AMENDMENT NO. 2089
(Purpose: To express the sense of Congress on missile defense of the United States)
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen], for himself and Mr. Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 2089.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill insert the following:
(a) Findings: Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges is a global problem that is becoming increasingly threatening to the United States, its troops and citizens abroad, and its allies.
(2) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions `possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty'.
(3) Articles XIII and XIV of the ABM Treaty establish means for the Parties to amend the Treaty, and the Parties have employed these means to amend the Treaty.
(4) Article XV of the ABM Treaty establishes means for a Party to withdraw from the Treaty, upon 6 months notice, `if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.'.
(b) Sense of Congress: Given the fundamental responsibility of the Government of the United States to protect the security of the United States, the increasingly serious threat posed to the United States, the increasingly serious threat posed to the United States by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology,and the effect this threat could have in constraining the options of the United States to act in time of crisis, it is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the supreme interest of the United States to defend itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile attack, whatever its source;
(2) the deployment of a multiple site ground-based national missile defense system to protect against limited ballistic missile attack can strengthen strategic stability and deterrence;
(3) the policies, programs, and requirements of subtitle C of title II of this Act can be accomplished through processes specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the Treaty;
(4) the President is urged to initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty as necessary to provide for the national missile defense systems specified in section 335 to protect the United States from limited ballistic missile attack; and
(5) if these negotiations fail, the President is urged to consult with the Senate about the option of withdrawing the United States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, may we have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has the floor. The Senate will come to order.
Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has the floor.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I am going to yield to the minority leader in just a moment. I just want to indicate that during the course of the debate on the Levin amendment, I indicated that I would be sending an amendment to the desk for consideration that would, I think, clarify the intent of the Armed Services Committee, as far as the ABM Treaty is concerned.
My understanding is that the minority leader wishes to proceed at this point and introduce another measure dealing with welfare. I am prepared to yield to him if that is his desire, or we can continue to debate the amendment that I have now offered. But I am prepared to yield the floor for as much time as the minority leader needs, and then I will come back to my amendment following his statement.
Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Senator from Maine for his courtesy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.
Mr. DASCHLE. I seek the floor using my leader time to make a statement unrelated to the bill. If I can do that and then return to the bill just as soon as we complete the statements, I prefer to do that. I appreciate the courtesy of the Senator from Maine.
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Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will we be able to get a time agreement on this amendment? Is it going to be accepted? We just spent 7 hours on the last amendment. If this bill is not finished by tomorrow night, I think it is gone. I hope we can get a time agreement, if it is necessary to have it.
Mr. COHEN. If the leader will yield, I think we can have a fairly short time agreement. I think Senator Nunn and I are working through really modifying this amendment to make sure we have broad bipartisan support for it. It should not take very long. If the leader wants to propose a time agreement----
Mr. LEVIN. Will the leader withhold offering a time agreement until we can see the amendment?
Mr. NUNN. I will say to the majority leader, if he will yield, I would like to have a time agreement on this amendment no longer than an hour equally divided. I believe we would be better to put that unanimous-consent request after the minority leader makes his statement.
Mr. BUMPERS. If the majority leader will yield, I wonder if it is possible to sequence the amendments so the Members will have some idea as to the sequence. I am not pleading for mercy, but I have to go to a funeral in my State this weekend, with absolutely no reservation. I have to leave here tomorrow night. I have a couple of amendments, and I would like to offer them before I leave. I think it would be expeditious for the Senate if we can get some lined up and some sequence and time agreements, maybe 30 minutes or an hour. I think we got the tough ones out of the way. The rest should not take that much time.
Mr. DOLE. I think that is an excellent idea. Senator Daschle and I may be starting to put it together, to rotate back and forth on the sequence of amendments. I think the Senator from Arizona wants to do the same thing. Maybe we can do the Senator's this evening if he has to be gone tomorrow.
Mr. DASCHLE. I yield to the manager of the bill.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I just want to say that we have spent a long time now just on a few amendments. I hope we can get reasonable time agreements and finish up this bill. I am saying that we can finish this bill in a reasonable time tomorrow, if we stay here tonight and work a reasonable time and do not take too much time on any one amendment. Most of the people know how they are going to vote; it is just a matter of voting. I hope we are all together.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, given that, I will use my leader time, and Senator Dole and I will have an opportunity to go off the floor and talk.
