MISSILE DEFENSE (House of Representatives - February 27, 1996)
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The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] is recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to speak, perhaps not for an hour but certainly for some time, on the issue of missile defense and partially in response to the administration's announcement of a little over a week ago in regard to their missile defense program for this fiscal year and the request to Congress which we anticipate receiving in the next several weeks.
TRIBUTE TO MC LEAN STEVENSON
. . .Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight, in addition, to respond to the administration's press conference of a little over a week ago, which in itself was a travesty. Many of us had been in contact with the administration in terms of the fiscal year 1997 budget request for missile defense and where the priorities would be in terms of programs.
I in fact wrote to both Secretary Perry and Deputy Secretary Kaminski, as well as to General O'Neill expressing my interest in meeting with them before any final decisions were made from a program standpoint relative to missile defense funding for this next fiscal year. In fact, that issue was repeated both verbally and in written form.
What really bothered me, Mr. Speaker, was that the administration saw fit, Secretary Perry and Dr. Kaminski, to hold a press conference at 3 o'clock on a Friday afternoon right before a 3-day holiday break, giving no advance word to Members of Congress except for an attempted phone call to myself the day before and other senior members of the defense committee and a call that I received on the day of the conference by General O'Neill. So there was no attempt in a bipartisan way to reach out to this Congress to work together on the issue of missile defense.
That is especially troubling, Mr. Speaker, because the single biggest change to the Clinton defense budget made by this body and the other body last year was in the area of missile defense. We plussed up the missile defense accounts by approximately $800 million because of the threat, both the near-term threat and long-term threat. We plussed up the national missile defense accounts, the theater missile defense accounts, as well as ballistic missile defense and Brilliant Eyes, space-based sensing program.
Those changes were made with strong bipartisan support in this House. In fact, when the bill left committee, it had the strongest vote in the 10 years I have been here, 478 to 3. When the bill was brought up on the House floor, for the first time in my 10 years we had 300 Members of the body vote in favor of the defense authorization bill, and that is with the significant changes from the Clinton administration relative to missile defense. So we thought it would be important to establish this new year in a bipartisan tone, working with the administration to try to find common areas.
Unfortunately, that did not occur. The press announcement that was held basically announced this administration's continuing policy to decimate defense spending as it relates to missile proliferation and the threat of missile attack, either accidently or deliberately. The mismatch relates between rhetoric and reality, and it is large and growing.
In fact, and I hate to make the statement on the House floor, but after looking at this issue as I have as a member of the National Security Committee and the chair of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee, I am firmly convinced this administration has no commitment to defend America whatsoever and under President Clinton never has. Even the sacred programs now that the Clinton administration said it supported, namely the theater missile defense programs, have been plundered to pay for other modernization needs.
The outrage here, Mr. Speaker, is that we have boxed our Joint Chiefs into a corner. As we have decimated defense spending, we have driven the leaders of each of our services to look to cut other areas beyond those programs that are important, parochially important to their own services. That has in fact caused the Joint Chiefs to come in and make recommendations, to have draconian cuts in the vital programs important to our national security from the standpoint of missile proliferation.
In addition, the press conference and the announcements of the program by Secretary Perry in fact are in major violation with the law that this Congress passed, most specifically section 234, which provides for specific dates relative to theater missile defense systems. In fact, we right now on the committee are considering whether or not to take legal action in suing the administration over these disconnects with the law.
Mr. Speaker, the concern that I have is that this administration has just not been serious in dealing with the American people and this body on the growing threat that is posted to this Nation and other free nations from the threat of missile proliferation. That is in spite of requests by the leaders of this administration.
Mr. Speaker, also during the February break there was an article in the Washington Times, which I will include as a part of my statement. The article that was in the Times, Mr. Speaker, cites a letter that was sent, a communications by General Luck. General Luck, Gary Luck, is our commanding officer in Korea. He sent a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, pleading for an enhanced funding profile for the THAAD missile defense system.
Why did he make this plea? Because there are serious concerns on his part as our commanding officer in South Korea relative to the threat posed by North Korea as they develop their state of the art missile systems, the No Dong and the Taepo Dong-II systems. These systems are sophisticated and pose a real and genuine threat, not just to South Korea and our troops in South Korea, but in fact as Secretary Deutch, the head of the CIA, mentioned in Senate testimony last week, even to the State of Alaska by the year 2000 and beyond.
General Luck made the case to General Shalikashvili that we needed to be able to deploy at least two batteries of THAAD systems at the soonest possible time. General Shalikashvili wrote back to General Luck, and this article which I have asked to put in the Record has the exact quotations from General Shalikashvili, that he is not able to fully fund the THAAD Program at what they thought was going to be the deployment program established last year by the Congress, and also a priority of this administration, because of the budgetary pressures and the need to fund other priorities in the military.
