The Ballistic Missile Defense Program
Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF
Director, Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization
Amended Fiscal Year 2002 Budget
July 19, 2001
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.It is a pleasure to appear before you today to present the Department of Defense's Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 Ballistic Missile Defense program and budget.
The fundamental objective of the BMD program is to develop the capability to defend the forces and territories of the United States, its Allies, and friends against all classes of ballistic missile threats.The Department will develop technologies and deploy systems promising an effective, reliable, and affordable missile defense system.The RDT&E program is designed to develop effective systems over time by developing layered defenses that employ complementary sensors and weapons to engage threat targets in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight and to deploy that capability incrementally.
At
the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we
have developed a research, development and
test program that focuses on missile defense
as a single integrated BMD system, no longer
differentiating between theater and national
missile defense.This revised structure involves three
basic thrusts.First, the new BMD program will build
on the technical progress we have made to date
by providing the funding required to develop
and test selective elements of the current
program fully.
Second,
the new program will pursue a broad range of
activities in order to aggressively evaluate
and develop technologies for the integration
of land, sea, air, or space-based platforms to
counter ballistic missiles in all phases of
their flight.The new program will not cut corners.Rather, it is designed to pursue
parallel development paths to improve the
likelihood of achieving an effective, layered
missile defense.
Third,
the new testing program will incorporate a
larger number of tests than in the past. They
will employ more realistic scenarios and
countermeasures.This will allow us to achieve greater
confidence in our planning and development.Through this robust testing activity,
we may discover opportunities to accelerate
elements of the program based on their
performance, and increase the overall
credibility and capability of BMD systems.This approach is designed to enable
contingency use of the demonstrated BMD
capabilities, if directed.
The
goal of the BMD System is a layered defense
that provides multiple engagement
opportunities along the entire flight path of
a ballistic missile.Over the next three to five years we will pursue parallel
technical paths to reduce schedule and cost
risk in the individual RDT&E efforts.We will explore and demonstrate kinetic
and directed energy kill mechanisms for
potential sea-, ground-, air-, and space-based
operations to engage threat missiles in the
boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of
flight.In
parallel, sensor suites and battle management
and command and control (BMC2) will be
developed to form the backbone of the BMD
System.
But
before I proceed to describe the new program
in detail, I would like to make clear what
this program does not do.It does not define a specific
architecture.It does not commit to a procurement
program for a full, layered defense.There is no commitment to specific
dates for production and deployment other than
for the lower tier terminal defense elements.It is not a rush to deploy untested
systems; it is not a step back to an unfocused
research program; and it is not a minor change
to our previous program.Rather this program is a bold move to develop an effective,
integrated layered defense that can be
deployed as soon as possible against ballistic
missiles of all ranges.
The
new program is a major change in our approach
to developing ballistic missile defense.The previous National Missile Defense
program, for example, was a high risk
production and deployment program dependent
for its success on an RDT&E effort that
was underfunded but charged with developing a
system that would operate at the outset with
near perfection; and it was based on rigid
military requirements.The new program is built around a fully
funded, rigorous RDT&E effort designed to
demonstrate increasing capability over time
through a robust, realistic testing program.
The
objective of the new program is a layered
defense to protect the United States, Allies,
friends, and deployed forces against ballistic
missiles of all ranges.We will pursue this objective in the
following way.First, we are recommending a broad,
flexible approach to RDT&E that allows us
to explore multiple development paths and to
reinforce success based on the best
technological approaches and the most
advantageous basing modes in order to hedge
against the inherent uncertainty of the
ballistic missile defense challenge.Second, we are recommending an
acquisition approach that is evolutionary, one
that will allow us to field systems
incrementally once they are proven through
realistic testing.And third, rather than committing to a
single architecture as we have done in the
past, we will deploy over time
different combinations of sensors and weapons
consistent with our national strategic
objectives.
We
have designed the program so that, in an
emergency and if directed, we might quickly
deploy test assets to defend against a rapidly
emerging threat.This has been done before with other
military capabilities, both in the Gulf War
and in Kosovo.But barring such an emergency, as the
Deputy Secretary has stated, we do not intend
to deploy test assets until they are ready
because such emergency deployments are
disruptive, and can set back normal
development programs by years.
LAYERED
DEFENSE-EFFECTIVE AGAINST COUNTERMEASURES
The
technical and operational challenges of
intercepting ballistic missiles are
unprecedented.While these challenges are significant,
our testing accomplishments to date tell us
that they are not insurmountable.Given the threats we expect to face,
there is a premium on fielding a highly
reliable and effective system.Reliability will be realized, in part,
through redundancy in our system.Effectiveness
is partly a function of the number of
opportunities the system provides to intercept
an in-flight missile and how early and how
often those opportunities occur in the
missile's flight.Because we need redundancy, we
determined that whatever BMD systems we
deploy, they should allow multiple engagement
opportunities in the boost, midcourse, and
terminal phases of a ballistic missile's
flight.
