Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities;
Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (Letter Report, 11/30/2000,
GAO/GAO-01-14).
Eight federal agencies now have teams that can respond to a terrorist
attack involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
Each team varies in size, structure, geographical scope, and task. The
teams do not duplicate one another. They have unique capabilities and
functions, and many have experience dealing with different types of
agents and weapons. Because of the teams' various functions, the type of
terrorist incident would determine which team would be most appropriate
to respond. GAO found that federal agencies lack a coherent framework to
develop and evaluate budget requirements for their response teams
because there is no national strategy with clearly defined outcomes. To
improve interagency cooperation, federal agencies have participated in
several group activities. For example, the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Interagency Steering Group, led by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, is identifying federal response teams that could respond to
different terrorist scenarios. Federal, state, and local agencies have
also participated in major field exercises that simulated urban
terrorist acts. These efforts could go a long way toward improving the
operational coordination of federal response teams.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-14
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied
Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve
Coordination
DATE: 11/30/2000
SUBJECT: National defense operations
Nuclear warfare
Biological warfare
Terrorism
Chemical warfare
Financial management
Budgeting
Interagency relations
Radiological warfare
Emergency preparedness
IDENTIFIER: Department of Energy: Radiological Assistance Program
FEMA Federal Response Plan
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan
Department of Justice: Five Year Interagency
Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan
CDC National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program
Department of Justice/FEMA: TOPOFF 2000
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GAO-01-14
Report to Congressional Requesters
November 2000 COMBATING TERRORISM
Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to
Improve Coordination
GAO- 01- 14
Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: Compendium of Selected Federal Response
Plans
and Authorities 34 Appendix II: Selected Information About Federal Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Consequence Management Response Teams 37
Appendix III: Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Chemical Terrorist Incident 43
Appendix IV: Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Biological Terrorist Incident 48
Appendix V: Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident 53 Appendix VI:
Organizations and Locations Visited 60 Appendix VII: Comments From the
Department of Defense 62 Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of
Energy 63 Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Justice 64 Appendix
X: Comments From the Department of Health and
Human Services 66 Appendix XI: Comments From the Department of Veterans
Affairs 67 Appendix XII: Comments From the Federal Emergency
Management Agency 68 Appendix XIII: Comments From the Environmental
Protection
Agency 69 Appendix XIV: Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission 70 Appendix XV: Comments From the Office of Management and
Budget 71 Appendix XVI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 74
Related GAO Products 75 Tables Table 1: Primary Functions Performed by
Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a Chemical Terrorist
Incident 43 Table 2: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence
Management Response Teams in a Biological Terrorist
Incident 48 Table 3: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence
Management Response Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident 54
Figures Figure 1: Federal and Local Responders Participate in a Joint
Training Exercise in New York City 7
Figure 2: Federal Consequence Management Response Teams 9 Figure 3: Aerial
Measuring System Aircraft With Detection
Equipment 14 Figure 4: Arrival of a Simulated National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile
During the TOPOFF 2000 Exercise 25
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency OMB
Office of Management and Budget PPD Presidential Decision Directive
Lett er
November 30, 2000 The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Democratic Member
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives
A terrorist act involving a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
agent or weapon presents an array of complex issues to state and local
responders. The responders, who may include firefighters, emergency medical
service personnel, and hazardous materials technicians, must identify the
agent used to rapidly decontaminate victims and apply appropriate medical
treatments. They must determine whether the agent has spread beyond the
incident site and what actions should be taken to protect other people. They
must also be concerned about damage to the
physical infrastructure and about coordinating efforts with law enforcement
personnel as they conduct their investigation. If the incident overwhelms
the capabilities of state and local responders, they may turn to the federal
government for assistance. Federal agencies may provide assistance by
deploying various response teams. In response to your request, we reviewed
federal agency teams that can respond to and help manage the consequences of
a domestic terrorist incident involving chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear agents or
weapons. This report discusses (1) the characteristics of federal response
teams, (2) whether duplication among teams belonging to different agencies
exists, (3) the budget requirements process for teams and how the budgets
are linked to a national strategy, and (4) initiatives to improve the
operational coordination of federal response teams across agency lines.
In our review, we defined response teams as groups of personnel and
equipment that could deploy to or near an incident site to provide
assistance. We focused on teams that assist with consequence management in a
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident. Consequence
management includes efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency
services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore government
services. To identify the capabilities and characteristics of federal
response teams, we reviewed our prior reports, conducted interviews with
agency officials, and met with the teams at various locations nationwide. We
also
observed a national- level combating terrorism exercise, which allowed us to
see the capabilities of several response teams in mock terrorist incidents.
We also attended several conferences that addressed response teams and
terrorism issues.
Results in Brief Eight agencies have 24 types of teams that can respond to a
terrorist incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
agents or weapons to assist state and local governments. 1 The
characteristics of these teams vary. Specifically, teams vary in their size,
composition of personnel, equipment, geographical coverage, transportation
needs, and response time. Moreover, most federal teams are long- standing
and have purposes other than combating terrorism, such as responding to
natural disasters, hazardous material spills, and military crises. For
example,
Department of Defense teams can provide a wide variety of consequence
management capabilities in response to a domestic terrorist incident.
However, these teams have a primary military role and mission. Even in the
absence of a terrorist threat, federal agencies would still need most of
their response teams to carry out other missions.
Federal response teams do not duplicate one another. Each team has a unique
combination of capabilities and functions when it is deployed to a terrorist
incident. Moreover, several federal teams have expertise concerning certain
types of agents and weapons that could be used in an attack. For example,
Department of Energy teams specialize in responding to incidents involving
radiological agents or weapons. Because of the differences in the
capabilities and expertise of the teams, the type of
incident would determine which individual team would be most appropriate to
respond. Federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate
budget requirements for their response teams. We have noted previously that
the federal government lacks a national strategy to guide resource 1 The
eight agencies are the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human
Services, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the Federal Emergency
Management Agency; the
Environmental Protection Agency; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
investments for combating terrorism. The Attorney General's interagency plan
on counterterrorism and technology crime, in our view, is the current
document that most closely resembles a national strategy. However, the plan
does not establish or define clearly desired outcomes that the federal
government is trying to achieve. Because most federal response teams have
multiple missions, federal agencies do not track the resources for their
teams based on their roles in combating terrorism. In 1999, the National
Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget began a new
interagency process for evaluating federal agencies' programs for combating
terrorism. The results of this evaluation provided a basis for new combating
terrorism budget requests in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2001.
This effort gives decisionmakers in the administration and Congress a better
picture of the resources federal agencies are devoting to their response
capabilities. However, it does not serve as an effective
mechanism for allocating funding to the highest priority areas because these
areas have not been clearly defined.
Two recent interagency activities could improve the operational coordination
among federal response teams. First, the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Interagency Steering Group, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
is identifying the federal consequence management teams that could be called
upon to respond to different terrorist scenarios. Prior to this group's
efforts, federal agencies did not engage in this type of
planning for a terrorist incident. However, the steering group has not
consulted with scientific experts or the intelligence community to assess
the realism of the scenarios. According to a Federal Emergency Management
Agency official, the scenarios were intended to be worst- case events that
would stress the federal response system, and therefore assessing their
realism was not a concern. As a result, it is uncertain whether the
scenarios can provide a sound analytical basis for developing
appropriate federal consequence management responses. Second, response teams
continue to participate in various combating terrorism interagency exercises
that provide agencies an opportunity to improve the operational coordination
of their teams. In May 2000, the federal government sponsored a
congressionally mandated national- level combating terrorism field exercise
that tested the response and
coordination of teams from federal, state, and local government agencies.
The exercise represented considerable progress from past interagency
exercises because it coordinated consequence as well as crisis management
teams in a no- notice realistic field setting. However, no additional
exercises of this nature are currently planned.
We are recommending that the Attorney General modify the interagency plan on
counterterrorism and technology crime to cite desired outcomes that could be
used to develop and evaluate budget requirements for agencies and their
respective response teams. Additionally, we are
recommending that the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, take
steps to require that the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering
Group develop realistic scenarios involving chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear agents and weapons with experts in the scientific
and intelligence communities. Lastly, we are recommending that the Director,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, sponsor periodic national- level
consequence management field exercises involving federal,
state, and local governments. The Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice,
Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the Federal
Emergency Management Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency; the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the Office of Management and Budget
provided comments on a draft of this report. Their comments are presented
and evaluated at the end of this letter following our recommendations.
Background In a domestic terrorist incident, states and local affected
governments have the primary responsibility for consequence management. The
federal government can help state and local authorities if they lack the
capability
to respond adequately. Figure 1 shows a federal response team supporting a
local government in a training exercise.