So here we have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Speaker, acknowledging in a letter to General Luck in South Korea that we cannot give hem the resources he needs, not because they are not warranted, and General Shalikashvili even mentions he fully supports the THAAD development, but because we have boxed the leadership of the military into a corner where they cannot fund the most basic priorities, and therefore have to cut wherever possible.
Mr. Speaker, this is outrageous. In fact, this communications and this request by General Luck and the negative response by General Shalikashvili reminds me of a situation that occurred several years ago. That situation was when our commanding general in Somalia sent a communique back to the Pentagon, which ultimately went to then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. That communique, Mr. Speaker, said that the commanding officer in Somalia said that he needed additional backup support to protect the welfare of our troops.
That request for additional support was denied. It was only after 18 of our young troops were killed in a massacre in Mogadishu that Secretary Aspin came up on the Hill along with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and addressed a bipartisan group of over 300 Members of the House and Senate assembled in one of the Capital meeting rooms, and under questioning Secretary Aspin said that he denied the additional support for the troops requested by the command officer in Somalia because of the political climate in Washington. This is the first time, Mr. Speaker, since Vietnam, that we have had an administration say that it has denied the support to protect American troops for a political reason.
That is exactly what we are seeking here in Korea. Out commanding officer in South Korea is concerned about the safety of our troops. He has communicated that to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, and the response by the administration is we agree with you, we would like to help you, but there is just not enough money, so we will have to risk the lives of those troops in terms of protection from a missile attack by the North Koreans. Mr. Speaker, that is outrageous.
Mr. Speaker, during the debate of the defense authorization bill last year, we went to great lengths to work with the administration on missile defense. Mr. Speaker, as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, I made sure that at every possible opportunity we were not forcing something down the administration's throat that they could not live with.
Some in my party, Mr. Speaker, as you know, wanted to have language in the defense bill that would have immediately caused a problem with the ABM treaty. They wanted multiple site language for deployment of a national missile defense system in the bill. I argued against that, Mr. Speaker.
The ultimate compromise bill that we presented to the President did not contain any language that would have violated the ABM treaty. In fact, everything we did in our bill, Mr. Speaker, General Malcolm O'Neill, the administration's point person on missile defense, acknowledged publicly would be in compliance with the ABM treaty. But what did President Clinton do when he vetoed the bill? He said that he had concerns about the possible impact of our bill on the ABM Treaty.
Mr. Speaker, that statement was absolutely outrageous. What we did in the bill is said that we should look to those threats that are there now. The most immediate threats, Mr. Speaker, are those posed by countries that either have the capability now, like North Korea and China with the SCSS-2 and SCSS-4, that have the potential in a few short years to have their missiles reach the shores of Alaska or Hawaii; or to have the threat posed by the Russians aggressively selling off the SS-25 architecture, which is currently their mainstay in their missile system.
An SS-25 has a range of 10,000 kilometers and it is mobilly launched. The Russians are now actively marketing that system to any nation that will buy it as a space launch vehicle. Once a rogue nation gets an SS-25, Mr. Speaker, without the nuclear tip on it, bit perhaps with a chemical, biological or conventional weapon, that poses an immediate threat to the mainland United States for which we have no system today that can shoot down one of those missiles. The American people, when you tell them that, they are amazed. They cannot believe that with our focus on defending this country, we today have no capability to shoot down an incoming ICBM. But the fact is, Mr. Speaker, we do not.
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A further outrage is the Russians do. Under the ABM Treaty, each of the two signatory countries is allowed to have an operational ABM system that can be operated from a single site. The Russians have had an operational ABM system around Moscow that protects 80 percent of their population for the last 15 years. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the Russians have upgraded that system several times.
When I was in Moscow last month, I asked to visit one of the ABM sites. They told me if I came back a week later, I could visit it, but they would not let me visit it the week I was there. But we all know and they know and acknowledge publicly they have an operational ABM system. We do not, Mr. Speaker. We do not have an operational ABM system. We have no capability if, in fact, a rogue nation deliberately or accidentally launches one missile aimed at America.
Now, it doesn't matter whether it is aimed at New York and hits Miami, the fact is that we have no protection against a rogue launch against this Nation. Now, the administration said they didn't want to support the bill because it would violate the ABM Treaty. So we were very careful and we came up with provisions in the bill that said, OK, two branches of our services today have acknowledged publicly that they can build a system compliant with the ABM that, in fact, would protect all 50 States. Nothing in the way of violating the ABM Treaty. And that is exactly what we called for in the bill.
It wasn't until after President Clinton vetoed the Defense authorization bill the first time that Mal O'Neill, the head of BMDO for the Clinton administration, came out publicly and verified what I had been saying all along. And that is, yes, the Army has a variant of an existing single-site system. And the Air Force has a variant of the current Minuteman system at Grand Forks, ND, that with a modest upgrade over 4 years can provide a limited protection for all 50 States. Totally treaty compliant.
