COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCHES AND FOREIGN ICBM PROGRAMS
MAY 21, 1998
SPEAKERS: U.S. SENATOR THAD COCHRAN (R-MS), CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS (R-ME)
U.S. SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI (R-NM)
U.S. SENATOR DON NICKLES (R-OK)
U.S. SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER (R-PA)
U.S. SENATOR FRED THOMPSON (R-TN)
U.S. SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI), RANKING
U.S. SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA (D-HI)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN (D-IL)
U.S. SENATOR ROBERT G. TORRICELLI (D-NJ)
U.S. SENATOR MAX CLELAND (D-GA)
U.S. SENATOR JOHN GLENN (D-OH)
DR. WILLIAM R. GRAHAM, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
SECURITY RESEARCH, FORMER DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
OF NASA AND SCIENCE ADVISER TO PRESIDENTS
REAGAN AND BUSH
JOHN PIKE, DIRECTOR, SPACE PROJECT, FEDERATION OF
AMERICAN SCIENTISTS
DR. WILLIAM SCHNEIDER JR. FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE
AND FORMER UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR
SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COCHRAN: This morning we will examine the question of how a
foreign country's satellite and intercontinental ballistic missile programs
could benefit from launching commercial satellites that are built in the
United States and whether the administration's export control policy for
satellites is adequate to prevent technology transfers that could endanger
our country.
We will hear from witnesses who will explain the evolution of our
commercial satellite export policies and discuss specifically whether military
benefits are derived by China when it launches U.S.-built satellites.
In 1996, President Clinton export licensing jurisdiction for all
commercial satellites on the U.S. munitions list moved from the State Department
to the Department of Commerce. This policy change was accompanied by an
announcement that the Commerce Department would conduct enhanced reviews
of satellite export license requests in order to safeguard American technology
and national security.
That export licensing decision for commercial satellites would
still be based primarily on the national security implications of the transfer
and that an individual validated license would continue to be required
through the export process.
The end of the Cold War, of course, did not signal the end of
threats to America's security. In numerous hearings last year, this subcommittee
took testimony from experts who provided many facts on one the most substantial
post-Cold War threats to the United States -- the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and missile delivery systems.
And while Russian and China were identified as the world's major
proliferators, we learned last year that the United States itself is implicated
in proliferation through increasingly lax controls over the export of so-called
dual-use products, such as supercomputers, that have both civilian and
military uses.
This morning we will explore the effect on American national
security of the relaxation of U.S. export controls on missile and satellite
technology.
Although there's a lot of interest in the reasons for the
administration's commercial satellite export policy changes, and particularly
in the questions that have been raised about the license issued to Loral
Space & Communications, those issues will be examined later after a thorough
review of the facts.
A senior official of one of America's major aerospace firms
recently told my staff that whenever you connect a launch vehicle to a
satellite there has to be some technology transferred. The question is
whether the United States faces enhanced national security risks as result
of this kind of technology transfer, and if so, what should be done about
it?
The witnesses who will testify this morning are Dr. William
Graham, former deputy administrator of NASA and science adviser to Presidents
Reagan and Bush and currently president of National Security Research,
Inc.; Mr. John Pike, director of the space policy project at the Federation
of American Scientists; and Dr. William Schneider, undersecretary of state
for security assistance, science and technology from 1982 through 1986
and now a fellow at the Hudson Institute.
It is the intention of the chair to ask each witness to make a
statement. We have written statements that have been supplied to the committee
which will all be printed in the record. And then we will have an opportunity
after all the statements have been made to question the witnesses.
Senator Levin.
LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That question that we're asking
today is whether using other country's rockets to launch U.S. commercial
satellites could jeopardize our national security. And specifically, the
focus will no doubt be on whether the United States should permit U.S.-
built civilian satellites to China or other similarly situated countries
for launching.
Apparently, our country does not have enough capacity to
accommodate the needs of our own commercial companies and launches in the
United States are considerably more expensive than launches in China.
These factors drove U.S. businesses to seek approval for their
satellites to be launched in China starting in the late 1980s when President
Reagan first approved the use of Chinese rockets in China to launch U.S.-made
commercial satellites.
In order to send a sensitive item like a satellite to a foreign
country like China, the owner must obtain an export license. As of March
1996, the owner is required to submit an application to the Commerce Department
which convenes and inter-agency process to review it.
The Departments of Defense, State, Energy Department and Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency all participate in reviewing the license
application. For countries other than China, that's the end
of the process. Commerce can either approve or reject the application.
Prior to March 1996, and depending upon the type of satellite or
satellite equipment, the licensing agency was the Department of State,
which maintains the so-called munitions list, which included many commercial
satellites and satellite equipment.
The Department of State limits licensing considerations to those
of national security and foreign policy without consideration of economic
or trade concerns. When the licensing authority was transferred to the
Commerce Department, consideration of national security and foreign policy
concerns continue, but consideration of U.S. economic interests was added
and Commerce was made the licensing agency.
Relative to China, however, the licensing process doesn't reach a
conclusion until the president agrees to a waiver. Unless, of course,
there's a decision not to proceed.
Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the law prohibits any
commercial satellite shipment to China unless the president, on a case-by-case
basis determines that the shipment would be in the national interest.
This waiver, like the export license, involves an inter-agency
process determining whether a waiver would be appropriate. The State Department
is a major player in this decision. If the agencies agree, they send a
recommendation to the National Security Council, which then conducts its
own review and makes a recommendation to the president.
No license to ship a satellite to China may be issued by the
Commerce, or could have been issued by the State Department when it had
the jurisdiction, without that presidential waiver.
So in the case of China, the licensing process is really
determined by the requirement of a presidential waiver, since no license
can be issued without it and, obviously, once a waiver is granted, a license
will follow.
Recent news stories have focused on the procedures that our
government follows in granting licenses to send the satellites to China
-- namely, the issue of which department should be in charge of approving
the licenses and whether the grant of waivers of President Clinton has
been appropriate.
But in looking at the last nine years in which American-made
satellites have been sent to China for launching, we can see that both
the choice of which department will be doing the licensing and the identity
of the president granting the waivers has been immaterial to the outcome.
As you can see from the list which has been prepared by my
subcommittee staff using data provided by the Congressional Research Service,
of the 20 waivers granted for satellites sent to China for launching in
the last nine years, nine were approved by President Bush
over three years and 11 were approved by President Clinton over four and
half years. And in all but the last three waivers -- so in 17 of the 20
waivers -- the licensing agency was the State Department, which is the
licensing agency if the exported item is on munitions list.
LEVIN: These facts strongly suggest that it has made no
difference relative to China whether satellites were on the munitions list,
and therefore licensed by the State Department, or whether the license
is not on the munitions list -- the item is not on the munitions list,
and therefore licensed by the Commerce Department.
Either way, the use of Chinese-launched rockets required a
presidential waiver. And it made no difference whether the president was
named Bush or Clinton. Those waivers have been approved.
In answering the question of whether we should simply eliminate
the opportunity for a waiver and bar the shipment of civilian satellites
or their parts to China, period, we need to look at the risks involved
in continuing the current practice initiated by President Reagan.
First, does the act of using China's rockets to launch U.S.
satellites involve the transfer of technology that will enhance China's
ability to launch missiles? One witness today at least thinks there is
such a possibility.
Second, there is the possibility that the failure of a launch --
the explosion of a rocket -- will allow pieces of U.S.-made satellites
to fall into the hands of the Chinese. And I'd like to explore that question
and the question of other possible risks with today's witnesses, as I know
each of us will.
And Mr. Chairman, the United States is a technological giant in a
world of commerce. And this hearing raises important questions about how
we carry out that role. And I'm glad we're holding this hearing and I
thank you for bringing us together.
COCHRAN: Thank you, Senator Levin.
Senator Thompson.
THOMPSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the fact that you're holding these hearings to
examine our process of export approval with regard to communications --
commercial communications -- satellites and whether or not we're risking
the transfer of technology that might assist the Chinese with their ICBM
missiles.
I think that we will have to conclude at the outset that no one
-- no one here anyway -- can possibly know whether or not technology has
been transferred in any particular instance that might compromise our interests.
I think it's clear that, with regard to the way these things
work, the extensive communications between our commercial vendors and the
Chinese concerning the operations of the missiles, no one knows exactly
what conversations take place or what information might be passed on.
We do know that it's very much in the interests of our commercial
enterprises for these missiles carrying these satellites to work. It's
very much in the commercial interests of our domestic companies to have
the Chinese, for example, carry these satellites. It's the difference
between hundreds of millions of dollars per launch and somewhere between
$25 and $85 million.
So going in, we know that our commercial interests, while totally
patriotic, have a commercial interest in not only having the Chinese do
this but -- and others -- but that they work, and that they not explode
as happens on occasion, and that if there are problems that they perceive
with regard to the missiles carrying these satellites, there is a tendency
I'm sure to want to transfer enough information -- to the Chinese in this
instance -- to make sure those missiles don't explode again, that they
don't shake so much that they mess up sensitive technology, and that they
have the capability of getting the job done.
THOMPSON: We can't know about all of what transpires. We can
guess. We think in terms of probabilities or we can think in terms of
possibilities.
We can think in terms of the risks that are there and we
certainly need to think in terms of safeguards and what kind of process
and procedure we need to have to minimize the risks that are there.
Of course, the underlying problem is that these commercial
communications satellites contain militarily sensitive characteristics,
cross-link capabilities where satellites talk to one another without having
to go through the ground, the integration technology that can improve ballistic
missile capabilities to make sure that the missiles are stable.
Many people think the intangible knowhow, not the hardware, not a
black box, but the intangible knowhow that might be derived from learning
more and more about how to make their missiles operable and accurate is
more important to the Chinese than anything else.
Satellite dispenser technology -- the same technology that allows
these multiple satellites to be launched on one launcher -- is the same
kind of technology that's needed for multiple warhead missiles.
There's no question that the standards have been relaxed with
regard to the transfer of this technology and the export licensing. State
and commerce simply approach things differently, as they're supposed to
do.
Commerce has more than one interest. Commerce has the commercial
interest in addition to the national security interest. I think it should
be pointed out I'm not sure how much we can determine by the fact that
there have been waivers in various administrations and some are state and
some are commerce.
I'm not sure, without examining each one, how much we can
determine about that and how -- or what the result might have been had
they been with another agency.
But we do know that the shift that this administration made in
1996 of the responsibility in this area from commerce -- or from the State
Department to commerce -- was contrary to the determinations that have
previously been made by interagency groups, both in the Bush and the Clinton
administrations.
I think it's important to point out that, in the Bush
administration, the interagency group established criteria with regard
to militarily sensitive characteristics pertaining to these satellites.
And they determined that, with regard to satellites that did not
contain these militarily sensitive characteristics, that they could be
transferred to the jurisdiction of commerce.
And about two dozen items were so transferred and about half of
the satellites, of which had no such characterizations. That was following
the recommendation of the two-year study by this interagency group. And
what happened in 1996 was that the interagency group, at that time, determined
that that situation should stay the way it was -- that is if these satellites
did not contain militarily sensitive information, it was OK to be under
the commerce jurisdiction. But if they did, they should remain at state.
Secretary of State Christopher agreed with that. The president
overruled his own interagency group and the secretary of state, his own
secretary of the state at the time.
THOMPSON: So the difference is, with regard to the nature of the
technology or the nature of the satellites that were being transferred
-- number one -- and the fact that, in one instance, the president was
following the recommendations of his interagency group, and in another
instance, the president overruled it.
