International Space Station or the June Progress resupply mission is unsuccessful, what are NASA's specific plans to deal with those contingencies? If funding were available, could Russia accelerate the launch of a backup Progress vehicle if needed, and should NASA make arrangements to ensure that that option is available?
A2. The April 6S Soyuz mission was successfully completed. If the April Soyuz crew rotation mission had not been a success, the Expedition 6 crew would have had to return by the end of May because of the on-orbit time limit certification for the Soyuz capsule.
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Had the Progress flight in early June been unsuccessful, NASA would have worked with its Partners to review a range of options, including whether use of consumables by the crew could be reduced, whether the next Progress launch could be accelerated to provide additional supplies or whether the ISS would need to be de-crewed.
Rosaviakosmos has said that with appropriate funding it is capable of accelerating some of the planned Progress resupply vehicles; however, their flexibility becomes more limited as the deadline for procurement of long-lead time items for each vehicle approaches. NASA personnel in the ISS Program Office and in Russia carefully track Russian vehicle production and NASA officials visit Russian facilities to observe the production lines. This type of regular engagement gives NASA significant insight into the Rosaviakosmos vehicle production schedule and clear early indications on Rosaviakosmos' ability to meet planned vehicle requirements.
The ISS Partnership is currently continuing discussions on the technical requirements for, and potential funding of, Progress acceleration and requirements for additional vehicles. Under the terms of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA), NASA is precluded from procurement of goods and services related to human space flight from Russian entities unless certain conditions are met. It is NASA's view that current operational requirements are being met by the Progress flight schedule agreed to by the ISS Partnership on February 26, 2003. As the Partnership continues to monitor consumables, the number of required Progress vehicles may be less than required by the February 26 agreement. NASA continues to monitor the situation closely with Rosaviakosmos and our ISS International partners from Europe, Canada, and Japan.
Q3a. If the crew is removed from the International Space Station, how long can it function without a crew? How long will the Space Station remain in orbit without a reboost, and can it be reboosted by a Progress vehicle if there is no crew on the Station?
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A3a. The ISS currently has over four metric tons of propellant on board for reboost capability. In the extremely unlikely event of no new propellant deliveries, the ISS could be reboosted to a higher orbit, which could keep the ISS above the 150km minimum altitude limit for up to four years. The Progress Vehicle can be commanded from MCC Moscow to perform a reboost without an ISS crew onboard.
Q3b. What are the critical Space Station systems that must remain operational in the absence of a crew to maintain them, and what is NASA's contingency plan in the event one of those systems fails?
A3b. The critical ISS systems that must continue to operate include: Power, Thermal Control, Command & Control, Attitude Control, and Communications. These systems are redundant such that one single failure would not place the ISS at risk. NASA's Mission Operations has planned for several contingency events with their Russian counterparts and documented contingency actions/responses in the ISS Flight Rules Document. Particular response will always be dependent on which system failed and what is the failure impact on the overall Operational Configuration of the ISS.
Q3c. What specific failure scenarios could result in the loss of the Space Station while there is no crew onboard, and what steps is NASA taking to guard against those scenarios?
A3c. A loss of any of the critical ISS systems, as well as fire or strikes by micro-meteoroids or orbital debris, could render the ISS uninhabitable or unusable as an orbiting research facility. In the event the ISS had to operate without a crew for a significant period of time, the ISS program has defined the best operational vehicle configuration (hardware, software and orientation) that will maximize the chances of vehicle survivability while operating without a crew.
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Q4. Have you ever discussed either using one of the exemptions permitted under the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA), modifying the INA, or seeking repeal of the INA with any White House officials up to and including the President? If so, when, with whom, what was the nature of the discussion, and what was the response by the White House official(s)?
A4. NASA has discussed various aspects of INA with other Agencies and Departments within the Administration. Since the loss of Columbia, NASA has looked to the ISS Partnership to assist in sustaining human presence on orbit while NASA concentrates on the necessary actions to return the Space Shuttle safely to flight. As such, NASA has been working closely with its International Partners to fully assess the implications of the loss of Columbia on ISS operations and to develop and implement an appropriate near-term plan of action. This plan of action does not contemplate modification of INA, use of an exemption or its repeal. Therefore, no such action has been requested.
Q5. Are there any conditions under which you would request an exception to or modification of the Iran Nonproliferation Act to buy additional goods or services from Russia? If so, what are they?
A5. NASA has no plans to seek an exception to, or request an amendment of, INA. The provisions contained within the Act clearly outline the responsibilities and procedures upon which NASA and the Administration can act should circumstances change in the future.
Q6. The FY 2004 budget request is presented in full cost accounting terms, with institutional costs merged with direct program costs.
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Q6a. What increases or decreases in the NASA workforce are assumed in the five-year budget projections?
A6a. The FTE Runout in the FY 2004 Budget is:
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Q6b. What facility or other infrastructure closings/consolidations are assumed in the five-year budget projections? Please list them.
A6b. NASA has no new infrastructure closings or consolidations assumed in the current five-year budget projections. NASA is preparing a Real Property Strategic Plan (RPSP). As part of this Plan, NASA, with the assistance of an independent national real estate services firm, is analyzing its existing underutilized facilities and land to leverage its value through potential leasing out to third parties or other innovative initiatives, and may also identify future facility consolidations and closures. NASA anticipates the RPSP will be complete in September 2003. Decisions resulting from the RPSP will be reflected in subsequent NASA budget requests. The NASA demolition fund (shown in question 6c below) will demolish facilities that are currently abandoned or mothballed.
