EXCERPTS - Ballistic Missile Defense
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 105-132
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
----------
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 1119
together with
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
June 16, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
One Hundred Fifth Congress
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona RONALD V. DELLUMS, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah Carolina
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey LANE EVANS, Illinois
STEVE BUYER, Indiana GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JAMES TALENT, Missouri ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama JANE HARMAN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania
HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
RON LEWIS, Kentucky ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JIM TURNER, Texas
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee F. ALLEN BOYD, Jr., Florida
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
Carolina JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
SONNY BONO, California CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
JIM RYUN, Kansas
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey
BOB RILEY, Alabama
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION.................. 19
TITLE I--PROCUREMENT............................................. 19
Weapons Procurement, Navy.................................... 66
Items of Special Interest.................................. 70
Other Procurement, Navy...................................... 81
Items of Special Interest.................................. 91
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force.............................. 101
Items of Special Interest.................................. 106
TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION............ 140
OVERVIEW....................................................... 140
Army RDT&E-.................................................. 142
Items Of Special Interest.................................. 151
Navy RDT&E................................................... 164
Items Of Special Interest.................................. 174
Air Force RDT&E.............................................. 202
Items Of Special Interest.................................. 211
Defense Agencies RDT&E....................................... 216
Items Of Special Interest.................................. 225
Subtitle C--Ballistic Missile Defense Programs............... 258
Section 231--Budgetary Treatment of Amount Requested for
Procurement for Ballistic Missile Defense Programs....... 258
Section 232--Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense Programs 258
Section 233--Deployment Dates for Core Theater Missile
Defense Programs......................................... 258
Section 234--Annual Report on Threat Posed to the United
States by Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ballistic
Missiles, and Cruise Missiles............................ 260
Section 235--Director of Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO)...................................... 260
Section 236--Tactical High Energy Laser Program (THEL)..... 261
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 105-132
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
_______
June 16, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
TITLE I--PROCUREMENT
.............
Weapons Procurement, Navy
Overview
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
Standard Missile (SM)-2 Block IIIB medium range (MR) modification kits
The budget request contained $35.6 million for 80 SM-2
Block IIIB MR modification kits.
The SM is the Navy's primary surface-to-air weapon against
hostile aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles. The latest MR
version to enter production, SM-2 Block IIIB, retains the full
performance of earlier models and adds improvements against
electronic countermeasures. However, the current SM inventory
is dominated by older versions that are less capable against
modern anti-ship weapons and ineffective against some newer
threat missiles.
Even though the Navy plans to supplement its new missile
production by upgrading older missiles to the Block IIIB
configuration, its projected Block IIIB inventories at the turn
of the century will still fall significantly short of the
quantity required to meet deployment inventories. Accordingly,
the committee recommends an increase of $33.0 million to
procure an additional 80 SM-2 Block IIIB MR modification kits.
This action will allow the Navy to field more of the latest-
version missiles and reduce the need to ``cross deck'' the
missiles between deploying and returning ships.
.............
Other Procurement, Navy
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
Cooperative engagement capability (CEC)
The budget request did not contain funding for CEC.
The CEC significantly improves anti-air warfare (AAW)
capability by integrating all battle group component AAW sensor
information into a single, real-time depiction that allows one
platform to target and engage a hostile air threat with
information from another. CEC distributes sensor data from any
ship or aircraft in the battle group to all others through a
real-time, line-of-sight, high-data-rate distribution network.
The committee notes that the Chief of Naval Operations has
identified CEC as one of the top three fiscal year 1998
unfunded procurement priorities. Therefore, the committee
recommends $114.8 million to restore the Navy's CEC fielding
plan by procuring and installing CEC shipsets for two aircraft
carrier battle groups.
.............
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
Theater Airborne Warning System (TAWS)
The budget request contained $67.1 million for defense
airborne reconnaissance program modifications, but did not
contain funding for TAWS, a medium-wave infrared (MWIR) sensor
system capable of detecting and calculating the launch points
of tactical ballistic missiles. TAWS is currently deployed on
the Cobra Ball RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft.
In the statement of the managers accompanying the
conference report on H.R. 3230 (H. Rept. 104-724), the
conferees urged the Air Force to proceed with a program to
install TAWS on the Rivet Joint RC-135 aircraft, which is
available in greater numbers than the Cobra Ball. Such a
program would provide an option for early deployment of TAWS in
support of improved theater ballistic missile defenses.
However, the Department has opted instead to install this
capability on the Airborne Laser (ABL).
The committee understands that the ABL is not scheduled to
reach initial operational capability until 2003. The long
intervening period during which TAWS would remain only on the
very few Cobra Ball aircraft would not meet the near-term need
for a theater ballistic missile analysis and warning
capability. Furthermore, the Air Force plans to acquire no more
than seven ABL aircraft, a force structure too small to assure
that TAWS would be available when and where needed.
The committee believes this important mission is best
satisfied by a reconnaissance aircraft. Therefore, the
committee recommends an increase of $20.0 million to migrate
the MWIR TAWS technology from the Cobra Ball RC-135 to the
Rivet Joint RC-135 to enhance near-term deployment flexibility.
.............
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations
.............
TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
.............