It was overruled when Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown appealed
the decision of Secretary of State Warren Christopher. And that's the
way that that came about.
The GAO looked at all of this, and they say that the implications
of this transfer of these militarily sensitive characteristics with regard
to these satellites to commerce -- they say that the implications of this
are uncertain.
I do not think that we can consider this matter without the
underlying consideration of who we're dealing with. We know the Chinese
have sent missiles to Pakistan. They've sent technology to Iran. They've
sent nuclear equipment to both. They've conducted missile tests off the
coast of Taiwan. And apparently, according to reports, the CIA has determined
that 13 of their 18 long-range ballistic missiles have nuclear warheads
aimed at American cities.
They have been caught in violation of their solemn agreements
with regard to these matters. They're apparently aggressively trying to
improve their missile program as a part of a military build-up. This is
what we're dealing with here.
So I appreciate the fact that you're having this hearing, Mr.
Chairman, and look forward to this and saving other matters for other times
-- several what have been called coincidences that we will look into later
on, such as the fact that the Chinese arms dealer Wang Jun visited Mr.
Brown at commerce and attended a White House coffee on the very day that
President Clinton approved the launch of four satellites by the Chinese
on February 6th, 1996. And of course, Mr. Wang Jun had millions of dollars
at stake in a Hong Kong satellite company.
Another coincidence that we will into later is the fact that,
between November of '95 and June of '96, Loral folks contributed $275,000
to the Clinton re-election. And the last coincidence we will look into
later on is one concerning Mrs. Liu who, apparently, after the president
announced this shift to commerce, facilitated the transfer of a little
under $100,000 to the Democratic National Committee. Ms. Liu, of course,
is an executive or a lieutenant colonel in the Chinese military. Her father's
the highest ranking member in the military and in the leadership of the
Communist Party.
And incidentally, the company of Mrs. Liu's parent company tests
and provides equipment for Chinese -- the Chinese nuclear arsenal and The
Great Wall Industries Company (ph). The company also launches private
satellites. And that company, incidentally, is the one that was sanctioned
by this country back in '93 for transferring satellites to Pakistan.
So those are all matters that we will save for another time. But
I look forward to that also.
Thank you very much.
COCHRAN: Thank you, Senator Thompson.
Senator Collins.
COLLINS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start by commending you, Mr. Chairman, for your long
leadership in the area of technology transfer. I know this is an issue
that has been of great concern to you for many years, and you've been a
leader in Congress in this area.
Certainly, recent events have conspired to give the subject of
this hearing this morning even more relevance than usual.
COLLINS: On February 15th, 1996, a so-called Long March booster
rocket lifted off its launch pad in the People's Republic of China only
to explode spectacularly some moments later. Because this explosion destroyed
a $200 million satellite owned by Loral Space and Communications and Hughes
Electronics, February 15th was a grim day for these American companies.
This launch failure, however, was perhaps not entirely unwelcome
from the perspective of the United States national security interests.
It has recently been reported that at least 13 of China's 18
intercontinental ballistic missiles are targeted on American cities. Significantly,
if ever launched, the nuclear warheads on these missiles would be carried
to their American targets by rocket boosters similar to the Long March
system that exploded on that day in February 1996.
Significantly, the defects that the two American companies
subsequently found in the exploding Long March booster were reportedly
symptomatic of more general engineering or design flaws in Chinese rockets.
If the Long March blew upon on launching, in other words, we could hope
that if the Chinese missiles were ever released against Washington, Chicago,
New York, Denver, Dallas or San Francisco, they too might well blow up.
Now ordinarily one might think that a previously undiscovered
defect in Chinese ballistic missiles would be good news for all Americans.
Loral and Hughes, however -- and with them it appears the White House
itself -- did not think so. The details of how these companies and the
administration cooperated to facilitate improvements in Chinese missile
reliability now seems likely to be the subject of considerable investigation
by Congress.
The reports of this missile episode, however, highlight the
importance of the export control matters that we are considering today.
They suggest some very real problems in the way that U.S. policy attempts
simultaneously to promote American business interests and to protect American
national security.
Security policymaking in a democracy often requires enormously
difficult trade-offs. Among these many balancing acts is the tension between
free trade and export controls. No matter what the economic benefits from
free trade, however, surely arming potential adversaries with weapons they
cannot otherwise obtain is foolhardy.
It is on the strength of this insight that we have built our
system of national security export controls. Today, they revolve
around such things as ICBM launch-control systems, supercomputers, and
multiple warhead delivery systems.
With regard to ICBMs, we should make no mistake. The
technologies used in military and civilian space launch systems have always
been inexorably intertwined. The space programs and the ICBM programs
in both the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, shared a common
origin in Hitler's V-2 rocket program. The V-2 mastermind Wernher von
Braun, in fact, went on to help us build our earliest ICBMs and to develop
our civilian satellite program.
Space launch technologies have always been dual-use technologies.
Now I do not mean to suggest that we can never insulate civilian
technology transfers from military ones. My point simply is that it takes
great care and diligence to do this correctly. It requires constant attention
from real security professionals. And it requires the White House not
to interfere with the decisions of those professionals.
There is considerable reason to believe that our government has
failed to follow these requirements. I look forward to hearing the expert
witnesses that we have before us today. And again, I commend the chairman
for his long-standing leadership in this area.
COCHRAN: Thank you very much, Senator.
If we now can move to the statements of our witnesses, we'll call
on Dr. Graham first, and Mr. Pike and Dr. Schneider will follow in that
order.
Dr. Graham, welcome.
GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, senators.
I'd like to briefly address the benefits of commercial space
launch assistance and use for foreign intercontinental ballistic missile
programs this morning. The design, engineering, testing and operation
of ballistic missiles and of space launch vehicles -- sometimes called
SLVs -- have a great deal in common. This is particularly true for intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
The maximum velocities of ICBMs can be slightly less than that of
SLVs. But from an orbital mechanic's point of view, ICBMs can be considered
space launch vehicles whose orbit intersect the earth at the target.
There's a misperception in some circles that ICBMs are more
sophisticated and complex than space launch vehicles. In reality, the
opposite is true.
The preponderance of SLVs are ICBMs with additional elements.
Put another way, if you have a special launch vehicle, you also have an
ICBM -- by removing those additional elements, the satellite in particular,
and adding a re-entry vehicle containing a nuclear or other type of warhead.
Most of the current U.S. unmanned space launch vehicles are
derived from ICBM systems and are closely related to them. This is true
for foreign countries as well.
In the case of China, the Long March III (ph) was derived from
the DF-5 ballistic missile technology. And India's Agni medium-range ballistic
missile is based on the design of its first space launch vehicle, the SLV
III, which in turn is a copy of U.S. space launch vehicle.
Space launch vehicles produced in nonmarket economies have been
offered to U.S. and other satellite manufacturers at attractive prices
for launching high altitude geo-synchronous communication satellites --
which support the demand for long distance telephony, data transmission,
pagers, radio feeds and television feeds, as we've seen
this week with the failure of the Galaxy 4 satellite, and also in the coming
years, lower altitude satellites to provide infrastructure for commercial
remote sensing, cell phones and pagers.
Because these commercial satellites are expensive and time-
consuming to build, and are instrumental in generating profits for the
communications industry, American satellite manufacturers have strong incentives
to ensure that foreign SLVs transport their satellites to the intended
orbits reliably and employ the satellites in good working order.
This assistance, however, can equally aid in the development and
the reliability of foreign ICBM's.
The essential elements of an SLV, space launch vehicle, are its
propulsion; structure; staging; guidance and control; ground support and
launch equipment and procedures; overall systems integration; payload;
satellite, or re-entry vehicle with warhead; the payload development --
the payload deployment; and the development, testing and engineering and
facilities of the space launch vehicle.
These essential elements of an ICBM are the same with the
exception of the payload, which for an ICBM, as I mentioned, is a re- entry
vehicle containing some type of warhead, rather than a satellite. And
I will briefly discuss each of these elements.
Propulsion -- there are basically two types of propulsion systems
used in rockets -- liquid fuel propulsion systems and solid fuel propulsion
systems. The liquid fuel systems are all derivatives and extensions of
the B-2 technology that was developed during World War II, and that applies
all the way from the B-2 itself to the space shuttle main engines that
are used today.
These liquid propulsion systems are very efficient, and at the
same time, require some care in handling in preparation for launching.
The propellants themselves are very, very energetic chemicals that have
to be managed by experts.
Solid propellants, on the other hand, are much more inert
materials until they're ignited and are much more appropriate for a ballistic
missile force that has to stay on a high state of alert for long times
-- years -- and still launch in very short notice, minutes. This is an
advanced ballistic missile force, and in fact, similar to the technology
that the U.S., and by and large, Russia use today.
Both of these technologies can be used for space launch vehicles
and both have been used for space launch vehicles. In general, developing
countries tend to prefer the greater efficiency of the liquid systems for
their first space launch vehicles.
And in terms of structure, ICBMs and space launch vehicles must
both be very light, since they're being accelerated against the force of
gravity to velocities in the range of 24,000 feet per second, about 10
times the speed of a typical rifle bullet, but still must be very strong.
The acceleration of launch produces several gravities worth of load on
the structure during the ascent phase, and the aerodynamic loads are large
during portions of the trajectory when the vehicle is high in the atmosphere.
Structural requirements place a premium on materials designed and
fabrication for both ICBMs and SLVs. And these structures are very highly
integrated in order to save weight. And that integration goes through
the payload itself, either the warhead or an ICBM or the satellite.
GRAHAM: The structural requirements place a premium on
materials, design and fabrication for both ICBM and SLVs. And these structures
are very highly integrated in order to save weight. And that integration
goes through the payload itself, either the warhead for an ICBM or the
satellite.
Staging is a common procedure designed to throw away part of the
mass of the space launch vehicle or the ICBM before it gets to orbit. So
you've heard of one-, two- and three-stage rocket systems in which elements
are sequentially discarded after the fuel has been expended.
Stage separation, which is commanded by the vehicle's control
system immediately after the propulsion of the stage is terminated, is
used to minimize the amount of structure, and furthermore, is a very delicate
process that has to be done quite precisely so that it doesn't disorient
or otherwise damage the stages remaining to go to orbit, or for that matter,
disrupt the satellite.
Guidance and control subsystem of both space launch vehicles and
ICBMs keep track of where the vehicle is and where it's supposed to go.
Where it's supposed to go is a combination of velocity and location in
orbit for a space launch vehicle or a point on the surface of the earth
for an ICBM. This system calculates the direction and duration of the
rocket thrust that must be commanded to reach the target and then controls
the direction of thrust so that it satisfies that calculation. This process
occurs several times each second during powered flight.
In the past the location of the vehicle during ascent was
determined by inertial measuring units, comprised of gyroscopes and accelerometers.
But the opportunity exists today to use U.S. global positioning satellite
systems and the Russian GLONASS system to establish the rocket's location
with high accuracy by reference to precision satellite beacons.
While high-precision inertial measuring units are expensive and
difficult to make, GPS and GLONASS assisted navigation units are potentially
more accurate and less expensive, and I might add the basic elements are
widely available today.
ICBMs designed to destroy targets specifically hardened to
nuclear attack require a more accurate guidance than do space launch vehicles.
However, for attacking all other targets, such as cities, space launch
vehicle guidance systems are very sufficient in their accuracy for ICBM
use as well.
