Drug Control: International Counterdrug Sites Being Developed (Briefing
Report, 12/20/2000, GAO/GAO-01-63BR).
With the closing of Howard Air Force Base in Panama, the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Coast Guard and the Customs Service began searching
for alternate sites from which to conduct counterdrug operations close
to drug producing zones. The United States has secured 10-year
agreements for the use of four such sites. However, each site requires
some construction to support a designated mix of aircraft. In response
to concerns over the costs to develop and operate these four sites and
whether these sites would meet the needs of interagency users, GAO
briefed members of the Caucus on International Narcotics Control on (1)
the process used to select these sites, (2) the estimated costs to
develop and maintain these sites, and (3) issues that might affect
operational capabilities at the sites. GAO found that the United States
used a reasonable process to locate and secure four sites for its
counterdrug efforts in foreign countries. DOD estimated that it would
cost about 136.6 million to build airfields at these sites. Several
issues might affect the capabilities of these sites, including (1) the
unavailability of certain U.S. aircraft to conduct counterdrug
operations, (2) DOD and Customs ongoing assessment of aircraft used to
track suspect traffickers, and (3) a lack of interagency agreement over
who will pay to ship the equipment and spare parts necessary to maintain
operations.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-63BR
TITLE: Drug Control: International Counterdrug Sites Being
Developed
DATE: 12/20/2000
SUBJECT: Drug trafficking
Site selection
Military facilities
Government facility construction
Military aircraft
International cooperation
Cost analysis
Interagency relations
IDENTIFIER: Aruba
Curacao
San Salvador
Ecuador
Air Force E-3 Airborne Early Warning System
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GAO-01-63BR
A
Briefing Report to the Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
U. S. Senate
December 2000 DRUG CONTROL International Counterdrug Sites Being Developed
GAO-01-63BR
Letter 3 Briefing Sections Briefing Section I: Background 8
Briefing Section II: Selecting Sites That Meet Operational Requirements 12
Briefing Section III: Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations 18
Briefing Section IV: Issues Affecting Operational Capabilities 28 Appendixes
Appendix I: U. S. Operations in the Source and Transit Zones
(May 1, 1999, Through September 30, 2000) 32 Appendix II: U. S. Overflight
Arrangements With Selected Countries 33
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 35 Appendix IV: GAO
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36
Lett er
December 28, 2000 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman, Caucus on
International Narcotics Control United States Senate
Dear Mr. Chairman: From the 1980s until 1999, Howard Air Force Base in
Panama was the main location from which the Department of Defense (DOD), the
U. S. Coast Guard, and the U. S. Customs Service conducted counterdrug
operations in South America, the Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific.
However, the
United States ceased counterdrug operations from Howard on May 1, 1999. 1 To
permit the United States to continue to mount counterdrug operations close
to the drug producing or source zones and illicit drug transshipment or
transit zones, the U. S. Southern Command, which is responsible for
counterdrug operations within the region, sought usable airfields. The
United States has secured 10- year agreements for the use of four airfields
for counterdrug activities. However, each airfield requires some
construction to support a designated mix of aircraft. Since the spring of
1999, the Defense Department and the U. S. Customs Service have been
conducting limited counterdrug operations from airfields at Manta, Ecuador;
and from Aruba and Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles; 2 and since August
2000 from San Salvador, El Salvador.
You expressed concern over the costs of developing and operating the four
sites and whether these “forward operating locations” would meet
the needs of the interagency users, principally DOD and the U. S. Customs
Service. As requested, on July 20, 2000, we briefed your staff on (1) the
process the United States used to select the sites, (2) the estimated costs
to develop and maintain the sites, and (3) issues that might affect
operational capabilities at the sites. This report updates information
provided in that briefing.
1 Under the Panama Canal Treaty, the United States agreed to leave the base
at the end of 1999. 2 Aruba is a protectorate of the Netherlands; Curacao is
a possession.
Results in Brief The United States used a two- track process to select the
four forward operating locations. First, U. S. embassies canvassed regional
governments' willingness to host U. S. military counterdrug operations.
Second, Defense Department and U. S. Customs Service personnel assessed
airfields within the region to determine whether they met operational
requirements by
providing proximity to the source and transit zones and force protection.
Defense and Customs users of the sites indicated that with enhancements, the
sites would be adequate to meet their operational requirements. They said
the sites collectively would
accommodate the mix of interagency aircraft required to perform counterdrug
missions; provide greater geographic coverage of the Eastern Pacific transit
zone
and deeper access into the source zone than was possible from Howard Air
Force Base; and provide more flexibility than Howard did to vary flight
operations, thus complicating traffickers' attempts to monitor U. S.
aircraft operations.