The
boost phase is that part of flight when the
ballistic missile's rocket motors are
ignited and propel the entire missile system
towards space. It lasts roughly 3 to 5 minutes
for a long-range missile and as little as 1 to
2 minutes for a short-range missile. When the
missile boosters are spent, the missile
continues its ascent into what we call the
midcourse part of flight (which lasts
nominally 20 minutes for a long-range
missile).In this stage of flight, a ballistic missile releases its
payload warhead(s), submunitions, and/or
penetration aids it carried into space.The missile enters what we call the
terminal phase when the missile or the
elements of its payload, for example, its
warheads, reenter the atmosphere.This is a very short phase, lasting
from a few minutes to less than a minute.
There
are opportunities and challenges to engage a
threat missile in each of these phases.The layered defense, or
defense-in-depth, approach will increase the
chances that the missile and its payload will
be destroyed.
Intercepting
a missile in the boost phase, for example,
results in the defense of any target that the
missile might be aimed at and can destroy a
missile regardless of its design range. A
midcourse intercept capability provides wide
coverage of a region or regions, while a
terminal defense protects a localized area.
Intercepting a missile near its launch point
is always preferable to intercepting that same
missile closer to its target.When we add shot opportunities in the midcourse and terminal
phases of flight to boost phase opportunities,
we increase significantly the probability that
we will be successful.
Another
advantage of the layered approach is that it
complicates an adversary's plans.Countermeasures, for example, will
always be a challenge for the defense.But because countermeasures have to be
tailored to the specific phase of a
missile's flight, layered defenses pose
major challenges to an aggressor.
RDT&E
ACTIVITIES
The FY 2002 Program speeds
development of established technologies,
enables robust testing and evaluation of
systems that are more mature, and explores new
missile defense concepts and technologies.I will address some of these activities
in a moment. We plan to pursue multiple,
parallel development paths to reduce the risk
inherent in BMD engineering, with initiatives
in each of theBoost, Midcourse, and Terminal Defense
Segments of the BMD system.As part of our risk reduction activity,
we will explore different technologies and
paths.We
will also pursue technologies that may be
useful across multiple Segments and employ
multiple technologies to avoid single point
failures in each Segment.
We
do not want to be in a situation, for example,
to discover a fundamental design problem in
our only Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), or
in our only sea-based booster under
development.That would amount to a single point
failure that could cost us years in developing
effective missile defenses, not to mention
leaving America and our allies unnecessarily
exposed.We must be agile in our engineering
approaches to keep the BMD program on track
and affordable.
This
robust RDT&E program aims to demonstrate
what does and does not work.Those activities showing the greatest
promise will receive greater resource
emphasis.Our progress will inform an annual high-level decision-making
process that will steer the BMD program in the
most promising direction, taking into account
optimal approaches and the most reliable
information on costs, allowing informed
research, production, and deployment
decisions.
This
RDT&E approach also will minimize possible
disruptive effects that the introduction of
new technologies, development challenges, or
changes in the threat otherwise could have on
the BMD program and allow us to keep
pressing forward along the most promising
paths.We
will pursue enough paths so that the scaling
back of one effort will not undermine progress
in other areas and the technological advances
we make even in failed efforts will be put to
good use.This represents the best approach for pursuing promising
capabilities that will allow us to get out in
front and pace a dynamic ballistic missile
threat.
The business of missile defense requires coping with a number of technological, developmental, acquisition, and threat uncertainties.For this reason, I cannot tell you today exactly what the system will look like 15, 10 or even 5 years from now.This system will take shape over time.We do not intend to lock ourselves into a highly stylized architecture based on either known technologies or hoped for advances in technology that will take a decade or more to complete.We intend to go beyond the conventional build-to-requirements acquisition process.
We have adopted a capability-based approach, which recognizes that changes will occur along two separate axes.On the one axis, the threat will evolve and change over time based on the emergence of new technologies, continued proliferation of missiles worldwide, and operational and technical adjustments by adversaries (including the introduction of countermeasures) to defeat our BMD system.On the other axis lie changes we will experience.These include improving technologies, incremental system enhancements, evolving views of system affordability, and out-year decisions expanding coverage, potentially including the territory and populations of our Allies and friends.
The
BMD system will feature a uniform battle
management and command and control network and
leverage, where possible, other Department
communication channels to integrate elements
of the BMD system.Because the system must act within
minutes or even seconds to counter ballistic
missiles, the information we receive on
threats must be accurately received,
interpreted, and acted upon rapidly.The information network must be
seamless and allow information to be passed
quickly and reliably among all the elements of
the system.
