May 13, 1999
ABM Treaty, START II, and Missile Defense
Hadley, Hon. Stephen, former Assistant Secretary of Defense,
partner, Shea & Gardner, Washington, DC........................ 171
Prepared statement of........................................ 173
Joseph Hon. Robert G., former Ambassador to the ABM Treaty's
Standing Consultative Commission; Director, Center for Counter
Proliferation Research, National Defense University,
Washington, DC................................................. 193
Prepared statement of........................................ 197
Lee, William T., former analyst for the Defense Intelligence
Agency; adjunct fellow, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC........................................ 211
Prepared statement of........................................ 212
Annex 1: Questions submitted by the Honorable Curt Weldon
to the CIA and CIA's responses......................... 216
Annex 2: Implications of the ABM Treaty Protocols and
Agreed Statements...................................... 217
Annex 3: Post Soviet Union Russian Missile and Air
Weapons Development.................................... 220
Smith, Hon. David J., former Chief U.S. Negotiator to the Defense
and Space Talks; president, Global Horizons Inc., Annandale, VA 178
Prepared statement of........................................ 184
S. Hrg. 106-339
BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
<snowflake>
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
ABM TREATY, START II, AND MISSILE DEFENSE
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:12 a.m., in room SD-562, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel presiding.
Present: Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Good morning. This morning's hearing is the
fifth in a series of hearings the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is holding on the 1972 ABM Treaty. Today's hearing
will focus on the relationship between missile defense,
strategic arms reductions, the 1972 ABM Treaty, and the
national missile defense architecture that the administration
is now developing.
Before introducing our witnesses this morning, I would like
to summarize five key judgments that have come out of our last
five ABM hearings to date.
First, the ballistic missile threat to the United States is
present and growing. A number of countries such as Iran and
North Korea could today inflict massive damage on the United
States using a short-range, ship-launched missile with an
unconventional warhead. We are threatened by further
instability in Russia. The Chinese missile threat exists and is
growing.
Second, the committee has heard compelling testimony that a
national missile defense against these threats is
technologically feasible. What is lacking is the political
will. America is kept vulnerable by a commitment to the 1972
ABM Treaty with a country and a government that no longer
exists.
Third, this committee has listened to numerous experts who
advocate deployment of a national missile defense system
despite Russian and Chinese objections. Ideally, we should seek
to engage Russia so that we can deploy missile defenses without
affecting our important bilateral relations. But we should
never let the defense of our citizens be held hostage to
diplomatic relations. The deployment process must move along
its own separate track.
We can undertake confidence building, and that confidence
building addresses Russian concerns. But at no time should
Russia be given the impression that it has a veto over any
aspect of U.S. missile defenses.
Fourth, an overwhelming number of witnesses have urged this
committee to reject the Clinton administration's effort to
expand the ABM Treaty. At a time when we need to move beyond
the ABM Treaty, it would be folly to extend it to new partners
or to place new limits on the capabilities of missile defense
systems.
Several witnesses have noted that the ABM Treaty is legally
dead. Nevertheless, they have pointed out that the treaty
remains a political question in our relationship with Russia
and that it must be addressed in further discussions on missile
defense and strategic arms reductions.
But all decisions relating to U.S. missile defense
capabilities, system architecture, and deployment timeframes
cannot be held captive to these talks. Some of our witnesses
have testified that Russia will ``get on board'' with our
missile defense plans only when they perceive that we are
serious, deadly serious, and that they risk being left behind.
It is time to get serious about missile defense.
Fifth, this committee has heard several recommendations
relating to the subject of today's hearing. The shadow of the
ABM Treaty continues to undermine U.S. missile defense plans.
Several witnesses have noted that missile defense plans
currently under development by this administration are designed
more to tiptoe around the ABM Treaty than they are to actually
intercept incoming ballistic missiles.
For example, the administration has chosen only those
sites, radar configurations, interceptor numbers, and
technologies that would fit most easily within ABM Treaty
constraints. The administration has not selected sites and
capabilities primarily on how well suited they would be for the
task of defending America.
In sum, while there is clear consensus on the nature of the
threat and the need for a national missile defense, the
administration continues to adhere to an outdated treaty. As a
result, we are squandering precious time in developing an
effective system that will protect America's interests from
missile attack.
The committee looks forward this morning to an examination
of these issues by our distinguished witnesses. First allow me
to introduce our two panels. Our lead witness is the Honorable
Stephen Hadley who served from 1989 to 1993 as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy under
President Bush. Mr. Hadley was responsible for DOD nuclear
weapons policy, ballistic missile defense, and arms control.
Mr. Hadley is now a partner at Shea & Gardner law firm here in
Washington, DC.
Our second witness is the Honorable David Smith who served
as chief negotiator to the Defense and Space Talks from 1989 to
1991. In this role, he worked to negotiate an agreement with
the Soviets to allow deployment of defenses against ballistic
missiles. And I note that in 1985 and 1986, he served as a
professional staff member on this committee where he advised
Senator Lugar on arms control issues. Ambassador Smith
currently serves as president of Global Horizons, an
international consulting firm.
Our third witness is the Honorable Robert Joseph. Mr.
Joseph served during the Bush administration as U.S.
Commissioner to the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative
Commission. Ambassador Joseph has a distinguished background at
the Defense Department where he worked on a wide range of arms
control issues, including missile defense, nuclear testing, and
nonproliferation. Since 1993, Ambassador Joseph has been on
detail from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the
National Defense University.
On our second panel will be Mr. William Lee who served as
senior analyst on nuclear targeting at the Defense Intelligence
Agency from 1981 to 1985. From 1985 to 1992, Mr. Lee was the
Senior Executive Service Officer at DIA charged with military
production, R&D, and collection systems. Mr. Lee is now an
adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
The committee welcomes all four of our distinguished
witnesses and look forward to hearing from each of you.
Gentlemen, thank you and we will ask you, Mr. Hadley, to begin
the presentations.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN HADLEY, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, PARTNER, SHEA & GARDNER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hadley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great
privilege to have the opportunity to appear before this
committee today.
I want to begin by saying that I strongly support the
effort to provide an effective national missile defense for the
United States. It is true that the current provisions of the
ABM Treaty prevent us from doing so, and hence the questions
raised about the future of the treaty.
In your opening comments, you pointed out that there are
those who believe that the United States should first seek to
negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty with Russia so as to permit
a national missile defense system. What is often overlooked is
the fact that the United States made a serious effort in 1991
and 1992 to negotiate changes to the treaty to permit that
deployment, and I thought it might be useful this morning for
me to describe briefly those efforts, to discuss how the United
States might go about renewing a discussion with Russia on ABM
Treaty revision, and to assess the prospects for success.
I have a longer statement on this subject. If it is all
right, Mr. Chairman, I will just go through and hit the
highlights.
Senator Hagel. That is fine. Your complete statement will
be included in the record.
Mr. Hadley. Thank you.
Many do not realize that on November 26, 1991, U.S.
representatives met with representatives from the Soviet Union,
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and tabled an outline
for a new ABM Treaty regime. This new regime would have
permitted ballistic missile defenses but limited to what was
required to protect against small ballistic missile attacks.
The proposal was very concrete. We proposed an upper limit on
the number of ABM interceptors, a limited number of
geographically dispersed sites at which they could be deployed,
a limit on the number of interceptors at each site. We proposed
eliminating the constraints of the treaty on development and
testing of ABM systems, and we proposed a limited duration for
the agreement.
These suggestions were listened to attentively by the
participants and were followed in January 1992 by a public
statement from President Yeltsin in which he called for a
global system for ballistic missile protection of the world
community that could be based on the reorientation of the
United States SDI program, as well as high level technologies
developed by Russia in its defense complex.
This was a real breakthrough. It was a Russian leader
formally acknowledging that ballistic missile defenses have an
important role to play in the post-cold war world.
The Bush administration informed President Yeltsin that it
welcomed his suggestions, and indeed in a summit meeting in
June 1992, President Yeltsin and President Bush formalized
cooperations between their two countries on a global protection
system. They established a high level working group to explore
on a priority basis three issues: potential sharing of early
warning information, potential cooperation in developing
ballistic missile defense capabilities with Russia and our
allies, and a legal basis for cooperation, including necessary
amendments to the ABM Treaty.
Considerable progress was made. A number of working groups
were established. Progress was made in defining a workable
concept for a GPS system, in defining specific areas of
technical cooperation, in developing means for sharing of early
warning information, and even undertaking the planning for a
joint deployment of the theater missile defense capabilities of
the two sides.
Regrettably, these discussions ground to a halt in October
1992 when it became clear that the outcome of the upcoming
Presidential election would not be the reelection of President
Bush.
Under the Clinton administration, discussions continued
between the United States and Russia on the subject of
ballistic missile defenses, but with a completely different
focus. Instead of trying to lead to a revision of the ABM
Treaty that would have facilitated deployment of ballistic
missile defenses, the administration's discussions instead
focused on the so-called demarcation issue and, as you noted in
your opening statement, resulted in, in fact, extending the
constraints of the ABM Treaty to our ability to deploy theater
ballistic missile defenses.
It is very regrettable that the Clinton administration did
not build on the work that had been done in the Bush
administration on a global protection system and on a U.S./
Russian dialog on how to amend the ABM Treaty to permit
national missile defense. In the intervening 6 years, we have
lost valuable time, and it may simply be too late for
negotiated amendments to the ABM Treaty. Obviously, the
political situation, particularly in Russia, is much more
difficult to deal with than it was 6 years ago.
My own view is, however, that it is worth making the effort
but we need to think very concretely about how we restart the
dialog with Russia.
In the balance of my statement, I describe in some detail
the kind of framework we need to pursue in order to have any
chance of successful discussions with Russia. It really has
three parts.
First, we need, I think, to put national missile defense in
a context of a global effort against the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. That
has to involve our allies, but it also has to involve Russia
and, to some extent, China because the reality is they are
potentially the biggest proliferators on the block. And we need
to see ballistic missile defense as one piece and, indeed, a
contribution that we can make to this global initiative against
weapons of mass destruction.
Second, we need to have a new concept of deterrence that is
more appropriate for the post-cold war world. In the cold war,
when we had a single overwhelming Soviet military threat,
deterrence based on threat of retaliation with offensive
nuclear forces made sense. It is not clear that simply relying
on deterrence through threat of retaliation is sufficient any
longer, and I talk in my statement as to why that is the case.
I would argue we need to have a new concept of deterrence that
is based on both offensive nuclear forces to provide
traditional deterrence and the ability to protect against
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them
should deterrence fail. And this is a concept that ought to be
attractive both to the Russians as well as to us.
Finally, I would propose, consistent with that concept,
that we go to the Russians with a so-called package deal in
which we would propose to Russia a coupling of significant
reductions in the numerical ceilings in the START II treaty
with a revision of the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of
numerically limited, but still capable ballistic missile
defenses to protect the territory of the two nations. I think
that is something that is both in the United States' and
Russia's national interest, and it is in that context that we
might have an opportunity of some success in those discussions.
I agree with you that the only way to go into those
discussions is making it clear that our NMD program is going to
go forward, and if at the end of the day, those discussions are
not successful, then we are not going to let the ABM Treaty
prevent us from protecting the country against these threats.
But I think the possibility of negotiations is something we
should pursue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen J. Hadley
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.
It is a great privilege to have the opportunity to appear before
you today to testify concerning national missile defense and its impact
on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
I strongly support the effort to provide an effective national
missile defense for the United States. The current provisions of the
ABM Treaty prevent the United States from doing so. Hence the serious
questions being raised about the future of the Treaty.
Some experts argue that the United States should act now to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty or that the ABM Treaty effectively lapsed
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Other experts argue that
before adopting either of these courses of action, the United States
should first seek to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty that would
permit the deployment of a national missile defense system. What is
often overlooked is that the United States made a serious effort in
1991-1992 to do precisely that--to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty
with the Russian government.
I thought it might be useful this morning to describe briefly these
earlier efforts, to discuss how the United States might go about
renewing a discussion of ABM Treaty relief with the Russians, and to
assess the prospects for success.
the global protection system or ``gps'' concept
The process began on September 27, 1991, when President Bush
publicly called on the leadership of the then-Soviet Union to ``join us
in taking immediate, concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of
non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile
strikes whatever their source.'' On October 5, 1991, then-Soviet
President Gorbachev responded by stating that ``we are ready to discuss
the U.S. proposal on non-nuclear ABM systems'' and suggested that the
two countries examine the possibility of creating joint ballistic
missile warning systems. This statement was a clear recognition by the
Soviets, and confirmed by the Russians, that the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (``WMD'')
represented as big a threat to them as to the United States.
Encouraged by this response, on November 26, 1991, U.S.
representatives met with representatives of the Soviet Union, Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazahkstan to table an outline for a new ABM
treaty regime. This new regime would have permitted deployment of
ballistic missile defenses but limited to what was required to protect
against small ballistic missile attacks. The proposal envisioned an
upper limit on the number of deployed ABM interceptors; the deployment
of ground based interceptors at a limited number of geographically
dispersed sites; a limit on the number of interceptors at each site;
elimination of the ABM Treaty's constraints on development and testing
of ABM systems; and a limited duration for the agreement so as to
permit deployment in the future of more advanced systems such as space-
based interceptors.
Meanwhile, dramatic events were occurring in Moscow which led
ultimately to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
an independent Russia with its first democratically elected president,
Boris Yeltsin. In speeches on January 29 and January 31, 1992,
President Yeltsin called for ``a global system for protection of the
world community [that could be] based on a reorientation of the U.S.
[Strategic Defense Initiative] to make use of high technologies
developed in Russia's defense complex.''
This was a real breakthrough that stunned even the most committed
U.S. advocates of ballistic missile defense. A Russian leader formally
acknowledged that ballistic missile defense had an important role to
play in the post-Cold War world.
The Bush Administration informed President Yeltsin that it welcomed
his proposal for a ``global protection system'' (or ``GPS'')--that the
United States shared his bold vision and was prepared to work with him
toward that goal. The United States moved quickly to consult with its
friends and allies in Europe and Asia to make clear that they would be
in on the ground floor and included in any such system. The United
States sought specifically to reassure the British and French that such
a system would not undermine the credibility of their own strategic
nuclear deterrents. The United States particularly sought to enlist the
NATO alliance in the cooperative GPS effort.
Everyone understood that to deploy a global protection system would
require changes to the ABM Treaty. It was believed that cooperation in
developing the system would allow Russia to accept its deployment and
the changes in the ABM Treaty that such deployment would require. This
approach would change thinking in the United States as well, for if the
world community in general and Russia in particular were ready to
develop and deploy defenses against limited ballistic missile attacks,
then even the most skeptical critics in the United States would have to
give way. Thus cooperation on a global protection system offered the
hope of breaking the log jam on the ABM Treaty that plagued the U.S.
domestic political system.
u.s. russian discussions on a global protection system
At their summit meeting in June, 1992, President Yeltsin and
President Bush formalized cooperation between their two countries on a
global protection system. In the joint summit statement issued on June
16, 1992, the two Presidents agreed that ``their two nations should
work together with allies and other interested states in developing a
concept for a system [to protect against limited ballistic missile
attacks] as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.'' To this end, they
established a high-level group to explore on a priority basis:
The potential for sharing of early waming information
through the establishment of an early warning center.
The potential for cooperation with participating states in
developing ballistic missiles defense capabilities and
technologies.
The development of a legal basis for cooperation including
new treaties and agreements and possible changes to existing
treaties and agreements necessary to implement a global
protection system.
The high-level group established by the two Presidents met twice,
during July and September of 1992, and established working groups to
pursue specific subjects. Considerable progress was made in developing
a workable concept for the GPS system, in defining specific areas for
technical cooperation, in developing means for sharing of early warning
information, and even in undertaking a joint deployment of the two
sides' theater missile defense capabilities. The activity of the high-
level group was suspended in November of 1992, however, with the
outcome of the U.S. Presidential election.
Under the Clinton Administration, discussions continued between the
United States and Russia on the subject of ballistic missile defense.
But the primary object of those discussions changed dramatically.
Instead of leading to the revision of the ABM Treaty to facilitate the
deployment of ballistic missile defenses, these discussions instead
resulted in extending the Treaty's limits and imposing constraints on
the ability of the United States to deploy systems to defend against
theater ballistic missiles. This is ironic because the ABM Treaty does
not by its terms impose any limits on defenses against theater
ballistic missiles systems. The results of these Clinton Administration
discussions are now before this Committee.
restarting the dialogue with russia
It is extremely unfortunate that the Clinton Administration did not
build on the work done during the Bush Administration on a ``global
protection system'' and on the U.S./Russian dialogue on how to amend
the ABM Treaty to permit national missile defense. If it had, we might
be a lot closer today to the consensual deployment of such a system. In
the interim, the political climate for anything positive in the U.S./
Russian relationship has deteriorated badly. We have lost valuable time
and it may simply be too late for negotiated amendments to the ABM
Treaty.
My own view, however, is that it is worth making the effort, for
all the reasons that caused the Bush Administration to undertake the
dialogue in the first place. But how we go about restarting the
dialogue is very important.
what is the right framework for working the problem?
The U.S. national missile defense effort and the issue of revision
of the ABM Treaty have been extremely sensitive issues for Russia. They
have been as divisive within the U.S. domestic political debate. In
truth the U.S. is unlikely to be successful in getting Russian support
for any revision of the Treaty unless it can demonstrate strong
bipartisan political support for the U.S. approach.
What is needed is a framework in which to view national missile
defense that offers the prospect simultaneously of creating a new
consensus within the U.S. political debate, offering an acceptable way
for the Russians to accept our ABM Treaty proposals, and reassuring our
own allies who are in some instances quite skeptical about U.S.
national missile defense efforts. The framework also needs to provide a
basis for dealing constructively with China on this issue.
This framework also needs to reconcile three competing U.S. policy
priorities: discouraging (if not preventing) the proliferation of WMD
and the means to deliver them, reducing the Russian nuclear posture in
ways that are stabilizing, and pursuing the development and deployment
of ballistic missile defenses.
Within the U.S. domestic political debate, these three priorities
have often been at war with one another. The partisans of non-
proliferation have seen the pursuit of national missile defense as
evidence of lack of commitment to and confidence in the non-
proliferation effort. The partisans of reducing the danger posed by
Russian nuclear weapons have seen national missile defense as fatally
undermining the prospects for START II in the Russian Duma and any hope
for a START III. The partisans of national missile defense have felt
stymied by both of the other two groups.
Conflict among these policy priorities has also bedeviled our
approach to these issues in dealing with other governments. The
Russians have made clear they will link any START II ratification to
continued U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty as written. Even some of our
closest allies are worried that the U.S. national missile defense
program represents either a neoisolationist retreat from the world or a
vehicle for U.S. intervention ``anytime/anywhere.''
Finally, by appearing to be a unilateral initiative providing a
capability available only to the United States, national missile
defense threatens U.S. leadership of the global effort against the
proliferation of WMD.
1. Embed Missile Defense Firmly in a U.S. Strategy Against WMD
The starting point for resolving these conflicts is to treat the
U.S. ballistic missile defense effort as part of a comprehensive U.S.
strategy for dealing with weapons of mass destruction (``WMD'') and the
means to deliver them. That strategy of necessity must be a global
strategy, one in which the U.S. can lead but cannot dictate. Such a
strategy can succeed only if the U.S. can enlist its closest allies
despite increasing economic competition and trade frictions between
these allies and the United States. It can succeed only if the U.S. can
enlist Russia and China, two of the greatest potential sources of both
WMD and the means to deliver them.
But in engaging these parties the U.S. has on its side the fact
that proliferation is a serious challenge that threatens each of these
countries as well as the United States. Europe cannot feel sanguine
about an Iraq with WMD and long-range ballistic missiles any more than
Japan can feel sanguine about North Korea. Russia and China should also
be concerned about North Korea and would certainly be concerned about
the nuclear-armed Japan that could follow if the North Korea problem is
not managed properly.
The United States needs to go to its key allies, to Russia, and
perhaps even to China at the highest levels to propose a revitalized
effort against WMD jointly led by these key nations. Particularly with
respect to Russia, such an undertaking would provide both a positive
element in the U.S./Russian relationship and the best approach for
obtaining Russian cooperation--assuming the Kosovo crisis is resolved
without a total breach between the U.S. and Russia.
Success of a joint effort against WMD will require probably lengthy
strategic consultations between the United States and these governments
to develop a common assessment of the risks posed by countries as Iran,
Iraq, and North Korea and the list of measures that will need to be
pursued. These measures need to include:
Better means of collecting and analyzing intelligence
information about potential proliferators.
Regional strategies to try to resolve underlying tensions
and disputes that provide part of the motivation for WMD
proliferation (such as in the Middle East).
Security strategies that deter the acquisition and use of
WMD and the means to deliver them by states seeking to coerce
their neighbors (such as Iraq).
Enhanced export controls on a multilateral basis with real
sanctions for noncompliance.