As of July 2000, DOD estimated the total cost of developing the four
airfields, which is driven by the anticipated aircraft mix, would be about
$136.6 million. Approximately $61.3 million is required to enhance the
Manta, Ecuador, site, primarily to construct airfields, taxiways, and
parking aprons and housing to support the U. S. Air Force's E- 3 Airborne
Early Warning System aircraft and its crews and other detection and
monitoring assets. DOD estimated that about $63.4 million would be needed
for enhancements to runways and aircraft parking areas at the international
airports in Aruba, Curacao, and San Salvador. In addition, the Air Force
estimated operations and maintenance costs 3 for Aruba/ Curacao and Manta to
be about $22.9 million through 2001 and anticipated that this cost would
increase to an average of $32. 3 million annually once the sites became
fully operational in late 2002. Navy estimates for these costs at San
Salvador, which will be fully operational in late 2003, were about $3. 6
million through 2001 and would decline to about $2.8 million annually
thereafter.
The level of operations at the sites could be affected by the unavailability
of U. S. aircraft to conduct counterdrug operations. In December 1999, we 3
The costs of operating and maintaining the sites, i. e., utilities, airfield
fuels, and ground maintenance, are borne by DOD.
reported that between 1992 and 1999, DOD allocated fewer aircraft to the
counterdrug mission, particularly in the high priority source zone. Since
then, some key aircraft have continued to be unavailable. 4 For example,
only one of the two required E- 3 aircraft has been in the region since the
beginning of 1999, and DOD has not been able to provide the required zone
coverage. In addition, an ongoing DOD and Customs assessment of aircraft
used to track suspect traffickers could affect the asset mix at Aruba and
Curacao as well as construction costs. Another unresolved issue is the lack
of interagency agreement over who will pay to ship the equipment and spare
parts necessary to maintain operations at Manta. The success of counterdrug
operations mounted from the forward operating locations also
partially depends on U. S. assistance provided to foreign governments for
interdicting or apprehending traffickers over their territory. 5 To assi st
Colombia and Peru in the short term, the State Department began, in fiscal
year 1999, a $29.6- million effort to upgrade these counties' A- 37
aircraft. However, Defense and State Department officials are concerned that
the aging aircraft will likely be operable for only 4 to 6 more years even
with these upgrades, and no long- term effort is under way to replace the
aircraft. This could affect the level of interdiction in both countries.
Finally, U. S.
operations can also be adversely affected if U. S. aircraft cannot fly over
countries in transit or in pursuit of traffickers. Agency Comments We
obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the Department of
Defense (see app. III). DOD concurred with the report and provided technical
comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
Scope and To determine how the United States selected sites, we met with
officials at Methodology the Departments of State and Defense, the U. S.
Customs Service, the Office
of National Drug Control Policy, the U. S. Interdiction Coordinator, and the
Joint Interagency Task Force-East. We examined these agencies' documents
outlining operational requirements for potential locations and
site selection criteria. We also reviewed official site surveys and messages
regarding the identification of potential host nations and possible sites
from the Department of State, U. S. embassies in the region, the Department
4 Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply
Have Declined (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 9, Dec. 21, 1999). 5 Interdiction is the
arrest of personnel and seizure of equipment or illegal drugs.
of Defense, the U. S. Southern Command, and the U. S. Customs Service.
Further, we reviewed and analyzed operational requirement documents and
flight data and spoke with aircraft operators and interagency members of the
Office of the U. S. Interdiction Coordinator, which coordinates counterdrug
asset requirements, about the capabilities of the selected sites. To
identify the cost of developing and maintaining the forward operating
locations, we analyzed cost estimates generated by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the U. S. Southern Command, and the U. S. Air Force
and U. S. Navy- the two DOD components responsible for operating and
maintaining the sites. We also met with Air Force officials to discuss the
operations and maintenance functions they are supporting at Aruba,
Curacao, and Manta. To determine issues that might affect operational
capabilities at the sites, we spoke with officials at the Departments of
State and Defense. We obtained and analyzed documentation on U. S.
counterdrug aircraft flight
hours beginning on May 1, 1999. We used this date because historical flight
hour data was not available prior to Howard's closure. We also discussed
logistics issues affecting aircraft availability and plans to provide and
upgrade foreign governments' interdiction aircraft with U. S. Customs
Service, Defense, and State Department officials.
