NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996 (Senate - August 03, 1995)
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in a moment I will send an amendment to the desk which would strike language from the bill which violates the ABM Treaty, which establishes unilateral interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and which also would tie the President's hands in even discussing the ABM Treaty with the Russians.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, however, that I now be allowed to yield the floor to Senator Exon for 10 minutes, and then to Senator Baucus for 5 minutes, without losing my right to the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, may I ask the Senator from Michigan, as part of that, will he agree to a time agreement on his amendment?
Mr. LEVIN. We are trying to see how much time will be required by various speakers. We are trying to put that together right now. We are working on that.
Mr. McCAIN. Also, reserving the right to object, following your amendment, there will be no more amendments on this issue?
Mr. LEVIN. I cannot say that; I do not know that.
Mr. McCAIN. Again, reserving the right to object, I remind the Senator from Michigan, we have now been on this single issue for all intents and purposes for 2 days.
At this point, we will have thoroughly ventilated the ballistic missile defense issue, and at some point we should acquire a list of proposed amendments and be prepared to move forward. I hope it is possible we could start reaching some time agreements.
The issue is a very important issue. I understand. It is critical. At some point, I think we should move on to other issues. There are other Members who plan on proposing amendments. I hope we can move forward.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to make an objection. Reserving the right to object, can I inquire of the Senator whether or not, given the somewhat unusual procedure of asking two Senators be allowed to speak--you now holding the floor--would the Senator include in his request that those desiring to speak will not offer amendments?
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I will modify my amendment. But I also will modify my UC in another way.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, is it in order for a quorum to be called at this point?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am sorry, I did not hear you.
Mr. LEVIN. Is it in order for a quorum call?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. No, it is not. The Senator from Michigan has the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. I object to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the most dangerous portion of this bill, in my view, is its head-on assault on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This is not a subtle issue. This is not an issue of interpretation. That is a frontal, head-on assault which says that it is now going to be the policy of the United States----
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, could we have order in the Senate? The Senator is making a very important speech. He is entitled to be heard.
I make the point of order the Senate is not in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senate is not in order. Will we remove the conversations, please, from the floor? Will we remove the conversation over here on my left from the floor, please? The Senator may proceed.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the language we are going to analyze, that is in this bill, directly confronts the ABM Treaty and says it is the policy of the United States--and these are the words of the bill--no longer to abide by the ABM Treaty.
It does it in a number of ways throughout this bill, but the way in which it does it first is by simply stating, in section 233, that `It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple site national missile defense system.' It goes on beyond that in section 233, but that is a very clear statement of what the intention and what the effect is, of this bill.
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator from Michigan yield for one second?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to.
Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to withdraw my objection to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Nebraska to speak for 10 minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Arizona. While we were going back to the unanimous consent, I would like to modify my UC in another way. This relates to the question of how many amendments will there be on this subject.
It was my intention originally to offer three different amendments striking the bill in three different places. I believe there has been some discussion between the ranking member and the chairman on this subject. I am not positive. But my amendment strikes language in three separate places and, rather than having three amendments striking three different places, since the issue is generally the same, I would modify my unanimous-consent request to make it in order that the amendment that I send to the desk strike three different provisions.
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator work on a time agreement for that amendment?
Mr. LEVIN. We are working.
Mr. THURMOND. As I understand it, the Senator has one amendment; is that correct?
Mr. LEVIN. I have one amendment touching the bill in three different places rather than having three amendments. This is the only amendment on ABM that this Senator has. But there are other Senators who may have other amendments.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Michigan.
If he wants to proceed with his unanimous-consent request, I will not object.
Mr. LEVIN. As modified?
Mr. McCAIN. As modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Is it necessary, when a unanimous-consent request is made, is it necessary for a Senator to reserve the right to object to get the floor?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. When a unanimous-consent request is made, the Senator making the request retains the floor. Others may ask for a right to reserve the right to object at the sufferance of the Senator having the floor.
Mr. BUMPERS. But is it necessary for a Senator to be recognized? When a request is made for a unanimous-consent agreement, is it necessary for the Senator to say `I reserve the right to object' in order to state whatever he wishes to state or she wishes to state?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the appropriate process to proceed.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, my question is, is it necessary?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is appropriate.
Mr. BUMPERS. But it is not necessary, is it?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair says it is an appropriate process.
Is there objection now to the UC?
If there is confusion here, will the Senator restate his unanimous-consent request, please?
