105th Congress Rept. 105-468
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1998
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 2786
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
March 26, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
One Hundred Fifth Congress
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona IKE SKELTON, Missouri
DUNCAN HUNTER, California NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia Carolina
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado LANE EVANS, Illinois
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
STEVE BUYER, Indiana NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
JAMES TALENT, Missouri JANE HARMAN, California
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma TOM ALLEN, Maine
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana JIM TURNER, Texas
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia F. ALLEN BOYD, Jr., Florida
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
Carolina MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
JIM RYUN, Kansas CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey
BOB RILEY, Alabama
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
BILL REDMOND, New Mexico
KAY GRANGER, Texas
Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Purpose and Background........................................... 3
Legislative History.............................................. 5
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 5
Section 1 - Short Title........................................ 5
Section 2 - Findings........................................... 5
Section 3 - Department of Defense Measures to Counter Enhanced
Ballistic Missile Threat..................................... 5
Section 4 - Identification of Other Actions.................... 6
Section 5 - Report to Congress................................. 6
Section 6 - Offsetting Reductions in Authorizations............ 6
Committee Position............................................... 7
Fiscal Data...................................................... 7
Congressional Budget Office Estimate........................... 7
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate...................... 7
Committee Cost Estimate........................................ 8
Inflation Impact Statement..................................... 8
Oversight Findings............................................... 8
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 8
Statement of Federal Mandates.................................... 9
Rollcall Vote.................................................... 9
Views of Committee on International Relations.................... 11
Additional views of Robert A. Underwood.......................... 12
Additional views of Rep. Silvestre Reyes......................... 13
Additional views of Congressman Michael Pappas................... 14
105th Congress Rept. 105-468
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1998
_______
March 26, 1998.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Spence, from the Committee on National Security, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 2786]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on National Security, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 2786) to authorize additional appropriations for the
Department of Defense for ballistic missile defenses and other
measures to counter the emerging threat posed to the United
States and its allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf
region by the development and deployment of ballistic missiles
by Iran, having considered the same, report favorably thereon
with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendments are as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Theater Missile Defense Improvement
Act of 1998''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Development of medium-range ballistic missiles by
potential adversaries, such as Iran, has proceeded much more
rapidly than previously anticipated by the United States
Government.
(2) Existence of such missiles in potentially hostile nations
constitutes a serious threat to United States forces, allies,
and friends in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region and
cannot be adequately countered by currently deployed ballistic
missile defense systems.
(3) It is a matter of high national interest to quickly
reduce the vulnerability of United States forces, allies, and
friends to these threats.
(4) Meaningful and cost effective steps to reduce these
vulnerabilities are available and should be pursued
expeditiously.
SEC. 3. ACCELERATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS TO COUNTER
ENHANCED BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for the Department of
Defense for fiscal year 1998 for Defense-wide research, development,
test, and evaluation in the amount of $147,000,000, to be available as
follows:
(1) Joint composite tracking network.--$35,000,000 to be
available for the Joint Composite Tracking Network program.
(2) Patriot remote launch capability.--$15,000,000 to be
available to accelerate development of the remote launch
capability for the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile
defense system.
(3) PAC-3 and navy area defense tests.--$40,000,000 to be
available to test the capabilities of the Patriot Advanced
Capability (PAC-3) missile defense system, and to test the
capabilities of the Navy Area Defense System, against missiles
with the range of the Iranian ballistic missiles under
development.
(4) Early warning enhancement.--$6,000,000 to be available
for improved integration of the various elements of the SHIELD
system.
(5) PAC-3 production rate enhancements.--$41,000,000 to be
available for production rate enhancements for the Patriot
Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defense system.
(6) Israeli arrow missile defense system.--$10,000,000 to be
available to improve interoperability of the Israeli Arrow
tactical ballistic missile defense system with United States
theater missile defense systems.
SEC. 4. IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER POSSIBLE ACTIONS.
(a) Identification.--The Secretary of Defense shall identify actions
in addition to those authorized by section 3 that could be taken by the
Department of Defense to counter the threats posed to the United States
and its national security interests by the development or acquisition
of medium-range ballistic missiles by Iran and other nations.
