INS' Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain
After Seven Years (02-AUG-01, GAO-01-842).
To deter illegal entry between the nation's ports of entry, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) developed its
Southwest Border Strategy. INS has spent seven years implementing
the border strategy, but it may take INS up to a decade longer to
fully implement the strategy. This assumes that INS obtains the
level of staff, technology, equipment, and fencing it believes it
needs to control the Southwest border. Although illegal alien
apprehensions have shifted, there is no clear indication that
overall illegal entry into the United States along the
Southwestern border has declined. INS' current efforts to measure
the effectiveness of its border control efforts could be enhanced
by analyzing the data in its automated biometric identification
system (IDENT). These data offer INS an opportunity to develop
additional performance indicators that could be incorporated into
its Annual Performance Plan review process and could help INS
assess whether its border control efforts are associated with an
overall reduction in the flow of illegal aliens across the
border. Borderwide analysis of the IDENT data could be used to
address several important questions related to illegal entry. The
strategy's impact on local communities has been affected by the
timing of INS, infusion of agent and other resources intended to
protect the local community from a surge in illegal alien
traffic; what routes the illegal aliens have used in crossing the
border; and INS' involvement with the community. INS has learned
the importance of outreach efforts in attempting to mitigate the
potential negative effects the strategy can cause a community and
the harm that can befall illegal aliens who risk injury and death
to cross the border.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-842
ACCNO: A01319
TITLE: INS' Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact
Issues Remain After Seven Years
DATE: 08/02/2001
SUBJECT: Illegal aliens
Immigration or emigration
International relations
Performance measures
Law enforcement
INS Border Safety Initiative
INS Automated Biometric Identification
System
Mexico
El Centro (CA)
San Diego (CA)
El Paso (TX)
Tucson (AZ)
Laredo (TX)
McAllen (TX)
Yuma (AZ)
Del Rio (TX)
INS Operation Safeguard
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Testimony. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-01-842
Report to Congressional Committees
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
August 2001 INS? SOUTHWEST BORDER STRATEGY
Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years
GAO- 01- 842
Page i GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Scope and Methodology 6 INS Continues to
Implement Its Southwest Border Strategy and
Estimates Significantly More Resources Are Needed to Fully Implement It 7
Strategy?s Effect on Reducing Overall Illegal Entry Unclear, but
Border Control Initiatives Have Had Positive and Negative Community Impacts
10 Experience Gained With Strategy Implementation; the Importance
of Communication; and Aliens? Determination to Enter Illegally 21
Conclusions 28 Recommendation for Executive Action 28 Agency Comments 29
Appendix I INS Border Patrol Authorized Staffing and Alien Apprehensions in
Southwest Sectors 31
Appendix II Comments From the Department of Justice 32
Tables
Table 1: Onboard Border Patrol Agents by Southwest Border Patrol Sector,
Fiscal Years 1993 Through 2000 8 Table 2: Migrant Deaths by Cause of Death
25 Table 3: Authorized Border Patrol Agent Positions in Southwest
Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 2000 31 Table 4:
Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal
Years 1993 Through 2000 31
Figures
Figure 1: Nine Southwest Border Patrol Sectors 4 Figure 2: Apprehensions in
Southwest Border Patrol Sectors in
Fiscal Years 1995, 1998, and 2000 12 Figure 3: Southwest Border
Apprehensions in Fiscal Years 1992-
2000 13 Contents
Page ii GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Figure 4: Apprehensions in Selected Southwest Border Sector Stations 17
Figure 5: Road Infrastructure in the Southwest Border Region 18 Figure 6:
Border Patrol Migrant Rescues in Fiscal Years 1999
Through June 1, 2001 27
Abbreviations
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act IDENT INS? automated biometric
identification system INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
Page 1 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
August 2, 2001 The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy Chairman The Honorable Orrin
G. Hatch Ranking Minority Member Committee on the Judiciary United States
Senate
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman The Honorable John
Conyers, Jr. Ranking Minority Member Committee on the Judiciary House of
Representatives
With the illegal alien population in the United States estimated to be
between 5 and a reported 11 million people, the issue of illegal immigration
continues to attract the attention of policymakers, the media, and the
public. In 1994, the Attorney General announced a five- part strategy to
strengthen enforcement of the nation?s immigration laws, including a
strategy to deter illegal entry along the Southwest border. To deter illegal
entry between the nation?s ports of entry, the strategy called for the
Immigration and Naturalization Service?s (INS) Border Patrol to
incrementally increase control of the border in four phases to make it so
difficult and costly for aliens to attempt illegal entry that fewer
individuals would try. The four- phased approach involved adding resources
along the Southwest border, starting with the areas that had the highest
known levels of illegal alien activity.
Seven years later, INS continues to make record numbers of arrests for
illegal entry along the Southwest border- over 1.6 million in fiscal year
2000. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 requires us to track, monitor, and evaluate the Attorney General?s
strategy and to report annually for 6 years. 1 We have issued two previous
1 P. L. 104- 208, sec. 107.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
reports on INS? Southwest border strategy and two others dealing with other
parts of the Attorney General?s strategy. 2
As agreed with your Committees, this report focuses on the component of the
Attorney General?s strategy that deals with INS? efforts to deter illegal
entry between the ports of entry along the Southwest border. Specifically,
this report addresses (1) INS? progress in implementing the strategy, (2)
the strategy?s effects to date, and (3) experience gained as the strategy
has unfolded over the past 7 years.
Since fiscal year 1998, INS has been implementing phase II of its fourphased
strategy. In phase II, INS has added almost 1, 200 Border Patrol agents and
other resources primarily to Arizona and South Texas, reaching an onboard
strength of nearly 8,500 agents along the Southwest border. To fully
implement the Southwest border strategy, INS? preliminary estimates show it
may need an additional 3,200 to 5,500 Border Patrol agents, additional
support personnel, and hundreds of millions of dollars in additional
technology and infrastructure, such as new roads and facilities. It would
take at least 5 more years to add the minimum number of agents INS believes
it needs along the Southwest border if the administration?s current agent
hiring goals are maintained and met.
The primary discernable effect of the strategy, based on INS? apprehension
statistics, appears to be a shifting of the illegal alien traffic. Between
1998 and 2000, apprehensions declined in three Border Patrol sectors, San
Diego, CA, and El Paso and McAllen TX, but increased in five of the other
six Southwest border sectors. The extent to which INS? border control
efforts may have affected overall illegal entry along the Southwest border
remains unclear, however. Although INS maintains data on apprehended aliens
in its automated fingerprint system, it has not analyzed the data to
determine how many aliens have been arrested, how many times they have been
arrested, where they have been arrested, and how these numbers have changed
over time in response to border enforcement efforts. Such information would
provide a better understanding of the relationship
2 Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More
Evaluation Needed (GAO/ GGD- 98- 21, Dec. 11, 1997); Illegal Aliens:
Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist (GAO/
GGD- 99- 33, Apr. 2, 1999); Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border
Strategy Implementation (GAO/ GGD- 99- 44, May 19, 1999); and Alien
Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address Growing
Problem (GAO/ GGD- 00- 103, May 1, 2000). Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
between INS? strategy and overall illegal entry along the Southwest border.