Mobility in our sensor and interceptor platforms and the capability to do boost phase and/or midcourse phase intercept must be central features in our architecture if we are to provide effective territorial protection at home and abroad.Placing sensors forward, or closer to the target missile launch point, either on land, at sea, in the air, or in space, will expand the battle space, improve discrimination of the target complex, and increase engagement opportunities.We will develop complementary elements in different combinations in order to afford the system a high degree of synergism and effectiveness.
Specific system choices and timelines will take shape over the next few years through our capability-based, block approach.We will increase our capability over time through an evolutionary process as our technologies mature and are proven through testing.The block approach allows us to put our best, most capable technologies "in play" sooner than would otherwise be possible.We have organized the program with the aim of developing militarily useful capabilities in biannual blocks, starting as early as the 2004-2006 timeframe.These block capabilities could be deployed on an interim basis to meet an emergent threat, as an upgrade to an already deployed system, or to discourage a potential adversary from improving its ballistic missile capabilities.
Consequently, the CINCs and military Services will be involved throughout the development process so that with each block we move steadily forward towards systems with ever increasing military utility that complement other operational capabilities and that minimize life cycle cost.
TESTING
We
have restructured the BMD program to
facilitate success through rigorous, robust,
and realistic testing.To ensure rigor our BMD testing
philosophy recognizes that we must have an
integrated, phased test program that
comprehensively covers all aspects of testing;
and our budget submission reflects our
investment in the requisite test
infrastructure to support this.To enable more robust testing we will
invest in additional test articles and
targets.The test bed we propose constructing
will enhance our ability to test the full
range of missile defense capabilities in
realistic configurations and scenarios.Let me describe our approach to testing
and discuss broadly what we are undertaking in
FY 2002.
Our
BMD developmental testing entails
conceptual prototype development, assesses the
attainment of technical performance
parameters, generates data on risk, supports
risk mitigation, and provides empirical data
to validate models and simulations.Testing of systems, subsystems, and
components, especially early in the
developmental cycle, helps us to achieve two
fundamental objectives: 1) determine
performance capabilities, and 2) identify
potential design problems to support timely
changes.Later testing will demonstrate the
broad range of effectiveness and suitability
of missile defenses in increasingly realistic
environments.
Our
test philosophy is to add, step-by-step over
time, complexity such as countermeasures and
operations in increasingly stressful
environments.This approach allows us to make timely
assessments of the most critical design risk
areas.It is a walk-before-you-run, learn-as-you-go development
approach.These testing activities provide
critical information that reduces
developmental risk and improves our confidence
that a capability under development is
progressing as intended.
Given the number of technical challenges shared among the many elements of the BMD system, we will conduct a number of program-wide tests, experiments, and measurement projects each year to achieve our program-wide objectives.System interoperability and critical measurements flight tests and ground experiments will be conducted to support development of BMD system operating concepts, reduce development risks, and assess BMD system integration and interoperability.Program-wide collection and measurement needs will be met by phenomenology measurements, countermeasure characterizations, and analysis of lethality, kill assessment, and discrimination.International cooperative test and evaluation activities could become an important part of our program.
Each
test range currently in use is equipped with
precision instrumentation sensors (radar and
optical), telemetry capabilities, and flight
and range safety systems.Additionally, BMDO deploys mobile
airborne sensors.Core supporting ranges include both
short- and long-range test facilities with
multiple launch sites, primarily in New Mexico
and over the Pacific Ocean.These collection capabilities are a
critical part of our program.In FY 2002, we will be engaged in a number of activities to
develop and upgrade the test range
infrastructure we require.
The
new program will feature range improvements
for boost segment and system level testing,
and will allow us to increase the tempo of our
testing operations.Existing ground facilities will be
upgraded for testing of Boost Segment
elements, advanced sensors,
counter-countermeasures, and nuclear weapons
effects.Airborne instrumentation platforms will be upgraded, and
modeling and simulation software having
system-level and program-wide application will
be developed.
Ground test facility development and enhancement will help us to improve sensor testing, strengthen our end-to-end test capability, and undertake tests using scenarios we cannot duplicate in our flight-testing, such as nuclear weapons effects testing.Facilities for program-wide interoperability ground tests must be upgraded to be capable of both analyzing yesterday's flight test data and predicting tomorrow's expected system performance.
With our more robust test program we will increase the number of tests and add tests of different technologies and basing modes.To meet the challenges of missile defense development we must upgrade our capabilities to test with flexibility over greater distances.Test scenarios must accommodate multiple intercepts occurring nearly simultaneously at realistic intercept geometries.Upgrades will be required in our launch facilities, flight hardware, and range tracking and collection assets.
In FY 2002 we will develop an inventory of targets and initiate procurement of additional test hardware to support a more aggressive test program.We must have quicker reaction in our targets program in order to accommodate changes in threat knowledge and to incorporate countermeasures.The BMD program will fund development of new threat-credible ballistic missile targets and countermeasures for all defense segment development activities, risk reduction flights, and comprehensive target system support, to include direct target costs and launch operations.