(b) Specific Actions To Be Taken.--The Secretary specifically shall
explore--
(1) additional cooperative measures between the Department of
Defense and the Ministry of Defense of Israel to further
enhance Israel's ability to defend itself against the threat
posed by ballistic missiles deployed by Iran and other nations;
and
(2) actions within the existing Navy Theater Wide Missile
Defense System program that could provide additional
capabilities useful to addressing the threat posed by medium-
range ballistic missiles within one to two years.
(c) Intergovernmental Coordination.--The Secretary shall undertake
appropriate intergovernmental and interagency coordination that would
be necessary to the conduct of any of the actions identified pursuant
to subsection (a).
SEC. 5. REPORT TO CONGRESS.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report providing--
(1) a description of the Secretary's plans for use of funds
appropriated pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations
in this Act; and
(2) a description of possible additional actions identified
by the Secretary pursuant to section 4(a) and the steps taken
or planned (as of the time of the report) to carry out section
4(c).
SEC. 6. OFFSETTING REDUCTIONS IN AUTHORIZATIONS.
The total amount authorized in section 201 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85) to be
appropriated for fiscal year 1998 for research, development, test, and
evaluation for the Department of Defense is hereby reduced by
$147,000,000, of which--
(1) $126,000,000 is to be derived from savings from the use
of advisory and assistance services by the Department of
Defense in accordance with section 8041 of the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105-56; 111 Stat.
1230); and
(2) $21,000,000 is to be derived from savings from the use by
the Department of Defense of defense federally funded research
and development centers in accordance with section 8035 of the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105-
56; 111 Stat. 1227).
Amend the title so as to read:
A bill to authorize additional appropriations for the Department of
Defense for ballistic missile defenses and other measures to counter
the emerging threat posed to the United States and its allies by the
accelerated development and deployment of ballistic missiles by nations
hostile to United States interests.
PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
The committee notes with deep concern that theater
ballistic missile (TBM) threats have evolved much more rapidly
than anticipated by the U.S. military and intelligence
community. The committee believes that efforts to deploy the
capability to defeat this growing threat to U.S. military
forces must be significantly enhanced.
The rapid and continuing development of TBMs by nations
hostile to U.S. interests would provide them with asymmetric
offensive capabilities to offset current U.S. conventional
superiority. Recent testimony to the committee by Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Jacques
Gansler described these asymmetrical strategies as including
``weapons of mass destruction * * * and large quantities of
low-cost cruise and ballistic missiles.'' TBMs, particularly
those armed with weapons of mass destruction, can be used to
intimidate U.S. friends and allies, diminish U.S. regional
influence, or deter U.S. involvement in a theater conflict.
The U.S. military and intelligence community has been
surprised by the speed of the development and deployments of
medium range ballistic missiles. Last year, North Korea
deployed its No Dong-1 missile in significant numbers after
very limited flight testing. The range of the No Dong-1 is
about 1,000 kilometers, enough to threaten nearly all of Japan
and the U.S. forces stationed in much of northeast Asia. Many
in the national security community had previously predicted
that additional system tests would precede No Dong-1
deployment. Furthermore, North Korea, in spite of its
formidable economic difficulties, continues to develop the
Taepo Dong-1 missile with a range of more than 1,500
kilometers.
Of particular concern within the past year is medium range
missile development activity in Iran. Recent intelligence
confirms that Iran is likely to achieve theater ballistic
missile capabilities that could target U.S. forces, allies, and
friends in the Middle East and Persian Gulf within one to two
years. The policies of the current regime in Iran, including
the export of terrorism, the pursuit of regional military
hegemony, and the development of weapons of mass destruction,
are inimical to the interests of the U.S. and its allies and
friends. According to an unclassified Central Intelligence
Agency study, Iran is known to have a stockpile of chemical
weapons, and is actively pursuing biological and nuclear
weapons. The U.S. has many allies and friends as well as vital
interests in this region. In addition, tens of thousands of
U.S. soldiers, sailors and airmen are presently deployed in
this area and are likely to remain as the tensions with Iraq
continue. The deployment of Iranian medium range ballistic
missiles would pose a clear and unacceptable threat to all of
these U.S. interests and forces.