I will yield to the Senator from Maryland, and following that, the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, for remarks regarding the Work First welfare reform plan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
(The remarks of Ms. Mikulski and Mr. Breaux pertaining to the introduction of S. 1117 are located in today's Record under `Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.')
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business before the Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is amendment 2089 offered by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn].
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I believe that language is still being worked out by Senator Cohen and Senator Nunn, and I believe that language will be resolved very quickly and with a commensurate time agreement.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is amendment No. 2089, offered by the Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside in order to allow Senator McCain to proceed with his amendment, and that there be a time limitation of 2 hours equally divided.
Mr. McCAIN. They are not ready for the time agreement.
Mr. COHEN. I ask unanimous consent that we set aside the pending amendment to allow Senator McCain to proceed with offering his amendment dealing with Seawolf. And, during the course of that time for debate, if we, Senator Nunn and I, come to the floor with our amendment, we then go off the McCain amendment and return to the Cohen-Nunn amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if I may repeat, my understanding of the parliamentary situation is that we temporarily set aside the Cohen amendment while negotiations continue on that amendment in order to take up the Seawolf amendment. It is also my understanding that a time agreement on the Seawolf is being negotiated. On the McCain amendment, there are negotiations going on, and I ask that the clerk keep time so that it will apply once the unanimous-consent agreement is reached for the purposes of moving forward.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct with respect to the parliamentary situation. The clerk will keep time on the McCain amendment.
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UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
This is the time agreement we wanted to obtain earlier. We could not do that. So I ask unanimous consent that tomorrow morning, after consultation with the managers--they can determine when to bring it up--Senator Thurmond be recognized to offer an amendment regarding title XXXI of the bill; that immediately after the reading of the amendment, Senator Exon be recognized to offer a second-degree amendment to the Thurmond amendment, and that there be 45 minutes of debate under the control of Senator Thurmond and 90 minutes of debate under the control of Senator Exon; further, that following the expiration or yielding of time, the Exon amendment be laid aside and Senator Reid be recognized to offer his amendment on tritium on which there be 60 minutes, to be divided 40 minutes under the control of Senator Reid and 20 minutes under the control of Senator Thurmond; and following that debate, the amendment be laid aside and Senator McCain be recognized to offer an amendment on competition, on which there be 10 minutes for debate, to be equally divided in the usual form; to be followed by a vote on or in relation to the Exon amendment, to be followed by a vote on or in relation to the Reid amendment, to be followed by a vote on or in relation to the McCain amendment, to be followed by a vote on the Thurmond amendment, as amended, if amended.
So we are talking about four amendments.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, everything is right except in the transcription, 45 should be 70 under the control of Senator Thurmond-- 90 and 70.
Mr. DOLE. I said 90--
Mr. BRYAN. Seventy, Mr. Leader, under the control of Senator Thurmond.
Mr. DOLE. Did I short him? Good. I gave him 45 minutes.
He wants 70.
Mr. REID. We talked about that all night.
Mr. DOLE. Make that 70 instead of 45.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Hopefully, when this happens tomorrow sometime, we will not take all this time, but we may. That would be 3 hours plus four votes. You are talking about a big, big time.
I would also ask consent--to accommodate Senator Bumpers --that following the disposition of this agreement, whenever it occurs, the previous unanimous consent, Senator Bumpers offer his amendment on defense firewalls, 1 hour of debate to be equally divided in the usual form, no second-degree amendment be in order, and that following the conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate vote on or in relation to the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Now, I might say to my colleagues, I know there are dozens of amendments out there. We are trying to accommodate those who have the shortest times. If we have 20 minutes equally divided or 30 minutes, we will try to rotate back and forth. It seems to me, if we are going to finish the bill, if everybody gets 2 hours, 3 hours, 4 hours, it is going to be 4 o'clock tomorrow afternoon before we take up 2 or 3 amendments here, and we cannot be on this bill Saturday.