Improved capabilities to deal with both the military and
civilian consequences of WMD use (including improved detectors,
vaccines, antidotes, protective clothing, and emergency
response procedures and practices).
Improved technical and operational means to detect and
defeat the various means of delivery of WMD (including
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and
unconventional means).
Improved conventional capabilities (including weapons and
sensors) to locate and destroy production, storage, and support
facilities for WMD and associated delivery systems (though with
obvious limitations on what could be shared with other
countries).
Partisans of ballistic missile defense must recognize that BMD is
only one of several measures that need to be pursued in dealing with
WMD risks, while partisans of nonproliferation (or the risks of WMD
delivery by unconventional means) must acknowledge that ballistic
missile defense needs to be pursued as well.
This framework allows the U.S. to offer to contribute ballistic
missile defense capability to those countries joining in this
comprehensive effort against the proliferation of WMD. The U.S. is
already making such a contribution to some degree in its cooperation
with Israel on the Arrow program, its sale of Patriot missile systems
to close allies, and certain technology sharing with allies under
existing cooperative agreements. But significant technology transfer
restrictions prevent wider sharing.
The foregoing framework also provides a better basis for dealing
with China on the issue of ballistic missile defense. It would allow
the U.S. to offer China a leadership role in this initiative if China
were willing to commit itself to the key elements of the overall
strategy--in particular, tough export control limitations, an end to
transfer of Chinese WMD and missile technology to key countries of
concern, and a halt to its own ballistic missile threat to its
neighbors.
2. Define a new Concept of 21st Century Deterrence
In a Cold War world of a single overwhelming Soviet military
threat, deterrence could be based in large measure on the threat of
retaliation by offensive nuclear forces. With a post-Communist Russia
no longer a global threat to U.S. interests, there is a real question
about the continued requirement for this concept of deterrence as to
Russia. With respect to the rest of the 21st century world, even more
questions can be raised.
A principal U.S. national security concern is to keep countries
like North Korea and Iraq from threatening U.S. regional allies, vital
U.S. interests, or critical resources. To deter or defend against this
challenge, the United States and its allies must be capable of bringing
conventional military power into a region and of using it against a
threatening state if necessary. The principal threat to this ability is
WMD directed against U.S. military forces and allies in the region--and
against the U.S. homeland, in hopes that a U.S. President will be
deterred from putting U.S. forces into the region or using them against
the offending country.
It is an open question whether the threat of even nuclear
retaliation represents a credible deterrent to the use of WMD in this
context. Is a regime as unstable and paranoid as the North Korean
leadership susceptible to ``rational'' deterrence? How credible is the
threat of nuclear retaliation against even states like North Korea and
Iraq--especially if they were to use WMD not against the U.S. but a
U.S. ally? Would we really respond to a chemical weapon attack on a
U.S. ally with U.S. nuclear weapons? To a chemical attack even on U.S.
forward deployed forces?
There is still a role for deterrence by threat of retaliation--even
nuclear retaliation: to help deter a North Korea from using its
overwhelming conventional military capability against South Korean and
U.S. forces; to help dissuade Saddam Hussein from using chemical and
biological weapons such as in the Gulf War. For this purpose, however,
the United States does not need anything like the number of deployed
nuclear weapons that it had during the Cold War. But it increasingly
needs to enhance deterrence by coupling the threat of retaliation with
the ability to deny an opponent the benefit of any WMD capability. This
is the contribution that active defenses (such as ballistic missile
defense) and other measures can make to deterrence.
The United States needs to develop a concept for deterrence in the
21st century based on both offensive and defensive forces, on a balance
between threat of retaliation and ability to deny, on a combination of
dissuasion, defense, and counterforce. A great deal of thinking is
required to develop this concept. But it should already be influencing
U.S. national security strategy and policy. It can help support the
case for ballistic missile defense.
3. Propose to Russia a ``Package Deal'' on Nuclear Forces and Deployed
Defenses
This concept of deterrence based on a mix of offensive and
defensive forces also makes sense as an approach to Russia's own
national security requirements. It would permit Russia to reduce the
number of its nuclear forces to a level that it could sustain
economically while still maintaining parity with the United States. It
would mark a return to the more traditional Russian emphasis on
defensive forces.
To operationalize this concept, the United States should propose to
Russia a ``package deal'' coupling a significant reduction in the
numerical ceilings in the START II Treaty with a revision of the ABM
Treaty to permit the deployment of numerically limited but still
capable ballistic missile defenses protecting the territory of the two
nations. The theater missile defenses of the two sides should remain
unconstrained.
Further analytical work would be required to determine the proper
level for strategic nuclear forces of the two sides. The establishment
of any such level would also have to be contingent upon no significant
increase in the forces of other nuclear weapons states (particularly
chemical) that might threaten either country. But the level might be
expected to be significantly below the 2,500 level set as a target for
START III.
Similar analysis would be required to determine the nature of the
limits to be contained in an amended ABM Treaty. But it is fully
expected that the national missile defense system that could be
deployed by either country under these limits would not undermine the
credibility or effectiveness of either the U.S. or Russian strategic
nuclear deterrents even at reduced levels. The U.S. should insure that
this is also true for the French and U.K. strategic deterrents, which
are likely to represent a much more sophisticated capability than can
be handled by the current U.S. national missile defense system design.
While such a ``package'' approach would reduce the economic burden
of Russia's nuclear forces, it could mean a significant new economic
burden for Russia in the form of ballistic missile defense deployments.
Ironically, however, Russia already maintains the world's only
operating ABM system, still has extensive air defenses, and produces
its own theater missile defense systems.
Still, the United States could consider as part of the ``package
deal'' the possibility of cooperative efforts in the field of ballistic
missile defense--as part of a comprehensive global strategy involving
U.S. allies and other countries in dealing with WMD and the means to
deliver them. Such potential cooperation--again, also involving U.S.
friends and allies--might include:
Expanded ballistic missile launch notification, sharing of
sensor early warning data on ballistic missile launches, and a
joint ballistic missile warning center.
Interoperable theater missile defense systems--the U.S. PAC
III and the Russian S300--that could be offered for sale in
tandem as agreed between the two countries by a U.S./Russian
joint venture to countries threatened by proliferating
neighbors. (This could both provide an important contribution
to a comprehensive global WMD strategy and offer U.S. support
for Russian access to a legitimate export market for its TMD
systems.)
A possible U.S./Russian joint venture to develop a ground-
based national missile defense system that the U.S., its
allies, and Russia could deploy, thereby assisting Russia in
meeting its own needs for ballistic missile defenses.
This latter proposal raises the controversial issue of sharing of
ballistic missile defense technology with the Russians. This is not a
new proposal. President Ronald Reagan offered to share just such
technology with the Soviet Union as part of his SDI initiative, and the
Bush Administration defined several joint development activities to be
pursued by U.S. and Russian scientists in the field of ballistic
missile defense.
Given the number of strategic ballistic missiles that the Russians
would continue to possess, they would not need to be able
technologically to defeat a U.S. national missile defense system but
could simply overwhelm it. Perhaps a greater risk is that the Russians
might provide critical technological information to countries against
which the U.S. system really was directed, such as Iraq or North Korea.
The issue warrants greater study. But such a technology sharing program
with Russia would help to rebut the argument that by pursuing a
national missile defense program the United States was simply seeking
unilateral advantage over Russia.
Thank you for your time and attention.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Hadley, thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. SMITH, FORMER CHIEF U.S. NEGOTIATOR
TO THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS; PRESIDENT, GLOBAL HORIZONS
INC., ANNANDALE, VA
Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
inviting me. I would also like to thank you particularly for
recalling my service here at the committee. Unfortunately, we
were dealing with many of the same issues on the ABM Treaty
when I was a staffer here in the mid-1980's, and it is a shame
that we cannot get over that.
Second, I would like to say that I would wholeheartedly
associate myself with your remarks at the outset. I think you
are absolutely right, and I hope that my statement here will
perhaps reinforce some of the points which you have made.
Your staff has asked me to take a look at a rather long and
complicated list of issues, and I have put together a fairly
comprehensive statement. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to submit it for the record and summarize what I
have to say.
Senator Hagel. It will be included in the record.
Ambassador Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My remarks this morning will focus on five areas, and I
would like to take them in turn.
First, while it has been said both by my friend, Mr.
Hadley, and by yourself at the outset, I think it is important
to set the stage. I think it is very important the United
States proceed apace with national missile defense. That is the
first point that I think lays the groundwork for everything
else I have to say.
I would refer to the July 15, 1998 report of the bipartisan
Rumsfeld Commission, and I will not go over all of their
conclusions, but I think two of them bear repeating.
One is that concerted efforts by a number of overtly or
potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with
biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the
United States. It seems to me that that is about all we need to
conclude that we have a problem here and we need to do
something about it.
The second conclusion that I think ought to be
highlighted--and I do not think it has gotten enough attention
since the commission's report was published--is that plausible
scenarios include rebasing or transfer of operational missiles,
sea and air-launch options. The implications of that are clear.
That means that the system that we deploy tomorrow is not going
to be good enough the day after tomorrow. It is like anything
else in human history. I do not know why we should be so
shocked, but the fact is we need to start thinking about what
we are going to do next.
Now, if the Rumsfeld Commission was not enough, recall that
not 6 weeks after the Rumsfeld Commission issued its report,
the North Koreans gave us a practical demonstration with the
launch of their Taepo Dong-1. This overflew Japan on August 31,
1998. And let us remember, it was a three-stage missile. Our
intelligence community was shocked that it was a three-stage
missile, and one of those stages was solid fuel. This is a
broke, hermetic State that has managed to go from a basic Scud
infrastructure to building a three-stage missile, including
solid fuel technology. I think we better watch out out there.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that there remains no doubt
that a ballistic missile threat to the United States is
developing rapidly, nor is there any doubt that national
missile defense is the right answer. And I offer you three
reasons.
The first is the most basic. ``Security against foreign
danger,'' wrote James Madison in Federalist Number 41, ``is one
of the primitive objects of civil society, an avowed and
essential object of the American Union.'' Every American
citizen should have the defense that our technology and our
wealth can afford.
The second reason for national missile defense is
geopolitical. Now, there are dedicated opponents of national
missile defense who will revel in telling you that why would
anybody go to ballistic missiles when there are 100 other ways
someone could harm the United States. And, of course, there are
100 other ways someone could harm the United States. We have
seen embassy bombings in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi. We have had
some homegrown problems here in the United States. Clearly
there are ways to do harm to the United States and to
Americans. That is terrorism. We need to make the distinction
between terrorism and geopolitical tools, and ballistic
missiles are geopolitical tools.
The Rumsfeld Commission makes it very clear that there are
plenty of countries out there who are willing to spend their
scarce resources on developing ballistic missiles. Now, it is
unlikely those countries are doing that just to create some
kind of a space-age car bomb. The fact is they see some other
use, and the use they see is they want to create an
asymmetrical capability with which to threaten the United
States, frankly to keep us from projecting our power into their
regions. They want to affect our calculations. It is a
geopolitical reason.
If somebody wants to throw a suitcase bomb at us, obviously
they can do that, and our Government ought to be working on
that. Do not misunderstand. But let us not confuse the two
issues.
The final reason I think we need to proceed with national
missile defense is to echo what my friend, Mr. Hadley, has
said, to complement our nonproliferation efforts. It seems to
me that if we make clear to countries who are thinking about
getting into this asymmetrical game, that the United States is
going to use its technology and its wealth to thwart their
plans, they might think twice. We might dissuade them. Not all
of them, but it seems to me that it is a necessary ingredient
of a serious nonproliferation effort.
Now, I think those are good, solid reasons why we need to
proceed with national missile defense. But we have a problem.
The fact is that national missile defense is blocked by the ABM
Treaty as it stands today. Mr. Chairman, there will be people
who will come in here and tell you that that is not the case,
that they have found ways to make things treaty compliant. The
three of us know exactly how the United States makes treaty
compliance decisions for its own behavior, and let me assure
you that in the end of the day, there is no such thing as a
treaty compliant national missile defense deployment.
Let me be clear. The only thing that we can deploy is a
second Safeguard system from the 1960's. That is all we can
deploy. We need to understand that even the so-called C-1
architecture, even confined to 20 missiles, even deployed at
Grand Forks, North Dakota is going to involve some kind of a
negotiation with the Russians. There is simply no such thing as
a treaty compliant NMD.
Let me give you three of the issues that will come up in
these kinds of discussions on the ABM Treaty.
The first is territorial defense. It is found in article I.
The root of the problem here is this. Over the years, when it
did not look like we were going to do much, we developed a kind
of shorthand, a common parlance with which we said what the ABM
Treaty permits. It permits 100 interceptors at one site. And
that shorthand grew up as lingua franca. That is what we
decided it meant. Well, we were not really doing much, and so
it was a good textbook description, but there are some
problems.
The notion that there is a treaty compliant defense forgets
that the 100 interceptors at one site was not an object in
itself. It was a tool to implement the treaty's object and
purpose, and the treaty's object and purpose is to prohibit a
territorial defense. Now, that stands in stark contrast with
the stated purpose of our current deployment readiness program
for national missile defense, and it is--I quote--``The NMD
system will provide defense of all territory of all the 50
States.''
Now, anyone who has stood in front of a TV camera or run
for elected office, as you have, Mr. Chairman, would understand
that we might be able to weave other arguments around this, but
it is going to be a real tough sell to stand up and say that
territorial defense is not territorial defense. I can do it but
not in a 15-second sound bite. It is not going to go over well.
Moreover, when you get in the room with the Russians, they
have absolutely no obligation or any interest to make this easy
for us. So, when you hear administration witnesses telling you
we are just going to go over and get the Russians to nod their
heads up and down to something like this, it is not going to be
that easy.
The second issue that is going to arise on any NMD
deployment under the ABM Treaty is the issue of radars. Now,
this may sound elementary, but I think it really does bear
repeating. The world is round. The United States territory is
rather large. From Calais to Key West to Kure to Attu and back
again, it is a large piece of that globe. And electromagnetic
waves travel in straight lines. The reason that the ABM Treaty
requires that the one, single ABM radar be deployed in a 150-
kilometer radius surrounding your launch site was to use those
elementary physical principles to make sure you only had a
territorial defense. It is not a game to see if American
scientists can somehow defend the country from North Dakota.
They cannot, by the way. But that is not the purpose of it. The
purpose is to keep that one radar in North Dakota, knowing that
the electromagnetic waves have to go straight so that you
cannot get out there and defend the whole territory.
It is not that easy just to say, oh, it is a matter of a
radar. Once again, I hear administration witnesses saying
things like that. We will just get the Russians to agree to the
radar. They are going to go right back to the purpose of the
treaty, and the reason for the prohibitions on the radars is
the object and purpose of the treaty: to prevent a territorial
defense.
What I am really getting at here is there is no such thing
as a modest treaty amendment.
Now, the third issue that is going to arise is where do you
put the NMD system. We have a problem even if you want to go to
Grand Forks. The ABM Treaty requires that your ABM system be in
a 150-kilometer radius that contains ballistic missiles. Well,
the idea here was--these are the concepts of mutual assured
destruction and crisis stability--that if you defend just the
missile field, or just the national command authority, you
assure stability because you are assuring some kind of survival
for a second strike capability. If you defend the entire
territory, that becomes destabilizing. That is why the missile
defense is supposed to be in either a missile field or the
national capital. There is a reason for that.
Well, guess what? We have shut down our missile field at
Grand Forks. The BRAC wanted it closed. It is shut down and the
missiles have been moved to Malmstrom, Montana. There are no
missiles at Grand Forks.
Now, what I am hearing now is the Pentagon has come up with
the latest plan that they are going to draw a new circle which
will take in the eastern-most silos that belong to Minot Air
Force Base, draw their 150-kilometer circle, and say that that
is the Grand Forks ABM deployment area. It just seems to me it
is too clever by half, Mr. Chairman. If the Russians did
something like that, we would be raising it with them. I do not
think that is going to float in the American compliance
context.
Finally, let me note that coverage of all 50 States, if you
are going to do that, really requires a deployment from a
single site in Alaska, not in Grand Forks, North Dakota. It is
my understanding that consequently that is what the
administration is currently--and I stress currently--planning
to do. Now, it should go without saying that if you are going
to put your single site in Alaska, everything I said does not
matter. You have to change article III because you cannot now
put your single site in Alaska.
Multiple fixed ground base sites, sea or space-based
national missile defense, the development of sea or space-based
national missile defense, and advanced sensors which could
substitute for what the treaty calls an ABM radar are
altogether prohibited by the ABM Treaty as it stands today.
Mr. Chairman, basically we have an urgent dilemma. What I
have tried to set up before you is this. We have to do national
missile defense. The ABM Treaty, as it stands today, blocks
national missile defense. So, what do we do?
Frankly, Mr. Chairman, continued U.S. adherence to the 1972
ABM Treaty is of no strategic value to the United States. The
ABM Treaty is not a cornerstone of stability for the new
millennium. It is a delicate diplomatic problem for today.
Now, that said, I wholeheartedly agree with those who say
that our security relationship with Russia is important, that
Russia is in a crucial transition, and I do not see any reason
needlessly to provoke them into some kind of a diplomatic rift
over the ABM Treaty. I favor trying to negotiate something,
although I recognize, as Mr. Hadley pointed out, today that is
not going to be easy. But the fact is the date at which we are
going to need some ABM Treaty modifications in place is fast
approaching. In fact, it is in about 18 months. That is not me
speaking. That is the schedule of the Clinton administration's
national missile defense program. We have got to have something
done in about 18 months.
There were better times as Mr. Hadley pointed out. There
were times when we had better relations with Russia. There were
times when there was less confusion in Moscow. There were times
when there was no Kosovo crisis. There were times when we had
more time. Unfortunately, the administration abandoned the
Ross-Mamedov talks in 1993, and 6 years during which we could
have been talking have been squandered.
I think it is still worth a shot, but it is going to be
difficult. As a former negotiator, let me offer some points on
how to do it if we do it.
First, the United States should carefully resolve what
national missile defense it needs. And there I mean deployment
of the near-term system, as well as development and testing of
follow-on systems. We should then craft an integral negotiating
position accordingly and then approach the Russians. I will not
go into it in detail here, but I do have some ideas on what it
is we ought to be negotiating if you are interested when we get
to questions.
The one thing I want to say, though, is the worst thing we
could do is to do this piecemeal and run off to Moscow and
negotiate some kind of a deal, pay some kind of a price, just
to get them to nod their heads up and down to the C-1 or C-2
architecture. That is the absolute worst negotiating mistake we
could make.
Second, we need to announce an NMD deployment decision now.
Third, we need to embark upon a vigorous research,
development, and testing program for national missile defense
systems which may follow our initial fixed, ground-based
deployment.
Fourth, in addition to our deployment announcement, we need
to realize that we do have some leverage. The fact is that
Russia's economic plight is sending their strategic forces down
regardless of what we do. They would like an agreement for
future reduction of strategic offensive forces. This is
different from the cold war. They want an agreement for further
reductions. We can get creative, roll this all into one
negotiation. We may actually be able to turn this into a win-
win because there may be some other things the Russians would
like, like real cooperation on early warning or cooperation on
theater missile defense. This does not have to be just the
United States getting its way. There are things the Russians
want. We could come to an agreement.
Fifth, politely, reasonably, but firmly we have to put a
time limit on negotiations.
And sixth, we should make no commitments on longevity of
the agreement beyond the time during which we think we can live
with what it is we have negotiated.
Now, I cannot tell you what the outcome is going to be, Mr.
Chairman. I think it is worth a try. If the effort comes to
naught, at least we can say we have prepared the way by leaving
no stone unturned. I do not believe the American political
system will do any less than that. I think we have got to give
a try on this negotiation. I cannot guarantee you that in the
end we may not be faced with the stark reality of having to
withdraw from the treaty. We may.
Now, there is a myth here that I would like to explode, and
that is that somehow deploying defenses, negotiating on the ABM
Treaty somehow ipso facto makes agreements for reductions of
strategic offensive weapons go away. It is simply not the case.
As I have stated, the Russians have a greater interest than we
do right now in reducing nuclear weapons and doing that in a
negotiated agreement with the United States. It is not clear
that if we go into a negotiation, we take their security
concerns into account, we offer them something that maybe they
perceive a stake in, and we can have some kind of a negotiation
to go down, which is right now their paramount concern is that
we go down equally, that we cannot have some kind of an
agreement here. I think we need to get over this myth that just
because the Russians scream and say that is the end of START,
that somehow that necessarily needs to be true.
My guess is that if we were really serious, very much like
NATO expansion, they will scream till the moment they realize
we are really serious, and then they will deal with reality and
they will try and negotiate something.
It seems to me that is a pretty good foundation for the
kind of talks that we ought to have here.
Now, since I am suggesting that we have some kind of talks,
I think I have to tie up one other loose end, and that is the
agreements on the ABM Treaty signed at New York on September
26, 1997 on succession and demarcation.