Cost? The administration and President Clinton has railed on about numbers in the $20 and $30 billion range. Mr. Speaker, I have had briefings. The Army says it can deploy a modified system in 4 years for a cost of less than $5 billion. The Air Force says they can modify the Minuteman, again a single-site system, again deployable in 4 years for a cost of less than $3 billion.
Mr. Speaker, there you have it. Working with the administration's own leadership and the military, we put together a scenario where we can protect the American people and we can do it at a cost of less than $4 to $5 billion and deploy it within 4 years. Each of those systems would provide a thin layer of protection against incoming missiles up to 10 with a 90-percent effective rate. Today we have no such system. And under the administration's revised program, we won't have a system. They are talking about a 3-year option and then making a decision and maybe 3 years down the road. Mr. Speaker, we can't wait 6 years. We can't wait 6 years, Mr. Speaker.
When the administration finally realized that we had, in fact, dealt with the ABM compliance issue and that we had, in fact, offered in our bill language to take existing technology, which the Air Force and the Army says they can do for the cost that I have mentioned, they realized they no longer had an ABM issue, even though President Clinton got up and said that. Everyone who knows the issues technically knew that he didn't know what he was talking about, and the ABM Treaty was not, in fact, jeopardized by our actions in the bill. Even his own people said so. So they raised a new issue, Mr. Speaker.
They then said through people like Bob Bell for the National Security Council at the White House, they said, well, there is no threat, we don't see a threat emerging. In fact, for the first time since I have been here, they politicized an intelligence study that was released early to minority Members in the other body that said that the Defense authorization bill had overstated the threat. Now, that was in early December, Mr. Speaker. On December 15--actually before December 15, I requested the briefing, the closed briefing, security briefing of the NIA, the updated assessment from our intelligence community.
I was so embarrassed by the briefing and so outraged by the lack of depth in the briefing, and I had staffers from both the National Security Committee and the intelligence committee with me, that I got up and said to the briefer, Dave Lazius from the CIA, that it was not worth my time to sit through.
They did not answer the most fundamental questions upon which the results of the briefing were based. In fact, Secretary Deutch later agreed with me the briefing was not what it should have been and has asked me to sit through a rebrief which I have agreed to do.
Mr. Speaker, the brief, parts of which have been leaked to the media, not by the Congress but by the administration itself, made the case that there is really no threat, we don't have to worry.
Less than a week after the administration deliberately in a political manner leaked out parts of that what is supposed to be a secret brief on intelligence relative to the threat from rogue nations. Less than a week later, the Washington Post, on December 15, ran a story.
Now, Mr. Speaker, this story is important. It is important because it gets to the heart of what we are talking about here. The Washington Post story documented that the Jordanian intelligence agency, working with the Israeli intelligence agency, had intercepted a shipment of sophisticated advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes. Now what is so important about a shipment of advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes? And I can't divulge the exact number. It is a classified number. But we know how many were confiscated in this country.
Mr. Speaker, those advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes were going from Russia to Iraq. In fact, that is where they were intercepted. Mr. Speaker, the items in question can only be used for a long-range ICBM. Now Mr. Speaker, we have been told that there is no threat from a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile coming from Iraq. Then why would there be advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes going to Iraq from Russia? And should we not question the Russians about why this technology transfer was taking place? Because if, in fact, they were taking place, that is a violation of the missile control technology regime.
So Mr. Speaker, when I was in Russia for a week back in January, on my seventh trip there, meeting in the Kremlin with Yeltsin's key defense advisers, Mr. Kortunov and others and meeting with Ambassador Pickering and our staff at the Embassy in Moscow, I asked the question, what is the Russian response to the technology transfer of equipment that can be used for a long-range ICBM from Moscow to Baghdad? Ambassador Pickering said we haven't asked them yet. And the Russians said, we don't know what you are talking about, even though it was a story in the Washington Post, even though we had the devices now in our hands since they had been confiscated by the intelligence community in both Jordan and Israel, that no one knows about this.
I can't believe it, Mr. Speaker. Here we have a technology transfer that is a direct violation of the missile technology control regime that only has one fundamental end purpose, and that is to give the Iraqis the capability for the long-range missile that we know Saddam has been after for a decade and we haven't even asked the Russians how it happened.
Now here is the problem, Mr. Speaker. If those items were stolen from Russia, that is a problem because that means the Russians don't have adequate controls over the advanced technology that would help Iraq or another nation build a long-range ICBM. But, Mr. Speaker, if the Russians did know they were being transferred and being sold to Iraq, that is a problem because that is not allowable under the MTCR.
And perhaps, Mr. Speaker, that is why the administration hasn't asked the question. Because this administration, back in August and September of last year, without a lot of fanfare, very quickly, without much attention from this Congress, although I asked questions of the administration at that time, rushed Russia into the MTCR. Because they wanted Russia to become a player of those countries who would abide by the controls put into place by the missile technology control regime.