We conducted our review from May through October 2000 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of
this report to appropriate congressional committees and to the Honorable
William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Madeline Albright,
the Secretary of State; the Honorable Lawrence H. Summers, the Secretary of
the Treasury; the Honorable Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, U. S. Customs
Service; and the Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National
Drug Control Policy. We will send copies to other interested parties upon
request.
Please contact me on (202) 512- 4128 if you or your staff have any questions
about this report. An additional contact and major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours, Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade
Bri Bri ef ng i ng ef Sect i Sect ons on i i I
Background Howard's Proximity to Key Trafficking Zones COLOMBIA PERUPERU
BOLIVIA
Howard Air Force Base, Panama Source Zone Nations Principal Trafficking
Routes
Before the closure of Howard Air Force Base in December 1999, the U. S.
government had used the secure base to provide unified logistical support
for counterdrug operations and other missions covering a wide geographic
area. From the centrally located base, the Department of Defense (DOD); the
U. S. Customs Service; and the U. S. Coast Guard, directed by the Joint
Interagency Task Force, 1 operated airborne early warning, marine patrol,
and tracker aircraft in support of U. S. counterdrug objectives. These
aircraft patrolled the drug trafficking routes within the South American
source zone and Caribbean and Eastern Pacific transit zones. Prior to the
closure of the airfield at Howard Air Force Base, DOD moved
some U. S. aircraft to the United States. Because these locations were far
from the source and transit zones, these aircraft spent more time transiting
to the zones and less time executing their monitoring mission. For example,
according to DOD officials, the Air Force Airborne Early Warning and Control
System E- 3 aircraft operating from the United States could fly only about
half of the required hours over the transit zone and provide very limited
source zone coverage. To counter the loss in capability, the Office of
National Drug Control Policy, which provides policy and guidance for
international and domestic counterdrug efforts, instructed DOD to establish
a post- Panama presence in the region. After an initial search, the
Commander in Chief of the U. S. Southern Command concluded that no single
location could support the aircraft used in the counterdrug mission. 1 The
Joint Interagency Task Force- East tasks aerial and maritime assets in
counterdrug operations throughout the Caribbean and Central and South
American Regions.
Process for Tacking and Interdicting Drug Traffickers
1. Ground- based radar detect suspected trafficker 2. Early warning
aircraft, such as the U. S. Air Force E- 3 and the U. S. Customs P- 3B,
track the target with
radar 3. Tracker aircraft, such as the Air Force F- 16 and
4. Foreign government forces interdict trafficker the Customs Citation,
visually identify and track the target
In a multiphase process, U. S. aircraft detect and monitor suspected drug
traffickers operating over land and sea. These detection and monitoring
efforts help foreign authorities interdict or apprehend traffickers on or
over their land. To illustrate, the U. S. Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar
2 or other ground- based radar first detects small, low- flying aircraft on
a known
trafficking route. Using this data and intelligence information, the Joint
Interagency Task Force-East in Key West, Florida, directs U. S. aircraft to
a suspect's approximate location. Second, aircraft, such as the U. S.
Customs P- 3 or a U. S. Air Force E- 3, use their sophisticated radar
systems to track the suspect. These aircraft make routine short- term
deployments from either the United States or regional sites to support their
operations. Third, using information supplied by these
airborne early warning aircraft, the Task Force directs a U. S. tracker
aircraft, such as a U. S. Air Force Reserve F- 16 or a U. S. Customs
Citation, to approach the suspect aircraft to make a visual identification
of it. Last, U. S. aircraft provide location and identification information
to foreign government law enforcement officials, who are responsible for
intercepting the aircraft. Participating nation liaison officers, called
host nation riders, travel on board U. S. airborne detection, monitoring,
and tracking aircraft to facilitate interdiction efforts by communicating
information to their defense agencies on the ground. Colombia, Peru, and
Ecuador currently participate in this program. 2 Located in the United
States and Puerto Rico, these radar systems continually scan source and
transit zones for potential drug traffickers.
Selecting Sites That Meet Operational
Br ef ng i i Secti on I I
Requirements Process for Selecting Sites for Counterdrug Operations
Countries Approached to Host Counterdrug Operations Peru (PE) Ecuador (EC)
Costa Rica (CR) Netherlands (NL) Honduras (HN) Belize (BH) El Salvador (ES)
Sites Surveyed
1998 1999
2000
Manta (EC) Belize City (BH)
Soto Cano (HN) Salinas (EC)
Liberia (CR) San Salvador (ES)
Guayaquil (EC) Aruba (NL) Curacao (NL)
Interim Agreements
April 1999
Ecuador Netherlands
May 1, 1999: Howard Air Force Base runway closes; interim operations begin
at Aruba, Curacao, and Manta Final Agreements
1999 2000
Ecuador Netherlands
BH= Belize El Salvador
CR= Costa Rica EC= Ecuador ES= El Salvador HN= Honduras NL= The Netherlands
PE= Peru
Note: Ratification of the agreement by the Parliament of the Netherlands
expected in early 2001.