These agreements should have been sent to the Senate for
advice and consent, and in his absence, I would like to commend
the distinguished chairman of this committee for insisting upon
that. Assuming that you are successful, Mr. Chairman, in that
venture, I respectfully suggest that these agreements are not
in the interest of the United States and the Senate should
reject them. I will offer you three main objections. Once
again, I will summarize and if you care to get into it in
questions, I would be glad to do that.
First, the memorandum of understanding adding Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as parties to the ABM Treaty is a
strategic absurdity. Whatever you think of the ABM Treaty's
merits, you have to agree that the ABM Treaty was designed to
regulate a particular relationship between the United States
and the Soviet Union during the cold war. We have no strategic
relationship with Kazakhstan. I have the utmost respect for the
people of Kazakhstan, but we do not have a strategic
relationship with that country.
My second concern is the New York package not only fails to
achieve so-called demarcation between ABM Treaty limited ABM
systems and unlimited TMD systems. It actually leaves matters
worse than they had been. I will not go into all the details,
but the fact is that we have gotten ourselves into a literal
quagmire and we do not have demarcation. If you are an
interceptor with a velocity between 3 kilometers per second and
5.5 kilometers per second, the fact is you still have to go
through the same old U.S. internal compliance review, now
putting all of this stuff that the New York agreements have
superimposed into the mix. And if you have to go and debate
this with anybody in the SCC, you now not only have to discuss
it with Russia, you also have to discuss it with Kazakhstan,
Belarus, and Ukraine.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, my third objection to the seven
documents in the New York package is that they form literally a
new TMD treaty, in all but name. Once again, I will not go into
the details, but if you add up all of the requirements, all of
the declarations, it clearly becomes a whole set of new
obligations, a literal obstacle course for U.S. theater--I
stress theater--missile defense which has nothing to do with
the ABM Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, I know I have gone on at some length. My
conclusion is very brief.
Today it is imperative that the United States proceed apace
with national missile defense, and by that I mean deployment of
the near-term system and research, development, and testing of
follow-on systems. These are actions blocked by the 1972 ABM
Treaty as it stands today. We have two choices: withdraw in
accordance with article XV or seek to negotiate the changes we
need--and I emphasize the changes we need--in accordance with
article XIV. I recommend that we attempt to negotiate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David J. Smith
Mr. Chairman: It is indeed an honor to appear before the Committee
on Foreign Relations which I once served with great pride. I thank you
and your colleagues for inviting me to share my views on missile
defense and the ABM Treaty. In accordance with your invitation, my
remarks this morning will address five key points:
--First, it is imperative that the United States proceed apace with
National Missile Defense (NMD) to protect every American citizen,
maintain freedom of action in defense of our worldwide interests, and
complement our non proliferation efforts.
--Second, the ABM Treaty as it stands today blocks even the most
modest NMD--there is no such thing as Treaty compliant NMD.
--Third, we face an urgent dilemma. To proceed with NMD, we must
soon realize at least substantial modifications to the 1972 ABM Treaty.
Frankly, continued U.S. adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty is of no
strategic value to the U.S. That said, however, it is in the interest
of the United States to attempt to negotiate such ABM Treaty changes as
we need. As a former negotiator, I offer six recommendations:
1. Carefully resolve what NMD we need.
2. Announce an NMD deployment decision now.
3. Embark upon a vigorous research, development and testing
program for NMD systems which may follow our initial fixed,
ground based deployment.
4. Recognize that we have considerable leverage--carrots and
sticks--in a broad strategic negotiation which includes ABM
Treaty issues.
5. Set a time limit on negotiations.
6. Make no commitments beyond the period during which we
think we can live with what we negotiate.
--Continuing with the five points of my testimony, fourth,
substantial modifications to the 1972 ABM Treaty need not inexorably
halt agreements to reduce strategic offensive weapons, consistent with
U.S. interests.
--Fifth, the ABM Treaty agreements signed at New York on September
26, 1997--on succession and demarcation--are not in the interest of the
United States. These agreements should have been sent to the Senate for
Advice and Consent and I commend the distinguished Chairman of this
Committee for insisting upon it. Assuming success on that count, I
respectfully urge the Senate to reject them.
I shall address each point in turn.
the u.s. must proceed apace with nmd
On July 15, 1998 the bipartisan Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States chaired by former Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld issued a watershed report. The Commission's
principal findings bear emphasis in the context of this hearing:
--``Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile
nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or
nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States . .
. to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five
years of a decision to acquire such a capability.
--``During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that
such a decision had been made.
--``The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is
broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been
reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence
Community.
--``The Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and
accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is
eroding.
--``Plausible scenarios [include] re-basing or transfer of
operational missiles, sea and air-launch options.
--``The U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational
deployment.''
If the Rumsfeld Commission left any doubt about the imminence of
the ballistic missile threat, the final jolt had to be from the roar of
North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) missile as it overflew Japan on
August 31, 1998. Even if we accept Pyongyang's explanation that the
rocket was a space launch vehicle, it is less than a hop, skip and jump
from space launch to ICBM capability. Our attention should not be
diverted from the startling news that the North Korean missile
consisted of three stages: liquid fuel first and second stages, which
the Intelligence Community had thought to be the entire TD-1, plus a
solid fuel third stage. Never mind that the test was not fully
successful--beginning with just a SCUD-based single stage missile
infrastructure, hermetic and destitute North Korea has flight tested a
three stage missile with solid fuel technology! A TD-1 with a small
payload could reach Alaska, and North Korea is known already to be
working on a TD-2.
Mr. Chairman, there remains no doubt that a ballistic missile
threat to the U.S. is developing rapidly, or that NMD is the right
answer for three reasons.
The first is the most basic. ``Security against foreign danger,''
wrote James Madison in Federalist Number 41, ``is one of the primitive
objects of civil society . . . an avowed and essential object of the
American Union.'' Every American citizen, from sea to shining sea,
should have such defense as our technology and wealth can afford.
The second reason for NMD is geopolitical. Dedicated NMD opponents
revel in telling us that there are ways easier than ballistic missiles
to hurt the United States. Why, they ask, would an enemy resort to
ballistic missiles? In light of some of the recent violence which has
gripped our nation, this question deserves particular attention.
Last year, attacks upon U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam
reminded us that simple bombs aboard trucks, cars or vans can be deadly
terror weapons. A home grown kook took the lives of two Capitol Police
officers, reminding us that no security system is risk free. And just a
few weeks ago, our nation was forced to look into its very soul by two
troubled teenagers in Littleton, Colorado. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman,
whether directed by trenchies, Aum Shinrikyo, Osama Bin Laden or some
hostile state, there could also be suitcase bombs, vials of anthrax,
malicious computer hackers, commonplace airplane hijackings, ship
boardings and automatic weapons spraying busy city streets. These are
all perils against which a responsible government should guard its
people. But they are tools of terrorism, not of geopolitical strategy--
and we must not confuse the two.
We must not confuse them because clearly our adversaries do not. As
the Rumsfeld Commission detailed, and as the North Korean TD-1 flight
underscored, there are plenty of countries willing to devote scarce
resources to building ballistic missiles. Since it is unlikely they
plan to use these as space age car bombs, they must calculate some
other benefit. Indeed they do. Regimes which perceive their interests
at odds with ours want ballistic missiles to wield in regional crises
to alter America's calculation of the costs and benefits of
involvement--in other words, to keep us out.
A remark of Chinese General Xiong Guang Kai during the 1996 Taiwan
Strait crisis is instructive in this regard. The United States would
not defend Taiwan, argued Xiong, because China would ``rain nuclear
bombs on Los Angeles.'' No two crises are identical and the outcome of
any future crisis will certainly be situation dependent, but--make no
mistake--a threat to the American homeland would indeed alter our cost-
benefit calculations. Xiong's remark, and others like it by Saddam
Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi, reflect not a reckless obsession to hurt
America but, in the words of William R. Graham and Keith B. Payne--both
recent witnesses before this Committee--``a well thought out strategy
to `trump' the West's capability to project overwhelming conventional
power into their regions.''
Anyone who sees the global power projection capability of America
and its allies and friends as stabilizing should see all missile
defense--theater and national--as stabilizing. Just as we do not want
Japan intimidated by North Korean missiles, neither can we tolerate the
same tactics applied directly to the United States by China, North
Korea, Iran or whomever. And best way to thwart such tactics is to
``trump'' them with NMD.
The final reason I shall mention today for the U.S. to proceed now
with a robust NMD program is to complement our non proliferation
efforts. Let us not forget that we are the world's only superpower.
Enemies fear our military might, our training, our experience, our
wealth and, most of all, our technology. They know they cannot take us
on on our terms, so they reach for asymmetrical capabilities such as
long range missiles to alter the playing field. So long as we remain
undefended, the price of entry to the club of countries able to affect
U.S. calculations is but a single long range missile with a nuclear or
biological payload. And as long we appear likely to remain undefended,
a lot of countries will consider joining that club. On the other hand,
if we send an unequivocal signal that we will apply our technology and
wealth to thwarting this particular asymmetrical threat, some countries
will be dissuaded from embarking upon or continuing long range missile
programs. Like any non proliferation effort, this will not be 100%
effective, but it would be a potent dimension of a serious non
proliferation effort.
Mr. Chairman, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. maintained
deterrence with the Soviet Union not only with the force in being, but
also with the so called ``R&D deterrent.'' Moscow's ambitions were
checked by the certainty that America's best and brightest would be a
step ahead at just about every turn. Ultimately, it was the ``R&D
deterrent'' which drove Marshall Akhromeyev and the Soviet military to
despair, a major contributing factor to the implosion of the Soviet
Union. It is time we reclaim our confidence and apply American
strengths to the challenges of the next century.
These are three solid reasons why the U.S. must proceed apace with
NMD. Unfortunately, the ABM Treaty as it stands today blocks even the
most modest NMD.
the abm treaty blocks national missile defense
Mr. Chairman, there are those who assert otherwise, but
understanding the way the U.S. goes about decisions on its own Treaty
compliance, I assure you there is no such thing as an ABM Treaty
compliant National--and I stress National--Missile Defense. About the
only system we can deploy under the ABM Treaty as it stands today would
be a Safeguard II. Let me be clear. Even the so called C-1 architecture
of 20 NMD interceptors, even deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota,
would require negotiation with Russia of some clarifications,
understandings or amendments. Today, I will outline for you the three
biggest ABM Treaty issues which any NMD deployment will raise:
territorial defense, radars and deployment area.
The root of the territorial defense issue is the shorthand
description which developed over the years of what the ABM Treaty
permits: 100 interceptors at one site. As the controversy over SDI
raged, people of good will sought a consensual path forward with a
Treaty compliant system which, applying the shorthand, came to mean up
to 100 interceptors at one site. In 1988, the distinguished past
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, recognized that
a space based version of his Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS)
would require ABM Treaty amendment, but he also spoke of defensive
deployments that ``might be possible within the terms of the treaty or,
at most, require a modest amendment.'' A few years later, the Missile
Defense Act of 1991 called for a ``. . . cost effective, operationally
effective and ABM Treaty compliant ABM system at a single site . . .''.
President Clinton vetoed the FY-96 Defense Authorization Act and
threatened to veto the 1996 Defend America Act on the grounds that
these bills would have set the United States on a path to violate the
ABM Treaty. At the same time, Administration spokespersons claimed that
their so called ``3 + 3'' NMD program would not violate the ABM Treaty.
More recently, the Administration has realized that while ``3 + 3'', or
now ``3 + 5'', development can probably be carried out in compliance
with the Treaty, deployment would require some amendment.
The fact is that if we ever proceed with the ``plus'' part of ``3 +
5'', significant amendments or understandings to the ABM Treaty will
have to be sought. The notion of Treaty compliant NMD ignores that the
100/1 limitation was not an object in itself, but a tool to implement
the Treaty's object and purpose as set forth in Article I: ``. . . not
to deploy ABM systems for the defense of the territory . . .'' Thus the
objective of our current NMD deployment readiness program--``the NMD
system will provide defense of all territory on the 50 states''--stands
in apparent contrast to the Treaty's object and purpose.
The question, then, is not the technical one of whether the
territory of the United States can be defended with 100 interceptors
from one site in North Dakota (it cannot, by the way). Rather, the
relevant ABM Treaty question is whether limited defense of the entire
territory--even with 100 interceptors at one site--is territorial
defense.
The traditional U.S. view, consistently held across
administrations, is that Article I is hortatory, establishing the
framework for the substantive provisions that follow. Thus, in the U.S.
view, a side would have to violate some provision of Articles Ill, V,
VI or IX in order to violate Article I. In other words, Articles Ill,
V, VI and IX specify what actions would be technologically necessary
for a side to move toward a territorial defense. If this traditional
U.S. view is maintained and sustained with the Russians, the issue of
territorial defense would not arise.
But this is uncharted water. The issue of territorial defense has
never arisen in a major way because, until now, the United States had
not been discussing deployment of an operational ABM system. Although
the Soviets raised Article I a number of times in connection with our
SDI program, we were always able to respond, as we did with the 1984
Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), that the activity in question was a
technology demonstration, not deployment of an operational system. This
time, the U.S. would be deploying an operational system whose stated
purpose is to cover the entire territory.
I do not deny that a sound argument can be made that territorial
defense of the type we are now contemplating would not be a territorial
defense which would impinge upon the object and purpose of the ABM
Treaty. That is, a thin defense against third countries or accidental
or unauthorized launch would not detract from a Russian second strike
capability, even under projected START Ill offensive force levels.
Nevertheless, anyone who has stood in front of TV cameras or run for
elected office will appreciate that arguing that ``territorial defense
is not territorial defense'' is going to be a tough sell. This may be a
hurdle which can be overcome, however, it will require the U.S. at
least to seek some clarification or understanding in the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC), the ABM Treaty's joint implementation
body. And the Russians have neither an obligation nor an interest in
making this easy for us.
There is one further liability which NMD raises in the context of
territorial defense. ABM Treaty Article I also commits us ``. . . not
to provide a base for [territorial] defense . . .'' If the thin NMD
system itself would not constitute a territorial defense in violation
of Article I, does it lay a base for such a defense? The U.S. may
establish that an NMD deployment of 20, or even 100, interceptors
cannot possibly be a territorial defense in the meaning of the ABM
Treaty, that is, a defense which could leave us invulnerable to a
Russian retaliatory attack. However, once even a minimal NMD system is
deployed at Grand Forks, long lead items such as radars and BM/C3 will
be in place and interceptor missiles and Kinetic Kill Vehicles (KKVs)
will be under production.
There are no doubt Treaty amendments and confidence building
measures which could address this issue, but these will have to be
negotiated. And this is precisely my point; we are in for a negotiation
which is going to involve the Article I issue of territorial defense.
The second issue, radars, is intertwined with the issue of
territorial defense. This issue is so complex and architecture
dependent that I shall confine my remarks to a general description.The
world is round; U.S. territory--from Calais to Key West to Kure to Attu
and back to Calais--occupies a large bit of it; and high frequency
electromagnetic waves travel in straight lines. By confining ABM radars
to one 150 Km. radius ABM deployment area, the authors of the ABM
Treaty used these elementary physical facts to implement the Treaty's
object and purpose, that is, to prohibit a territorial defense.
With today's technology we can do a lot more from that one site
than we could in 1972 but, still, a single ABM radar in North Dakota
just cannot cover the territory of the United States. Consequently,
every candidate NMD architecture I have seen features some combination
of upgraded Early Warning Radars (EWRs), including EWRs outside U.S.
territory, space based sensors, X-Band radars deployed outside the ABM
deployment area, and a highly capable sensor aboard the NMD
interceptor. Such sensor suites don't fit into the ABM Treaty's
framework.
But the problem is only partly that today's technology does not
match yesterday's Treaty terms. The greater issue is that our objective
for today's technology does not match the object and purpose for which
yesterday's Treaty terms were written. In other words, to proceed with
NMD we will have to seek ABM Treaty adjustments and understandings on
radars and these will be directly related to the issue of territorial
defense. This will involve wrenching the Russians and the American arms
control community from positions with which they have grown quite
comfortable. Consequently, there will be no such thing as a ``modest''
Treaty adjustment or understanding.
Yet a third ABM Treaty issue is the deployment area, and this too
is related to the issue of territorial defense. The ABM Treaty requires
the 150 Km. radius ABM deployment area at Grand Forks to contain ICBM
silo launchers. But the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission
(BRAC) recommended that the 321st Strategic Missile Group at Grand
Forks AFB be deactivated and its Minuteman III missiles relocated to
Malmstrom AFB, Montana. The missiles have now been moved, but START
Treaty accountable silos will remain at Grand Forks for three more
years. The Department of Defense is apparently taking the view that it
can now locate a Grand Forks ABM deployment area within a 150 Km.
radius circle drawn to include some missiles assigned to Minot AFB, ND.
In a strict legal sense this may be correct. However, deactivating the
missile field in which we have said our ABM system would be located,
and redrawing a circle to encompass a few missiles from a different
base to satisfy Treaty obligations could easily be portrayed as a sham
which is not the way the U.S. complies with its legal obligations. It
is too clever by half and we would surely question an analogous Russian
move. Proceeding in this way would only further underscore the
territorial defense issue.
The idea underlying this ABM Treaty provision was that defense of a
single missile field in order to guarantee survival of at least some
retaliatory capability would be stabilizing, unlike territorial defense
which was seen as destabilizing. Now, if the U.S. deploys an NMD system
in North Dakota which is only perfunctorily related to an ICBM field,
it must be ``up to'' something else--again, we return to the matter of
territorial defense.
Finally, I note that achieving coverage of all fifty states from a
single site, particularly if the fastest emerging threat is in
Northeast Asia, requires that single site to be in Alaska. It is my
understanding that, consequently, the Administration's current plan
would be to deploy our first NMD site in Alaska, if President Clinton
decides to deploy in June, 2000. Clearly, deploying an NMD site in
Alaska would require amendment of the Treaty's Article Ill.
Multiple fixed ground based sites, sea or space based NMD, the
development and testing of sea or space based NMD, and advanced sensors
which could substitute for what the Treaty calls an ``ABM radar'' are
altogether prohibited by the ABM Treaty as it stands today.
we must soon realize at least substantial modifications to the 1972 abm
treaty
We face an urgent dilemma. Frankly, continued U.S. adherence to the
1972 ABM Treaty is of no strategic value to the U.S. Setting aside
discussion of the Treaty's value during the Cold War, we must now
recognize that it is indeed an artifact of the Cold War. It was
conceived to preserve deterrence and crisis stability between two
superpowers locked in an ideological struggle which, from time to time,
erupted into crises. Now, the Soviet Union is gone and with it the
Marxist-Leninist ideology which was the root cause of the Cold War.
Russia, whatever its problems or even faults, is not dominated by a
Marxist-Leninist ideology which impels it into conflict with us across
the globe. It does not keep twenty divisions in East Germany poised to
strangle Berlin. It does not operate a worldwide network to spark
conflict in places like Korea, Vietnam and Angola. Admiral Gorshkov's
blue water navy is rusting, tied up in decaying ports. And the major
issue for Russian strategic forces today is how to manage inevitable
economically driven decline. Quite simply, the potential crisis which
the ABM Treaty purported to stabilize no longer looms. The ABM Treaty
is not a cornerstone of stability for the new millennium; it is a
delicate diplomatic matter for today.
That said, I wholeheartedly agree with those who say that our
security relationship with Russia remains important, that Russia is in
a crucial transition and that we should not needlessly provoke a
diplomatic rift over the ABM Treaty--the Treaty remains important
diplomatically and strategically to them. Therefore, I favor attempting
to negotiate such changes to the ABM Treaty as the U.S. needs, although
I recognize it will not now be easy.
Given even the schedule of the ``3 + 5'' program, the time at which
we will need ABM Treaty modifications in place is fast approaching.
President Clinton has said he will decide whether to deploy in June of
2000. For the reasons outlined above, it would be inconceivable to me
that he would decide otherwise. Then, the kind of construction which
would raise ABM Treaty issues would begin in mid 2001, at the start of
the short Alaskan construction season. Understanding that our only
alternative to negotiated modifications would be withdrawal from the
Treaty in accordance with Article XV, requiring six months notice, we
would have to achieve those negotiated modifications by the Fall of
2000--about eighteen months from today. That would be a tall order in
the best of times and these are not the best of times. The crisis in
Kosovo has created a major rift in U.S.-Russia relations. Moreover,
Russia faces elections to the State Duma this December and presidential
elections in June, 2000. Soon thereafter, the U.S. faces a general
election.
There were once better times when there was more time to negotiate.
Unfortunately, the Administration has squandered six years since 1993
when it abandoned the Ross-Mamedov Talks and discussion of President
Yeltsin's proposal for a Global Protection System.
Still, I think an attempt at negotiation should be made. If it is,
allow me as a former negotiator to suggest a few guidelines.