Army RDT&E
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
Missile/air defense product improvement
The budget request contained $17.4 million for missile/air
defense product improvement within PE 23801A. The Patriot
system, which provided vital air defense during Operation
Desert Storm, is being upgraded through enhanced communications
and other system improvements to respond to the evolving air
and cruise missile threat. The committee is also aware of
efforts to develop block II modifications to the Stinger
Missile to provide enhanced performance. The committee supports
continuation of these initiatives and recommends $34.1 million,
an increase of $10.0 million for Patriot PAC-3 missile upgrades
and an increase of $6.7 million for Stinger block II
modifications. The Secretary of the Army may use existing PAC-3
missiles from inventory to support development of a cruise
missile defense capability.
.............
Missile defense battle integration center
The budget request contained $5.0 million for the battle
integration center (BIC). The Army is building a flexible
distributed interactive simulation-based architecture which can
operate in regimes of training, exercises and military
operations, as well as providing support to advanced concept
development. The committee understands that this effort has
been identified as an Army priority, yet it is insufficiently
funded. The committee recommends an increase of $14.0 million
in PE 63308A to continue development of the BIC as an
integrated battlelab with the capability to provide high
fidelity representation of the modern battlefield.
.............
Navy RDT&E
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
Cooperative engagement capability
The budget request contained $139.2 million in PE 63658N
for the cooperative engagement capability (CEC).
As reflected in the House report (H. Rept. 104-563) on H.R.
3230 and the statement of managers accompanying the conference
report on H.R. 3230 (H. Rept. 104-724), the Congresshas
recognized the CEC program as among the highest priority programs in
the Navy and the Department of Defense. In testimony during the defense
posture hearing on the fiscal year 1997 budget request, the Secretary
of Defense singled out the CEC as a program of high priority that he
had chosen to accelerate because of its great potential for linking
units from more than one service together and greatly increasing their
warfighting capability. The Congressional defense committees agreed
with the priority established by the Secretary and recommended
significant increases to the CEC program to accelerate the fielding of
the capability to the fleet and to accelerate and expand joint service
integration efforts.
The committee notes that the Navy's fiscal year 1998 budget
request for the CEC program is significantly less than
projected in the fiscal year 1997 Future Years Defense Plan and
budget justification, and results in a slip of over one year in
the fielding of the capability to fleet units. The committee
does not understand the Navy's failure to provide the funding
required to maintain the accelerated fielding schedule for a
program that has received such a high priority from the
Secretary of Defense and from the Congress. The committee
believes that the Navy has overemphasized programs for new
naval ``platforms'', at the expense of the warfighting weapons
systems that would make existing platforms more effective.
The committee recommends a total increase of $50.0 million
in PE 63658N for the CEC program: $15.0 million to continue the
accelerated development of the low cost common equipment set,
$5.0 million to support transfer of the CEC design and
development agent to industry, $20.0 million to accelerate
integration of the CEC into Navy E-2C and P-3 aircraft, $5.0
million to initiate development of an integrated capability
between CEC and the ship self defense program, and $5.0 million
to accelerate joint service integration and demonstration of
CEC with the Army's Patriot and the Marine Corps' Hawk air
defense missile systems.
.............
Integrated ship self defense test site
The budget request contained $132.3 million in PE 64755N
for the ship self defense program and $33.2 million in PE
64759N, Major Test & Evaluation Investment. No funds were
requested in either program element for the ship self defense
set and support equipment required to activate the Navy's
Integrated Ship Self Defense Engineering Center (ISDEC).
In 1991, the Navy received approval to construct a land-
based test facility at Wallops Island to integrate and test the
ship self defense system (SSDS) and its related equipment. The
decision was made after a comprehensive review of available
test sites and their ability to support the engineering
development, in-service engineering, training, testing, and
other initiatives associated with the SSDS. Construction of the
facility was completed in 1995. A December 1996 letter from the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations advised that ``program
reductions have resulted in delays of two or more years for the
procurement and installation of systems intended for ships and
insufficient funding to operate and maintain the Wallops Island
facility.''
In view of the priority assigned to the cooperative
engagement capability (CEC) and ship self defense programs, the
committee does not understand the inability of the Department
of the Navy to fund the installation of the required SSDS
equipment set and related equipment required to activate the
integrated SSDS test site. Such funding should have been an
integral part of the program plan when approval for
construction of the site was sought and given in 1991. The
Navy's inability to provide the required funding is even more
incomprehensible in view of the fact that the ship self defense
and CEC programs that will use the site have been among the
Navy's highest priority programs. These programs have been
funded at an average funding level of approximately $400.0
million annually since 1990, and have received significant
annual funding increases from Congress. By failing to budget
for the activation and operation of the ISDEC, the Navy has
severely restricted its ability to perform testing and lifetime
engineering support, in-service engineering, and engineering
initiatives related to the CEC and SSDS systems.
Accordingly the committee recommends an increase of $8.6
million in PE 64759N to purchase the SSDS and related equipment
required to activate the integrated land based test site at
Wallops Island. The Secretary of the Navy is also directed to
provide from available funds the $6.0 million that is required
to refurbish and install an AN/SPS-48E air search radar at the
site.
.............
