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Inventory Management: Handheld Missiles Are Vulnerable to Theft and Undetected Losses

(Letter Report, 09/16/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-100)

Among other discrepancies, 40 deadly Stinger missiles shipped to the
Middle East during the Persian Gulf War could not be accounted for when
GAO visited military storage sites to check the inventory of handheld
missiles--the Stinger, Redeye, and Dragon. In all, inventory records
differed from GAO's physical count by thousands of missiles. The
military services do not know how many of these missiles they have in
their possession because they have not established systems to track the
missiles produced, fired, destroyed, sold, and transferred by serial
number. Lax military oversight and recordkeeping have left these
missiles, which are in demand by terrorists and drug dealers, vulnerable
to theft.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
     TITLE:  Inventory Management: Handheld Missiles Are Vulnerable to 
             Theft and Undetected Losses
      DATE:  09/16/94
   SUBJECT:  Inventory control systems
             Military inventories
             Records management
             Internal controls
             Reporting requirements
             Facility security
             Federal property management
             Property losses
IDENTIFIER:  Persian Gulf War
             Stinger Missile
             Redeye Missile
             Dragon Missile
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================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
September 1994
Inventory Management
=============================================================== ABBREV
=============================================================== LETTER
September 16, 1994
The Honorable John Glenn
Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Dear Mr.  Chairman: 
In response to your request, we inventoried the military services'
most sensitive (Category I) missiles.  The reported loss of control
over these missiles during the Persian Gulf War had raised concern
that some of these missiles may be missing.  We visited all 78
land-based storage sites, counted each missile container, opened a
sample of these containers, and recorded pertinent identifying
information such as serial numbers.  We excluded missiles stored
aboard ships and provided under the Foreign Military Sales Program. 
We compared the number of missiles counted at each location to two
different levels of records:  (1) the item managers' records and (2)
the records at that location or base. 
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Category I missiles--the Stinger (see fig.  1), Redeye, and
Dragon--are handheld, accurate, lethal, and in most cases ready to
   Figure 1:  The Stinger Missile
   (See figure in printed
Since 1970, several hundred thousand of these missiles have been
produced and issued to the military services, and thousands were sold
to other nations through the Foreign Military Sales Program.  Because
the Stinger and the Redeye can destroy aircraft in flight and the
Dragon can pierce armor, they are in demand by terrorists,
insurgents, and drug dealers.  The Army and the Marine Corps are the
primary purchasers of Category I missiles; consequently, we focused
our review on their inventories. 
In 1991, the Defense Department's Inspector General inventoried 60
percent of the Army's and the Marine Corps' Stinger missiles.  The
Inspector General could not account for 188 missiles and concluded
that the two services' inventory records were inaccurate and
reporting procedures were ineffective.  The Inspector General
considered the inventory variances to likely be the result of
paperwork problems. 
The last page of the report contains a list of the Defense
Department, the Army Audit Agency, and our reports published over the
years on the control of and accountability for Category I missiles,
ammunition, and explosives. 
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
Many serious discrepancies in the quantities, locations, and serial
numbers of Category I missiles indicate that the services have poor
oversight and record-keeping of these lethal weapons.  Further, the
services do not know how many Category I missiles they should have in
their possession because they did not establish systems to track the
missiles produced, fired, destroyed, sold, and transferred by serial
number.  We therefore could not determine the extent to which
missiles may be missing from inventory. 
Service inventory records differed from our physical count by
thousands of missiles.  In addition, physical security measures are
not uniformly applied at all locations where these missiles are
stored.  Moreover, during the Persian Gulf War, inventory problems
complicated accountability of the missiles. 
According to law enforcement officials, thefts of missiles from U.S. 
inventories have been alleged numerous times over the years, but no
such thefts have been confirmed.  The poor oversight and
record-keeping of Category I missiles, however, lead us to conclude
that these missiles have been and remain vulnerable to theft or other
undetected losses. 