We are recommending that INS use the data in its automated fingerprint
system to help it measure the results of its border control efforts and
enable it to refine its border enforcement strategy. In commenting on a
draft of this report, INS? Executive Associate Commissioner for Field
Operations concurred with our recommendation and stated that INS will begin
developing specific performance indicators using data from its automated
fingerprint system.
At the community level, implementation of the strategy and the resulting
changes in the level of illegal alien apprehensions, a proxy for the level
of illegal alien traffic, have reportedly had both positive and negative
effects. When increased INS enforcement resulted in apprehensions declining
in certain border communities, some of the communities reported experiencing
lower crime levels, civic and economic improvements, and an improved quality
of life. When apprehensions surged in communities in which the illegal alien
traffic was reportedly pushed, officials and residents in one community
reported experiencing loss of business, destruction of private property, and
environmental degradation.
As the strategy has unfolded, there has been an accumulation of knowledge
and experience regarding factors that could impede INS? ability to implement
the strategy; the importance of communications between INS and border
communities; and aliens? determination to cross the border. First, it has
taken INS longer to implement the strategy than originally planned because,
among other things, INS experienced difficulties hiring Border Patrol agents
and delays in obtaining approvals needed to deploy technology and build
fences. Second, INS has recognized that it needs to make outreach efforts to
communities because its initial failure to warn some communities about
anticipated increases in illegal alien traffic caught community officials by
surprise. Third, although INS has realized its goal of shifting illegal
alien traffic away from urban areas, this has been achieved at a cost to
both illegal aliens and INS. In particular, rather than being deterred from
attempting illegal entry, many aliens have instead risked injury and death
by trying to cross mountains, deserts, and rivers. This has prompted INS to
create a media campaign to warn aliens about the dangers of crossing
illegally, as well as to establish search- and- rescue units.
In 1997 and 1999, we reported that INS was implementing its border strategy
generally as planned. The strategy called for concentrating personnel and
technology in a four- phased approach, starting first with the Background
Page 4 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
sectors with the highest levels of illegal immigration activity (as measured
by apprehensions) and moving to the areas with the least activity. The four
phases of the strategy called for allocating additional Border Patrol
resources to sectors along the border in the following order: (1) Phase I:
San Diego, CA, and El Paso, TX, sectors; (2) Phase II: Tucson, AZ, sector
and three sectors in south Texas- Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen; (3) Phase
III: the remaining three sectors along the Southwest border; (4) Phase IV:
the Northern border, Gulf Coast, and coastal waterways. The Southwest
border, which has been the focus of INS? buildup in Border Patrol resources
to date, represents 9 of the Border Patrol?s 21 sectors nationwide (see fig.
1).
Figure 1: Nine Southwest Border Patrol Sectors
Source: GAO.
The strategy?s objectives are to (1) close off the routes most frequently
used by smugglers and illegal aliens (generally through urban areas) and (2)
shift traffic to ports of entry, where travelers are inspected, or to areas
that are more remote and difficult to cross. With the traditional crossing
routes disrupted, INS expected that illegal alien traffic would either be
M E X I C O
Del Rio Laredo Tucson
Pacific Ocean Gulf of Mexico
El Paso San Diego
McAllen Marfa
Yuma El Centro
Texas New Mexico Arizona California Oklahoma
Page 5 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
deterred or forced over terrain less suited for crossing, where INS believed
it would have the tactical advantage.
INS? Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and detecting illegal entry
along the border between the nation?s ports of entry. To carry out the
strategy, the Border Patrol was to
concentrate personnel and resources in a four- phased approach, starting
with the areas of highest illegal alien activity;
increase the time Border Patrol agents spend on border control activities;
make maximum use of physical barriers; and
identify the appropriate quantity and mix of personnel and technology
needed to control the border.
The Border Patrol?s fiscal year 2001 budget is about $1. 2 billion, a 9-
percent increase over its fiscal year 2000 budget of about $1.1 billion. As
of September 30, 2000, there were 9,096 Border Patrol agents nationwide;
8,475, or 93 percent, were located in the nine sectors along the Southwest
border.
INS? phased approach to implementing its strategy has included several
operations in which INS allocated additional Border Patrol agents and other
resources- such as fencing, lighting, night vision scopes, sensors, cameras,
vehicles, and aircraft- to targeted locations along the Southwest border. In
October 1994, the Border Patrol launched Operation Gatekeeper in its San
Diego sector. Initially, the operation focused enforcement resources along
the 5 miles that at that time accounted for nearly 25 percent of all illegal
border crossings nationwide. Since then, the sector has expanded Gatekeeper
to include the entire 66 miles of border under the sector?s jurisdiction. 3
In 1994, the Border Patrol began Operation Safeguard in the Tucson sector.
Initially, the operation focused enforcement resources in the Nogales, AZ,
area. Since then, the sector has expanded operations to the Douglas and
Naco, AZ, area to respond to the increase in apprehensions in that area.
3 In September 1993, before officially implementing of the strategy, the El
Paso sector launched Operation Hold- the- Line. Initially, the sector
assigned its agents directly to a 20- mile section of the border in the
metropolitan area of El Paso. The high- profile presence was intended to
deter illegal aliens from attempting to cross the border.
Page 6 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
In August 1997, INS launched Operation Rio Grande in the Rio Grande Valley
area in south Texas. The Border Patrol focused enhanced resources in the
McAllen and Laredo, TX, sectors. In fiscal year 1998, the Border Patrol
extended Operation Gatekeeper to the El Centro sector in California?s
Imperial Valley, east of San Diego. This was done to respond to the increase
in illegal alien traffic in that area and to target the alien smuggling
rings that moved there after the Border Patrol increased its presence in San
Diego. INS has reported that each of these initiatives reduced the number of
alien apprehensions in some of the targeted areas.
INS? apprehension statistics have been its primary quantitative indicator of
the results of the strategy. INS anticipated that the following changes,
among others, would provide evidence of the interim effectiveness of the
strategy:
Locations receiving an infusion of resources would experience an initial
increase in the number of illegal alien apprehensions, followed by a
decrease in apprehensions when a ?decisive level of resources? had been
achieved.
Illegal alien traffic would shift from sectors that traditionally
accounted for most illegal immigration activity toward other sectors.
One of the major technological initiatives deployed along the Southwest
border has been IDENT, INS? automated biometric identification system, which
captures apprehended aliens? fingerprints, photos, and biographical data, as
well as information on the date and location of the apprehension. IDENT was
developed to help INS determine whether an apprehended alien is an
aggravated felon, smuggler, or repeat illegal crosser. Since fiscal year
1995, INS has deployed the system incrementally along the Southwest border,
and it is now deployed in all Border Patrol stations within the nine
Southwest border sectors. INS spent about $34 million on IDENT development
and deployment through fiscal year 2000.