First, the U.S. should carefully resolve what NMD it needs--
deployment and development and testing--for the next few years, craft
an integral negotiating position accordingly, and then approach the
Russians. Nothing should be excluded from consideration, including
space based defenses. Of course, the more we seek, the tougher the
negotiation will be. On the other hand, there is no sense in seeking or
agreeing to less than is needed. We should not conform our NMD
requirements to the ABM Treaty or to what we expect to be
``negotiable.'' And the worst thing we could do is negotiate piecemeal,
rushing off to negotiate Russian assent to, say, just the C-1 or C-2
architecture. There will be a price to pay and we are likely to have to
live with what we negotiate for a few years.
Second, announce an NMD deployment decision now. Funds to support
the decision should be put into the FYDP and the Congress should
authorize and appropriate the funds necessary to ramp up to a
deployment. Without these, the Russians will not recognize any urgent
need to treat our approach seriously. This is all the more important in
the current political turmoil in Moscow because we will have to work
extra hard to gain their attention which is almost entirely focused on
economics and internal power struggles.
Third, embark upon a vigorous research, development and testing
program for NMD systems which may follow our initial fixed, ground
based deployment. There are no constraints on the evolution of the
ballistic missile threat to the U.S. We should expect MIRVs, MaRVs,
decoys, penetration aids, lower radar cross sections and higher
velocity re entry vehicles. Moreover, a principal finding of the
Rumsfeld Commission is that ``plausible scenarios [include] re-basing
or transfer of operational missiles, sea and air-launch options.''
Fixed, ground based interceptors cannot respond to such threats. We
should not despair and be self deterred from deploying the NMD system
we are developing and getting into the business of missile defense. But
neither should we become complacent and neglect to prepare for the
challenges of tomorrow. Consequently, our foreseeable development and
testing needs must figure into careful resolution of what NMD we need
for the next few years.
Fourth, in addition to the NMD deployment announcement, we must
recognize that we do have other points of leverage. Russia's economic
plight dictates dramatic reductions in strategic forces and their
calculus dictates a negotiated mutual reduction with the United States.
With START II almost certainly dead, we have an opportunity to discuss
force levels and structures appropriate for the new millennium from
START I levels. Moreover, there may be other things Russia would like
to have such as real early warning sharing and cooperation on theater
missile defense. In short, creative strategic negotiations which
include ABM Treaty issues could result in a ``win-win outcome.''
Fifth, politely, reasonably, but firmly put a time limit on
negotiations. The luxury of protracted talks having been squandered, we
must now demand closure in the near term. In a sense, we could turn a
weakness into a strength by using the current NMD schedule as a point
of leverage.
Sixth, while the Russians will demand some longevity for whatever
they negotiate, we should not make any commitments beyond the period
during which we think we can live with the new agreement. One of the
major lessons of the ABM Treaty is that it is absolutely impossible to
predict world events and technology a quarter century down the road.
The ABM Treaty is already of unlimited duration so, to seek further
changes in the future, we would again be faced with renegotiation or
withdrawal from the Treaty. These are guarantees enough. Moreover,
assuming we really negotiate for what we need over the next few years,
I believe there is an excellent chance that by the time we need to face
the issue again, both sides will have moved to a whole new strategic
paradigm in which we no longer base our security on threats of mutual
nuclear annihilation. The ABM Treaty just won't matter any more.
I cannot tell you what the outcome of a negotiation on the ABM
Treaty might be. In the end, if a negotiating effort comes to nought
and we are faced with withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, at least we will
have prepared the way by leaving no stone unturned. We will demand no
less of ourselves.
modifications to the 1972 abm treaty need not inexorably halt
agreements to reduce strategic nuclear weapons
One myth which has dogged NMD for years is that U.S. missile
defenses beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty as it stands today will
inexorably bring agreements to reduce strategic offensive arms to a
screeching halt. This need not be the case. The ABM Treaty's Article
XIV provides for amendments--otherwise how could the Treaty's authors
have purported to write a document of ``unlimited duration?'' If the
U.S. has amendments to propose, we should offer them. Russia has an
obligation to engage seriously on our proposals although, of course, no
obligation to agree. However, I would suggest that once it becomes
clear that U.S. NMD is inevitable, Russia--as it did with NATO
expansion--will douse the rhetoric and deal with reality. This is
especially so if we are willing to negotiate, take Russian security
concerns into account and offer benefits in which they perceive a
stake. Today, Russian strategic offensive forces are declining for
economic reasons--some authoritative Russians have even suggested to
the hundreds of warheads. Different from Cold War days, Russia now
wants agreed reductions more than we. Indeed, START II is almost
certainly dead, languishing in the State Duma not over concerns about
American NMD, but over concerns about Russian offensive force
structure. This would appear to be about as promising a foundation for
talks as we are likely to get.
the new york abm treaty agreements are not in the interest of the
united states
Since I have recommended that the U.S. seek needed modifications to
the ABM Treaty in the context of wider strategic negotiations and
suggested that START II is almost certainly dead, it is incumbent upon
me to address one more loose end--the ABM Treaty agreements signed at
New York on September 26, 1997 on succession and demarcation. These
agreements should have been sent to the Senate for Advice and Consent
and I commend the distinguished Chairman of this Committee for
insisting upon that. Assuming success on that count, I respectfully
suggest that these agreements are not in the interest of the United
States and I urge the Senate reject them.
When I refer to the New York package, I am referring to seven ABM
Treaty documents, the first three of which should be submitted for the
Senate's Advice and Consent, signed on September 26, 1997:
--A Memorandum of Understanding adding Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine as ABM Treaty parties.
--The First Agreed Statement and Second Agreed Statement which
purport to demarcate between ABM Treaty limited ABM and
unlimited TMD.
--An Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).
--A Joint Statement on annual updates to information on TMD systems
covered by the CBMs Agreement.
--A unilateral Statement by the United States of America that ``it
has no plans'' to test TMD of a velocity greater than 3 Km/sec.
before April, 1999, to develop TMD with velocity greater than
5.5 Km/sec. (4.5 for sea based), or to test TMD against MIRVs
or strategic RVs.
--New Regulations of the Standing Consultative Committee which
reflect the addition of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
I offer three main objections to the New York ABM Treaty package.
First, the Memorandum of Understanding adds Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine as parties to the ABM Treaty--a strategic absurdity. Whatever
one's opinion of the merits of the ABM Treaty, we could all agree that
its purpose was to regulate a unique strategic relationship between the
U.S. and the USSR. No such relationship exists or can exist between us
and Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine. These newly independent states had
to be added, the Administration argues, because Treaty limited radars
and an ABM test site now lie in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This
is a specious argument. The Treaty limited Skrunda Radar lies in
Latvia, but Latvia is not being added to the Treaty. The U.S. operates
Treaty limited radars on the territories of Denmark and the United
Kingdom and an ABM test site in the Republic of the Marshall Islands
(which attained sovereignty just a few months before the 1991
dissolution of the USSR). Yet we never felt a post Cold War itch to add
these countries to the ABM Treaty.
It doesn't make sense. But the Administration has persisted so on
this that one cannot escape the thought that its purpose is to consign
negotiations such those proposed here to a pentalateral quagmire.
Moreover, adding Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will cloud the issue
of which country to address on future compliance matters.
I would add that because of the way the New York documents are
written, everything turns on the succession Memorandum. Defeat it, and
the entire package falls.
My second concern is that the New York package not only fails to
achieve so called demarcation between ABM Treaty limited ABM and
unlimited TMD systems, it actually leaves matters worse than they had
been.
The First Agreed Statement, that is, the demarcation agreement on
lower velocity TMD, confirms what we could have, and should have,
simply asserted: U.S. TMD with interceptor velocities not exceeding 3
Km/sec. are not subject to the ABM Treaty so long as they are not
tested against targets with a velocity exceeding 5 Km/sec. or of a
range greater than 3,500 Km.
The harder question of higher velocity TMD--interceptor velocities
3 to 5.5 Km/sec. (4.5 for naval systems)--is murkier under the New York
agreements than it was before President Clinton headed to Helsinki in
March, 1997. For higher velocity TMD systems, compliance with the
target velocity and range criteria applied to lower velocity TMD is
necessary, but not sufficient, to determine ABM Treaty compliance.
There is no demarcation! Higher velocity TMD systems would still
undergo an internal U.S. Government compliance review and we would now
be committed to consult not just with Russia, but with four ABM Treaty
parties on any TMD matter. Worse, both internal and pentalateral
deliberations would be clouded by vague new restrictions: TMD may ``not
pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another
party,'' may not be deployed ``for use against each other'' and may not
be inconsistent ``in number or geographic scope'' with the ballistic
missile threat. We have even agreed to provide our missile threat
assessment to the other parties for discussion!
The Administration emphasizes that the New York agreements would
allow all U.S. TMD programs to go forward. Well, there's ``forward''
and there's ``not exactly.'' One U.S. program, Space Based Laser, would
be preemptively prohibited, as would anything else that can intercept a
theater ballistic missile from space. Aside from that, the New York
package would freeze traditional TMD technology at its 1997 level,
grandfathering five U.S. TMD programs--Navy Area, THAAD, PAC-3, HAWK
and MEADS--in their current state. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) standing
alone would be grandfathered too. But add an improved radar, space
cueing or Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) fire control data,
and NTW would fall into the murky waters of internal compliance review
and bilateral consultation. Airborne Laser would have to traverse the
same murky waters. So would an evolved THAAD if its interceptor
velocity exceeded 3 Km/sec. So would just about anything new--something
as simple as an airship launching a kinetic boost phase interceptor.
Finally, TMD with more capable interceptors--the global missile threat
remaining unconstrained--would be handicapped by a unilateral statement
that the U.S. ``has no plans'' for interceptors faster than 5.5 Km/sec.
(4.5 for naval systems).
Mr. Chairman, I have suggested that we negotiate substantial
modifications to the ABM Treaty. If that effort were successful we
would still have an ABM Treaty, albeit substantially modified. That
means we would still have to have some guidelines to distinguish Treaty
limited ABM from unlimited TMD. Having criticized the Administration's
demarcation agreement I feel I should add just a few more words on
demarcation. Demarcation is a fleeting concept. In the early days of
the ABM Treaty the gap between the ranges of short range or Theater
Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) and those of Strategic Ballistic Missiles
(SBMs) was fairly wide. Therefore, the gap between the capabilities of
systems designed to counter each was also fairly wide--it was easy to
``demarcate'' between Treaty limited ABM and unlimited TMD. As TBM
ranges increased, TMD capabilities had to increase. But, for a time,
the gap was preserved because older, less capable SBMs were being
removed from service.
Today, it is still possible to discern a gap between TBMs and SBMs
and hence between TMD and ABM systems. This is reflected in attempts at
demarcation over the quarter century between the ABM Treaty and the
1997 New York agreements. During ABM Treaty ratification hearings,
Director of Defense Research and Engineering John Foster suggested that
an air defense interceptor of a velocity greater than 2 Km/sec. would
require U.S. Treaty compliance review. Leaving aside the New York
Agreed Statements' many defects, they draw a line calling for U.S.
compliance review at an interceptor velocity of 3 Km/sec. and they
allow that interceptors with velocities between 3 Km/sec. and 5.5 Km/
sec. (4.5 for naval systems) could be found not subject to the ABM
Treaty. This reflects the increased capabilities of TBMs and,
therefore, of TMD.
But there is every indication that TBM ranges will continue to
increase. Just a few weeks ago India tested a 2,000 Km. range Agni-2,
followed by Pakistan's test of an 1,100 Km. range Ghauri-2. India
claims the Agni-2 has a range of 2,000-2,500 Km. and the Ghauri-2 is
credited with a range between 2,000 and 2,300 Km. During 1998, Iran
tested the 1,300 Km. range Shahab-3. Iran is reportedly working on
Shahab-4 and 5 and we should not exclude the possibility that North
Korea could export the TD-1. As the ranges of TBMs increase, the
distinction between TBMs and SBMs will begin to blur. Consequently, the
capabilities of TMD and ABM will blur and demarcation will become
impossible. At that time the concept of a treaty which limits ABM
systems will become untenable. Only interim fixes are possible.
There are two essential ingredients to an effective interim--and I
stress interim--demarcation. First, the U.S. must adopt a true
``demonstrated capability'' standard, that is, we would limit TMD
testing to targets with re entry velocities of 5 Km/sec. or ranges of
3,500 Km. or less. Other considerations, including calculations of
``inherent capability'' would become irrelevant. Second, we must adopt
a realistic ``force-on-force'' approach with which to evaluate ABM
Treaty compliance of U.S. TMD systems. This would eliminate the
altogether theoretical and exaggerated capabilities which our current
``one-on-one'' methodology attributes to U.S. TMD systems. I suggest
that we not repeat the Administration's mistake of trying to negotiate
demarcation criteria, and simply announce that henceforward these are
the criteria the U.S. will use. The Russians can always seek
clarification in the SCC.
Returning to the New York agreements, my third objection is that,
all seven documents added up, the New York package is a new TMD Treaty
in all but name. In addition to the measures I have just sketched,
consider the vast declarations of TMD information that will be
required:
launch notification;
name, designation & basing mode of TMD systems and
components;
concepts of operations;
plans and programs;
launchers per battalion for land based TMD;
class and type of ship & launchers per ship for sea based
TMD;
TMD interceptors per launcher;
aircraft type & interceptors per aircraft for air based TMD;
TMD radar frequency band and potential.
It is an elaborate new obstacle course for American TMD. Consider as
just one example how this sort of thing could afflict the U.S. Navy.
It does not require too vivid an imagination to foresee fishing
expeditions for more and more information on the Aegis system which is,
in reality, a system of systems whose purposes vastly exceed missile
defense. Then, add in commitments to limit ``number and geographic
scope,'' not to ``pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear
force of another party,'' not to deploy TMD ``for use against each
other'' and declarations of interceptors per launcher, launchers per
ship, and class and type of ship, and we are right around the corner
from naval arms control and restrictions on U.S. Navy surface ship
deployments.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, my conclusion is as brief as my presentation has been
long. Today, it is imperative that the U.S. proceed apace with NMD--
deployment of the near term system and research, development and
testing of follow on systems. These actions are blocked by the 1972 ABM
Treaty as it stands today. We have two choices: withdraw in accordance
with Article XV or seek to negotiate the changes we need in accordance
with Article XIV. I recommend that we attempt to negotiate.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Smith, thank you.
Mr. Joseph.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. JOSEPH, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE
ABM TREATY'S STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION; DIRECTOR, CENTER
FOR COUNTER PROLIFERATION RESEARCH, NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure and an honor to
be here.
It is necessary at the outset for me to say that the views
that I will express are entirely personal. They are not the
views of the National Defense University, the Department of
Defense, or any agency of the U.S. Government.
I have submitted a statement that addresses three highly
dubious propositions or myths that are frequently asserted in
the context of supporting the ABM Treaty and maintaining that
treaty with either no change or minimal change. You touched in
your opening statement on all three of these, a statement that
I, like the previous two witnesses, would like to associate
myself with.
The three propositions that I will, with your permission,
summarize in my opening comments are, first, any attempt to
alter or to withdraw from the treaty will lead to the end of
offensive nuclear reductions and in fact the overall
deterioration in the U.S./Russian strategic relationship.
Second, the rogue state long-range missile threat is still
years distant, and if it does emerge, it will consist of very
few unsophisticated weapons.
And third, the ABM Treaty does not impede the current
development of a national missile defense and will require only
slight changes to permit the deployment of a limited but
nevertheless effective national missile defense.
In assessing the first proposition, I think looking back
can be very instructive. Following the Gulf War and the
attempted coup in the then Soviet Union, as Mr. Hadley points
out, the Bush administration put forth both a national missile
defense deployment plan, as well as an arms control initiative
to support that deployment. The concern was twofold: a rogue
state armed with long-range missiles able to strike the United
States, and an accidental or unauthorized launch, perhaps from
a breakaway military commander.
To deal with this threat, the United States declared its
intention to deploy GPALS, or global protection against limited
strikes. For the near term, this architecture consisted of up
to six fixed land-based sites with up to 1,200 interceptors, a
very robust space-based sensor capability, as well as robust
theater missile defenses. In the longer term, as the threat
evolved, many looked to space-based interceptors as the key
capability.
On the arms control side, in the summer and fall of 1992,
the United States formally proposed fundamental changes to the
ABM Treaty that were consistent with this architecture. These
changes included the elimination of all restrictions on testing
and development, the elimination of all restrictions on
sensors, the elimination of restrictions on the transfer of
systems and components in order to allow cooperative
relationships, including with Russia, and finally, the right to
deploy additional land-based interceptors at additional sites.
These positions were presented to the Russians in a
nonconfrontational and straightforward way. The Russians were
told that we could work together on defenses, but that with or
without them, the United States must protect itself from the
emerging threat. If modifications to the treaty could be
agreed, it could be retained. If not, the United States would
need to consider withdrawal, legally and in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty.
We also made clear to the Russians at that time that the
level of defenses that were to be deployed by the United States
with or without the ABM Treaty, would not threaten the
offensive capability of the Russian force at START levels or
even well below those levels. At the same time, the U.S. team
stressed that with the end of the cold war, the United States
and Russia should base their new relationship on common
interests and on cooperation and not on the cold war suspicions
and distrust that was the foundation for the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction.
I think the Russian reaction was very telling. They did not
threaten and they did not posture. They did not say yes, they
did not say no. They mostly asked questions to explore our
position.
Most important and I think relevant to keep in mind in
terms of today's discussions, while the United States was
insisting on fundamental changes to the ABM Treaty, the Russian
START negotiators in the very next room in the very same
building in Geneva were concluding the long sought after START
agreements that provided for the first time for fundamental
reductions in offensive forces. That the U.S. position on the
ABM Treaty did not affect the Russian willingness to agree to
offensive reductions was evident in the signing of both START I
and START II in quick succession.
Nevertheless, in 1993, the new administration reversed
course on national missile defenses and the renegotiation of
the ABM Treaty. NMD programs, as you know, were downgraded in
priority and funding was significantly reduced, and the treaty
was proclaimed to be the cornerstone of strategic stability.
For years this policy position has prevailed, often justified
by the assertion that we must choose between offensive
reductions and even limited defenses.
And in particular, we are told that this approach is
necessary to save START II, a treaty that Moscow has held
hostage so many times over so many years for so many different
purposes that few now believe it will ever be ratified, or if
it is to be ratified, that it will have much significance.
Yet, irrespective of START II, how Russia will react to the
deployment of national missile defenses by the United States
does remain an important question. A number of U.S. and Russian
officials have predicted dire consequences if the United States
insists on amending the ABM Treaty or withdraws from that
treaty. Such assertions I believe lack supporting evidence and
ignore Russia's own approach to arms control and its own
security policies. Similar predictions were voiced in the
context, as Ambassador Smith has pointed out, of NATO
enlargement. One could give any number of other examples such
as air strikes on Iraq and some of the talk over Kosovo. Yet,
in all of these cases, Russia has acted on the basis of its
interests, not on the basis of its press statements.
The same is true regarding arms control experience, where
the most recent example of Russia pursuing its own interests in
the context of changing strategic realties is also the most
instructive. When the breakup of the Soviet Union led Russia to
conclude that the legal limits on deployed forces in its flank
regions, as established under the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty, or CFE Treaty, were no longer in its interest,
Russia's approach was very straightforward: It insisted that
the treaty be changed. And the United States, as well as the
other parties to that treaty, accommodated the Russian demands
in the Flank Agreement. Since then, Russia has again insisted
on additional modifications to the CFE Treaty and the other
parties are certainly going to go along.
The principle I think is very clear. Russia assesses arms
control agreements in the context of its defense requirements.
When security conditions change, it acts with determination to
change those treaties. For us, the parallel to the ABM Treaty
is evident and the principle I believe ought to be the same.
Today the United States faces a long-range ballistic
missile threat that was not envisioned when the ABM Treaty was
negotiated. Although Moscow will certainly seek to delay and
minimize changes to the treaty and will seek a high price for
accommodation, it will understand the U.S. need to defend
against this new threat. And, as we have done with Russian
demands in the CFE context, it will accommodate.
I believe accommodation is possible because Russian
interests and U.S. interests are not mutually exclusive. Even
at the lowest levels of offensive forces speculated for Russia
in the future, a U.S. missile defense deployed to protect
against a limited attack would not undermine its offensive
capability. And this is the critical point: If Russia knows
that U.S. defenses will not call into question the credibility
of their nuclear offensive force, they will have what they
believe they need. And in this context, given the choice
between a modified ABM Treaty and no treaty, Moscow will almost
certainly follow past practice and choose to renegotiate the
treaty because that is in its own best interests.
Finally, the future of offensive nuclear reductions more
generally is less likely to be tied to formalistic arms control
negotiations than to the realities of the post-cold war world.
The Russians, according to almost all assessments, will be
compelled by economics to go to much lower levels of offensive
forces, independent of arms control outcomes.
