William R. Graham,
Former Presidential Science Advisor
The Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. and its Allies
28 February 1996 - House National Security Committee
On November 14. 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12938. "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," which read in part: "I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction") and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat."
On November 9, 1995, President Clinton issued a "Notice of Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction", which stated, in part: "Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security., foreign policy, and economy of the United States, the national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1995."
These two Presidential Executive Orders provide a clear and concise statement of the immediate danger posed to the U.S. and its interests by "the proliferation of nuclear. biological, and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons." (Emphasis added). In view of the President's excellent characterization of the proliferation problem, the message he sent to Congress with the veto of the first 1996 Defense Authorization should be noted. It said, in part, "First, the bill requires deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system able to defend all fifty states from a long range missile threat that our intelligence community does not foresee in the coming decade ....The missile defense provisions would also jeopardize our current efforts to agree on an ABM/TMD demarcation with the Russian Federation."
President Clinton's 1996 Defense Authorization Bill veto statement. and more generally the terms of the administration's position on when the absence of need to deploy a national missile defense, reflect a fundamental tension in its views on the importance of ballistic missile defense.
The intelligence community bears some responsibility in the matter. A new National Intelligence Estimate reportedly projects no ballistic missile threat to the U.S. for 10-15 years. Yet in 1994, when Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch was the Deputy.' Secretary of Defense, he reported to Congress that a ballistic missile threat to U.S. territory could emerge by the end of the decade. Dr. Deutch's statement is highly credible. In fact, the threat of ballistic missile attack against the US. and its allies already must be factored into responsible policy formulation. Since the U.S. values allied cooperation, deterring our allies can also deter the U.S. by indirect means. Russian threats against NATO expansion and Chinese threats over Taiwan are directed at U.S. allies as well as the U.S.
Many in the threat assessment community discount the value of acquiring key technical personnel, and the possibility of modifying existing ballistic missiles to extend their range. However, this position ignores the way in which the U.S. itself advanced its ballistic missile objectives. During 1945 and 1946, the U.S. conducted "Operation Paper clip" in order to employ Dr. Wernher von Braun and his team of German scientists and technicians, who were the same people who had been responsible for the Germany's V-2 rocket program. The transfer of these experts, along with their equipment, provided the U.S. with nearly instant ballistic missile capability. Under the HERMES Project, the U.S. soon began launching German V-2 rockets with the technical help and support of von Braun and Iris team. These early experiments helped infuse German technical expertise into the U.S. Army.
A year later. the development of a two-stage vehicle based on the V-2 was begun. The so-called "BUMPER" vehicle went on to establish range, altitude and speed records. By the late 1950s, frustrated by difficulties in the Atlas program, General Bernard Schriever, a pioneer of U.S. ballistic missile deployment, ordered the modification of the existing THOR IRBM to include a second stage as a means to achieve a strategic range capability. The resulting THOR-ABLE configuration was ready within a year and a half. THOR-ABLF extended the range of the THOR from 1500 miles to approximately 5000 miles. Shortly thereafter, another configuration, the THOR-AGENA, was ready.
The lessons to be learned from the U.S. history. of Ballistic missile advancement are straightforward. The acquisition of key technical experts can move a country, rapidly forward in advancing ballistic missile capability. In addition, the range of existing systems can be rapidly increased by incorporating additional stages.
In the 1940s, designing and fabricating ballistic missiles was challenging, but with focus. determination, and national-level support it was done very rapidly. even though new types of inertial guidance instruments had to be developed, new rocket engines and missile structures fabricated, and new fuels produced. By contrast, in the 1980s and 90s, the West's schools and universities teach advanced technology to students from all over the world, missile designs are well understood, missile components are available on the world market, and whole missile systems can be bought and delivered, as in the case of the Soviet SCUDs to China, the North Korean SCUDs to Iraq, Chinese M-11s to Pakistan, Chinese CSS-2s to Saudi Arabia, and so forth. Since most of today's ballistic missiles are mobile, training and launching by customer nation crews can take place in the missile' s country of origin, so that the first launch of a missile from a customer country may occur without advance warning.
North Korea is one of the smallest, poorest countries on earth and one of the most isolated geopolitically. Yet it is able to produce and export ballistic missiles. If North Korea can accomplish this, there are few countries that cannot.
Ballistic missiles do not need to have a long range to threaten the United States. In the 1950s, the U.S. launched several ballistic missiles from the deck of a ship, and sent them to high altitudes where their nuclear weapon payloads were detonated. Most of the population of the U.S. lives near the East and West coasts, and thus is highly vulnerable to a ship-launched missile that could be covertly deployed in the merchant traffic several hundred miles at sea. The modifications to such a ship would not need to be obvious, and a few test missile launches could be performed in remote locations in attempts to avoid detection.
To understand the role of national missile defense, one must first understand the most important mission of the U.S. military. The primary mission of the military is not to fight wars, although the U.S. military, trains constantly to be able, if necessary, to do just that. Its mission is not even to win wars, although this is certainly the objective in fighting them.
The single most important mission of the U.S. military is neither to fight nor win wars, but to resolve conflicting interests on terms favorable to the United States. while avoiding the need to resort to warfare. This primary mission is focused on supporting the goals of the U.S. and the other democracies by peaceful means.
Historically, the U.S. has been forced to go to war, with great loss of life and resources, not because its military capability was too strong. clear and certain; but when the U.S. military was weak, as it was during the era leading up to W.W.II, or when the U.S. was confused about its own national interests, as it was in the antecedents of the conflict with Korea and China, the war with Iraq, and most recently in the current administration's reported answers to Chinese questions on the probable U.S. response to an attack on Taiwan.
This same principle applies to the role of U.S. ballistic missile defense. The primary purpose of a ballistic missile defense, both national and theater--that is, national for the U.S., or national for our friends and allies--is to discourage countries from developing offensive ballistic missiles and the chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads that make them able to produce masses of casualties. It is essential to recognize that countries are most susceptible to being discouraged from developing offensive missiles before they have made major national commitments to such programs, when they are still considering the alternatives, and when they have maximum flexibility in their future course of action. Therefore, the best opportunity for avoiding offensive ballistic missile threats is squarely before the US. today - not tomorrow, not next year, not 15 years from now, but today.
The problem is not to estimate the last possible time when ,the U.S. could deploy missile defenses. Historically, the U.S. has proven poor at making such intelligence estimates for many reasons. The challenge before the U.S. is to deploy theater and national missile defenses as rapidly as possible to discourage potential proliferators from developing, building, buying, or otherwise obtaining offensive ballistic missiles, as well as to counter the many ballistic missile threats that already exist.
Most one-time skeptics of the need for theater missile defenses became supporters after attacks on the U.S. and our allies caused loss of life in the war with Iraq. There can be little doubt that a ballistic missile attack on the U.S. would produce similar support for national missile defense. The question before the Congress is: must the U.S. wait until it is attacked by ballistic missiles before it deploys such missile defenses?
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