Q6c. What new investments in facilities or other infrastructure are assumed in the five-year budget projections?
Page 209 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2A6c. Most new investments in facilities are through the Construction of Facilities (CoF) program, which is summarized below. The CoF program is primarily repair and renovation of existing facilities, with little new capability or new footprint construction involved. Large investments include replacing older, costly facilities with newer, more efficient facilities at several Centers (''repair by replacement''). The major discrete construction projects are listed below. The CoF program also includes a demolition program for the first time to assist NASA Centers to dispose of aged, abandoned facilities. This fund will demolish over 50 facilities of various sizes.
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Q6d. What is the size of the current maintenance backlog (in dollars) for NASA's existing facilities and infrastructure, and does the five-year budget plan eliminate that backlog?
A6d. In FY 2003, NASA conducted a fence-to-fence assessment of its facilities using contractor support. This assessment uses a parametric model based on facility inspections and an extensive database of facility repair costs. The assessment calculated facility repair needs and facility condition index. The FY 2003 deferred maintenance is approximately $2 billion. The average NASA facility condition index indicates that NASA's facilities are between ''fair'' and ''good'' condition overall. The current five-year budget plan will not eliminate this large backlog of repair; however, NASA's Real Property Strategic Plan will identify strategies for NASA to address this backlog by reducing requirements as well as funding critical maintenance and repair.
Page 210 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2Q7. NASA currently has the authority under Title 5 of the U.S. Code to conduct human capital demonstration projects.
a. How many demonstration projects has NASA conducted to date?
b. Please describe each of the demonstration projects undertaken and the results of each.
c. If NASA received the enhanced demonstration authority being asked for in your legislative proposal, what specific demonstration project(s) do you want to undertake?
A7. NASA has not undertaken any demonstration projects to date; however, as the Agency seeks to address a number of human capital challenges, the prospect of using the ''demo'' becomes more attractive. The current statute governing demonstration projects limits the number of employees who can be covered by a demonstration project to 5,000. Limiting this authority to a segment of the workforce by an artificial number would create a ''dual'' workforce—with employees in similar positions being subject to different human resources processes and practices—a confusing, inefficient, and potentially demoralizing manner in which to manage the workforce.
NASA has used all available human capital flexibilities to help optimize our ability to attract, recruit, and retain a high quality workforce. We identified additional tools to enhance these capabilities, and are seeking legislation to give us these tools. But we know that we will face additional challenges, and that no one solution will meet all of our needs. The demonstration project authority, with the ability to extend coverage over a significant portion of the workforce (by lifting the current limit of 5,000 employees who may be covered by a project) will be a valuable mechanism to meet new challenges as they arise.
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Although we are very interested in testing human capital innovations under the demonstration project authority, we do not have a preconceived notion of the features of the project. Specific proposals would be developed in collaboration with employees, unions, and managers—focusing on those flexibilities that are most needed to address NASA's human capital challenges and achieve the Agency's strategic and programmatic goals.
We have learned from the positive experiences other agencies (including the Department of Defense, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture) have had with their demonstration projects. We may find it beneficial initially to develop proposals similar to some of the successfully tested flexibilities implemented in past and current demonstration projects, tailoring them to meet the specific workforce challenges NASA faces. We are likely to look closely at various compensation and hiring tools that have been used in those demonstration projects.
The demonstration project authority is an excellent way for an agency to develop and propose human resources innovations that are tailored to the agency's specific needs, while protecting important rights. (No waivers of law are permitted in areas of employee leave, employee benefits, equal employment opportunity, political activity, merit system principles, ethics statutes, or prohibited personnel practices.) The goal of such projects is to develop and test new ways of conducting personnel functions or applying human resource systems that are more efficient and effective and thereby contribute to the organization's overall mission and productivity.
Demonstration projects have been used in various agencies for over twenty years to improve personnel management practices and procedures. This approach represents a structured, sound means of ''testing'' innovations, particularly since it requires ongoing evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the alternative systems. A number of human capital initiatives now enacted into law for all federal agencies—such as the category rating system—were first tested in a demonstration project. We believe the demonstration project authority would be an effective tool for NASA to use in addressing its human capital challenges.
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Q8. With respect to recruitment, retention, and relocation bonuses, NASA's 2002 National Recruitment Initiative report stated that ''It is important to note that the payment of these bonuses comes from the Center budget—there is no extra money for the payment of these bonuses. Most Center managers said that budget constraints kept them from making use of all of these flexibilities.''
[NASA Clarification: The quote from the National Recruitment Initiative report reflects conversations with managers that took place nearly two years ago. One of the values of the study is that it enabled us to identify barriers to successful recruitment. In this case, it is possible that there may have been a misconception among some managers about the funding mechanism for bonuses or the availability of funds, or other funding needs simply may have taken priority. At that time there was no distinct recruitment, relocation, and retention bonus pool. These items were budgeted as part of each Center's awards program. Beginning with the FY 2003 budget, the Centers have broken out the amount to be spent on recruitment, and retention bonuses into separate categories. This change should make it easier to earmark funds available for these bonuses.]
Q8a. How much would each Center's budget need to be increased to allow managers to make full use of these existing flexibilities?