Mr. LEVIN. I am not sure the confusion relates to my unanimous-consent request. I will be happy to restate my unanimous-consent request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If you would.
Mr. LEVIN. That is, I now be allowed to yield the floor for 10 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska. Following his 10-minute remarks, without offering an amendment, that the Senator from Montana be recognized for 5 minutes, and that he is not intending to offer an amendment. And that, then, I retain my right to the floor.
It is now part of the modified UC that it be in order in the amendment, which I will send to the desk, that it touch the bill in three places.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank my friend from Michigan, Senator Lott, and others for their cooperation. I would simply say, we have just gone through an exercise in futility, although finally successful. Had the Senator allowed me to proceed, I would have been almost through with my statement at this time. But at least I appreciate the consideration that has been offered by both sides.
There has been some criticism about the possibility of redundancy with regard to this authorization bill, particularly with regard to ballistic missile defenses. I simply say, this is the time to pause, this is the time to reflect, this is the time, if you will, to take some time. Because what we are about, in this authorization bill, is going to have long-range, possibly serious implications, in the view of this Senator, who has worked on these matters for a long, long time.
Later in the day, I believe, probably my colleague from Arkansas, Senator Bumpers, will be addressing some of the issues that I will be addressing now, and he will probably be referencing a statement that came out of Moscow today with regard to what the Russians are doing and not doing and thinking as we proceed in this area.
Certainly, the policies regarding the national security interests of the United States should not be dictated by Moscow. But certainly, since we are talking about the possible violation if not the outright violation of treaties that we are a party to and a part of, we are talking about serious business here. And whatever redundancy is necessary to get that message across should be the order of the day.
Mr. President, I rise to offer my thoughts on the fiscal year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act. Rarely in my 17 years in the U.S. Senate have I come to the floor to take issue with a Defense authorization bill reported out of the Senate Armed Services Committee. As a member of the committee, I have usually been satisfied that the reported bill was the product of a bipartisan effort to further advance our national security objectives. To my dismay, the content and philosophy embodied in this year's bill is a significant departure from those of previous years. Crafted with little bipartisan consultation, the bill reported out of the committee represents a regrettable and potentially harmful U-turn in our national security policy that will, unless corrected, return the United States to the confrontational cold war policies of the 1980's that predated the fall of the Soviet Empire.
While much in the committee bill is laudable and will greatly enhance the readiness and capabilities of our Armed Services, I am fearful that these constructive elements of the authorization bill will be offset by misguided efforts to defend against threats that do not exist and hostile attempts to scuttle international agreements intended to enhance our security through peaceful means. As originally drafted--I emphasize `originally drafted'--in the Armed Services Committee, this bill attempted to: abolish the Department of Energy; gut the cooperative threat reduction program responsible for the removal of thousands of Russian nuclear warheads from their missiles; prevent the administration from carrying out a number of important nuclear non-proliferation agreements relative to North Korea and the former Soviet Union, and purchase unwanted B-2 bombers at a potential cost totaling tens of billions of dollars.
While the majority of the Armed Services Committee was successful in overturning these and other astonishing hardline recommendations, many provisions remain in the reported bill that will return us to the cold war mentality of yesteryear. Among the most objectionable of these reversals are bill provisions that: advocate violation of the antiballistic missile treaty; as has been briefly addressed and will be addressed more so by the Senator from Michigan on an amendment that I am a cosponsor of.
Add over $500 million in star wars missile defense funding; endanger ratification of the Start II Treaty, and resurrect at least two battleships.
Let me repeat that because this is an old battle that this Senator has carried on against unneeded, unwanted, and useless battleships.
It resurrects at least two battleships at a cost of nearly a $0.5 million a year with untold future modernization and operations costs; and, mandates the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.
These are just a few of the things that I think are terribly wrong with this bill.
The defense authorization bill is rife with legislative initiatives and reshuffled spending priorities intent on rekindling an arms bazaar that will have both domestic and international repercussions. The bill includes $7 billion--let more repeat that this bill includes $7 billion--in additional spending above the administration's request, a large majority of which has been siphoned off for the purchase of ships, planes, trucks, and other weapons not requested by the Pentagon. The so-called readiness debate we used to hear so much about is dead after only a year. The real winners in the committee reported bill are the defense contractors who stand to receive billions of dollars in unexpected weapons buys.
While our domestic spending accounts are being squeezed tighter and tighter--and while the polls are showing very clearly that with all the hoopla the standing in the public with the newly created Congress is going down and down. The people are catching on.