The problem this administration knows, Mr. Speaker, is if they ask the question about the technology being transferred, they then have no recourse but to apply economic sanctions against Russia. And if they apply economic sanctions against Russia, that means we undermine Boris Yeltsin's leadership and perhaps cause turmoil inside of Russia and instability in this, an election year.
Mr. Speaker, that is absolutely the worst reason not to question the Russians about the transfer of technology that could ultimately pose a threat to our country. And it further undermines our confidence in the intelligence community assessing for us in a logical way without sanitization which is really occurring in terms of missile proliferation and technology proliferation around the world. I wrote a three-page letter to President Clinton asking him, and I would ask unanimous consent at this time, Mr. Speaker, to include my letter in the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection.
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Mr. WELDON of Florida. Asking the President some very specific questions about the technology transfer and I am still waiting for a response 1 month later. I also, Mr. Speaker, had a three-page letter drafted to the intelligence community asking for specific responses to questions about the upgraded intelligence assessment that was used by the minority party in the Senate to say we don't really have a threat to worry about.
Now, Mr. Speaker, some listening to this might think well, here is a Member of Congress who only wants to stick it in the eye of the Russians, he doesn't really care about relations with the former Soviet Union, he just wants us to build a bigger and bigger defense industrial base. First of all, Mr. Speaker, let me make this point. I have no parochial interest in missile defense. There were no contractors in my district, I don't have a military base in my district. I do chair the R&D committee.
Let me make one additional point, Mr. Speaker. I will match my record on Russian-American relations with any Member of this body. For the past 3 years I have cochaired the Russian-American energy caucus where I have worked with Members of the Russian Duma on joint energy deals, two of which are now in place, Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II with Mobil, Marathon, and McDermott
Corporations. Western companies will invest between $50 and $70 billion in Russia to help them develop their energy resources. We are now working on Sakhalin III. In fact, the Russian Duma last December passed a new production sharing agreement which will encourage other projects of this type to help Russia stabilize the economy. Just 2 weeks ago, I was the only Member of the Congress in attendance at a luncheon with Mr. Chernomyrdin and the Energy Minister from Russia Mr. Shafranik where we talked about joint cooperation in terms of energy investment. Secondarily, Mr. Speaker, I work with Russia on environmental issues, Nikolai Vorontsov, a member of the Duma, has chaired the globe task force in Russia on environmental issues. I have worked with him as a member of globe U.S.A., in fact, was in St. Petersburg leading the effort on the part of our Navy to put funding in to help the Russians clean up their nuclear waste in the Arctic Ocean and in the Sea of Japan. As a member of the National Security Commission have fought for the past several years to get additional funding to help the Russians deal with their terrible environmental problems, working with Bob Colangelo and Vartov to establish joint Russian-American energy initiatives. In fact, just in December of last year had the leading Russian environmental activist in our country testifying before my subcommittee on ways that we can work with the Russians on environmental initiatives. Mr. Speaker, we are doing a ton of work with the Russians on the environment. Mr. Speaker, we have also proposed establishing a new Russian-American Duma to Congress forum. In January of this year when I was in Russia, I carried a letter from you, Mr. Speaker, which I delivered to the new speaker of the Russian Duma, Mr. Seleznyov. This letter suggested that both speakers should support the establishment of a formal process where Members of Congress and the Duma company meet at least twice a year focusing on specific issue areas; namely, the environment, energy, defense, foreign policy, and relations, as well as other issues that are going to come up in the forefront, like the economy, health care, adoption laws, and so forth. That letter from you, Mr. Speaker, was delivered to Mr. Seleznyov by me. In addition, I met with members of the four major political parties in Moscow to convince them that it was in their interest to have more formal relationships with Members of the Republican and Democrat Parties in the Congress. I met with the Yabakov Party, Zhirinovsky's party, the Communist Party and Yavlinsky's party, and Mr. Speaker, the response was overwhelmingly positive from all of them.
But you know, Mr. Speaker, and we expect, by the way the Ambassador, the Washington Ambassador from Russia will be in my office tomorrow where I will meet with him, Ambassador Aleksey Arbatov where we will discuss the Russian administration, Mr. Seleznyov's response to your letter, Mr. Speaker, to establish this new forum, as well as your letter also outlining a proposal to establish a direct internet linkage where Members of Congress and members of the Russian Duma can communicate through simultaneous translation in a written form back and forth on an instantaneous basis. These are concrete proposals that we have made. These are concrete actions, Mr. Speaker, that we are taking on an ongoing basis. Last year I have hosted over 100 members of the Duma in my office. My goal is the same goal as President Clinton and that is to build a solid relationship between Russia that encourages economic growth, that encourages democratization and encourages the reforms you have been seeing in Russia. But the difference, Mr. Speaker--and this is a key difference, this administration wants to sanitize and ignore the realities of the Russian military threat.