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Some missile inventory problems can be traced to the Persian Gulf
War.  Although the Army's item managers\1 had knowledge of Army
missiles within the wholesale system and could direct wholesale
shipments to the Persian Gulf, they either lacked or believed they
had inaccurate information on missiles that were shipped at the unit
level.  Some Army combat units deployed to the Gulf with more than
their authorized levels of ammunition, including Category I missiles. 
In addition, we were told that several units disposed of their
inventory records before deployment to the Gulf, and at one supply
point, both hard copy and automated inventory records were allegedly
destroyed.  The Marine Corps knew how many missiles it sent to the
Gulf because it sent all it had. 
In the Persian Gulf, the combat theater commander relaxed
administrative requirements, as permitted by regulation, so that
weapons could be quickly provided to support military operations. 
According to Army officials, at the entry port, combat units took
what they wanted.  In addition, some missiles were transported
unguarded on trucks driven by third country nationals, and some
ammunition sites were wide open.  According to one Army official, due
to the lack of accountability, it would be "pure luck" if no missiles
were lost. 
The Marine Corps inventoried missiles at entry ports to ensure that
units received the appropriate number of missiles, and Marine guards
accompanied each vehicle carrying missiles.  Although some units
signed for their missiles, particularly Stingers, others did not.  In
addition, units frequently shared ammunition.  According to one
Marine official, missile accountability was lost at this point, if
not earlier. 
To expedite troops' return to the United States at the end of the
war, units were allowed to turn in weapons, ammunition, and equipment
without documentation.  Unauthorized items, such as enemy weapons,
could be placed in "amnesty" boxes; some Stinger missiles were also
placed in these boxes.  In addition, according to Army officials, a
load of Stinger missiles was found unguarded on the side of a road. 
\1 Item managers are responsible for Category I missiles while they
are at or en route to and from a depot and for reporting missile
inventory levels and locations for combat deployment and sustainment
requirements.  Historically, the item managers have managed missiles
by quantity and not by serial number. 
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
The Army and the Marine Corps reconciled the missiles sent and
returned from the Persian Gulf with reported combat use and concluded
that no missiles were missing.  According to the Army's analysis,
6,373 Stinger missiles were shipped to the Gulf, and the same number
of missiles were returned.  The Army said it did not fire any
Stingers in combat or training while in the Gulf. 
While the Army could reconcile the missiles it was told were sent
with those returned by quantity, it could not reconcile by serial
number.  A comparison of serial numbers showed that 40 of the
missiles sent to the Gulf were not returned to the depot, other Army
locations, or the other services.  The Army does not know where these
missiles are.  In addition, the Army could not determine ownership
for 1,400 of the missiles returned because it did not have serial
numbers for all the missiles sent to the Gulf.  The item manager
provided a list of these serial numbers to all Army units and to the
other services; however, none of the missiles were claimed. 
The Army's reconciliation also does not include 106 missiles taken by
a unit to the Persian Gulf against instructions and therefore not
recorded as having been sent to the war.  The unit returned the
missiles to the depot after returning from the Gulf War.  It also
does not account for a Stinger missile that was damaged and then
destroyed in theater. 
According to a Marine Corps official, the Marine Corps shipped 3,754
Stinger missiles and 7,485 Dragon missiles to the Persian Gulf.  All
were returned except for 7 Stingers and 160 Dragons, which were
reportedly fired during the war.  However, the Marine Corps cannot be
certain that all unfired missiles were returned because it did not
compare the serial numbers of missiles shipped with those returned. 
Furthermore, the Army's reconciliation includes a missile that is
also claimed by the Marine Corps. 
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Our review showed it is impossible to accurately determine how many
missiles are missing at the item manager or storage level because the
services did not establish effective procedures to determine what
should be in their inventories.  Such a procedure would compare the
number of missiles produced less the number fired, destroyed, sold,
or transferred with on hand inventories.  Although the services have
collected this information over the years, they stated it is
inaccurate and incomplete and therefore unreliable.  The services
stated that they cannot correct the situation because they cannot
reconstruct the data that would be needed. 
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
Oversight responsibility for each type of Category I missile has been
assigned to a single individual or organization within each service. 