By July 1998, the United States recognized that U. S. access to Howard Air
Force Base would not be extended beyond December 31, 1999. By September
1998, DOD had developed basic site selection criteria and had begun the
search for new operating locations. Key criteria were
(1) proximity to the source and transit zones, (2) protection of U. S.
personnel and equipment, and (3) adequate infrastructure to minimize
construction costs.
The United States used a two- track process to identify suitable airfields
and nations willing to host U. S. operations. DOD and U. S. Customs Service
officials surveyed several sites in the Caribbean and South America between
September and December 1998. DOD officials also surveyed sites in Central
America in 1999. Concurrently, the State Department queried
regional nations on their willingness to allow the United States to conduct
counterdrug missions from their territories. The United States sought to
secure agreements before the closure of the Howard Air Force Base runway on
May 1, 1999. The operational limitations of potential sites, the difficulty
protecting U. S. forces, and the reluctance of some nations to have U. S.
military aircraft at their airports narrowed DOD's choices. DOD ultimately
selected Manta, Ecuador, and Aruba and Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles
and continued to search for a Central American site. By April 1999, the
United States had signed interim operating agreements on the use of the
sites with the governments of Ecuador and the Netherlands. These agreements
permitted shared use of the international airports in Aruba and Curacao and
an air force base in Manta and allowed the United States to continue limited
counterdrug operations from these three locations after ceasing operations
at Howard Air Force Base.
By November 1999, the United States finalized a long- term agreement with
Ecuador for the use of Manta, and in early March 2000, the United States
concluded long- term agreements for the use of the Aruba and Curacao sites.
State Department officials expect ratification of the agreement by the
Parliament of the Netherlands in early 2001. Also, by late March 2000, the
United States had signed a long- term agreement with El Salvador for use of
the San Salvador international airport. DOD officials said that this site
located northwest of Panama extends the geographic coverage of the
Eastern Pacific transit zone beyond that available from Howard Air Force
Base.
Agreements Allow Unrestricted Use for Counterdrug Operations Only
The Netherlands Netherlands Antilles Aruba
Kingdom of The Netherlands
Ecuador El Salvador
United States may conduct only counterdrug detection, tracking, and
monitoring operations
Following consultation, facilities and U. S.- funded improvements revert to
host nations
Contracts are for 10- year duration with renewable 5- year terms Access is
24 hours a day, 7 days a week Host nations provide perimeter security
The agreements with the governments of Ecuador, El Salvador, and the
Netherlands allow the United States unrestricted airfield access solely to
conduct U. S. counterdrug detection and monitoring operations. The United
States does not own or rent any facilities but may receive the use of any
land it needs to establish the sites. After the agreements' expiration and
with mutual agreement of the parties, facilities built by the United States
for its use during the period of the agreement will be transferred to the
other nations' governments. The airfields and national airspace remain under
the sovereign control of the governments. Each agreement is for a 10- year
period, which State and Defense officials
told us is the minimum period needed to justify the capital investment in
these facilities. After the initial 10- year period, either party may
terminate the agreement with 1 year's notice. However, if both parties
agree, the agreements may be renewed for 5- year periods.
Under the agreements, host nation authorities have overall responsibility
for air traffic control and the physical security of the airfield. Each of
the locations requires some enhancements, and the agreements permit the
United States to construct the necessary facilities. The United States will
also maintain these facilities and provide physical security for its
aircraft. The agreements also state that the United States will pay
reasonable charges for services such as utilities and fire protection.
Comparative Coverage From Howard and Forward Operating Locations
P- 3: 5 Hours on Station
Howard Air Force Base Forward Operating Location Approximate P- 3 Coverage
Range From Howard Air Force Base Approximate P- 3 Coverage Range From
Forward Operating Locations
Together, the four sites provide greater geographic coverage than did Howard
Air Force Base, according to DOD officials. In particular, they provide
deeper source zone coverage and extend coverage farther into the
increasingly trafficked Eastern Pacific because of their proximity to the
targeted zones. The actual coverage provided will depend upon the type of
aircraft and its ability to fly over foreign territories when tracking or
pursuing suspect traffickers. (See app. II for information on U. S. regional
overflight agreements.) DOD officials said that with multiple sites, flight
operations could be varied, thus complicating traffickers' attempts to
monitor U. S. aircraft operations. Aruba and Curacao, situated in the
Caribbean Sea just off the South American coast, can support both DOD and U.
