AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SPRATT
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Spratt:
Strike out section 232 (page 31, line 17 through page 32, line 4), and insert in lieu thereof the following new section:
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to deploy at the earliest practical date highly effective theater missile defenses (TMD) to protect forward-deployed and expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and to complement the missile defense capabilities of our allies and forces friendly to the United States; and
(2) to develop, test, and deploy, at the earliest practical dates, a national missile defense system (NMD) that complies with the ABM Treaty and is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks.
Page 32, strike out line 17 and all that follows through line 5 on page 33 and insert in lieu thereof the following:
(1) Up to 100 ground-based interceptors at the site now designated by the ABM Treaty or additional ground-based interceptors at such other site or sites as the Secretary of Defense may recommend if deployment of ground-based interceptors at more than one site is allowed by amendment to the ABM Treaty.
(2) Fixed, ground-based radars.
(3) Space-based sensors that are capable of acquiring and tracking incoming reentry vehicles as an adjunct to ground-based radars.
(4) Battle management, communication, and control systems integrated with ground-based radars and space-based sensors.
Page 38, line 5, strike out `DEFINED'.
Page 38, line 6, insert `(a) Definition.--' before `For purposes of'.
Page 38, at the end of line 11, strike out the period and insert the following:
and all Agreed Statements and amendments to such Treaty in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act or made after such date.
Page 38, after line 11, insert the following:
(b) Interpretation: Nothing in this subtitle shall be interpreted to violate, or to authorize the violation by the United States of, the ABM Treaty. Any provision of this subtitle that authorizes or requires the United States to deviate from the ABM Treaty is premised on the assumption that before any such action is taken amendments will be made to the Treaty to make such provision compliant with the Treaty.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] and a Member opposed will each be recognized for 10 minutes.
Is the gentleman from California opposed?
Mr. HUNTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] will control the 10 minutes in opposition.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, my good friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], chairman of the subcommittee, has just said in the well of the House to those who want to abrogate or violate the ABM treaty, he is opposed. It is not timely. And I agree with him.
I will come to the reason I agree with him in fuller detail in a minute, but basically it boils down to this. It is not an opportune time to talk about that because the ratification of START II hangs in balance right now.
The authors of this bill, therefore, say they don't support violation; they seek abrogation, not now, of the ABM treaty. All my amendment does is call for clarity, for the removal of any ambiguity, for spelling out their intention which they have stated here in the well of the House so that there is no mistake about it.
Section 233 of this bill, however, calls on the Secretary of Defense to deploy at the earliest practicable dates a national missile defense, NMD, system designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks.
This NMD system, according to the bill, shall include up to 100 ground-based interceptors at a single site or at a greater number of sites as determined necessary by the Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, the ABM treaty as it is now written limits the United States and Russia to 100 interceptors at 1 site. By requiring in this bill that any national missile defense system protect the entire United States at more than one site, if necessary, we are going beyond the boundaries of the existing treaty. We may need to, and I anticipate that in the very language of my amendment when I say, `Stay within the ABM treaty or the processes of it and seek amendments where necessary.'
But as I read the bill, the Secretary has no leeway and, in effect, it requires a multisite system and this is a violation of the treaty as now written.
As I said, my amendment deals with it by saying any such language would be interpreted to mean that we would seek an amendment to permit it before we went ahead to do it.
Now, section 233 also refers to direct queuing of interceptors, that is having an interceptor on the ground queued by the so-called Brilliant Eye, or low-Earth orbit satellite, which will be put into place some time around the turn of the century if we ever deploy a missile defense system.
This language is, too, a technical violation of the treaty. Now, I think we probably ought to clarify the amendment and permit it, but my amendment would say simply that if you are going to do it, then go seek a clarification or an agreed statement, or something that will permit it if you want to use that language.
My amendment anticipates, calls for, the deployment of a national missle defense system which would include 100 interceptors at 1 or more sites if the additional sites were approved by amendment. A ground-based radar system and space-based sensors plus BMCCC, Battle Management Command, Control, and Communications software.
Now, why is all of this so important? It is important because in the next 4 or 5 months the Russian Duma will either take up or not take up, and will either ratify or not ratify, START II. If START II is ratified, we will reduce Russian warheads, a real threat, which can be launched against us by
5,000, which is a significant diminution of the threat to the security of the United States today. It would reduce those by 5,000 down to 3,500 warheads.
We cannot build a missile defense system that will effectively shoot down so many Russian missiles, so much ballistic missile threat against us, so cheaply as the ratification of START II. Why put it in jeopardy by leaving any ambiguity in this bill?
Ratification by the Duma is shaky at best. It is by no means assured. And any signal this Congress sends that we may be breaking out or reaching beyond the terms of the ABM treaty could doom START II. And now is not the time to send such a signal.