Ground support and launch equipment and procedures are also an
important part of both ICBMs and space launch vehicles. And in fact, they
are the same for the propulsion and guidance elements of both these types
of systems.
From a personnel standpoint, space launch vehicle crews are
automatically capable of being ICBM launch crews.
The ground support for preparation, monitoring and checkout of
the specific payloads for space launch vehicles and ICBMs is different,
since the payloads are different. But satellite payloads for SLVs tend
to be more complex and require more advanced ground support than do ICBM
warheads.
A very important area that is sometimes overlooked is the overall
system integration, which in general is a field in which the U.S. has world
leadership. Even after the individual components and subsystems of a space
launch vehicle or ICBM are functioning properly, they must still be integrated
into a complete system that can work together.
Instabilities in propulsion, control or other subsystems often
depend upon the coupling of two or more subsystems in unanticipated ways.
Incipient instabilities can lead to rough rides to orbit. Additional mechanical
stress is placed on the payload, and extreme manifestations of these instabilities
can, and unfortunately has, caused the breakup and destruction of the entire
vehicle in powered flight.
The integration of the propulsion, guidance control, structure,
and aerodynamics is the same for space launch vehicles and ICBMs, while
the integration of the payload is unique to the specific design. However,
the analytical tools, such as the structural dynamics analysis software,
are the same for both and are used widely.
GRAHAM: The integration of the payload, like other aspects of
system integration, require an intimate knowledge of both the payload and
the launch vehicle. In the case of a space launch vehicle, a great deal
of detailed technical information must be exchanged between the satellite
designers, the satellite attachment and aerodynamic shroud designers, and
the vehicle designers to integrate the payload into the system. And there
must be a close working relationship between the space launch vehicle and
satellite engineers and technicians to assure a successful launch mission.
Mr. Chairman, this is not like putting a load in the back of a
pickup truck. This is a very, very highly integrated system.
The more that can be done to improve the ride to orbit by
reducing the mechanical stresses, the more that can be done throughout
the SLV system to increase its overall reliability, and the more likely
that a successful launch and orbital insertion will be achieved. Measures
taken to increase the performance and reliability of space launch vehicles
translate directly into performance and reliability improvements in ICBM's.
U.S. and Russian ICBM development programs have used more test
flights than have their space launch vehicle counterparts. This is a result
of U.S. and Russian efforts to achieve both high reliability and high accuracy,
goals that may not be as important to other countries.
Payloads for space launch vehicles and ICBMs are different, and
that has been noted in the opening statements and is certainly worth repeating.
On the other hand, the integration problems, as I've mentioned, are the
same and all the ascent problems are very similar.
Payload deployment is another area of common technology. The
release of a single satellite payload and a single warhead payload are
similar operations. Both require the proper deployment, positioning and
orientation of the payload. The deployment of multiple satellites from
the space launch vehicle and multiple warheads from the ICBM are also similar
operations.
The Iridium system, for example, which has been deployed from
Chinese launch vehicles among others, deploys several satellites during
one mission and requires a deployment platform to do that. This, of course,
is very similar to the technology for multiple reentry vehicles, such as
we have on our Minuteman III system, and for that matter, Peacekeeper.
Information and experience gained from one of these activities
can be applied directly to the other.
The development testing, engineering and facilities is another
area of common technology. They are very similar for those required for
space launch vehicles and for ICBM vehicle development. These include
engine test stands (ph) and testing, guidance and navigation test laboratories
and facilities, test light ranges, and vehicle diagnostics and telemetry
systems.
One, perhaps the most critical technology that can be transferred
is the engineering skill and experience required for interpreting and rectifying
design problems that occur during system development, and are reflected
in the telemetry and system performance during testing.
In addition to advancing the ICBM capabilities of other
countries, U.S. assistance in supporting and developing space launch vehicle
capability assists these countries in being able to use space for military
purposes more effectively. These purposes include reconnaissance, communications,
meteorology among others.
Such capabilities can then also be provided in term to other
countries for military, political or financial support.
GRAHAM: Transferring space launch technology to the developing
world provides space access to many potential adversaries of the U.S. and
is a serious matter that carries substantial risk to the U.S. and its allies
around the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COCHRAN: Thank you very much, Dr. Graham, for your statement.
Mr. Pike, we will now here from you.
PIKE: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify to you this morning -- a morning in which the world
is a more dangerous place than it was a month ago or a year ago, and a
morning on which I think it's going to be a more dangerous place a month
and a year from now.
We're witnessing the birth pains of an arms race in the Indian
subcontinent, rumors of war in Kashmir. Ratification of the Comprehensive
Test Ban in the United States or the START II agreement in Russia seem
less likely than even a few weeks ago.
And this committee, in particular, has been instrumental in
alerting the nation to these and other dangers, many of which transcend
the traditional Cold War litany. Fortunately, however, the subject of
today's hearing does not rank very high on this list, and I welcome this
opportunity to inject some much needed balance to the increasingly controversial
questions of the relationship between missile and space launch technology
and the adequacy of existing export control mechanisms to maintain this
distinction.
You might recall that Werner von Braun aimed for the moon and hit
London. Since the dawn of the space age and the missile area, the primary
distinction between space launch vehicles and missiles has been attitude,
and only secondarily, altitude.
The first American, Soviet satellites were launched on converted
military missiles, and derivatives of these missiles continue to be used
by both countries.
It remains trivially true that many of the major technical arts
applicable to the challenges of missilery are equally applicable to space
launch operations. The more challenging question is to unravel the actual
military significance of specific technologies.
Concerns have been raised as to whether the interactions with
American commercial satellite operators could have led to the transfer
of technical information that would have been useful to the Chinese in
improving the reliability or capability of their missiles.
Given the ongoing investigations of these matters and the
consequent limited public availability of detailed technical information,
it's difficult to form a definitive view on this matter, but several general
observations are possible and necessary at this juncture.
For nearly three decades, the Chinese have maintained a small
arsenal of ICBMs capable of targeting American cities. It is the fact
of the existence of this force, rather than the fine-grain details of their
technical characteristics, that has defined their existential deterrent
posture relative to the United States.
The space launch industry is extremely sensitive to questions of
launcher reliability with launchers exhibiting reliability lower than the
prevailing 90 to 95 percent reliability rates, placing potentially prohibitive
insurance premiums. Unlike space launch vehicles, the difference between
75 percent and 90 percent reliability of the Chinese missile force would
have no material bearing on the quality of the existential deterrents in
terms of American or Chinese calculation.
High confidence in high reliability of missiles has been an
abiding concern of the United States. But we face a very different operational
requirement of achieving prompt hard target kill against a large number
of Russian ICBM silos. I am concerned that in the absence of rampant and
significant reductions in American and Russian nuclear arsenals, China
may over the coming decades build up to current American force levels if
we choose not to build down to there's and develop an appetite for high
confidence and reliability.
Hopefully, we can forestall this development. But should we
fail, we will not confront a Chinese arsenal of liquid fuel DF-5s, such
as they have today, but rather a more numerous arsenal of their new solid
fuel DF-31 and DF-41 missiles.
Any insight, however marginal, into the reliability of the DF-5
gained in the 1990s would surely be of vanishingly little relevance to
the reliability of the utterly unrelated 31s and 41s deployed decades hence.
While accuracy is also of interest in the missile and launch
fields, divergent considerations apply. Satellite operators generally
set standards for launch vehicles, placing their satellites into some proximity
of the destination orbit. But the margin for error in the real world is
normally many miles. And since satellites always carry their own maneuvering
propellant, it's left to the satellite rather than the launcher to reach
the ultimate destination. And in the case of deploying multiple satellites,
this deployment can take place over a period of hours or days rather than
the minutes found in the case of a multiple warhead missile.
The warheads carried on missiles have no such supplementary
guidance or propulsion capability, and rely entirely on the missile and
equality of the re-entry vehicle body to reach their terrestrial destination.
The accuracy of existing Chinese missiles is not well-
characterized in the open literature, but is surely denominated in miles,
rather than the hundreds of yards characteristic of American missiles.
Such accuracy is consistent with the deterrent role of the
existing Chinese missile force.
PIKE: Close does count in horse shoes, hand grenades and global
thermonuclear war. It matters little to China or America precisely which
part of Los Angeles is the actual ground zero. It should be recalled that
the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki actually missed by a wide margin, a
fact lost on the citizens of that unfortunate city.
Again, over time, this may change, and we may a few decades hence
confront a Chinese nuclear arsenal that is both as numerous and as accurate
as that deployed by the United States today.
While this would represent a profound policy failure on the part
of the United States to the extent that it was in our control, the potential
transfer of technical data related to current Chinese launch vehicles would
not materially contribute to this failure.
And given the ongoing investigation of allegations, it's also
difficult at this point and in this forum to provide a definitive answer
to the adequacy of current export control regulations. But the course
taken over this decade with respect to the Chinese launch vehicles has
had diverse benefits, and on balance, manageable risks.
This set of policies has strengthened the American satellite
industry, enhancing our global dominance of this strategic sector, and
in the process, increasing the diversity and capability of communications
available to our military forces worldwide.
It's engaged the energies of the Chinese aerospace industry and
perhaps moved them toward seeing space development -- rather than missiles
-- as a central focus of their emerging role in the world. It's given us
leverage in discouraging their transfer of special weapons technologies
to other countries, notably Pakistan.
While these efforts have clearly not been as successful as we
would have wished, our nonproliferation sticks would have been even less
effective in the absence of the carrots for space cooperation.
We should not allow controversies to obscure the fundamental
soundness of this approach, but even more critically, we should not allow
the current controversy to distract us from the more-pressing and significant
challenges American security faces today.
Thank you.
COCHRAN: Thank you, Mr. Pike.
Dr. Schneider, we will hear from you now.
SCHNEIDER: Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
appreciate the privilege of testifying before this committee and also appreciate
your leadership on this particularly important subject. I'll just summarize
a few remarks concerning the regulatory aspects of this problem.
The U.S. government has historically regulated communication
satellites, even when they were having strictly commercial applications,
because of the close association of space launch and space satellites with
national defense purposes.
And over time, the enabling technologies for this civil and
military applications began to converge, and there were relatively few
differences between them for either civil or military applications of communication
satellites.
The primary differences between the commercial communication
satellites and military communication satellites was focused on measures
to assure the survivability of those satellites. And those measures were
generally developed through the Department of Defense and hence justified
the regulation of the communications satellites even for commercial purposes
under munitions lists auspices.
Due to the growth in space launch services reliability, as Dr.
Graham and Mr. Pike referred, especially in Russia and China, it created
the possibility of creating a worldwide commercial launch industry. This
coincided with the U.S. government's policy change seeking to renationalize
the space launch industry and convert it into a commercial industry.
However, for national security as well as the commercial
considerations, the U.S. government chose, in the 1980s, to limit the use
of Russian and Chinese space launch services. This was done through continuing
munitions list licensing of communications satellites and a system of launch
quotas because of the fact that China and Russia at the time were nonmarket
countries.
A policy change undertaken, as referred to in 1996, is an
important philosophical change. And I think it should be noted -- because
of the difference between the concept of munitions license regulation and
commercial or Department of Commerce regulation -- the philosophy under
munitions licensing is that the matter to be exported is exported for achieving
the national security purposes of the United States. And nothing is permitted
to be exported that addresses those purposes unless specifically authorized.
SCHNEIDER: And as a consequence, when a communications satellite
or space launch services or anything else that is identified on the munitions
list as proposed for export, the technology is very thoroughly disaggregated
to the point where perhaps two dozen offices in the national security community,
the Department of Defense, Department of State, intelligence community
and other agencies, depending on the details of the technology, will review
it very carefully based upon very detailed documentation required to be
submitted by the applicant.
