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THE ABM TREATY AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACK MENDELSOHN DEPUTY DIRECTOR THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 26, 1996

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. In response to your request, I appreciate the opportunity to present my views this morning on the critical issue of the ABM Treaty and ballistic missile defenses. Overall, I believe that maintaining the integrity of the ABM Treaty is essential for further strategic force reductions, that deployment of ballistic missile defenses against "rogue" state attacks is unnecessary at this time because no such threat exists, and that theater missile defenses should be deployed in a manner that does not undercut the confidence of the U.S. or Russia in their retaliatory forces.

WHY LIMIT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES?

The United States and the Soviet Union agreed 24 years ago in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to severely limit strategic ballistic missile defenses (BMD). The primary purpose of these limits was not to degrade U.S. security by inhibiting our ability to defend ourselves but to enhance our security by limiting the build-up of Soviet strategic offensive forces and facilitating their future reduction. The ABM Treaty was a recognition of the fundamental reality that major reductions in strategic offensive forces are achievable only if BMD is limited and both sides retain confidence in their own deterrent forces and in their ability to retaliate after absorbing a first strike.

This key conclusion is worth restating: Large numbers of highly capable ballistic missile defense systems, strategic or tactical, are bound to interfere with efforts to shrink strategic offensive arsenals. The substantial force reductions negotiated in START I and II, which will reduce the threat facing the U.S. from some 10,500 warheads to 3,500, were obtained because of the presence of the ABM Treaty and the (virtual) absence of ballistic missile defenses. In reality, the ABM Treaty is a cheap and highly effective defense which has helped negate a considerable portion of the most significant threat facing the United States.

Russian ratification and implementation of START II, and any strategic force reductions which they may agree to in the future, will almost certainly be contingent upon the continued viability of the ABM Treaty. This point was repeatedly stressed during discussions I had recently with members of the Duma, Yeltsin government officials and Russian non-governmental analysts both here in Washington and, just last week, in Moscow. I might add that the ABM Treaty is not only important to future reductions, but directly impacts on current obligations under existing agreements. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, you will recall that in 1991, at the conclusion of the START I negotiations, the Soviet Union unilaterally declared that "this treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the [ABM] Treaty."

THE "ROGUE" THREAT

The current rationale behind the revived pursuit of strategic ballistic missile defenses derives from concern over an attack by a "rogue" state or from accidental or unauthorized launches. These concerns are largely unfounded.

At present, there is no "rogue" nation ballistic missile threat to the United States and, according to U.S. intelligence, a low probability that any will emerge in the next 15 years. Of the 20-odd developing states possessing ballistic missiles only three - India, Israel and North Korea -- have actually produced or flight-tested missiles with ranges of more than 1,000 kilometers. (North Korea, the only one of these three countries that can be considered a potential adversary, is far from presenting a real threat at this time. It has conducted one partial-range test of the Nodong missile and does not yet have an operational version after seven years of development.) The balance of the developing world missile "threat" -- fully 97 percent, according to the Defense Department -- comes from ballistic missiles with ranges of less than 1,000 kilometers, far short of the ranges required to threaten the U.S.

Even if a "rogue" nation did possess the combination of technical expertise, political will and irresponsible leadership required to consider at attack against the U.S., is it reasonable to assume that they would employ ballistic missiles carry it out? Given the fact that truly long-range ballistic missiles are expensive and technically difficult to design, develop, deploy and conceal, these complex systems would be the least likely method such a state would use to attack or threaten the United States. Ships, aircraft and -- as we have seen -- rented vans are a much more convenient and realistic delivery vehicles.

Furthermore, ballistic missile launches are readily and routinely detectable by satellite. Only if a "rogue" state actually wanted the U.S. to be able to determine precisely the origin of the attack, and only if it desired an immediate and devastating response, would a ballistic missile be the weapon of choice for a strike on the U.S.

Moving on to the issue of accidental or unauthorized launches from Russia or China, such occurrences are extremely unlikely: it is in China and Russia's own self-interest to ensure that such launches do not occur and, in the case of Russia, U.S. intelligence believes their control mechanisms are "very good." In any case, ballistic missile defenses are not the appropriate remedy for the threat of a potential failure in command and control arrangements. Operational arms control measures, such as reduced alert rates, separating warheads from delivery systems, and improved permissive action links (PALs), are a much more effective and direct way to deal with this concern.

WHAT IF?

What if a long-range ballistic missile threat to the U.S. from third countries (other than Russia or China) actually appears to be developing sometime in the future? That would be an appropriate time to fully and rigorously debate the pros and cons of a ballistic missile defense. And that would be an appropriate time to make a decision to deploy BMD based on an evaluation of the ability of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship to support the insertion into it of missile defenses, the effectiveness of non-BMD responses (i.e., diplomatic, operational, and conventional military), and the cost of BMD deployments compared to the benefits.

The current Administration "3+3" position on national missile defenses strikes the right balance. In three years, or anytime thereafter, if a real-world threat emerges we can respond after a reasoned analysis of the strategic situation, the alternatives and our resources. At present we have neither the threat, nor the analysis, nor the debate. The real issue, Mr. Chairman, is not when the threat will occur - 5, 10 or 15 years from now, but rather how best to respond to it after we understand its true extent and nature.

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES

Since the fall of 1993, the U.S. and Russia -- together with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine -- have been discussing the establishment of a "demarcation" line between those strategic ballistic missile defense systems that are limited by the ABM Treaty and those theater missile defenses (TMD) that are allowed. The parties completed an initial agreement last June which apparently will clear the way for the testing and deployment of lower-velocity TMD systems (with interceptor speeds up to 3 kilometers per second.)

The first phase agreement, however, does not address the status of those advanced systems -- high-performance interceptors and space- based components with significant potential to shoot down strategic ballistic missile warheads -- which threaten to undermine simultaneously the ABM Treaty, confidence in retaliatory forces, and the START reduction process. Russian concerns about high performance TMD systems mirror those of the U.S., expressed during the ABM Treaty negotiations, that Soviet air defense systems, much less capable than the TMD systems currently under discussion, could, if up-graded, acquire strategic capability.

Resolution of the status of these advanced TMD systems remains at the heart of the START II ratification debate in Russia. Last year, for example, a study on START II ratification prepared for the Russian Duma recommended that "an accord on strategic and nonstrategic (regional) ABM systems should precede ratification of START II." The study also argued that a demarcation agreement must contain "precise quantitative limitations on deployment of nonstrategic ABM [i.e., TMD] systems." (Washington Times, October 25, 1995, p. A1.)

The limited nature of the initial demarcation agreement has brought into clear focus the fundamental differences between the U.S. and Russian positions on the testing and deployment of highly capable TMD systems. At some point in the future, we will have to resolve these differences and apply meaningful qualitative, numerical and geographic measures to these systems if strategic arms reductions are to continue.

CONCLUSION

In sum, Mr. Chairman, I believe it would be contrary to U.S. interests to do away with the ABM Treaty because of the important role it plays in strategic force reductions. I believe it would be contrary to U.S. interests to deploy ballistic missile defenses in the absence of any "rogue" nation threat and without rigorous analysis and full debate of the optimal response should such a threat emerge. Finally, I believe it would be contrary to U.S. interests to deploy high-performance theater missile defenses in such a way as to undercut confidence in retaliatory forces and disrupt the strategic force reduction process.