However, responsibility for control, security, and accountability of
these missiles rests with those organizational entities having
physical custody of them.  This means that item managers are expected
to know, at any point in time, how many missiles are in inventory and
where they are located, but are dependent on many others for this
information.  Item managers told us that reporting this information
is a problem because some units fail to report or inaccurately report
missile inventories.  Oversight organizations do not have the
authority to direct compliance with reporting requirements.  They are
also dependent on those having custody of missiles to conduct
required and unscheduled physical inventories and to report any
adjustments to them. 
The services referred us to their item managers for information on
how many missiles were in inventory and where they were located.  The
item managers told us they would have difficulty providing missile
quantities and storage locations and would have to contact combat
units and storage locations directly to get accurate information. 
Nevertheless, item manager records differed substantially from our
physical inventory count of the missiles (see table 1). 
                           Table 1
            Comparison of Our Inventory With Item
               Manager Records, by Missile Type
Missile\a        Our inventory        records    Difference\
---------------  -------------  -------------  -------------
Stinger                 36,216         28,484          7,732
Dragon                  40,359         50,103          9,744
Redeye                   7,983          2,753          5,230
\a We did not include missiles on ships at sea. 
The following examples show how these differences could be so large: 
  The item manager's record of missiles at one major depot showed
     7,370 in the inventory; we counted 12,426. 
  In Europe, item managers' records indicated that 22,558 Category I
     missiles were on hand; we counted 20,373, a difference of 2,185. 
  At a manufacturing facility, we counted 953 more missiles than the
     item manager told us were there.  This variance resulted in part
     because contractor employees deleted 130 missile serial numbers
     from the database to make it match the number of missiles they
     believed were in the two magazines. 
The services have recognized that they must control Category I
missiles by serial number.  The Navy and the Marine Corps item
managers began controlling missiles by serial number in 1990 and late
1992, respectively.  Since the Persian Gulf War, the Marine Corps has
inventoried its missiles twice--once by quantity and more recently
(Nov.  1992) by serial number.  Although the Army's Stinger and
Dragon item managers are working on obtaining control by serial
number, the Redeye item manager is not because the missile is being
phased out.  The Army has not conducted a worldwide inventory to
establish an inventory baseline by serial number. 
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
Missile inventory records at the storage sites contain discrepancies
in quantities and serial numbers and problems with national stock
numbers.  Of the 78 missile sites we visited, 31--or 40 percent--did
not have accurate records of their on-hand inventories.  For example,
after we had finished our inventory at one storage site, personnel
called to tell us that they had located 70 more missiles in another
magazine.  Table 2 shows the number of sites that had inaccurate
quantities, by type of missile. 
                           Table 2
           Inaccurate Quantities at Missile Storage
                                                  Percent of
                                   Sites with     sites with
                 Sites storing     inaccurate     inaccurate
Missile\a              missile     quantities     quantities
---------------  -------------  -------------  -------------
Stinger                     44             18             41
Dragon                      57             17             30
Redeye                      29              6             21
Note:  Some of the 78 sites store only one type of missile; others
store more than one type. 
\a We did not include missiles on ships at sea. 
We found either more or fewer missiles than records indicated were on
hand at 31 different sites.  The differences ranged from one missile
at several sites to hundreds at other sites (see table 3). 
                           Table 3
              Variances at Sites With Inaccurate
Site                  Missile                       Variance
--------------------  ------------------  ------------------
A                     Dragon                             423
B                     Stinger                             77
C                     Dragon                               1
D                     Dragon                             158
E                     Stinger                             10
F                     Stinger                              3
                       Redeye                              5
G                     Stinger                              1
H                     Stinger                              4
                       Dragon                            598
I                     Stinger                              1
J                     Stinger                              2
K                     Stinger                              8
                       Dragon                              1
                       Redeye                              1
L                     Dragon                              72
                       Redeye                              2
M                     Stinger                             10
N                     Dragon                               5
O                     Stinger                             41
P                     Stinger                            142
Q                     Stinger                            142
R                     Stinger                             70
                       Dragon                             22
S                     Dragon                               9
T                     Redeye                              49
U                     Dragon                               1
V                     Stinger                             63
                       Dragon                             42
W                     Redeye                               4
X                     Stinger                             83
                       Dragon                             50
                       Redeye                              4
Y                     Dragon                              90
Z                     Dragon                               3
AA                    Dragon                               2
BB                    Stinger                             10
                       Dragon                              1
CC                    Stinger                              1
DD                    Dragon                               4
EE                    Stinger                             18
                       Dragon                             62
We did not attempt to reconcile the differences with inventory
personnel, and the differences may result from record-keeping
problems.  The possibility of undetected loss, however, remains. 