And this differs from the philosophy of products that are
licensed under the Department of Commerce licensing, which is mainly done
to promote the economic interests of the United States. And the aim is
to facilitate the passage of this technology or services or hardware into
international commerce for the benefit of U.S. industry. Typically, the
technology associated with it is focused primarily on the functionality
of the system. That is, what purpose would it be used for rather than
a disaggregated review of the technology as is the case in munitions licensing.
And the -- these philosophical differences are important because
as we -- to the degree to which technology is transferred under a commodity
jurisdiction change from the munitions list to the Department of Commerce
list, the technology is more likely to go into the public domain and indeed,
to be done in a way that is generally not subject to U.S. monitoring.
And I think the trends in this can be underscored by the degree
to which liberalization has taken place. When I served in the Department
of State in the mid-'80s, the Department of Commerce issued nearly 150,000
validated export licenses due to this equipment.
In fiscal year '97, that figure dropped to about 11,000,
underscoring the dramatic degree to which advanced technology has been
liberalized, and indeed the most common items licensed on the Department
of Commerce list is shotguns. So the degree of liberalization is indeed
very substantial. If added to that, there is commodity jurisdiction change,
based on the philosophical differences between the two licensing systems,
it reflects a change in underlying public policy.
And the circumstances that we face with communications satellites
is that it is on the -- at the nexus of the problem of balancing between
these commercial aspirations of the United States, which are extremely
important as our society and economy are information-driven, and our national
security concerns. And I appreciate the work of this committee in trying
to understand the issue and achieve appropriate balance in them. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
COCHRAN: Thank you, Dr. Schneider for your assistance to the
committee and for your statement.
Dr. Graham, you pointed out how there are a lot of similarities
between space launch activities and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
activities in terms of the testing and building and launching of these
types of vehicles.
COCHRAN: We happen to have a chart here that was prepared for
the committee by the Central Intelligence Agency, although it is unclassified
and it's available there. And it compares different parts of the missile
system with a space-launch vehicle.
Does this, in your view, and based on your experience and
knowledge of these systems, describe in a helpful way or an accurate way
how interchangeable so many of the parts of these systems are?
GRAHAM: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think this is a good
representation of it.
I would only add that for Third World countries that are
developing longer-range rockets, they can also take the strap-on boosters
you see on the space launch vehicle and apply them to the ballistic missile
as well. So there is, in fact, a little more commonality than that chart
shows, but it's basically correct.
COCHRAN: In 1993, on the question of whether the State
Department would continue to license technical data-sharing for the commercial
satellites already moved to the Commerce Department's licensing jurisdiction,
a Defense Department memorandum to the Department of State said, and I
quote, "While all of the USML..." -- meaning U.S. munitions list -- "...
controlled technical data is of concern, that technical data which covers
launch vehicle integration services is of the utmost importance to DOD
and the missile tech community because any technical data on the launch
vehicle other than electrical and mechanical integration data directly
relates to ballistic missile proliferation concerns."
My question is -- Do you think the Department of Defense
memorandum in 1993 is still a valid expression of concern?
GRAHAM: Yes, Mr. Chairman. If anything, I think it was an
understatement of the concern. It excludes the mechanical integration
information but, in fact, the mechanical integration of the payload with
the booster is very important.
For example, both ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles
tend to bend while they're flying upwards -- sort of like this. And the
control system has to be able to take that out by dynamic control. The
weight of the satellite or the payload on top is also moving back and forth.
You can't let that body -- it's called the body mode -- either damage
the satellite or its mount or somehow have that mass at the top of the
missile adversely affect dynamical response of the rest of the vehicle.
So I think, if anything, the concerns are a little more extensive
than they voice there. But they're basically correct.
COCHRAN: In the next year, January of '94, there was a
Washington Times article which reported that licenses had been approved
for the launch of two Martin Marietta satellites -- EchoStar (ph) and AsiaSat
II (ph) -- in China.
The Commerce Department export licenses reportedly permitted
martin Marietta to assist the Chinese with integration analysis of the
satellites to the space-launch vehicle. According to the article -- and
I quote from it -- it said, "A Martin Marietta spokesman confirmed that
his company's sale would include an integration analysis package." End
of quote.
My question to you is -- What is this integration analysis that
is being discussed there? And how could it be helpful to Chinese missile
programs?
GRAHAM: The integration analysis is the analysis of the overall
performance of the space-launch vehicle with the satellite on board. It's
a very important part of space launch activities because if, in fact, the
missile or the booster is not well suited to the satellite launch -- if
it provides a rough ride or high accelerations to the satellite -- one
of two things will happen.
GRAHAM: Either you'll have to put more structure in the
satellite, which means you have less useful payload in it, or you will
experience a failure in the satellite either from the mechanical stresses
on it or on the attachment it has to the space-launch vehicle.
Similarly, if the satellite isn't the right mass and balance, it
can affect adversely the rocket booster itself. So there is not a way
to separate the integration of the satellite with the integration of the
space booster. They have to be done as one single unit, and you have to
understand the performance of that whole system to have a successful launch
to orbit.
There's not a -- technically not a divide between what the
booster design people need to know and what the satellite people need to
know. They both need to know almost everything about the mechanical and
electrical characteristics of the system.
COCHRAN: Your statement is, in essence, a conclusion based on
your experience and knowledge of these systems that, by allowing China
to launch U.S. commercial satellites, we're actually helping improve China's
missile and satellite launch capabilities and their infrastructure.
Does this also relate to providing a higher state of readiness
for those involved in China in these programs?
We hear a lot about training and being able to immediately
respond in cases of emergencies. Does launching U.S. satellites also help
keep China's launch team in a higher state of readiness than it otherwise
would be?
GRAHAM: Well, it certainly provides strong economic support to
the cadres of rocket scientists and engineers that China has. We essentially
pay for part of their training and their infrastructure. That gives China
an overall greater ballistic missile as well as satellite launch capability.
It also keeps those cadres active in preparing launching rockets,
and that again helps their readiness to launch whatever China dictates
that they launch.
Finally, in the longer run, the next step in guidance systems,
for example, is going to be to global positioning satellite-assisted guidance
-- both for space-launch vehicles and for ICBMs. And that will make both
of these much, much more accurate in their performance and ability to hit
targets.
COCHRAN: Dr. Schneider, in your discussion of the regulatory
regime and its evolution and the changes that have taken place of the last
several years, you mentioned the impact of the change of philosophy as
well as regulation that occurred in 1996.
I have a copy of a letter that was written to the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee from the Department of State signed
by Barbara Larkin, who was assistant secretary for legislative affairs.
It's dated September 20, 1996, and it's notifying the United States Senate
-- specifically the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee -- of these
changes that had taken place under the Export Administration Act.
One of the things -- and I'm going to -- I'm going to give you a
copy of this so you can -- you can have it available to you -- one thing
that is mentioned in this letter is that not only is there a removal from
State Department to the Commerce Department, from the munitions list to
the so-called Commerce Control List of militarily sensitive components
of commercial satellites, but it noted that additional controls would be
placed on these items by commerce to bolster its export control regime.
And then the letter says this. "These satellites would not be
eligible for a Commerce Department general license." The question (audio
gap) what is meant by the terms general license? Is this some kind of
jargon for saying a formal export license from the government is not necessary
to export the item? And how is this different from an individual validated
license?
SCHNEIDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SCHNEIDER: The general destination license is essentially
equivalent to and not requiring an export license. The technology that's
so identified or the product that's so identified can be exported by the
exporter without need for additional authority from the U.S. government.
The individual validated license which is, that is the category I mentioned
that has been the beneficiary of substantial liberalization from about
150,000 now down to about 11,000 in fiscal 1997. Individual validated
license means that the applicant has to provide information on what he
wishes to export and who the end user is, and other bits of information
relating to it. And that is assessed by the Department of Commerce and
in some cases referred to other agencies. And if the agencies agree, then
the Department of Commerce will issue a license for the intended purpose.
And that is an individual validated license.
COCHRAN: Thank you, for the purpose our record, I'm going to ask
that a copy of the letter dated September 20, 1996 be included in the record.
Senator Levin.
LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I'd like to go back to
1988 when President Reagan decided to allow for the transfer of satellites
for Chinese launch, and that was apparently a highly controversial decision.
It was opposed by many members of Congress. This is what The Washington
Post article says, September 10, 1988, which I would ask be made part of
the record, Mr. Chairman.
COCHRAN: Without objection, it will be made a part of the
record.
LEVIN: It says that President Reagan in a move that's designed
to expand trade between the United States and China is given conditional
approval to plans to launch three American made communications satellite
on China's Long March (ph) rocket boosters, the State Department announced
yesterday. If the decision is not blocked by Congress or by a special
Western bloc commission that monitors technology transfers to communist
nations, it will mark the first time U.S. satellites have been launched
from a non-Western or communist country.
The administration's approval of export licenses, and I'm
shortening this, that's why I want the whole article in the record. The
administration's approval of export licenses for the satellites was condemned
by several members of Congress as threatening national security by giving
the Chinese an opportunity to see American satellite technology. China
has promised it will not examine the satellites which will be shipped for
launch in sealed containers. But some U.S. officials have said that there
is no way to ensure the security of the satellites once they're in China
awaiting launch.
So apparently this decision, it just says here, by the way, this
is a victory, according to The Post for the Chinese government, 1988. Apparently,
it was a highly controversial decision at the time because of some of the
concerns Dr. Graham, which I heard from you this morning. The very launch
of an American satellite from a Chinese rocket contributes to the advancement
of rocket science in China. Is that fair?
GRAHAM: Yes senator, that's fair.
LEVIN: Now, since that time and since Tiananmen Square, there's
been a requirement for a presidential waiver for a transfer of a satellite
for a Chinese launch. And those waivers have been forthcoming under both,
President Bush and President Clinton. There must be a national security
review as I understand it before those waivers. And that waiver in effect
supersedes the licensing requirement because the agency, whether it's State
Department or Commerce Department is going to license something where there's
been a presidential waiver.
LEVIN: Once it's gone through that wavier process I doubt that
there's very much left for the agency to decide. The waiver process kind
of supersedes the licensing process. If the president waves a transfer
it's kind of hard to imagine his Commerce Department or his State Department
is not going to issue the license following that.
Do you know, Dr. Schneider, whether or not the number of agencies
involved in that presidential review are fewer than they are for a munitions
list review when there's a State Department licensing? Do you know if
the number of agencies is fewer?
SCHNEIDER: I'm not intimately acquainted with the process that's
being used, but my expectation would be that the same agencies at the cabinet
level would be involved. The issue that is not known to me is the degree
to which the technology is in fact disaggregated and sent to the special
offices that have the particular knowledge of the technology, and that
might make a difference in how the review would come out.
LEVIN: So within each agency you're not sure whether or not
inside that agency it goes to the same sub agency groups for review, but
it might.
SCHNEIDER: It might yes. I would hope it would.
LEVIN: Now yesterday the House passed an amendment which
reverses this policy and says no more satellites can be transferred to
China. It basically reverses the decision. There's also a couple other
amendments too which change the munitions list issue, but the fundamental
amendment adopted yesterday by the House said no more satellites can go
to China for launch.