So I emphasize again, Mr. President, while our domestic accounts are being squeezed tighter and tighter, this bill contains a Christmas list or unexpected gifts for home State contractors that carry staggering price tags: $770 million more for missile defense contracts; a $650 million downpayment for two more DDG-51 destroyers; $1.3 billion for the unrequested LHD-7 assault ship; 12 more F-18's than asked for and the list goes on. Add in to this mix a committee initiative establishing a loan guarantee program for defense contractors to export their weapons overseas and you can understand why defense contractors throughout the country are popping champagne corks: Christmas has indeed come early.
But the bill to the taxpayer is not complete at the committee passed authorization of $264.7 billion. There is a built-in cost overrun. In the rush to fund these and other unrequested multibillion dollar weapons, the committee majority did not fund the anticipated expenses for ongoing Department of Defense operations in Iraq and Bosnia. This outstanding bill, the cost of which will in the mean time come out of Pentagon operation accounts, will come due next year and I warn my colleagues to not be surprised when this $1.2 billion expense is funded in part by more domestic spending cuts. Ironically, this built-in cost overrun is nearly identical to the cost of the LHD-7 add-on. I would hope that the Senate will reconsider this issue during floor debate and decide to place the operations funding of our troops in the field overseas above the cost of building an unneeded naval vessel.
While the funding priorities in this bill are questionable to say the least, there should be no doubt as to the design and effect of the bill on arms control and international relations. The defense authorization bill before the Senate takes aim at scuttling the ABM Treaty by requiring that the United
States break out of the treaty and deploy a multiple site national missile defense system by 2003. Caught in the cross hairs of the committee's aim is the START II Treaty as well. Although this arms control agreement is a good deal for the United States as well as global security, the defense authorization bill does its best to see that it is killed in the cradle. That is precisely what will happen if the bill provision to break out of the ABM Treaty is approved. Ratification of START II will be blocked by the Russian Duma and the new alliance between our two countries will, in turn, be irreparably damaged, thrown into a resumption of the cold war, and still higher defense budgets. The bill is filled with jabs at Moscow designed to create distrust toward the United States and harm our new alliance. As if breaking out of the ABM Treaty and derailing START II Treaty ratification is not enough, the bill adds $30 million for a new antisatellite weapons program, it attacks and limits the Nunn-Lugar program that has been responsible for the safe and accountable disarming of over 2,500 former Soviet nuclear warheads, it cuts Energy Department nonproliferation, arms control, and verification funding, it recommends reconstituting our nuclear weapons manufacturing complex at untold billions of dollars while at the same time advocating the resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing. This last committee initiative is contrary to U.S. policy and is designed to scuttle ongoing comprehensive test ban negotiations and any prospect of reaching a treaty agreement. I will have a great deal more to say about the issue of nuclear testing later on during the consideration of this bill.
In summary, I am concerned with the tone and substance of the bill. The level of micromanagement placed on the Pentagon and the Department of Energy is unprecedented and harmful to our Nation's standing in the international community. Many of the committee initiatives are driven by a desire to defend against a superpower threat to U.S. security that simply does not exist. At a time when our one-time enemies are now allies and the world community is committed more than ever before to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the committee bill is at odds with reality and in strong need of amendment before it can properly serve our Nation's security interests.
At a time when American leadership in the world community is strongly needed, we cannot be viewed as a nation living in the past, jousting with imaginary dragons in order to lay claim to the mantle of being `strong on defense.' We are a strong country, the preeminent military power in the world by far. But we must also be forward looking and recognize that it is in our national interest as well as in the interest of other nations to encourage arms control and alliances based on collective security. It is unfortunate that some feel more comfortable in an adversarial environment than in one based on cooperation and a lowering of superpower antagonism.
Like a beehive, the world in 1995 has the capacity to be both dangerous and peaceful. If handled properly, the hive can be benign and capable of producing sweet honey. If agitated, however, it can become hostile and threatening. The defense authorization bill in its present form is a sharp stick ready to be jabbed into the hive. The design and intent of the bill is to agitate the world community to the ultimate detriment of ourselves. This is not the time in history to rekindle the rhetoric of the cold war. I urge my colleagues to support amendments that will correct these and other self-defeating elements of this flawed legislation.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana has 5 minutes.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from Michigan retains the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, this bill is a head-on assault on the ABM Treaty. There is nothing subtle about it. Unlike our existing policy which permits us to consider whether or not we wish to withdraw from the treaty at the appropriate time, if and when there is a threat and after we have done the research and development to see how much it would cost to put up a national defense and after we have gathered together the information that we need and the impacts that we need in order to make that decision on a reasonable basis, this bill decides now that it is the policy of the United States to pull out of the ABM Treaty. It makes no bones about it. The language of section 233 says:
It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system.