Challenges we face in this area include development of new targets for boost segment testing, proper incorporation of countermeasures, and overcoming a dwindling supply of target hardware, particularly hardware incorporating countermeasures. The objective is to ensure an adequate supply of target boosters, reentry vehicles, and countermeasures to prevent major delays in development schedules resulting from a shortage of these major target components.We need to be able to test more and more often, and this requires that we have the test articles on hand and ready for use. Larger quantities of hardware also will help us overcome lengthy delays caused by, for example, a pre-launch problem with a target booster.
As I mentioned earlier, we will increase testing of alternative technologies, especially in the medium and high-risk areas of development.We must be hardware rich if we are to have a robust testing program and if we are to avoid single point failures in any of our development efforts.
Among the challenges that faced the previous NMD program was overcoming flight test restrictions on trajectories, impact areas, and debris in space in order to test overall system performance limits.The range we have been using between Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and Kwajalein Missile Range, while useful for developmental testing, lacks realism for tests of BMD interceptors and sensors.
The
amended budget request contributes
significantly to the development of a BMD Test
Bed, which will be used initially to prove out
the midcourse capabilities.That test bed will expand test
boundaries and develop and enhance test
infrastructure and will provide for more
operationally realistic testing.Over time the test bed will expand to
include weapons and sensor capabilities to
improve all missile defense capabilities as
they are made available.
The integrated test bed will be oriented in the Pacific region and extend many hundreds of miles from the Marshall Islands in the South Pacific to Alaska.It will allow more realistic flight-testing of capabilities in the Boost, Midcourse, and Terminal Defense Segments.
The
new test bed would make use of early warning
radars at Beale Air Force Base and Cobra Dane
at Shemya Island, and use the Kodiak Launch
Facility in Alaska to launch targets and
interceptors.The test bed would continue our
practice of integrating early warning cueing
information from Defense Support Program
satellites and leveraging a battle management
system operated out of Colorado Springs,
Colorado.The test bed
also will include up to five ground-based
silos at Fort Greely, Alaska.We anticipate a prototype ground
support capability, to include launch
facilities, sensors, and networked
communications, will be developed in FY 2002
and built in FY 2003.We will initiate construction of an
interceptor integration facility in FY 2002 to
support a wide range of interceptor needs for
testing.
This test bed will allow us to test more than one missile defense segment at a time and exploit multiple shot opportunities so that we can demonstrate the viability of the layered defense concept.The test bed will provide a realistic environment to test different missile defense capabilities under varying and stressing conditions.It will also help us prove out construction, transportation, and logistics concepts we will need to clarify as we execute deployment decisions.
If directed, the BMD test bed also could provide a basis for a contingency defensive capability if the security environment warrants.
BMD
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
We
must deviate from the standard acquisition
process and recognize the unprecedented
technical challenges we are facing.We do not have major defense
acquisition programs in the FY 2002 budget.We do not have program activities with
traditional fixed milestones and clearly
marked phases showing the road to production.
The
new approach to BMD development features more
streamlined, flexible management through
comprehensive and iterative reviews.We will establish yearly decision
points to determine the status of the
available technologies and concept evaluations
in order to be in a position to accelerate,
modify, truncate, or terminate our efforts in
a particular area.This comprehensive annual review
process will also help us make decisions to
shape the evolving systems and allocate
resources to optimally support them.This decision process will allow for:
1) more complete understanding of current
technologies and the evolving capabilities; 2)
evaluation of innovative concepts; 3)
development of competing technologies to
reduce cost, schedule, and performance risks;
and 4) better estimation of complete costs for
making informed decisions concerning system
capability, production, and deployment.We believe that full annual evaluations
of our program activities and demonstrated
technical achievements will build confidence
for decision makers.
This
program is designed to seek opportunities to
provide the most effective and efficient
missile defense by exploiting advances in
technology as they emerge and by making timely
decisions to direct individual development
activities.We will make adjustments as we learn
what we can and cannot do technically and as
we make the tough calls on selecting among the
promising technologies to create the best mix
of missile defense capabilities across the
threat missile flight envelope.
As
missile defense capabilities mature, we
envision transferring the individual elements
to the Military Department for production and
procurement as part of a standard acquisition
program.This approach will ensure that the
Military Department can operate these
capabilities effectively and reliably.
PROGRAM
ELEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES
To
manage and account for program resources, BMDO
plans a configuration of nine Program Elements
(PE): BMD System; Terminal, Midcourse, and
Boost Defense Segments; Sensors; Technology;
Pentagon Reservation Maintenance Reserve Fund;
Small Business Innovation Research; and
Headquarters Management.This PE structure supports the revised
BMD program goals by aligning activities and
funding with the program's internal
technical focus.It also provides the flexibility to
mitigate, through internal adjustment,
unforeseen consequences and risks in budget
and schedule.The following table illustrates the PE
structure.