Regardless of what President Reagan's done, what President Bush
had done, what President Clinton has done in terms of permitting this with
waivers, or with scrutiny, the fundamental issue here seems to me is the
one that Dr. Graham has raised and a few others have commented on. Should
the satellites be permitted to go to China for launch? By a vote yesterday
of 417 to 4 following I believe a 10 minute debate on the amendment, but
a much longer debate on the whole issue, the House of Representatives said
that there will be a prohibition -- here it is, no satellites the United
States in origin, including commercial satellites and satellite components
may be exported or re-exported to the Peoples Republic of China. Do you
agree with that decision Dr. Graham?
GRAHAM: Senator Levin, I -- just as a brief word of background.
I first worked on ballistic missiles in 1964 when I was an officer in
the Air Force and have worked on several ballistic missiles since then
and also helped, when I was at NASA, resurrect the U.S. Unmanned Space
Launch Vehicle Program. So I have considerable familiarity with both of
those. I was the director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
when the issue came forward in 1988, as well as science adviser to the
president, and based on my experience at that time, I opposed sending those
first three satellites to China for launch. I still think that an unsound
policy and therefore think the measures the House have taken yesterday
are in fact correct.
LEVIN: In 1988 you opposed President Reagan's action?
GRAHAM: No Senator. There was an inter agency review of the
prospect of allow those satellites to be transferred to China for launch.
And during that inter agency review process I opposed them being transferred.
LEVIN: That's what I mean. During that process it was your
opinion that those satellites should not have been transferred. We should
not have started down that road.
GRAHAM: That's correct Senator.
LEVIN: And that's still your opinion.
GRAHAM: That's correct.
LEVIN: Mr. Pike yesterday vote, do you think it is wise or wise,
is the fundamental issue?
PIKE: Well I think that it was certainly very poorly premised
and that's one of the reasons I'm hoping that this hearing today is going
to be able to put this matter in a slightly better perspective. If one
examines the statements that have been made on the floor of the House,
the floor of the Senate over the last several weeks regarding the situation
with respect to Chinese strategic forces, it seems to me that the House
was making a decision that was at best extremely poorly informed.
We've heard charges that there are now hundreds of Chinese
nuclear missiles aimed at the United States. Although I think we've had
probably a more realistic assessment of that here this morning. The suggestion
that there were no Chinese missiles capable of reaching the United States
until last year, and that this change and all kinds of other horrific changes
have been solely due to the events that I take it are going to be subject
to further investigation here and elsewhere, I think is obviously and fundamentally
at variance with the facts.
And so if the House is basing it's decision with respect to
launching Chinese satellites on -- American satellites on Chinese rockets,
I think the notion that this policy has somehow resulted in some profound
immediate obvious irrefutable degradation in American security due to the
ability of the Chinese to fire hundreds of nuclear missiles at the United
States today, whereas they were utterly incapable of doing so a year ago,
I think that it's astonishing that the House could be making a decision
on the basis of such erroneous information.
LEVIN: I take it then you don't agree with the House decision.
PIKE: I think it was very poorly premised, and I'm hopeful that
the Senate will be able to set matters straight, hopefully on the basis
of the record we're making in the hearing today.
LEVIN: Dr. Schneider did the House -- was the House doing the
right thing yesterday in prohibiting the transfer, export of satellites
or components to China?
SCHNEIDER: I know any president wishes to have discretion in the
ability to manage foreign policy and restrictions imposed by the Congress
are often resisted for that reason, but because of the risks of proliferation
I think it was the right choice.
LEVIN: Yesterday, just simply no more commercial satellites were
launched in China.
SCHNEIDER: Now unless we can come up with a technique that
isolates China's access to the technology transfer that we've been discussing
here.
LEVIN: But doesn't the very launch of those satellites
contribute somewhat to their knowledge for the reasons Dr. Graham went
into and you went into some...
SCHNEIDER: Yes and the -- hypothetically the only way I can
imagine doing it is if they export the satellites to an off shore user
acceptable to the United States where all the launch integration services
would be performed by people outside of China.
LEVIN: My understanding of the waiver provision which as been
used by President Bush and by President Clinton is that -- and this following
Tiananmen Square, is that the Congress has an opportunity to overturn the
waivers that were on that chart that I put up, those 20 waivers. Is that
your understanding? Does any one know if that is correct? Excuse me,
the license technically which follows the waiver. Do you know if that's
technically correct, anybody that Congress has, I think, 30 days after
the license is issued following the waiver that China to overturn that
license?
SCHNEIDER: That's not my understanding Mr. Chairman. That
process to the best of my knowledge applies only to exports under the arms
export control act where there's a Congressional...
LEVIN: OK. Well, all right, but 17 of those 20 were munition
list items. So in those 17 cases where in the State Department had the
technical licensing thing following the waiver, in those cases Congress
had 30 days to object, is that correct?
SCHNEIDER: Yes.
(AUDIO GAP)
THOMPSON: ...the process by which these decisions were made.
THOMPSON: So, I think when we acknowledge that there are several
waivers at several different times, we have to go a little further than
that in determining exactly what was waived and under what circumstances,
and what were the processes.
Now you've mentioned the difference, some of the different
standards between Commerce and State as I understand it, there's one license
required at Commerce, two licenses at State.
SCHNEIDER: Yes, there are different types of licenses. For
example, to market products that are licensed by state, you need one type
of license. Then to transfer technical data, you need another type of
license. And then to actually transfer the hardware, you need yet a different
type of license. So, the aim is to protect as best can be done through
the regulatory process, access to defense-related technology.
THOMPSON: Well it's State -- a matter under State on the
munitions list. Don't you have to have a license even to begin to enter
into discussions with the Chinese for example?
SCHNEIDER: Yes, yes.
THOMPSON: That's not true with Commerce, is it?
SCHNEIDER: That's correct.
THOMPSON: And as I understand it, according to this GAO report
that the Bush interagency group and subsequently the Clinton interagency
group all agreed that if these satellites contain militarily sensitive
characteristics, integrated in them, they should remain at State. Right?
SCHNEIDER?: Correct.
THOMPSON: Are you familiar with these nine sensitive
characteristics, anti-germ capability, antenna cross-links, encryption
devices, pointing accuracy and all of that. Are you generally familiar
with those...
SCHNEIDER: Yes. Yes, I am senator.
THOMPSON: Do you agree with the interagency determinations there
that that if those sensitive military matters are present within these
satellites, they should remain under the stricter standards of State. Do
you agree with that?
SCHNEIDER: Yes, I do sir.
THOMPSON: Is it not also true that now, sense 1976 and the shift
has taken, that even if a satellite contains any or all of these characteristics,
pointing accuracy, propulsion systems, the others that I mentioned, that
that's still vests (ph) and rests with Commerce now.
SCHNEIDER: That's correct.
THOMPSON: All right. There has been some writing in the
professional journals concerning no one article in the "International Defense
Review" concerning the intangible know how. And Dr. Graham, you might
respond to this or either all of you that hardware is one thing, but one
of the things that we need to be most concerned about is the intangible
no how, the conversations that might go on, the information that might
be transferred pursuant to us trying to make sure that these rockets work,
launching facilities. Do you share that concern?
GRAHAM?: Yes, senator. Engineers are, and I'm an engineer
speaking with this criticism. But we are trained our whole lives to look
at equipment capabilities, analyze it, look for flaws, errors, things that
cause failure or trouble and try to solve the problem. And that's what
engineers do. It's almost impossible to stop them from doing that. And
almost no matter where you put them down, that's what they're going to
do. And that's the intangible knowledge that can very easily be transferred
to foreign engineers, if you put U.S. engineers together with them.
THOMPSON: Well I understand that the statement is made sometimes
in response to that. But there is a monitoring that goes on. But my information
is that there is no absolute requirement that the Department of Defense
monitor and be present at all times with regard to discussions, the mating
process, the launching and all of that. But in fact, with regard to the
May 19th, the Lockheed Martin Marietta launch, that they went to the DOD
and asked them to monitor them. Are you familiar with that point?
GRAHAM: I'm generally familiar with the fact that Martin
initiated the request for monitoring, not the U.S. government, senator.
THOMPSON: Do you know whether or not in practice, there's
absolute requirement that DOD monitor and be present at all stages?
GRAHAM: I would defer to Dr. Schneider for this specific....
THOMPSON: Dr. Schneider.
SCHNEIDER: My understanding is no, that is not the case. And
this illustrates a difference between a commercial license and a State
Department license. The State Department license limits what technology
can be transferred, and there are procedures that a vendor's required to
follow that restricts even the amount of informal knowledge he is allowed
to transmit. He's told, exactly what he can transmit. The vendor is required
to submit a technology transfer control plan in most cases so that they
know exactly how the information will be transferred, under what procedures
and so forth.
But with a commerce license the idea is to transfer the asset and
its functionality. And there is not a procedure in ordinary commerce licenses
for the control of this informal transmission of information. And the idea
of a monitor would probably be of some help. But, would still, it would
still be difficult to control the transfer of information if there was
not otherwise a requirement and a license to do so.
THOMPSON: Alright, let me ask you one more question. Are you,
any of you gentlemen familiar with the coordinating committee for multilateral
export controls, which the United States was a member of?
SCHNEIDER: Yes, I'm familiar with it.
THOMPSON: Dr. Schneider, what was the function of that entity,
and why did we get out of it?
SCHNEIDER: It was established in 1949 among the U.S. and our
European allies to restrict the flow of initially arms to the Warsaw Pact.
But later controlled the flow of technology that would enhance the military
performance of the Warsaw Pact. And it was a non-treaty based organization,
headquartered in Paris that coordinated the export control activities of
the member states. And at the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government
was unable to persuade allied governments to continue the existence of
the COCOM (ph) organizations. So, a new entity was established in 1994
called the Wasenar (ph) arrangement after the, a river in the Netherlands,
where the meeting was held. And this arrangement does not control the transfer
of technology, but only limits the flow of let's say, requires notification
after sale of military equipment to essentially pariah states.
THOMPSON: Did the United States remove itself from the original
organization?
SCHNEIDER: It, the United States agreed not to continue COCOM
(ph) and to seek a new...
THOMPSON: When, excuse me, when did that happen?
SCHNEIDER: In 1993.
THOMPSON: In 1993. Did COCOM (ph) as you've referred to it,
would that have placed stricter requirements on the exports of these commercial
satellites than what we have today?
SCHNEIDER: Yes.
THOMPSON: That's all.
COCHRAN: Senator Collins.
COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow-up on some
questions that Senator Thompson posed to you about the differences between
the procedures used by the Department of State and the Department of Commerce.
It seems to me one basic difference is also in the mission of the two
departments. And indeed, when you look at the people who are appointed
to be the Commerce secretary, they often have considerable political experience.
But, I can't think of any in recent history who had national security
expertise.
COLLINS: And this area is very technical and does obviously
involve national security. I'd like to ask each of you which department
or agency you believe should have primary responsibility in the area of
export control of space technology? Dr. Graham, I'll start with you.
GRAHAM: It's my personal view that the greatest expertise in
that area resides in the Department of Defense, since they are the agency
that develops or at least used to develop ballistic missiles for the United
States, and also is an extensive user of space launch technology. So,
from a national security and generally, national benefit point of view,
I would feel most comfortable if it resided ultimately in the Department
of Defense.
COLLINS: Mr. Pike.
PIKE: I think that the current arrangement where the Bureau of
Export Administration at the Department of Commerce has primary responsibility
for dual use technologies is the correct arrangement. The challenge of
course that we have is that unlike the situation in the Cold War where
we were mainly concerned with primarily military exports, the concern today
is primarily with dual use technologies like super computers, like space
launch components. And I think that the Bureau of Export Administration,
it's proper place is trying to strike the balance with American competitiveness
and other interests.