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The key thing that we have to understand, Mr. Speaker, is that the leaders of the Russian military are the same leaders who led the Soviet military; they have not changed. They are not a part of the reform movement and many of the actions being proposed by the leadership of the Russian military potentially pose a threat to this country's security.
Mr. Speaker, I think the Russian people want us to call their military leadership when things occur which they even cannot ask in their own country about, yet this administration tends to want to put its head in the sand and not acknowledge issues that occur like the transfer of technology of the Acceleramas, like the effects of the morale problems in the Russian military, like threats posed by the transfer of the SS-25 technology and the threat that poses to the United States in terms of a rogue nation getting that capability.
It reminds me, Mr. Speaker, the Clinton's administration policy reminds me of my first amendment that I offered on the floor of the House in 1987. At that time there was a debate in this Congress that was going on about the ABM Treaty much like there is now, and on that debate, Mr. Speaker, the liberals were saying that we should adhere to the strictest interpretation of the ABM Treaty. My amendment was very simple. It said the Russians in fact were in violation of the ABM Treaty because they had installed a large fader-phased radar system in a town called Krasnoyarsk. My amendment passed the House 418 to zero; no Member voted against it. But many of the liberals who voted for it stood up on this floor, Mr. Speaker, and they said it is not an important issue. The Russians just built that radar for space tracking purposes. They do not plan to use it in violation of the ABM Treaty; that has never been their intent. It is an accidental location. Yes, it is a technical violation of the ABM, but it does not really matter because it is not going to be used for battle management and certainly would not be used against the United States.
That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker. In 1995, General Voitinsev in the Russians' Military Historical Journal was interviewed. Now General Voitinsev for 18 years was the commander of Russian air and space defenses for the entire Soviet Union. In the interview he was asked about Krasnoyarsk radar, Mr. Speaker, and in response to the question he said he was ordered to place the Krasnoyarsk radar where it was by at-that-time General Ogarkov. General Ogarkov was ordered to place it there by the Politburo, the ruling body in the Communist Party and in the Soviet Union. So here we have the 18-year commander of air and space defense command for the Soviet Union now admitting in a public record in Russia that he was ordered to place the radar where it was in direct violation of the ABM that would eventually allow the Soviet Union to break out of the ABM Treaty and have battle management capability that would directly threaten the United States.
So, Mr. Speaker, we have to understand the context in which the Russian military operates. There are some in our Congress and there are some in the White House who want to do whatever they can to bolster up Boris Yeltsin, and what I am saying is, Mr. Speaker, we have got to be candid and frank with the Russians. When they violate a treaty, we have got to call them on it. When they violate by sending equipment or technology to Iraq, we have got to call them on it. When they want to send SS-25 technology out around the world as a space launch capability, we have got to call them on that.
Mr. Speaker, that is in our interest and it is in the interest of the Russian people that we understand what is going on and that we want them to be as compliant as we expect ourselves to be. But Mr. Speaker, that is not happening in this administration. This administration wants to lift up the rug, bury everything under the rug and say do not worry, everything is OK. Mr. Speaker, it is not OK, and I am not about advocating massive increases in funding in these areas. Every dollar that we plused up, Mr. Speaker, last year was done so with the request of Gen. Malcolm O'Neill. General O'Neill is President Clinton's point person on missile defense.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, General O'Neill is retiring this May. Right before our break in January I got wind that he was retiring. I talked to him, tried to convince him to stay on because I have confidence in him. I think he is a great American and a great leader. I put together a letter, Mr. Speaker, asking Secretary Perry to reconsider and ask General O'Neill to reconsider and stay on as head of BMDO. Within 1 hour I was able to get 22 Members of this body who were the leaders on defense issues to sign that letter asking that General O'Neill stay on, 12 Democrats and 10 Republicans. Everyone from Jack Murtha to Floyd Spence to the key leaders on both sides of the aisle on defense issues signed that letter asking to keep General O'Neill on board. Why? Because we in a bipartisan way have confidence in him. he did not do that. He decided and announced this past week that he is going to retire and I got the word, Mr. Speaker, through the grapevine of the Pentagon that the administration, to further downplay the whole potential threat for missile defense, that they were going to replace General O'Neill, who is a three-star general, with a two-star, and the notion was that if Bill Clinton won the election by lowering it to a two-star position there would not be as much visibility. But if a Republican won the Presidential election, then the Pentagon would elevate it back up to three-star to give it the visibility it warrants.
Mr. Speaker, that is outrageous.
I will say that when I raised this issue with Dr. Kaminski he said he would not support that and felt that the appropriate level of support that has been displayed by General O'Neill as a three-star should be continued by whoever replaces him.