(TY
$ In Millions)
Program
Element Title |
FY
02 |
BMD System |
779.584 |
Terminal Defense Segment |
988.180 |
Midcourse Defense Segment |
3,940.534 |
Boost Defense Segment |
685.363 |
Sensors |
495.600 |
Technology |
112.890 |
Pentagon Reservation Maintenance Reserve Fund |
6.571 |
HQ Management |
27.758 |
Small Business Innovative Research* |
0.000 |
Total
RDT&E |
7,036.480 |
BMD System MILCON |
7.549 |
Terminal Defense Segment MILCON |
0.750 |
Total
MILCON |
8.299 |
Total
Program |
7,044.779 |
*
Funds for this PE are allocated immediately
following the annual appropriation; the amount
is based on internal redistribution of RDT&E
funding (2.65% of extramural RDT&E). Total
program appropriation does not change.
Program
Element Descriptions
BMD System
The BMD System Program Element allocates the resources required for the overarching conduct and integration of the multi-layered BMD System. The BMD System PE comprises five primary projects: Battle Management, Command and Control (BMC2); Communications; Targets and Countermeasures; System Engineering and Integration (SE&I); and Test and Evaluation (T&E).System-level activities involve integrating the Boost, Midcourse, Terminal, and Sensors segments into a single and congruous missile defense system; this PE also includes management efforts to preserve and promote architectural consistency, interoperability, and integration of PAC-3, MEADS, and Navy Area systems within the overarching BMD mission.Our amended request of $780 million for these activities represents an increase of $253 million over FY 2001 enacted funding.
Our evolutionary acquisition process will increase the BMD System capabilities over time in two year increments.Each BMD System block will comprise multiple weapon and sensor elements.The BMC2 and Communications project funding is for developing and integrating the command and control and communications for the BMD System.The BMC2 project includes the development and allocation of BMC2 specifications to ensure the weapons and sensor system products are fully interoperable with each other and with external systems, providing optimum flexibility to the war fighter.To this end, a ballistic missile defense integration center will be established at BMDO's Joint National Test Facility.
The Communications project consolidates and refines BMD system-wide communication systems to allow components to exchange data and to permit command and control orders to be transmitted to the weapons and sensor systems.
The Targets and Countermeasures project funding provides threat-credible ballistic missile targets, countermeasures, and target system support.This project will provide new target and countermeasure development, risk reduction flights, and target characterization.
As the central engineering component within BMDO, the Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) project provides the overall system engineering development and integration of the BMD system.The SE&I mission is to define and manage the layered BMD system, providing the collaborative, layered, and detailed systems engineering and integration required across the entire spectrum of BMD warfighter capabilities.
Lastly, the Test & Evaluation project provides consolidated system-wide Test & Evaluation capabilities and resources required to allow for cohesive facilitation, management, and execution of test activities.Test & Evaluation efforts include the development, operation, maintenance, and modernization of the BMD program-wide Test & Evaluation infrastructure.The T&E program also addresses crosscutting issues related to BMD system lethality, discrimination, and other T&E derived mission critical functions.Finally, the T&E Program conducts system integration tests for the entire BMD system and will validate performance of each block.Test & Evaluation activities are grouped in terms of Program Wide Test & Evaluation; Test Support of facilities, ranges, sensors, and test instrumentation; modeling and simulation; and facilities, siting, and environmental efforts.
Terminal Defense Segment
The Terminal Defense Segment (TDS) allocates resources to support development and selective upgrades of defensive capabilities that engage and negate ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their trajectory.The primary projects under this PE are the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Israeli Arrow Deployability Program (ADP).Related activities include the Israeli Test Bed (ITB), Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP), and studies via the Israeli Systems Architecture and Integration (ISA&I) effort that assess the Arrow performance relative to both existing and emerging threats.Our amended request of $988 million represents an increase of $353 million over FY 2001 enacted funding.Note: The PAC-3, MEADS, and Navy Area programs are funded within their respective Service accounts.
The
mission of the THAAD System is to defend
against short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles at significant distances from the
intended target and at high altitudes.THAAD will protect U.S. and allied
armed forces, broadly dispersed assets, and
population centers against missile attacks.This evolutionary program is structured
to demonstrate capability in Block 2004, with
planned improvements based on upgraded
seekers, ground support equipment, and
discrimination software.Current efforts are addressing
component and system performance,
producibility, and supportability.A robust ground-testing program will
precede flight testing, currently planned for
FY 2004.The budgetadds resources to accelerate
acquisition of a THAAD radar and to buy more
test missiles in order to capitalize on early
flight test successes should our disciplined
development program prove effective. The Arrow
Weapon System (AWS) (developed jointly by the
U.S. and Israel) provides Israel a capability
to defend against short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles and helps ensure U.S.
freedom of action in future contingencies.Arrow also provides protection against ballistic missile
attacks for U.S. forces deployed in the
region.The
successful Arrow intercept test on September
14, 2000, resulted in Israel declaring the
system operational in October 2000.The Arrow Deployability Program (ADP)
also supports Israel's acquisition of a
third Arrow battery and Arrow's
interoperability with U.S. TMD systems.Interoperability will be achieved via a
common communication architecture utilizing
the Link-16. An interoperability test was
completed in January 2001 using the Theater
Missile Defense System Exerciser (TMDSE) that
validated that the Arrow Weapon System is
interoperable and can exchange surveillance
and missile track cueing data with U.S.