A8a. Each center's budget contains funding for fully loaded FTE's that includes not only the funding for salaries and benefits but also funding for training, awards, relocation costs, and recruitment, retention, and relocation bonuses. In addition, there is usually funding available from the lapse between the time a loss occurs and a replacement is hired. Although individual managers may have felt constrained, the overall center budgets are generally large enough to accommodate funding for recruitment, retention, and relocation bonuses.
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Additionally, on the rare occasions in which an organization finds itself in need of additional funds in order to use the new authorities/incentives, that need can be addressed by reprogramming from other accounts. The organization may be able to have funds transferred from unused funds from other elements at the Center. If that is not a viable option, there may be sufficient flexibility to move funding from other Centers to accommodate the organization's request.
Q8b. Under full cost accounting, where will the funds for bonuses at each Center come from? Will a project be taxed if one of the personnel on the project is to be given a bonus?
A8b. Under full cost, all the funding for the enterprise, program or project is combined and all costs are charged back to the cost entity (enterprise, program, or project). Therefore, any personnel costs would be charged to the enterprise, program, and project. This is a change in the way the funding is accounted for but not a change in the total amount of funding or the amount available for recruitment, retention, or relocation bonuses. The same amount of funding for these bonuses will be available under full cost.
Q8c. What determines the size of the bonus funding pool at each Center?
A8c. Each center develops its bonus pool based on projections of future hiring needs and anticipated attrition and labor market conditions.
Q8d. What was the size of the bonus funding pool requested by each Center in each of the years FY 2000 through FY 2004?
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Q8e. What was the size of the bonus funding pool actually available at each Center in the operating plans of each of the years FY 2000 through 2003?
Q8f. What was the size of the bonus funding pool requested by NASA for each Center in the FY 2004 budget request?
A8d,e,f. As stated in the response to Question 8a above, beginning with the FY 2003 budget, the Centers have broken out the amount to be spent on recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses into separate categories. Prior to that they were budgeted as part of the Centers' awards program. There was no distinct recruitment, relocation, and retention bonus pool and, therefore, we cannot identify what specific amounts were requested and available in those categories for FY 2000 through FY 2002.
The values for FY 2000, 2001, and 2002 are the total of recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses paid out in those years. The FY 2003 and FY 2004 values are the budgeted amounts in the FY 2004 Budget to Congress.
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Q8g. How many bonuses (by category) were offered in each of the years FY 2000 through FY 2002?
A8g. See table, at the end of this question. The numbers representing ''offers,'' however, do not actually represent all of the bonuses offered during the indicated year. Not all NASA Centers maintained data on bonus offers declined by individuals, so these Centers reported the number of offers as equal to the number of acceptances. Consequently, the numbers representing bonus offers are artificially low.
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Q8h. What fraction of the total amount of the bonus funding pool did that represent in each year?
A8h. As indicated in the response to questions 8d, 8e, and 8f, above, the Agency did not have a distinct recruitment, relocation, and retention bonus pool in those fiscal years.
Q8i. How many of the bonuses were accepted?
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Q9. What length of time did NASA have a hiring freeze?
A9. NASA initiated workforce restructuring efforts in 1993 when it had approximately 25,000 civil servants at its Headquarters and Field Centers. After intense efforts, the Agency achieved an employment level of under 18,500 at the end of 1998, when downsizing stopped.
Q9a. Since the hiring freeze was removed, how many employees has NASA sought to hire?
A9a. During the downsizing period, the Agency had constrained hiring, but Centers were able to fill critical vacancies. The Agency averaged 160 full-time permanent hires per year. Even during FY 1996, the year with the lowest intake of new employees, 110 full-time permanent hires were made as well as 30 term appointments. In the years since 1998 NASA has hired 2500 full-time permanent employees and made an additional 250 term appointments. With these hires, NASA has been able to replace attrition and keep the employment level relatively constant.
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Q9b. How many positions are still unfilled?
A9b. NASA does not track ''vacancies'' in the usual sense of maintaining a master list of positions that are either filled or unfilled. When an individual leaves the Agency, we do not automatically refill the position with the same skill set or level. Staffing decisions are based on program needs, competency gaps, attrition levels and available resources.
The FY 2004 budget proposal shows a decreasing civil service workforce in the FTE run out though FY 2008. With declining staffing levels, centers use hiring opportunities to rebalance and otherwise focus workforce competencies on evolving missions. NASA will continue to need to hire 500 to 600 new full-time permanent employees each year to replace employees lost through attrition.
Q10. What is NASA's success rate in filling positions—e.g., how many rejections per acceptance? How does this rate compare to that of the aerospace industry? Of the high technology industry at large?
A10. We tracked the rate of declinations for scientists and engineers for fiscal years 2001 through 2003 and found that the rates for the Agency as a whole averaged five percent for experienced candidates and twenty percent for freshout hires. Freshout acceptances actually declined sharply since last year, from 81.1 percent to only 72.1 percent of candidates opting to come to work for NASA. Several Centers were able to convince only 70–75 percent of their choice candidates to accept job offers. At the Dryden Flight Research Center, which is located in a relatively remote location, managers struggled to gain a 50 percent acceptance rate, even with use of available incentives.
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We do not have data to compare these rates with those of private industry. Such information is not made readily available to the public.
Q11. For all of the individuals who either decided to not accept a position with NASA or decided to leave the agency, what were the specific reasons that they gave for their decision? Please provide a breakdown of the total of individuals by category of reason given.