COLLINS: Dr. Schneider.
SCHNEIDER: The two export control regimes, the question that the
Department of Commerce regime and the arms export control regime have their
origin in different statutes with different purposes. The State Department
export controls over the U.S. munitions list is derived from the Arms Export
Control Act. And the purposes of that act are to ensure the congruence
of exports with the foreign policy and national security interests of the
United States.
The export control regime managed by the Department of Commerce
is derived from the Export Administration Act. And the purpose of that
is to promote the Commerce of the United States. And for that reason,
I believe that the licensing apparatus should be managed by the national
security apparatus because of the coupling of this technology to the, to
U.S. national security interests. And I think the arrangement that the
Department of State manages with interagency consultation where the office
with the most expertise, whether it's the Department of Defense or the
Department of Energy or whatever is the one that dominates the licensing
decision. And I think that is an acceptable way of managing it and should
be continued.
COLLINS: So Dr. Schneider, you would disagree with the decision
that the Clinton Administration made to transfer the primary responsibility
from State to Commerce?
SCHNEIDER: Correct.
COLLINS: Thank you. Dr. Graham, I'm interested in the issue of
technology transfer that can happen in the event of a large failure. It's
been reported that a so-called black box contain encryption hardware is
missing from one of the satellites launched unsuccessfully by China, one
of the ones that presumably blew up. The New York Times has reported that
similar devices are used to communicate with American spy satellites, and
that the Pentagon and intelligence agencies were concerned that anyone
who could crack the code could take control of the satellites themselves.
Now the National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger has dismissed
technology transfer concerns on the grounds that China had no access to
the technology in U.S. satellites because such devices are sealed into
a container that's not opened until the satellite actually leaves the booster
in space. But isn't there a danger in the event of a failure that there
would be unexpected access to technology, to very sensitive technology?
GRAHAM: Yes there is, Senator Collins. I am not familiar with
the details of this particular satellite and its encoding devices. But
it's common to provide some degree of encryption in what is called the
telemetry command and control or housekeeping system for the satellite
so that unauthorized users can't come in disorient or otherwise cause the
satellite to malfunction, once it's on orbit.
GRAHAM: You basically protect yourself against rogue data
streams coming into the satellite. That is impart embedded into the hardware
in the satellite and in part in the software. That hardware will be placed
inside black boxes in the satellite and should the satellite and booster
fail on the way to orbit those black boxes will be scattered over the landscape
or the seascape, depending on where it comes down, and are available for
whoever finds them first.
And while they will tend to be rather damaged looking from the
outside, my experience with such failures is that you can learn a great
deal by taking them apart and basically reverse engineering them.
COLLINS: Mr. Pike do you share the concerns expressed by the
Pentagon and intelligence agencies and Dr. Graham about the access that
could occur in the event that a satellite blows up?
PIKE: Well this is obviously dependent on technical details. It
can't be discussed in an unclassified forum. I mean I think that it's
certainly safe to say that for instance in the immediate aftermath of the
Challenger accident one of the very highest priorities that the United
States government had was not recovering the bodies of the astronauts but
was rather recovering the cryptographic support materials that were on
the communications satellite carried by the shuttle.
Now the cryptologic systems used by American military satellites
are obviously of a different type and at different standard than those
used on commercial satellites, however, obviously commercial satellite
operators have an interest in making sure that backyard enthusiasts can't
commandeer the satellite, have their own pirate television stations, as
was done before these cryptographic systems were implemented in the early
1980's.
At the same time normally these systems are embedded in chips
that have been hardened to make it extremely difficult to open the packaging
of the chip without completely destroying the underlying chip, and even
having access to the cryptosystems electronics hardware might enable you
to replicate that type of hardware, but it is not going to give you the
keys to getting access to enable you to commandeer a commercial satellite
and certainly not a military satellite. Now of course the United States
has been trying to get other countries to implement these type chip based
cryptologic systems to make it easier for the national security agency
to read their communications. So the notion that the Chinese are going
to be trying to replicate a cryptographic system whose chief virtue is
that it's certified to be readable by the National Security Agency is not
something I'm terribly worried about. I don't think they'd want to do
that.
COLLINS: Dr. Schneider do you have a concern in this area?
SCHNEIDER: Yes, I think it logically follows if the public
policy was to protect the access to the contents of the satellite before
it went on, then it follows that if the satellite should be destroyed and
the contents accessible to unauthorized parties that it would be a concern
of the United States.
COLLINS: It seems that it would be to me also. Thank you Mr.
Chairman.
COCHRAN: Thank you Senator Collins. Dr. Schneider in your
capacity as undersecretary of state you had a responsibility for supervising
this munitions list that we've talked about. And you've served in that
capacity for how long?
SCHNEIDER: Four years sir.
COCHRAN: And now I understand you are chairman of the State
Department's Defense Trade Advisory Group. Is that correct?
SCHNEIDER: That's correct Mr. Chairman.
COCHRAN: Can you tell us based on your experience in these
positions if there is a substantial difference between a technical assistance
agreement that was required when a munition list item was to be sold or
transferred and the current policy in this administration.
COCHRAN: And if there is a difference what is that difference
and what was the reason for the technical assistance agreement?
SCHNEIDER: You mean the difference between a TAA and the State
Department and the Commerce Department?
COCHRAN: Yes, the current license or...
SCHNEIDER: OK. A technical assistance agreement is required
under a munitions license anytime you transfer technical data that is not
in the public domain. This can be classified or unclassified. It requires
this review, and the review is extremely thorough and very few licenses
are issued without what are called provisos which are further restrictions
on how the technical data can be transferred.
And it has a high order of rigor because the technical data is
often the key to understanding the performance of the system. Because
of the differing philosophies between the two export control regimes, the
Commerce Department normally doesn't license technical data, in some cases
they do, but it's not a primary feature of Commerce Department licenses
because of the philosophy of the export control. They are mainly transferring
the functionality of the system, and don't seek, in most cases, to control
the transfers of the technical data per se.
COCHRAN: There is a list that I have been given of 14 categories
of technical data, and I'm advised that these relate to missile launch
activities or characteristics or components. I'm given a copy, ask the
staff to give a copy to each witness and each Senator, and I will also
ask that a copy be made a part of the record.
Now I'm wondering if you can tell us if these technical data
categories would have been included in a required technical assistance
agreement as part of a license if the transfer of commercial satellites
were still a munitions list item?
SCHNEIDER: Yes they would and there would be additional ones to
that.
COCHRAN: Can you tell us what the significance of these
technical data items would be in terms of technology transfers that could
be harmful to the United States if in the hands of the wrong country?
SCHNEIDER: Each of the items on this list pertains to matters
relating to the integration of the payload to the booster, and that's why
they would be considered categories that the applicant would have
to provide if it was a Department of State munitions license. And they
would have to, in addition to providing the information, the license would
specify exactly what form fit and function data could be transferred, and
frequently they will say in addition what cannot be transferred. And the
applicants are required to do a substantial amount of record keeping and
recording and so forth relating to the implementation of that license.
COCHRAN: And as I understand it the Commerce Department's
control list and it's licensing requirements and rules don't include any
such technical data categories or specific authority to discuss technical
data. Is that correct?
SCHNEIDER: It's -- in the case of the arrangements that were
made during the transfer of the commodity jurisdiction the Department of
Commerce has undertaken a higher order of review than is the case normally
in Department of Commerce licenses with respect to the transfer of satellite
systems. And as Senator Levin mentioned the Commerce Department leads
an inter agency process that undertakes reviews that can't cover this particular
material.
SCHNEIDER: As I mentioned, I'm not intimate with the details of
how the interagency process is being conducted, so I can't really comment
as to whether they take each of these items in detail, but it's the fact
that they have an expanded would certainly give the agencies the authority
to comment on these issues if they chose to do so.
COCHRAN: I understand that some companies despite the absence of
a requirement to do so, are continuing to go to the State Department to
obtain -- what amounts to -- a technical assistance agreement, TAA license,
is that your understanding, and if...
SCHNEIDER: Yes, I have heard that and that may be for applicants
who previously had export licenses issued by the Department of State and
are following up on that. I don't have any specific knowledge of why they've
chosen to do that.
COCHRAN: Based on all of these facts that you have given us, is
it fair to conclude that export control requirements on commercial satellites
have become less stringent since being moved from the munition list to
the commerce control list?
SCHNEIDER?: I believe that's the case.
COCHRAN: On October 8, last year, the manager for export
compliance at the Hughes Space and Communication's company wrote a letter
to the Commerce Department seeking guidance on whether the technical of
data I mentioned -- these 14 categories of technical data -- requires an
export license and I understand the Commerce Department has not replied
to that letter -- over seven and a half months ago.
Even though for the first 10 categories, the official with Hughes
wrote and I quote, "We believe that this data is classified as EAR-99 exportable
under commerce license exception NLR" unquote, and I'll ask that this letter
be made a part of the record and a copy provided and also note that the
commerce license exception NLR stands for, I think, no license required.
For the last four categories, the Hughes official wrote, and I
quote, "Since there is some difference of opinion as to what event triggers
the ability to utilize a Commerce Department license exception, please
clarify conditions under which the exception is applicable," end of quote.
What is your reaction to that in terms of the Defense Department
memorandum that we earlier talked about that mentioned transferring jurisdiction
of this data -- these 14 categories to commerce and
commerce handling it -- how important do you consider the licensing oversight
of technical information transfer under these circumstances to be?
SCHNEIDER: I think it's very important if the technology is
pertinent to matters relating to national defense. I think for items that
are not so required that it would constitute a burden on commerce.
COCHRAN: Dr. Graham, you have in front of you this list that I
refer to that was included in the Hughes letter. What is your opinion
about whether we should be concerned that one of the major air space companies
is operating on the impression that 10 of these 14 categories requires
no technical assistance license? -- or for that matter any license -- and
that for the last four categories -- clarification of administration's
policy is necessary.
GRAHAM: Well Mr. Chairman, these are just categories, of course,
but in looking at them I would be very concerned that there -- if there
were an unconstrained dialogue or cooperative engineering work that was
performed even seemingly simple looking ones like mass involve far more
than just how heavy the satellite is -- there -- the distribution of the
mass that concentricity of the mass, the moments that it provides to the
missile are very important in the -- not just the weight but also how it
effects the dynamic response of the missile of -- rather the space launch
vehicle satellite system and that is picked up in item five again, dynamic
environmental.
When you get into a dynamic analysis of the space launch vehicle
and it's satellite, here again, I believe it would be virtually impossible
for an American engineer to look at a space launch vehicle satellite combination,
observe some kind of a serious problem, or perhaps even critical flaw in
the space launch vehicle and go ahead and let the satellite be launched
on that with a high degree of knowledge that it might not reach orbit without
saying something about it, of course correcting flaws in either the structural,
electrical or other elements of the system are also directly applicable
to both liquid and sold ICBM systems.
Telemetry is another component of that. tells you how well it's
working on its way to orbit and tells you what problems it's having, if
any, so I think each of the elements on these lists warrant further exploration,
but some of them are just clear areas of potential technology transfer
that would be adverse to the U.S.
COHCRAN: And it seems if I'm concluding correctly from the
Hughes letter, that they believe this data is exportable under the commerce
license rules and according to what I understand from you and Dr. Schneider,
these are items and technical data items that could very well be employed
by the recipient country -- in a militarily useful way -- it could endanger
our national security, is that correct?