START II serves our national security interests, as I said, by reducing the number of warheads that can be launched against us by 5,000 warheads; an enormous number. But it also does something else for our national security.
By lowering the number of warheads that we will have to maintain in our arsenal, the launchers, the platforms from which they would be launched, it also frees up resources for other national defense needs which are really more pressing right now. It would save us the cost of maintaining a huge nuclear arsenal with more than 8,000 warheads in it.
If START II is not ratified, then Secretary Perry warned in an address at Georgetown more than a year ago that we, the United States, will have no other choice. We will not go below START I levels. And there is no money currently in the DOD budget or the DOE budget to support this higher level of maintaining an arsenal of 8,500 warheads.
We will have to cut into funding for conventional forces, for quality of life, for modernization, for readiness, in order to pay to maintain the arsenal at this higher level. I would rather pay to maintain a stronger conventional force. I would rather get rid of those 5,000 warheads potentially aimed at us.
This amendment simply seeks to take the authors of the bill before us at their word and say, deploy a national missile system, but stay within the confines of the ABM treaty. If you need to amend it to go to multiple sites, then do so. Amend it.
But it sends a signal to the Russians at a critical time here on the eve of ratification of START II that we are not about to break out of the ABM treaty.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
[Page: H5947]
Mr. HOKE. I thank the chairman for yielding me this time.
The reason that we should not pass this amendment, and the reason that we should not be concerned about the ABM treaty, notwithstanding whether or not what happens with respect to this bill does or does not violate the ABM treaty, and as you know we have got a letter that says it does not, but the reason that we ought not to be so concerned about that is that the former Soviet Union and Russia is not the only nation that has the capacity, the ability to lob a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead at the United States.
What we have done is we have taken this policy, this national strategy that is based on mutually assured destruction that may have had validity in 1972, and we have extended it 25 years into a point in time when Russia is joined by as many as 25 or more other nations that have the same capability to blow up cities in the United States.
It is just a bad policy that I believe in the broad sweep of history is going to be seen as something that was peculiar and bizarre and should be completely abrogated.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Cramer].
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I am a strong supporter of our Nation's defense and a strong supporter of a robust national missile defense program. My community is strongly involved in that defense program. And I support the missile defense program outlined in this bill.
I strongly support the Spratt amendment. This amendment is frankly a very simple one, and I cannot imagine why anybody would oppose it. It simply reaffirms our Nation's commitment to a reduction of nuclear weapons.
This amendment in no way changes the missile defense program outlined in this authorization bill. The Spratt amendment would simply require that we develop, test, and deploy a national missile defense system that complies with the ABM treaty. It would allow for any future amendment if we determined that we need a missile defense system that might not need to comply with the ABM treaty.
I believe this amendment is crucial, this amendment today is crucial to our efforts to ratify the START II treaty. This amendment does not affect the theater ballistic missile programs, and only affects our national missile defense programs. I urge my colleagues to support the Spratt amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Spratt amendment.
Mr. Chairman, a nearly identical amendment was considered in the Committee on National Security's markup of H.R. 1530. That amendment was rejected on a bipartisan vote of 18 to 33. This amendment should be defeated. It is designed to obviously cloud the issue and for that purpose, only.
The Spratt amendment is unnecessary. There are no activities planned for fiscal year 1996 that would conflict with the ABM treaty, as noted in the letter from General O'Neill referred to previously, who is the director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
More importantly this amendment sends the wrong signal. The Clinton administration in its zeal to `strengthen the ABM treaty' is seeking to turn the ABM treaty into a theater missile defense treaty, and constraining our theater missile defense systems.
The President continues on this course despite repeated appeals from the Republican congressional leadership and others.
A `yes' vote on the Spratt amendment is an endorsement of the President's approach to all missile defense.
The amendment would also essentially grant Russia an effective veto over our missile defense deployments in the future. All of us ought to find this unacceptable and resent it. The United States ought to be able to take whatever actions are necessary to defend our territory, its troops, and our interests. This amendment is not in our national security interest, and people who vote for it are not acting in the best interests of this country.
I strongly urge my colleagues to vote `no' on the Spratt amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask how much time is remaining on each side?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] has 3 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] has 7 minutes remaining.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Edwards].
Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, I am a hawk on defense. I support increased funding to ensure a strong national defense, and yesterday I voted for increased funding for the B-2 bomber.
[TIME: 1415]
However, there is a huge difference between being a hawk on defense and possibly jeopardizing the elimination of 5,000 Russian nuclear warheads. No national defense system can stop that many warheads.
By insuring compliance with the ABM Treaty, the Spratt amendment will contribute to the elimination of 5,000 nuclear warheads that someday could be aimed at America's citizens, at America's children. To do anything, to do anything at this time, this crucial time, that might jeopardize reduction of those 5,000 Russian nuclear warheads would not be being strong on defense. It would be sheer insanity.