A11. The numbers cited in the above question don't tell the whole story, of course. Our data on acceptances and declinations of job offers over the last three fiscal years do not capture reasons for declination in each instance. However, there are several cases we are aware of that are stunning examples of our need for additional tools to attract top candidates:
A NASA Center lost a key individual last year—the head of an Advanced Supercomputing Division—to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The lab offered a salary increase of almost $40,000 and, in addition, the job was located in a much lower cost of living area. This was a significant loss to the Agency; the employee had been with the Agency since 1986, had experience at two Centers, and was highly respected.
A NASA Center attempted to recruit an impressive candidate for nanotechnology research. He had a Ph.D. in chemistry from Scripps Research Institute and three years of Postdoctoral Fellow research at Harvard University in which he specialized in the development of microfabrication techniques using mesoscale self-assembly. These were competencies highly desired by that Center. Despite being offered a salary at an advanced step of his grade, along with a recruitment bonus, he declined the offer due to the high cost of living in that area. NASA's compensation package simply wasn't adequate.
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One NASA Center is in danger of losing one of their brightest recruits in the last two years. The employee has a Ph.D. from Yale University School of Medicine and conducted Postdoctoral Fellow research in DNA sequencing at the Stanford Genome Technology Center. He conducts nanotechnology and DNA/genome research with application to NASA missions such as the development of medical diagnostics, in vivo gene detection and astronaut health monitoring. He is heavily recruited by organizations such as Intel Corporation and by Yale University with starting salaries at approximately $150,000—or more than one and a half times his current salary.
A freshout Ph.D. candidate from the University of California at Berkeley declined a job offer from a NASA Center that included a salary at the top step of the grade and a recruitment bonus. He was offered a position at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories at a salary almost $20,000 more than this Center could offer.
Recently, a NASA Center attempted to hire a freshout Ph.D. from MIT who had a background in nanotechnology computing. Despite NASA's salary offer at an advanced rate, combined with a recruitment bonus, he declined the offer to accept a position with a small start-up company in one of the Boston high-tech communities.
A NASA Center lost a high quality employee at the GS–14 level to the private sector. The company raised the person's salary by over 50 percent, bought his house, moved him to corporate housing, helped him buy a new house, gave him stock options, and other perks.
Although we maintain data on losses of employees who leave NASA for reasons other than retirement, our database does not capture the specific reason an employee left NASA. In 2001, NASA conducted a National Recruitment Initiative (NRI) study to develop Agency-wide recruitment strategies to attract and hire a highly, technical S&E workforce. As part of its data collection effort, the NRI study team conducted focus groups at NASA Centers with technical directors, human resource directors, chiefs of employment, recruiters, equal opportunity staff, university affairs officers, hiring managers, and new/recent hires. These focus groups provided valuable information in shaping NASA's current legislative proposals by identifying critical factors necessary to recruit and retain a quality workforce.
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NASA has an initiative underway to develop an Employee Preference Survey to better understand ''turnover risk'' in the Agency. Since this initiative is in the developmental stage at this time, meaningful Agency-wide data are not yet available. The data gathered through this survey are likely to be more accurate than exit interview data in understanding why employees leave an organization since departing individuals often are ''guarded'' in telling an employer their true reasons for leaving.
Q12. With respect to the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) assignments: how many IPAs have there been in each of the years FY 1992 through FY 2002? How many of those assignments were to NASA and how many were from NASA? How many of individuals of each category of IPA were extended to four years duration? Of those assigned to NASA, what were their specific responsibilities?
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Below is a summary of the key responsibilities of the IPA individuals assigned to NASA for a period of four years:
1. Provides strategic direction for the Advanced Human Support Technology Program, including the four projects within this Program: Advanced Life Support, Advanced Environmental Monitoring and Control, Space Human Factors Engineering, and Advanced Extravehicular Activity.
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2. Serves as Program Scientist for the Gravitational Biology Facility (GBF), the Centrifuge Facility (CF), and the Life Sciences Data Archive at Ames Research Center. Works with science program managers to ensure seamless evolution from ongoing ground and flight research programs to GBF and CF facilities on the International Space Station (ISS). Participates in bilateral and multilateral international discussions to develop and share complementary facilities and synergistic capabilities for life sciences research on ISS. Also serves as Coordinator for U.S.–Ukrainian cooperation in Space Life Sciences.
3. Plans, directs, and coordinates the scientific and operational activities of the NASA Astrobiology Institute. Identifies research opportunities, coordinates efforts involving multiple academic organizations, and communicates the excitement of astrobiology. The Institute represents a partnership between NASA and a number of academic or other research organizations to promote, conduct, and lead integrated interdisciplinary astrobiology research. Also, as Senior Advisor to the NASA Administrator, provides guidance for the newly created Enterprise of the Office of Biological and Physical Research.
4. Assists in scientific direction, development, and management of future Pluto mission as well as the Galileo and Nozomi missions, and the Jovian System Data Analysis research programs.
5. Performs research to develop a global three-dimensional chemistry and transport model for tropospheric ozone and sulfur research. Incorporates the emission, chemistry, dry and wet deposition modules to the current Goddard transport model, and uses the Goddard Earth Observing System Chemical Transport Model to study the natural and anthropogenic contributions to tropospheric ozone and sulfate aerosol levels and the processes controlling those levels.