But, Mr. Speaker, the turmoil continues. The program outlined by this administration is not logical, it is not based on threat, it is not based on reality and we are going to counter that with every ounce of energy in our bodies this year, Mr. Speaker. In fact, tomorrow we will have our first missile defense hearing. Thursday I was supposed to have General O'Neill come in along with the Air Force and the Army. I am still scheduled to have that hearing on Thursday, where they can talk about their national missile defense capabilities. But, Mr. Speaker, unfortunately I heard in a phone call from General O'Neill yesterday that he is being told by superiors not to come before my committee. Perhaps there is something that he cannot say or perhaps the administration does not want it on the record again that, in fact, the people who are responsible for these programs are going to say directly opposite of what the Commander in Chief said, that in fact we can deploy a system that is not in violation of the ABM Treaty.
Well, I can tell you this, Mr. Speaker. I am having a hearing on Thursday, and I am having a hearing with General O'Neill and with General Garner from the Army and with the general from the Air Force to talk about it and if they are not there, we will have empty seats, and we will let the people of America decide.
Now, the Pentagon said we are sure we want them to come in because Dr. Kaminski has not briefed the Congress on program needs for this year. Mr. Speaker, that hearing has nothing to do with program needs. All we are talking about is what capability do we have now, what capability do we have now, and can we in fact deploy systems in the Air Force and in the Army using existing capabilities at a low cost that can give us some protection.
So, Mr. Speaker, if there is anyone in the Pentagon listening tonight, we are going to have the hearing on Thursday and I hope you show up because if you do not show up, we are going to have the hearing anyway.
Mr. Speaker, beyond that hearing we are going to have 10 hearings this year on the threat from missile proliferation, on the Russian command and control problems. We are going to have a hearing on joint, dual American-Russian cooperation in missile defense programs. We are going to have a hearing on the standpoint of political implications of the ABM from Russia's standpoint, just as I have asked the Speaker, their Duma, on the political implications of the ABM from our standpoint. We are going to have the most aggressive debate in this country's history on the threat to our people from a proliferation of missiles, and I would hope in the end, Mr. Speaker, that when we have to make a final decision on a defense bill that it will be based on fact and not rhetoric.
It troubles me though, the direction I see the administration going. The week before we left for the February work break, Mr. Speaker, we were called in as members of the Committee on National Security and we were told the administration was going to ask for a $3 billion reprogramming request from this year's defense bill. Now this administration, who is telling the American people we do not have enough money for defense, we do not have enough money for the priorities of missile defense, General Shalikashvili's letter to General Luck saying we would like to help you, but we do not have enough money for that and to protect our troops in Korea, this administration asked for a reprogramming, Mr. Speaker. One of the items was to reprogram $80 million of DOD money to train the police force in Haiti. Now, Mr. Speaker, to me that is outrageous.
I live near Philadelphia. Philadelphia could use $80 million for its police force. So could New York. I think Washington, DC, could use $80 million to train its police force. But this administration wants to reprogram $80 million of this year's DOD money to pay to train the Haitian police force, and they are telling us they do not have enough money for their priorities. This administration wants us to reprogram $200 million to pay the Jordanians for the peace agreement that President Clinton signed, $200 million out of this year's defense bill to assist Jordan in coming to the peace table; not coming out of State Department funds, not being appropriated publicly, but in a reprogramming request coming from this administration out of this year's DOD dollars.
Third, the administration wants to reprogram money for nation building in Bosnia. Now we are not asking the Germans to put money up, or the French or any other NATO country. We are going to reprogram money from out DOD budget to nation build in Bosnia.
Mr. Speaker, those are some of the outrages that I feel, but one that really got my attention during the break more than anything else dealt with the B-2 bomber. Mr. Speaker, I chair the Research and Development Subcommittee for the Committee on National Security, and I have consistently opposed the B-2 bomber this past year despite intense pressure from my party leadership, and the reason is not that I think the technology is bad, it is not. It is because we cannot afford it. In the current budget environment we cannot afford to buy more B-2's. But that battle was fought on the floor and those that supported the B-2, some of the most liberal Members who hate defense spending voted for it and we funded it. I think it was a mistake. But the ultimate goal of this President to go out to southern California, Mr. Speaker, just this past month and have a press conference and say to the workers working on the B-2, I think we ought to take another look at whether or not to build more B-2 bombers: Mr. Speaker, that is absolutely outrageous. Talk about hypocrisy, Mr. Speaker, that a President who says that we put too much money into the defense bill, that we plused up programs we should not have plused up is now talking about a study to determine whether or not we should build more B-2's. For those poor workers out in California who may be watching, Mr. Speaker, I would ask them to ask the President when that study is expected back. I would tell them it is probably the week after the November election and that is when the report will come back, no more B-2's.
Mr. Speaker, what I am saying in summary is it is time to stop playing politics with the defense of our country. Missile defense and the programs and priorities we have are not a Republican issue. Every gain that we made last year was done with support from my colleagues on the other side of the aisle. They were in the forefront of this debate. They were in the forefront on the committee, on the House floor, in the Senate, as well as the House of Representatives. This is a bipartisan issue that should be based on fact. If Neil Abercrombie's Hawaii is threatened by a missile from North Korea, every one of us needs to pay attention, and that is exactly the situation, Mr. Speaker, just as if Don Young's Alaska is threatened from a missile that can potentially hit parts of Alaska from North Korea.