Air Force RDT&E
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
Rocket system launch program
The budget request contained $8.0 million in PE 65860F for
the rocket system launch program (RSLP). The RSLP provides
research, development, test, and evaluation support to the
Department of Defense and other government agencies using
excess ballistic missile assets.
The committee continues to support the atmospheric
interceptor technology (AIT) program, a primary technology base
program within the Ballistic Missile Defense Office for
advanced hit-to-kill interceptor technologies. Flight tests are
needed in fiscal year 1998 for the AIT program to move ahead,
but funding for these tests was not included in the AIT or RSLP
budget requests. The committee understands that these flight
tests may use experimental Advanced Solid Axial Stages
boosters, the testing of which will help the RSLP program
better meet future requirements. The committee recommends $33.0
million for RSLP, an increase of $25.0 million, to support AIT
flight tests in fiscal year 1998.
.............
Defense Agencies RDT&E
.............
Ballistic missile defense
The budget request contained $2,589.1 million for research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), procurement, and
military construction of ballistic missile defense (BMD)
systems within the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO). The committee recommends changes to the request as
summarized below:
[In millions of dollars]
Support technologies(PE63173C)................................ $25.0
Navy Theater Wide (PE63868C).................................. 150.0
Navy Area Theater (PE64867C).................................. 22.0
THAAD (PE64861C).............................................. 45.0
National Missile Defense (PE63871C)........................... 474.0
Cooperative Programs (PE63XXXC)............................... 123.1
Joint Theater Missile Defense (PE63872C)...................... (18.7)
UAV BPI (PE63870C)............................................ (12.9)
Theater Missile Defense procurement........................... 384.6
A detailed explanation of the recommended changes are
provided below.
Cooperative programs
The budget request did not contain a separate program
element (PE) for cooperative ballistic missile defense (BMD)
programs. The committee continues to support cooperative
ballistic missile defense programs with U.S. allies.
The budget request for cooperative BMD programs with Israel
contained $38.7 million for the Arrow Continuation Experiments/
Arrow Deployability project (ACES/ADP) in PE 63872C, and $12.9
million for the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Boost Phase Intercept
(UAV BPI) program in PE 63870C. The Israeli commitment to
cooperative BMD development remains strong. The committee notes
the accomplishments achieved to date by the U.S.-Israeli ACES/
ADP project and recommends $48.7 million for the program, an
increase of $10.0 million. The committee believes that
additional funding will support efforts to deploy an Israeli
ballistic missile defense capability while also providing
valuable technological benefits to on-going U.S. TMD programs.
The budget request contained $16.5 million within PE 63308A
for the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program. The
committee is aware that the threat from tactical rockets and
missiles is growing, as such systems proliferate world-wide.
The U.S. and Israel are cooperating in an effort to respond to
this threat by developing a high energy laser that can destroy
tactical missiles in flight.
The committee recommends a legislative provision (sec. 236)
that would transfer the THEL program from the Secretary of the
Army to the director of BMDO, and would authorize a total of
$38.2 million for the THEL program. The committee directs the
transfer of $16.5 million from PE 63308A to PE 63XXXC, a new
program element that would consolidate cooperative ballistic
missile defense programs under BMDO management. The committee
also recommends an increase of $15.0 million to ensure
completion of the first phase of the program to design, build,
integrate and test the THEL advanced concept technology
demonstrator and to begin developmental testing to validate
THEL capabilities. The committee further directs the director
of BMDO to provide the remaining $6.7 million required for the
THEL program from BMDO administrative accounts.
The budget request did not contain funding for two
cooperative projects with Russia, the Russian-American
Observation Satellite (RAMOS) and the Active Plasma Experiment
(APEX). The committee recommends $30.0 million for the RAMOS
and APEX projects. Recent events indicate some Russian interest
in exploring the possibility of greater cooperation in this
area. For example, at the recent Helsinki summit, Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin declared that they are prepared to explore
integrated cooperative defense efforts in the area of early
warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in
areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of
cooperation in TMD exercises.
The committee notes that expanded cooperation with Russia
in the area of ballistic missile defense must be carefully
considered and implemented only in a manner that does not
jeopardize U.S. technological advantages or the development and
deployment of U.S. BMD systems. The committee directs the
Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for U.S.-Russian
cooperative projects--identifying the costs and benefits
associated with each project--and to submit this plan to the
Congressional defense committees no later than February 1,
1998.
The committee believes that the effective management of
cooperative BMD programs requires their consolidation in a
separate program element. Therefore, the committee recommends a
legislative provision (Sec. 232) that would establish the
``Cooperative Ballistic Missile Program'' as a separate program
element within BMDO to support technical and analytical
cooperative missile defense efforts between the U.S. and other
nations.
The committee recommends $123.1 million to support the
cooperative programs in the new PE63XXXC. This amount includes
the transfers of $38.7 million from PE 63872C, $12.9 million
from PE 63870C, $16.5 million from PE 63308A, and an increase
of $55.0 million over the amounts requested.
Joint theater missile defense
The budget request contained $542.6 million for the Joint
Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) in PE 63872C.
The Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) provides an
essential test range capability for Navy and other TMD
programs. PMRF enhancements are needed to ensure that the range
can support the full scope of TMD testing required in the
future. The committee recommends an increase of $20.0 million
for the purpose of upgrading the PMRF.