Figure 1: Federal and Local Responders Participate in a Joint Training
Exercise in New York City Source: U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological
Incident Response Force.
Shortly after the April 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, which
enumerated responsibilities for federal agencies in combating terrorism,
including domestic incidents. In May 1998, the President issued Presidential
Decision Directive 62 that further articulated responsibilities for specific
agencies. Both directives call for robust, tailored, and rapidly deployable
interagency teams to conduct well- coordinated and highly integrated
operations.
If a national emergency has been declared, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) is responsible for managing the consequence management support
provided by other federal agencies and coordinating response activities with
state and local authorities. Federal agencies provide this support through
their response teams or other assets. FEMA coordinates the federal response
through a generic disaster contingency plan known as the Federal Response
Plan. The plan, organized around
12 emergency support functions, is used to respond to incidents or
situations requiring federal emergency disaster assistance and to facilitate
the delivery of that assistance. 2 In 1997, FEMA issued a terrorism incident
annex to the Federal Response Plan to implement Presidential Decision
Directive 39. The annex was revised in April 1999. Other federal authorities
and contingency plans, such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan and the Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan, may be activated in lieu of, prior to, or in conjunction with
the Federal Response Plan. Appendix I summarizes selected federal plans and
authorities that may apply for consequence management response to a domestic
terrorist incident.
Proposed spending to combat terrorism, as requested in the President's
fiscal year 2001 budget, is about $11.3 billion. The $11.3 billion is
divided into two broad categories: combating terrorism ($ 9. 3 billion,
which includes $1. 6 billion directly related to weapons of mass
destruction) and
critical infrastructure protection ($ 2 billion). The Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) tracks federal funding to combat terrorism and provides
this information to Congress in an annual report. Numerous Response
Eight federal agencies have response teams that can deploy to or near the
Teams Can Provide site of a terrorist incident involving a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear agent or weapon (see fig. 2). The
capabilities and characteristics of
Assistance federal response teams vary in a number of ways.
2 The 12 emergency support functions are transportation, communications,
public works and engineering, firefighting, information and planning, mass
care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and
rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy.
Figure 2: Federal Consequence Management Response Teams
Department Department of of Defense Defense
Joint Joint Task Task Force Force for for Civil Civil Support Support
U. U. S. S. Marine Marine Corps Corps Chemical Chemical - - Biological
Biological
Incident Incident Response Response Force Force
Chemical/ Chemical/ Biological Biological Rapid Rapid Response Response Team
Team
U. U. S. S. Army Army Radiological Radiological Advisory Advisory Medical
Medical Team Team
U. U. S. S. Army Army Technical Technical Escort Escort Unit Unit
U. U. S. S. Army Army Special Special Medical Medical Augmentation
Augmentation
Response Response Team Team - - Nuclear/ Nuclear/ Biological/ Biological/
Chemical Chemical
Department of Health and Human Services
U. U. S. S. Army Army Special Special Medical Medical Augmentation
Augmentation
Department Department of of Energy Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Response Team - Aero- Medical Isolation Radiological Radiological Assistance
Assistance Program Program Teams
Teams Disaster Disaster Medical Medical Assistance Assistance Teams
Teams Response Team - Aero- Medical Isolation
Aerial Measuring System Disaster Disaster Mortuary Mortuary Operational
Operational Response Response Teams
Teams Aerial Measuring System
National Medical Response Teams Federal Federal Radiological Radiological
Monitoring Monitoring and
and National Medical Response Teams
Assessment Assessment Center Center
National National Pharmaceutical Pharmaceutical Stockpile Stockpile
Radiation Emergency Assistance Management Management Support Support Teams
Teams Radiation Emergency Assistance
Center/ Center/ Training Training Site Site
Chemical, Biological, Environmental Protection Agency Radiological, and
Environmental Protection Agency Department Department of of Transportation
Transportation
On- On- Scene Scene Coordinators Coordinators
U. U. S. S. Coast Coast Guard Guard National National Strike Strike Teams
Teams
Nuclear Terrorist
Environmental Environmental Response Response Team Team
U. U. S. S. Coast Coast Guard Guard On- On- Scene Scene Coordinators
Coordinators
Incidents
Radiological Radiological Emergency Emergency Response Response Team Team
Department Department of of Veterans Veterans Affairs Affairs
Federal Federal Emergency Emergency Management Management Agency Agency
Medical Medical Emergency Emergency Radiological Radiological
Emergency Emergency Response Response Team Team
Response Response Team Team
Nuclear Nuclear Regulatory Regulatory Commission Commission
Regional Regional Incident Incident Response Response Teams Teams
Source: GAO's analysis.
Appendix II provides information on the mission, cited authority, size,
location, transportation mode, and expected response times for the 24 types
of federal teams discussed in this report.
Teams Vary in Size, Teams vary in size, with some teams having fewer than 10
personnel and
Composition, and others having almost 400 members. For example, a Department
of Energy Equipment
Radiological Assistance Program team has 7 members, a Department of Health
and Human Services National Medical Response Team has 36 members, and the U.
S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force has 373
personnel. Large teams such as the Department of Energy- led Federal
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, which
may have several hundred members detailed from numerous federal agencies for
a major incident, may send out a relatively small advance team and then
tailor the follow- on team based on the requirements of the specific
incident.
Teams may be comprised of federal civilian employees, military personnel,
contractor personnel, or federalized local personnel. 3 The U. S. Coast
Guard's National Strike Teams and many Department of Defense (DOD) teams are
comprised of military personnel. The Department of Veterans Affairs' Medical
Emergency Radiological Response Team is comprised of federal civilian
employees. Contractor personnel augment the
Environmental Protection Agency's and the Department of Energy's teams.
Medical response teams from the Department of Health and Human Services
consist of medical personnel living in local communities who become
federalized when the teams are activated and deployed to an incident.
Team members may be dedicated full- time or may serve on a team as a
collateral duty. DOD's teams such as the Joint Task Force for Civil Support
and the U. S. Army Technical Escort Unit have dedicated full- time
personnel, even when the teams are not deployed. The Department of
Energy's teams, on the other hand, rely heavily on volunteers who have other
jobs within the agency. Some teams, such as the Department of Veterans
Affairs' Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team, are inactive until
they are activated for training, exercises, or an actual incident. Moreover,
some teams have members who assemble from disparate locations nationwide.
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency's Radiological Emergency
Response Team may draw
staff from the agency's radiation laboratories in Las Vegas, Nevada, and
Montgomery, Alabama.
Teams have various amounts of equipment to perform their mission. The
Department of Energy- led Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment
Center brings an extensive array of communications and computer equipment as
well as logistics support items such as generators. The U. S. Marine Corps
Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force may 3 Federalized local
personnel are not full- time, permanent federal employees but do become
temporary federal employees and serve under government orders when their
team is activated. For example, under the authority of the Disaster Relief
Act of 1974, P. L. 93- 288, 42 U. S. C. 243, as amended, the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services
may federalize personnel.
deploy with communications equipment, medical equipment and supplies,
forklifts, generators, decontamination equipment, water purification
equipment, and other supplies. In contrast, FEMA's Emergency Response Team,
which coordinates response activities, arrives with cellular phones, pagers,
and laptop computers.
Teams' Geographic Many teams are geared toward response in a specific
geographic region,
Coverage and whereas others are intended for nationwide response. The
Environmental Transportation Needs Differ Protection Agency's On- Scene
Coordinators are located in each of the
agency's 10 geographic regions and are responsible for response functions
within their region. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's four Regional
Incident Response Teams are also oriented toward a regional response. The
Department of Energy- led Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment
Center, the U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force,
and the Department of Veterans Affairs' Medical Emergency Radiological
Response Team are examples of teams that are intended for nationwide
response.
Expected response time varies by team, as does the mode of transportation.
The Environmental Protection Agency's Radiological Emergency Response Team
prefers to deploy its mobile laboratories by
ground transportation and is expected to arrive within 2 to 3 days after
notification. The Department of Health and Human Services' Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams use commercial or military aircraft or ground
transportation and are expected to arrive on site within 12 to 24 hours.
Traveling by either air or ground transportation, a Department of Energy
Radiological Assistance Program Team is expected to arrive within 2 to 6
hours of being notified. The U. S. Marine Corps Chemical- Biological
Incident Response Force can deploy by ground transportation or on large
military aircraft that can easily accommodate the large quantity and weight
of equipment belonging to the team. An initial group can be ready to deploy
in 6 hours, and the remainder of the team is expected to be ready to deploy
within 24 hours.
Most Teams Are LongStanding Most federal response teams are long- standing
and were created for
and Have Other purposes other than combating terrorism such as responding to
natural Missions disasters, hazardous material spills, and military crises.