PATRIOT and Aegis missile defense systems.The Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP)
will include both technical cooperation to
improve the performance of the AWS and a
cooperative test and evaluation program to
validate the improved AWS performance.We added $20 million in our amended
budget specifically for additional flight
testing and development of additional
production capacity for the Arrow missile.
Equally important to the integrated BMD System are the lower tier programs that are being transferred to the Military Departments. We have had significant success with the PAC-3, and interceptor missiles will be delivered to training battalions this year.PAC-3 system will provide critical operational capability to defend our forward-deployed forces, allies, and friends.The system is designed to counter enemy defense suppression tactics that may include tactical ballistic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and aircraft employing advanced countermeasures and low radar cross-section.The PAC-3 technology has a proven record of hit-to-kill success.We are now 7-for-8 in body-to-body intercepts against ballistic missile targets.PAC-3 missile technology also accomplished 4-for-4 body-to-body intercepts against cruise missiles and air-breathing threats.Recent successes included multiple simultaneous engagements of both short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles using PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors.
Although the Navy Area Program has experienced technical, cost and schedule challenges we are now at a point where we can execute a rigorous set of flight tests and likely achieve a capability in the middle of this decade.A Fly-By test is anticipated for early 2002, to be followed by a series of intercept flight-tests.At-sea testing is expected to begin in late 2002/ early 2003.Navy Area has been positioned to undertake initial at-sea tests using, Aegis "LINEBACKER" ships.
With the German Parliament funding recently made available to continue the trilateral MEADS activity, that program is about to embark on a three-year Risk Reduction Effort.MEADS will use the PAC-3, which has already begun production, as its interceptor.Once deployed, MEADS will improve tactical mobility and strategic deployability over comparable missile systems and provide robust, 360-degree protection for maneuvering forces and other critical forward-deployed assets against short- and medium-range missiles.
These
systems have been in development for many
years and PATRIOT and Navy Area are
approaching procurement and deployment
decisions.For this reason, and in compliance with
our program philosophy to have BMDO do RDT&E
and the Military Departments do procurement,
and to support the Military Departments' air
defense mission, the Department is
transferring to the respective Services the
responsibility for execution and management of
PAC-3, Navy Area, and MEADS
Midcourse
Defense Segment
The Midcourse Defense Segment (MDS) develops increasingly robust
capabilities for countering ballistic missiles
in the midcourse stage of flight.The MDS will develop and test multiple
technologies to provide credible capabilities
against this threat to operate in this segment
of flight.The MDS program of work is divided into
multiple elements including Ground-based
Midcourse Systems, and Sea-Based Midcourse
Systems, the successors to the National
Missile Defense and Navy Theater Wide
programs, segment Systems Engineering and
Integration, and segment Test and Evaluation.Our amended request of $3,941 million
represents an increase of $1,455 million over
FY01 enacted funds.
Under
the previous BMD program, we had under
development only one system that could provide
a midcourse intercept capability for defeating
ICBMs.We
made significant progress in the National
Missile Defense (NMD) program and brought
system development to the point where an
Independent Review Team led by retired Air
Force General Larry Welch concluded that,
despite some challenges, the technical
capability was in hand to develop and field
the limited system to meet the projected
threat.We
were pursuing a highly concurrent development
and production program focused on a 2005
deployment.While the NMD testing program
experienced delays in development and testing,
our analysis last year showed that ground and
flight tests to date have demonstrated about
93% of the system's critical engagement
functions and have shown the ability to
integrate the system elements.
The
revised Ground-based Midcourse System has
three objectives: 1) to develop and
demonstrate an integrated system capable of
countering known and expected threats; 2) to
provide an integrated test bed that provides
realistic tests and reliable data for further
system development; and 3) to create a
development path allowing for an early
capability based on success in testing.During its initial phase, the program
will develop an integrated system, further
demonstrate a "hit-to-kill" capability,
and prepare for the RDT&E test bed
capability and subsequent blocks.Each block will develop capability
against increasing threat complexity.
Within
the MDS, the bulk of the resources are
designed to build and sustain an operationally
realistic test architecture that represents
the envisioned operational capability.We plan to have an RDT&E ground
based test bed available in the 2004 - 2006
time frame. As designed, this test bed will
expand to enhance overall test infrastructure
and system maturation, although its initial
development will occur within the midcourse
segment.Over time the test bed will expand to
include weapons and sensor capabilities from
throughout the BMD System when they become
available.