S. Customs Service source zone operations. DOD officials also noted that the
sites' strategic locations allow U. S. aircraft to detect traffickers flying
from the northern coast of Colombia over the Caribbean Sea. Manta, located
about 500 miles from the
Southeastern Colombian source zone, permits coverage of this area while also
being closer than Howard Air Force Base to source zones in Peru and Bolivia.
DOD officials said that the advantage of the San Salvador site is that it
extends the ability to support aerial and marine detection of maritime
traffickers in the Eastern Pacific.
Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward
Bri ng ef i Sect on i II I
Operating Locations Construction and Operations and Maintenance Costs
Estimated Design and Construction Costs
Dollars in Millions Design costs for
$9. 3 San Salvador all sites
$11.9 $61.3 Manta Curacao $43.9 $10.2
Aruba Estimated Annual Operations and Maintenance Costs Through Fiscal Year
2001
Aruba $3. 6
San Salvador CuracaoM
$16.8 Command Support
anta $6. 1 Aruba, Curacao, Manta
As of July 2000, DOD estimates that it will cost a total of about $136.6
million to design and complete construction. When fully operational between
late 2002 and late 2003, the four sites will be able to accommodate a
planned mix of aircraft. As the lead U. S. agency, DOD is responsible for
upgrading and building facilities at the sites to meet interagency
requirements. Estimates for operating and maintaining the sites vary by
location. Manta will require the most construction, which DOD estimates will
total about $61.3 million. The costs are largely driven by the need to
strengthen the runway and widen the taxiway and build a parking area
to accommodate the U. S. Air Force E- 3 aircraft and its accompanying
refueling tanker. Other aircraft such as P- 3s and C- 130s will also use the
site. Curacao and Aruba construction costs are estimated at about
$43.9 million and $10. 2 million, respectively. The Curacao construction
will include a taxiway, aircraft parking spaces, and a hangar, also
partially in support of the E- 3 as well as other aircraft. Aruba, which
will support fewer and smaller aircraft, will require aircraft parking space
and small operations and maintenance facilities.
The San Salvador site will require aircraft parking space, an operations
center, and other facilities that DOD estimates will cost about $9. 3
million.
Operating and maintenance costs for Aruba, Curacao, and Manta are estimated
to be about $22. 9 million through fiscal year 2001, including $6. 1 million
for command support. The funds will be used to provide support such as
communications, airfield management, maintenance, and supplies. DOD
officials said that these costs are likely to increase to about $32.3
million annually, as the sites become fully operational. For the San
Salvador site, annual operating and maintenance costs are estimated to be
about $3. 6 million in 2001 and to decrease to about $2.8 million annually
in later years.
Manta: Primary Site for Staging Source Zone Operations
Hangar/ Maintenance/ Operations
Pacific Ocean
Facilities Taxiway
Fire Station
05 05
Current Operating
N
Facility
1º W
FEET 0 500 1000
100
Dining Facility and Quarters Ramp, Runway, Taxiway
U. S.- Constructed Facilities
Manta, Ecuador, will serve as the primary site for staging operations in the
source zone, which, since 1993, has been the highest U. S. priority for
counterdrug operations. Manta requires the most construction of all the
sites because the runway and taxiway do not meet U. S. standards for large
aircraft. When runway construction is completed, currently estimated to be
by September 2001, the site will accommodate the large U. S. Air Force E- 3
airborne early warning aircraft and its accompanying KC- 135 aerial
refueling aircraft. When fully operational in about mid- 2002, the site is
to accommodate four large and seven medium aircraft, such as the U. S.
Navy's or Customs Service's P- 3 aircraft. On a periodic basis since April
1999, one U. S. Navy P- 3 has flown from Manta; the U. S. Customs Service
began periodic, 7- day deployments of P- 3 aircraft in June 2000. Of the
estimated total cost for construction at Manta ($ 61. 3 million), 73
percent, or $44.4 million, is directly attributable to construction needed
to support the E- 3 aircraft, according to DOD officials. Runway and
taxiway construction are estimated to cost $38.6 million. The current
runway's strength will not support the E- 3 aircraft, and the taxiways are
not wide enough for safe movement on them. Other construction estimates are
for lodging and dining facilities ($ 6. 3 million), hangar facilities ($ 6.7
million), a maintenance facility ($ 4.9 million), a squadron operations
facility ($ 2.6 million), and a fire/ rescue station ($ 2. 2 million). 1
The U. S. Air Force will manage base support services such as airfield
management, security, communications, and food services. Base operating
costs are estimated to total about $7. 4 million in fiscal year 2001 but
will likely rise once the construction is completed and Manta becomes fully
operational. Air Force officials told us that they expect Manta will require
a permanent staff of eight persons that will be augmented by contractor
support staff.