I think I can be very brief with regard to the second
proposition. As you stated in your opening statement, the
Rumsfeld Commission and the launch of the North Korean Taepo
Dong missile--this multi-stage, long-range missile--underscore
that the threat is here now and that it is likely to become
ever more sophisticated. The national intelligence estimate
that concluded that we would have warning and that we would
likely not face a long-range ballistic threat for 15 years has
been widely repudiated. That we are near consensus on the
missile threat is reflected in the Senate's recent overwhelming
passage of the National Missile Defense Act.
The third proposition that the ABM Treaty does not impede
the development of U.S. defense capabilities and that
deployment of defenses will require only modest changes to the
treaty is in my view more akin to a self-limiting, self-
fulfilling, self-deluding proposition than an objective
assessment of U.S. missile defense requirements in light of the
threat that we face.
It is very difficult for me to conclude that, absent the
treaty, the United States would be considering the contrived
ground-based architectures being contemplated as primary
candidates. If the treaty did not exist, we would most surely
be aggressively exploring sea and space-based options that
offer much greater potential in terms of cost effectiveness and
flexibility for expanding our defense capabilities as the
threat expands. This is not being done because our programs
must be compliant with the treaty.
Moving from development to deployment, one must also
question the proposition that even very limited defenses could
be fielded with only modest changes to the implementing
provisions of the treaty.
The words of article I are very clear and, if one applies
plain and ordinary definitions, the language makes evident the
need to confront the basic contradiction between today's
imperative to deploy defenses, to protect our population
against ballistic missile attack from rogue states, and the
underlying strategic rationale of the treaty.
Designed in the bipolar context of the cold war
confrontation with the then Soviet Union, the express objective
of the treaty was to severely limit defenses so as to preserve
the credibility of strategic offensive forces. Few would
advance this same deterrent concept today for states such as
North Korea or Iran. Yet, the treaty does not provide an
exception for defense against these threats.
This leads to two final observations. The first is on
timing. Given the stated Russian goal of retaining the ABM
Treaty without change, any negotiation, if that is the option
we pursue, can be expected to be long and difficult. Yet, if
the United States acts with determination and avoids mixed
signals, such negotiations could be in my view successful, but
only if we have both, as you say, Senator, a clear deployment
objective and the perceived resolve to move forward, even if
that requires withdrawal from the treaty under the supreme
national interest clause of the treaty. In light of the pace of
missile programs in countries such as North Korea and Iran, we
simply do not have the luxury to devote years to renegotiate
the ABM Treaty.
The second observation is that in attempting to resolve
treaty issues to permit limited defenses, we need to ensure
flexibility for the future to counter missile threats as they
continue to evolve, taking full advantage of new technologies.
Narrow treaty relief to allow for fixed ground-based
interceptors to protect against a very small and crude threat
in the near term must not be purchased at the price of fixing
in concrete a future that does not permit us to adapt our
defenses to meet the threat as it evolves. For example, we must
not compromise now on a defense against a small handful of
missiles from North Korea but leave ourselves totally
defenseless when they add one or two missiles more.
Senator, in conclusion, let me say that my personal view is
that the best option is to exercise our right under the treaty
for withdrawal. I have two primary reasons for this.
First--and I have touched on this--the treaty is currently
inhibiting us from exploring sea and space-based approaches
that in my view offer the greatest potential in terms of cost
effectiveness and flexibility for the future. There is a high
risk that even under a modified treaty, we will foreclose
options that build on new technologies that will be essential
to counter the threat as it develops.
And second, I believe we should discourage the proposition
that mutual assured destruction forms a solid basis for our
strategic relationship with Russia. The ABM Treaty in my view
has a very corrosive effect on how we see each other. It is a
treaty that is unhealthy for both the United States and for
Russia. We simply should not maintain this cold war artifact at
the center of our relations. I believe we can address our
differences with Russia and reconcile those differences outside
of the ABM Treaty.
That said, I believe that the option to renegotiate the
treaty and change it fundamentally, as we attempted to do in
1992, is a viable option and is, in fact, the most likely
option that we will pursue.
As I said in my comment earlier and as you have said in
yours, we must, if we pursue this approach, be serious and be
perceived as serious. In order to do so, we must have a real
deployment program and the willingness to leave the treaty if
in fact that is necessary.
Senator, thank you very much. That concludes my comments. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Joseph follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert G. Joseph
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today. It is an honor to be able to present my views on the
ABM Treaty and, specifically, on the central Treaty-related issues that
surround the debate over the deployment of a national missile defense.
It is necessary to emphasize at the outset that the views expressed
in this statement are entirely personal and do not necessarily reflect
those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or
any agency of the U.S. Government.
My statement addresses three highly dubious propositions that are
frequently asserted in support of maintaining the ABM Treaty either
without change or with only minor modifications. These are: First, any
attempt to alter or withdraw from the Treaty, although consistent with
our legal rights, will lead to the end of offensive nuclear reductions
and to an overall deterioration of the U.S.-Russian relationship.
Second, the rogue state long-range missile threat is still years
distant and that, if it does emerge, it will consist of very few
unsophisticated weapons. And, third, the ABM Treaty does not impede
current development programs and will require only slight changes to
permit deployment of limited but effective national missile defenses.
Experience and evidence stand in stark contrast to all three of these
propositions.
In assessing the first proposition, looking back can be very
instructive. Following the Gulf War and the attempted coup in the then
Soviet Union, the Bush national security team put forth both a
deployment plan and an arms control initiative to support this
deployment. The concern was twofold: a rogue state armed with a small
number of ballistic missiles able to strike American cities, and an
accidental or unauthorized launch, perhaps from a breakaway military
commander.
To deal with this limited threat, the United States declared the
intention to deploy GPALS--Global Protection Against Limited Strikes.
For the near term, this architecture consisted of up to six ground-
based sites with up to 1200 interceptors, a space-based sensor
capability, and robust theater missile defenses. In the longer term, as
the threat evolved, many looked to space-based interceptors as the key
capability.
On the arms control side, in the summer and fall of 1992, the
United States formally proposed fundamental changes to the ABM Treaty
consistent with the GPALS concept. These included:
First, the elimination of restrictions on the development and
testing of ABM systems. These restrictions both directly and indirectly
had impeded our ability to field effective strategic and theater
defenses, just as they do today.
Second, the elimination of restrictions on sensors. Disagreements
in this area had for years dominated the contentious compliance debate.
Moreover, it was recognized that no missile defense architecture that
would permit even a limited territorial defense could be deployed
without Treaty relief on sensors. This also remains the case today.
Third, the elimination of restrictions on the transfer of ABM
systems and components to permit cooperative relationships on missile
defenses with other countries, including Russia. And
Fourth, the right to deploy additional ABM interceptor missiles at
additional ABM deployment sites.
In Washington, Moscow and Geneva, American representatives
presented these positions to the Russians, stating that the emerging
threat of long-range missiles compelled changes to the ABM Treaty. In a
non-confrontational but straightforward way, the Russians were also
told that we could work together on defenses but that, with or without
them, the United States must protect itself from limited attacks. If
modifications to the Treaty could be agreed, it could be retained. If
not--and the implication was direct--the United States would need to
consider withdrawal, legally in accordance with the provisions of the
Treaty.
American representatives also made clear that the level of defenses
to be deployed by the United States, with or without the ABM Treaty,
would not threaten the offensive capability of the Russian force at
START levels or even well below those levels. At the same time, the
U.S. team also stressed that, with the end of the Cold War, the United
States and Russia should base their new relationship on common
interests and cooperation, and not on the distrust that was the
foundation of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction that had
defined relations as Cold War enemies.
The Russian reaction was telling. They did not threaten or posture.
They did not say yes or no; they mostly listened and asked questions to
explore the U.S. proposals. Indeed, in a speech to the United Nations
in January 1992, President Yeltsin had called for the joint development
of a ``Global Protection System'' to defend against ballistic missile
attack.
Most important, and relevant to keep in mind in today's
discussions, while the United States was insisting on basic changes to
the ABM Treaty, the Russian START negotiators were concluding the long
sought START agreement providing, for the first time, for substantial
reductions in offensive forces. That the U.S. position on the ABM
Treaty did not affect the Russian willingness to agree to offensive
reductions was evident in the signing of both START I and START II in
quick succession.
Nonetheless, in 1993, in one of its most substantial departures
from the Bush Administration security policy, the new Administration
reversed course on national missile defense and the renegotiation of
the ABM Treaty. National missile defense programs were downgraded in
priority and funding was significantly reduced. For years this policy
position has prevailed, often justified by the assertion that we must
choose between offensive reductions and even limited defenses.
Most recently, in the context of the Senate's consideration of the
National Missile Defense Act of 1999, the Administration reaffirmed at
the highest level that the United States has not made a decision to
deploy and continues to uphold the 1972 ABM Treaty as the ``cornerstone
of strategic stability.'' This approach, we are told, is necessary to
save START II--a Treaty that Moscow has held hostage so many times to
so many different objectives over so many years that few now believe it
will ever be ratified by the Duma or, if it is ratified, that it will
have much significance.
Yet, irrespective of the fate of START II, how Russia will react to
the deployment of national missile defenses by the United States
remains an important question. A number of U.S. and Russian officials
have predicted dire consequences if the United States insists on
amending the ABM Treaty or withdraws from the Treaty. Such assertions
lack supporting evidence and ignore Russia's own approach to arms
control and its own security policies. Similar predictions were voiced
in the contexts of NATO enlargement and air strikes on Iraq. Yet, in
both of these examples, Russia acted on the basis of its interests, not
its press statements. Russia's actions spoke louder than its words.
The same is true regarding arms control experience. When NATO
decided to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces in the early 1980s,
while simultaneously negotiating for the elimination of this entire
class of nuclear weapon, the Soviet Union made stark threats to test
the Alliance's resolve. Moscow promised to walk out of the negotiations
when the first NATO missiles were fielded, and did so in November 1983.
But when it became clear that the determination of the Allies would not
be shaken, the Soviet negotiators returned to the table and the result
was a total ban on these weapons.
The most recent arms control example of Russia pursuing its own
interests in the context of changing strategic realities is also
perhaps the most instructive. When the breakup of the Soviet Union led
Russia to conclude that the legal limits on deployed forces in its
flank regions--as established in the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty--were no longer in its interest, its approach was
straightforward: it insisted that the Treaty be changed. The United
States and the other parties accommodated the Russian demand in the
Flank Agreement. Since then, Russia has again insisted on additional
modifications to the CFE Treaty. That the other parties will again go
along is apparent in the recent Washington NATO Summit Communique that
reads: ``The CFE Treaty is the cornerstone of European security. We
reaffirm our commitment to the successful adaptation of the Treaty
reflecting the new security environment . . .''.
The principle is clear. Russia assesses the value of arms control
agreements in the context of its defense requirements. When the
security conditions change for Russia, it acts with determination to
change the treaties. For us, the parallel to the ABM Treaty is evident
and the principle should be the same.
Today the United States faces a long-range ballistic missile threat
that was not envisioned when the ABM Treaty was negotiated. Although
Moscow will certainly seek to delay and minimize any changes to the
Treaty, and as always will seek a high price for accommodation, it will
understand the U.S. need to defend against this new threat and, as we
have done with Russian demands in the CFE context, it will accommodate.
Accommodation is possible because Russian interests and U.S. interests
are not mutually exclusive.
Even at the lowest levels of offensive nuclear forces speculated
for Russia in the future, a U.S. missile defense deployed to protect
against a limited attack would not undermine its offensive capability.
And this is the critical point: at the end of the day, if Russia knows
that U.S. defenses will not call into question the credibility of their
nuclear offensive force, they will have what they believe they need. In
this context, given the choice between a modified ABM Treaty and no
Treaty, Moscow will almost certainly follow past practice and choose to
renegotiate the Treaty consistent with its own best interests.
Finally, the future of offensive nuclear reductions is less likely
to be tied to formalistic arms control negotiations than to the
realities of post-Cold War world. The Russians, according to almost all
assessments, will be compelled by economics to go to much lower levels
of offensive forces, independent of arms control outcomes. If this
forecast is accurate and Russia does go to lower numbers, perhaps even
well below those being discussed for START III, the United States could
make appropriate adjustments in our own posture--a posture that must be
structured to meet our global interests, which are much different from
those of Russia.
With regard to the second proposition--that the rogue state missile
threat to the United States is still years away--the findings of the
Rumsfeld Commission and the North Korean launch last August of the
multi-stage, long-range Taepo Dong missile underscore that the threat
is here now and will become increasingly sophisticated. There is an
apparent consensus within the defense community that the proliferation
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons represents a major security
challenge to the United States. We are also near consensus on the
missile threat, as reflected in the Senate's overwhelming passage of
the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. The National Intelligence
Estimate that concluded that we would have warning and that we likely
would not face a long-range missile threat for fifteen years has been
widely repudiated.
Here, two points should be made. First, in the area of
proliferation shocks and surprises, we have a long record of
intelligence failures. From Sputnik and missiles in Cuba to the recent
Taepo Dong launch, there is every reason to believe that we will be
surprised in the future about the size, scope and speed of adversaries'
missile programs. The same applies to their programs to develop weapons
of mass destruction. Second, it seems to me that the North Korean
launch settles the debate. We now have a desperate, totalitarian
regime, that could we are told have a couple nuclear bombs, in the
possession of long range missiles.
The third proposition--that the ABM Treaty does not impede the
development of U.S. defense capabilities and that deployment of
defenses will require only modest changes to the Treaty--is more akin
to a self-limiting, self-fulfilling proposition than an objective
assessment of U.S. missile defense requirements in light of the threat
we face.
One can argue technically that the fixed, ground-based national
missile defense architectures being contemplated can be developed
consistent with the Treaty. Yet, it is very difficult to conclude that,
absent the Treaty, the United States would be considering these
architectures as the primary candidates. If the Treaty did not exist,
we would likely be aggressively exploring sea- and space-based options
that offer much greater potential in terms of cost effectiveness and
flexibility for expanding our defenses as the threat expands. This is
not being done because our programs must be compliant with the Treaty.
Moving from development to deployment, one must also question the
proposition that even very limited defenses could be fielded with only
modest changes to the implementing provisions of the Treaty. Article
One embodies the purpose of the Treaty by committing each party ``not
to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and
not to provide a base for such a defense.'' Coupled with the 1974
Protocol that reduces the number of permitted sites from two to one,
Article One limits a compliant defense to the sole purpose of
protecting the former ICBM field near Grand Forks, North Dakota.
The words of Article One and their meaning are very clear and, if
one applies plain and ordinary definitions, the language makes evident
the need to confront the contradiction between today's imperative to
defend our population against ballistic missile attacks from rogue
nations and the underlying strategic rationale of the Treaty.
Designed in the bipolar context of the Cold War confrontation with
the then Soviet Union, the express objective of the Treaty was to
severely restrict defenses so as to preserve the credibility of
offensive deterrent forces. Few would advance this same deterrent
concept today for states such as North Korea or Iran. Yet, the Treaty
does not provide an exception for what is often referred to as a light
territorial defense against these and other ballistic missile threats.
This leads to two further observations. The first is on timing.
Given the stated Russian goal of retaining the ABM Treaty without
change, and given their fears that any U.S. deployment program will
provide the base for a robust national missile defense that could
threaten the viability of their nuclear arsenal, any negotiation can be
expected to be long and difficult. Yet, if the United States acts with
determination and avoids mixed signals, such negotiations could be
successful if we have both a clear deployment objective and the
perceived resolve to move forward to meet the threat from rogue states,
even if that requires withdrawal from the Treaty under the supreme
interest clause. In light of the pace of missile programs in countries
such as North Korea and Iran, there simply is not time to devote years
to the renegotiation of the ABM Treaty.
The second observation is that in attempting to resolve Treaty
issues to permit limited defenses, we need to ensure flexibility for
the future to counter missile threats as they continue to evolve,
taking full advantage of developments in technology. Narrow Treaty
relief to allow for fixed ground-based interceptors to protect against
a very small and crude missile threat in the near term must not be
purchased at the price of fixing in concrete a future that does not
permit us to adapt our defenses to meet the threat as it evolves. For
example, we must not compromise now on a defense against a small
handful of missiles from North Korea but leave ourselves totally
defenseless when they add one or two more.
In conclusion, I will end by describing three alternative futures
for the ABM Treaty. The first, advocated by Russia and China, would
have the United States abide by the Treaty without change. At the core
of this approach--although often disguised by such noble sounding
phrases as ``the cornerstone of strategic stability'' or ``the
cornerstone of world stability''--is the perpetuation of the Cold War
concept of mutual assured destruction that bases national security
policy on the vulnerability of our society to nuclear destruction.
That the United States would remain vulnerable to the rogue nation
missile threat is either discounted or prized. For Russia, the status
quo best protects the nuclear force that it increasingly relies on in
both defense planning and declaratory policy. Moscow gives little
indication of concern about U.S. vulnerability to rogue state attacks,
such as from North Korea. For China, the ABM Treaty is considered
critical to its national interest because, without U.S. defenses,
Beijing can credibly threaten the United States with unacceptable
destruction of our cities. While not a party to the Treaty, China
certainly sees itself as an interested beneficiary, especially in the
context of its designs on Taiwan.
The second ABM Treaty future rejects the three propositions
assessed in this statement and calls for the United States to withdraw
from the Treaty consistent with our legal rights. Here, the clear
imperative is to deploy an effective national missile defense against
the rogue threat in a manner that permits our defenses to evolve as the
threat evolves. Under this approach, the ABM Treaty is acknowledged to
be strategically obsolete and counterproductive to long-term relations
with Russia. Differences with Russia--and specifically assurances to
Moscow that U.S. missile defense deployments would not undermine the
Russian offensive force--could be reconciled outside of the Treaty,
through informal confidence building measures or perhaps even in a more
formal way.
The third ABM Treaty future accepts as a national security
imperative the need to defend against the rogue threat. It also sees
the ABM Treaty as obsolete and counterproductive. Yet, under this
approach, there is a willingness to attempt to renegotiate the Treaty
if Moscow believes it essential and is willing to accept fundamental
changes that permit the United States to pursue defenses that are
sufficiently robust and flexible to protect against the threat. If this
attempt is unsuccessful, the United States would be forced to withdraw
from the Treaty, legally and consistent with our security requirements.
This was the approach taken in 1992. It may well provide a way ahead
today.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Joseph, thank you. Thanks again to each
of the three of you.
I would like to take each of you through a series of
questions, realizing that there is a significant technical
aspect to all of this which the three of you are far more
prepared to deal with than I am, but seeing if I can keep this
in the jargon that most of us understand. But nonetheless, all
three of you have touched on important dynamics of the ABM
Treaty as we currently understand it and interpret it. And I
want to match that up a little bit in a series of questions
with what you all have laid out as to where you think we need
to go, how you suggest we get there, and what the consequences
are for not dealing with this, especially as we have to deal
with the reality of this over the next 18 months.
So, with that, I will suggest some questions, and take as
much latitude as you wish in embroidering around the question
as well. If there are some things that you want to add, please
feel free to do so.
Mr. Secretary, may I ask you? We have heard from both
Ambassador Smith and Ambassador Joseph this morning some
references to the Rumsfeld Commission, which all three of you
are thoroughly familiar with. I would like to begin by asking
each of you whether you believe that the timeframe that the
Rumsfeld Commission came up with, the 5-year timeframe, before
a serious North Korean or Iranian missile threat would emerge
is correct. Are they understating it? I would be interested in
getting your evaluation of that dynamic of the Rumsfeld report.
Mr. Hadley. I have not gone into the intelligence behind
that report. I have read the report, talked to some of the
people who participated in it. All I can say without that kind
of technical review is it sounds right to me.
I spent some time looking at the 1995 CIA estimate which
seemed to me really did not hold up particularly well, and I
think that the Rumsfeld Commission has really done a remarkable
service by what it has done. And I would point out that my
understanding is that the CIA analysts really are pretty much
in accord with where the Rumsfeld Commission comes out. I have
talked to those analysts and heard briefings from them. I have
concluded that Rumsfeld had it about right.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Ambassador Smith.
Ambassador Smith. Well, Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege
of serving as a consultant and reviewer of the Rumsfeld
Commission report, and I think I can assure you that they are
basically correct. Obviously what they are saying is, to a
certain extent, things cannot be predicted. So whether it is 4
years or it is 6 years, or maybe it is wrong in one case it is
10, but in another case it could be 3, they have got it just
about right.
And our official intelligence community has gotten it wrong
pretty consistently. Let me just give you a few examples. Look
how quickly North Korea went from a No Dong to a Taepo Dong
with not two stages, with not liquid fuel, but a three-stage
Taepo Dong with a solid fuel stage. That is an important
advance in a couple of years.
Just 2 years ago, the intelligence community told us that
the Iranians were a long way away from the Shahab 3. Not 9
months later, the Director of Central Intelligence was here in
the Senate testifying that actually they had been wrong, and
now we are looking at a Shahab 4 and a Shahab 5.
I would also point out that the Indians and the Pakistanis
went very quickly from their first missiles to their second
missiles and we saw I think just last month both tests of the
Indian Agni and the Pakistani Ghauri.