That is a clear breach of the ABM Treaty. Article III of the ABM Treaty says:
Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems at more than one site.
The ABM Treaty has permitted us to do a number of things. First, it is permitting arms reduction in offensive weapons. Without the ABM Treaty, the Russians are not going to be reducing their offensive weapons, as they have agreed to in START I and we hope they will ratify in START II. That process is going to be ended because if they are going to be facing missile defenses, they are going to be increasing the number of offensive weapons rather than decreasing the number of offensive weapons.
They have told us that. So the ABM Treaty has allowed us to do the most important single thing we are probably doing right now in the nuclear strategic world, which is to reduce the number of offensive nuclear weapons.
The ABM Treaty has also allowed us to avoid a defensive arms race, where a defense is installed and there is a countermeasure to the defense, and then there is a counter-countermeasure to the defense, and then there is a counter-counter-counter, and on and on ad infinitum.
But first and foremost, what is going on right now is the dramatic reduction of offensive arms, and we have been told by the Russians--and I am going to read from General Shalikashvili's letter in just a moment about how seriously he takes this issue--they are going to stop the reduction of offensive arms and forget the ratification of START II.
That is what the stakes are in this discussion. This is not some theoretical discussion about defenses. This is a premature decision to destroy a treaty which is allowing us now as we speak to reduce the number of offensive weapons that threaten us, that face us, that are aimed at us now.
The bill also States in section 235 that to implement the policy that I just read in section 233:
The Secretary of Defense shall develop an . . . operationally effective national missile defense system which will attain initial operating capability by the end of the year 2003.
It shall be developed in a way which includes ground-based interceptors deployed at multiple sites.
There we go again with the multiple-site breach of the ABM Treaty. Section 235 also provides for an interim operational capability. It is all laid out very specifically as to the deployment schedule for the ABM system.
Now, this is a head-on collision. This again is not like our current law provides, that we are going to continue to do research and development on nationwide defenses, on strategic missile defenses. This bill decides now that it is the policy to deploy such a system before we have done the research and development and before we have concluded our negotiations with the Russians in an effort to make such a nationwide defense system permissible under an amended treaty.
This is not a question of interpretation. This is the head-on clash, this is the trashing of the ABM Treaty. This is the establishing of a policy now to pull out of the ABM Treaty. I cannot think of anything much more shortsighted than this. It is a provocative move to commit ourselves now to deploy an illegal national defense system, the ABM Treaty be damned. This is going to wreck the START treaty which was a landmark arms reduction treaty which was achieved by President Bush, and it is going to spark a buildup of offensive weapons instead of the reduction of offensive weapons which we have been trying to achieve.
Now, General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote me the following on June 28:
While we believe that START II is in both countries' interests regardless of other events, we must assume such unilateral U.S. legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification by the Duma and probably impact our broader security relationship with Russia as well.
The Secretary of Defense has weighed in in strong opposition to these missile defense provisions saying, in a letter to Senator Nunn dated July 28:
These provisions would put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM Treaty. The bill's provisions would add nothing to the DOD's ability to pursue our missile defense programs and would needlessly cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks.
Secretary Perry's letter continues as follows:
. . . certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty would be very damaging to U.S. security interests. By mandating actions that would lead us to violate or disregard U.S. Treaty obligations--such as establishing a deployment date of a multiple-site NMD system [national missile defense system]--the bill would jeopardize Russian implementation of the Start I and Start II Treaties, which involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic nuclear weapons.
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The bill's unwarranted imposition, through funding restrictions, of a unilateral ABM /TMD demarcation interpretation would similarly jeopardize these reductions, and would raise significant international legal issues as well as fundamental constitutional issues regarding the President's authority over the conduct of foreign affairs.
And he concluded as follows in his recent letter to Senator Nunn:
Unless these provisions are eliminated or significantly modified, they threaten to undermine fundamental national security interests of the United States.
That is pretty strong language. Here is the Secretary of Defense, telling us this language, unless it is eliminated or significantly modified, will `* * * threaten to undermine fundamental national security interests of the United States.'