Iran has two missiles under development: the Shahab-3, with
a range of about 1,300 kilometers, and the Shahab-4 with a
range of about 2,000 kilometers. The Shahab-3 is expected to be
capable of threatening Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other
U.S. friends and allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf
regions, while the Shahab-4 is anticipated to reach deep into
Europe.
There is a wide consensus within the intelligence community
that the Shahab-3 will be tested shortly, and that Iranian
ballistic missile development has proceeded much more rapidly
than expected. The Director of Central Intelligence recently
testified that, while last year he offered the assessment that
Iran would have medium range ballistic missiles within ten
years, he now believed that timeline to be much shorter.
Israeli officials are publicly reported to believe that Iran
could test and deploy a TBM by 1999.
The speed of the Iranian development results from
indigenous efforts, as well as technical assistance from
several quarters, most significantly Russian sources. The U.S.
government has sought to stop this assistance. However, even if
such assistance is halted, given the advanced state of Iranian
missile development, it is not clear that these missile
programs would be delayed significantly.
While a consensus has coalesced that the Shahab-3 could be
tested within a year or so, the timeline associated with
substantial deployments remains unclear. The Director of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), in testimony to
the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development,
predicted that deployment would lag behind testing by a
considerable time. The committee notes that the North Korean
deployment of the No Dong-1 after extremely limited testing
suggests that such a lag is not inevitable. The committee also
notes that even a limited capability based on residual test
assets, in combination with chemical or biological payloads,
would represent a very serious threat to small nations (such as
Israel or Bahrain) and urban areas in the region, as well as
deployed U.S. forces.
Emerging TBM threats are not limited to Iran and North
Korea. The recent U.S. build up in the Persian Gulf was driven
in large part by the growing concern that the Iraqi regime
secretly retains the capability to produce weapons of mass
destruction, and the ability to deliver them on improved SCUD-
class missiles. Continued missile development in Syria and
Libya remains a concern as well.
Currently deployed U.S. theater missile defenses (TMDs) are
not adequate to meet the threats posed by TBM developments in
Iran and North Korea. Longer range missiles are faster than
those with shorter range and TMD systems now deployed are
designed to meet shorter range, slower threats. The most
advanced U.S. TMD system now deployed, the PAC-2 Guidance
Enhanced Missile (PAC-2 GEM), has a very limited capability to
defend a small area against the 1,300 kilometer threat missile.
Moreover, other less modern PAC-2 variants have virtually no
capability against missiles of that range.
Further, current plans to improve U.S. theater missile
defense capabilities are also inadequate to meet these growing
threats within the accelerated time frames now predicted. For
instance, the rapid emergence of the Iranian TBM threat was not
anticipated when the fiscal year 1998 budget was crafted, and
consequently the programs outlined in the 1998 budget request
did not address the timing of this threat. While the Patriot
Advanced Capability-Configuration 3 (PAC-3), the Navy Area
Defense TMD system, and the Israeli Arrow system, all now under
development, were also designed against slower threat missiles,
they promise improved capability against the Shahab-3. The
timing for deployment of these systems, however, remains a
problem. For example, the PAC-3 missile will not be deployed to
an operational unit before the fourth quarter of fiscal year
1999. The user operational evaluation system (UOES) version of
the Navy Area Defense System is also not scheduled for
deployment before late 1999. If the Shahab-3 is tested and
deployed before then, U.S. forces and regional allies will face
a period of vulnerability during which no deployed defenses
will have any significant capability to defeat this threat.
H.R. 2786 is intended to provide the Department of Defense
with additional resources to ensure that this period of
vulnerability is minimized and to assure to the extent possible
that deployment of improved U.S. TMD systems will keep pace
with TBM deployments in Iran and elsewhere. In developing H.R.
2786, the committee ensured that the recommended program
actions would be executable in fiscal year 1998, would address
worldwide TBM threats, would be consistent with planned TMD
systems and system architectures, and would be consistent with
current international agreements.
The committee is gratified that, after initial reluctance
to endorse any steps beyond its planned programs, the
Administration now agrees that the additional funding
recommended would make a valuable contribution to enhanced TMD
capabilities.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
H.R. 2786 was introduced by Representative Curt Weldon (R-
PA) with 106 cosponsors on October 31, 1997. The bill was
referred to the Committees on National Security and
International Relations. On November 17, 1997, the bill was
referred to the Subcommittee on Military Research and
Development of the Committee on National Security.