To address our three objectives, we (1) analyzed Border Patrol staffing and
workload data; (2) reviewed INS? strategy, INS planning documents, and
reviews of INS? Annual Performance Plans; (3) interviewed INS officials at
Border Patrol headquarters in Washington, D. C., and in the San Diego, El
Centro, Yuma, Tucson, and Del Rio sectors; (4) interviewed local officials
in Calexico, CA; Yuma, Douglas, Santa Cruz County, and Pima County, AZ; and
Cameron County and Eagle Pass, TX; (5) interviewed the Mexican Consuls
General in Nogales and Douglas, AZ; and (6) held a group discussion with
members of the Citizens Advisory Group to the Scope and
Methodology
Page 7 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
local Border Patrol station in Douglas, AZ. We chose these locations
because, except for San Diego, Border Patrol apprehensions in these areas
increased as INS implemented its strategy. We also reviewed statistics on
migrant deaths and studies on Operations Gatekeeper and Rio Grande that were
prepared by an INS contractor. Finally, we observed border enforcement
activities in the El Centro, Yuma, and Tucson sectors.
We conducted our work between October 2000 and June 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
As INS continues to implement the second phase of its four- phased strategy,
its preliminary estimates show that it may need 3,200 to 5,500 more agents,
additional support personnel, and hundreds of millions of dollars in
additional technology and infrastructure to fully implement the Southwest
border strategy.
Since fiscal year 1998, INS has been implementing the second phase of its
four- phased approach, which called for primarily increasing resources in
the Tucson sector and the three sectors in south Texas- Del Rio, Laredo, and
McAllen. In accordance with the strategy, INS allocated 1,140 (80 percent)
of the additional 1,430 agent positions authorized in fiscal years 1999 and
2000 to these sectors. The strategy noted that Border Patrol needed to be
flexible in responding to changing patterns in illegal traffic.
Consequently, INS added some of the additional enhancements in fiscal years
1999 and 2000 to the Yuma and El Centro sectors, scheduled for phase III, in
order to respond to the shifts in illegal alien traffic to those sectors.
Onboard strength in all nine sectors along the Southwest border increased by
1,183 agents (16 percent) to almost 8,500 between fiscal years 1998 and
2000. As shown in table 1, INS has added over 5,000 agents to sectors along
the Southwest border since fiscal year 1993, the year preceding the initial
implementation of the strategy. This represents a 150- percent INS Continues
to
Implement Its Southwest Border Strategy and Estimates Significantly More
Resources Are Needed to Fully Implement It
Implementation of the Strategy
Page 8 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
increase between fiscal years 1993 and 2000 in the total number of onboard
agents in the nine sectors along the Southwest border. (App. I, table 3,
provides additional information on Border Patrol agent enhancements along
the Southwest border.)
Table 1: Onboard Border Patrol Agents by Southwest Border Patrol Sector,
Fiscal Years 1993 Through 2000
Fiscal year Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Phase I
San Diego, CA 980 1,272 1,422 1,955 2,268 2,257 2,117 2,039 El Paso, TX 602
641 739 835 913 962 951 1,023
Phase II
Tucson, AZ 281 276 400 695 868 1,010 1,325 1,513 Del Rio, TX 290 283 394 398
464 580 632 750 Laredo, TX 347 332 416 411 446 623 680 790 McAllen, TX 386
385 467 501 754 1,100 1159 1,370
Phase III
El Centro, CA 194 185 187 185 246 378 420 499 Yuma, AZ 178 172 182 170 171
224 222 307 Marfa, TX 131 124 130 131 131 158 139 184
Total 3,389 3,670 4,337 5,281 6,261 7,292 7,645 8,475
Source: INS data.
As a result of the increased number of agents along the Southwest border,
the amount of time spent on border enforcement activities in these sectors
increased by 27 percent, from about 8.5 million hours in fiscal year 1998 to
almost 11 million hours in fiscal year 2000. The proportion of time Border
Patrol agents spent on border enforcement increased from 66 percent to 69
percent during this time.
INS has continued to erect barriers as called for in its strategy. Since
fiscal year 1999, INS has completed about 12 miles of fencing and other
types of barriers, bringing the total to about 76 miles along the Southwest
border as of May 2001. 4 INS had plans to erect an additional 32 miles, some
of which was under construction as of May 2001. In addition, in fiscal years
1999
4 The San Diego sector has an additional 9 miles of secondary fencing just
north of the fencing that is along the border.
Page 9 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
and 2000, INS installed 107 remote video surveillance systems along the
Southwest border bringing the total to 130. 5
According to INS? year- end review of its fiscal year 2000 Annual
Performance Plan, INS estimated it may need between 11,700 and 14,000 agents
to fully implement the Southwest border strategy. This is between 3,200 and
5,500 more agents than the roughly 8,500 agents INS had on board along the
Southwest border at the end of fiscal year 2000.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
mandated that the Attorney General increase the number of agents on board by
no less than 1,000 agents per year during each of fiscal years 1997 through
2001. 6 INS was able to meet this goal in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, but
not in the following 3 years. We reported that in fiscal year 1999, INS was
only able to achieve a net increase of 369 agents out of the goal of 1,000
because INS was unable to recruit enough qualified applicants and retain
them through the hiring process. 7 In fiscal year 2000, INS stated that it
requested no additional agents because of its concern that the ratio of
inexperienced- to- experienced agents was getting too high and law
enforcement experts said this was risky. Congress, however, funded 430
additional agents. In fiscal year 2001, INS requested 430 agents. In her
March 2000 testimony, the former INS Commissioner stated that the 430 agents
represented the level that was achievable in the existing tight labor
market. It also allowed INS to have sufficient funds to increase the
journeyman level from a GS- 9 to a GS- 11 and for signing bonuses for those
who successfully completed the Border Patrol Academy training program. 8
It would take between 5 and 9 years and congressional approval for INS to
obtain the additional Border Patrol agents it believes it needs to control
the Southwest border. As noted above, INS estimates it needs between 3,200
and 5,500 more agents than the roughly 8,500 agents it had on board
5 Remote video surveillance cameras include daylight and low- light cameras
mounted on poles that allow Border Patrol personnel to monitor the border
from a central station area. 6 P. L. 104- 208, sec. 101.
7 Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initiatives, Fiscal Year 1999 Hiring
Goal Was Not Met (GAO/ GGD- 00- 39, Dec. 17, 1999). 8 Testimony of INS
Commissioner Doris Meissner before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
State, and the Judiciary, Senate Committee on Appropriations, President?s FY
2001 Budget Request, March 7, 2000. Plans for Additional
Personnel
Page 10 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
along the Southwest border at the end of fiscal year 2000. INS plans to hire
430 agents and reach an onboard agent strength of about 8,900 agents by the
end of fiscal year 2001. The President?s fiscal year 2002 budget requests
570 Border Patrol agents per year in 2002 and 2003. If the growth rate of
the Border Patrol continued to be 570 agents per year beyond 2003, INS would
reach the lower limit of the number of agents it believes it needs in 2006
and the upper limit in 2010, assuming that all of the new agents would be
assigned to the Southwest border.
INS? April 2000 Border Patrol Technology Plan outlines a 5- year plan for
adding new technology along both the Northern and Southern borders.