I am not certain when we will get back on the bill. Senator Thurmond needs to leave tomorrow for an important family matter on Saturday. We will have votes on Saturday. We will be on at least one or two appropriations bills. If we should, by some miracle, finish this bill early tomorrow, we could go to Treasury-Postal tomorrow evening. If not, that will begin hopefully about 9 o'clock on Saturday morning. And there are two amendments there that may require some debate. Beyond that, it should not take very long, according to the managers.
Following that, it would be our intention either to move to welfare or to the Work Opportunity Act, or the Interior Appropriations bill.
So somebody asked me, what about Saturday. We have been saying for the last 2 weeks there will be votes on this Saturday and tomorrow. The day after tomorrow is Saturday, and there will be votes on Saturday, August 5.
AMENDMENT NO. 2089
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk which originally was designated as being cosponsored by Senator Nunn. That was in error. Senator Nunn is not a cosponsor of the amendment that I sent to the desk, and so I would ask unanimous consent that his name be withdrawn as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I have requested that the entire amendment not be read, but let me just point to the basic purpose behind the amendment and some of the pertinent language.
Mr. President, we had extended debate during the course of the morning and afternoon dealing with the ABM Treaty. Senator Levin spent, I believe, roughly 6 or 7 hours debating this issue. And I think it has been resolved on a close vote but nonetheless resolved.
I had intended and now do offer this amendment for the purpose of at least clarifying what my intent was in supporting the legislation as it was developed by the Armed Services Committee in the DOD authorization bill.
Basically, I believe it should be our policy to develop a defensive capability against a limited or accidental launch of a nuclear weapon against the United States. I believe we have an absolute obligation to the American people to say that in the event that anyone were so mad as to launch an ICBM toward the United States or one should be launched accidentally, we ought to have some minimum capability of destroying that missile before it arrives on U.S. soil.
I find it really quite astonishing to think that we would represent to the American people that a missile somehow has been fired, whether by accident or by miscalculation or madness, it is on its way to New York City, Washington, DC, Los Angeles, you name the city or town, and we have absolutely no way of stopping it. The best we can do is tell you that we will try to minimize the casualties; we will try to evacuate as quickly as possible after catastrophic damage has been done.
I think that is unacceptable to the American people given the fact that we are now witnessing the proliferation of missile technology on a fairly pervasive basis. And so what this amendment does is to express the sense of Congress on this matter.
Given the fundamental responsibility of the Government of the United States to protect the security of the U.S., the increasingly serious threat posed to the United States by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile technology, and the effect this threat could have in constraining the options of the United States to act in time of crisis, it is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the supreme interest of the United States to defend itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile attack, whatever its source;
(2) the deployment of a multiple-site ground-based national missile defense system to protect against limited ballistic missile attack can strengthen strategic stability and deterrence;
(3) the policies, programs and requirements of subtitle C of title II of this Act can be accomplished through processes specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the treaty.
Mr. President, what I am saying in this amendment is that whatever we do, we can do it consistent with the treaty. I want to stay within the limits of the treaty. The treaty allows us to seek to negotiate changes.
Originally we had a multiple-site ABM Treaty, two sites. We renegotiated it down to one site. With the changes of circumstances throughout the world, what we are asking is that we encourage the President to go to the Russians to seek to renegotiate the ABM Treaty for the purpose of allowing the Russians and the United States to have a effective capability against limited ballistic missile threats.
And so in this amendment the President is urged `to initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty as necessary to provide for the national missile defense system as specified in section 235' to protect us from a limited ballistic attack.
And `(5)'--and here is another key point--
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If the negotiations fail, the President is urged to consult with the Senate about the option of withdrawing the United States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with provisions of article XV of the treaty.
Mr. President, basically what this amendment says is, there is a potential threat that we ought to be facing and that we should seek to negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty. That is contemplated by the treaty itself. So I am urging the President to seek to negotiate with the Russians, and in the event he is unsuccessful in those negotiations to gain amendments allowing the deployment by each party of a limited system, that he then come back to the Senate and consult with the Senate about whether we should stay in the ABM Treaty as it originally stands now or whether we ought to opt out as the treaty allows us to do.