The
test bed will consist of up to five
ground-based silos with an upgraded COBRA DANE
radar; associated command and control and
launch facilities; other sensors; and
networked communications to support robust
testing with credible targets, scenarios, and
countermeasures.This project includes four flight tests
in FY 2002. Moreover, upon availability, the
test bed could incorporate air launched
targets, thereby providing geographically
realistic scenarios and improving overall
testing realism.Throughout, enhancements will be made
to both the Ft. Greely and Kodiak Island test
facilities, improving both target and
interceptor launch capabilities.
This
approach might be a near term option to employ
the test facilities - radars, C2, and
interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and Kodiak
- in an operational mode.Its use in this mode could provide an
interim capability to meet an emergent threat.
This interim capability could subsequently be
upgraded through technical improvements,
replaced by deployment of production-quality
radars, C2, and interceptors as described
below or supplemented with a sea-based
midcourse system, described below.
The
Sea-based Midcourse System is intended to
intercept hostile missiles in the ascent phase
of midcourse flight, which when accompanied by
ground-based system, provides a complete
midcourse layer.By engaging missiles in early ascent,
sea-based systems also offer the opportunity
to reduce the overall BMD System's
susceptibility to countermeasures.The Sea-based Midcourse System will
build upon technologies in the existing Aegis
Weapon System and the Standard Missile
infrastructures and will be used against short
and medium range threats.Funding in FY 2002 offers the ability
to continue testing and enables a potential
contingency sea-based midcourse capability
that can grant limited defense to U.S. and
allied deployed forces as an element of the
BMD system Block 2004.To support this effort five flight
tests of the sea-based midcourse system are
planned in FY 2002.Funding also begins concept development
and risk reduction work for advanced
capability blocks to include more robust
capability against intermediate and long-range
threats to complement Ground-based Midcourse
capabilities later this decade.
The
United States and Japan signed a Memorandum of
Understanding in August 1999 to conduct a
two-year cooperative project to conduct
systems engineering and to design four
advanced missile components for possible
integration into an improved version of the
SM-3 interceptor.This project leverages the established
and demonstrated industrial and engineering
strengths of Japan and allows a significant
degree of cost-sharing.
Other
Segment activities include Systems Engineering
and Integration (SE&I), Test &
Evaluation (T&E), and Program Operations.SE&I funding will allow for further Risk Reduction
activities and Counter-countermeasure
development and will begin a complementary
kill vehicle development which could be common
to both ground- and sea-based interceptors.T&E funding starts a new target
booster development that will allow for
testing against more realistic targets.
Boost
Defense Segment
The mission of the Boost Defense Segment (BDS) is to define and develop boost phase intercept (BPI) missile defense capabilities.Our amended request of $685 million for the Boost Defense Program represents an increase of $313 million over the FY01 enacted funding.
The capabilities defined and developed in the BDS will progressively reduce the "safe havens" available to a hostile state.A "safe haven," is formed by geographic and time constraints associated with BPI.It is the region of a state from which it can launch a missile safely out of range of a potential boost phase intercept.To engage ballistic missiles in this phase, quick reaction times, high confidence decision-making, and multiple engagement capabilities are needed.The development of higher power lasers and faster interceptor capabilities are required to reduce the size of safe havens, whereas development of viable space-based systems could potentially eliminate them entirely.Thus, resources have been allocated to develop both kinetic and directed energy capabilities in an effort to provide options for multiple engagement opportunities and basing modes to address a variety of timing and geographic constraints.
Successful BDS operational concepts could be fully integrated with midcourse and terminal elements in the overall BMD System.In accordance with the overall BMD acquisition strategy, BDS will employ multiple paths and acquisition methodologies to deliver initial capability blocks as soon as practical, and upgrade the initial capabilities over time.From information gained following this approach, BMDO will evaluate the most promising projects to provide a basis for an architecture decision between 2003 and 2005.
There are four principal objectives for the BDS.First, it will seek to demonstrate and make available the Airborne Laser (ABL) for a contingency capability in Block 2004 with a path to an initial capability in Block 2008.Second, it will define and evolve space-based and sea-based kinetic energy Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) concepts in the next two to four years, supporting a product line development decision in 2003-2005.This effort will include concept definition, risk reduction activities, and proof-of-concept demonstrations.For example, the sea-based boost program is considering a high-speed, high-acceleration booster coupled with a boost kill vehicle.This same booster will be evaluated (with a different kill vehicle) for sea-based midcourse roles.Third, the BDS will execute a proof-of-concept Space-Based Interceptor Experiment (SBX).Fourth, the BDS will also continue Space-Based Laser (SBL) risk reduction on a path to a proof-of-concept SBL Integrated Flight Experiment (SBL-IFX) in 2012.At appropriate times, BMDO will insert mature system concepts and technologies into product line development and deployment.Planned tests within the Boost Segment include a ground test of the ABL project and a ground test of the sea-based boost concept in 2002.