This year, Mr. Speaker, we are going to lay the facts on the table through the extensive series of hearings that we are going to have, 10 in the subcommittee, 2 in the full committee, starting tomorrow, through briefings we are going to have. We are going to make the case that it is in our interest to work aggressively toward missile defense; it is in our interest to work with the Russians to convince them that they have more of a threat from missile proliferation than even we do. In the end we have got to work together to only defend the people of America, the people of Russia and freedom loving people everywhere, just as we are doing with Israel.
Mr. Speaker, we have helped Israel build the prototype for what will be their national missile defense system; it is called the Aero Program. The taxpayers of this country have put a half a billion dollars into that program and it is justified, it is a good program, and it is good to give Israel the security they deserve. Why do not the American people deserve the same security? Why should we build a system that can protect the people of Israel from a missile attack and leave the people of America vulnerable?
That is the question we have to answer, Mr. Speaker, and we can do it without massive increases in funding, we can do it with a very careful and deliberate approach that builds upon the technology we have today that will deal with the threat we have today and build and allow us the options down the road to build a more elaborate defense capability, a more robust defense capability.
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Does this mean that eventually the ABM treaty may have to be renegotiated? Absolutely. Mr. Speaker while I am not willing to take the treaty on this year, I am one who is firmly convinced the treaty has outlived its usefulness. But we need to understand the political considerations in Russia if we attack that treaty head on. My proposal is to grab the hand of the Russians and work with them to show them that we are no longer in a bipolar world with just two countries, with offensive military missile capability. We now have North Korea, we have Communist China, we have Iraq trying to get long-range missile capabilities, and it is in our interest to work together.
That should be the approach we use this year. Mr. Speaker, that will be the approach that I use as we begin our hearing process, and as we move forward to provide security for the people of this country with our fiscal year 1997 budget request.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the Washington Times article of February 15, 1996, and the letter to President Clinton of January 30, 1996.
The material referred to follows:
[Page: H1304]
From the Washington Times, Feb. 15, 1996
Plea for Missile Defense in Korea Fails
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has declined to back the commander of U.S. forces in Korea in seeking to reverse a Pentagon decision to delay a new missile-defense system urgently needed in Korea to protect U.S. troops from North Korean missile attack.
Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a cable told Gen. Gary Luck, the commander in Korea, that the Pentagon plans to scale back funds for the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to pay for other weapons modernization programs.
The Shalikashvili cable calls into question Clinton administration support for building effective regional anti-missile systems.
`Five years after 28 Americans were killed in the Gulf war by an Iraqi Scud, we still have no effective theater missile defense, which the administration has said is its top defense priority,' said Heritage Foundation defense expert Tom Moore, commenting on the cable.
`It is absolutely reprehensible that the administration is leaving American forces abroad exposed to these growing threats,' he said.
A spokesman for Gen. Luck had no comment. A spokesman for Gen. Shalikashvili said no final decision on the missile-defense funding has been made since the cable to Korea was sent.
Mr. Shalikashvili was responding to an earlier cable from Gen. Luck, who warned the threat of North Korean missiles is growing and that two THAAD batteries--18 launchers--are needed as soon as possible.
Delays in fielding THAAD, the first modern anti-missile system in decades, could have serious consequences for defending the peninsula against attack from the north, Gen. Luck stated in a Dec. 11 cable to Gen. Shalikashvili,
Gen. Luck wrote to seek the chairman's support for reversing the Pentagon's decision in October to hold up a new phase of THAAD development.
In his reply cable, Gen. Shalikashvili said that `I understand your concern,' but he did not say he supported efforts by Gen. Luck to reverse the decision placing a hold on THAAD's engineering and manufacturing development program, a new stage that would move the system closer to deployment.
Instead, the four-star general indicated THAAD may not be deployed at all. In 2002 or 2003, the Pentagon will put it in a `shoot-off' competition with a Navy wide-area missile defense system, he said.
Until the shoot-off, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which sets priorities for defense spending and weapons programs, `is recommending THAAD funding at a minimum level,' Gen. Shalikashvili stated.
`A final decision has not been made,' he said. `Will keep you advised.'
North Korea has deployed scores of modified Soviet-design Scuds, like those fired against U.S. troops during the Persian Gulf war, and reportedly is in the early stage of deploying a longer-range missile known as the No Dong.
The Shalikashvili cable also indicates that Pentagon missile defense policy is not in line with new provisions of the 1996 defense authorization bill, signed into law Saturday by President Clinton.