The committee also directs the transfer of $38.7 million
from PE 63872C to the new cooperative BMD PE 63XXXC to support
the Israeli-U.S. effort to develop the Arrow ballistic missile
defense system (project 2259). The details of this transfer are
discussed elsewhere in this report.
The committee recommends $523.9 million for the JTMD
program.
Medium extended air defense system (MEADS)
The budget request contained $47.9 million in PE 63869C for
the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS).
The Administration has identified the MEADS as a high
priority Theater Missile Defense (TMD) initiative and as an
important international cooperative development effort. While
the committee supports MEADS, it does so with some reluctance
since the Administration currently has no funding in fiscal
year 1998 or the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) to continue
MEADS development beyond the current project definition-
validation phase. The Administration's apparent lack of long-
term commitment to MEADS threatens both program stability and
perceptions of U.S. reliability as a partner in current and
future international cooperative programs. The committee's
support for MEADS is dependent on the Administration's
willingness to fund its continued development and the Secretary
of Defense is urged to provide adequate funding for this
development in the FYDP and to designate strongly MEADS as a
core TMD program.
Multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
The committee notes the Administration's decision to seek
to expand beyond Russia the number of states party to the 1972
U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to include
three former republics of the Soviet Union.
The committee is concerned with the Administration's
contention that multilateralizing the ABM Treaty is not a
substantive change to the treaty's terms and, therefore,
Congressional approval is not required. In a report to Congress
in November 1996, the Administration asserted that ``the
resolution of succession questions has long been regarded as a
function of the Executive Branch'' and that the notion of
Congressional approval of any succession agreement ``would cast
doubt on well-established principles of treaty succession.''
The committee believes that the issue of whether or not
multilateralization involves substantive changes to ABM Treaty
has less to do with the question of which states are
appropriate successors than with the rights accorded those
states under the agreement reached. For example, the treaty
allows the parties to deploy up to 100 ABM interceptors.
However, the administration has stated that Russia will be
granted exclusive rights to deploy the full complement of 100
interceptors on its side. In other words, although the former
Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan might become
parties to the treaty, they would not be allowed to deploy ABM
interceptors on their national territory. In the committee's
view, this represents a modification to the rights of the
states party to the ABM Treaty, and, therefore a substantive
change to the treaty.
Furthermore, the committee believes that the addition of
multiple coequal parties to the ABM Treaty would substantively
change the process by which treaty revisions to might be
negotiated. Four parties, each of equal legal standing but with
varying rights accorded under the treaty, would presumably have
to agree unanimously to amend the treaty if the U.S. pursues
such amendments. Such a process is substantively different than
negotiating with one equal party.
Deployment of an effective national missile defense capable
of defending all fifty states, even against a limited ballistic
missile threat, will likely require amendment of the treaty.
With five parties where there were once only two, the treaty
amendment process would be rendered much more difficult, and
perhaps impossible. Thus, even while the Administration
purports to be committed to an NMD deployment option, it
simultaneously supports a change to the ABM Treaty that could
render any such deployment option, short of abrogating the
treaty, implausible.
The committee believes that multilateralization represents
a substantive change to the ABM Treaty, and, as such, that the
Administration is required to submit any such proposal to
Congress for appropriate review and approval.
National missile defense
The budget request contained $504.1 million for National
Missile Defense (NMD) in PE 63871C, $324.7 million less than
appropriated for fiscal year 1997. The Secretary of Defense
recently informed the committee that NMD funding in the Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP) is inadequate to support the program
and identified a fiscal year 1998 shortfall of $474.0 million,
part of a total shortfall of at least $2.3 billion over the
FYDP.
The committee has consistently believed that proposed NMD
budgets were inadequate to support the Administration's ``three
plus three'' deployment readiness program. As early as 1994,
the committee was informed by the BMDO that annual NMD funding
of $600 million was required for a viable technology readiness
program. BMDO reported then that annual funding in the range of
only $450 million ``could seriously damage our NMD readiness
strategy and would likely permit projected third world threats
to the homeland to materialize prior to any viable NMD
deployment capability.'' In 1995, BMDO informed the committee
that a ``three plus three'' deployment readiness program would
require annual development funding of $800 million to $850
million. However, the Administration's annual funding requests
have consistently fallen hundreds of millions of dollars short
of the levels needed for a viable program. Even after the
Administration provides additional outyear funding for NMD, the
program schedule will be challenging and the committee is
concerned that several factors may undermine the viability of
even the Administration's option to deploy an NMD by 2003.
First, the previous Under Secretary for Acquisition and
Technology testified to the committee that no long lead
procurement funding for NMD had been budgeted anywhere in the
FYDP because no deployment decision had been made. The
committee remains concerned that unless appropriate funds for
long lead procurement, military construction, and deployment
planning are programmed in fiscal year 1999, the option to
deploy an NMD by 2003 will be unavailable. Accordingly, the
committee directs the Director of BMDO to provide a report to
the Congressional defense committees by February 1, 1998,
detailing long lead procurement, military construction, and
deployment planning, and any other acquisition activity that
must be funded prior to a decision to deploy an NMD in order to
ensure that deployment by 2003 could be achieved; the cost of
these activities; and how BMDO intends to preserve a 2003
deployment option if these activities are not funded in the
fiscal year 1999 budget request.