It seems to me that 5 years is about right. And remember
what they said. It is 5 years from the time a country makes
that decision. They did not say there was going to be an
onslaught in 5 years from today. They said that given
technology transfer, given that these countries do not have to
reinvent the wheel, given that they can beg, borrow, and steal
technology in bits and pieces all over the world, if and when a
country makes a decision, it would take it about 5 years. And
there are plenty of countries doing just that, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Ambassador Joseph.
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I do not know what I can add.
Let me say that I, like many other people, was very impressed
with the individuals that formed the Rumsfeld Commission--very
competent, very experienced individuals with a wide variety of
views. They had access to a great deal of intelligence, and I
think the findings--in this case, the findings in terms of the
5 years--does reflect the best assessment that can be made.
I would point out that, in that finding, the report says we
may not know when that 5-year clock begins. We may not have
indicators and warning. So, it is not necessarily 5 years from
now or 5 years from a time in the future in which a decision is
made by a State to acquire this capability. We may be well
along that path already.
And I would also emphasize what Ambassador Smith just said
about the history of being surprised, of intelligence failures,
as some would call them. We have often been surprised by the
speed and the scope of adversaries' missile programs, as well
as their nuclear, biological, and chemical programs. One can go
back to Sputnik or to missiles in Cuba. The Taepo Dong and the
Iranian program are just more recent examples. In terms of
nuclear, biological, and chemical programs, we were surprised
with the Indian test last year. We were also shocked at the
scope and size of the Iraqi biological and chemical weapons
program.
This uncertainty is something that we need to take into
account in terms of our own sense of timing for moving forward.
I believe it is urgent that we move forward with the national
missile defense, and that is supported by this history of
surprises.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Let me ask each of you. You all touched on this in some
way. The ship-based threat, the sea-based threat. Recently we
became aware of the fact that the Iranians towed a barge out in
the middle of the Caspian Sea and on that barge was a Scud
missile, and they test fired a Scud off the barge. What our
intelligence shows is that the result of that test was rather
accurate where they placed the missile.
In response to the three of your analyses of what not only
our limitations are presently under the ABM Treaty constraints,
but more importantly, as we are looking out into the future,
how do we prepare ourselves--and can we--to deal with this kind
of a threat? Obviously, the Iranians, a terrorist group, anyone
can get a hold of a cargo ship and put a Scud type of missile
in the hold and run it around out in the bay somewhere and get
it close to our shore where we have very little time to respond
and fire it. What is your response to that specific threat, Mr.
Secretary?
Mr. Hadley. Mr. Chairman, I have not gone through or
reviewed military analysis or technical analysis about how you
deal with that threat, but let me give you a couple
suggestions.
I think one of the things that is unfortunate about this
debate about ballistic missile defense is that in some sense
the partisans of ballistic missile defense have had to focus
all their efforts on this one instrument because the resistance
to it has been so great. While the critics of ballistic missile
defense are prepared to do a lot of things to deal with weapons
of mass destruction--almost anything but ballistic missile
defense. I think we have got to try and bridge that gap and
recognize that ballistic missile defense is an active element,
but only one element of what has to be a broader strategy.
In my testimony and elsewhere, you can find a long list of
the things we need to do to deal with the challenge of weapons
of mass destruction. And I think the Iranian case is an example
of that. We may have a role for active ballistic missile
defense in that case, but it is also a situation where we are
going to need good intelligence about what kinds of ships are
approaching our shores and what they contain. We are going to
need capability based on that intelligence to preempt, if
necessary, and take out some of those threats.
So, I think what we need to do is look for a comprehensive
strategy which has a variety of elements, and of course, in
those instances where appropriate, ballistic missile defense
will be one. But that is why I mentioned this need for a really
comprehensive approach to the weapons of mass destruction
threat. We have got a lot of tools in our arsenal. It is a
serious threat and we have got to use them all.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Ambassador Smith.
Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, let me try and respond to
that. First of all, with regard to the possibility, the
likelihood of this, I think we should not scare ourselves to
the point where we think we are going to be overwhelmed with
this tomorrow. But the fact is there are countries working on
this, as we have just stated. They are making breakthroughs and
I think we should expect this. They know what kind of defenses
we are thinking about. They clearly go and look for something
else, for the same reason people built submarines years ago.
You noted the Iranian barge incident. There are some other
things in the Rumsfeld report. I would just note a couple
things that I think are common knowledge.
One, the Israelis launch the targets for their Arrow
missile from a barge at sea. It is clearly done and that is a
fairly accurate trajectory that they are following.
Two, the Boeing Corporation has just launched a Ukrainian
booster from something called Sea Launch quite successfully for
commercial purposes. The technology is basically there.
The problem that used to lead people to say it cannot be
done is a problem basically of navigation. It was the challenge
that our SLBM program had to face at the outset. To know where
you are going, you need to know where you are. That is why it
makes it very hard to launch a missile at sea. Well, guess
what? If you have GPS or you have GLONASS or you have both--and
these countries do--you can go to any sport shop and buy a GPS
device for $1,000, $2,000. If you are willing to spend a little
more, you get a real sophisticated one. The missile knows where
it is, sir.
The other problem is the roll and yaw of a ship. As you
launch something, obviously the ship is on the sea. It is not a
completely stable platform. But once again, if you know where
you are, the missile can correct for its position.
And remember there is a big difference with these kind of
countries. They are not going for high accuracy, hard target
kill the way the United States and the Soviet Union were. What
if they are 5 miles off? What we are talking about is a missile
on some kind of a ship, 500 miles at sea in the Atlantic Ocean.
They are aiming for Charleston, South Carolina, sir, and if the
roll and yaw gets it at the wrong moment, they hit Hanahan
instead of Charleston. They still achieve their objective. So,
it is very possible and we need to think about that.
Now, what do you do? I have to underscore what Mr. Hadley
suggested. We need a comprehensive program. We need better
intelligence. We need to double nonproliferation efforts. We
need to think about interdiction or preemption, and we need to
think about defense.
Now, when you think about defense, the fact is that if the
ships can be out there, you can track them. And the Coast
Guard, by the way, has a very interesting program that has just
been reinvigorated to keep track of significant ships out there
for various reasons. But the fact is ships move. That is why
countries want them. Well, you cannot fix that with a fixed,
land-based system in Grand Forks, North Dakota or in the middle
of Alaska. If it is 500 miles off the coast of South Carolina
and it launches at Charleston, believe you me, you will not get
a missile that is leaving North Dakota there in time.
The fact is if we are worried about this--and I think we
should be--we need to start looking at space-based defenses.
That is the answer, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Ambassador Joseph.
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, just very briefly. There are,
as you point out, many different avenues for missile attack,
both ballistic and cruise. All are technologically challenging.
Some, in fact, may be countered only by future capabilities
such as boost-phase interceptors or the space-based
interceptors, as Ambassador Smith just said.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The intercept of a missile carrying a biological warhead,
for example, is obviously risky for many reasons. If that
intercept is not done during the missile's boost phase, the
intercept occurs over a friendly nation, fallout, casualties.
Does, in your opinion, the current administration proposal for
intercept deal with this, deal with it in a way that addresses
this possibility, calling for a boost phase, for example, of
the intercept capability in the three-tier C-1, C-2, C-3? Would
you each comment on that?
Mr. Hadley. I am not aware that the C-1, C-2, or C-3
architecture for national missile defense has any boost phase
capability to it. My colleagues can correct me on that.
That is obviously for a lot of reasons the intercept moment
of choice. I think one of the things that we should do from a
deterrence standpoint is to be working on and try and
demonstrate that kind of capability for deterrence purposes. I
am not fully briefed in the airborne laser program. That is one
which would provide that capability, and there an advantage to
moving it along even if it is fairly primitive and
demonstrating it because it makes it clear to countries of
concern that we are working that problem much the same way that
we dumped an MX missile out the back of a 747 in the 1980's
simply to show there were technical fixes out there available
to us for MX vulnerability so that countries that did not wish
us well had to take them into account.
I think that is the kind of thing we need to be doing--the
kind of robust research and development program we need to
support national missile defense, and that is one of the
reasons all three of us have argued that part of the ABM Treaty
relief we need is to get out from under the restrictions on
research and development.
Senator Hagel. Would you like to add anything?
Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I agree with
Mr. Hadley. The current administration, the 3 + 3 or what I
guess has now become 3 + 5--we are not talking about boost
phase. We are talking about fixed, ground-based interceptors in
the United States. Obviously, the people engineering that
system are trying to build it such that the interceptor can get
to something high enough, fast enough so that they can vaporize
that kind of warhead. Depending on the distance they have to
travel and the angle of attack, that could be problematic or
not. They are working the problem as best they can with that
stricture.
If you want to be sure about it, you are quite correct. You
need to go to boost phase. The United States does not now have
any programs--does not now have any programs--for strategic
defense in boost phase. We have an airborne laser program, but
I need to underscore airborne laser is theater missile defense.
The ABC concept of operation does not permit that to be in the
right time and the right place to carry out a strategic
mission.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Ambassador Joseph.
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I would add that I have had a
number of discussions with Israeli colleagues. Israel as a
nation is very concerned about the problem, the threat that you
just raised. The Israeli approach is a comprehensive approach.
It is an approach that emphasizes active defenses against
ballistic missiles. It emphasizes a whole range of passive
defense capabilities to protect not only forces, but the
population should active defense fail. And it emphasizes
counter force capabilities and options in that category. That
sort of comprehensive approach is the type that I believe we
should be looking at.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
As the three of you look at the administration's concept
for national missile defense, as you understand it, what are
your concerns about the elements of that concept that might
make the time table slip even more than what we have discussed
this morning? You all three have identified some of those
areas. But if you would like to add to that part of your
testimony, the committee would be interested in hearing
anything further on this.
Mr. Hadley. I do not have anything to add.
Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, the only thing at this
point, having stretched out from 3 + 3 to 3 + 5, I think the
program manager probably has the latitude that he needed. It is
a high risk program. Obviously something could go wrong. But
frankly the biggest risk to our NMD program right now is it
gets delayed for political reasons, not technical reasons.
Ambassador Joseph. I have nothing to add, sir.
Senator Hagel. Some have criticized the administration's
missile defense concept because they say it seems to
concentrate more in keeping within the ABM Treaty, as you have
all noted, I have noted, others, rather than focusing on
providing the essential effective defense that this debate
should be about, the purpose of all this should be about.
And setting aside for a moment the question, which we
continue to deal with and will, whether the ABM Treaty is
legally in force and all the dynamics and consequences of that,
would each of you comment on whether you believe that even the
limited defense contemplated under the administration's C-1
concept would be a violation of article I of the ABM Treaty
which bans any defense of the territory or regions of the
United States?
Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Hadley. I think for the reasons that Ambassador Smith
laid out, I would associate myself with the statement that even
C-1 presents an ABM Treaty problem.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Smith. Well, I can only repeat what I have said.
I think there are arguments one could make, but the fact is we
are getting at the object and purpose of the treaty. It seems
to me that you are going to have to negotiate something,
otherwise it will at least be construed by a lot of significant
people in both countries to be a violation of the ABM Treaty,
particularly of article I.
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, as I said--and I certainly
would agree with Ambassador Smith--article I is very clear. It
is a very short article. If you use plain and ordinary
definitions of terms, then I think the language makes very
clear that a national missile defense, even a very limited
national missile defense, is not permitted and, in fact,
expressly prohibited by article I.
Senator Hagel. A follow-on to this question. The
administration's C-1 concept--and this again has been touched
upon here this morning by each of you--calls for a missile
defense site in central Alaska. Would this, again in your
opinions, violate the protocol to the ABM Treaty as well as
article III?
Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Hadley. Yes, sir.
Ambassador Smith. Unequivocally.
Ambassador Joseph. Yes, sir.
Senator Hagel. The central Alaskan site that I am referring
to being considered now by the administration would rely upon
the Shemya X-band radar, with which I think all three of you
are very familiar. Is this again legal under the ABM Treaty
given the distances involved?
Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Hadley. I am going to defer to my two colleagues on
that issue. They have struggled with that issue much more than
I.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hadley defers for a
good reason. That is a very complex question, and it hinges on
whether that Shemya radar is an ABM radar. Now, the way it
parses out is basically this.
The ABM Treaty imagined a world in which there would be
one, big, giant radar like we had at Cavalier, North Dakota,
and that was an ABM radar. And the treaty specifies where it
can be. Now, if it is an early warning radar, it can be out on
the periphery of the territory, but if it is an ABM radar, it
needs to be in a 150-kilometer radius that contains the launch
site. And clearly Shemya to central Alaska is more than 150
kilometers. There is absolutely no doubt about that.
The question is, is that X-band radar an ABM radar? Now, it
seems to me that if you argue that it is not, you then fall
into the quagmire of answering the question, all right, then
what is? Is some other early warning radar out there an ABM
radar? Is something on board the system an ABM radar? Something
has to be an ABM radar or a substitute for an ABM radar.
I think the most likely conclusion that people will reach
is that the X-band radar that is being built expressly for the
purpose of national missile defense at Shemya is the ABM radar,
and if that is the ABM radar, it cannot be at Shemya as the ABM
Treaty stands today.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Ambassador Joseph.
Ambassador Joseph. I agree with Ambassador Smith. I think
article III would have to be addressed and changed in order to
permit an ABM radar to be at Shemya.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Ambassador Smith, I wanted to get back to a point you
raised in your testimony, inviting me essentially to followup
with you on some additional thoughts you might want to share
with the committee on negotiating points. I would like to avail
you of that opportunity at the present time, and with your
colleagues on either side of you, as they listen to your
insightful commentary on this, if they would like to add
anything, we would welcome their thoughts as well.
Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I suggested that what we need to do before we run off and
talk to the Russians is consider exactly what we need and go
and try and get no more or no less than that. As I look at what
we are going to do over the next few years, over what we should
do over the next few years, on the one hand, you do not want to
err on the side of caution and go and ask for less than you
need. That is ridiculous because you are back in the same
situation--you have jumped from the pot to the frying pan. On
the other hand, if this is a negotiation, there is no point of
overplaying your hand and seeking things that you really do not
need for maybe another 10, 15 years.
The way I parse it out is this. First of all, we are moving
along on the fixed, ground-based system. If we could go back a
few years and I could do it differently, I might not do it that
way. But the fact is that is where we are. I think it would be
a real shame to derail that system. We have got to get in the
business of missile defense. It will give us a minimal
capability. It will get us into the production business. It
will get us into the operational side of operational concepts,
training, et cetera, et cetera. And most importantly, we will
demonstrate to ourselves and the rest of the world that when
you deploy a missile defense interceptor, the sun will actually
come up the next day, and a lot of these bugaboos will go away.
So, I think we need to do that.
Can we get by with one site? No, sir, we cannot. I think we
need to start thinking about multiple sites. It seems to me
that the option would be three or six. When we were talking
about a ground-based component of the GPALS architecture, we
were talking about six, but there was a sort of GPALS light for
three sites. When you think about it, it makes sense. You put
something in Alaska, something in the north central United
States, and something in New England. If someone is going to
launch a missile at the United States from, let us say, Iran or
from Libya, the great circle route from that part of the Middle
East really brings you to Boston. That is the logical target.
So, if you are worried about that, not just North Korea,
logically you are somewhere in Maine. So, you need to get
multiple sites. So, that would be my first point. We need to
get multiple sites.
Second, we need to get sensors go free for several reasons.
One, that is what glues the whole system together.
Two, you just touched upon it with the Shemya radar.
Sensors are a source of never-ending argument. I do not know
what an ABM radar is, Mr. Chairman. We do not really know what
1972 terms mean anymore as we hit the new millennium. What is
an ABM radar? What if we can make something on the interceptor
itself to do the whole job? Is that an ABM radar? We are just
going to go on and on. We are going to have endless compliance
problems, not just for ourselves, but look at the compliance
problems we have had with the Russians. Sensors go free is the
way we not only can go forward now but we can start laying the
groundwork for what we are going to need to do in another
decade. We need to get out of the business of limitations on
sensors.
The third thing we need to do you raised with the idea of
the ship-borne missiles. If we need to have follow-ons--and I
cannot imagine a situation in human defense for 10,000 years in
which there has not been a follow-on to something--then we need
to start looking at things like space and sea based NMD. We do
not even know if we can do those things yet. We have not even
got a proof of concept. We do not need to deploy them. We do
not need deployment rights for that. We do need development and
testing to go free.
Those would be my three basic elements. I would go for
multiple sites, sensors go free, and development and testing go
free.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Hadley. I would agree with that.
I would put two cautions down, and they are political
cautions actually. The first explains why I mentioned in my
testimony that we need to put ballistic missile defense in the
context of a global effort against weapons of mass destruction
in which we would invite our friends and allies and even
countries like Russia and maybe even China to participate. It
is not just an issue of the ABM Treaty. There is a political
aspect that even our allies are concerned about, and that is
whether a national missile defense is a vehicle for one of two
things, both of which give even our friends pause. One is a
sort of fortress America--that we can withdraw behind a
national missile defense and be safe from all the threats that
some of our friends and allies have to face.
Or two is it in some sense a protection that is going to
allow us to deploy forces anywhere, anytime. I think one of the
consequences of Kosovo is going to be some real questions about
what the United States is doing in the world. I think if we are
going to move forward on national missile defense in a way that
is not going to be disruptive of relations not just with Russia
but also with some of our friends and allies, we have to put it
in the broader context of a global effort against weapons of
mass destruction.
Second, I think we have got to make sure that we'd not let
the best be the enemy of the good. If we were going to throw
out the ABM Treaty, we would probably have a different NMD
architecture. But the architecture of national missile defense
has been changed too many times. We need to stabilize an
architecture, get something deployed and get in the business,
as Dave Smith said, of defending the country.
So, I would urge us to have a political context as we go
forward, ask for what we need in ABM Treaty relief, but not let
the best be the enemy of the good because the objective here
has to be to get into the business of defending the country. We
are already late. That is the message of the Rumsfeld
Commission. We have got threats and no capability to deal with
them. We are already late. If we start changing baseline
architectures and the like, we are going to be even later. We
have got a defenses gap not a missile gap, and we do not want
to make that gap any bigger.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Ambassador Joseph.
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I think that if we do choose to
renegotiate the ABM Treaty, then the experience of 1992
provides a very good model. In fact, the components that
Ambassador Smith has just mentioned were the very components of
our negotiating position back then. These included:
Elimination of all restrictions on sensors. Very
straightforward and very simple.
Elimination of all restrictions on development and testing.
Again, very straightforward and very simple. This would allow
for flexibility for the future whether it be space-based
approaches or sea-based approaches or any other approach,
including mobile land-based.
Elimination of restrictions on the transfer of ABM systems
and components to allow for the type of cooperative
relationships that underly Mr. Hadley's last point on the
context in which we conduct these negotiations and move forward
with defenses. This is particularly the case given the concerns
of our allies, which, in fact, may pose obstacles equal to
those are that posed by Russia.
And finally, relief on the number of fixed land-based sites
and interceptors that are permitted. Our position then was six
sites, and up to 1,200 interceptors.
I think in fact we do know the basic components of what our
negotiating position should be and we do not need to take a
whole lot of time doing the inevitable. In my experience it is
inevitable in arms control that we will negotiate among
ourselves before we take our position to Russia. This is a
luxury that we cannot afford. We need to move forward now and
we need to move forward recognizing that whatever agreement we
make with Russia must provide flexibility for the future, given
that the threat is going to continue to change and become more
challenging. We cannot fix now on a compromise that permits us
to defend only against the threat of today. We need to look
beyond that.
Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, you have all been very helpful,
and the committee appreciates your individual contributions. I
might also add thank you for what you have done for this
country over the years, and hopefully at some point you will
have renewed opportunities to bring new leadership in this
area. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lee, welcome. You have been patient. I know that you
will probably add on to what some of your colleagues have said,
and I know you have some very specific points that you wish to
make. On behalf of the committee, thank you very much for
coming this morning, and please proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM T. LEE, FORMER ANALYST FOR THE DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ADJUNCT FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Lee. Well, thank you, Senator. I very much appreciate
the opportunity and I want to thank you personally and all
members of the committee for this opportunity.
I am going to concentrate on the new evidence, the bottom
line of which is the ABM Treaty is not and was not from the
beginning a valid contract.
Since the publication of my book on this subject a year
ago, we have had a lot of additional evidence that has
confirmed the conclusions of that book. The Soviets violated
article I prohibiting national ABM defenses by deploying more
than 10,000 dual purpose, anti-aircraft and anti-missile, SAM/
ABM, missiles supported by 17 huge radars on the Soviet
periphery. Moreover, Russia is now developing yet another new
SAM/ABM.
Based on what they had been told by the Secretary of
Defense and other senior U.S. officials, the Soviets most
likely entered the SALT negotiations expecting two things: they
could negotiate a treaty banning national ABM defenses in both
superpowers while continuing to develop and deploy their dual
purpose SAM/ABM systems; and second, U.S. satellites would not
detect the violation. The treaty certainly confirmed such
expectations.