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6. Performs original research in biotechnology, including all aspects of macromolecular crystallography and microgravity research.
7. As project leader for Work System Design and Evaluation (WSDE) within the Computational Sciences Division at ARC, directs the research and development effort in WSDE.
8. Responsible for Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS) Enterprise-level education and outreach activities for HEDS science-related endeavors. [NOTE: The HEDS Enterprise no longer exists. The individual who was assigned to NASA under this agreement no longer works for the Agency.]
9. Supports the Marshall Space Flight Center effort in assisting state and local organizations with their K–16 math, science, and technology reform programs. Assists in designing, developing, and disseminating math, science, and technology instructional resource materials relating to NASA programs, activities, and results to these partners in the educational community on a regional and potentially national scale.
10. Represents the International Space Station Program before the international and domestic scientific communities. Reviews current space station goals and capabilities with respect to the science community requirements and makes recommendations to the program so that a customer focus is maintained.
11. Serves as Senior Advisor to the Associate Administrator for Aerospace Technology in the area of Space Technology. Provides principal leadership for Bio and Nano Technologies.
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12. Assists the Education Office in planning and implementing an overall education program for the northeastern part of the U.S. Programs reflect NASA's GSFC goals and objectives, and are intended to inform educators and students in the areas of science, math technology and training, curriculum development, research and development, and technology applications.
13. As Director of Aerospace at Ames Research Center, plans, directs, and coordinates the technology, science, and development activities of the Aerospace Directorate. The research and technology development efforts include elements such as advanced aerospace projects, aviation systems, space transportation and thermal protection systems, basic and applied aerodynamics, acoustics, and rotorcraft aerodynamics.
14. Assists in the scientific direction, development, and management of NASA programs in solar-heliospheric and cosmic ray physics, and other scientific and educational programs.
15. Collaborates with NASA Education Enterprise to ensure that Human Exploration and Development of Space education programs being developed and coordinated with and integrated into the Agency's overall education programs. Manages the Resident Research Associate program. Works with Office of Equal Opportunity Programs to develop a new Human Exploration and Development of Space technology and education solicitation directed towards minority universities. [NOTE: The HEDS Enterprise no longer exists. The individual who was assigned to NASA under this agreement no longer works for the Agency.]
16. Program Manager for the Intelligent Systems program, responsible for structuring the program elements, soliciting proposals, organization review panels, tracking research programs, and reporting program results.
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17. Assists in direction of NASA's Space Science Mission Operations and Data Analysis Program; supports oversight of the Deep Space Network and other space operations services at NASA Centers.
18. Assists in the scientific direction, development, and management of programs in High Energy Astrophysics Program. Provides expertise in observational techniques, including new instrumentation and data analysis techniques in a X-ray and gamma ray astronomy.
19. Performs original astrophysics research.
20. Serves as senior high-energy astronomer in the Space Science Department at Marshall Space Flight Center coordinating research of other engaged in theoretical and experimental research related to current space instrument measurements. Performs independent research in high-energy astronomy.
21. Assists the Public Affairs Office in planning and implementing an overall education program from the Northeast part of the U.S. Develops and distributes instructional materials, coordinates and conducts workshops, coordinates conferences, and develops teacher inquiries concerning the program.
22. Serves as Information Power Grid project manager at Ames Research Center. Leads the engineering planning of the IPG testbed and supporting enabling technologies program. Conducts research and development in the area of Internet related security, and secure, policy-based access control for Internet-attached resources.
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23. Assists in planning and coordinating efforts for an education/visitors facility. Serves as liaison to the non-profit Foundation to lead this effort. Initiates programs to promote community awareness of NASA and Stennis Space Center educational offerings in support of science and technology.
24. As Director of the Ames Research Center, provides leadership for all research and development programs and the overall management of the Center. Plans, directs, and coordinates research in airspace operations systems, astrobiology and space, and computing.
25. Performs, advises, and coordinates research in the rover autonomy program. The goal of the research is to create a planetary rover system which is able to autonomously navigate across a planetary surface while looking for geologic and biological sites of scientific interest.
26. Assists in the scientific direction, development, and management of the Planetary Astronomy Program and the Near Earth Objects Observations program. Provides expertise in such areas as observational techniques and instrumentation, in situ studies of comets and asteroids, including issues related to sample returns from asteroids and comets.
27. Provides expertise in evaluation Next Generation Space Telescope (NGST) optical systems design and NGST models and tools.
28. Participates in formulation of the advanced information systems technologies for Earth Science Technology Office (ESTO), providing expertise in high speed digital communication, digital processing and adaptive digital signal processing systems for enabling the proper technologies for the Earth Science Enterprise vision development.
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29. Plans, designs, conducts, and evaluates experiments involving advanced launch propulsion technologies, such as propellant injection, super-critical spray diagnostics, pulsed detonation engines, and small-scale chemical thrusters.
30. In support of the ARC Advanced Life Support Division, coordinates the development of medical and science support requirements for human life support systems in space. Acts as program scientist for the extended duration orbiter medical research program. As an internationally recognized expert in Space Biology, conducts research jointly with Russian and JSC medical researchers on problems concerning the effects of weightlessness on the skeleton of Cosmonauts about the MIR Space Station. His assignment was extended as development of the ISS began, and to continue critical work on the NASA/MIR research program.