Even in the
absence of the threat of terrorism, the federal government would still need
most of these response teams. The Department of Health and Human Services'
Disaster Medical Assistance Teams were created under the
National Disaster Medical System in the early 1980s to provide emergency
medical care to victims of earthquakes, hurricanes, and other disasters.
Since 1989, the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams have been activated on
more than 19 occasions. Several examples include Hurricane Hugo in 1989, the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and numerous floods in 1997 and 1998.
The U. S. Coast Guard's and the Environmental Protection Agency's teams were
created originally to respond to incidents where pollutants or contaminants
have been released and pose a threat to public health or the environment.
The U. S. Coast Guard created its three National Strike Teams under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 to respond to oil spills in
waterways. The Environmental Protection Agency created its
Environmental Response Team in 1978 under the Clean Water Act to provide
scientific and technical expertise in response to the release of hazardous
chemicals into the air, land, and water. Under the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 4 these teams were given
the authority to respond to hazardous materials incidents, which
include deliberate acts of releasing hazardous materials. The U. S. Coast
Guard has the lead for incidents in the coastal zone, including major
waterways, and the Environmental Protection Agency takes the leading role
when incidents occur in the inland zone. 5
DOD, compared to the other federal agencies, has the greatest breadth and
depth of capabilities in its collective response teams. DOD and its response
teams have capabilities relevant to all 12 of the emergency support
functions in the Federal Response Plan. Nevertheless, the teams generally
have missions in responding to military crises and may not be available to
assist in a domestic terrorist incident involving chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear agents or weapons. For example, the U. S. Marine
Corps Chemical- Biological Incident Response Force would support deployed U.
S. military forces when facing the threat of attack from chemical or
biological weapons. The U. S. Army Technical Escort Unit renders items safe
such as a device, packages the items, and escorts and transports the items.
In 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, the unit packaged and escorted
captured samples of potential chemical and biological weapons for
examination. The U. S. Army Radiological Advisory 4 This plan is described
in appendix I.
5 These jurisdictional responsibilities are specifically defined in regional
and area contingency plans.
Medical Team provides guidance on the potential health hazards from
radiological contamination and radiation exposure. However, this Army team
also has a military mission of responding to a radiological accident and may
not be available to respond to a terrorist incident.
Agency Laboratories A few agencies have fixed assets such as laboratories
that may augment Augment Response by teams and the overall federal response
in a chemical or biological terrorist Federal Teams
incident. In some incidents, these laboratories may perform functions that
enable deployed federal response teams to perform their role. For example,
when a diagnosis is confirmed by one of the laboratories at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention or the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute
of Infectious Diseases, the National Medical Response Teams and
the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams can begin to treat victims
appropriately. The laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention can rapidly analyze and test samples of chemical and biological
agents. The U. S. Army's laboratory serves as a reference center for
identification of biological agents and its primary mission is to protect
military personnel against biological attack or endemic infectious diseases.
According to officials at both agencies, their laboratories may be called
upon to corroborate a diagnosis of an unusual biological agent. Federal
Teams Do Not
Federal response teams do not duplicate one another for a number of
Duplicate Each Other reasons. Each team has a unique combination of
capabilities and functions when deployed to or near the site of a terrorist
incident. No single team or agency has all the capabilities and functions
that might be required to respond to a terrorist incident. Some federal
response teams have
capabilities and functions that are clearly unique, such as the ability of
the Department of Health and Human Services' Disaster Mortuary Operational
Response Teams to process, prepare, and dispose of contaminated fatalities.
Several federal teams would be more likely to respond to certain types of
incidents because they have expertise concerning the type of agent
used in the attacks. For example, Department of Energy teams specialize in
responding to incidents involving radiological agents or weapons. Other
teams have similar capabilities and functions, but there are also
distinctions among these teams that differentiate them. One distinction is
that they perform a wide variety of functions. In general, these functions
fall into one of three categories- performing hands- on response functions,
providing technical advice to federal, state, and local authorities, or
coordinating the response efforts and activities of other federal teams.
Because of the differences in the capabilities and expertise of the teams,
the type of incident would determine which individual teams would be most
appropriate to deploy.
Hands- On Functions Hands- on functions include detecting and evaluating the
agent used in the incident; dismantling, transferring, disposing of, and/ or
decontaminating
property; extracting and/ or decontaminating victims; performing triage on
victims; and providing medical treatment. Some teams perform hands- on
functions that are unique from any other federal team. For example, the
Department of Health and Human Services' Disaster Mortuary Operational
Response Teams are the only federal teams whose primary function is to
recover, identify, and process fatalities. These teams can respond to any
type of chemical, biological, or radiological/ nuclear incident. The
Department of Energy's Aerial Measuring System is the only team that can fly
aircraft over an incident site to rapidly survey large areas for
radiological contamination (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Aerial Measuring System Aircraft With Detection Equipment
Source: Department of Energy.
This team gathers information that is used by other responders and
decisionmakers to conduct an initial response until further assessments are
made. Unlike any other federal teams, the Department of Energy's
Radiological Assistance Program teams can respond quickly to a
radiological incident, put on protective gear, enter a contaminated area,
and take initial measurements of radioactivity. Another federal team with
unique capabilities in a radiological incident is the Environmental
Protection Agency's Radiological Emergency Response Team. This team, through
its two mobile laboratories, can prepare air, soil, and water samples and
perform a field analysis on them to detect low levels of radioactivity.
According to Environmental Protection Agency officials,
these capabilities are unique among federal response teams. Several teams
perform hands- on medical functions. While some of their capabilities and
functions are similar, some are different. For example, while the Department
of Veterans Affairs' Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team can
decontaminate victims and provide medical care, its sole purpose is to
respond to a radiological incident. The U. S. Marine Corps Chemical-
Biological Incident Response Force and the Department of
Health and Human Services' National Medical Response Teams are intended to
respond and treat victims in a chemical or biological incident. The U. S.
Marine Corps' team, however, can also search for and extract victims from a
contaminated area. In contrast, the primary function of the National Medical
Response Teams is to decontaminate and treat victims after they have been
extracted. Each of the four National Medical Response Teams has a supply of
antidotes to treat up to 5, 000 people who have been exposed to chemical
agents. The U. S. Marine Corps' team also has a supply of antidotes, but the
supply is smaller than a National Medical Response Team's supply. Moreover,
the U. S. Marine Corps' supply is intended to treat team members and a
limited number of victims. The Department of Health and Human Services also
has numerous Disaster Medical Assistance Teams that can provide general
medical treatment in various emergencies to
augment the specialized care provided by other medical teams. Technical
Advice Functions Several teams offer specialized technical advice to
federal, state, and local
responders. These teams do not significantly duplicate one another because
they have different areas of expertise. In some cases, the type of incident
determines which teams are appropriate to provide technical advice. For
example, four to six technical advisors from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention accompany the Department of Health and Human Services'
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile when it is deployed in
response to a biological incident. The stockpile contains antibiotics and
other medical supplies. The advisors assist state and local officials in
organizing the bulk stockpile medications into individual doses and
implementing plans to distribute and dispense the medications. The U. S.
Army Chemical/ Biological Rapid Response Team offers technical assistance
and advice to DOD's Joint Task Force for Civil Support during a terrorist
incident. The team offers links to Army experts in a variety of technical
disciplines, such as detection, neutralization, containment,
dismantlement, and disposal of chemical and biological agents or weapons.
The Department of Energy's Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/ Training
Site provides expert advice concerning the medical care of
victims that have been exposed to radiation. The team has expertise in,
among other things, triage, decontamination procedures, and radiation dose
estimates. Two DOD teams- the U. S. Army Special Augmentation Response Team-
Nuclear/ Biological/ Chemical and the U. S. Army Radiological Advisory
Medical Team- can provide similar types of technical advice as the
Department of Energy's team. However, each team
has fewer than 10 members. Furthermore, the DOD teams may not be available
if they are deployed to a military crisis.
Coordinating Functions Many federal teams coordinate activities at an
incident site. However, the scope of their coordination responsibilities
varies widely, from the response activities of federal teams overall to
activities performed by a
single agency. FEMA's Emergency Response Team coordinates overall federal
response and recovery activities with a state government in the event of a
disaster or an emergency declared by the President. DOD's Joint Task Force
for Civil Support deploys to an incident and commands and coordinates the
activities of federal military forces. It would not be responsible for
coordinating the activities of federal civilian teams. The Department of
Health and Human Services' Management Support Teams coordinate federal
civilian medical teams. The Environmental Protection Agency's On- Scene
Coordinators focus their work on coordinating the containment, removal, and
disposal of hazardous substances. They may direct the efforts of regionally
based contractors to evaluate the size and
nature of the released substance and its potential hazard and to
decontaminate and clean up the incident site. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's Regional Incident Response Teams may be activated when an
incident occurs at licensed facilities such as nuclear power plants. The
teams are responsible for coordinating the technical response activities of
federal entities, including hands- on response teams from the Department of
Energy. The Department of Energy- led Federal Radiological Monitoring
and Assessment Center acts as the control point for all federal assets
involved in monitoring and assessing levels of radioactivity outside the
immediate incident site. 6 Appendixes III, IV, and V provide more details on
the federal teams' primary functions in response to a chemical, biological,
and radiological/ nuclear incident.