According to an INS official, Southwest border sectors have requested new
technology estimated to cost roughly between $450 million and $560 million,
nearly all of it for about 1,100 remote video surveillance systems. INS is
also developing sector- level, integrated border infrastructure plans (e. g.
barriers, roads, and lighting) for each Southwest border sector. The plan
also states that INS will need additional support personnel, such as Law
Enforcement Communications Assistants to monitor the cameras and technicians
to repair cameras and other equipment. INS will need to construct additional
space to house both the additional equipment and personnel. In May 2001, INS
budget officials told us that they estimated it might take between 7 and 10
years to deploy the additional staff and equipment INS believes it needs for
the Southwest border.
In commenting on our draft report, INS? Executive Associate Commissioner for
Field Operations stated that the long- term resource requirements we discuss
above are preliminary and subject to change.
As the Border Patrol has increased enforcement in certain locations, illegal
alien apprehensions have shifted to other locations, as the Border Patrol
predicted would result from its strategy. However, until very recently,
apprehensions borderwide continued to increase. The Border Patrol is
attempting to supplement its apprehension data with additional indicators to
measure the effectiveness of its border control efforts, but it could learn
more about the results of its border control efforts if it capitalized on
using the automated fingerprint data that it collects on apprehended illegal
aliens. The shift in illegal alien apprehensions has had both positive and
negative effects on local border communities. Plans for Additional
Technology Strategy?s Effect on Reducing Overall Illegal Entry Unclear, but
Border Control Initiatives Have Had Positive and Negative Community Impacts
Page 11 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
We reported in 1997 and 1999 that illegal alien apprehensions shifted as
expected after INS allocated additional resources to targeted border
sectors, such as El Paso and San Diego. This continued to occur, especially
in San Diego. As shown in figure 2, apprehensions were notably lower in San
Diego in fiscal year 2000 compared with fiscal year 1998. Apprehensions in
El Paso were slightly lower in fiscal year 2000 than in fiscal year 1998. 9
In the McAllen sector, as resources were applied in 1997, there was an
initial increase in apprehensions in 1998, followed by a decline in
apprehensions in fiscal year 2000. However, illegal alien apprehensions
shifted to other sectors in fiscal year 1998, as indicated by the increased
apprehension levels in the El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, Laredo, and Del Rio
sectors.
9 The greatest decline in apprehensions occurred in El Paso in fiscal year
1994, the year after Operation Hold- the- Line began. Apprehension levels in
El Paso increased in the years after fiscal year 1994, although the total
number of apprehensions in each of fiscal years 1998 through 2000 was still
less than half that in fiscal year 1993. Illegal Alien
Apprehensions Have Continued to Shift, but Have Increased Overall
Page 12 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Figure 2: Apprehensions in Southwest Border Patrol Sectors in Fiscal Years
1995, 1998, and 2000
Source: INS data.
Although implementation of the strategy has shifted the areas in which
illegal aliens are apprehended, total Border Patrol apprehensions along the
Southwest border have increased overall since the strategy was implemented
in 1994. Figure 3 shows the total number of apprehensions along the
Southwest border, and table 4 in appendix I shows the apprehension numbers
for each of the nine Southwest border sectors.
0 100,000
200,000 300,000
400,000 500,000
600,000 700,000
Marfa, TX Yuma, AZ El Centro, CA Del Rio, TX Laredo, TX McAllen, TX Tucson,
AZ El Paso, TX San Diego, CA
Apprehensions
Phase I Phase II Phase III FY1995
FY1998 FY2000
Sector
Page 13 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Figure 3: Southwest Border Apprehensions in Fiscal Years 1992- 2000
Source: INS data.
Very recently, apprehensions have been declining. For the period January
through April 2001, Border Patrol apprehensions along the Southwest border
declined by 26 percent compared with the same period in fiscal year 2000.
Although the reasons for the decline are unclear and it is too early to tell
whether the decline will persist, INS and Mexican Consulate officials we
spoke with as well as some researchers offered various theories, including
the following:
INS? strategy is effectively deterring illegal entry.
Substantially fewer Mexican illegal aliens went home for the holidays in
December 2000 as a result of (1) legislation that enabled them to apply for
permanent residency or (2) their believing that it would be too difficult to
get back into the United States.
0 800,000
1,000,000 1,200,000
1,400,000 1,600,000
1,800,000 FY2000 FY1999 FY1998 FY1997 FY1996 FY1995 FY1994 FY1993 FY1992
Apprehensions
Page 14 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Mexicans are more optimistic about the future in Mexico and less likely to
migrate because of improvements in the Mexican economy and a change in the
Mexican government.
Prospects for finding employment in the United States have diminished with
the slowing economy, so fewer aliens have attempted to enter illegally.
Whether INS? strategy has deterred illegal entry overall or whether it has
merely shifted the traffic to different locations is unclear. INS has taken
some steps to design an overall evaluation of the strategy?s effectiveness,
and it has issued reports on the effects of Operations Gatekeeper and Rio
Grande. Both these reports stated that the operations were successful in
reducing illegal entry in the locations where INS had concentrated its
enforcement resources. However, INS has not conducted a comprehensive,
systematic evaluation of the strategy?s effectiveness in detecting and
deterring aliens from entering illegally, as we recommended in our 1997
report. With no baseline data to compare results against and with the
passage of 7 years since INS began implementing its Southwest border
strategy, undertaking such an evaluation becomes increasingly difficult. By
necessity, the evaluation would be a retrospective study that relied on
available data rather than systematically gathered evaluation data (1) based
on clearly defined indicators of the range of effects the strategy might
have and (2) collected expressly to answer the research questions. As a
result, what effect the strategy has had on overall illegal immigration
along the Southwest border may never be fully known.
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 10 requires agencies to
establish performance indicators to measure or assess the desired outcomes
of their program activities. As a way of gauging the effectiveness of its
strategy in deterring illegal entry, the Border Patrol is attempting to
measure its effectiveness in apprehending aliens. For example, in certain
locations, called corridors, the Border Patrol attempts to estimate the
number of aliens who entered or attempted to enter illegally in a given time
period. Border Patrol officials told us that agents count the number of (1)
aliens they have physically observed crossing and those that have turned
back and (2) aliens detected by video cameras and sensors. In addition,
agents examine footprints along the border to estimate the number that may
have crossed, a technique the Border Patrol calls signcut. The Border Patrol
measures its effectiveness as the ratio of aliens
10 P. L. 103- 62 (1993). INS Has Not Evaluated the
Strategy?s Overall Effects on Illegal Entry and Has Not Analyzed Key
Performance Data
Page 15 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
arrested plus those that have turned back to the estimated number of illegal
entries. INS officials told us that the effectiveness ratios only apply to
areas where INS can monitor the border either electronically or by using
agents. Because it is difficult to determine the accuracy or completeness of
INS? estimates of the number of aliens turned back and those entering
illegally, we do not know how valid or generalizable INS? effectiveness
measures are.
The Border Patrol began reporting the corridor effectiveness ratios through
its annual performance plan review process in fiscal year 2001. For example,
from October 2000 through March 2001, the effectiveness ratios in the 12
corridors in California and Arizona ranged from 37 percent in the west
desert area in Tucson to 92 percent in west desert area of El Centro. We did
not independently assess INS? methodology for calculating this performance
information.