So this is a sense of the Senate that we ought to proceed with this system, that we ought to encourage the President and urge him to go and meet with the Russians and their negotiators to renegotiate the ABM Treaty to allow the deployment of a land-based system with multiple sites that would protect us against accidental launch or miscalculation, certainly not against an all-out attack by the Russians, but a limited type attack, so we can have the capability to defend ourselves.
We urge the President to do this, seek this. In the event he is unsuccessful, we ask that he turn to the Senate and at least consult with us as to whether we should stay in the treaty or get out of the treaty.
Mr. President, I believe that is a fair expression of the sentiment that was expressed during the debates within the Armed Services Committee. I believe it is a fair expression of the sentiment on this side of the aisle. I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge all Members on both sides of the aisle to read this, of course, because some people may disagree with it, parts of it, particularly on my side of the aisle.
I do not disagree with anything in the Cohen resolution. I think it is helpful in the sense that it points in the right direction for the President to negotiate changes rather than simply assert changes. And that is clear in paragraph 4. I think also that it is the correct procedure for the negotiations. If the negotiations fail with the Russians, the President is urged to consult with the Senate about the option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty under provision of article XV of the treaty.
I agree with some of the findings. Some of the people on this side of the aisle may not agree with the findings. I do. This is very close to what we had in the Missile Defense Act that Senator Warner and I sponsored 2 or 3 years ago in the Missile Defense Act.
What is the problem with it? There is no problem with it that would keep me from voting for it, but it does not correct any of the things that we pointed out as being what we considered --most of us on this side and a few on that side of the aisle--to be fatal flaws with the bill itself. What it does not do because it is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, it does not change any of the operative provisions in the underlying bill. And the operative provisions have the force of law. So we have got sense-of-the-Senate legislation that cannot by its very nature change the force of law.
So anyone who thinks there are problems in the underlying bill would not be comforted by this. This does not cure the problem. That is the reason I have not cosponsored it, not because I am not going to vote for it, not because it is not in the right direction, because it is. But it does not change the operative provisions of the bill which establish a number of legal restrictions on the President. This is, I believe, the first time I have seen provisions that restrict the President as to what he can negotiate. The underlying bill restricts the President of the United States in terms of his ability to negotiate.
Now, I believe that will be challenged by many as unconstitutional. I do not try to make a judgment on it. But I imagine that those in the executive branch would assert it is unconstitutional on its face. Whether that is the case or not, in my view it is bad policy, because if the President of the United States cannot negotiate, who can? We do not have a negotiating team from the U.S. Senate that I know of. We have an arms control observer group, but we make it clear we never negotiate; we simply discuss. So if the President cannot negotiate these changes, even if they are changes that the majority wants, how do we get changes in the treaty?
The Cohen amendment deals with one set of changes. And I think it appropriately says the President should negotiate the amendments to the ABM Treaty as necessary to provide for the national missile defense system specified in section 235. So the sense-of-the-Senate resolution does urge him to move in that direction.
The restrictions on negotiations of the President, however, do not relate to that section; they relate to the section that we talked about at length earlier in the debate which gets to the demarcation point between theater ballistic missiles and strategic ballistic missiles. And the defense against strategic ballistic missiles is that restricted by the ABM Treaty. The provision on theater ballistic missiles is not. And that demarcation point is defined in the underlying bill as a matter of law, and the President in the underlying bill is told that he cannot negotiate on that point. He cannot do anything on that point. And, therefore, I do not see how the Russians would ever accept that.
Now, maybe no one cares whether they accept it or not. But as I said earlier today, I do not think they have the option to go to defenses at this stage because of their economic condition. What they do have the option to do, and what they have said repeatedly they will do. So unless you believe they will not do what they said they are going to do, there is nothing in this amendment that changes the problem of the bill. And that is, it encourages, in fact it makes it clear to the Russians that we are going to move forward notwithstanding any concerns they may have on the ABM Treaty and that we will not comply with ABM Treaty in certain respects. And if they want to take action, then they will take action.