6 The Department of Energy has the lead responsibility for coordinating the
early phases of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center.
During later stages, the Environmental Protection Agency assumes control and
other federal agencies participate.
Team Budgets Are Not Federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop
and evaluate
Guided by a National budget requirements for their response teams. We have
noted previously that the federal government lacks a national strategy to
guide resource Strategy
investments for combating terrorism. 7 We have stated that there needs to be
a federal or national strategy on combating terrorism that has a clear
desired outcome. Such an outcome would provide a goal and allow measurement
of progress toward that goal. In December 1998, the Department of Justice
issued the Attorney General's Five- Year Interagency Counterterrorism and
Technology Crime Plan. The plan was intended to serve as a baseline strategy
for coordination of a national strategy and
operational capabilities to combat terrorism. As part of its ongoing
efforts, the Department of Justice updated the plan in March 2000. According
to a Department of Justice official, both the original plan and its update
were developed through an interagency process that included, among others,
participants from the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The 5- year plan, which is classified, lists specific
combating terrorism tasks agencies are to perform.
In our view, the Attorney General's 5- year plan is the current document
that most resembles a national strategy. It represents an interagency effort
that identifies which federal agencies will perform specific tasks. However,
the plan is not useful for guiding resource investments in response teams
because it does not link recommended actions to budget resources. The
original plan indicated that updated versions would link recommended actions
to budget resources. The March 2000 update, however, does not identify this
linkage. A Department of Justice official who is responsible for the plan
stated that the Attorney General does not believe that the Department of
Justice should direct the budget resources of other agencies. Furthermore,
the updated plan identifies needed actions without citing clear desired
outcomes that the federal government is trying to achieve.
As stated earlier, most federal consequence management teams are
longstanding and fulfill roles other than combating terrorism. While
agencies may be able to identify how much they invest in their teams, they
cannot easily estimate what proportion of that investment is for combating 7
Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 00- 145, Apr. 6, 2000) and Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to
Strategies and Resources (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 218, July 29, 2000).
terrorism functions. For example, the Department of Energy tracks the
operating, technical integration, and exercise costs for the Aerial
Measuring System and other response teams. The Department, however,
does not track combating terrorism costs separately. Other missions of the
Aerial Measuring System aircraft are to respond to an accidental, as well as
intentional, release of radioactive materials, and to conduct work for other
agencies by providing baseline surveys of radiation levels. In 1999, the
National Security Council and OMB began a new interagency process for
evaluating combating terrorism programs governmentwide to help identify
duplication and shortfalls as well as prioritize programs. As part of this
process, federal agencies were asked to identify new combating terrorism
funding specifically for weapons of mass destruction preparedness
activities, including their response teams. Interagency working groups
reviewed the agencies' proposals and developed
recommendations on whether they should be funded. The agencies were expected
to integrate the working groups' funding recommendations into their fiscal
year 2001 President's Budget submissions. Prior to this jointly sponsored
process, agencies would make combating terrorism budget recommendations
through the annual OMB budget submission. Decisions were made on an agency-
by- agency basis rather than in a governmentwide
context. According to OMB officials, Presidential Decision Directives 62 and
63 and the Attorney General's 5- year plan serve as criteria for the program
evaluations in the new interagency process. 8 On the basis of our discussion
with OMB officials, it is unclear to us whether and to what extent the
Presidential Decision Directives and the 5- year plan were used in the
process. In the absence of a national strategy, it was also unclear to us
how the National Security Council, OMB, and the agencies were developing and
evaluating combating terrorism budget requirements for agency response
teams. While the interagency process gives decisionmakers a better picture
of the resources federal agencies are devoting to their response
capabilities, it does not serve as an effective mechanism for allocating
funding to the highest priority areas because these areas have not been
clearly defined.
8 In May 1998, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 to
address protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure.
We found an instance where the new interagency process was circumvented.
FEMA's fiscal year 2001 budget submission to OMB requested $3.8 million to
upgrade the capabilities of 6 of its 28 Urban Search and Rescue Task Force
teams so that they can operate in a contaminated environment. OMB reviewed
FEMA's budget and, as a result,
did not include the Urban Search and Rescue request. Nevertheless, FEMA
requested that the National Security Council include this proposal as part
of the fiscal year 2001 President's Budget request. 9 Furthermore, according
to a FEMA official, this budget proposal was not based on a national
strategy, but rather was precipitated by congressional perception that the
search and rescue teams already had this capability. A national strategy
could provide the framework and criteria for determining whether such an
enhanced capability- and others that federal agencies might propose-
represent progress toward meeting desired outcomes.
Interagency Activities Federal agencies participate in exercises and other
interagency activities to Offer Opportunities for
coordinate how their individual response teams will operate together in a
terrorist scenario. Two recent interagency activities have identified Better
Coordination opportunities for improving the operational coordination of
federal response teams. First, FEMA is leading an interagency steering group
that is identifying groups of federal teams that could respond to different
terrorist scenarios. Such planning can be useful; however, the steering
group has not consulted with scientific experts and the intelligence
community to assess the realism of its scenarios. Second, federal, state,
and local agencies participated in a major field exercise in May 2000 that
involved mock terrorist events in three U. S. metropolitan areas. The
lessons learned from this exercise- the first of its kind- could improve
operational coordination of response teams from all levels of government.
However, no additional exercises of this nature are currently planned. 9
This funding for the Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces was part of FEMA's
fiscal year 2001 President Budget's submission.
Interagency Group Plans In 1998, FEMA formed the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Interagency Team Responses, but
Steering Group to identify which consequence management teams could respond
to specific terrorist scenarios. 10 The steering group is identifying
Realism of Scenarios Has
the functions of individual federal response teams and developing a Not Been
Assessed
database to include the size and composition of each team, its equipment,
response time, and other data. The response teams that can respond together
to a given scenario are referred to as a force package. As a basis for
developing the force packages, the interagency steering group has
created various terrorist scenarios, which include (1) release of a chemical
agent, (2) release of a biological agent, (3) release of radiological
material, and (4) detonation of a nuclear device. According to a FEMA
official, if an incident occurs, a force package can be pared and tailored
based on the specific requirements. The steering group has long- term plans
to improve the database, develop further scenarios, refine its force
packages, and incorporate observations from terrorism exercises. One long-
term plan, for example, is to create smaller force packages of teams that
would respond
during the first 24 hours of different types of incidents. Prior to the
group's efforts, federal agencies did not engage in this type of interagency
planning for a terrorist incident. 10 The federal agencies listed in figure
2 are members of the interagency steering group.
The FEMA- led interagency steering group's efforts have been based upon
worst- case scenarios rather than analysis of credible threats.
Specifically, when developing the scenarios for the force packages, the
group did not
consult with scientific experts from the disciplines of chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear warfare to assess the scenarios'
realism. For example, the group's biological scenario involved the
dissemination of plague. According to various biological warfare and
scientific experts we consulted for our prior work, 11 it is difficult to
obtain, produce, and disseminate plague, especially in sufficient quantities
to produce mass casualties. The steering group also did not incorporate
information about the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear terrorism from
the intelligence community. According to a Federal Emergency Management
Agency official who is leading the steering group's efforts, the scenarios
were intended to be worst- case events that would stress the federal
response system, and therefore assessing the realism of the scenarios was
not a concern. Because the realism of the scenarios was not assessed, it is
uncertain whether they can provide a sound analytical basis
for developing appropriate federal consequence management responses. We
believe that consultation with experts in the scientific and intelligence
communities is important for realistic consequence management planning.
Moreover, we have previously reported that valid, current, and documented
threat information is crucial to ensuring that countermeasures or programs
are not based solely on worst- case scenarios and are therefore out of
balance with the threat. 12
Exercise Shows Progress in Presidential Decision Directive 39 requires key
federal agencies to maintain Response Team well- exercised combating
terrorism capabilities. Exercises test and Coordination
validate policies and procedures, test the effectiveness of response
capabilities, increase the confidence and skill levels of personnel, and
identify strengths and weaknesses in response before they arise in actual
incidents. Furthermore, federal efforts to combat terrorism are inherently
interagency matters, and exercises allow agency personnel to become
familiar with each other's missions and procedures and learn to coordinate
and operate together. 11 Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat
and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks (GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
163, Sept. 7, 1999). 12 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological
Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 112, Mar. 16,
1999).