SCHNEIDER: Yes, if these items are transferred and are applied
to military purposes, yes they could be.
COCHRAN: And how does that compare with the State Department
notice about the transfer of these munition list items to commerce licensing
regime and then the statement that enhance regulations have been developed
and agreed upon and individual validation license will be required for
all destinations, etcetera, and obviously Hughes and others had copies
of these regulations and then for them to be able to conclude no license
are required for 10 of these items, didn't seem to me that these are enhanced
regulations, these are much more relaxed regulations -- is that the conclusion
that you come to as well?
SCHNEIDER: The process that was set up under the Department of
State notification could produce the same result and I haven't, say, audited
the process to see if how it's actually working, but if the situation spends
out as you describe it, it could produce unintended transfers of technology
that's pertinent to military purposes.
COCHRAN: Thank you.
PIKE: That is not self evident from this ...
COCHRAN: Mr. Pike, I didn't ask you. I'll ask you a question a
later. Senator Levin.
LEVIN: Thank you. Relative to the shift from state to commerce,
this occurred after 17 licenses were issued for transfer to -- for a launch
in China, is that correct?
SCHNEIDER: That's correct.
LEVIN: So the vast majority, including the one that blew up, was
on the munition's list.
SCHNEIDER: Correct.
LEVIN: Then when the transfer was made with the last three,
Congress had an opportunity for 30 days for someone to fill a bill or someone
to object -- I don't know of any effort on the part of Congress or anyone
in Congress to object to that transfer -- so none of our witnesses seem
to know of any effort at that point either, but there's another point and
that is that when we come to China, it is the same process in terms of
a presidential waiver whether or not you had a State Department or a Commerce
Department issuing the license.
Now again with the vast majority since '88, since president
Reagan started down this road -- and the vast majority, 17 out of 20 --
it was a State Department -- that means the munitions list issue and they
all got approved, but in all 20 of the 20, there was a presidential waiver,
but you involved the National Security Council recommendation to the president.
Now, do any of you know relative to that National Security
Counsel recommendation, that occurred with all 20 of these -- it gets us
a little closer to your point, it seems to me Dr. Graham, about getting
the DOD involved in this, because I think that is a critical issue -- relative
to that National Security Council recommendation to a president -- be it
president Bush or president Clinton -- is, was that process in those 20
instances any different, whether or not the State Department started down
the licensing road in 17 of the 20 or the Commerce Department started down
the road.
Do you know of any differences in that waiver review, which
involves the national security council -- do you know of any differences
Dr. Schneider? -- in that review process?
SCHNEIDER: No, the waiver is a separate process from the
analysis of the transfer itself.
LEVIN: All right. Do you know -- are you familiar with that
process?
SCHNEIDER: Not in detail. I only -- in the structure that you
described -- I have heard of before.
LEVIN: Do you know of any difference in the national security
council involvement in this waiver process, be it under the first 17 whether
it was State Department or the last three under Congress.
PIKE: There was certainly important differences in terms of the
policy objectives that were solved and granting the waivers, because
we have not been granting these waivers simply because American satellite
companies wanted to fly on Chinese launch vehicles. This has been part
of our non proliferation policy with respect to China.
On several occasions, we have withheld these pending resolution
on non proliferation concerns with the Chinese and they were all then brought
forward once the Chinese had made representations that were satisfactory
at the concerns that would have been raised, but apart from that very
important policy difference, which I think highlights a lot of why we have
been doing this procedurally, I think there was approximately the same
(ph).
LEVIN: As far as you know, the procedure used with a
presidential waiver ...
PIKE: Essentially, to the first ...
LEVIN: As far as you know is the same whether it's State
Department or Commerce Department. Do you know Dr. Graham?
GRAHAM: Senator, I haven't followed this process since I left
the government, so I don't know either way.
LEVIN: Alright. There are some differences between State
Department and Commerce Department -- there's not doubt about it -- and
items are shifted by the way, from one list to another, with notice to
Congress, and there are differences. But in the case of China, when we're
talking about satellites, you have a totally different track -- whether
it starts up here at the State Department, which it did 17 out of 20 or
up here, the last three with Commerce.
LEVIN: It then gets into a single track which goes through a
process, interagency process and then a recommendation from the National
Security Council to the president. DOD is deeply involved as it should
be in that track by the way. But I think it's important that we know the
difference between Commerce and State, I think that's a very relevant issue.
But it's not nearly as relevant, and indeed may be totally irrelevant
relative to these particular transfers.
Because in the case of China with the satellites they all go
through this presidential review process involving the National Security
Council. And I think Mr. Chairman that it would be very useful for us
to have somebody either answer for the record or somehow or other tell
us whether or not there is any difference in that National Security Council
process dependent on whether or not it started off on the State Department
track or on the Commerce Department track.
I don't believe there is, if there isn't it seems to me relative
at least to the satellite issue that this distinction between State and
Commerce is not relevant.
It is a relevant distinction for a whole lot of other issues, but
when it comes to the issue of export or transfer to China of satellites
it's not relevant, if the key issue is a presidential waiver, made on recommendation
of the National Security Council no matter whether or not the initial review
started in State with that munitions list or started in Commerce with it's
own list.
So Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for the record from the
National Security Council whether or not their process of review for a
presidential waiver purpose is any different dependent on whether or not
that process was initiated, the licensing process began with State or with
Commerce. If we could do that for the record, I'd be ...
COCHRAN: Yes, I suggest we draft a letter, you and I sign it and
we send it to them and ask them for a response for our record.
LEVIN: Thank -- one last question. A number of other countries
apparently, allegedly do not treat civilian satellites on their comparable
munitions list, or as munitions. Is that correct Dr. Schneider?
SCHNEIDER: Yes that's correct Mr. Chairman and I think that's
been one of the frustrations that has lead to the change in commodity jurisdiction,
that the U.S., I believe, is the only producer of satellite that had maintained
satellites on the munitions list.
LEVIN: Could you -- we were the only producer of commercial
satellites which at one point had them on a munitions list?
SCHNEIDER: That's correct.
LEVIN: And the other countries that produced satellites did not?
SCHNEIDER: Did not. Yes. And I think that, as I said, that's
one of those things that stimulated the efforts to move it from the munitions
list to the Commerce list.
LEVIN: Thank you so much. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
COCHRAN: Thank you. Senator Thompson.
THOMPSON: Thank you very much. I think we still have a bit to
understand about the distinction between the waiver process and the license
process. By the time a waiver gets down the department I would assume
they would know what their boss, the President of the United States, would
want, and I think that some might assume that the review process would
be just a rigorous under those circumstances as if they were on the munitions
list for example, I question that.
But let me as you about -- reference has been made to the
explosion that happened in February of '96, $200 million satellite apparently,
Hughes-Loral. There was an investigation conducted, in a sense cause some
controversy as to whether or not sensitive information was given to the
Chinese pursuant to that investigation.
THOMPSON: Gentlemen, are you generally familiar with that
situation? And what can you do to enlighten us with regard to what happened
and what the potential problems are there? Let me tell you what my understanding
is and then you can correct me or fill in to the extent that you can.
My understanding is that after that explosion Hughes-Loral did an
investigation and prepared a report. And determined apparently that it
was the guidance system that was essentially the problem. And there was
a question raised as to whether or not that information should have been
given to the Chinese and, I think even the Hughes- Loral people voluntarily,
I think the phrase was used, turned themselves in. Whether or not that's
a correct phrase or not.
And I've also read where the Department of Defense has determined
that national security was harmed by this. What do you know about the
instance and what is the significance? Dr. Graham?
GRAHAM: Senator Thompson, let me address just what I've seen in
the press about it. I've seen statements that in fact the Defense Department
as you said, have judged that arising from the review of the launch failure
with Loral, in cooperation with the Chinese that information was transferred
by Loral to the Chinese which would benefit their construction and operation
of both space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles in the future. I
have not seen any statements in the press which state that by the Defense
Department or by any other government agency that contradicts that conclusion.
I'm afraid I have to leave it there in this particular forum.
THOMPSON: As far as what happened -- the facts, Dr. Schneider
can you elaborate on that in anyway?
SCHNEIDER: I read the same material and that's my understanding
of what took place. And from a regulatory perspective, my presumption
is that transferring information about the guidance section would require
a separate license. And if that is indeed what happened, then that activity
would of course need to be licensed for authorization.
THOMPSON: Is this one of the kinds of problems that just arise
in these sorts of things? I mean it stands to reason that you put up a
$200 million satellite, and it's destroyed, you want to tell the people
who going to put the next one up, maybe what went wrong. And therein lies
the inherent problem, I suppose.
What about with regard to the May launch of the Motorola
satellites? Are you familiar with, my understanding is they were using
dispensing technology. Can you describe dispensing technology and how
that is used commercially? What purpose it serves?
SCHNEIDER?: Yes, the Motorola launch, I believe was for one of
the sets of irridium (ph) satellites that will form a low altitude or low
orbit constellation of basically cellular telephone base stations. Each
of these satellites is relatively small, smaller than the payload of, of
certainly of the Long March or most other space launch vehicles. And therefore,
it's economical to put several of these satellites on the same space launch
vehicle and take them to orbit simultaneously. But of course, you don't
want to put them in exactly the same orbit.
SCHNEIDER?: You want to at least disburse them enough so that
they won't interfere with each other while they finish the maneuvers to
get to the final desired orbits that they're going to, and therefore you
have to be able to release them independently and allow them to follow
a preplanned orbit...
THOMPSON: It's been said -- it's been written that this is the
same thing as MIRV technology. Is that essentially correct in your opinion?
SCHNEIDER: This is very similar to MIRV technology.
THOMPSON: Now Mr. Pike, he can speak for himself, but I
understand Mr. Pike your point was that with regard to the commercial satellites
they dispensed the satellites more slowly than in a military situation.
PIKE: That's correct.
THOMPSON: Which is a rapid dispensing.
PIKE: An ICBM basically has about half an hour from launch to
impact. The MIRV busing phase typically you're only looking at about ten
minutes or so. I'm not familiar with precise deployment sequence in the
case of Motorola irridium (ph), but in the case of U.S. intelligence community
satellites where you have multiple deployments, those typically take place
over a period of several days.
I think that the Motorola people were able to go to the Chinese
with some confidence that they would succeed in this regard because the
Chinese had demonstrated a multiple launch capability off a single launch
vehicle, the ability to deploy several satellites on a single launch vehicle
about two decades ago, so there was nothing particularly novel or in my
view immediately militarily significant in the irridium (ph) launch.
THOMPSON: Well what -- doing something and how you do it are two
different things and then perfecting it I think would be also, but I assume
that that leads you to the conclusion that it's not that big a problem
if we can enhance the Chinese capability to use this dispensing technology
because that transfer from the commercial the military is, I assume in
your opinion, not significant as a lot of other people think it might be.
Dr. Graham what's your response to that?
GRAHAM: Well I think it can be quite significant. In the first
place we need to look at the time lines on the irridium (ph)
deployment, but in fact with ICBM's we do some final maneuvering much as
we do with satellites when we insert independent reentry vehicles in independently
targeted reentry vehicles. The device on the ICBM's is usually called
the bus. It moves the satellites around in space and velocity until it
has them on the right line to the target and then releases it.
A similar process is done with the space launch satellites. In
fact, if anything the time lines for the space launch are longer but in
fact can be the same for the ICBM without damage to the space launch, it
just depends on how you want to go about doing it.