Although most of the missile containers we examined showed serial
numbers, national stock numbers, and the Defense Department
identification codes, as required by regulation, we found duplicate,
missing, or illegible serial numbers as well as other problems at
many of the locations we visited.  Other serial number problems found
at many locations were
  bar codes but no stenciled serial numbers;
  stenciled serial numbers that were not legible;
  bar codes that did not match the stenciled serial numbers;
  two different stenciled serial numbers;
  serial numbers handwritten in chalk;
  serial numbers written on paper tags; and
  no identification because the tags or bar codes had fallen off, or
     the serial numbers written in chalk had been partially or
     completely erased. 
Confusion over which national stock number is assigned to a missile
configuration\2 also resulted in some units dropping missiles from
their reports.  Missiles were also dropped from inventory records
when parts were removed for testing, maintenance, or inspection,
increasing the possibility of errors and resulting in loss of
\2 The national stock number identifies the missiles' configuration. 
The Stinger has 22 different national stock numbers. 
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
At each location we visited, we opened about 1 percent of the missile
containers to see if a missile was enclosed.  We found that (1) one
missile was missing from its container, (2) one missile was missing
its launcher tube, and (3) some containers had serial numbers that
did not match the enclosed missiles.  Depot personnel believed the
missing missile had been destroyed, but they had no documentation to
support their belief.  They also said the missing launcher tube had
been sent to a testing facility.  They could not explain the
mismatches in serial numbers.  When we pointed out a mismatch at one
location, a maintenance man quickly spray-painted the serial number
on the container to match the number on the missile inside.  No one
verified, however, whether the changed serial number matched another
live missile. 
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Although most of the missile storage sites we visited provided
adequate barriers to outside intrusion, some had not implemented
required security measures.  For example, several sites used only one
key to open a missile magazine, although two keys controlled by
separate individuals are required for each magazine.  Other sites had
no fence surrounding the magazine area, even though fencing topped
with barbed or razor wire is required.  At still others, the alarm
systems did not work.  In addition, some missiles packaged for rapid
deployment were stored on flatbed trucks or trailers parked in
secured areas, while others were stored in magazines.  Missiles
undergoing environmental testing were also stored outside.  Category
I missiles are required to be in a magazine controlled by a guard or
locked and monitored by a video camera, and the magazines must have
alarms that can be deactivated before entering.  According to service
officials, some of these exceptions were covered by waivers. 
Security regulations and procedures directed at employee theft were
not uniformly applied at all locations.  Security guards routinely
and thoroughly inspected unfamiliar vehicles entering or leaving the
ammunition area.  They checked for appropriate identification, opened
trunks, and looked in the back seat and under the vehicle.  Security
guards, however, do not routinely inspect all vehicles entering or
leaving ammunition storage areas.  Guards are only required to
conduct spot checks based on guidance provided by the local
commander.  At one missile storage location, we witnessed a spot
check where a guard found and removed two new boxes of small arms
ammunition that was hidden in a trash truck.  The guard permitted the
driver to pass through the gate without questioning and did not file
an incident report but did make an appropriate notation in his log. 
Not all trash trucks or other vehicles that could easily conceal
missiles are inspected when leaving an ammunition storage area.  We
previously reported that military inventories remain more vulnerable
to employee theft than to outsider intrusion.\3
\3 Inventory Management:  Strengthened Controls Needed to Detect and
Deter Small Arms Parts Thefts (GAO/NSIAD-91- 166, July 17, 1992) and
Small Arms Parts:  Poor Controls Invite Widespread Theft
(GAO/NSIAD-94-21, Nov.  18, 1993). 