In 1999, a congressional mandate required that a national combating
terrorism field exercise be conducted “without notice” and
include “the participation of all key personnel.” 13 The
Department of Justice and FEMA sponsored such an exercise, TOPOFF 2000, in
May 2000. The exercise included concurrent responses to a radiological
terrorist incident in the
Washington, D. C., area; a biological terrorist incident in the Denver,
Colorado, area; and a chemical terrorist incident in Portsmouth, New
Hampshire. 14 Eighteen federal agencies participated in addition to state
and local government agencies. 15 The overall stated goals of the exercise
were to test federal, state, and local response to a challenging series of
no- notice, integrated, geographically dispersed terrorist acts; assess the
Nation's crisis and consequence management capacity under
stressful conditions; and develop lessons learned to enhance domestic
preparedness.
TOPOFF 2000 represented progress over previous combating terrorism
exercises. We reported in 1999 that federal agencies had conducted 201
combating terrorism exercises in the previous 3 years. We noted several
shortcomings in these exercises that limited their effectiveness in
preparing federal, state, and local agencies for response to a terrorist
incident. 16 For example, FEMA had not conducted consequence
management field exercises. Of the 201 exercises, only 4 were considered no-
notice exercises in which participants were not given advance notification.
None of the four exercises included consequence management activities.
TOPOFF 2000, which included participation by many of the
response teams discussed in this report, addressed many earlier
shortcomings.
13 This requirement is in House Report 105- 825 (Oct. 19, 1998), Making
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1999. 14 The related concurrent exercise in the Washington, D. C.,
area, was referred to as National Capital Region 2000. For purposes of the
report, we refer to all three venues as TOPOFF 2000. 15 Private voluntary
organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army also
participated in TOPOFF 2000. 16 Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved
to Improve Counterterrorism Operations (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135, May 13, 1999)
and Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises
(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 157BR, June 25, 1999).
TOPOFF 2000 included scenarios where crisis and consequence management
activities occurred simultaneously. In a terrorist incident, crisis and
consequence management activities would overlap, so it is important that
federal teams exercise these activities together. TOPOFF 2000 included
transfers of authority among government
agencies. For example, a local fire chief transferred authority over the
incident site to Federal Bureau of Investigation officials to enable
processing of the crime scene. Such transfers are important to practice
because the response to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
terrorist incident would likely require a response from multiple agencies at
the federal, state, and local levels. TOPOFF 2000 was conducted as a field
exercise rather than a tabletop exercise. Field exercises are more
challenging because agency
command and response teams actually deploy to practice their skills and
coordination in a realistic field setting. Tabletop exercises, on the other
hand, do not include the deployment of actual response teams and their
equipment. TOPOFF 2000 was designed and executed as a no- notice exercise.
17 Nonotice exercises provide the highest degree of realism to federal
response teams and can lead to improvements in deployment
procedures to an incident site so that state and local first responders
receive federal assistance as soon as possible. Final after- action reports
for TOPOFF 2000 have not yet been completed. After- action reports typically
identify both successful interagency actions and procedures and areas that
need improvements and highlight shortcomings in the overall structure and
management of the exercise.
Based on our observations of TOPOFF 2000, we believe that it largely met the
overall goals. We believe that large, periodic exercises like TOPOFF 2000
provide valuable insight to the complex relationships necessary for a
coordinated response to a domestic terrorist incident. For example, a
simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile was delivered and distributed
for the first time in TOPOFF 2000 to treat victims exposed to aerosolized
plague. The delivery of the stockpile during an exercise provided an
opportunity for federal, state, and local governments to coordinate their
respective responses. Figure 4 shows the simulated National 17 We consider
TOPOFF 2000 to be a no- notice exercise because it was planned by a group of
“trusted agents” who were not to disclose details of the
exercise scenarios and timing to response teams and other participants. We
recognize that response teams and participants were probably aware of the
general timing of the exercise, and some may have inadvertently learned
about some exercise details.
Pharmaceutical Stockpile after it has been delivered and unloaded at the
Buckley Air National Guard Base, Denver, Colorado. The items in the
simulated stockpile were subsequently distributed to hospitals and other
points of distribution, such as makeshift medical treatment centers, so that
victims could be appropriately treated.
Figure 4: Arrival of a Simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile During
the TOPOFF 2000 Exercise
Source: GAO.
According to FEMA and Department of Justice officials, there are no agency
plans or a congressional mandate to conduct another national- level
combating terrorism exercise similar to TOPOFF 2000. In the past, the
federal government sporadically held national- level exercises. In addition,
the federal government did not conduct exercises that combined
“participation by all key personnel” and the concurrence of
crisis and
consequence management in an interagency and intergovernmental field
setting. Future exercises of this nature would allow the intergovernmental
response teams to practice coordination in realistic settings. Also,
national- level exercises could allow federal consequence management teams
to demonstrate their hands- on, technical, and coordinating response
functions when assisting state and local governments. Lastly, periodic
national- level exercises would allow federal agencies to maintain
proficiency when “key personnel” change.
Conclusions Federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and
evaluate budget requirements for their response teams because there is no
national
strategy with clearly defined outcomes. In our view, the Attorney General's
5- year plan is the current document that most resembles a national
strategy. The plan represents an interagency effort that identifies which
federal agencies will perform specific tasks. However, the plan does not
link its
recommended actions to budget resources. Further, the plan does not cite
desired outcomes that the federal government is trying to achieve. Without a
sound framework, agencies may not target programs and spending appropriately
for their response teams.
The FEMA- led Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group has
identified consequence management teams that could respond to specific
terrorist scenarios. Prior to this effort, federal agencies did not engage
in this type of interagency planning for a terrorist incident.
However, the interagency steering group did not consult with scientific
experts or the intelligence community to assess the realism of its
scenarios. Thus, it is uncertain whether they can provide a sound analytical
basis for developing appropriate federal consequence management responses.
In May 2000, the federal government sponsored a national- level combating
terrorism field exercise that represented considerable progress from past
interagency exercises, particularly for consequence management response
teams. In the past, the federal government sporadically held national- level
exercises. In addition, the federal government did not conduct exercises
that combined “participation by all key personnel” and the
concurrence of crisis and consequence management in an interagency and
intergovernmental field setting. However, plans to continue national- level
no- notice exercises similar to TOPOFF 2000 do not exist. The objectives of
these types of exercises are to engage applicable responders and to identify
strengths and shortfalls so that the needs of states and localities as well
as future potential challenges can be met effectively. Exercises such as
TOPOFF 2000 help ensure the seamless integration of federal, state, and
local teams and related assets, which is critical to rapid and effective
response. Without conducting exercises similar in nature to TOPOFF 2000,
federal, state, and local government agencies will not be able to
realistically practice coordination of their response teams and therefore
may not be well prepared to respond to terrorist incidents that may occur.
Recommendations for To guide resource investments for combating terrorism,
we recommend
Executive Action that the Attorney General modify the Attorney General's
Five- Year
Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan to cite desired
outcomes that could be used to develop budget requirements for agencies and
their respective response teams. This process should be coordinated as an
interagency effort.
To provide a sound analytical basis for developing appropriate federal
consequence management responses, we recommend that the Director, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, take steps to require that the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Interagency Steering Group develop realistic scenarios involving
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents and weapons with
experts in the scientific and intelligence communities.
To build upon the experience and lessons learned by the federal response
teams from the TOPOFF 2000 exercise, we recommend that the Director, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, sponsor periodic national- level consequence
management field exercises involving federal, state, and local governments.
Such exercises should be conducted together with national- level crisis
management field exercises.