Not only would this committee decision to deploy missile defenses destroy a treaty which has been a cornerstone of global nuclear arms control for over 20 years, it would increase the threat to the United States by leaving more nuclear weapons pointed at us and it would, in addition, poison our relationship with Russia, a relationship which is improving and beginning to stabilize. Now, why do we want to risk that? Why do we want to hand the hard-liners in the Russian Duma an excuse to block the ratification of the Start II Treaty and resume an offensive arms race, instead of continuing and accelerating the dismantlement of nuclear strategic weapons? There is no new threat of massive nuclear missile attack on the continental United States requiring a decision now to pull out of the ABM Treaty.
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Clapper, said:
We see no interest in or capability of any new country reaching the continental United States with a long range missile for at least the next decade.
For several years, we have had a bipartisan consensus in Congress for continuing research on national missile defense that is consistent with the ABM Treaty.
We have had a consensus that we should preserve the option to decide later to deploy a national missile defense system if the threat increases or if it proves financially feasible, or both. At the same time, we have had a national or bipartisan consensus that we should seek ABM Treaty understandings or changes that are mutually agreeable between the United States and Russia, and we should be doing these things simultaneously. We should be doing research and development of national missile defenses. We should be seeking understandings and modifications of the ABM Treaty while these research activities are continuing, and we should keep the option open when the time comes to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
This bill before us breaks that bipartisan consensus, and instead decides now that it is the policy of the United States to trash the ABM Treaty and to withdraw from it. This bill commits us to meet a deployment program that is simply reckless because it is so intentionally provocative to the Russians without any military benefit to us because our present program is unconstrained by the ABM Treaty. What we are doing now in missile defense research is unconstrained by the treaty.
We do not need to make this decision now to trash a treaty which is allowing us to reduce the number of offensive weapons that threaten us. That is what is so reckless about this language. It prematurely commits us to a course of action which we need not take now and maybe never need to take. We do not know that.
We have had a bipartisan consensus to keep an option open. This wipes out that bipartisan consensus. Now, there is another provision in this bill which is threatening to our security in the eyes of Secretary Perry, and that is the one that sets a demarcation line between short-range and long-range missiles. Defenses against the former are permitted. Defenses against the long-range missiles are not.
What is the demarcation line? What is the range? We have been trying to negotiate that with the Russians as to what is the precise line between a short-range missile and a long-range missile. We put a proposal down on the table which we hope is going to be adopted. This bill incorporates our proposal as U.S. law.
We, in this bill, unilaterally adopt the proposal that the administration is making at a negotiating session and saying they cannot deviate from their proposal. Now, that is a rather unusual way to negotiate: You are sitting down with the other side, trying to reach an agreement, and your Congress back there unilaterally puts into domestic law what your first proposal is. Now, what would we think if the Duma did the same thing? We say we would like a range of 3,500 kilometers and the Duma says, unilaterally, the ABM Treaty means a range of 3,000 kilometers. Now, what would our reaction be? We are sitting at a negotiating table with the Russians, trying to figure out a demarcation line, and the Russians unilaterally make their own interpretation and make it their law, and tell their President he cannot deviate from that law. He cannot even sit down with the Americans to talk about it. He cannot even listen.
Under this bill, the President's people are not even allowed to listen to a Russian proposal because that would involve the expenditure of funds; that is, travel funds. So you can kiss goodbye those negotiations. And, by the way, the language in this bill says it is the sense of the Senate that the President cease all negotiations for a year. That is just sense-of-the-Senate language. But there is the power of the purse that is used here to prevent the President or the President's people from implementing any Presidential policy relative to the ABM Treaty. Negotiations to set a demarcation line are over.
Now, this is a country that has thousands of nuclear weapons that we have been in a cold war with, that we are trying to improve our relationship with, and we have had some real successes. And now we put one stick, two sticks, three sticks right in their eyes. For what? A new threat? Has our research carried us to the point where we now can even make a decision as to whether we can effectively and cost-efficiently deploy such a system? We are not at that point now.
The ABM Treaty does not constrain our research and development. That is why Secretary Perry said that the bill's unwarranted imposition through funding restrictions of a unilateral demarcation interpretation would jeopardize these reductions and would raise significant international legal issues, as well as fundamental constitutional issues regarding the President's authority over the conduct of foreign affairs.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters from General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the bill does not stop there.
Mr. KENNEDY. I wonder if the Senator will yield for a question, or does he prefer to finish.
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield for a question.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I have been listening with great interest to the Senator's comments, and I find them enormously persuasive.