31. Assists in the scientific direction, development, and management of research and flight programs in the Geospace Science cluster and in the Sun Earth Connection theme areas. Provides expertise in fields and particles in situ and remote observational techniques, including instrumentation and data analysis techniques used and proposed for SEC flight programs.
32. As Research Scientist with expertise in the area of deductive synthesis and specializing inference, collaborates with the Ames Research Center Automated Software Engineering Group on research, design, and development of the meta-amphion system.
33. In collaboration with senior staff members, responsible for completion of the functional, environmental, and system testing of the plasma instrumentation developed by the Space Plasma Physics group of the MSFC Science Directorate. Oversees the integration of the flight instrument and will leads the mission data analysis effort. Provides technical support to Tether Reboost System study for the ISS; Momentum Exchange/Electrodynamic Tether Reboost technology development program; and Plasma Sails technology development program.
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34. Responsible for conceptualizing and developing strategic implementation plans and approaches for Earth Sciences (ES) Enterprise's educational initiative, and aids in implementation and coordination of these plans. Coordinates ES related educational activities with other offices at GSFC. Develops and implements new educational initiatives in collaboration with other programs at GSFC. Represents ES at selected national and international educational committees, conferences and meetings.
Q12a. Do you have any specific examples of projects suffering as a direct result of the four-year time limitation on IPA's? If so, please describe.
A12a. IPA assignees often are brought in to NASA to work on or manage projects or directly support programs that extend beyond four years. Disruption inevitably occurs in any instance in which an individual with specialized expertise is managing or supporting a project and that individual must be terminated on a specific date without regard to the state of the project at that time.
Since all participants in an IPA assignment are aware of its maximum duration, NASA minimizes potential disruption to the project or research by planning well in advance for transitioning the work to other individuals. Nevertheless, despite such planning to avoid adverse consequences, the ability to extend an IPA assignment at a critical juncture—even for a few months—may permit the project, research, or work to progress more effectively or efficiently.
Generally, there are two situations in which the Agency needs to continue an IPA assignment up to the statutory limit (or desires to extend it beyond that limit): the incumbent provides expertise or talent that is not easily found elsewhere, or there would be a significant return on investment by maintaining continuity on the project or assignment.
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The assignment described in #6 above is an example of an assignment in which the individual had exceptional expertise directly related to the work being done.
The IPA assignee was responsible for performing original research in biotechnology, including all aspects of macromolecular crystallography and microgravity research at a NASA Center as related to the development of NASA biotechnology programs and scientific payloads. The assignee had been an accomplished scientist in macromolecular research at an Institute. She had authored numerous publications in peer-reviewed scientific journals in the area of macromolecular structural biology and had been instrumental in developing innovative instruments for biological research in microgravity. Her continued involvement in the Center's biotechnology work was essential for the development of its Microgravity Biotechnology Program. For example, she developed an independent structural biology research program at the Center that created the first operational microfocus X-ray system for macromolecular crystallography, resulting in two seminal publications and submission of a pending U.S. patent application. Continuing the assignment beyond the inflexible four-year limitation would have enabled the Center to further strengthen its developing Microgravity Biotechnology Program.
The assignment described in #33 above is an example of an assignment in which continuity provided a significant return on the investment.
The IPA assignee was responsible for conducting research and technology development activities on new methods of supporting human crews in space. The new technologies were required to conform to the current medical and physiological requirements for crew equipment and to future, developing requirements based on specific mission definitions (e.g., for Space Station, MIR 2.) The incumbent had been playing a critical role in the development and implementation of the NASA/MIR research program. At the time of his assignment, the International Space Station (ISS) development had begun but the date for utilization for Life Sciences research had been delayed 6–8 months. NASA needed to extend his assignment to provide the needed continuity on the ongoing development for the ISS at a critical and sensitive stage. His assignment also involved aiding the Agency in its international collaborations with the Institute of Biomedical Problems in Russia and the French Space Agency. Extending his assignment to the four-year limitation provided much-needed continuity to important and sensitive work.
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Q12b. Please provide specific examples of NASA projects or activities that require a six-year IPA commitment in order to succeed.
A12b. NASA's position is not that there are projects or activities that require a six-year IPA commitment in order to succeed. Our point is that there are projects or activities that can be accomplished more effectively and efficiently if the IPA assignment can be extended beyond the four-year point, but not exceed six years.
Due to the nature of the work at NASA, many projects have a duration of more than four years. The average length of projects at one Center is seven years; at another Center the average length of projects is five to six years. If an IPA assignee is providing critical support to such a project due to his or her specialized expertise, terminating the individual in advance of the project's completion (or in advance of completion of key milestones) creates disruption. The following situation illustrates this point.
Several years ago, a Center reorganized to provide a renewed focus on its technology mission. A nationwide search was conducted to find a person to serve as the Center's Chief Technologist and lead the newly-focused technology mission. An individual from academia was identified as having the unique skills and research background needed to establish a credible research capability for the Center. The individual has made great strides in this initiative, but the effort will require more than four years to be firmly established. As the four year mark approaches, the Center will be required to recruit again for very specific expertise to sustain this major initiative. Having the flexibility to extend the incumbent beyond the four years—but not necessarily for up to a full six years—would benefit the Center and the Agency.
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Q13. With respect to NASA's workforce requirements, how does NASA define ''critical need,'' and what explicit criteria will NASA use to determine whether a critical need exists?