If the authors of this bill say the bill does not violate the ABM Treaty, they should have nothing to fear from this amendment. On the other hand, despite the authors' intentions, if anyone someday might interpret this bill as being in violation of the ABM Treaty, then our grandchildren's future depends on the passage of this amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Bateman].
(Mr. BATEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
[Page: H5948]
The debate need not and should not focus on any expectation or any claim that we are in jeopardy of violating a solemn treaty obligation of the United States of America.
What is involved here is allowing our technicians, our scientists to explore that technology which works best and most cost effectively to provide us with theater and national ballistic missile defense systems. If the best answer to those scientific equations is that we need to go back and renegotiate the ABM Treaty, that is exactly what the Constitution and the law will require, and what will be done.
If any messages are being sent here, it is a garbled and misinformed message to the Russian Duma that somehow or another we are concerned with and intend to violate a solemn treaty obligation. That is not what this provision is about.
Common sense would dictate if the best technology for our ballistic missile defense system nationally or for the theater is something that violates that treaty, then all common sense says we should go to the Russians, to anyone else, and renegotiate it. We also must bear in mind that under the very terms of the treaty itself, by giving appropriate notice, we are freed of any obligations under that treaty, and clearly should do so if violating it would be putting in jeopardy our ability to effectively defend this Nation either as a nation or its forces in the theater from missile attacks.
The common sense of this is to reject this amendment. We are sending the wrong message.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time, 2 minutes, to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
I commend him for his amendment, and I strongly support it.
I think what this debate really is about is an abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty. The Spratt amendment assures that however the United States proceeds on missile defense, it stays within the terms of the ABM Treaty. That treaty is 23 years old. It has been the foundation for all of our arms control agreements with Russia.
Today we certainly may want some clarifications of that treaty or even revisions of it, but those changes ought to be worked out with the Russians. Those changes should not be imposed on the Russians.
There are provisions in this bill which clearly bring about the abrogation of the ABM Treaty. I think that is a bad precedent. Abrogation of that treaty will harm the national security interests of the United States in a number of ways.
If we break the ABM Treaty unilaterally, we will poison our relations with Russia. United States-Russian relationships are still the cornerstone of world peace. If we poison the well, every issue we have with Russia--arms control, European security, the Middle East peace process, Bosnia, nonproliferation--becomes more difficult, and we then would bank on little or no cooperation with the Russians if we walk away from our obligations under this treaty.
If we break the ABM Treaty, Russia will not ratify the START-II Treaty, a treaty that I should remind us all was negotiated by President Bush.
Russia then is likely to stop dismantling its nuclear weapons. No military planner in Russia will advocate further dismantling of nuclear missiles if a missile defense race begins. Breaking the ABM Treaty then risks a cold peace, a possible return to the cold war.
If START-II is ratified and implemented, and it would not be if the Spratt amendment is defeated, 5,000 warheads aimed at the United States would be dismantled.
I urge a `yes' vote on the Spratt amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development.
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I cannot believe some of the debate here.
If this were a debate on the ABM Treaty or treaties themselves, perhaps we could bring out the four sanctions we waived against the Russians in violation of the missile control technology regime. Perhaps we would bring up the Krasnoyarsk radar violation which the Politburo deliberately ordered in terms of the ABM Treaty. Perhaps we would bring up the numerous accounts of deliberate proliferation activities by the Russians to other countries. But this is not a debate on any treaty.
This is a national defense bill. We have agreed to have a full debate on the ABM Treaty in a separate, freestanding bill. We have taken the extraordinary effort of making sure that our side did not offer an amendment to tilt the bill so that it in fact would attack the treaty.
But our colleagues on the other side--not all of them, because we have bipartisan opposition--but some of our colleagues on the other side want to tilt this treaty to the extreme of supporting and furthering the ABM Treaty beyond where it currently stands.
Even General Shalikashvili, in a memo to the administration earlier this year, made the point that our negotiations with the Russians were in danger of undermining our defense posture, and only when we threatened the nomination of Secretary Deutsch did the administration back off of that interpretation and that negotiation.
Mr. Chairman, this is not the time to be discussing the ABM treaty.
I will again enter at this point in the Record this letter, dated June 14, from General Mal O'Neill, the administration's point person on missile defense, and I would close with his statement:
I can tell you that every activity under my control complies with the ABM Treaty and that we will not develop, test, or deploy systems that violate the treaty.
Mr. Chairman, we have that in writing from General O'Neill. That, more than anything else, speaks to the intent of this amendment. This is not about this bill violating the ABM Treaty, because even the administration's own leader says that is not the case.
This is about a political attempt to score some points for the Clinton administration and expanding the ABM Treaty, and that should be a separate debate at a separate time.
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