Does the Senator agree with me that these negotiations on SALT I and SALT II have been worked out in a very comprehensive way by Republican Presidents, Democratic Congresses, Joint Chiefs of Staffs, Secretaries of Defense? They were all negotiated not just as a way of trying to ease some pressure on the Soviet Union, but were negotiated because they were considered to be in the United States national security interest. It was Republicans and Democrats alike, after debate and discussion in the course of the hearings with the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, and over a very difficult and complex period of time, as to the nature of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that these were put into place because the leaders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the leaders of our military establishment, the Secretaries of Defense, the Secretaries of State, Presidents of the United States--Republican in these instances in terms of the SALT agreements--believed that they were in our national security interest.
As I understand from the Senator's excellent presentation, just by reviewing the particular words and phrases that are included in the defense authorization bill, the provisions that are included in the legislation, that this is effectively saying that a majority, in this case probably in terms of the vote, are expressing a counterview; that somehow they have better knowledge of the security interests and the nature of the nuclear threat to the American people than that long-term negotiating process that took place by those who were very sensitive to the security interests, the role of the United States and the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Can the Senator comment briefly on the historic context? I found very persuasive the particular details.
Second, does the Senator from Michigan, if he assumes that all of this was done in our security interest, believe that this is an extraordinary action on the floor of the U.S. Senate, when we are having our challenge in our relationship between China and the United States--we recently have heard about two military officers who were actually arrested in China; we have the tragic circumstances around Mr. Wu who has been apprehended, and the human rights violations--a range of different challenges that we are having with one of the other great world powers, China?
Our Secretary of State is involved in trying to work out at least some kind of modus operandi with the Chinese. As a student of history and as one of the leaders in the U.S. Senate on the whole issue of arms control policy, does the Senator from Michigan feel that we should be unilaterally abrogating the solemn treaty of the United States with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons that will certainly, in a very significant way, put in serious threat our relations with the Soviet Union? Does this make any sense?
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is right. The Secretary of State has written a letter to Senator Nunn dated August 2, which I also want to print in the Record, which addresses the questions which the Senator from Massachusetts has raised.
These arms reduction treaties, starting with the ABM Treaty, which is limiting arms, and then going to START I and START II--START II is before us now, supported by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee--these have been negotiated by Democratic and Republican administrations alike. These are not partisan treaties.
President Nixon is the one who negotiated the ABM Treaty. This is a Republican President who strongly believed that the ABM Treaty was in our security interest, and I believe every single President since has supported keeping the ABM Treaty, modifying it at times. We have had protocols to it, we have had interpretations to it, but it has allowed us to reduce offensive arms. So it has had broad bipartisan support in administration after administration.
The Secretary of State points that out when he says in his letter to Senator Nunn that `successive administrations have supported the continued viability of the ABM Treaty as the best way to preserve and enhance our national security.' And the Secretary of State points out that these unilateral interpretations `would immediately call into question the commitment to the treaty and have a negative impact on United States-Russian relations and on Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of the START II Treaty.'
The START II Treaty is going to come to the floor of the Senate one of these days, I understand with the support of the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, negotiated by a Republican President. It allows us to significantly reduce, dramatically reduce, the number of offensive nuclear weapons which we face.
We are told by General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry that for us to trash the ABM Treaty will threaten the ratification of the START II Treaty. It makes absolutely no sense in terms of the bipartisan consensus which has been put together for these treaties over the years and in terms of reducing the number of offensive weapons. So I agree with the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator's conclusion be that should the violation of the ABM Treaty--and I think the Senator has made that case both with regard to the multiple-site issue and also for the unilateral declaration on the theater and strategic systems, which are in the process of being negotiated, and the unilateral action or statement or sense-of-the-Senate resolution, that as far as our chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to the President of the United States as well as the Secretary of State--those who have responsibility in the nature of both defense policy in this area and diplomacy--that the counteraction will be an action by the Soviet Union which will result in more nuclear missiles being pointed toward the United States, there will be more nuclear missiles pointed to the cities in my State, there will be more nuclear missiles pointed to cities in the Senator's State, and that there will be less security in terms of the citizens of our Nation from the dangers of nuclear war?
Finally, let me just ask the Senator, how does the whole Nunn-Lugar effort fit into this whole process? We have been involved in the very recent times with a bipartisan effort to try and help and assist the dismantling of Soviet weapons systems. For the obvious reason, as the Senator and others have pointed out, we believe that kind of reduction is in our security interest.