A13. NASA does not have a precise definition of ''critical need'' in the sense of a succinct description that would be applicable to Agency workforce requirements in all contexts. Such a concept would be difficult to develop for any Agency that has a mission characterized by significant program changes and greatly affected by new and emerging technology.
There are a variety of factors that are relevant in identifying critical needs. Among them are: identification of the competencies needed to achieve success in an Agency program; the magnitude of the gap between the required workforce strength in a competency and the current workforce strength in that competency; the percentage of retirement eligibles among the workforce possessing a competency needed by the Agency; the projected turnover rate for a competency; and labor market dynamics relevant to a competency (nationwide as well as Center-specific).
In identifying workforce needs, NASA will consider those factors in conjunction with the Agency-wide workforce planning and analysis capability and the Agency Competency Management System. This system will enable the Agency to track, project, and analyze critical workforce competencies; identify current competency imbalances in the workforce relative to future needs (oversupply/undersupply of key skills); and measure and assess the competency gaps for continuous improvement of human capital management.
To illustrate the point above, a critical need might be identified as a competency in which there was a substantial gap (e.g., greater than 10 percent) between the need for employees with that competency and the competency level within the current workforce. Or, the Agency might identify a critical need in terms of a competency in which all, or nearly all, employees possessing that competency are eligible for retirement.
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NASA recognizes that the language in H.R. 1085, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2003, includes a definition of ''critical need'' and requires the Agency to develop a Workforce Plan that includes a description of the Agency's critical needs and the criteria used to define them. If this should be enacted as written, the Agency will involve key stakeholders in developing a Workforce Plan, including the requisite information on critical needs that fully meets the intent of Congress.
Q14. With respect to term appointments,
a. How many term employees has NASA had in each of the years FY 1992 through FY 2002?
b. Please provide a breakdown of those term employee totals by job category.
c. Of those, how many, if any, have been converted to career employees?
A14a,b,c. The number of term employees by occupation and the number of conversions are shown on the charts below.
85091t.eps
85091u.eps
Q14d. How many term employees does NASA envision having for each of the years FY 2003–2008?
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A14d.
50
85091v.eps
Q14e. If NASA were given the authority provided in H.R. 1085, how many term employees do you estimate would be converted to permanent employees?
A14e. About one third of the current term employees would be converted in any year. The legislation would expedite the process and enable NASA to hire a proven employee.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Representative Brad Miller
Q1. Thank you for testifying before the Science Committee regarding the President's FY 2004 budget request. At the hearing, you stated that you believe NASA has technology worthy of introducing and developing in the private sector. You also said NASA does not have the internal expertise to accomplish technology transfer:
''. . .We are also looking to—is to utilize the capacity on the part of industry, universities, others to pick up that tech transfer, because in a lot of ways, the last thing we are is really competent at figuring out what commercial applications could come from something. Industry is good at that. Universities are good at that. And so part of our task ought to be to make that information available to figure out how they can then apply it rather than us, the government, public sector trying to anticipate how you can use something for a commercial application. We are singularly unqualified to do that kind of activity, so we are trying to look to industry and universities to partner with us to assume that role in a more dynamic way.''
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Despite your support for relying on organizations outside NASA to accomplish technology transfer, the Administration's FY 2004 budget proposes to terminate the Commercial Technology program. The program would be reduced to $11.5 million in FY 2004 and would receive no funding in subsequent years. This would have the effect of eliminating support for the regional technology transfer centers and for contractors currently engaged in this work. Given that NASA cannot accomplish this important work internally, why is NASA substantially cutting funding for technology transfer contracts? Please explain the apparent discrepancy between your words and the NASA FY 2004 budget proposal.
A1. The Administrator was discussing a change in focus at NASA, which recognizes that commercial companies are better than government at determining how best to use government technologies in commercial applications. In a constrained budget environment, the Commercial Technology Program, which focused on transferring NASA-developed technology to the marketplace, was not perceived to be providing results sufficient to justify continued support at its previous funding level. As described in the President's FY 2004 budget for NASA, our primary emphasis will now shift from ''pushing'' NASA-funded technologies on industry, to ''pulling'' industry in to help NASA develop technologies and applications of benefit to both. Under the proposed Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships (ITTP), NASA would continue to support essential technology transfer efforts that have been part of the Commercial Technology Program, such as documenting and licensing NASA technologies and making them available for use by the private sector. While the Agency will reduce the amount of active outreach activities to industry, we will conduct a reformulated technology transfer program (ITTP) that relies on vehicles such as e-Commerce and web-based systems to present information on technology that might be applicable for use by the private sector. The National Technology Transfer Center will continue to be one of the resources we use to mission-focused transfer technology to the private sector. The President's Budget also supports a new program, the Enterprise Engine, a pilot project to establish partnerships with private sector innovators and investors that have not traditionally conducted business with NASA.
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Q2. The NASA FY 2004 budget would terminate funding for an organization that has consistently proven its value to NASA and to numerous other organizations in assessing commercial applications of new technological inventions. The Research Triangle Institute has repeatedly won a NASA contract (Contract #NAS 1–99134) to provide assessments of the industrial applications and commercial value of NASA innovations. This RTI team, awarded the NASA Public Service Medal as recently as the year 2000, consists of engineers and scientists with a broad range of commercial experience, which have guided NASA in licensing 70 patents in recent years. This team provides just the type of commercial market awareness that you said NASA needs. How much has NASA spent on the RTI contract? To what extent has RTI met or exceeded NASA's performance criteria?