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
According to law enforcement officials, thefts of missiles from the
Defense Department inventories have been alleged numerous times over
the years.  Allegations are examined for merit and investigated when
warranted.  By agreement, the Defense Department is to notify the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms within 72 hours of the
confirmed loss of a missile.  According to Bureau officials, the
Department has never reported such a loss.  In addition, other law
enforcement agency officials said that they had no data on confirmed
We tried to follow an allegation (Apr.  1992) made regarding the
theft of Stinger missiles from an Army storage depot.  According to
the Bureau, an informant said that nine Stinger missiles were going
to be diverted/stolen and had been moved to a location that would
facilitate their easy removal from the depot.  The informant also
indicated that as many as 20 other Stingers had been diverted/stolen
in this manner.  The Bureau immediately provided this information to
the Defense Department, and an Army investigator found the missiles
in the location identified by the informant.  When we asked about the
results of the investigation, Department officials said that they
vaguely remembered the incident and that inventory personnel had
plausibly explained why the missiles were in that location and had
confirmed that no missiles were missing.  The Defense Department,
however, could not provide any investigative documents to confirm
that an investigation actually took place. 
Inventory personnel told us that the Defense Department does not
normally conduct independent inventories of its missiles every time
an allegation is made because it would be too costly and
time-consuming.  Further, missile containers are not opened during
inventory to ensure that they contain missiles. 
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to
  authorize Category I missile oversight organizations to enforce
     missile reporting requirements and to conduct unscheduled
     independent inventories at depot, post, base, or unit level
     missile storage sites;
  conduct independent worldwide inventories of Category I missiles by
     serial number to establish an accurate baseline of existing
  establish procedures to track, document, and report additions to
     and deletions from these new inventory baselines;
  establish procedures to include a random sampling of missile
     containers during inventories to ensure that they contain
  reemphasize employee security procedures so that they are
     consistently and uniformly applied to all individuals entering
     and leaving missile storage areas; and
  reexamine the current security policy that permits less than full
     inspection of vehicles, such as trash trucks, that could easily
     conceal missiles when leaving ammunition storage areas. 
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
The Defense Department generally agreed with our findings and
accepted our recommendations.  The Department recognizes that
improvements are needed in serial number controls of Category I
missiles and agreed to strengthen inventory accountability by (1)
reviewing guidance to make inventory management among oversight
organizations as uniform as practicable; (2) completing a serial
number inventory of Stinger, Dragon, and Redeye missiles; (3)
maintaining a permanent record to account for missile ownership and
use by serial number; (4) opening a sample of missile containers
during inventories; and (5) reemphasizing policies for controlling
access to missile storage areas and the deterrent value of consistent
screening of vehicles entering and leaving storage areas. 
The Defense Department stated that it can reconcile its missile
quantity balances because it has maintained positive control of
missile quantities.  It also emphasizes that neither GAO nor any
other investigative source has confirmed that any lapses in control
have lead to theft or unexplained loss of Category I missiles.  We
continue to believe, however, that the Defense Department does not
know how many Category I missiles of each type it should have in
inventory.  Therefore, it cannot be certain that a reconciliation of
missile quantities includes all the missiles it should.  Without such
information, the possibility exists that missiles could be missing. 
Furthermore, the fact that we found a missile and parts of a missile
missing from their containers should heighten concerns over the
vulnerability of the missile inventory system.  Further, item
managers and some inventory managers were unable to provide accurate
information regarding missile quantities and locations. 
The Defense Department took exception to our portrayal of its
handling of an allegation regarding the theft of Stinger missiles. 
It said it completed an appropriate investigation and conducted a
100-percent inventory of Stinger missiles at the depot.  The Defense
Department could not provide details of the investigation or
documentation that an inventory had been conducted at the time of the
The Department's detailed comments are included in appendix II. 
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
We inventoried Category I missiles at all Defense Department storage
locations worldwide.  These missiles were stored in 78 locations in
the United States and at U.S.  bases in Europe, Asia, and South
America.  Details of how we conducted our inventories are included in
appendix I. 
