
THE THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1995 (Senate - April 06, 1995)
Sen. WARNER
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today, in continuation of my long-standing efforts--working with many others--in support of missile defenses, to in troduce the Theater Missile Defense Act of 1995. I am please to have as original cosponsors of this legislation Senator Dole, Senator Thurmond, Senator Lott, Senator Cohen, Senator Nickles, Senator Kyl, Senator Stevens, Senator Cochran, and Senator Smith.
Mr. President, few would argue with the compelling need we are facing for defenses against the growing threat of attack from theater ballistic missiles. Indeed, poll after poll has shown that the overwhelming majority of Americans believe that we already possess a highly effective capability to defend forward-deployed troops--and indeed the United States--from ballistic missile attack today are only slightly better than they were during the gulf war.
Iraqi SCUD missile attacks during Desert Storm brought home to all Americans the vulnerability of United States forward-deployed troops to short-range--theater--ballistic missile attacks from third world nations. Although the Iraqi SCUD's were rudimentary , comparatively inexpensive, weapons which were not considered `militarily significant,' they wrought havoc on allied operations, alerts disrupted the front lines as well as the rear echelons. And on February 25, 1991, an Iraqi SCUD missile attack that st ruck a United States military barracks in Saudi Arabia represented the largest single cause of American casualties during Desert Storm.
Currently, over 30 nations have short-range ballistic missiles. And 77 nations have cruise missiles in their inventories. The defenses being developed to counter theater ballistic missiles will also incorporate some capabilities to counter cruise missiles . In addition, the Department of Defense is actively pursuing a dedicated effort to develop defenses which are focused specifically on the growing curse missile threat.
As the gulf war demonstrated, the threat such missiles pose to the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces is real, immediate, and growing. We must accelerate the development and deployment of highly effective theater missile defense systems to protect our troops. We owe it to the brave men and women who serve in uniform to provide them with the most advanced defense systems which we are technically and financially capable of producing. Work on such defenses should not in any way be constrained by restrict ive and erroneous interpretations of the ABM Treaty--a 23-year-old treaty with the former Soviet Union. I would also like to point out to my colleagues that the restrictions of the treaty currently hamper the defense efforts of only two countries- -the United States and Russia. To the extent we allow the U.S. to be `handcuffed' by the limits of this Treaty, the U.S. fails to utilize its full scientific potential while other nations are free to pursue their defenses against ballistic missile attack unrestricted by this treaty.
Mr. President, the ABM Treaty was never intended to limit or restrict theater missile defense systems. The administration concedes this point. In addition, I have had the opportunity to discuss this issue recently with two individuals who were int imately involved in the ABM Treaty negotiations, John Foster and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. They both agreed that defenses against theater missiles were never contemplated during the ABM Treaty negotiations. According to Se cretary Kissinger, the focus of the negotiations was on defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles because, `Those were the only systems that were in existence.'
But, unfortunately, this administration is pursuing a policy--and is in the process of negotiating some type of legal obligation, or `demarcation agreement,' with the Russians--that would allow ABM Treaty limitations to restrict our theater missil e defense efforts. Indeed, an administration delegation headed by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott left last evening for Moscow to discuss a number of issues, possibly including the demarcation talks. I note that Deputy secretary of Defense Deutch dropped off of this trip, in part because of concerns expressed by a number of Members of Congress that he intended to conclude a demarcation agreement wit the Russians while in Moscow.
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