A2. In FY 2002, under the NASA contract with RTI in support of Commercial Technology activities, NASA funded RTI in the amount of $2 million. Beginning with the FY 2004 President's Budget, NASA has shifted its focus to ensure that technology transfers directly benefit the Agency's mission. As a consequence of this changing focus, the technology transfer functions performed by RTI will no longer be supported. In no way does this change of emphasis suggest that RTI was not performing optimally. On the contrary, RTI has met or exceeded the performance criteria included in the contract.
Q3. You noted that NASA is not terminating all funding for technology transfer. Please explain how the $26.4 million funding designated for technology transfer in FY04 will be distributed. What process and empirical evidence was used to determine how this funding should be distributed?
A3. The $26.4 million for technology transfer in the FY 2004 budget request is the amount required to phase out the Commercial Technology Program and continue to fund:
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the National Technology Transfer Center;
Small Business Innovative Research and Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTR) program management;
and technology transfer statutory requirements.
The $26.4 million request also includes $5 million for the new Enterprise Engine initiative, which is intended to create partnerships between NASA, U.S. industrial firms, and the venture capital community to address NASA's new technology mission needs through innovative technology development partnerships. In addition, the FY 2004 Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships budget provides $131.4 million for the SBIR and STTR technology transfer programs.
Q4. Would you agree that contractors should be able to compete openly for technology transfer work and that contracts should be awarded to those with the best record of accomplishing technology transfer? Will RTI be able to continue to compete for technology transfer funding based on the FY 2004 budget proposal? If this funding will not be competitively awarded, please explain why not.
A4. NASA agrees that competitive sourcing is the best method of competing NASA work across the U.S. contractor base. RTI will be able to continue competing for any competitively awarded NASA contracts. Due to the program's change in focus, the standard Commercial Technology contract opportunities of the past are not supported the President's FY 2004 Budget, there would not be.
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Q5. Many of the field center technology transfer centers already are losing talented, experienced staff after the announcement that they were slated to be dismantled during the next fiscal year. What is your plan for preventing such loss of skill and experience?
A5. With the ITTP, the FY 2004 President's Budget shifts our emphasis toward partnerships that engage in the development of technologies directly beneficial to NASA missions. The departures of any talented and experienced staff as a result of this changing emphasis should not detract from our dedication to retaining and attracting a skilled workforce. We would welcome their talents in other capacities involving NASA.
Q6. As described in the budget, the Enterprise Engine is intended to work in concert with industry and venture capital firms to create new technologies that will benefit NASA. How will Enterprise Engine accomplish this? Do you view Enterprise Engine as a replacement for the current transfer technology programs? If not, how will NASA continue to meet the Congressional mandate for technology transfer with reduced funding for such efforts?
A6. The Enterprise Engine is a pilot project to establish partnerships with private sector innovators and investors to sponsor dual-use technologies to meet NASA's future mission and technology needs. The Enterprise Engine is intended to attract new partners to NASA—innovators and investors that have not traditionally conducted business with NASA. This new concept entails partnerships at the beginning of the process of technology development, taking advantage of existing technologies or the technological capability that exists in the private sector. As part of the new emphasis on technologies that directly benefit NASA's missions, this outside capability would then be channeled to meet NASA's technological needs.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Question submitted by Representative Zoe Lofgren
Q1. Were there any Shuttle safety upgrade proposals, recommendations, or projects presented to you, either as NASA Administrator or in your former capacity at the Office of Management and Budget that you did not support? If so, what were they, and why did you reach the conclusions that you did?
A1. Administrator O'Keefe has not rejected any Shuttle upgrade proposal as NASA Administrator or during his tenure at the Office of Management and Budget. Since Mr. O'Keefe has been the NASA Administrator, the Administration prepared and submitted to the Congress in November 2003 an amendment to the FY 2003 budget request to increase the funding for upgrading the Space Shuttle system by approximately $660 million for the FY 2004–2008 timeframe. The budget amendment recognized that the Space Shuttle would be the workhorse for International Space Station transport through at least the middle of the next decade.
In 2001, the electric auxiliary power unit (EAPU) was experiencing technical difficulties, cost growth, and schedule delays. This led NASA, with the endorsement of the NASA Space Flight Advisory Committee (SFAC) and the NASA Advisory Council (NAC), to cancel the project in mid-2001. In the FY 2002 Operating Plan, the Space Shuttle program canceled or deferred several upgrades because of cost growth or technical immaturity. In the Operating Plan, reviewed by Congress, the funding made available as a result of these actions was then applied to Space Shuttle operations to accommodate operations cost growth. These actions did not affect safety. In September 2002, NASA's Office of Space Flight canceled the supportability upgrade for the Checkout and Launch Control System (CLCS). The decision was based on: unforeseen development difficulties with software, uncertain confidence in meeting schedule, and significant growth in development and projected operations costs, as well as the fact that this upgrade would not have been significantly more capable than the existing Launch Processing System.
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Per the latest update to NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan, which extends the Space Shuttle's operational life to the middle of next decade, the Administration's FY 2003 budget amendment increased out-year funding for the Space Shuttle program. This increase provides for an additional flight in support of the ISS and an increase in funding for upgrading the Space Shuttle system of approximately $660 million for the FY 2004–2008 timeframe, through a Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).
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