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(3) A comprehensive data base on the military balance of forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the balance of forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, that are affected by arms control agreements in existence as of the time of the report between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, including an explanation of the methodology used to analyze the effects on such forces.

(4) A net assessment of the effect that proposed arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would likely have on United States force plans and contingency plans, including an assessment of the effect that such proposal agreements would have on the risks and costs of the United States.

(5) An assessment of the effect that proposed treaty subceilings, asymmetries, and other factors or qualifications affecting a treaty or arms control proposal would have on the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, including an assessment of how such factors increase deterrence and reduce the risk and cost of war.

(6) A statement of the strategy the United States and NATO will use to verify and deter noncompliance with proposed arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact

(7) A discussion of the extent to which and the manner in which the United States intends to consult with its allies regarding proposed arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

(8) A discussion of how the United States proposes to tailor its defense structure in order to ensure that the national security can be preserve with or without arms control agreements.

(b) Explanation of Methodology: In reporting on the current effect of arms control agreements on the status of, and trends in, the military balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (required under paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsections (a)), the President shall--

(1) specify the methodology used in analyzing the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and express the results of such analysis in terms of (A) static comparisons, and (B) comparisons that include dynamic factors; and

(2) discuss all major scenarios, assumptions, and contingencies, including political confrontation, full-scale war, and serious confrontations not involving full-scale war.

(c) Form of Report: The President shall submit such report in both classified and unclassified form. (a) Study: The President shall conduct a study regarding the antiballistic missile capability and activities of the Soviet Union. In conducting the study, the President shall assess each of the following:

(1) The military capabilities and significance of the extensive network of large-phased array radars of the Soviet Union.

(2) Whether the Soviet Union is developing or producing mobile or transportable engagement radar in violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty.

(3) The ability of the Soviet Union to develop an effective exoatmospheric missile defense without using widespread deployments of traditional engagement radars.

(4) The ability of air defense interceptor missiles of the Soviet Union, now and in the future, to destroy warheads of ballistic missiles in flight.

(5) Whether silos or other hardened facilities of the Soviet Union located outside of the existing antiballistic missile site permitted near Moscow under the terms of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty are or could be associated with antiballistic missile defenses not permitted under that Treaty.

(6) Whether the Soviet Union is developing terminal antiballistic missile defenses.

(7) Whether the existing antiballistic missile site near Moscow that is permitted under the terms of that Treaty conceals or could conceal development, testing, or deployment by the Soviet Union of a widespread antiballistic missile system.

(8) Activities of the Soviet Union regarding boost-phase intercepts of ballistic missiles.

(9) The status of laser programs, particle-beam programs, and other advanced technology programs of the Soviet Union comparable to programs conducted by the United States under the Strategic Defense Initiative.

(10) The consequences for the United States of a successful effort by the Soviet Union to deploy an effective nationwide or limited antiballistic missile system.

(b) Assessment of Ability of United States To Counter a Soviet ABM System: In conducting the study required by subsection (a), the President shall also assess the ability of the United States to counter effectively an effective antiballistic missile system deployed by the Soviet Union. Such assessment shall consider both the deployment by the Soviet Union of a nationwide, and of a limited, antiballistic missile system. In assessing the ability of the United States to counter effectively such a system, the President--

(1) shall consider the ability of the United States to modify (A) existing strategic offensive forces (including modifications involving the development of additional penetration aids), and (B) current strategic doctrine and tactics; and

(2) shall consider whether the actions of the United States described in paragraph (1) could be accomplished over the same period of time that the Soviet Union would require to deploy such an antiballistic missile system.

(c) Report: Not later than January 1, 1989, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in both a classified and an unclassified version, specifying the results of the study conducted pursuant to this section. The report shall include such recommendations as the President considers appropriate, including recommendations with regard to maintaining the deterrent value of the strategic forces of the United States in light of the antiballistic missile capability and activities of the Soviet Union described in the report.