Department of Justice guidance on GPRA states that agencies should use a
variety of indicators to evaluate program performance. In 1997, we reported
that immigration researchers and INS officials stated that IDENT data, when
more fully available, could be quite useful for examining the flow of
illegal aliens across the border. For example, using IDENT data, INS could
conduct a borderwide analysis of the number of individuals arrested
attempting illegal entry; the number of times they have been arrested; and
how these numbers have changed over time and by location. The results of
such analyses could supplement the effectiveness ratios that INS currently
calculates for GPRA reporting, and it could lead to a better understanding
of the apprehension statistics that INS routinely reports. This is because
the number of apprehensions- although frequently used as a proxy indicator
for the magnitude of illegal alien traffic- provides information on INS
arrests rather than on the number of different individuals arrested or the
number of illegal aliens who eluded arrest by the Border Patrol. 11 Analysis
of the IDENT data offers the potential for better understanding the effects
of INS? enforcement operations on shifts in illegal alien traffic and for
statistically modeling the flow of illegal aliens across the border and
their probability of apprehension.
11 An individual might be arrested more than one time and, therefore, the
number of different individuals arrested would be lower than the number of
arrests.
Page 16 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
According to the Director of INS? Statistics Branch, the IDENT system is now
at a point where meaningful analyses can be done for the period January 1998
to the present. 12
INS? border control efforts have resulted in some communities experiencing
an unprecedented surge in illegal alien traffic. As shown in figure 4,
apprehensions from fiscal year 1994 to 1998 increased over 10fold in
Calexico more than doubled in Nogales. In fiscal year 2000, apprehensions in
these locations declined even with the addition of new Border Patrol agents,
although apprehensions were still higher than in fiscal year 1994. In
Douglas and Yuma, apprehensions continued to increase in fiscal year 2000
compared to fiscal year 1994, with Douglas experiencing an eightfold
increase and Yuma experiencing a nearly sixfold increase. Apprehensions in
Brownsville, TX, peaked in fiscal year 1996 and since then have been
declining as border enforcement has increased there.
12 INS began collecting IDENT data in fiscal year 1995. According to the
Director, INS Statistics Branch data from the early years of IDENT usage
would not yield meaningful performance information because there were
hardware and software changes to IDENT and because the system was not fully
implemented. IDENT data from January 1998 forward can be meaningfully
analyzed because IDENT has been deployed to enough stations along the
Southwest border and contains data on a sufficiently large percentage of
apprehended aliens. INS? Border Control
Efforts Had Positive and Negative Community Impacts
Page 17 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Figure 4: Apprehensions in Selected Southwest Border Sector Stations
Source: INS data.
According to INS officials, an increase in illegal alien traffic is more
likely to occur in border communities that have the infrastructure- for
example roads and housing- that facilitate aliens transiting through them.
This is because aliens and alien smugglers use the network of roads leading
to the border from Mexico as well roads leading away from the border once in
the United States (see fig. 5). Also, smugglers need towns that have
sufficient housing available to hide aliens from authorities, as well as
access to vehicles to transport the aliens out of the area.
0 50,000
100,000 150,000
200,000 250,000
300,000 Brownsville, TX Douglas, AZ Nogales, AZ Yuma, AZ Calexico, CA
Apprehensions Sector
FY1994 FY1996 FY1998 FY2000
Page 18 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Figure 5: Road Infrastructure in the Southwest Border Region
The shift in illegal alien traffic to certain small, border communities has
had varied effects on the communities, depending on such factors as the
routes illegal aliens used to transit through them; the level of Border
Patrol presence in specific locations; how much barrier fencing was in
place; and how the community perceived the situation. For example, in
Calexico, a border town approximately 125 miles east of San Diego with
approximately 27,000 residents, local police officials told us they noted a
significant increase in prowler calls and vehicle thefts as illegal alien
traffic shifted from San Diego to Calexico. However, according to police
officials, there was a drop in reported prowler incidents and auto thefts
after INS added resources and completed erecting a fence in downtown
Calexico in 1999.
Gulf of Mexico Pacific Ocean
8 8 15
19 20
Major interstate road State road Desert areas Mountain ranges
37 5
Texas New Mexico Arizona California Oklahoma 35 35 25
10 10 10
10 10
98 2
2 191
2 2
45 2 90
57 85
59 77
16 85
86 8
2 67 377 277
281 15
77
Mexicali
Mexico Del Rio
Laredo
Deming
Tucson
Douglas Brownsville Monterrey
El Paso
Calexico Nogales
San Antonio San Diego
Eagle Pass
Marfa Yuma
Presidio Colorado River
Rio Grande River Rio Grande River
Hermosillo
15 45 1
1 5
49 49
Page 19 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
An official in Nogales, a border community of about 20,000 residents, told
us that illegal immigration contributed to the city?s crime rate. According
to the Santa Cruz county attorney, before the Border Patrol increased its
presence in the downtown area, thieves would frequently cross illegally into
the United States and steal items they could carry back into Mexico. When
the Border Patrol increased resources and enforcement operations and built a
larger and less penetrable fence in the downtown area, thefts along the
border dropped. The county attorney attributed a 64- percent decline in the
number of felony filings against Mexican illegal aliens between 1998 and
2000 to INS? increased border control efforts. The county attorney also
attributed improved business conditions in Nogales to the Border Patrol?s
efforts to deter illegal aliens from entering in the downtown area. As
apprehensions in downtown Nogales dropped, many small shops that benefited
from the illegal alien trade closed. With these small, locally- owned shops
going out of business, large national retailers began to locate in Nogales.
Community residents and legal entrants from Mexico could now shop locally
instead of having to travel to Tucson.
However, the county attorney also stated that crimes against illegal aliens
have increased because the migrants are forced to attempt entry into the
United States through remote areas outside town, where criminal activity is
less likely to be detected and more difficult to respond to. These crimes
are difficult to prosecute because they typically involve Mexican nationals
harming other Mexican nationals. Cases are difficult to make and prove
because assailants are seldom captured, crime scenes in remote areas are
rarely located, and victims disappear. The Mexican Consul General in Nogales
told us that there is strong evidence that some alien smugglers work in
collusion with border bandits who prey on the illegal aliens.
Officials in Douglas, a small border community with about 14,000 residents
about 125 miles east of Nogales, also told us about both positive and
negative effects of the strategy. According to a city official, the
additional Border Patrol agents assigned to the Douglas area have had a
positive effect on the local economy; many agents live and shop in the
community, and tax revenues are increasing. Illegal immigration in the
downtown area has decreased with the Border Patrol?s increased presence and
additional fencing. Residents stopped encountering agents chasing groups of
30 to 40 illegal aliens through town. A key reported negative effect was
that illegal aliens were diverted to the rural area on the city?s outskirts
and began to cross over private ranchland as the Border Patrol increased
enforcement in the downtown area. Ranchers living in these areas told us
that they have incurred economic losses because illegal aliens transiting
their property have torn their fences and stolen fencing material, which has
allowed their
Page 20 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
livestock to get loose. The ranchers also said that their livestock have
been killed, personal belongings stolen, and ranches littered with trash.