Second, the committee is concerned with persistent NMD
program organizational difficulties, particularly the delays in
establishing the NMD joint program office and awarding the lead
system integrator contracts. The committee urges the Secretary
to ensure that all management and contract difficulties are
identified and addressed in an expedited manner in an effort to
provide some long overdue stability to the program.
Third, the committee notes that inadequate investments in
test assets has increased technical and schedule risk for BMD
programs, including NMD. A recent test failure, due to human
error in the launch sequence of a NMD test vehicle, resulted in
delays to the program because another booster and additional
test targets were not available. The committee finds this kind
of delay unacceptable for such a high priority program.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Director of BMDO to
report to the Congressional defense committees by February 1,
1998, on the specific steps that are being taken, and those
that should be taken but are not, to mitigate schedule risks
and the potential for single point failures resulting from
inadequate test assets.
Finally, the committee notes that NMD battle management/
command, control, and communications (BM/C3) funding has
declined dramatically in each of the last two fiscal years.
Effective BM/C3 is of central importance to the success of all
ballistic missile defense efforts. While the committee is
encouraged that reuse of theater missile defense BM/C3 software
is being emphasized by BMDO as a means of speeding development
and reducing risk and cost, NMD software development remains a
significant challenge. The committee believes that BM/C3
development and risk reduction efforts deserve priority
attention and urges DOD to establish reuse of TMD BM/C3 as a
significant evaluation criterion in future NMD system contract
awards, consistent with system requirements.
The committee believes that deployment of a national
missile defense remains a national priority and recommends
$978.1 million, an increase of $474.0 million.
Navy area theater ballistic missile defense
The budget request contained $267.8 million in PE 64867C
for Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). The
committee notes the program's recent missile intercept testing
successes and supports Department efforts to accelerate this
program. As with all current TMD programs, the committee
believes that the Navy Area TBMD test program could be more
effectively accelerated if sufficient threat representative
missile targets and test component spares were available.
Accordingly, the committee recommends $289.8 million, an
increase of $22.0 million to provide additional test support.
Navy theater-wide missile defense
The budget request contained $194.9 million in PE 63868C
for the Navy theater-wide missile defense system. The unfunded
requirements list from the Chief of Naval Operations and
communications from other offices in the Navy indicate that the
theater-wide program is inadequately funded to support an
accelerated development test plan. Moreover, there is a growing
concern that the Department still has not thoroughly assessed
the feasibility of accelerating the currently planned Navy
theater-wide missile defense deployment date of fiscal year
2008. Noting numerous Administration statements attaching high
priority to TMD programs, the committee directs the Secretary
of Defense to report to the Congressional defense committees no
later than February 15, 1998, on the cost and technical
feasibility of options for a more robust Navy theater-wide
flight test program, the earliest technically feasible
deployment date, and costs associated with such a deployment
date. The committee recommends an increase of $344.9 million,
an increase of $150.0 million, to support a more robust program
schedule.
Support technologies
The budget request contained a total of $147.6 million in
PE 63173C for BMD support technologies.
The Atmoshperic Interceptor Technology (AIT) program is an
ongoing effort that addresses technological challenges common
to several BMD programs, including THAAD, the Navy theater-wide
program, and the national missile defense effort by examining
advanced hit-to-kill warhead technologies. The budget request
included only $4.9 million for AIT, a reduction from $43.0
million appropriated for fiscal year 1997. The committee
supports AIT and recommends an increase of $25.0 million to
continue more robust AIT development.
The committee is concerned by a funding reduction of over
$100.0 million for BMD support technologies from the fiscal
year 1997 level. Reductions of this magnitude slow the
development of critical and innovative technologies and are
inconsistent with the Administration's assertion that the
budget request supports an acceleration of theater missile
defense programs. They also undermine the comprehensive
technology effort needed to stay ahead of the evolving
ballistic missile threat.
The committee urges the Secretary of Defense to provide
adequate funding for BMD support technologies and recommends
$172.6 million, an increase of $25.0 million.
Theater high altitude air defense
The budget request contained $556.1 million for
demonstration/validation and engineering and manufacturing
development for the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD)
system.
The committee supports the THAAD program, believes it will
provide U.S. military forces with critically needed protection
against ballistic missile attack, and restates its support of
THAAD as a core TMD system. Although the THAAD program has met
numerous test objectives to date, the committee is concerned by
recent test failures and supports the Department's prompt and
comprehensive program reviews. However, the committee is
disturbed by indications that the Department nonetheless plans
to reduce prior year and fiscal year 1998 THAAD funding in
order to use the funds for other purposes. Although
identification of the causes of test failures is necessary
before further testing, the committee believes that both the
Administration's currently planned fielding date of 2006 may be
indicative of a program constrained by funding and insufficient
test opportunities.
Independent reviews of THAAD have reaffirmed the program's
planned design, operational requirement, and the successful
completion of 28 of the 30 THAAD program objectives to date. In
addition to the on-going review of THAAD, the committee
believes that the test program will benefit from additional
funding to provide reserve interceptor, missile, and target
assets, as well as other back-up resources. A more robust test
program will help to lower the risk of delays and lost
opportunities resulting for unexpected anomalies and single-
point failures.