The key to this whole thing, one of the keys to their whole
approach to it, was these large radars, which I can talk to in
some detail, but they provide what is called battle management,
target tracking data. That mode of operation was dictated by
the technology constraints on the Soviet Union at the time and
continued through the cold war. With the exception of one late
model, the maximum velocities of Soviet ABM missiles were a
fraction of that of the targets. Thus an ABM interceptor with a
velocity of 2 kilometers a second had to be launched with an
ICBM warhead with some 1,200 kilometers from its target. The
big radars on the periphery and those at Moscow provided the
long-range tracking data so that the ABM's could launch in
time. This applied to all Soviet ABM systems, both the legal
systems at Moscow that we call a Galosh and ABM-3, as well as
to the SAM/ABM's that we call SA-5 and SA-10.
The general staff wrote the script for the Soviet treaty
negotiators, five of whom belonged to the military-industry
cabal that had secured Politburo approval of national ABM
defenses by mid-1962. To keep it short, the Soviet Union was in
violation of article I of the ABM Treaty when they signed it.
They had been in violation at that point 10 years.
The new evidence that I submit is now conclusive fills in
the intelligence gaps that we had from our national collection
systems. The sources for this are very credible. They include
the former Premier of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kosygin; General
Colonel Vitintsev, who was the former commander of Soviet ABM
and space defense forces for 20-odd years; a gentleman named
Kisun'ko who was the chief designer of the Moscow system and
general designer of ABM systems for the Soviet Union; a number
of other very credible sources.
The essential part here is that all of these Russian
sources agree on three critical issues in the intelligence
record. The SA-5 and the SA-10 were designed from the beginning
as dual purpose SAM/ABM's from relatively low cost air defense
components.
The big radars that we call the Hen House and LPAR, the
first and second generation respectively, were designed to
provide target tracking data to make these systems work. They
were not initially designed just as early warning radars. As
far as the record from Russian sources is concerned, the early
warning function was recognized only later, some years later,
after they had designed these for the battle management target
tracking function.
Furthermore, these sources provide the information, though
in less detail than on other things, that by the mid-1970's the
Soviet Union had a national ABM and space defense command-
control system to make it all work. We ourselves by the early
1970's verified that the dual purpose missiles, the SAM/ABM's
had the nuclear warheads they required.
Russia is now developing and is about to deploy a major
update to this system, their national defenses, called the S-
400. It represents a major improvement in all respects--I can
go into details some other time--on the capabilities of the ABM
defenses that they inherited from the Soviet Union.
I want to say something briefly about the implications of
this, that modernizing the Russian national ABM systems with
the S-400 will challenge the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent, especially if our arsenal is reduced from the 6,000
warhead level permitted under SALT I to 3,500 under SALT II
that the Senate already has ratified. Existing Russian ABM
defenses probably nullified the small British and French
nuclear deterrents and would be able to exact some significant
attrition on our forces. Even before Kosovo, Russia was
committed to maintaining its strategic advantage in this
respect. They understand very well that the side that has both
offenses and defenses has an advantage over the side that only
has offenses. It is like we have two boxers, one with one hand
tied behind his back. The guy with both hands free has an
advantage.
In sum, the 1972 ABM Treaty was neither a valid contract
nor the cornerstone of strategic stability. Amended by these
1997 protocols, the treaty would be a monument to strategic
instability by legalizing major improvements in Russia's ABM
defenses while the U.S. and our allies remain totally
vulnerable. There simply is no excuse for failing to protect
the United States population, our military forces, and our
allies in the name of a treaty that never was a valid contract
with a State that no longer exists.
Now, I can use these graphs here and so forth to illustrate
some of these points, if you wish, or I understand you are
under considerable time pressure. Do you want to go directly to
questions?
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of William T. Lee
Thank you Senator Hagel. I wish to thank you and all Committee
members for the opportunity to testify on this issue. My testimony
represents the findings of my own research and should not be construed
as the position of any organization with which I am associated.
Since the publication of my book, ``The ABM Treaty Charade: A Study
in Elite Illusion and Delusion,'' in May 1997 additional evidence has
confirmed the conclusions in my 1997 book: the Soviets violated Article
1 prohibiting national ABM defenses by deploying more than 10,000 dual
purpose, anti-aircraft and anti-missile (SAM/ABM) missiles supported by
17 huge radars on the Soviet periphery. Moreover, Russia is developing
yet another SAM/ABM.
Based on what they had been told by Secretary of Defense McNamara
and other senior U.S. officials, the Soviets most likely entered the
SALT negotiations expecting: a) they could negotiate a Treaty banning
national ABM defenses in both superpowers while continuing to develop
and deploy their SAM/ABM systems; and b) U.S. satellites would not
detect the violation.
The Treaty certainly was consistent with such expectations by
permitting, among other things, deployment of 18 large phased array
radars--Hen House and LPAR (Krasnoyarsk type)--that delivered target
tracking data to the SAM/ABMs under the guise of providing only early
warning of ballistic missile attack.
The battle management mode of operation was dictated by technology
constraints. With the exception of one late model, the maximum
velocities Soviet ABM missiles were a fraction of that of the targets.
Thus an ABM interceptor with a velocity of 2 km./sec. had to be
launched when an ICBM warhead was some 1,200 km. from its target. The
big radars--on the periphery and at Moscow--provided the long range
target tracking data so that the ABMs could launch in time. This
applied to all Soviet ABM systems--Galosh and ABM-3 as well as to the
SAM/ABMs.
The General Staff and KGB wrote the script for Soviet Treaty
negotiators, five of whom belonged to the military-industrial cabal
that had secured Politburo approval of national SAM/ABMs defenses by
mid-1962. When the Soviets signed the ABM Treaty banning such defenses
in 1972, much of their first generation national SAM/ABM defense
system--the SA-5 and Hen House radars--was in place, and construction
was about to begin on the first LPARs for the second generation SA-10
SAM/ABM system. The Soviets were in violation of Article 1 of the ABM
Treaty when they signed it.
In the U.S. national intelligence estimates (NIEs) the issue of
whether the Soviets were deploying national SAM/ABM defenses turned
primarily on four questions. First, were the SA-5 and SA-10 designed to
be only (anti-aircraft) SAMs, or dual purpose SAM/ABMs? Second, were
the Hen House and LPAR radars passing only early warning data, or
battle management target tracking data as well? Third, was there a
central ABM command authority with an adequate command-control system?
Fourth, did the SAM/ABM missiles have nuclear warheads? All NIE
participants agreed that if the answers to these questions were
``yes'', then the Soviets were deploying national SAM/ABM defenses.
Until 1967 CIA and other NIE players agreed that the SA-5 could be
a SAM/ABM. Similarly, in the 1960s the NIEs stated that Hen House
radars were providing ``early tracking and prediction data for use by
ABM launch units'' and ``initial (target) track data'' for the Moscow
ABM, which is tantamount to saying that the Hen Houses were battle
management radars. Then CIA switched its position--the SA-5 was only a
SAM, the radars were only for early warning--and the majority soon
followed.
Neither of these changes in CIA assessments was the result of
evidence on either SA-5 and Hen House design, or actual radar
operations. In rare moments of candor, CIA acknowledged that there
simply were too many ``intelligence gaps'' in the evidence from U.S.
technical collection systems to resolve these issues. The CIA and the
NIE majority simply systematically violated the rule that absence of
evidence is not evidence of absence, e.g. if satellites did not detect
the Soviet radars passing battle management target tracking data,
therefore, only early warning data were being passed. When the U.S.
identified nuclear warhead storage at the SA-5 complexes in the early
1970s NIE positions remained the same.
Conclusive evidence filling in the ``intelligence gaps'' began to
surface publicly from U.S. and Russian sources only in 1992. The
principal Russian sources for that evidence are:
--A.N. Kosygin, former Premier and Politburo member for over three
decades;
--Gen. Col. Yu.V. Votintsev, Commander ABM (PRO) and Space Defense
(PKO) Troops, 1967-85;
--G.V. Kisun'ko, Chief Designer of the Moscow ABM system 1954-75,
General Designer of the Soviet Empire's ABM systems from 1956
until the mid-1970s, and two of his colleagues;
--two Soviet Military Attaches--one a military intelligence (GRU)
general officer; and
--various books and articles from the Russian press.
The top three Russian sources--Kosygin, Votintsev, Kisun'ko--had
unique access to all Soviet ABM programs. All the Russian sources are
consistent on three critical points refuting CIA's position:
--the SA-5 and SA-10 were designed as dual purpose SAM/ABMs from
relatively low cost air defense components;
--the Hen House and LPAR radars were designed to provide target
tracking (battle management) data to the SAM/ABMs; and
--a national ABM and space defense command-control system was
installed by the mid-1970s.
In 1991 a U.S. inspection team independently confirmed the LPAR
battle management role. The de-classified NIEs and the Russian sources
confirm the same function for the Hen House radars. There are no
factual contradictions between the NIEs and the Russian sources. For
the most part, the Russian sources simply fill in the intelligence
gaps. Tables 1 and 2 list the major milestones for the Moscow ABM and
national SAM/ABM programs. Table 3 gives the sequence of flight tests
for all Soviet ABM programs (excluding directed energy systems).
In sum, the evidence now is conclusive: the ABM Treaty was DOA.
Russia inherited most of the illegal Soviet national ABM defenses and
is trying to maintain and modernize them. The Russian military
understands that the side with both strategic offensive and defensive
forces has a great advantage over the side that relies only on
offensive weapons, and that the advantage multiplies as offensive
arsenals are reduced by START agreements. Meanwhile, Russia's national
ABM defenses can protect them from the nuclear and missile
proliferation to which they are contributing so much.
To this end, over the past decade Russia has developed a new SAM/
ABM, the ``S-400'', which is scheduled for deployment next year. Both
the S-400 SAM/ABM and its predecessor, the SA-10, can operate with the
same interceptor missiles.
The new long range S-400 missile can engage ballistic missiles with
ranges of (at least) 3,500 km., as compared to about 2,000 km. for the
latest model SA-10 missile, even without target tracking data from
battle management radars. The new ``super-maneuverable'' short range S-
400 missile provides two layers of ABM defense instead of one layer for
previous SAM/ABMs (SA-5 and SA-10), and has the potential for non-
nuclear kill of strategic ballistic missiles.
Given long range target tracking data from Russia's battle
management radars and nuclear warheads, the S-400 should be highly
effective against all types of strategic ballistic missiles--medium
range through ICBMs. Furthermore, production of three new radars of
various ranges is underway.
Inasmuch as S-400 missile characteristics correspond to the limits
set in the 1997 protocols to the ABM Treaty, Russia obviously
negotiated those protocols to legalize modernization of its illegal
national ABM defenses. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration
persists in the illusion that the protocols only defined the technical
boundaries between ``theater'' and ``strategic'' ABM systems.
Modernizing Russian national ABM defenses with the S-400 will
challenge the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, especially if
our arsenal is reduced from the 6,000 warhead level permitted by SALT I
to 3,500 under the SALT II Treaty that the Senate already has ratified.
Existing Russian ABM defenses probably nullify the small British and
French nuclear deterrents. Even before Kosovo Russia was committed to
maintaining its strategic military advantage in this respect.
In sum, the 1972 ABM Treaty was neither a valid contract nor the
``cornerstone of strategic stability.'' Amended by these protocols the
Treaty would be a monument to strategic instability by legalizing major
improvements in Russia's ABM defenses while the U.S. and our Allies
remain totally vulnerable. There simply is no excuse for failing to
protect the U.S. population, our military forces, and our Allies in the
name of a Treaty that never was a valid contract with a State that no
longer exists.
TABLE 1_MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM MILESTONES
1953 Seven Marshals: need ABM
Politburo charges KB-1 with proposal
1954 ``System A''--competing battle management radar designs,
non-nuclear ``V-1000'' interceptor, 25km altitude
1956 Begin construction Sary Shagan ABM polygon
Test nuke air blast ABM warhead
1959 V-1000 interceptor flight tests
Moscow defended area requirements specified
1960 V-1000 simulated SS-3/4 intercepts
Neutron & x-ray kill mechanisms understood
ABM at Moscow by October 1967
1961 V-1000 direct hit SS-4 RV, battle management mode
11 intercepts SS-4 RVs
Simulated nuke warheads test on V-1000 missile
ECM decoy & terminal guidance tests of system A
``Operation K-1/2'' nuclear tests
System ``A-35'' with Galosh interceptor instead of system A
1962 Deploy Galosh system (A-35) at Moscow by October 1967
Operation ``K-3/4/5'' nuke tests
Develop x-ray nuke warhead
1963 Project ``Battering Ram''--SS-11 as ABM with 10 MT
1964 Reduce Galosh (A-35) radars and launchers
Cancel ``Battering Ram''
1966-67 Galosh flight tests begin at Sary Shagan
1967 Develop ABM X-3 (``A-135'') (copy U.S. 1966 Nike-X)
1972 ``Experimental Exploitation'' Galosh system
1973 Modernize Galosh, some anti-MIRV capability
1975 Engineering development ABM-3 (derivative of X-3)
1978 Modernized Galosh ABM system Aaccepted into Service
1982 Extraordinary Strategic Force Exercise
1987 ABM-3 accepted into services
TABLE 2_SA-5/l0 NATIONAL SAM/ABM PROGRAM MILESTONES
1953 Split in KB-1 on ABM feasibility
1954 ``Zonal ABM'' alternative to system A
Design Hen House and Dog House battle management prototypes
Military set on semi-mobile systems for the future
PVO Strany Mission = Aerospace Defense
1956 Begin construction Sary Shagan ABM test range
Reject SAM/ABM to replace system A at Moscow
1957 Project ``Saturn'' (SA-5) SAM/ABM
1960 Developing ``Universal SAM/ABM'' (SA-5)
1961 Politburo approved SA-5/Hen House deployment
1962 Program entrenched in Politburo, VPK, MOD, MIL industry
Cancel Leningrad SAM/ABM, Replace with SA-5
Project ``Battering Ram'' (SS-11 ABM with 10 MT warhead)
SA-5 SAM/ABM flight tests begin
1963 Three ABM systems for Moscow: Galosh, SA-5, & SS-11
1964 Canceled project ``Battering Ram''
1967 SA-5 accepted into service at least as SAM (anti-aircraft)
Reconfirmed SA-5/Hen House program, modernize SA-5
Develop: SA-10 (``S-300'') SAM/ABM and LPAR radars
Rejected project ``Aurora'' national ABM (ABM-X-2)
Formed ABM/Space Defense Command
1973 SA-5 Modernization flight tests in ABM mode
1974 Nuke storage appears at SA-5 complexes
1975 Acceptance SA-5 into service as ABM (SAM/ABM)
1977 Deployment SA-5/Hen House national ABM virtually complete
1980 First LPARs operating but unreliable
SA-10 (SAM/ABM) deployment begins
1982 Extraordinary Strategic Forces exercise with ABM
1985 1st SA-10 modernization (``S-300PMU''), LPARs reliable
1992 SA-10 modification (``S-300PMU-1'')
1995 SA-10 modification (``S-300PMU-2'')
TABLE 3_APPROXIMATE SEQUENCE OF ABM SYSTEM TESTING AT SARY SHAGAN RANGE
1958-60 System A (original Moscow ABM), Griffon (Leningrad SAM/
ABM), SA-2 as tactical ABM ?
1961-62 System A, Griffon (SAM/ABM), SA-5 (SAM/ABM)
1963-65 SA-5 (SAM/ABM)*
1966-67 SA-5, Galosh
1967-70 Galosh, SA-5 (1st modernization)
1971-75 Galosh, SA-5 (2nd modernization), probably ABM X-3
1976-80 Galosh, SA-5, ABM X-3
* A few Griffon tests--the Leningrad system--could have continued into
early 1963.
______
Annex 1: Questions Submitted by the Honorable Curt Weldon to the CIA
and CIA's Responses
subject: responses to the honorable curt weldon's questions
QUESTION 1. The ABM Treaty was based on acceptance of Russian
declarations that the large phased array radars located on the
periphery of the former Soviet Union are only early warning radars. How
confident are we of that assessment?
ANSWER 1. We are confident in our assesment that Russia's large
phased array radars (LPARs), as well as the older Hen House radars,
perform a ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) function against
strategic and shorter-range missiles from potentially hostile
countries. NOTE: The ABM Treaty was signed before the first LPAR was
constructed, although the Hen House radar network was aready in
operation.
QUESTION 2a. I would like to know the current operational and
maintenance status of the Hen House and LPAR radars in Russia and the
CIS states.
ANSWER 2a. General Sokolov, Russia's commander of the missile
attack early warning system group, has recently claimed that his
deployed forces continue to function ``with the utmost reliability and
operational efficiency.'' The press has touched on the same theme with
coverage of the Pechora, Russia, and Lyaki, Azerbaijan, LPARs,
specifically singling out the Pechora facility for the role it played
in correctly identifying the Norwegian sounding rocket as non-
threatening in the January 1995 incident. At the same time, the Russian
press has noted the difficulties introduced by having many of these
radars now located outside Russia's borders. In particular, the press
has covered extensively Azerbaijan's continuing efforts to pressure
Russia into large annual payments for operating the Lyaki LPAR, and has
also commented on the serious loss of the Skrunda LPAR in Latvia, razed
in 1995 before completion as a result of negotiations with the newly
independent Latvian government.
QUESTION 2b. In light of the Administration's official [policy] on
Russian nuclear targeting, changes in U.S. strategic forces, and
Russian military budgets, why does Russia want to continue to operate
those radars?
ANSWER 2b. Russia continues to rely on its ballistic missile early
warning network, in conjunction with its launch detection satellites,
to assure the viability of its strategic nuclear deterrent forces.
These radars and satellites provide Moscow with its warning capability
against strategic ballistic missile attack from the United States, the
UK, France and China, as well as warning of tactical ballistic missile
attack from other neighboring nations. Despite public statements that
recognize significantly reduced tensions and the greatly reduced
likelihood of a future nuclear confrontation, Russian military planners
appear unwilling to accept the risk to Moscow's nuclear deterrent that
the absence of an eary warning capability could pose.
QUESTION 3. Since only the SA-12 is identified as a theater missile
defense (TMD) system, how confident are we that the SA-10 is not a TMD?
ANSWER 3. The SA-12 is the only Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian
system subject to the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement; however,
this does not imply that the SA-12 is the only TMD system possessed by
former Soviet states. The SA-10 has in fact been advertised by the
Russians as a TMD system.
QUESTION 4. I would like to know how many of the SA-10 complexes in
Russia and the CIS states have been retrofitted with the later models
of that system?
ANSWER 4. We are unable to supply an unclassified response to this
guestion.
QUESTION 5. There have been recurring concerns that SA-5 and SA-10
systems were ABMs as well as SAMs. Has any new evidence of this issue
appeared over the last decade? If so, what is the assessment of such
evidence?
ANSWER 5. We are unable to supply an unclassified response to this
guestion.
QUESTION 6a. What was the velocity and range of the target missiles
employed to test the Galosh and ABM X-3 systems prior to IOC?
ANSWER 6a. We are unable to supply an unclassified response to this
question. NOTE: The ABM-X-3 system never attained IOC.
QUESTION 6b. What are the maximum velocities [of] the Galosh,
Gorgon, and Gazelle missiles?
ANSWER 6b. We are unable to supply an unclassified response to this
guestion.
QUESTION 6c. How do these numbers compare with the definition of
low and high velocity TMD systems in the amendments and agreed
statements?
ANSWER 6c. As ABM interceptor missiles, none of these missiles is
subject to either the First or Second Agreed Statement of 26 September
1997. The First Agreed Statement addresses, inter alia, interceptor
missiles other than ABM interceptor missiles, whose demonstrated
velocity does not exceed 3.0 km./sec. The Second Agreed Statement
addresses, inter alia, interceptor missiles other than ABM interceptor
missiles whose demonstrated velocity exceeds 3.0 km./sec.
QUESTION 7a. When was the last NIE on Soviet or Russian/CIS
strategic defense published?
ANSWER 7a. The last NIE on strategic air defenses in Russia and
other states of the former Soviet Union was published in May 1994. The
last NIE to address the ABM system was NIE 11-3/8 in 1991.
QUESTION 7b. When is the next NIE on this subject scheduled to be
completed?
ANSWER 7b. In May 1997, the National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic Programs and Nuclear Proliferation sponsored a two-day
conference to assess the status of Russian ballistic missile defenses.
The review of current activity did not appear to indicate the need for
a new NIE at this time.