The authorization law orders the defense secretary to restructure regional missile defense programs to make Patriot PAC-3, THAAD and two Navy systems, known as lower and upper tier, top-priority programs. The law sets specific dates--all by 1999--for deploying the first models of the systems. Full-scale deployment must begin by 2000 for THAAD, and by 2001 for upper tier.
Gen. Shalikashvili stated in the cable that the primary objective of the internal review of missile defense needs to to `free up dollars for critically underfunded areas of recapitalization.'
The proposed competition in 2002 or 2003 between THAAD and Navy upper tier could delay production of the wide-area defense system by three to five years, Gen. Shalikashvili said.
More than a dozen Senate Republicans, including top party leaders, wrote to Defense Secretary William Perry last fall urging him not to delay THAAD.
Any slowdown in THAAD development would be considered `a declaration by the administration of a lack of commitment to theater missile defense,' the senators stated in a Nov. 7 letter to Mr. Perry.
Missile Defense
Excerpts of a cable sent to Gen. Gary Luck, commander of U.S. forces in Korea, from Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Jan. 19.
In response to Ref. A [a cable from Gen. Luck of Dec. 11], Ballistic Missile Defense programs are under internal DoD review to evaluate the cost-effectiveness strategies for meeting validated theater missile defense requirements. The primary objective is to free up dollars for critically underfunded areas of recapitalization. For this reason the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is recommending THAAD funding at a minimum level necessary to continue development toward a shoot-off with the Navy theater-wide ballistic missile defense system in 2002-2003.
`My execptation is that this JROC plan, if adopted, will possibly delay an upper tier production decision three to five years. Full impacts of the JROC course of action under consideration are to be assessed by the services and Office of the Secretary of Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. I understand your concern. A final decision has not been made. Will keep you advised.
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, January 30, 1996.
President William Clinton,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: I am writing to express my concern about the recent attempted shipment of Russian missile components to Iraq. While this shipment, which included gyroscopes and accelerometers designed for use in long-range missiles, was intercepted in Jordan, it raises serious questions about the Russian government's willingness or ability to halt proliferation.
Reports of this shipment, in contravention of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), surfaced publicly in December, several months after Russia was admitted as a full member of the MTCR regime. Whether the Russian government sanctioned the shipment or not, the events which transpired underscore the fact that Russia is at best unable or at worst unwilling to fulfill its MTCR obligations.
Recently, I travelled to Russia and met with members of the Duma, defense advisors to President Yeltsin and officials of Rosvooruzheniye, the main Russian state arms export company. Russian government officials with whom I raised the issue denied all knowledge of this highly reported incident. Rosvooruzheniye officials were aware of the attempted transfer, but denied any involvement. I also met with Ambassador Pickering, who indicated that the United States neither sought nor received any information or explanation from the Russian government about the attempted transfer.
This recent incident is not the first time that Russia has transferred missile technology to non-MTCR states. In 1993, Russia sold an associated production technology for cryogenic rocket engines to India. Recently, Russia transferred missile components to Brazil. To this very day, Russia continues to aggressively market a variant of its SS-25 missiles under the guise of a `space launch vehicle.'
If nonproliferation agreements are to have any meaning, they must be aggressively enforced through careful monitoring and the application of sanctions for violations. I believe that the Russian shipment of missile components deserves a forceful response from the United States, and I am deeply troubled by the U.S. government's apparent inaction in this regard. I would appreciate answers to the following questions in that regard:
1. Has the United States demanded from the Russian government a detailed explanation of the attempted shipment of gyroscopes and accelerometers to Iraq? If so, when did this occur and through what channels? If not, why not?
2. Has the Russian government responded, and what was the substance of the response? Does the Administration find it credible?
3. Do you believe that this shipment occurred with or without the knowledge of the Russian government, and what does your answer imply about Russia's willingness or ability to advance the U.S. nonproliferation agenda?
4. Why have sanctions not been imposed on Russia as a result of this attempted transfer of MTCR-prohibited missile components? What does the failure to impose sanctions, as required by U.S. law, say about the Administration's commitment to ensure the viability of the MTCR regime? Why wouldn't this set a dangerous precedent for others that might seek to circumvent or violate MTCR guidelines?
5. Russia's ascension to the MTCR regime as a full member imposes certain obligations on it that this incident demonstrates Russia is unwilling or unable to fulfill. What does that Administration intend to do to ensure full Russian compliance with its MTCR obligations in the future? Without acting firmly now in response to the attempted component transfer to Iraq, why should Russia believe that similar transfers will carry severe consequences in the future?
6. Please provide the dates and topic considered by the Missile Trade Analysis Group since the Russian shipment was reported.
7. Please list and describe all instances which raised U.S. concerns regarding compliance with the MTCR, all instances since 1987 in which the U.S. government considered imposing sanctions on a `foreign government or entity,' whether sanctions were in fact imposed and against whom; how long those sanctions remained in effect, and the reason why they were lifted.
Thank you for responding to these serious issues.
Sincerely,
Curt Weldon,
Member of Congress.
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