The large number of illegal crossers has reportedly ruined some grazing
fields.
According to Border Patrol officials, the increase in illegal alien traffic
has increased tensions in the Douglas community. Some residents have grown
frustrated with the large influx of illegal aliens and begun making
citizen?s arrests of illegal aliens while patrolling their property with
loaded weapons; at least two aliens have been shot. According to the city
manager, the negative national publicity Douglas has received as a result of
the increase in illegal alien traffic may have long- term detrimental
effects on economic development. He expressed concern that tourists might no
longer want to visit; businesses might not want to locate there; and it
might be more difficult recruiting professionals, such as teachers and
physicians. City officials believe that negative publicity about illegal
immigration- the perception that the town was unsafe- might have been a
factor in a company?s decision not to relocate to Douglas. The business
would have employed 250 people.
According to one Tucson sector official, Border Patrol officials had
anticipated that the illegal alien traffic would shift to Douglas as the
sector began increasing enforcement in Nogales. However, the sector did not
have enough agents to simultaneously build up its agent resources in both
Nogales and Douglas.
In Yuma, a city of about 77,000 in western Arizona, city officials told us
that unlike other border communities, the increase in apprehensions have not
had negative effects on their community. They said that this was because
illegal aliens use the town as a transit route to other parts of the United
States and generally do not cross in populated areas. According to Border
Patrol officials, most of the illegal alien apprehensions are made in the
outskirts of the city on uninhabited public lands.
Brownsville is the largest city in the lower Rio Grande Valley, with a
population of about 140,000. According to an evaluation, 13 before Operation
Rio Grande began in August 1997, illegal immigration was having a
significant, negative impact on Brownsville. According to the study,
citizens reported routinely watching 100 to 200 illegal aliens enter
13 Border Management Evaluation of Operation Rio Grande (Lawton, OK:
Advancia Corp., June 27, 2000).
Page 21 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
the United States by crossing the Rio Grande River from Mexico and passing
through a local golf course. Citizens also reported being harassed by
Mexican youths who crossed the border and posed as street performers while
panhandling, hustling, or causing trouble in downtown Brownsville.
Shopkeepers reported two or three shoplifting incidents a day and complained
that certain illegal aliens harassed them and their customers. The
evaluation also quoted a police official as saying that there were nearly
daily occurrences in which citizens at a local park near the Rio Grande
River were accosted and frequently robbed by illegal aliens.
As the Border Patrol increased its presence in the downtown area, the
situation reportedly improved. According to the evaluation, as of January
2000, fewer illegal aliens attempted to enter the United States in
Brownsville. Citizens reported that they were seeing about one alien a week
crossing the river and passing through the golf course. Brownsville police
and Border Patrol agents now take immediate action against illegal aliens
posing as street performers. The study reported that, according to a police
official, shoplifting incidents dropped to about one per year, and the park
near the river was again a safe recreational area for adults and children.
As the strategy has unfolded, there has been an accumulation of knowledge
and experience concerning (1) factors that can impede INS? implementation of
the strategy, (2) the importance of communications between INS and border
communities, and (3) aliens? determination to cross the border.
Experience has indicated to INS that it cannot implement its border strategy
at the pace that it originally anticipated. In March 1997, INS submitted a
5- year staffing plan to Congress covering fiscal years 1996 through 2000.
According to the plan, INS was to bolster border control efforts along the
Northern U. S. border and Gulf Coast beginning in fiscal year 1998 and
continuing into fiscal year 2000. INS had planned to deploy between 245 and
about 400 agents to sectors in these areas, but during these 3 years, INS
added 47 agents to the Northern border and none to the Gulf Coast sectors.
INS officials identified various factors as having impeded their ability to
implement the strategy faster. According to a sector chief, a shortage of
support personnel has required him to use Border Patrol agents for jobs that
should be performed by support staff. In this sector, agents who would
otherwise be patrolling the border are used instead to monitor remote video
surveillance cameras because the sector does not have Experience Gained
With Strategy Implementation; the Importance of Communication; and Aliens?
Determination to Enter Illegally
Page 22 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
enough Law Enforcement Communications Assistants. According to a Western
Region Border Patrol official, this is a problem in many sectors. Agents are
doing work, such as building fences, monitoring sensors, and performing
dispatching duties, that could be done by support personnel. This has
detracted from INS? goal of increasing the amount of time Border Patrol
agents spend on their core activity of patrolling the border. According to
INS budget officials, INS has requested funds for additional support
personnel, but these positions have not been fully funded.
Border Patrol officials also identified a lack of technology, fencing, and
lights as having impeded their ability to implement the strategy faster.
According to officials in one sector, additional remote video surveillance
systems, lighting, and fencing would allow them to monitor a greater portion
of their border area than is now possible. According to a Border Patrol
headquarters official, the deployment of technology, fencing, and lights has
been slower than anticipated because it has taken longer than planned to
prepare environmental impact assessments and coordinate with other federal,
state, and local agencies. Also, the Border Patrol has had to build new
stations to house the increased number of agents. According to a Border
Patrol official, construction funding for fencing has been limited by the
competing need to build new stations.
After several instances in which border communities expressed dismay at
having been caught unaware by the sudden increase in illegal alien traffic,
INS recognized the need to establish channels of communication to discuss
the potential implications of its strategy with local communities. Officials
from border communities, such as Nogales and Douglas, AZ, told us that they
were unaware that INS even had a strategy until they saw a dramatic increase
in illegal alien traffic in their towns. A Douglas city official told us he
first became aware that something was going on when the Border Patrol began
building a fence in the downtown area. Local officials became increasingly
concerned when they learned that the Border Patrol was transporting aliens
apprehended in Nogales to Douglas and returning them to Mexico through the
port of entry there. Many would then try to renter at Douglas.
According to local officials, had they known about the strategy and its
potential impact, they might have been able to do some things to mitigate
its impact on the community. For example, a Douglas police official said
that the department could have rearranged shift schedules to have more
police on duty to respond to the increase in prowler calls and provide more
support to Border Patrol agents needing assistance. He also said that the
city could have strengthened city taxicab ordinances to prevent alien
Importance of INS
Communicating With Border Communities
Page 23 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
smugglers from establishing ?taxi companies? to shuttle illegal aliens to
Phoenix and other locations. They said the number of taxicabs in Douglas
increased from 2 or 3 cabs to between 20 and 40 taxi companies almost
overnight.
Pima County, AZ, officials told us that the Border Patrol should have put
local jurisdictions ?on notice? regarding their strategy. They said this
would have helped local officials respond to constituent questions and
concerns. It would also have allowed time for local governments to try to
obtain additional funding to deal with the expected influx or, for example,
to add more law enforcement. The officials added that if they had been
forewarned, they might have requested the Border Patrol to deploy additional
agents to certain areas to mitigate the destruction of the pristine areas in
the wildlife refuge.