The committee recommends $601.1 million, an increase of
$45.0 million in PE 64861C, to provide funds necessary for
additional THAAD testing and to further mitigate risk in the
flight test program. The committee strongly urges the
Department not to reduce funding for THAAD in order to address
shortfalls elsewhere in the FYDP and to use any prior or fiscal
year 1998 THAAD funds deemed unavailable for obligation for
their original purpose for further risk reduction in the test
program.
Theater missile defense demarcation
The committee notes that the presidents of the United
States and Russia, at the recent Helsinki summit, signed a
joint statement concerning the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty and the relationship of TMD systems to that
treaty. The joint statement outlined the agreement reached last
year between both sides at the Standing Consultative Commission
(SCC) regarding lower-velocity TMD systems, which Russia
refused to sign, and established parameters to be used as the
basis for further negotiations on higher-velocity TMD systems.
The committee is concerned with several elements of the
joint Helsinki statement. First, it establishes limitations on
TMD systems in the context of the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty,
which prohibits a defense of U.S. national territory against
strategic ballistic missiles, was never intended to apply to
theater missile defense systems.
Second, the Administration asserts that it has sought to
negotiate an agreement with Russia that would ``clarify'' the
distinction between permitted and prohibited missile defense
capabilities. The agreement fails to achieve this
clarification.
The committee continues to accept the ``demonstrated
standard'' identified in section 325 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106),
which makes no reference to interceptor speeds. Specifically,
this provision established the principle that TMD interceptors
could not be tested against a ballistic missile traveling
farther than 3,500 kilometers or with a velocity greater than
five kilometers per second. Interceptors tested against
ballistic targets exceeding these parameters would be
considered ABM-capable. This ``demonstrated standard'' was the
only criterion supported by Congress for judging whether TMD
interceptors were captured by the ABM Treaty.
The U.S.-Russian Helsinki agreement would establish the
``demonstrated standard'' as the sole measure of treaty
compliance for lower-velocity TMD systems, those with speeds of
three kilometers a second or less. However, no agreement was
reached on higher-velocity TMDsystems. While the Administration
has issued public assurances that no U.S. TMD systems now under
development will be restricted by the Helsinki agreement, it has also
committed to negotiate with Russia on the higher-velocity systems. The
Russian perspective on these impending negotiations is that limits on
interceptor speed must be introduced, the U.S. cannot unilaterally
declare its higher-velocity TMD programs to be in compliance with the
ABM Treaty, and that compliance can only be established through
negotiation
Far from clarifying the distinction between permitted and
prohibited systems, the Administration has apparently accepted
an artificial distinction between lower- and higher-velocity
TMD and has agreed to negotiations that may limit the
performance of U.S. TMD systems. The committee opposes
restrictions on higher velocity U.S. TMD systems, as well as
negotiations that would compel any degradation of the
capabilities embodied in U.S. TMD systems, present or future.
Third, the agreement reached in Helsinki went beyond even
the Administration's stated objective of clarifying ambiguities
in the ABM Treaty. For instance, the joint statement notes that
TMD deployments should be limited in ``number and geographic
scope.'' Such a restriction could impose for the first time
unacceptable restraints on where and how TMD systems might be
deployed.
Fourth, the joint statement notes U.S.-Russian agreement
that no TMD deployment will be directed against the other
party. This prohibition could deny new NATO members an
important defensive benefit under Article V of the North
Atlantic Treaty. Under such a restriction, Russia may object to
U.S. TMD systems deployed in Western Europe or Asia intended to
protect U.S. forces and allies. Such a restriction is likely to
make it more difficult to build an allied consensus on the need
for TMD.
Finally, the language of the joint statement committing the
sides to ``exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans
and programs'' has the potential to provide Russia with
sensitive information regarding U.S. TMD programs, as well as
an opportunity to challenge U.S. TMD programs early in their
development. Such exchanges must be carefully thought through
and implemented only to the extent that they do not undermine
U.S. national security objectives.
The committee notes the Administration has stated that the
Helsinki agreement on theater missile defense demarcation
represents a substantive change to the ABM Treaty and its
intention to submit the agreement to the Senate for its advice
and consent. The committee believes that a full and thorough
debate over the implications of the TMD demarcation agreement
for U.S. security is long overdue.
Theater missile defense of U.S. territories
The committee supports highly effective theater missile
defenses for the territories of the United States and urges the
Secretary of Defense to take all appropriate steps to ensure
that U.S. ballistic missile defense planning continues to be
responsive to evolving threats to these territories.
.............
Transfer of cooperative engagement capability operating frequency band
Title VI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(Public Law 103-66) requires the federal government to provide
a span of radio frequencies aggregating not less than 200 Mhz
for allocation to the public. To minimize negative impact on
the federal government, the act requires that the spectrum to
be reallocated must not be ``required for the present or
identifiable future needs of the Federal Government'' and
should not result in costs to the federal government that
exceed the benefits gained. In February 1995, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, recommended reallocation of 50 MHz from
within the operating frequency band of the Navy's cooperative
engagement capability (CEC) system. In the statement of
managers accompanying the conference report on H.R. 3230 (H.
Rept. 104-724), the conferees directed the Secretary of the
Navy to prepare a detailed report on: (1) progress being made
to resolve spectrum interference that would result from the
reallocation of the CEC operating band, and (2) steps being
taken to resolve interference between CEC and other fleet
weapon systems and data links.
