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Threat Amendment

Proliferation is a real concern:

(A) At their summit in Moscow in May of 1995, President Clinton and President Yeltsincommented on the threat posed by proliferation when they released a Joint Statement recognizing`. . . the threat posed by worldwide proliferation of missiles and missile technology and thenecessity of counteracting this threat. . . .'

(1) In a March 1995 report, The Weapons Proliferation Threat, the Central Intelligence Agency'sNonproliferation Center observed that at least 20 countries-nearly half of them in the Middle Eastand South Asia-already have or may be developing weapons of mass destruction and ballisticmissile delivery systems. Five countries--North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria--pose thegreatest threat because of the aggressive nature of their regimes and status of their weapons ofmass destruction programs. All five already have or are developing ballistic missiles that couldthreaten U.S. interests.

(2) The missile proliferation threat, even to the U.S. homeland with long-range missiles, is realand growing. Third World nations are advancing their missile programs through indigenousdevelopment, the purchase of missile components, and the purchase of space launch vehicles forreportedly peaceful purposes.

(3) While space launch vehicles can be used for peaceful purposes, such as launchingcommunications satellites, they also give would-be proliferants an inherent missile capability.Every four years another country develops space launch capability.

(4) The Clinton Administration is overestimating how long it could take for Third Worldcountries to develop nuclear missiles that could hit the American homeland. The ClintonAdministration claims that missile attack threats from potentially dangerous Third World nationsto the U.S. homeland will not arise for at least ten years. No one can possibly know that--muchless depend on such a guess.

(5) This estimate is based on the assumption that the states acquiring missiles will develop themindigenously. While it is questionable whether it will take ten years for Third World countries todevelop missiles on their own, it is clear that proliferants could purchase long-range missiles andnuclear warheads at any time, with little or no advance warning.

(6) Indeed, Saudi Arabia purchased the 2,000-mile range CSS-2 missile from China several yearsago. Others, such as Iran and Syria, have purchased shorter range ballistic missiles from NorthKorea. There is evidence, including from Russian General Victor Samoilov, who was chargedwith maintaining control over nuclear weapons, that nuclear warheads have disappeared fromformer Soviet sites.

(7) There are also reports that nuclear weapons have been sold abroad covertly, particularly toIran.

(8) The key to estimating how long the United States has to respond to a missile threat is not, asis currently the practice, to determine how long it takes a rogue state to produce ICBMs once ithas decided to do so. Rather, U.S. planning should be based on how long a rogue state needs tofield missiles once the intelligence community has convincing evidence that either theirdevelopment or purchase is under way.

(9) The evidence, as reported by the Heritage foundation, thus far is troubling indeed. Forexample:

`(a) Iraq tested a booster with potential intercontinental range in 1990, only months after the U.S.intelligence community discovered what it was doing. After the Gulf War, it was discovered thatIraq had been pursuing an extensive, undetected, and covert program to develop nuclearwarheads for its ballistic missiles. By authoritative accounts the Iraqis were within 18 months ofhaving the bomb.

`(b) U.S. intelligence in early 1994 discovered that the North Koreans were developing a longrange missile dubbed the Taepo Dong 2. Then Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch testifiedon August 11, 1994, that the Taepo Dong 2 may be able to strike U.S. territory by the end of thisdecade. If so, this capability will have arisen only five years after its discovery.'

(10) Once the basics of missile technology are mastered, adding more range to the missile is not agreat technical challenge. It can be accomplished by adding more thrust and rocket stages.Further, it can be accomplished under the guise of developing space launchers. Every boostercapable of placing satellites in orbit can deliver a warhead of the same weight to intercontinentalrange. And missile sales can create a new missile threat very quickly.

(III) Others will argue that if the United States were threatened by a nuclear weapon, it would bein the form of a suitcase bomb, or errant aircraft, or fashioned like the Oklahoma Citybombing.

(A) Each scenario represents a possible method of attack. But, why is that an argument againstBMD? We make great strides to cope with these and other kinds of threats. We have anti-aircraftweapons to shoot down hostile aircraft. We suspend commercial flights from potentiallydangerous countries. The immigration and customs services monitor people and goods coming tothe United States. Law enforcement agencies seek to identify terrorist groups before they act. Ourtools may be woefully inadequate, but we make considerable efforts. Not so in defending thecountry against ballistic missile attack.

(IV) Moreover, the ballistic missile is the weapon of choice in the Third World. Ballistic missilessignify technological advancement, and are thus a source of prestige in the developing world.Missiles have become symbols of power, acquiring a mystique unrelated to their capabilities.Regional powers that have acquired these weapons can threaten the security of global powers andextend influence throughout the region.

(A) Jasit Singh, Director of the Indian Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, has pointed outthat `the element which is tending to rapidly enhance the strategic value of ballistic missiles . .. is there is yet no credible defense against them.'

(V) Others may argue that the arms control regimes will protect us from threat from ballisticmissiles. Not so.

(A) The Non-Proliferation Threaty (NPT), provides a useful barrier to discourage the transfer oftechnology concerning weapons of mass destruction. It is not, however, leak proof, and shouldnot be relied upon as a primary element of American and allied security. The NPT, for example,failed to prevent Iraq or North Korea from developing their nuclear weapons programs.

(B) The Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR), founded by Ronald Reagan in 1987, again,has admirable goals, but can only slow the transfer of missile technology until more effectivemeasures can be developed. The MTCR is a weak agreement that has no monitoring agency orenforcement mechanism, does not incorporate all the world's missile producers (most notablyChina), and cannot forbid technologies that have civil uses.

(C) Former CIA Director James Woolsey said on January 10,1995, that, with regard to Russia, `. . . we are particularly concerned with the safety ofnuclear, chemical, and biological materials, as well as highly enriched uranium or plutonium,although I want to stress that this is a global problem.

(D) We simply cannot rely on arms control to do the job.

(VI) The Kyl/Inhofe amendment expresses the Sense of the Senate that Americans should bedefended--whether in foreign lands or here at home.

We can argue about how to do it: but we should not begin this debate without at least agreeing onthe basic premise that Americans should be protected. Surely we can all agree with that.

There is nothing threatening about defenses. Missile defense destroys only offensive missiles.