Kinetic Energy Concepts
Little has been done in this area in recent years.We intend to address operational concept development and technical risk reduction to produce experiments and systems to deliver demonstrations in the 2003-2006 timeframe.Kinetic boost phase intercept is a challenge because the threat missile must be detected and confirmed within a few seconds of launch.It then becomes a race between an accelerating ballistic missile and the interceptor in which the threat missile has had a head start.Another technical challenge is designing a kill vehicle that can detect and track the target following missile-staging events and then impact the missile in the presence of a brilliant plume.
The money requested in FY 2002 will allow us to begin risk reduction activities to resolve critical technological risks associated with candidate boost systems and the development of a concept of operations through war-gaming and other planning activities.We are considering a sea-based boost activity to develop a high-speed, high-acceleration booster coupled with a boost kill vehicle.This activity will simultaneously support a proof-of-concept space-based experiment (SBX) using a space-based kinetic energy kill vehicle.
Directed-Energy Capabilities
The two primary programs in this area are the Airborne Laser (ABL) and Space Based Laser, now transferred to BMDO.The Air Force ABL program has been focused on short and medium range threats.We are taking deliberate steps to prepare ABL for a strategic defense role as well. With onboard sensors, each ABL aircraft will conduct long-range, wide-area surveillance of regions from which threat missiles might launch.The FY 2002 budget request will allow us to conduct an initial flight test of ABL and plan for a lethal demonstration in 2003.
The budget request will enable BMDO to continue SBL risk reduction work. Near-term SBL activity will focus on ground-based efforts to develop and demonstrate the component and subsystem technologies required for an operational space-based laser system and the design and development of an Integrated Flight Experiment vehicle that is scheduled to be tested in space in 2012.The SBL Project builds on many years of previous development and is based on prudent reduction of technical risk as early as possible in the design process.
Sensors
Sensors
developed in this segment will have
multi-mission capabilities intended to enhance
detection of and provide critical tracking
information for ballistic missiles in all
phases of flight.This PE funds the Block 2010 SBIRS-Low
sensor satellite constellation, and the
Russian-American Observation Satellites
(RAMOS) program, as well as emergent
technologies and test and evaluation
activities.In addition, resources are provided to further concept
development and risk reduction efforts.Our amended budget request of $496
million represents an increase of $221 million
over the FY01 enacted funding.
SBIRS-Low
(transferred from the Air Force) will
incorporate new technologies to enhance
detection; improve reporting of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM),
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and
tactical ballistic missiles; and provide
critical mid-course tracking and
discrimination data for BMD.SBIRS-Low, in conjunction with SBIRS-High
(developed by the Air Force), form the SBIRS
system, which will consist of satellites in
Geosynchronous Orbits (GEO), Highly Elliptical
Orbits (HEO) and Low Earth Orbits (LEO) and an
integrated centralized ground station serving
all SBIRS space elements and Defense Support
Program (DSP) satellites.
The
Russian-American Observation Satellites
(RAMOS) program is an innovative
U.S.-Russian space-based remote sensor
research and development program addressing
ballistic missile defense and national
security directives.This program engages Russian developers
of early warning satellite in the joint
definition and execution of aircraft and space
experiments.
Technology
The
Technology Segment will develop components,
subsystems and new concepts needed to keep
pace with the evolving ballistic missile
threat.The
primary focus of the Technology Segment is the
development of sensors and weapons for future
platforms that can complement today's
missile defense capabilities.Investments will maintain a balance between providing
improvements in current acquisition programs
and demonstrating the enabling technology for
new concepts.Our amended request of $113 million
represents a decrease of $74 million relative
to the FY01 enacted funding (and congressional
adds).
The
Technology Program is divided into four thrust
areas: 1) terminal missile defense, 2)
midcourse counter-countermeasures, 3) boost
phase intercepts, and 4) global defense.Specific projects include the
development of a doppler radar to be used in a
missile seeker, the demonstration of active
and interactive midcourse discrimination
techniques, the design and development of
miniature kill vehicles for boost and
midcourse application, and the development
and/or testing of space relay mirrors for
laser tracking systems. In addition to thrust area projects,
investments are made in technology at the
component level to improve the
state-of-the-art in radars, infrared sensors,
lasers, optics, propulsion, wide band gap
materials, and photonic devices.
In
closing, the Ballistic Missile Defense System
Strategy balances significant engineering,
management, schedule and cost challenges.It also provides for a robust RDT&E
program with rigorous testing.Your support will be critical to our success.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.I would be happy to answer any questions you and the Members of the Committee might have.
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
NEWSLETTER
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