What action will they take? In my opinion they will simply not ratify START II. They will not, in my view, continue to draw down their missile forces under START I.
So, inadvertently, in the name of defending the United States and the people in the United States, the underlying bill, in my view, almost, not quite, because you cannot ever predict with certainty a foreign country's behavior, but it almost assures that the United States will end up with thousands of more missiles pointed at this country than we would otherwise have. I do not see how that improves our defense.
We are basically saying we want to move forward in 10 years to defend against threats that may be here in 10 years, that are not here now. But the threat that is here now, that is, the SS-18's the SS-24's that are pointed at us now that we want to take down, and the two Republican presidents have negotiated successfully to get the Russians to take down, we do not worry about that threat. It is now being dismantled. We put provisions in here that are likely to require or at least to encourage the Russians to keep those missiles pointed at us. I do not see how I can go home and tell my people that I voted for an underlying provision in a bill that is likely to keep thousands of missiles that we have described as the foremost threat that is aimed at the United States that we spent 15 to 20 years trying to figure out how to either negate through a deterrence policy, through a policy of negotiations, one way or the other, either through defenses or negotiation that we finally had two Republican Presidents, President Reagan and President Bush, successfully concluded the negotiations--one of them is now being implemented, START I, the other is pending in the Russian Duma and in the Senate.
So we are going to put a provision in here that says to the Russians, `We are going to go ahead anyway. And we are going to disregard the ABM Treaty. But you do what you choose.' I think what they are going to choose to do is keep those missiles pointed at us. Now maybe 10 years from now we will be able to defend against them. 2003 is the date. But understand, we are only talking about a thin defense, a thin defense against a few missiles and a Third World country
or an unauthorized launch or terrorist group that gets ahold of a ballistic missile or cruise missile. I want a defense against those. I am in favor of defense. I am in favor of amending the ABM Treaty, but I think we ought to do it through the procedure of international law and the procedure of American law, because a treaty is American law, and we are the ones who signed up for the ABM Treaty. It is our law now. It is the law of the land.
A treaty is the law of the land. We are saying disregard it in the underlying bill. I do not understand the logic, Mr. President. I cannot understand the logic of taking a step in the name of defending the people of America that is likely to end up having thousands of warheads pointed toward us while we spend 10 years and billions of dollars to figure out how to defend against a threat that is not yet here. I do not understand that logic.
Mr. President, I will vote for the Cohen amendment. It does not cure the underlying defects in the bill. I will have another amendment, in all likelihood. It depends on whether I have a chance to get it adopted. If I do not, then I will simply leave the bill as it is now and people can make their choice. But if I do have a chance to have it adopted, I will have an amendment that sets forth very clearly what our policy is. Succinctly what that would be is a policy, first of all, of coming forth with a defensive system in this country that protects against unauthorized launches, that protects against accidental launches, that protects against a third country defense, but that does so in compliance with the ABM Treaty.
Second, we ask the President to try to amend the ABM Treaty with amendments that would allow us to deploy that kind of system.
Third, if he fails to be able to amend it with the Russians--that is, if the Russians refuse--that we then consider our option of terminating our ABM obligations in accordance with article XV of the treaty itself, which says we can give 6 months' notice and terminate those obligations.
Mr. President, to me, that is a sensible policy. In the meantime, we should not tie the hands of the President of the United States to negotiate. We ought to insist that anything that has the nature of a treaty come before us for approval. We should not let treaties be amended by the executive branch, but we should not prevent the President from negotiating. We should not prevent him from negotiating a demarcation point.
I happen to agree with the demarcation point in the bill. I think it is perfectly reasonable. I do not mind putting it as a matter of findings. I do not mind saying this is the policy of the demarcation point. But I do not want the President to be prevented from saying to the Russians, `This is what the Congress thinks and I would like for you to sign up to this.' We preclude him from even doing that. He cannot negotiate anything.
I do not believe that provision will stand, because I do not think it will become law. But if it does become law, I think it probably will be challenged on constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, that is where we are.
I urge my colleagues to agree with the findings in the Cohen amendment, to vote for it, because I think the provisions make sense. I think they are a step in the right direction, but it does not cure what I consider to be fatal flaws of the underlying provisions.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Cohen has 12 minutes; Senator Thurmond 4 minutes.