According to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
General Accounting Office (GAO), this transfer could result in
the loss of a total of 200 MHz (one-third of the CEC's usable
operating frequencies) and could severely affect the
operational capability of the CEC. DOD officials have also
indicated to the GAO that current and future spectrum
reallocations could significantly degrade the capabilities of
many major weapons systems in addition to the CEC and could
cost the Department hundreds of millions of dollars to modify
systems and/or rent frequencies from the private sector or
foreign governments. The committee is informed, however, that
the full implications of the 1993 act are not yet known and
that the Department is conducting a comprehensive analysis of
spectrum requirements for critical systems in order to
determine the extent that operational effectiveness of these
systems could be affected by loss ofthe frequency spectrum. The
committee also understands that a recent DOD study indicates that the
Department's top level spectrum management for planning, policy, and
oversight is diffused and weak and that there is no single high-level
DOD point of contact for spectrum management.
In response to H. Rept. 104-724, the Secretary of the Navy
has reported that the Navy is working with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to minimize interference with
civilian applications in the reallocated frequency band and the
effect of the reallocation on CEC performance. The Secretary's
report also states that the Navy's preferred technical option
for resolution of interference between CEC and the LAMPS Mk III
data link is moving the LAMPS data link to the Ku-band. Should
the Navy choose this option for resolution of the problem, the
committee expects that the funding required for the transfer
will be included in the fiscal year 1999 defense budget
request.
The committee concurs with the steps taken by the Navy to
address the issues raised in the House report, but believes
that the problem should be addressed in a more comprehensive
manner by the Secretary of Defense. The committee encourages
the Secretary to assign responsibility for overall radio
frequency spectrum management to a specific organization within
the Department. The committee directs the Secretary to prepare
a report to the Congress, in coordination with the Chairman of
the FCC and the Secretary of Commerce, which addresses: (1)
agreements on measures being taken to resolve the impact of the
transfer of 50 Mhz from the radio frequency operating band of
the cooperative engagement capability (CEC); (2) the impact of
transfers of the federal radio frequency spectrum on other
critical military systems; (3) how the DOD plans to modify the
CEC and other critical systems, including estimated costs and
schedule, to compensate for any operational degradation that
might be caused by losses of the radio frequency spectrum due
to such transfers; and (4) any unresolved issues in joint
frequency spectrum management and impediments to the
resolutions of these issues. The report shall be submitted to
the Congress by March 31, 1998.
.............
Subtitle C--Ballistic Missile Defense Programs
Section 231--Budgetary Treatment of Amount Requested for Procurement
for Ballistic Missile Defense Programs
The budget request incorporated a major change in funding
policy for BMD programs by transferring all procurement for TMD
programs from the centralized BMD account to the separate
service procurement accounts. The committee is convinced that
the Department, through this action, has placed its professed
highest priority missile defense initiatives at risk by forcing
them to compete with underfunded modernization programs of
higher priority for each individual service. Additionally, in
transferring fiscal year 1998 TMD procurement funding to the
services, the Department did not issue any specific guidance
that outyear funding for these programs was to be sustained or
that TMD programs were to be considered as a service priority.
Without such guidance, the committee believes that TMD
procurement would suffer the same fate as other service
modernization programs which continue to be restructured and
have their schedules stretched due to funding shortfalls.
Finally, despite testimony from the Department on the
importance of TMD programs, the committee is disappointed to
note that funding for all TMD programs is significantly reduced
from the levels provided in fiscal year 1997.
The committee is opposed to the proposed change in the TMD
funding policy. This provision would direct the Secretary of
Defense to transfer all fiscal year 1998 TMD program
procurement funds back to the BMD procurement account. The
provision would also require that all National Missile Defense
program procurement funds be included in the BMDO procurement
account. The committee considers procurement and fielding of
TMD systems to be a priority congressional interest item and
directs the Secretary to retain procurement for these programs
within BMDO.
Section 232--Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense Programs
This section would establish the ``Cooperative Ballistic
Missile Defense Program'' within the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, to support on-going and future technical and
analytical cooperative efforts between the U.S. and other
nations that contribute to U.S. missile defense capabilities.
Section 233--Deployment Dates for Core Theater Missile Defense Programs
The committee is disappointed by the Administration's lack
of commitment to the timely deployment of theater missile
defenses. While the Administration concedes that theater
ballistic missiles constitute a clear and present danger to
U.S. forces deployed abroad, Congressional efforts on behalf of
the rapid development and deployment of TMD systems to meet
this threat have been slowed by both Administration action and
inaction.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996 (Public Law 104-106), Congress established first unit
equipped (FUE) dates of fiscal year 2000 for Theater High
Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD), fiscal year 2001 for the
Navy Theater Wide system, fiscal year 1998 for Patriot Advanced
Capability Configuration 3 (PAC-3), and fiscal year 1999 for
the Navy Area Defense system. These dates were based on
Congressional support for the early deployment of a TMD
capability, but they were also based on the assumption of
aggressive and streamlined management as well as robust
funding.