There have been difficulties in terms of the expenditure of funds and other factors which I know that the Armed Services Committee and DOD are interested in. The Congress has been reviewing that effort in terms of trying to see further action in the dismantling of nuclear weapons.
Does he think that this kind of unilateral action will enhance that whole kind of effort for further dismantlement, or does the Senator believe that whole effort will be undermined in a significant way as well?
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This is a very threatening thing, we have to understand, to us. This is a threat to our security, what is going on in this bill language, because instead of seeing offensive weapons aimed at our States continuing to be reduced, the numbers of those weapons are suddenly going to go up instead of down. At a minimum, we are going to see the termination of these dramatic reductions which we have been able to achieve under START I and START II.
Mr. KENNEDY. I know the Senator has further comments to make, but I want to ask him, as I understand the situation we are facing in the Soviet Union--we are facing local elections that are going to be taking place in the next year.
It is also a commitment in terms of the Presidential election which is to take place next year--there is movement in terms of the Soviet Union and, as I understand it, in terms of the political process and activity of increasing involvement and intensity and increasing United States investments.
Obviously, there are the creaking problems of a new nation finding itself in terms of trying to develop democratic institutions in that nation. Does the Senator, as someone who is a student both of the Soviet Union and the recent history of this time, does he think that this will help to stabilize the nature of the political discussion in the Soviet Union? As he has pointed out, the reduction of these nuclear arms was done because we believed they were in the security interests of the United States. As the Senator pointed out, if we take this action, that will be threatened.
Does he believe, as well, that if the Soviet Union did this action to the United States, there could be a counteracting reaction here in the Senate and among the American people? Does he anticipate that this may very well have some factor and force in terms of the domestic politics and defense politics of the Soviet Union?
Mr. LEVIN. This unilateral action in setting the dividing line between short-range and long-range missiles, which has been subject of the negotiations, suddenly is yanked out from those negotiations, the U.S. Senate usurps this and puts into American law what it believes the demarcation line is and prohibits the President from negotiating any other demarcation line. At the same time, we establish the policy of the United States to deploy a system which clearly violates the ABM Treaty.
Doing those things will play into the hands of the most rabid, anti-Western political forces in Russia. We are going to pay a terrible price, not just in having more weapons face our States, we are also going to pay a terrible price in terms of lending unwitting support to the very anti-Western forces in Russia which are creating so much difficulty already, not just for Russia, but for the rest of the world.
Mr. KENNEDY. Finally, the Senator spent a great deal of time in recent years, along with others, in terms of the meaning of the ABM Treaty. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee. All of us were enormously impressed during the 1980's and 1990's when the ABM Treaty issue and related issues were being reviewed as to the meaning. I think all of us who followed this whole issue in terms of arms control and the ABM Treaty are very mindful of the expertise which the Senator from Michigan has.
I hope at some time during the debate that at least included in this record, there will be some references to that review and that study, so that those that may be newer Members of this body can have some appreciation for the extensiveness and the depth of the hearings that were held on the meaning and significance of the ABM Treaty, which was challenged and reviewed and reviewed. So that the presentation will be given the weight that it should have. I think some reference or incorporation of some past discussion of that history is important for the understanding of the Senators.
I thank the Senator. I hope that our colleagues listen carefully to the excellent presentation. I find it absolutely persuasive. We have not gotten into if the Soviet Union takes corresponding action, what will be the corresponding action here in the United States. I think anybody who has followed the arms issue with the Soviet Union can predict that very easily and with certainty, not only with the cost but the instability that will be brought about.
So I thank the Senator. I think it has been a very important presentation. I think, in many respects, this may very well be either the first or second most important vote that we will have this year. I hope our colleagues give it attention.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. He reminds us that we had a debate here, and there was an effort made by Senator Nunn and myself, and many others, to avoid a unilateral reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty during the 1980's. This Senate has had a long history in not undermining treaties or not undermining chief executives who are aimed at negotiating treaties. We have an advise-and-consent function that is very different from putting into American law unilateral interpretations and prohibiting Presidents from even negotiating relative to treaties.
Senator Nunn's leadership during the 1980's on the whole ABM issue--and the Senator from Massachusetts was correct, he was deeply involved in it, as well--was part of a long-time bipartisan effort, generally, on the part of the Senate to avoid this kind of unilateral interpretation of treaties being put into American law and undermining the executive branch in their negotiating function, as well.