1 Personnel under contract with DOD will operate the fire station.
Aruba: Supporting U. S. Customs Service Operations
N
VAR W
8º Taxiways
FEET 0 500 1000
Operations Center/ Hangar
Caribbean Sea
Ramp
100
U. Facilities
29
S.- Constructed 29 11 11
The forward operating location at Aruba will support the U. S. Customs
Service's operations in the South American source zone and the Caribbean
transit zone. According to officials at the U. S. Southern Command, Aruba
can accommodate two medium- sized P- 3 aircraft and three small- sized
tracker aircraft when fully operational in late 2002. U. S. Customs
officials said that the P- 3 aircraft would conduct airborne early warning
and tracking operations mainly in the source zone. At least one tracker
aircraft will be on alert at all times to track potential traffickers over
the Caribbean
Sea. Customs aircraft have been operating from this site since April 28,
1999, and share parking spaces and other facilities with commercial
aircraft.
Of the estimated $10. 2 million total construction costs, DOD will use about
$8. 8 million to construct a new ramp, taxiway, and rinse facility for the
use of U. S. Customs aircraft. The Department will also spend about $1.5
million to construct a new hangar and squadron operations facility. These
costs could increase if Customs assumes a larger role in tracking
traffickers and requires additional hangar and operations space. DOD and
Customs will not need lodging facilities because Aruba has an ample supply
of hotels. The Air Force estimates that it will spend about $1.9 million in
fiscal year 2001 for base operations. The Air Force expects to maintain a
permanent staff of about three personnel to operate and maintain the site.
Curacao: Supporting DOD Operations
Caribbean Sea
Existing Runway FEET
W
0 500 1000
N 10º
Ramp 100
VAR
H Current Operating Facility Realigned Taxiway
Free Trade Zone Royal Netherlands Operations/ Hangar/
Naval Air Station Maintenance Facilities
U. S.- Constructed Facilities
The forward operating location at Curacao will host a range of DOD aircraft
supporting both source and transit zone operations. The facility will
accommodate four to six F- 16s used in the transit zone: one to two
Navy P- 3s, one Navy E- 2, and one Air Force E- 3 airborne early warning
aircraft for detection and monitoring in the source and transit zones and
two C- 130- type planes. DOD has operated aircraft from this site since May
1, 1999.
Initially, DOD planned to construct the U. S. facilities at the eastern end
of the airport. However, according to a DOD official, this construction
would have required extending electric and utility lines. DOD ultimately
decided to construct the facilities at the western end near the Royal Dutch
Naval Air Station. The Dutch favored the move since they use similar
aircraft to conduct counterdrug operations and can share facilities if
necessary. In addition, DOD can benefit from the security provided by Royal
Dutch
forces and minimize the overall visibility of U. S. personnel. The official
said that DOD had not studied the costs of making the change but did not
anticipate that the move would increase overall costs. DOD estimates it will
spend about $43.9 million to construct new facilities and upgrade existing
ones. Of the total costs, about $29.5 million will be used to construct new
parking spaces and a taxiway that will connect the aircraft parking area to
the runway. An additional $14.4 million will be used to construct an
operations center and hanger and maintenance facilities.
The Air Force estimates that operating costs will average about $7. 5
million through fiscal year 2001. A permanent presence of six personnel will
provide support services such as site maintenance, communications, and
resupply.
San Salvador: Supporting U. S. Navy Maritime Operations
Cross Runway
Commercial Cargo Ramp Commercial Ramp
Fire Station Maintenance Hangar Hangar
Military Ramp
Ramp Maintenance
Ramp Taxiway
Runway U. S.- Constructed Facilities
From the San Salvador, El Salvador, forward operating location, U. S. Navy
aircraft will conduct maritime patrol operations in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean. According to DOD officials, traffickers are increasingly using the
Eastern Pacific Ocean to move drugs toward the United States. The Defense
Department plans to build this site to host four medium- sized DOD and
Customs aircraft. DOD projects that the construction in San Salvador,
the last of the locations to be selected, will begin in 2002 and be
completed by late 2003. The Navy began conducting limited operations from
this site in August 2000. The site will be fully operational upon completion
of ramp
and taxiway construction. DOD plans to spend about $9. 3 million on
construction. The construction of new parking spaces and a taxiway is
estimated to cost about $5 million. The remaining amount will be used for
new maintenance and squadron operations facilities and other site
improvements.