However, within weeks of the dates being approved by
Congress and signed into law by the President, the
Administration took budgetary and programmatic actions that had
the effect ofdelaying each of these programs and their
deployment dates. Compared to the legally directed dates, the
Administration's plan delayed the THAAD deployment date by six years,
the Navy Theater Wide system date by at least four years, PAC-3 by one
year, and the Navy Area Defense system by two years.
In presenting the fiscal year 1998 funding request earlier
this year, the Department asserted that all TMD programs had
been accelerated. Yet in the case of each of these TMD systems,
the fiscal year 1998 request is lower than the amount Congress
appropriated for fiscal year 1997. Despite the requirements of
Public Law 106-104, the Administration target FUE dates for
PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense remained fiscal year 1999 and 2001,
respectively, the dates the Administration unilaterally
established in 1996 contrary to the law. As noted elsewhere in
this report, the Department has still not reviewed the Navy
Theater Wide program to determine if accelerating the program
from its currently anticipated deployment date of 2008 is
feasible. And while Department of Defense announced in January
that the THAAD FUE would be accelerated to 2004, the program's
FUE was immediately slipped back to 2006 following a test
failure.
The committee continues to believe that a THAAD user
operational evaluation system (UOES) can and should be deployed
by fiscal year 2000 and FUE achieved by fiscal year 2004 at an
acceptable risk given the high-value payoff associated with
deployment of an operational THAAD capability. The committee
also understands that BMDO is considering steps that could
provide a more robust THAAD UOES capability, thus providing
greater capability in the field at an earlier date, and
strongly supports any such initiatives. Accordingly, this
provision would require the Secretary of Defense to structure
the THAAD program to achieve a THAAD UOES capability by fiscal
year 2000 and FUE by fiscal year 2004.
The committee reiterates its concern that the Department
still has not defined the Navy Theater Wide program nor
established a program schedule. The committee finds this lack
of focus and commitment unacceptable and elsewhere in this
report has directed the Secretary of Defense to report to the
Congressional defense committees on the earliest feasible Navy
Theater Wide deployment date. The committee reminds the
Secretary of Defense of his obligation under current law and
urges that the Navy Theater Wide program be structured to come
as close as possible to achieving a UOES capability in fiscal
year 1999 and FUE in fiscal year 2001.
Congressional funding increases have helped to accelerate
the Navy Area Defense system into engineering and manufacturing
development and the PAC-3 program into procurement. The
committee also notes the budget request does not propose to
slip the deployment dates of these two systems further into the
future. Given both programs' advanced state of development and
the increasing likelihood that the currently programmed
deployment dates will be met, this section would also repeal
the dates specified in section 234 of the Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) for PAC-3 and the
Navy Area Defense System.
The committee remains committed to fielding effective TMD
systems at the earliest feasible date and once again urges the
Administration to support full funding and aggressive goal-
oriented management for all of these critical systems.
Section 234--Annual Report on Threat Posed to the United States by
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ballistic Missiles, and Cruise Missiles
The committee believes that awareness of information and
assessments concerning evolving threats to U.S. national
security is essential to informed congressional debate and
decision-making. To that end, the committee believes that a
comprehensive description and assessment of the threats posed
by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic and cruise
missiles to the U.S. and its allies would be an essential
informational for Congress and the public.
Therefore, this provision would direct the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence, to prepare and submit to Congress by January 30,
1998, and January 30 of each subsequent year, a report on
threats posed to the U.S. and its allies by cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction, and the
proliferation of such technologies. The report should be
prepared in classified and unclassified form, to assure the
most complete information and widest distribution possible.
Section 235--Director of Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
The committee believes that without appropriate senior
leadership and a streamlined reporting chain, BMDO's ability to
efficiently develop and deploy BMD systems is at risk.
Therefore, this provision would requiring that the position of
director of BMDO be filled by an officer of the armed forces of
the United States with a rank of at least Lieutenant General or
Vice Admiral. The committee believes that three star rank is
essential to provide the BMDO director the stature within the
Department of Defense commensurate with the job's
responsibilities. The committee notes that the current director
of BMDO is a Lieutenant General, and expects that the
requirement established by this section will continue to be
filled from within existing statutory authorizations for
general and flag officers.
The committee also recommends establishing a requirement
that the director of BMDO report directly to the Secretary of
Defense concerning all matters pertaining to the management of
BMDO programs. Such streamlining will help overcome
bureaucratic obstacles and allow issues to be promptly and
definitively resolved.
Section 236--Tactical High Energy Laser Program (THEL)
This section would transfer the THEL program from PE 63308A
to an new PE 63XXXC that would consolidate cooperative
ballistic missile defense programs under Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization management and would authorize $38.2
million for THEL.
.............
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
----------
DISSENTING VIEWS OF RONALD V. DELLUMS
I voted against reporting H.R. 1119 from the committee for
several reasons.
.......
Third, the committee recommendation would press forward too
rapidly with national missile defense, notwithstanding that the
committee recommendation implicitly adopts the administration's
so-called three-plus-three strategy for development and
preparation of a national missile defense system. I applaud the
committee's retreat from any effort to implicitly or to
explicitly recommend a program that would exceed the limits of
the ABM Treaty.
......
Sixth, I am also troubled at the decision to reduce funds
for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, a program that is
essential to our interests in reducing or eliminating threats
that are currently posed by nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and materials.
Ronald V. Dellums.
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