Agency Comments and We obtained written comments on a draft of this report
from the
Our Evaluation Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, Health and Human
Services, and
Veterans Affairs; FEMA; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; and OMB. Comments from these agencies appear in
appendixes VII to XV. The Department of Transportation provided oral
comments. The agencies, with the exception of Justice and OMB, agreed
with the report's summary and its description of federal teams that can
respond to terrorist incidents involving the use of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear agents or weapons. Many of the agencies also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs concurred with our
recommendation to modify the Attorney General's Five- Year Interagency
Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan to cite desired outcomes that
could be used to evaluate budget requirements for agencies and their
respective response teams. In contrast, Justice and OMB, while not directly
addressing our recommendation, disagreed with our conclusion that the
federal government lacks a national strategy to guide resource investments
for combating terrorism. According to Justice, the 5- year plan articulates
high- level goals and contains specific objectives, priorities, and
recommended actions that, if accomplished, would lead to the fulfillment of
these goals. OMB believes that a number of documents taken together,
including Justice's 5- year plan, articulate the Nation's strategy for
combating terrorism and the resources needed for its successful
implementation. While not in its official comments, the Environmental
Protection Agency disagreed with our recommendation to modify the 5- year
plan. The Environmental Protection Agency stated that the major thrust of
Justice's 5- year plan was to develop a strategy for law
enforcement agencies. The agency does not believe that Justice can be held
accountable for developing budget requirements for response teams from all
federal agencies. The agency stated that there should be two separate 5-
year plans, one developed by Justice for law enforcement agencies and one
developed by FEMA for consequence management agencies. We disagree with
Justice and OMB that the 5- year plan, either alone or taken together with
other documents, constitutes a fully developed national strategy. The 5-
year plan does not cite desired outcomes the federal government is trying to
achieve. For example, the plan includes a goal to improve state and local
capabilities as well as actions to be taken
related to federal and state response teams. However, it does not cite an
outcome in terms of the level of preparedness to be achieved, nor does it
cite specific capabilities that response teams should achieve. Moreover, the
March 2000 update does not link its recommended actions to budget resources,
and does not include prioritization of actions, performance indicators, or
time frames that were included in the original December 1998 plan. Further,
we believe that using more than one document to articulate a national
strategy, as OMB suggests, obscures the direction and priorities of federal
programs to combat terrorism. We are concerned that the
Environmental Protection Agency's suggestion to have two agencies prepare
separate national strategies would further fragment the federal government's
combating terrorism activities. Development of any national strategy should
be coordinated as an interagency effort incorporating crisis and consequent
management. For these reasons, we continue to believe our conclusions and
recommendations have merit.
FEMA and the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs concurred with our
recommendation that the Director, FEMA, take steps to require that the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group develop realistic
scenarios involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents
and weapons with experts in the scientific and intelligence communities.
FEMA and the Departments of Defense and Veteran Affairs concurred with our
recommendation that the Director, FEMA, sponsor periodic nationallevel
consequence management field exercises. FEMA noted that its fiscal year 2001
budget request included funding to sponsor a consequence
management exercise. Justice and Transportation officials stated that our
recommendation does not adequately acknowledge the close linkage between
crisis and consequence management in a terrorist incident. We have modified
our recommendation to suggest that future national- level consequence
management exercises be held together with national- level crisis management
field exercises.
Scope and To identify the capabilities and characteristics of federal
consequence Methodology management response teams, we reviewed our prior
reports and conducted in- depth interviews with officials from the
Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation,
and Veterans
Affairs, as well as FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We also reviewed Presidential Decision
Directives, the Federal Response Plan and the Terrorism Incident Annex, the
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, and the
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. We attended several
conferences that addressed consequence management response
teams and issues related to combating terrorism. One conference demonstrated
how health emergency response teams prepare for deployment and set up their
equipment at an incident site.
To determine if duplication among teams belonging to different agencies
existed, we analyzed information from documents provided by government
officials concerning the scope, nature, and functions of the teams.
Moreover, we interviewed various team members at locations nationwide to
determine their teams' specific functions and capabilities in a terrorist
incident. When possible, during our visits we examined the teams' equipment.
We developed the report's team- related appendixes as a tool to help
determine whether duplication existed. We discussed federal response
teams with state and local officials in Colorado. Appendix VI provides a
detailed list of the organizations and locations we visited.
To assess the budget requirements process for these teams and how their
budgets are linked to a national strategy, we reviewed our prior work, met
with OMB officials, and discussed the budget process with participating
agency officials. We also reviewed OMB's annual budget reports on combating
terrorism to Congress and the Attorney General's Five- Year Interagency
Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan (the December 1998 and the March
2000 updated versions).
To ascertain initiatives to improve the operational coordination of federal
response teams across agency lines, we reviewed our prior work on
counterrorism exercises and discussed current interagency coordinating
efforts with FEMA, the lead federal agency for consequence management. We
also discussed the scientific feasibility of the terrorist scenarios used by
the FEMA- led Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group
with a technical expert from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict and a biological
warfare consultant. Officials from individual intelligence agencies briefed
us on the threat of chemical and biological terrorism. In addition, we
reviewed pertinent intelligence analyses related to terrorism and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's assessment of the domestic- origin
terrorist threat. We attended the three TOPOFF 2000 exercise venues in
Washington, D. C.; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; and Denver, Colorado, to
assess federal teams' consequence management capabilities in mock
terrorist incidents. We obtained information about two additional exercises
that involved federal teams and were conducted during our review.
As agreed with your offices, because of the number of response teams
involved, we limited our review to federal teams that assist with
consequence management in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
terrorist incident and excluded crisis management teams. Crisis management
includes measures to anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat or act of
terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation being assigned the lead federal role for
domestic crisis response. Consequence management may follow crisis
management, but these two activities usually occur simultaneously or
overlap, depending on the nature of the terrorist incident. To understand
the difference between crisis and consequence management, we reviewed our
prior reports and other documents and discussed the Bureau's crisis
management teams with Bureau officials in Virginia. We recognize that teams
other than those identified in this review could play a consequence
management role because of their emergency response capabilities. However,
the teams that we selected for our review were based on participating agency
officials' views about the teams' roles as well as our analysis.
Additionally, we recognize that a few teams have both crisis and consequence
management functions, such as the Department of Defense's U. S. Army
Technical Escort Unit. However, information received from DOD suggests that
this team could play a key role in a consequence management response. In
contrast, elements that are part of the Department of Energy's Nuclear
Emergency Search Team have some consequence managementrelated functions.
However, based on our analysis, in general, this team has functions related
primarily to crisis management. In addition, we excluded
the National Guard's Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams-
formerly known as Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams- from our
review. These teams are federally funded but are considered state assets.
Moreover, based on our observations from TOPOFF 2000, these teams would
remain as state assets when activated in response to a
terrorist incident. We evaluated these teams' roles and response in a prior
report. 18
In discussing our draft report, the Department of Transportation and the
Environmental Protection Agency stated that more emphasis should be placed
on preparing federal responders to integrate into the incident command
system established at the incident site. According to the Environmental
Protection Agency, the incident command system is the 18 Combating
Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear (GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
110, May 21, 1999).
standard on- scene response management system used in metropolitan areas
around the United States by state, local, and many federal responders to
manage emergency response. Both agencies emphasized the need for more
federal responders to receive incident command system training to ensure
interoperability and safe coordination. The agencies believe that the
incident command system should be the common command system for use by all
responders. We agree that all responders from federal, state, and local
governments should coordinate their activities at the incident site as
seamlessly as possible. Although we observed efforts to integrate federal,
state, and local response activities at the TOPOFF 2000 exercise, our
primary focus on this assignment was to examine how federal teams improve
operational coordination across federal agencies. Accordingly, a detailed
examination of the on- site integration of federal teams with state and
local responders was outside the scope of our review.
We did not independently verify agencies' data about the teams; for example,
the number of personnel on a team or the expected arrival time at a
terrorist incident. However, we sent our analysis of the teams' data to the
participating agencies for their review and validation. Our review was
conducted from January through September 2000 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time,
we will send copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees and the federal agencies discussed in this report. We will also
make copies available to other interested parties upon request.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at (202)
512- 6020. Key contributors to this assignment are listed in appendix XVI.
Raymond J. Decker Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendi xes Compendium of Selected Federal Response
Appendi x I
Plans and Authorities Presidential Decision This Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) sets forth U. S. general policy to Directive 39
use all appropriate means to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist
attacks against U. S. interests. More specifically, PDD- 39 directs all
federal departments and agencies to take various measures to (1) reduce
vulnerabilities to terrorism (e. g., to assess the vulnerabilities of
government facilities and critical national infrastructure); (2) deter and
respond to terrorism (e. g., to pursue, arrest, and prosecute terrorists and
to minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency assistance); and
(3) develop effective capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of
terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Presidential
Decision This directive set up an integrated program to increase the federal
Directive 62
government's effectiveness in countering terrorism threats against U. S.
targets. PDD- 62 organizes and clarifies the roles and activities of many
agencies responsible for combating a wide range of terrorism, including
preventing terrorist acts, apprehending and prosecuting terrorists,
increasing transportation security as well as protecting critical
computerbased
systems. The directive also provides for consequence management of terrorist
incidents. To carry out the integrated program, PDD- 62 established the
Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection
and CounterTerrorism. Working within the National Security Council, the
National Coordinator is responsible for overseeing the wide range of
policies and
programs covered by PDD- 62 and is to take the lead in developing guidelines
that might be needed for crisis management.