On November 5, 1997, the Subcommittee on Military Research
and Development held a hearing on H.R. 2786 and the Iranian
ballistic missile threat.
On March 17, 1998, the Committee on National Security held
a mark-up session to consider H.R. 2786. The amended version of
the bill was reported favorably by a roll call vote of 45 to 0.
The roll call result can be found at the end of this report.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1--Short title
This section would establish the short title of the Act as
the ``Theater Missile Defense Improvement Act of 1998.''
Section 2--Findings
This section would establish findings: that the TBM threat
has evolved more rapidly than expected, this evolution
constitutes a serious threat, taking steps to reduce the
vulnerability to this threat is in the U.S. interest, and that
meaningful steps to do so are available and should be pursued
expeditiously.
Section 3--Department of Defense measures to counter enhanced ballistic
missile threat
This section would authorize specific program funding.
These include:
(1) $35.0 million for the Joint Composite Tracking Network
(JCTN). JCTN would link sensors from various platforms to allow
earlier, more accurate cueing of TMD missiles, thus increasing
the effective range of TMD systems.
(2) $15.0 million to accelerate completion of the PAC-3
remote launch capability. Remote launch allows PAC-3 missiles
to be deployed at considerable distances from the PAC-3 radars
and command and control equipment, in effect doubling the
footprint of defended territory. PAC-3 remote launch capability
had slipped a year to fiscal year 2000 because of program cuts
and this funding would restore the operational capability to
fiscal year 1999.
(3) $40.0 million for tests of PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense
System. Both systems were designed against slower, shorter
range threat missiles, but are thought to have some
capabilities against the longer range threat potentially posed
by Iranian ballistic missiles. This funding would provide for
one test of each of these TMD systems to determine the extent
of their capability against more demanding threats.
(4) $6.0 million for enhanced early warning. This funding
would support integration of the various elements of SHIELD, to
provide more accurate launch point, trajectory and impact point
predictions. This early warning capability can be used to cue
weapons and radars earlier and to support attack operations.
(5) $41.0 million for production rate enhancements of PAC-
3. This funding would support an increased rate of production
during initial low rate production, from four a month now
planned to six a month; and during full rate production, from
20 a month now planned, to 30 a month. This increase would
provide a hedge if missile threats are deployed in Iran and
elsewhere more rapidly and in larger numbers than expected.
(6) $10.0 million for the Israeli Arrow TMD system. This
funding would improve the interoperability between the Arrow
system and U.S. TMD systems in a timely manner.
Section 4--Identification of other actions
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to
identify other steps to counter TBM threats, including
cooperative measures between DOD and the Minister of Defense of
Israel. The Secretary of Defense would also be required to
rapidly assess any actions that might be taken in the Navy
Theater Wide defense system to address near term TBM threats.
Finally, it would require appropriate intergovernmental and
interagency coordination to allow for rapid implementation of
those steps should they be pursued.
Section 5--Report to Congress
This section would require a report by the Secretary of
Defense describing how the Secretary plans to use the funds
authorized in H.R. 2786 and further actions he has identified
to counter TBM threats.
Section 6--Offsetting reductions in authorizations
This section would reduce the amounts authorized to be
appropriated in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85) by $147.0 million. This
amount would offset the authorized funding in H.R. 2786. The
specific reductions represent funding that was authorized in
the National Defense Authorization Act but for which no
appropriation was provided in the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105-56).
COMMITTEE POSITION
On March 17, 1998, the Committee on National Security, a
quorum being present, approved H.R. 2786, as amended, by a vote
of 45 to 0.
FISCAL DATA
Pursuant to clause 7 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the committee attempted to ascertain annual
outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal year 1999 and the
four following fiscal years. The results of such efforts are
reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in this
report pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(C) of House rule XI.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and submitted
pursuant to section 403(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 is as follows:
March 18, 1998.
Hon. Floyd Spence,
Chairman, Committee on National Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2786, the Theater
Missile Defense Improvement Act of 1998.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them.