INS has recognized the need to increase communications with the public
regarding the strategy and its potential implications. According to INS?
fiscal year 2000 Annual Performance Plan, one of INS? major goals was to
improve INS? involvement with communities in the development and
implementation of INS operations. To improve communications with the
community, the Tucson sector appointed a full- time community relations
officer in November 2000. The sector also has a community advisory group
made up of local citizens in each of three cities, Nogales, Douglas, and
Naco, AZ. Members of the Douglas group told us they find these meetings
helpful and that the Border Patrol has been responsive to their concerns.
Since 1999, the sector has had a toll- free number to improve communications
with local residents. Agents assigned to the sector?s
?ranch patrol? monitor the private ranchland surrounding the city of
Douglas, where many aliens now cross.
According to Border Patrol officials, the Del Rio sector, and in particular
the Eagle Pass, TX, area may be the next location to experience a
significant increase in illegal alien traffic. They believe this because,
like the other areas that have experienced significant increases in illegal
alien traffic, it has the infrastructure of roads leading to and from the
border area that alien smugglers need to transport the illegal aliens.
The Del Rio sector chief believes the sector is better prepared than were
other sectors, such as Tucson and El Centro, when they experienced
significant increases in alien traffic. In February 2001, the Del Rio sector
had slightly over 1,000 agents, of whom about 300 were assigned to the Eagle
Pass station. The sector recently received airboats to patrol the Rio Grande
River and additional lights and remote video surveillance systems
Page 24 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
to better monitor the border. The sector chief told us that he has been
conducting community outreach efforts for several years to inform the
community about INS? strategy. He said the sector has a Rancher Liaison
Program that informs and educates the community about Border Patrol
activities and operations. This program has, according to the chief, opened
channels of communication between the community and the Border Patrol that
have helped the sector gain access to private lands. He believes working
with ranchers and the public helps reduce the potential for violence between
the citizens and illegal aliens as well as the negative publicity that can
befall a community because of significant increases in illegal immigration.
According to the Police Chief of Eagle Pass, the Del Rio sector began its
outreach efforts several years ago. For example, after Operation Rio Grande
began in the summer of 1997, Border Patrol sector officials gave a briefing
to the Eagle Pass City Council on INS? Southwest border strategy. They
explained that increased enforcement in locations south of Eagle Pass and
the ongoing enforcement in El Paso to the north might increase the illegal
alien traffic in Eagle Pass. The police chief stated that since then, the
Del Rio Border Patrol sector chief has given numerous presentations before
community organizations, such as the local Rotary Club. He stated that such
outreach efforts have kept the lines of communication open, and the city has
not experienced any instances of citizens detaining illegal aliens as has
occurred in other locations along the border.
The strategy assumed that as the urban areas were controlled, the traffic
would shift to more remote areas where the Border Patrol would be able to
more easily detect and apprehend aliens entering illegally. The strategy
also assumed that natural barriers such as rivers, mountains, and the harsh
terrain of the desert would act as deterrents to illegal entry. However, INS
officials told us that as the traffic shifted, they did not anticipate the
sizable number that would still attempt to enter through these harsh
environments. A study of migrant deaths along the Southwest border concluded
that while migrants have always faced danger crossing the border and many
died before INS began its strategy, the strategy has resulted in an increase
in deaths from exposure to either heat or cold. INS Taking Steps to
Reduce Migrant Deaths
Page 25 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Border Patrol data indicated that 1,013 migrants died trying to cross the
Southwest border illegally between October 1997 and June 1, 2001 (see table
2). 14 Nearly 60 percent died from either heat exposure or drowning.
Table 2: Migrant Deaths by Cause of Death Fiscal year Cause of death 1998
1999 2000 2001 a Total Percent
Exposure to heat 87 57 135 27 306 30 Drowning 89 72 92 40 293 29 Unknown 29
38 43 45 155 15 Motor vehicle accident 16 21 48 22 107 11 Other 16 15 27 10
68 7 Exposure to cold 16 18 17 4 55 5 Train 8 14 5 1 28 3 Confined s pace 0
1 0 0 1< 1
Total 261 236 367 149 1,013 100
a Through June 1, 2001. Source: Border Patrol data.
To reduce the number of illegal aliens who die or are injured trying to
cross the border illegally, INS began a Border Safety Initiative in June
1998. The initiative focuses on (1) educating those who may be contemplating
crossing illegally on the dangers of crossing and (2) searching for and
rescuing those who may become abandoned or lost. Working in conjunction with
the Mexican government, INS has produced public service announcements that
are shown on television in Mexico to warn people of the dangers of crossing-
for example, exposure to heat and cold, dehydration, snakes, and bandits
that rob and assault those who cross in remote areas. Border Patrol sectors
show detained aliens a similar video announcement. Signs have been posted on
both sides of border fences in various locations that also warn about the
dangers of crossing. Toll- free numbers in both Mexico and the United States
can be used to report migrants in trouble.
14 Although the Border Patrol reports these numbers as the number of migrant
deaths per year, the data actually reflect the number of migrants who were
found dead by INS during the year. Therefore, migrants who died attempting
to cross the border during one year but were not found until the following
year would be included in the migrant death statistics for the year in which
they were found. Because the bodies of some migrants may never be found and
others may have died while still in Mexico, the actual number of deaths may
be higher.
Page 26 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
The Border Patrol has created special search- and- rescue units in areas
where it is becoming more dangerous to cross. For example, the El Centro
sector has a desert rescue team whose members have been trained in emergency
medical procedures or first aid. The team uses a desert rescue ambulance
equipped with water and lifesaving equipment. To deter crossings, El Centro
agents are positioned, and high- powered lights have been installed, at
dangerous crossings along the All American Canal, which runs along the
border. The sector?s air unit flies along the canal and in desert areas to
search for those who may be in danger.
According to the Border Patrol?s Border Safety Initiative coordinator, most
of the border safety- related expenses, such as agent time and acquisition
and maintenance of equipment, have been funded out of Border Patrol general
operations funds. Therefore, detailed cost data for all safetyrelated costs
were not readily available. According to the coordinator, in fiscal years
1998 through 2001, INS will have spent about $1 million primarily for public
service announcements, signs, mapping potential danger areas, and liaison
with Mexican counterparts. For fiscal year 2002, INS? proposed border safety
budget is $1.5 million.
As shown in figure 6, there was a significant increase in Border Patrol
rescues of migrants from 1999 to 2000.
Page 27 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Figure 6: Border Patrol Migrant Rescues in Fiscal Years 1999 Through June 1,
2001
Source: INS data.
The Border Patrol has also given search- and- rescue training to Mexican law
enforcement officials. In June 2001, a joint U. S.- Mexico safety conference
was held in San Antonio, TX.
Another aspect of the initiative is to identify and prosecute alien
smugglers who use dangerous smuggling practices. The Border Patrol has
established procedures for identifying such smugglers to facilitate
coordinated efforts to target them for arrest and prosecution. According to
INS? year- end review of its fiscal year 2000 Annual Performance Plan,
apprehending and prosecuting the smugglers will require full cooperation
from Mexico.
The Border Patrol has incorporated the issue of border safety into its
overall strategy. In November 2000, the Border Patrol issued a Border Safety
addendum to the strategy that emphasizes the need to incorporate safety
issues into any future operations.