The San Salvador international airport includes both a commercial terminal
and an adjacent, secure Salvadoran air force base. The new U. S. facility
will be located on this military facility. This facility will offer security
for U. S. personnel and equipment. However, Salvadoran munitions previously
housed in a bunker located near the intended U. S. site have been moved to a
temporary location to allow for safe U. S. operations. A permanent bunker
will be constructed at U. S. expense. A DOD official estimated that this
construction could cost an additional $1. 2 million.
The U. S. Navy expects annual base operating costs to be about $3. 6 million
in fiscal year 2001 and drop to about $2.7 million annually thereafter. The
Navy estimates the permanent U. S. presence to be about eight support
personnel.
Bri ng ef i Sect on i V I Issues Affecting Operational Capabilities Certain
Issues May Limit the Counterdrug Mission
Overflight Overflight
Venezuela Colombia Ecuador
Interdiction Capability Aircraft Availability and
Logistics Support Peru
The U. S. counterdrug mission supported by the forward operating locations
may be affected by the (1) availability of U. S. aircraft, (2) U. S. efforts
to equip foreign forces responsible for interdicting traffickers within
their territories, and (3) standing overflight authority in foreign airspace
for
U. S. aircraft supporting counterdrug operations. DOD has allocated fewer
aircraft to the counterdrug mission since 1992 in part due to DOD- wide
force reductions, which affected its ability to fly the required number of
hours over the trafficking zones. 1 For example, in 1999,
we reported that between fiscal year 1998 and 1999, DOD's detection and
monitoring flight hours over the high- priority source zone countries of
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru decreased by 48 percent. 2 Customs, which has
provided primary early warning and tracking coverage of the source zone
since April 1999, has partially offset this decrease and plans to add six
more
planes to its inventory by October 2001. While constructing the Manta site
to support the required two Air Force E- 3 aircraft, DOD has been able to
provide only one E- 3 aircraft in nearly 2 years due to higher priority
operations. Between May and December 1999, the only available E- 3 aircraft
operated primarily in the lower priority transit zone. This aircraft has not
been able to provide its required flight hours. 3 During the period, it
conducted very few sorties in the source zone but it has provided about 39
hours of coverage per month since January 2000. (See app. I for flight hour
information.) In addition, a current DOD assessment of the aircraft being
used to track suspect traffickers could affect the asset mix planned for
some of the locations. Two aspects of logistics support affect aircraft
availability- timely resupply of the remote Manta site and delivery costs
for non- DOD parts. On its first deployment to Manta in June 2000, for
example, U. S. Customs aircraft could not operate for several days because
the crew was awaiting delivery of replacement propeller parts. Ultimately,
DOD delivered the parts; however, the agencies have not resolved who is
responsible for the
$71,215 cost of the delivery. The logistics issue remains to be resolved,
and neither agency has budgeted for Customs logistics support in its fiscal
year 2001 budget.
1 The military services provide required equipment from their existing
inventories. 2 Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal
Drug Supply Have Decline d (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 9, Dec. 1999). 3 The required
number of flight hours spent over the zones of interest is classified.
The success of counterdrug operations mounted from the forward operating
locations depends in part on the U. S.- provided assistance that enables
foreign governments to interdict traffickers over their territories. 4 The
United States, for example, provides foreign forces with equipment and spare
parts, largely under an excess equipment program so that they
can interdict suspect traffickers. 5 To assist Colombia and Peru in the
short term, the State Department began, in fiscal year 1999, a $29. 6-
million effort to upgrade its A- 37 aircraft. However, Defense and State
Department officials are concerned that the aging aircraft will likely be
operable for only 4 to 6 more years, even with these upgrades, and no long-
term effort is underway to replace the aircraft.
The United States has overflight and pursuit agreements with many of the
countries in the counterdrug region. However, U. S. operations can be
adversely affected if U. S. aircraft cannot fly over countries in transit to
their search areas or in pursuit of traffickers. For example, the lack of an
overflight agreement with Venezuela increases the transit time for
U. S. aircraft flying from Aruba and Curacao to the source region. Appendix
II provides information on countries overflight provisions.
4 DOD personnel are prohibited from interdicting suspect aircraft over
foreign territory and must cooperate with foreign government forces to
execute an interdiction. 5 Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended (22U. S. C. 2318), authorizes the President to provide up
to $150 million per fiscal year, subject to limitations, in articles and
services from any U. S. agency, and military education and training to
foreign countries for certain purposes, including international narcotics
control assistance, if it is in the
national interest of the United States to do so.