______
Annex 2: Implications of the ABM Treaty Protocols and Agreed Statements
The ABM Treaty Protocols and agreed statements that the U.S. signed
with Russia and three successor States in 1997, and which are to be
submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification, have a number of
implications that may not be apparent at first glance. The demarcation
between strategic anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs) and theater
missile defense systems (TMDs) is the most complex issue, hence is
treated first in some detail. Other implications may be treated in a
summary fashion. Essentially, the Protocols and agreed statements
border on the absurd.
tmd definitions
In 1972 Dr. John Foster told Congress that a TMD is any interceptor
with a maximum velocity of about 2 km./sec., tested against a target
with 40 km. maximum altitude, which is typical of a Scud missile--
flight range 150-300 km. However, the 1972 ABM Treaty did not address
this issue.
In the ABM Treaty Protocols TMD parameters are defined as:
Low velocity TMD
--``demonstrated'' interceptor velocity not to exceed 3 km./sec.;
--target velocity not to exceed 5 km./sec.;
--target flight range not to exceed 3,500 km.
High Velocity TMD
--interceptor velocity greater than 3 km./sec.
--target velocity and flight range limits same as for low velocity
TMD.
According to conventional wisdom, and the U.S. interpretation of
both Soviet and Russian compliance with the ABM Treaty, the only
``strategic'' ABM systems were those deployed at Moscow, Galosh and
ABM-3, and the only ``TMD'' system was the SA-12 deployed in limited
numbers in the 1980s. The SA-5 and SA-10 were only ``SAMs,'' i.e. anti-
aircraft systems.
The U.S. ``intelligence community'' and the Clinton administration
have simply ignored all evidence from both Russian and U.S. sources
that the SA-5 and SA-10 really were dual purpose anti-aircraft and
anti-missile systems (SAM/ABMs) deployed nation-wide in violation of
Article 1 of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Russian plans to modernize its
illegal ABM defenses with the new ``S-400'' SAM/ABM also are being
ignored.
The following discussion focuses on the implications of Dr.
Foster's and the 1977 Protocol criteria for ``strategic ABM'' and TMD
systems.
background on soviet abm test practices and system characteristics
In the mid 1950s the Soviets concluded that they could develop ABM
systems using only medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) as targets.
The Galosh and ABM-3 systems, which were deployed only at Moscow, and
the dual purpose anti-aircraft/missile (SAM/ABM) SA-5 and SA-10/12
systems, which were deployed nationwide, were all developed at the Sary
Shagan range (on the Western shore of Lake Balkhash). Target missiles
were SS-3 and (mostly) SS-4 MRBMs launched from Kapustin Yar (across
the river from Stalingrad, now Volgograd): maximum target velocity 3-
3,5 km./sec.; range <difference>2,000 km.; and maximum altitude
<difference>1,000 km.
With the exception of one interceptor (Gazelle) deployed at Moscow
in 1987, all Soviet ABM systems had maximum velocities that were a
fraction of that of ICBMs. Although the maximum velocity of the Galosh
missile has not been reported, it most probably was around 2 km./sec.
This also applies to the Gordon, a modernized Galosh, currently
deployed with the ABM-3 at Moscow. Moreover, these interceptors had low
initial launch acceleration rates.
The interceptor missiles of the first generation SAM/ABM, the SA-5,
had maximum velocities around 1.5 km./sec. Both the original SA-10
(Russian S-300P) interceptor and the anti-aircraft interceptor for the
SA-12 (Russian S-300V) had maximum velocities of <difference>1.7 km./
sec. Subsequent modernizations of the SA-10 (Russian S-300 PMU-1 & PMU-
2) raised the maximum velocity to over 2 km./sec., approaching the 2.4
km./sec. maximum velocity of the SA-12 TMD interceptor. (The SA-12 was
a variant (S-300V) of the SA-10 designed to protect Soviet Ground
Forces from both tactical aircraft and missiles).
In order to intercept ICBM RVs with velocities of 6-7 km./sec., all
of these interceptors, both for the ABM systems deployed only at Moscow
and the SAM/ABM systems nation wide, had to be launched when the target
RVs were on the order of 1,200 km., or more, from the intended targets.
Consequently, all of these systems depended upon long range target
tracking data from large phased array radars located on the Soviet
periphery and in the Moscow area.
All of the large phased array radars--Hen House, LPARs, Dog House
and Cat house--were designed initially as ``battle management'' target
tracking radars because, given the available interceptor missile
technology, there was no other practical ABM architecture, either for
defense of Moscow or of the Soviet Union, during the Cold War. When
Soviet designers began working on ABM systems in 1954-55, they had no
choice but to adopt ``battle management'' architecture. Early warning
of a missile attack was a bonus mission for those radars, not the
initial design objective.
It is hardly possible to overemphasize these points, or of the
consequences of U.S. failure to grasp them.
Table 4 summarizes these data and various U.S. attempts to define
the differences between ``strategic'' and theatre (TMD) ABM systems.
TABLE 4--SOVIET ABM & TMD SYSTEM AND TARGET PARAMETERS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
R&D targets SS-4 Operational
MRBM targets ICBMs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Range............................. <difference>2,000 10,000 km.+
km.
Velocity (Max.)................... 3.5 km./sec. 6-7 km./sec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTERCEPTOR VELOCITIES_KM./SEC.
Moscow ABM Systems
Galosh..............................................\1\<difference>2
Gordon.................................................<difference>2
Gazelle................................................... very high
National SAM/ABMs
SA-5...................................................... 1.4-1.6
SA-10
1980.................................................. 1.7
1985.............................................<difference>1.7
1992.................................................. >2.0
\1\ Not available but likely approximation.
DR. JOHN FOSTER'S 1972 TMD PARAMETERS
Target range.........................................<difference>300 km.
Target velocity...............................................2 km./sec.
1997 ABM TREATY PROTOCOLS' TMD PARAMETERS
Low Velocity TMD: S-400
Target range: 3,500 km.............................. 3,500 km.
Target velocity: 5 km./sec.......................... 4.8 km./sec.
Interceptor velocity: 3 km./sec............\2\<difference>3 km./sec.
High Velocity TMD:
Same target range and velocity as low velocity
Interceptor velocity: >5 km./sec.
\2\ Specifics not available, but probably about 3 km./sec.
The new ``S-400'' from the same design school that produced the SA-
2, SA-5, and SA-10 pushes even the Protocol criteria to the limits, if
not beyond. The S-400 is designed to intercept missiles with velocities
up to 4.8 km./sec. and a range of 3,500 km. While maximum velocities of
either of the two new S-400 interceptors were not available at this
writing, expect them to be at or near the Protocol limit of 3 km./sec.
for both the long range and short range models.
Trying to delineate between ``strategic'' and ``theater'' ABM
systems by interceptor velocity and target parameters only results in
confusion and contradictions when the U.S. does not comprehend the
implications of the Soviet ABM architecture, and persists in the
erroneous notion that Soviet/Russian SAM/ABMs are only SAMs, i.e. not
even TMD systems much less strategic ABMs as well. Thus systems that
are strategic ABMs by one definition are only TMDs by others.
Components of the same system are equally contradictory.
By Dr. Foster's target altitude and range criteria--40 and up to
300 km. respectively--all these systems, whether officially recognized
``ABMs'' deployed at Moscow, or the SAM/ABMs deployed nationwide that
the U.S. insists are only ``SAMs'', are strategic ABMs. The same
applies to the new S-400 SAM/ABM.
On the other hand, by Foster's interceptor velocity criteria, the
SA-5 and the original SA-10 are only TMDs, but the modernized SA-10 and
one of the SA-12 interceptors are strategic ABMs. Galosh and its
successor Gordon deployed with ABM-3, which the U.S. considers are the
only strategic ABMs the Soviets developed and deployed, are somewhere
on the borderline between strategic ABMs and TMDs.
By the 1997 Protocol target and interceptor velocity criteria, only
the Gazelle interceptor of the ABM-3 qualifies as a strategic ABM
component. All other systems and components are only TMD systems with
the S-400 falling on the border line between ``Low'' and ``High''
velocity TMD interceptors.
Some qualification of the Soviet practice of using mostly SS-4
MRBMs as targets for all ABM systems is in order. During the
extraordinary 1982 Soviet strategic forces exercise, SS-11 and SS-20
missiles were fired into Sary Shagan from an unspecified range. SA-5s
and SA-10 SAM/ABMs, of course, were present. However, only the
``rapidly deployable'' version of the ABM X-3 with the small phased
array radar was present at Sary Shagan in 1972. While ABM-3 is a
derivative of ABM X-3, its ``Pillbox'' radar is unique to Moscow.
While the ABM X-3 reportedly was active against the SS-11 and SS-20
targets in 1982, no intercepts--attempt, failure, success--have been
reported. Was SA-5/10 activity also detected at the time? One recent
Russian source hints that some targets on the Sary Shagan may have been
boosted to ICBM velocities, i.e. 6-7 km./sec., but such activity has
not been reported publicly by Western sources.
Despite billions of dollars of satellite collection effort the U.S.
Intelligence Community cannot certify with much confidence which
specific systems were, or were not, tested against which targets during
more than three decades of operations on the Sary Shagan range. All
technical intelligence can provide is a circumstantial case indicating
a high probability of intercept activity in some time periods with many
information gaps remaining.
In sum, U.S. attempts to define the difference between strategic
ABMs and TMD systems have resulted in hopeless contradictions and
confusion. U.S. technical intelligence cannot answer a lot of key
questions with any confidence. Nor can U.S. intelligence negate reports
from highly credible Russian sources that the SA-5 and SA-10, in
conjunction with the Hen House and LPAR battle management radars, were
SAM/ABMs. CIA's assessments on these issues are fatally flawed.
other implications and conundrums
Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the 1997 Protocols
declare that all of the large phased array ABM battle management radars
deployed on the periphery of the former Soviet Empire are only ``early
warning'' radars that Russia may continue to operate. Russia still
controls at least nine, possibly as many as 13, of these radars. Thus
this provision of the protocols legalizes Soviet violation of Article 1
of the ABM Treaty by deploying these radars with some 10-12,000 SAM/ABM
interceptors, and Russia's continued violation with its inherited
portion of Soviet ABM defenses.
Indeed the protocols explicitly permit passing battle management
tracking data from these radars, and from space based sensors, provided
such data are not used to intercept strategic ballistic missiles! The
only way the U.S. could verify that the data were not being used in the
ABM mode would be to launch a missile strike on Russia, and accept the
consequences.
Despite the fact that Russia is marketing the SA-10 as the world's
best TMD, with characteristics equal to or considerably superior to the
SA-12, only the latter is declared to be a TMD prohibited from being
tested in the ABM mode. The same applies to modernization of Russia's
massive violation of the Treaty with the S-400, which also has an
export version.
Inasmuch as all TMD deployments by the U.S. and Russia must be
proportionate to the threat, Russia evidently may veto any U.S. global
TMD deployment simply by declaring it disproportionate to the local
threat.
Each side is to notify the other if it has plans to test a ``high
velocity'' interceptor but deployment is not prohibited, and ``Treaty
compliance . . . will remain the national responsibility of each
Party.'' Verification of land based ABM programs depends entirely on
Russia informing the U.S. of its plans!
______
ANNEX 3_POST SOVIET UNION RUSSIAN MISSILE & AIR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
SS-X-26 SRBM Operational
SS-27 ICBM Operational 1997-98
SS-N-X-28 SLBM ?
``Borey'' Class SSBN 2005-07
New Long Range Bomber ..................... MOD Specs submitted
TU-95 & 175 ..................... Maintain, modernize
with new ASM
AS-X Long range ? ASM .....................
AS-X Medium range ASM .....................
S-400 SAM/ABM: ..................... .....................
New missile 400 km. range Deployment 2000
New missile 160 km. range .....................
New target tracking radars Long range .....................
Medium range Deployment 2000-03
OTH, range 5-600 km. .....................
Modernized SU-27 ..................... Schedule ?
New MIG model ..................... Flight testing
New Fighter ..................... Schedule ?
AS-X Short range ASM* Schedule ?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Derivative of short range S-400 missile.
Senator Hagel. Well, Mr. Lee, thank you. We are looking at
a vote probably around noon. So, I am going to shoot to try to
have this wound up by then.
But in the time we have, which is valuable because you have
so much to contribute, and I do not want to interfere with
that. Why do we not take a couple of minutes at your
instruction to take the committee through what you think are
the most important points related to the charts in connection
to your testimony.
Mr. Lee. Thank you, sir.
If you look at that first chart, the Hen House radars, that
is the first generation of the system. What we never were able
to determine from technical intelligence collection was whether
those radars were designed for this long-range tracking mode so
they could look out, see the targets coming far enough in
advance so that the missile could fire and the interceptor
could fire, intercept, and make up for that difference in the
velocity.
We simply did not know whether they were just for early
warning or for both purposes. The majority in the intelligence
community concluded they were only for early warning. There was
never any basis in the technical evidence to prove that. It was
simply which way you chose to interpret ambiguous data that
could be interpreted either way.
We now have the evidence from the Russian sources that
these systems were designed that way from the very beginning,
and as I said, indeed the realization that they were good for
early warning seems to have come after they had originally
designed them for the target tracking function.
The second chart simply--and I could not find one that is
complete with all the radars from both generations. The second
chart shows one of the radars at Moscow. There is another one
that complements the coverage of that that is not shown--I did
not have that available--and some of those in the second
generation. At the end they had 17 of these deployed. They
negotiated the ABM Treaty to permit 18 of them, and we did not
realize that was what we were doing, that we were legalizing
the first generation and the second generation deployment. The
Krasnoyarsk radar would have been the 18th, but the Politburo,
from the record available, made the decision to put that at
Krasnoyarsk rather than Aral'sk and so they lost that radar
before the Soviet Union collapsed.
Russia controls something like six or eight of these. I can
give you the list of them still. The important part is they
have what is necessary still for a viable national ABM defense
and the upgrade even with what they have lost in Latvia and
incomplete radar in the Ukraine.
The other charts. From putting together the declassified
national intelligence estimates and the data from the Russian
sources, let me emphasize all this new data from the Russian
sources does not conflict with any of the facts we had from our
national collection systems. They are complementary. I could
not a find a single case where there is a factual
contradiction. The information from the Russian sources fills
in the gaps that we did not and could not have collected from
our national collection systems.
The important points on that first one, it is sort of the
history of the Moscow ABM system. The critical things are we
did not realize that the Russians started out with a non-
nuclear ABM system for Moscow. Indeed, they achieved the first
non-nuclear hit-to-kill back in March 1961 on a strategic
missile, what they used as a target, an intermediate range
system, the SS-4, a medium range system.
Not realizing that, we never understood the sequence of the
development of that system and the Moscow system. We did not
realize that that original system had been canceled and
replaced with quite a different version of it in the Moscow
system that we call the Galosh. So, there was a 5-year gap
there, which I will come back to, in which we were just
misinterpreting the evidence we had because we did not
understand what the Russians had started out with and what they
had changed over to. That was simply a limit of the national
intelligence collection. We could not have expected them to do
any better as long as they limited it to that.
The other important thing is that I already mentioned but
will reiterate that the Russian sources are very clear that all
of these systems, all these radars that were on the previous
two graphs, all of them were designed to provide the long-range
target tracking data so that the low velocity interceptors,
including those at Moscow, as well as these dual purpose SAM's
could be fired in time to get up there and meet the warhead
before it was too late.
The second table shows the points in their national ABM
system, dual purpose, anti-aircraft and anti-missile designed
from the beginning which we suspected for a long time, but then
refused to believe from fairly standard anti-aircraft
components that they could be adapted with the big radars to
make them dual purpose. All that really does is confirm that is
really what went on, and gave us a key date that the Politburo
had approved this national deployment of the first generation
no later than mid-1962. That is the basis of my statement that
they were in violation of the treaty, article I of the treaty
for 10 years before they signed it.
Now, because of various problems of providing the nuclear
weapons and the command-control system, that original national
ABM dual purpose system probably was not operational until
about 1975. It may have been partially operational just in the
Moscow area because they had the big Moscow radar there 1969-
70. But otherwise, it was probably not.
I think those are the most important points I wish to make.
Table 3 simply shows that sequence of test firing, what
went on at Sary Shagan, the development center. And the
critical thing that was missed in the national intelligence was
that from sometime around mid-1962 and until 1966, all of the
test firings we saw going on there that we could not interpret
very well as to what was going on--and this is very clear from
the estimates--all of that, those 4 to 5 years, was the initial
test firing of the dual purpose SA-5 system. And we simply did
not recognize that that was what was going on.
That is the essence of it, sir.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Lee, thank you very much.
Let me ask a couple of questions which tie into
specifically your timeframe here and some of the testimony. You
have claimed that there is new evidence from Russian sources
relating to that country's violations of the ABM Treaty. You
have also claimed in your book and testimony this morning that
this evidence has been known to the U.S. Government for some
time.
What happened? Did the CIA not pass it on or DIA failed to
act on it. Did our political leaders know it and did not
respond? Would you take us through what your interpretation of
that failure was about, why and what it has meant to our
defense capabilities?
Mr. Lee. To the best of my knowledge, sir, they simply have
not been reading it.
Senator Hagel. They meaning who?
Mr. Lee. The CIA and DIA simply have not been reading this
evidence, not been looking at it at all. In fact, a little over
a year ago, CIA replied to seven questions from Congressman
Weldon clearly stating that they had not read any of this
evidence whatsoever, much less reexamined the entire past
history and told anybody about it.
I sure would like to see your colleagues in the
Intelligence Committee ask some questions on precisely that
point. It would be kind of nice to have the Rumsfeld Commission
look into this or a new version of the Rumsfeld Commission look
into this whole issue.
Senator Hagel. When was that testimony given to Congressman
Weldon?
Mr. Lee. The questions were submitted by Congressman Weldon
in late 1997. I have the questions and the replies that were
returned to him in early 1998. There was not a specific date on
that. Those are appended as annexes to my testimony.
Senator Hagel. I will, of course, include all your
testimony and your accompanying materials, charts, and the
questions and answers for the record.
That is rather serious, what you have said about our
intelligence community. Is that an ongoing, long-term problem
do you believe in our intelligence community, that they have
not paid attention to these things?
Mr. Lee. Sir, how much time do you have to listen to past
records of not paying attention to what was in the open press?
I have often made kind of a harsh remark that the Soviet Union
could always hide some of its deepest and darkest secrets very
effectively by putting them in books and on the newsstands.
Senator Hagel. If Russian public sources on this matter
complement the evidence from the U.S. collection systems, then
what are the key intelligence gaps that are filled in by this
information?
Mr. Lee. The key gaps are the radars were designed from the
beginning as battle management radars for target tracking data,
and at some point--I can only date it 6 years later--they
realized they could use them for early warning too and went
ahead and used them for both purposes.
Second, the SAM/ABM's were designed from the beginning as
dual purpose systems, recognizing they were not terribly
effective by U.S. standards, not terribly effective at all
perhaps--we do not know and maybe we really do not want to know
because the only way you could really test it was to have a
little nuclear exchange, which is not exactly desirable. But
they went ahead and did the best they could, and they have a
long record of doing that in many areas and that was simply
overlooked, that they would do the best they could with what
they had and they were determined to defend the USSR and now
Russia no matter what. And that is the story from the new S-400
also.
The third point is clear. They did put together the command
and control system to make it all work, although it probably
was not very effective or really satisfactory until about the
mid-1970's as best as I can reconstruct it.
Senator Hagel. As you laid out rather clearly in your
testimony and the accompanying charts, in view of the evidence
that you have brought to light over the years, including what
you have shared with us this morning and what we do know that
is available on Soviet violations of the ABM and biological
weapons treaties, in your opinion were there ever any cold war
arms control agreements that the Soviets adhered to?
Mr. Lee. Well, they adhered to the agreement not to test
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, although there was always
some question about bending in some cases. The issue of whether
they observed the threshold test ban treaty was always very
controversial. It is generally accepted that they did, but
there was a significant minority of highly qualified people who
repeatedly--and you could get some of those to testify in
detail on this--repeatedly that they did violate that one.
The critical thing about the interim agreement on the
offensive weapons, the SALT agreements on the offensive
weapons, was that they negotiated those so they did not have to
violate them in any significant degree except to encode the
telemetry, which they proceeded to do. They simply negotiated
those to their level of sufficiency which was defined by their
military doctrine and strategy, their nuclear targeting
strategy, and therefore they did not have to violate them.
The biological treaty was totally violated. The chemical
treaty, we really do not know, but probably also violated.
It is hard to find anything except the hot line and a few
things like that that they really strictly adhered to. But the
SALT agreements and so forth, they only violated them when they
really believed it was in their interest to do so. They did not
violate them capriciously.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Lee, unfortunately, the bewitching hour
has arrived and I am going to have to go do my duty here.
I first want to thank you for your contributions. They are
very important and we are grateful for what you have shared
with us this morning in addition to the information that you
have brought with you. I suspect we will want to do a little
followup work here. We have really not had adequate time to
cover as much as we need to cover. If it is acceptable with
you, we may have followup questions that we would like to ask
you to respond to, and we would give those to you and we would
insert those answers for the record. Again, thank you.
Mr. Lee. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity, and anytime
day or night I am at your service.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at 2:15 p.m., May 25, 1999.]
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