On June 22, 2001, the United States and Mexico announced plans to enhance
border safety in the wake of the death of 14 undocumented aliens
0 500
1,000 1,500
2,000 2,500
3,000 FY2001 FY2000 FY1999
Number
Number of Rescue Operations
People Rescued
Page 28 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
in the Arizona desert in May 2001. The plans call for the United States and
Mexico to
strengthen the public safety campaign to alert potential migrants of the
dangers of crossing the border in high- risk areas;
reinforce plans for the protection and search and rescue of migrants,
including increased aerial surveillance of the U. S. side and increased
presence of Mexican law enforcement on the Mexican side; and
implement a cooperative, comprehensive, and aggressive plan to combat and
dismantle alien smuggling organizations.
INS has spent 7 years implementing its Southwest border strategy, but it may
take INS up to a decade longer to fully implement the strategy. This assumes
that INS obtains the level of staff, technology, equipment, and fencing it
believes it needs to control the Southwest border. Although illegal alien
apprehensions have shifted, there is no clear indication that overall
illegal entry into the United States along the Southwest border has
declined. INS? current efforts to measure the effectiveness of its border
control efforts could be enhanced by analyzing data in its IDENT system.
These data offer INS an opportunity to develop additional performance
indicators that could be incorporated into its Annual Performance Plan
review process and could help INS assess whether its border control efforts
are associated with an overall reduction in the flow of illegal aliens
across the border. Borderwide analysis of the IDENT data could be used to
address several important questions related to illegal entry.
The strategy?s impact on local communities has been affected by the timing
of INS? infusion of agent and other resources intended to protect the local
community from a surge in illegal alien traffic; what routes the illegal
aliens have used in crossing the border; and INS? involvement with the
community. INS has learned the importance of outreach efforts in attempting
to mitigate the potential negative effects the strategy can cause a
community and the harm that can befall illegal aliens who risk injury and
death to cross the border.
To better gauge the effects of its border control efforts, we recommend that
the INS Commissioner develop specific performance indicators using the IDENT
data and incorporate these indicators into INS? Annual Performance Plan.
Conclusions
Recommendation for Executive Action
Page 29 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney General.
In a letter dated July 24, 2001, which we have reprinted in appendix II,
INS? Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations concurred with
our recommendation and said that INS will begin developing specific
performance indicators using IDENT data. However, he also stated that ?INS
will continue to evaluate the use of IDENT data for analyzing shifts in
illegal alien traffic,? and a ?Congressional moratorium on the deployment of
new IDENT sites, as well as efforts to integrate IDENT [with the automated
fingerprint system used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation], have an
operational impact that delays comprehensive data collection along the
southwest border.?
We believe that IDENT, which has been incrementally deployed to all Border
Patrol stations along the Southwest border since 1995, already contains data
that could be used to determine the number of aliens Border Patrol agents
have arrested between ports of entry, how many times they have been arrested
trying to enter illegally, and what shifts in illegal entry attempts between
ports of entry have occurred over time along the Southwest border.
Therefore, while future improvements to the collection of fingerprint data
will be useful, we believe that the IDENT data currently available puts INS
in the position to develop the types of performance measures discussed in
our report and to use the measures to gain a better understanding of the
results of its enforcement efforts.
INS? Executive Associate Commissioner also stated that the long- term
resource requirements we refer to in our report are based on preliminary
information and are subject to change. He indicated that further discussions
among INS, the Department of Justice, and the administration are needed to
finalize the requirements. We have added wording to our report to clarify
that INS? estimates of its long- term resource requirements are preliminary
and subject to change.
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General; Commissioner
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties. Copies of this report
will also be made available to others upon request. Agency Comments
Page 30 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me or Evi Rezmovic on (202) 512- 8777. Michael P. Dino, James R.
Bancroft, and Brian J. Lipman made key contributions to this report.
Richard M. Stana Director, Justice Issues
Appendix I: INS Border Patrol Authorized Staffing and Alien Apprehensions in
Southwest Sectors
Page 31 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Table 3: Authorized Border Patrol Agent Positions in Southwest Border Patrol
Sectors, Fiscal Years 1993 Through 2000 Authorized increases each fiscal
year Sector 1993 authorized
agents 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
San Diego, CA 980 300 229 428 278 0 0 0 2,215
El Centro, CA 194 0 0 0 50 134 78 45 501
Yuma, AZ 178 0 0 0 0 56 50 10 294
Tucson, AZ 281 0 128 246 228 140 350 100 1,473
El Paso, TX 602 50 93 101 107 45 25 10 1,033
Marfa, TX 131 0 0 0 0 25 25 0 181
Del Rio, TX 290 0 100 0 52 135 80 95 752
Laredo, TX 347 0 75 0 49 205 120 45 841
McAllen, TX 386 0 75 25 228 260 250 100 1,324 Total 3,389 350 700 800 992 a
1,000 978 b 405 c 8,614
a 8 additional agents allocated to Puerto Rico. b 22 additional agents
allocated to northern border sectors. c 25 additional agents allocated to
northern border sectors.
Source: INS data.
Table 4: Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 1993
Through 2000 Fiscal year Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
San Diego, CA 531,689 450,152 524,231 483,815 283,889 248,092 182,267
151,681 El Centro, CA 30,058 27,654 37,317 66,873 146,210 226,695 225,279
238,126 Yuma, AZ 23,548 21,211 20,894 28,310 30,177 76,195 93,388 108,747
Tucson, AZ 92,639 139,473 227,529 305,348 272,397 387,406 470,449 616,346 El
Paso, TX 285,781 79,688 110,971 145,929 124,376 125,035 110,857 115,696
Marfa, TX 15,486 13,494 11,552 13,214 12,692 14,509 14,952 13,689 Del Rio,
TX 42,289 50,036 76,490 121,137 113,280 131,058 156,653 157,178 Laredo, TX
82,348 73,142 93,305 131,841 141,893 103,433 114,004 108,973 McAllen, TX
109,048 124,251 169,101 210,553 243,793 204,257 169,151 133,243
Total 1,212,886 979,101 1, 271,390 1,507,020 1,368,707 1,516,680 1,537,000
1,643,679
Source: INS.
Appendix I: INS Border Patrol Authorized Staffing and Alien Apprehensions in
Southwest Sectors
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Justice
Page 32 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Justice
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Justice
Page 33 GAO- 01- 842 INS' Southwest Border Strategy (183645)
The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are
$2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are also accepted.
Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent.
Orders by mail:
U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013
Orders by visiting:
Room 1100 700 4 th St., NW (corner of 4 th and G Sts. NW) Washington, DC
20013
Orders by phone:
(202) 512- 6000 fax: (202) 512- 6061 TDD (202) 512- 2537
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To
receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30
days, please call (202) 512- 6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu
will provide information on how to obtain these lists.
Orders by Internet
For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, send an email
message with ?info? in the body to:
Info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO?s World Wide Web home page at: http:// www.
gao. gov
Contact one:
Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm
E- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov
1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering system) Ordering Information
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
*** End of document. ***
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