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Mr. NUNN. How much time do I have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four minutes and 40 seconds.
Mr. NUNN. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in addition to the fact this amendment highlights the flaws in the underlying legislation because of what it does not address, it still leaves the President's hands tied. He cannot negotiate. It still commits us to deploy a system which is in violation of the ABM Treaty. That all remains. But in addition to actually highlighting the flaws of the underlying bill and not curing it, this resolution raises two questions, in my mind.
First, it says that the President is urged to initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty. The underlying bill also has sense-of-the-Senate language which is exactly the opposite, which says the President should cease all efforts to modify U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.
The Cohen language says initiate it, presumably as soon as you can. In section 4, the President is urged to initiate negotiations to amend the treaty. The bill, which is left untouched, has sense-of-the-Senate language which says cease all efforts until the Senate has completed its review process. It is just totally inconsistent with the underlying language. That is No. 1. But No. 2 is a question to my good friend from Maine.
When the resolution says that it is in the supreme interest of the United States to defend itself from the threat, if one votes for this resolution, does one thereby commit himself or herself to withdrawing from the ABM Treaty under the supreme interest provision in the ABM Treaty? In other words, would this vote be looked back at as a statement on the part of people voting for your resolution that, in fact, we should withdraw from the ABM Treaty because of a supreme national interest?
Mr. COHEN. The answer to my friend is no. What the language of my amendment says is the President should, in fact, initiate negotiations. I believe we should seek to negotiate a provision to the ABM Treaty to allow for the construction and deployment of a multisite limited system. And you will see the second part of that is, if the President is unsuccessful, he is to return and consult with the Senate to see whether we should stay in the treaty or get out of the treaty under article XV.
Mr. LEVIN. The language urging the President to negotiate in one part in your resolution, and the underlying bill says cease and desist all negotiations as to modify the treaty, do you view those as inconsistent?
Mr. COHEN. I believe there is an appearance of an inconsistency that came about as a result of an attempt by the majority to prevent the President negotiating to apply the ABM Treaty to the theater missile defense system. That is where that confusion came about.
I believe it is in our interest to urge negotiation on the part of the President to seek to revise the ABM Treaty in order to allow for deployment of a multiple site system here in this country and in Russia.
I might point out that I disagree with the statement of my friend from Georgia----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Levin's time has expired.
Mr. COHEN. I yield myself 1 minute. That with respect to section 238, I do not believe you can point to that language as preventing the President from negotiating. It simply says that the appropriated funds may not be obligated or expended by any official of the Federal Government for the purpose of prescribing, enforcing, or implementing. It does not prevent him from negotiating, but he could not implement any changes that would apply the ABM Treaty to theater missile defenses. The difference, he could not negotiate, he could not implement under the language of section 238.
Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield, because there is a subsection (B) that says take any other action.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. COHEN. At the direction of the majority leader, I yield back my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I think after this vote, I talked to the managers and what they would like to do, and I say this to all my colleagues, is to stay here. There are probably 25, 35 amendments that can be accepted, some on each side of the aisle. They are willing to stay here, and that will take a big amount of the amendments that are pending.
We now changed our list and, hopefully, before we go out tonight or tomorrow morning, we will have an agreement these will be the only amendments in order. That will at least give us a finite list. It is pretty long. We have 190-some amendments and everybody wants 2 hours. So I do not think we can make that by tomorrow night, the way I look at it. But you have to be optimistic around here. I know Senator Thurmond is, he is going to finish it by 6 tomorrow night, or earlier, more or less.
This will be the last vote tonight, but I say to my colleagues on both sides, the managers are here, the staffs are here. A lot of the amendments have great merit and are going to be accepted. This is an opportunity to have your amendment accepted. Then the managers will determine what time we start tomorrow morning and whether we start on the agreement we have or some other amendment. That will be up to the managers.
I thank my colleagues.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Cohen has 8 minutes, and Senator Nunn has 1 minute.
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Mr. COHEN. I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. NUNN. I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
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