THOMPSON: So you don't think that difference in timing is that
significant?
GRAHAM: No Senator.
THOMPSON: That's all I have Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
COCHRAN: During my last questions of the witnesses I mentioned a
letter from Hughes Space and Communications Company. I'm going to make
that letter a part of the record which included the 14 categories of technical
data, it was the subject of their inquiry about whether or not license
was required, permit required in those instances, and a copy will be made
available to all Senators as well.
One other characteristic of the policy that you administered Dr.
Schneider at the Department of State was that a Department of Defense monitor,
a person who would observe discussions and transfer of data was required
a part of the process and procedure.
COCHRAN: What is in your view the importance of having that
monitor involved in the process, and does the absence of such a monitor
now under current policy present any particular problems for our national
security?
SCHNEIDER: Well, the incorporation of provisions for a
Department of Defense monitor occurred subsequent to my departure from
the government. But during my service on China exports, there were several
cases where there was a requirement for a U.S. monitor. And the general
purpose of this is to assure compliance with the terms of the license,
that the license was implemented by the specific end user identified in
the license. And for the purposes identified in the license.
The monitor would also prevent or is designed to monitor efforts
to divert the product transferred to an end use that was not specified
in the license. And the absence of a monitor then creates a compliance
issue as to whether or not compliance can be monitored by other means.
COCHRAN: But do you think the lack of a requirement under
current regulations for the president's Department of Defense monitors
to be a weakness in the current policy?
SCHNEIDER: Well, if they don't have any other means of
monitoring compliance, then there could be some difficulty. And I haven't
seen the details of the licenses as to whether they have, perhaps other
U.S. government officials other than the Department of Defense doing the
monitoring or some other means to sustain compliance. But, if they have
no one monitoring it, then there presumably is no other way to assure compliance.
COCHRAN: Dr. Graham, when we were preparing for the hearing, we
learned that there was an impending Chinese launch scheduled of a Lockheed
Martin China Star No. 1 (ph) satellite. The China Star I (ph) license
was granted in 1996, and according to Lockheed Martin officials, the license
required no Department of Defense monitor for any phase of the export.
We were told that Lockheed Martin requested the monitors despite the absence
of a licensing requirement.
My question is by not having Department of Defense monitors
present at these meetings between the satellite builder or vendor and the
Chinese launch team officials, does this increase the risk in your opinion
of technology transfer and intangible know how transfer that could be militarily
useful to the Chinese?
GRAHAM: I believe it does Senator Cochran. As you know, I'm not
in favor of this process in any of its forms. This would be an effort
to mitigate the damage done to the U.S. by adverse technical transfer to
the Chinese. And it could have some of that effect if there were a set
of clear terms of reference, guidelines and constraints imposed on the
contractor before the discussions began. The government monitors or chaperons
were competent to know when those terms were being observed and when they
were being violated. And it would also provide the opportunity for the
contractor to hold side discussions on issues before materials presented
to the Chinese. Once you have said something or given some material, it
doesn't come back.
GRAHAM: So, it's a very irrevocable act. So, while I would not
encourage any of this type of technological interchange or transfer, if
it's going to be done, I think having the strongest possible chaperons
present would be in the U.S. interest.
COCHRAN: Mr. Graham, Dr. Graham would it surprise you if an
engineer or scientist were to identify a problem as suggest how it could
be fixed in the case of a launch vehicle, give the financial situation
and the risk of a loss of an expensive satellite, is it your view that
these kinds of temptations under the current situation are too great to
overcome and to stand and remain silent while a launch is about to take
place that might very well be risky or destined to fail, and not point
out some deficiency?
GRAHAM: Well the economic issues certainly drive the process
toward tech transfer, but even beyond that engineers are trained and practiced
all their lives to find problems, point them out and fix them. So it would
surprise me only if the engineer did not do something to try to rectify
the problem once he saw it.
COCHRAN: There have been many low earth orbit communication
satellite constellations deployed or planned for the future and are driving
the demand by U.S. satellite manufacturers for foreign launch services.
What needs to be done, in your opinion to keep these launches or at least
more of them within the United States? Do we not have the launch capability
here to handle the volume of launches that are in demand now by the communication
companies, and if we don't what should we consider doing about it?
GRAHAM: Senator Cochran in the early 1960's we built a thousand
Minutemen missiles in something on the order of six years. It is inconceivable
that the industrial base of the U.S. couldn't provide adequate launch systems
for all the satellites that the U.S. builds. I believe this is basically
an economic issue where satellite owners and builders are attempting to
take advantage of the prices that these non-market economies such as China
are willing to provide, and to receive in term the recognition of their
ballistic missile and satellite capability, the technology they'll get
from it, and the western hard currency to sustain their rocket infrastructure.
But the U.S. could certainly do this without any difficulty.
COCHRAN: Dr. Schneider one aerospace executive told us, as we
were preparing for the hearing, that he views the DOD monitors that you
and I were talking about as important because companies tend to view their
foreign launch service providers as customers. Hence when the customer
wants something you want to try to help him out. And U.S. companies try
to respond in a way that establishes a good relationship for future business
dealings.
Do you think this attitude is prevalent or a problem among
American satellite manufacturers, and what, if anything, can be done to
prevent it from making technology transfer common place?
SCHNEIDER: Well I don't think there's necessarily a conflict
because in the case of munitions list, transfers of says convention munitions
to conventional arms to allies in abroad, the ally abroad is of course
a customer as well, but the terms of the license restrict the U.S. vendor
from transferring information.
And my own experience in the Department of State is that the
vendor community was very familiar with these restrictions and would inform
the customer that they cannot give them information of a specific type
because it was proscribed by the terms of the license.
SCHNEIDER: And so I think in -- because this practice generally
works pretty well, there is not a normal requirement for a Department of
Defense monitor to be associated with all munitions lists transfers. The
licensees enforce the transfers themselves, because there are indeed draconian
penalties for failure to do so.
COCHRAN: Thank you very much, Dr. Schneider. Senator Levin.
LEVIN: I withhold any additional questions for the record.
Thank you very much and thanks to these witnesses.
COCHRAN: Senator Thompson.
THOMPSON: Just a -- just one more observation. It occurs to me
that -- and I certainly want to understand more about this process myself.
With waiver, it first must be obtained for these satellites, and the question
of whether or not will we have a national security process to go through
are the same regardless.
You know, we saw the administration's national security process
at work. Secretary Christopher convened an interagency group consisting
of the Department of Defense, State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Commerce, CIA, NSA, and the entire intelligence community. And
it was overridden on the recommendation of Ron Brown.
So that's the process that we saw work in one instance, in terms
of the -- of the waiver and I wonder too if the waiver process for an item
that is not on the munitions list is as stringent as it would be if the
item were on the munitions list, then why take it off the munitions list
to start with?
That is -- I think it implies less to China than perhaps to other
markets. That the munitions list treatment of any item is imposes a greater
burden on the exporter than does the Commerce Department license. And
I think that has been what is driven people to seek the commodity jurisdiction
transfer to the Department of Commerce. But, because of the special circumstances
of China, there has been this process of approving a waiver after the licensing
activity's been undertaken by the inter agency process.
And that is the device that's intended to assure compliance with
the U.S. national security objectives. And -- if the administration is
set up a system where the president gets to make the -- the final call
that's all that can be done, I believe.
THOMPSON: That's all I have.
LEVIN: Mr. Chairman, can I just briefly comment ...
COCHRAN: Certainly, Senator Levin.
LEVIN: My understanding is that the Ron Brown references was not
to a waiver situation, but was to a transfer from the munitions list issue.
That the State Department approved every single one of the waivers. But,
that's the kind of factual determination we can make when that answer comes
from the record. But I don't believe that the Ron Brown position related
to a waiver at all. It related to a transfer from munitions list to the
Commerce Department list, which he of course was fighting for.
I'll repeat that I believe that every single one of those waivers
was approved by the State Department.
COCHRAN: I should have done this at the beginning of the
hearing, but I hope you'll forgive me for omitting this, but for the record,
could you state your professional training and qualifications and education,
Dr. Graham, and Mr. Pike, and Dr. Schneider?
GRAHAM: Mr. Chairman, I have a bachelors degree in physics and a
Ph.D in electrical engineering. I've served as an Air Force project officer,
working at the Air Force weapons lab and working on, among other things,
the Minuteman Two and Three Missile Systems, the Polaris and Poseidon Sea
Launch Ballistic Missile Systems, and subsequent working, after I left
the Air Force and have generally been involved with ballistic missile programs
for about 35 years.
I've also serving as the Deputy Administrator of NASA, was
involved in trying to resurrect the space launch capability -- the unmanned
space launch vehicle capability of the U.S. Those are my primary involvements
with this particular area.
COCHRAN: Thank you. Mr. Pike.
PIKE: I fear my involvement slightly less illustrious than my
colleagues here.
PIKE: I've been director of the Space Policy Project at the
Federation of American Scientists for the last 15 years. I've done consulting
work with NASA, the United Nations and I'm a fellow of the British Interplanetary
Society.
C0CHRAN: What is your educational experience?
PIKE: I attended Vanderbilt in Nashville, Tennessee as an
undergraduate.
COCHRAN: As an undergraduate? Dr. Schneider.
SCHNEIDER: Mr. Chairman I'm an economist, a Ph.D from New York
University, I have worked for 16 years in the federal government including
four years in the Department of State dealing with matters pertaining to
export control, and subsequent to my departure from the Department of State
I served as chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control
and Disarmament and have monitored the export control system throughout
my career.
THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman if I may comment just very briefly.
While it is true, the instance I mentioned was not a waiver, it had to
do with something much more significant that a waiver, it had to do with
the entire transfer of the entire process, and it had to do with a national
security process which I think is instructive when we consider the process
they may be going through with regard to any individual waiver. Thank
you very much.
COCHRAN: This has been a very interesting and I think productive
hearing for our committee, and I appreciate very much the attendance of
the witnesses and the Senators for participating. I think we've learned
first that there can't be any question about the potential military utility
of commercial satellite launches for ballistic missile and satellite programs.
And when commercial satellites received export licenses from the
State Departments munition list, a license was necessary for technical
data that was shared with China and others, and DOD monitors were required
to be present in all meetings and launch activities. Third, since commercial
satellites were moved to the Commerce control list the requirement for
a license to share technical information is at best ambiguous, with some
companies proceeding with them, and some without them.
Furthermore the requirements for a DOD technical monitor is also
ambiguous with some companies requesting monitors on their own volition
and other companies proceeding without them. This sounds to
me like a situation where militarily significant technology transfer can
occur, and probably has occurred. It a situation at odds with the administration's
September '96 representation to the Congress that enhanced regulations
have been developed and agreed upon by the interested departments that
would provide for both national security and foreign policy controls under
the Export Administration Act for commercial satellites.
It's hard to understand why the administration has failed to
respond to a request seven and a half months ago from the Hughes Corporation
for clarification of the current regulations. I think it's clear the administration's
export control policy for commercial satellites isn't doing a good enough
job of reducing risks to American security.
We will continue to explore this issue. Our subcommittee will
have another hearing on this subject in June at a date that we will announce
later. We will invite the Commerce Department to testify and explain why
it worked so hard to gain control of export licensing for commercial satellites,
but has done little to control their exports since gaining the authority
to do so.
We will likely invite some of the aerospace companies as well to
send representatives to discuss the licensing process, until then the subcommittee
will stand in recess.
END
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