The CBO staff contact is Raymond Hall.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
H.R. 2786 would authorize appropriations for 1998 totaling
$147 million for programs in the Department of Defense (DOD) to
counter enhanced ballistic missile threats from potential
adversaries. The bill would also reduce by $147 million amounts
authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85) for research, development, test,
and evaluation.
Total authorizations for fiscal year 1998 would not change
under the bill. The proposed reductions in authorizations would
probably not result in savings in appropriations, however,
because the reductions are in programs that were not fully
funded in the 1998 appropriations bill. If the new
authorizations are funded without reducing other
appropriations, CBO estimates that outlays would increase by
$16 million in 1998 and $147 million over the 1998-2003 period.
The estimate assumes appropriation of the authorized amounts by
July 1, 1998. Because the legislation would not affect direct
spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.
Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
excludes from the application of that act any legislative
provisions that are necessary for the national security. CBO
has determined that all provisions of this bill fit within that
exclusion.
The estimate was prepared by Raymond Hall. This estimate
was approved by Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant Director for
Budget Analysis.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE
Pursuant to clause 7(a) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee generally concurs with
the estimate contained in the report of the Congressional
Budget Office. However, it should be noted that the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 has placed an upper limit on defense
discretionary spending for fiscal year 1998. Accordingly, this
limit would require that new appropriations made pursuant to
the authorizations contained in this bill would necessarily
require corresponding reductions in other defense
appropriations.
INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee concludes that the bill
would have no significant inflationary impact.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, this legislation results from
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or
expenditures. The fiscal features of this legislation are
addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the committee has not received
a report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 2786.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority for
this legislation in article I, section 8 of the United States
Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES
Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this
legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state,
local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private
sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded federal
intergovernmental mandates.
ROLLCALL VOTE
In accordance with clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, a rollcall vote was
taken with respect to the committee's consideration of H.R.
2786. The record of this vote can be found on the following
page.
The committee ordered H.R. 2786, as amended, reported to
the House with a favorable recommendation by a vote of 45 to 0,
a quorum being present.
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VIEWS OF COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC, March 26, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
The Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I write to inform you that the Committee
on International Relations waives the right to consider H.R.
2786, a bill to authorize additional appropriations for the
Department of Defense for ballistic missile defenses and other
measures to counter the emerging threat posed to the United
States and its allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf
region by the development and deployment of ballistic missiles
by Iran. H.R. 2786 was referred to the Committee on
International Relations on October 31, 1997.
The Committee supports passage of H.R. 2786, as amended
during its consideration by the Committee on National Security,
and would not support further amendments to those portions of
the bill in our Committee's jurisdiction during floor
consideration of this measure.
The Committee would like to make clear that in waiving our
consideration of this measure that we preserve our prerogatives
with respect to any floor amendments on this bill or to any
House-Senate conference and any amendments thereto, including
the appointment of conferees.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD
Mr. Chairman, I emphatically support the substitute
amendment to bill, H.R. 2786 as offered by Mr. Weldon, Mr.
Pickett, and Mr. Spratt. The Theater Missile Improvement Act of
1998 is one of the most important and timely pieces of
legislation to be presented before this committee. As a three-
term veteran of the House National Security Committee, I have
been made keenly aware of the threats posed by ballistic
missile development, technology transfers and deployments
around the globe. We know only too well the potential for
destruction these weapons hold. In the hands of our friends and
allies, these weapons are valuable tools that safeguard
democracy. In the hands of our enemies, where the potential
exists to arm them with chemical and biological warheads--the
results are nothing short of catastrophic.
Mr. Chairman, in a world wrought with uncertainties we must
remove the cloak of fear that is utilized by our adversaries.
The Theater Missile Improvement Act of 1998 will insure, in no
small manner, that the United States will have the technology
and capability to defend her troops and citizens of every state
and territory in the land. The very real danger posed by rogue
states such as Iran, North Korea, and Iraq compel us to prepare
to defend our vital assets. I support this bill because it is
the best way to ensure our friends and allies that we will not
be placed in a tactically compromising situation. The credible
deterrent that is afforded the United States through a robust
theater missile defense system is paramount. Mr. Chairman, I
support H.R. 2786 because it is non-scenario, non-
geographically specific. It cuts to the core of the issue--to
produce for the defense of the United States a highly capable,
highly robust TMD system that could be deployed anywhere our
enemies pose a ballistic missile threat. Finally, Mr. Chairman,
on behalf of the people of Guam, I support this bill for the
safety and defense of your fellow U.S. citizens who have been
targeted by the North Korean military as they develop the
Taepo-Dong I and II.