We also met with Army, Marine Corps, and Navy officials involved in
controlling Category I missiles to discuss each service's management
process.  We excluded the Air Force because it had purchased few
Category I missiles.  We also met with intelligence and law
enforcement officials to discuss terrorist or criminal demand for
Category I missiles and to identify any known diversions of the
missiles from Defense Department or other inventories. 
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date.  At
that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen of the House and
Senate Committees on Armed Services; the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine
Corps; and other interested parties.  Copies will also be made
available to others on request. 
This report was prepared under the direction of Donna M.  Heivilin,
Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues, who may be reached on
(202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions.  Major
contributors to this report were Nomi R.  Taslitt, William K. 
Newman, and Yolanda C.  Elserwy. 
Sincerely yours,
Frank C.  Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
=========================================================== Appendix I
To determine whether Category I missiles are adequately controlled
and accounted for, we physically inventoried the Stinger, the Redeye,
and the Dragon missiles, by serial number, at all Defense Department
storage locations worldwide.  Category I missiles located at sea or
in other locations were inventoried, at our request, by the military
services.  We did not attempt to inventory the missiles that were
sold or transferred to foreign governments. 
We inventoried all identified storage locations in the continental
United States between May and October 1992.  We then inventoried
missiles at all identified foreign locations, including Europe, Asia,
and Latin America, completing our inventory in April 1993.  We
completed reconciliation of the data in March 1994. 
Each service gave us a list showing where each type of missile was
stored and how many were stored at each location.  The services
notified each location of our inventory plans well in advance of our
visits.  Before our visits, we also directly notified storage
location personnel of the dates of our planned inventory.  At each
site, we
(1) asked the storage manager to identify all locations where
Stinger, Dragon, or Redeye missiles were stored;
(2) inventoried all Stinger, Dragon, or Redeye missiles found in the
locations identified by the storage manager;
(3) hand recorded the serial number imprinted on each missile
container or, if the serial number was missing or hidden, recorded
the serial number found on the bar code, the pallet card, or a paper
(4) opened about 1 percent of the missile containers to ensure that
they contained a missile and that the missile and container serial
numbers matched;
(5) observed the physical security provided Category I missiles at
each location; and
(6) asked storage managers to provide a list of the serial numbers of
all the missiles stored at the facility during our visit and a list
of the serial numbers of missiles received during the 3 months
following our inventory. 
We conducted our review from May 1992 to March 1994 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp.  1-3. 
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp.  4-5. 
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp.  5-9. 
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 1. 
Now on p.  10. 
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp.  10-11. 
Now on p.  11. 
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p.  11. 
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p.  11. 
Now on p.  11. 
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p.  11. 
Now on p.  12. 
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following is GAO's comment on the Department of Defense's letter
dated July 18, 1994. 
1. We made two comparisons for each missile storage location
inventoried.  We compared the number of missiles found at each
storage location with (1) the number of missiles identified on item
manager records and (2) the number of missiles identified on storage
site records.  The two comparisons often produced very different
results.  Item managers told us there were 2,185 more Stinger,
Dragon, and Redeye missiles at Europe's 11 storage sites than we
found, and storage site records identified 4 less than we found. 
Ammunition and Firearms Accountability:  24th Infantry Division and
Fort Stewart (Army Audit Agency Report SR 92-8, Jan.  31, 1992). 
Special Report on the Review of Redeployment of Personnel, Equipment,
and Materiel from Saudi Arabia (Army Audit Agency Report SR 92-309,
Aug.  25, 1992). 
Controls Over Ammunition and Explosives (DOD/OIG Report 91-119,
Sept.  11, 1991). 
Review of Ammunition Accountability (Army Audit Agency Report
EC-91-711, Sept.  6, 1991). 
Ammunition Accountability Audit at Fort Stewart, Georgia (Internal
Review Report A1-90, Feb.  4, 1991). 
Army Inventory:  A Single Supply System Would Enhance Inventory
Management and Readiness (GAO/NSIAD-90-53, Jan.  25, 1990). 

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