Now, Mr. President, the language in this bill, by saying that `appropriated funds may not be obligated or expended by any official for the purpose of implementing any executive policy that would apply the ABM Treaty to the research, development, or deployment of a missile defense,' means the President and the President's representatives cannot even listen at a negotiation. They cannot even use travel money. `Appropriated funds are prohibited here from being obligated or expended by any official for the purpose of implementing an executive policy that would apply the ABM Treaty to the deployment of a missile defense.'
That is section 238(b). In another subsection: `Or from taking any other action to provide for the ABM Treaty to be applied to the deployment of the missile defense.'
That is what the ABM Treaty is all about.
So this language does three things. First, it unilaterally says what the demarcation is between short-range and long-range, and makes that the law of the United States. It prohibits the President of the United States from negotiating anything other than that. He cannot even listen to anything other than that.
It does one other thing. This is some of the most, I think, extreme language I have read in any bill, almost on any subject that has come to the floor because, under this language, if there were a test that violated this definition of a long-range system, nobody could act to stop it, because it says here that `appropriated funds may not be expended by any official to implement any policy that applies the U.N. treaty to the deployment of a missile defense.'
What happens if you have a test here of an ABM system against a missile with a range of 4,000 kilometers, clearly in violation of the demarcation line, by this new demarcation line. Under this language, until the test is completed, the prohibition on the use of any funds to stop that test stands.
This language says that `unless and until there is an ABM qualifying flight test of a system, this prohibition stands.'
This language goes so far as to say that even if there is going to be a flight test of an ABM system against a missile, with a range that clearly violates this unilateral declaration, that nobody can stop that illegal action on our part, which is admittedly illegal under this unilateral definition because the flight test has not occurred. Unless and until the flight test is completed, this restriction stands.
The ABM Treaty cannot be used to stop a test, even if it is illegal, by the definition in this bill.
Now, if we want to talk about language which is so excessive, this fits the test. That is what it says, what I guess is the frosting on the cake. What the bill provides is that we will have a commission to look at this whole thing. On page 61 of this bill, section 237, it says that the Senate should undertake
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Now, in addition to undertaking a comprehensive review of the ABM Treaty, we were are also told in subsection B we should consider establishing a select committee to carry out the review, and to recommend such additional policy guidance on future application of the ABM Treaty, as the select committee considers appropriate.
Now, that is a little bit like having the hanging first, and then the trial. This bill says it is our policy to trash the ABM Treaty; this is the dividing line unilaterally; the President cannot negotiate anything else. But it is our policy now under this bill to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. That is what this bill says.
Then the same bill that says that says: But we are going to have a study; we are going to have a comprehensive review of the continuing validity of the ABM Treaty.
We ought to have the study before we trash the treaty. Looking at the committee report on page 119, it says:
The committee believes that Congress should undertake a comprehensive review of the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty, with the intent of making a well-informed and carefully considered recommendation on how to proceed by the end of the 104th Congress.
That is supposed to be the purpose of this comprehensive review.
On page 120, the majority says it is prudent--prudent--to dedicate a year to studying all ABM Treaty-related issues and alternatives, and recommends the review of the continuing value and validity--a careful 1-year review, the report says--of the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty. Why not do the `careful' study before we decide to trash the treaty?
If it is prudent to have a 1-year study of the ABM Treaty's value, is it not prudent to have the review prior to saying it is the policy of the U.S. Government to trash the ABM Treaty? Does not prudence dictate that you withhold your conclusion until after the study?
If the purpose of our `comprehensive careful 1-year review' is to make a study of the value of the ABM Treaty, for heaven's sake, we should withhold the conclusions until after the study. That is not what this bill does. This bill says it is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-site system. That is an illegal system under the ABM Treaty. That is why Secretary Perry says that these serious consequences argue for conducting the proposed Senate review of the ABM Treaty before considering such a drastic and far-reaching measure. He underlines the word `before.'
It seems to me it is just absolute common sense that we do not reach conclusions and implement those conclusions the way this bill does, with initial operating capability, with a date set, 2003. There is an IOC of 2003 for a national missile test, an interim capability mandated by the bill for this system.
We are mandating violations of a treaty when at the same time in another part of the bill we say we are studying the continued validity of that treaty. That makes no sense at all.
Mr. President, I will be sending an amendment to the desk which addresses these three issues that I have just outlined. It will strike the words that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-site system, since that is directly violative of the ABM Treaty; we will also strike the language which sets forth in permanent law what the demarcation line is between long-range and short-range missiles, since that is the subject of negotiations; and we will also strike the language which prevents the President from even discussing any matters relative to the ABM Treaty with the Russians.
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