Robert A. Underwood.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE SILVESTRE REYES
The IMPACT 98 bill addresses a critical need of our
military. The funds authorized by this bill will increase the
capabilities of missile defense systems, allowing our air
defenders to better protect our deployed soldiers and our
allies.
Fort Bliss, located in my district, trains all of the
soldiers who provide air and missile defense for our military.
Also, and perhaps most importantly for purposes of this bill,
most of the Patriot batteries are located at Fort Bliss.
As such, the increased funds for PAC-3 technologies will
directly affect these soldiers. The Fort Bliss air defenders
will be using these technologies to better defend our military
and their allies.
Our soldiers at Fort Bliss are pleased that this Committee
is working to provide the resources necessary to move PAC-3
into the field as effective as possible and as quickly as
possible.
The bill includes $15 Million to accelerate completion of
the PAC-3 remote launch capability. This technology will allow
the Patriot soldiers to place their missile launchers further
out in front of the radar and the battery--which, in turn,
expands the battle space. This will allow each Patriot unit to
defend a larger area.
Second, the bill provides $41 Million to allow for an
increased rate of production for PAC-3. This will move PAC-3
missiles out into the field more rapidly, so every Patriot unit
will have the PAC-3 capability.
At the beginning of the Gulf War conflict, our Patriot
soldiers had only three PAC-2 missiles--missiles capable of
defending against incoming ballistic missiles. Not only were
there few PAC-2 missiles, but PAC-2 could only achieve mission
kill against the incoming ballistic missile and not kill the
warhead. As a result, some diverted incoming missiles caused
collateral damage in civilian areas.
PAC-3 will have hit to kill capability, eliminating the
fear of hitting other areas and destroying offensive missiles
and their warheads which could include weapons of mass
destruction. The funds we provide today in the bill will equip
our Patriot units more quickly with this technology.
Third, the bill provides $40 Million for tests of PAC-3 and
Navy Area. Our air defenders will feel more comfortable knowing
that these technologies have been sufficiently tested with live
fire tests against longer range missiles.
I want to thank Mr. Weldon, Mr. Spratt and Mr. Pickett, as
well as Chairman Spence and Ranking Member Skelton for bringing
this bill before our committee.
Silvestre Reyes.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL PAPPAS
This Congress is faced with the situation of whether to
stick our heads in the sand or open our eyes to see the threats
to our national security. This committee has gone through
several weeks of intelligence and service chief briefings on
threats to our nation, interests and allies. Many of these
threats are known, yet not enough concrete steps have been made
to defend our interests from ballistic missile attacks.
This bill moves us from the ``hand-wringing'' stage into
the action stage. This bill will leverage existing systems to
advance missile defense for our troops. However, we cannot stop
here. Passage of this bill is not the end of discussion, this
is a stop gap, immediate measure to advance our immediate
concerns within the present budget cycle. However, this issue
will be with us for many years and this Committee must continue
to raise awareness of the problem and offer solutions.
Part of the ability to leverage existing technologies is to
capitalize on what has worked elsewhere. For example, Israel
has an ongoing missile defense system that has demonstrated
favorable results. In this age of limited defense dollars, the
Pentagon cannot afford to ``reinvent the wheel'' or be a slave
to bureaucracy to develop technology and implement systems that
will protect our troops now.
Recently, 36 members of this committee signed a letter to
the President circulated by myself and Congresswoman Jane
Harman urging him to work with Israel and leverage existing
technology to develop Arrow, Tactical High Energy Laser and
Boost Phase Intercept. Many share my concern about a seeming
lack of commitment by this Administration to deal with missile
defense and the very real risks our troops, interests, and
allies face in the Middle East, Korea and throughout the world.
This bill is a good first step and I am hopeful this
committee and Congress will continue to seek to protect our
troops. Failure to do so would be to shirk our duty to uphold
the Constitution and provide for the common defense.
Sincerely,
Michael Pappas.
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