Federal Response Plan This plan lays out the manner in which the federal
government, with the With Terrorism
Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinating the support/ assistance
efforts of other agencies, responds to domestic Incident Annex
incidents or situations in which the President has declared an emergency
requiring federal emergency disaster assistance. More specifically, the plan
outlines the planning assumptions, policies, concept of operations,
organizational structures, and specific assignment of responsibilities to
lead departments and agencies in providing federal assistance. The plan also
categorizes the types of federal assistance into specific emergency support
functions such as transportation, communications, firefighting, and health
and medical services.
The Terrorism Incident Annex establishes a general concept of operations for
the federal response to a terrorist incident, including the concurrent
operation under other plans such as the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan and the Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan.
Authority The Federal Response Plan is authorized under the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U. S. C. 5121 et.
seq., as
amended, and 44 Code of Federal Regulations Subchapters D (Disaster
Assistance) and E (Preparedness). National Oil and
This plan provides the organizational structure and procedures for Hazardous
Substances
preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous
substances, pollutants, and contaminants. The plan lists the general
Pollution Contingency responsibilities of federal agencies regarding such
incidents, identifies the Plan
fundamental kinds of activities that are performed pursuant to the plan, and
describes the specific responsibilities of the National Response Team, the
Regional Response Teams, the National Response Center, and the U. S. Coast
Guard's National Strike Force Teams for planning and responding to such
incidents. Federal agencies may conduct consequence management activities
under
the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan because
it provides authority and funding sources to respond to hazardous materials
incidents regardless of the suspected cause. For example, a terrorist act
may at first appear to be a routine hazardous materials incident, leading to
the activation of a federal response under this plan. If the Federal
Response Plan is activated, the response actions of the
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan are
conducted as one of the Federal Response Plan's emergency support functions.
Authority The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan is authorized under section 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U. S. C. 9605, as
amended; section 311( d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. 1321( d), as
amended; and 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 300.
Federal Radiological This plan establishes an organizational and operational
structure for Emergency Response
coordinated responses by federal agencies to peacetime radiological
emergencies, taking into consideration the specific statutory authorities
Plan
and responsibilities of each agency. The plan provides guidance as to which
agency will lead and coordinate the federal response to a radiological
emergency (i. e., the lead federal agency), which depends on the type of
emergency involved. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the
lead agency for an emergency that occurs at a nuclear facility or any
activity licensed by the Commission. The plan also identifies the specific
role and responsibility of a lead federal agency, such as responding to
requests from state and local governments for technical information and
assistance. The plan may be used whenever any of the signatory agencies
responds to a radiological emergency, which includes deliberate acts to
spread radioactivity in the environment. The Federal Response Plan may be
implemented concurrently with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
Plan. The functions and responsibilities of the Federal Radiological
Emergency Response Plan do not change, except for the coordination that
occurs between the lead federal agency and the Federal Coordinating Officer
(usually a Federal Emergency Management Agency official). Authority The
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan is authorized under
section 304 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1980 (P. L. 96- 295) and Executive Order 12241, September 29,
1980.
Selected Information About Federal Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear
Appendi x II
Consequence Management Response Teams Number of team (dedicated/ collateral)
members and team's Transportation mode Response team Mission Cited authority
primary location and response time Department of Defense
Joint Task Force for Civil Supports lead federal Established Oct. 1, 1999
Sixty dedicated personnel
Travels by military aircraft Support agency, establishes by Secretary of
Defense
located at Fort Monroe, or ground transportation. command and control of
directive. Va.
Initial team deploys within designated Department of 4 hours. Defense (DOD)
forces, and provides military assistance to civil
authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and provide temporary
critical life support.
Chemical/ Biological Coordinates and
Secretary of Defense Fourteen dedicated
Travels by commercial or Rapid Response Team integrates DOD's directive
based on the
personnel located at military aircraft or ground technical assistance for
Defense Against Aberdeen Proving transportation. the neutralization,
Weapons of Mass Grounds, Md. Initial team deploys within containment,
Destruction Act of 1996 4 hours, and remainder of dismantlement, and
and Fiscal Year 1997 team deploys in 10 to 12
disposal of chemical or National Defense hours.
biological materials, and Authorization Act.
assists first responders in dealing with consequence management. U. S. Army
Technical Provides Chemical Warfare Service
One hundred ninety- three Travels by military aircraft Escort Unit chemical/
biological
directive dated Jan. 20, dedicated personnel or ground transportation.
advice, assessment,
1943. located at Aberdeen
Team deploys in 4 hours. sampling, detection, field
Proving Grounds, Md.; verification, packaging, Fort Belvoir, Va; Pine
escort, and render safe for
Bluff, Ark.; and Dugway, chemical/ biological
Ut. devices or hazards.
U. S. Army Special Provides technical advice Established in 1998 by Six
teams located at Travels by military aircraft Medical Augmentation in the
detection, U. S. Army Surgeon
various sites with six or ground transportation Response Team-
neutralization, and General directive. collateral duty members in 12 hours.
Nuclear/ Biological/ containment of chemical,
per team. Chemical
biological, or radiological hazardous materials in a terrorist event.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Number of team (dedicated/ collateral) members and team's Transportation
mode Response team Mission Cited authority primary location and response
time U. S. Army Special Provides a rapid response
Established in 1977 by Approximately 20 Travels by military aircraft.
Medical Augmentation evacuation unit to any U. S. Army Surgeon collateral
duty personnel
Response Team- AeroMedical area of the world to
General directive. at Fort Detrick, Md.
Isolation transport and provide patient care under conditions of biological
containment to service members or U. S. civilians exposed to certain
contagious and highly dangerous diseases. U. S. Marine Corps Provides force
protection Established in Apr. 1996
Three hundred seventy Travels by military aircraft Chemical- Biological
or mitigation in the event by the U. S. Marine Corps
three dedicated personnel or ground transportation.
Incident Response of a terrorist incident, Commandant's planning at Indian
Head, Md.
Initial team deploys in 6 Force domestically or overseas.
guidance. hours, and remainder of team deploys in 24 hours.
U. S. Army Radiological Assists and furnishes Army Regulation 40- 13, Eight
to 10 collateral duty
Travels by military Advisory Medical Team radiological health hazard Feb. 1,
1985. personnel located at transportation, guidance to the on- scene Walter
Reed Army commercial aircraft, or commander or other
Hospital, Washington, personal vehicles within responsible officials at an
D. C. 8 hours. incident site and the installation medical authority.
Department of Health and Human Services Management Support Manage federal
medical National Security Six to eight dedicated
Travels by commercial or Teams teams and assets that are
Decision Directive 47, personnel located at military aircraft. Initial
deployed in response to 1982; Federal Response
Rockville, Md., team (2 to 5 members)
an incident. Plan; Presidential supplemented by 18 to
expected to be ready to Decision Directives 39 20 collateral duty
deploy within 2 hours and and 62.
Department of Veterans arrive within 12 hours. Full Affairs personnel.
team expected to arrive within 12 to 24 hours. National Medical
Decontaminate casualties Federal Response Plan; Four teams located at
Travels by commercial or Response Teams resulting from a
Presidential Decision Washington, D. C. (non military aircraft or ground
hazardous materials Directives 39 and 62.
deployable); Winston transportation. Expected
incident, provide medical Salem, N. C.; Denver, to be ready to deploy care,
and deploy with Colo.; and Los Angeles, within 3 hours and arrive
pharmaceutical cache of Calif., with 36 collateral within 12 hours.
antidotes and medical
duty members per team. equipment.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Number of team (dedicated/ collateral) members and team's Transportation
mode Response team Mission Cited authority primary location and response
time Disaster Medical
Provide emergency National Security Forty- four teams at Travels by
commercial or
Assistance Teams medical care during a Decision Directive 47; various
locations
military aircraft or ground disaster or other event. Public Health Service
nationwide with transportation. Expected
memorandum of 34 collateral duty to be ready to deploy understanding with
each
members per team. within 3 to 4 hours and
team and team sponsor; arrive within 12 to Federal Response Plan; 24 hours.
Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62.
Disaster Mortuary Provide identification and
Federal Response Plan; Ten teams at various Travels by commercial
Operational Response mortuary services to state Presidential Decision
locations nationwide with aircraft or ground Teams and local health
officials
Directives 39 and 62; 25 to 31 collateral duty transportation. Expected upon
request in the event
Public Health members per team.
to be ready to deploy of major disasters and Service/ National within 4
hours and at the emergencies. Association for Search site within 6 to 12
hours. and Rescue
memorandum of understanding. National Pharmaceutical Resupplies state and
local P. L. 105- 277: Omnibus Four to six dedicated Travels by commercial,
Stockpile public health agencies
Consolidated and personnel located at charter, or military aircraft. with
pharmaceuticals and
Emergency Atlanta, Ga.