Appendi xes U. S. Operations in the Source and Transit Zones (May 1, 1999,
Through September 30,
Appendi x I
2000) Average sorties Average monitoring hours Type of aircraft per month
per month
Source Zone
U. S. Air Force E- 3 a 3 20 U. S. Customs Service P- 3B 8 50 U. S. Customs
Service P- 3A 6 34 U. S. Navy P- 3CDU 10 53
Transit Zone
U. S. Air Force E- 3 8 53 U. S. Customs Service P- 3B 19 114 U. S. Customs
Service P- 3A 8 47 U. S. Navy P- 3CDU 4 18 U. S. Navy P- 3C 61 288 U. S.
Navy E- 2C 66 232 a From January 2000 through September 2000, the E- 3
conducted, on average, six source zone sorties per month, which totaled an
average of 39 monitoring hours per month. Note: Data prior to May 1999 was
not available. The aircraft listed above are the primary detection and
monitoring types operating from forward operating locations, but the data
also includes operations from other sites. Other U. S. aircraft not listed
also operate in the sources and transit zones.
Source: GAO analysis of Joint Interagency Task Force-East data.
U. S. Overflight Arrangements With Selected
Appendi x II
Countries Overflight Pursuit Country allowed a allowed b Comments
Antigua and Barbuda Yes Yes Bahamas Yes Yes Barbados Yes Yes Belize Yes Yes
Colombia Yes Yes Costa Rica No Yes Cuba No No Dominica No Yes Dominican
Republic Yes Yes Ecuador Yes Yes Overflight permitted as part of the forward
operating agreement El Salvador Yes Yes Overflight permitted as part of the
forward operating agreement French West Indies No No Grenada Yes Yes
Guatemala No No Haiti Yes Yes Honduras Yes Yes Jamaica Yes Yes Mexico Yes
Yes Netherlands Antilles Yes Yes Overflight permitted as part of the forward
operating agreement Nicaragua No No Agreement pending Panama Yes Yes On a
case by case basis Peru Yes Yes On a case by case basis St. Kitts and Nevis
Yes Yes St. Lucia Yes Yes St. Vincent Grenadines Yes Yes Suriname Yes Yes
Trinidad and Tobago Yes Yes Turks and Caicos No No Venezuela No No With
preflight plan, U. S. Customs aircraft recently flew over Venezuelan air
space a Overflight arrangements allow U. S. law enforcement assets to fly in
foreign airspace in support of counterdrug operations.
b Pursuit arrangements allow U. S. law enforcement assets to pursue suspect
vessels or aircraft in foreign waters or airspace.
Note: This table represents only a portion of counterdrug- related
arrangements covered in U. S. bilateral agreements. Ship boarding and port
access are examples of other agreed- upon arrangements. Source: U. S. Coast
Guard and the Joint Interagency Task Force- East.
Appendi x II I Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendi x V I GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Lawrence L.
Suda (202) 512- 5380 Acknowledgments In addition to Mr. Suda, Andrew
Crawford, Patricia Martin,
Nancy Ragsdale, Maria- Alaina Rambus, and Ray Wrysch made key contributions
to this report.
(711565) Lett er
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GAO United States General Accounting Office
Page 1 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Contents
Page 2 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 3 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 3 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 4 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 5 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 6 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 7 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 8 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section I
Briefing Section I Background
Page 9 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section I Background
Page 10 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section I Background
Page 11 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 12 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section II
Briefing Section II Selecting Sites That Meet Operational Requirements
Page 13 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section II Selecting Sites That Meet Operational Requirements
Page 14 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section II Selecting Sites That Meet Operational Requirements
Page 15 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section II Selecting Sites That Meet Operational Requirements
Page 16 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section II Selecting Sites That Meet Operational Requirements
Page 17 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 18 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section III
Briefing Section III Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations
Page 19 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section III Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations
Page 20 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section III Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations
Page 21 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section III Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations
Page 22 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section III Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations
Page 23 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section III Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations
Page 24 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section III Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations
Page 25 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section III Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations
Page 26 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section III Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward Operating
Locations
Page 27 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 28 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section IV
Briefing Section IV Issues Affecting Operational Capabilities
Page 29 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Briefing Section IV Issues Affecting Operational Capabilities
Page 30 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 31 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 32 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Appendix I
Page 33 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Appendix II
Appendix II U. S. Overflight Arrangements With Selected Countries
Page 34 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Page 35 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Appendix III
Page 36 GAO- 01- 63BR Drug Control
Appendix IV
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
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*** End of document. ***
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