Expected to arrive within other medical treatments Appropriations Act of
12 hours. in the event of a terrorist 1999. incident.
Department of Energy
Radiological Assistance Assist federal agencies, Established in the late
Twenty- six teams at Normally travels by Program Teams state and local 1950s
under the Atomic various locations
ground transportation but governments, private Energy Commission.
nationwide with seven can deploy by commercial business, or individuals in
collateral duty members
aircraft. Expected to arrive incidents involving per team. within 2 to 6
hours. radiological materials.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Number of team (dedicated/ collateral) members and team's Transportation
mode Response team Mission Cited authority primary location and response
time Federal Radiological
Collects, evaluates, Federal Radiological Team members deploy in Travels by
military,
Monitoring and interprets, and distributes Emergency Response phases. Phases
I
commercial, or Assessment Center a off- site radiological data in Plan. (15
members) and II
Department of Energy support of the lead federal (45 members) consist of
owned aircraft. Expected agency, state and local
collateral duty to arrive within 4 to
governments. Department of Energy 8 hours (phase I), Coordinates federal
personnel from Nellis Air
11 hours (phase II), and resources in responding
Force Base, Nev., and 24 to 36 hours (phase III). to the off- site
monitoring other locations. Phase III and assessment needs at (known as Full
Federal the scene of a radiological
Radiological Monitoring emergency. and Assessment Center) involves multiple
federal
agencies and may have 150 or more personnel from various federal agencies.
Aerial Measuring Detects, measures, and
Established in the early Five to 10 dedicated and Initial team travels in
System tracks ground and 1950s as a U. S. collateral duty personnel
fixed- wing aircraft and is airborne radioactivity over Geological Survey
located at Nellis Air Force
expected to arrive within large areas using fixed program to support the
Base, Nev., and Andrews 4 to 8 hours. wing and rotary- wing
Atomic Energy Air Force Base, Md. aircraft.
Commission. Radiation Emergency
Provides medical advice Established in 1976 under Four to eight dedicated
Travels by commercial or
Assistance and on- site assistance in an agreement between personnel located
in Oak charter aircraft. Expected
Center/ Training Site triage, diagnosis, and the Energy Research and
Ridge, Tenn. to be ready to deploy treatment of all types of Development
within 4 hours. radiation exposure events.
Administration and a local hospital.
Department of Transportation
U. S. Coast Guard Respond to oil and
Federal Water Pollution Three teams located in Travels by military aircraft
National Strike Teams hazardous substance Control Act of 1972;
Fort Dix, N. J.; Mobile, or ground transportation.
pollution incidents in and National Oil and
Ala.; and Novato, Calif., Expected to deploy within around waterways to
Hazardous Substances with 35 to 39 dedicated
1 to 6 hours and arrive protect public health and Pollution Contingency
members per team. within 12 hours. the environment. Area of
Plan (40 C. F. R. 300); Oil responsibility includes all Pollution Act of
1990. Coast Guard Districts and Federal Response Regions. Support
Environmental Protection Agency's On- Scene Coordinators for inland area
incidents.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Number of team (dedicated/ collateral) members and team's Transportation
mode Response team Mission Cited authority primary location and response
time U. S. Coast Guard OnScene
Coordinate all National Oil and Approximately
Travels by ground Coordinators containment, removal and
Hazardous Substances 50 dedicated personnel in transportation. On- call
disposal efforts during a Pollution Contingency pre- designated Coast
24 hours. Response time hazardous release Plan (40 C. F. R. 300). Guard
regional zones at
depends on location of incident in coastal or
various locations incident site.
major navigational nationwide. waterways.
Department of Veterans Affairs
Medical Emergency Provides technical advice, Executive Order 12657:
Twenty- one to Travels by commercial Radiological Response
radiological monitoring, Federal Emergency
23 collateral duty aircraft. Expected to be
Team decontamination Management Agency personnel are located at ready to
deploy within expertise, and medical Assistance In Emergency various sites
nationwide. 6 hours and arrive within care as a supplement to Preparedness
Planning at
12 to 24 hours. an institutional health care Commercial Nuclear provider.
Power Plants; Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan.
Environmental Protection Agency
On- Scene Coordinators Direct response efforts National Oil and
Approximately Travels by commercial and coordinate all other
Hazardous Substances 200 dedicated personnel, aircraft or ground
efforts at the scene of a Pollution Contingency plus contractor support, at
transportation.
hazardous materials Plan (40 C. F. R. 300). various locations
Coordinators and discharge or release.
nationwide. contractors are on- call
24 hours. Response time depends on location of incident site. Environmental
Provides technical National Oil and Twenty- two dedicated
Travels by commercial Response Team support for assessing, Hazardous
Substances personnel, plus contractor aircraft. Advance team managing, and
disposing
Pollution Contingency support, located in expected to deploy within of
hazardous waste. Plan (40 C. F. R. 300). Edison, N. J., and 4 hours. Full
team Cincinnati, Ohio.
expected to arrive within 24 to 48 hours. Radiological Emergency
Provides mobile National Oil and As many as 60 collateral Travels by ground
Response Team laboratories for field Hazardous Substances duty personnel
located in transportation or military analysis of samples and
Pollution Contingency Las Vegas, Nev., and air. Expected to arrive technical
expertise in
Plan (40 C. F. R. 300) Montgomery, Ala.
within 2 to 3 days. radiation monitoring, radiation health physics, and risk
assessment.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Number of team (dedicated/ collateral) members and team's Transportation
mode Response team Mission Cited authority primary location and response
time Federal Emergency Management Agency
Emergency Response Coordinates federal Robert T. Stafford Size is dependent
on the
Travels by commercial, Team response and recovery Disaster Relief and
severity and magnitude of
charter, or military aircraft, activities within a state. Emergency
Assistance
the incident. Collateral or ground transportation.
Act, 42 U. S. C. 5121 et. duty team members are
Expected to arrive within seq. geographically dispersed 24 hours. at Federal
Emergency Management Agency headquarters and 10 regional offices.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regional Incident Carry out the Public Law 96- 295, dated
Four teams located in Travels by commercial or Response Teams
responsibilities and June 30, 1980; Federal Atlanta, Ga.; Lisle, Ill.;
charter aircraft or ground functions of the lead Radiological Emergency
Arlington, Tex.; and King transportation. Initial team federal agency during
Response Plan. of Prussia, Penn., with
expected to arrive within incidents at licensed 25 to 30 collateral duty 6
to 12 hours. facilities such as nuclear members per team. power plants.
a The Department of Energy has the lead responsibility for coordinating the
Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center during the early phase of
an emergency. The Environmental Protection Agency assumes control during
later phases.
Note: Agency officials define deployment time as the number of hours in
which team members receive notification to leave for an incident and their
arrival at their place of departure. They define arrival time as the number
of hours in which the team is expected to reach the incident site after
receiving
notification. Department of Defense officials provided only deployment times
for their teams. Source: Our analysis and discussions with agency officials.
Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a
Chemical
Appendi x II I Terrorist Incident The primary functions federal response
teams may perform in a terrorist incident involving a chemical agent or
weapon vary (see table 1). Different types of chemical agents exist, and
they can be dispersed as a gas, vapor, liquid, or aerosol. A chemical agent
could be disseminated by explosive or mechanical delivery. Some chemicals
disperse rapidly and others remain
toxic for days or weeks and require decontamination and clean up. Rapid
exposure to a highly concentrated agent would increase the number of
casualties. Federal, state, and local officials generally agree that a
chemical terrorist incident would look like a major hazardous material
emergency. According to the International Association of Fire Chiefs, over
600 local and state hazardous material teams will be the first to respond to
an incident, whether it is a chemical agent, industrial chemical, or other
material. If local responders are unable to manage the situation or are
overwhelmed, the incident commander has access to state and federal assets.
Table 1: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence Management
Response Teams in a Chemical Terrorist Incident Dismantle, transfer, Extract
and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate
and/ or victims from Provide
Provide Response
activities at Detect and decontaminate
the incident Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Department of Defense
Joint Task Commands all Force for Civil federal military Support
forces on site for consequence management and coordinates these activities
with the lead federal agency.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer, Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate
and/ or victims from Provide
Provide Response
activities at Detect and decontaminate
the incident Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Chemical/ Provides Biological specialized
Rapid technical Response advice to the Team
Joint Task Force for Civil Support. Offers links to U. S. Army experts in a
variety of disciplines,
such as agent detection and disposal and assistance from medical
laboratories. U. S. Army Samples, Renders safe, Technical detects, and
packages, and Escort Unit a
identifies escorts chemical chemical munitions or agents. devices. U. S.
Army Provides Special advice to
Medical (1) medical Augmentation treatment Response facilities on Team-
Nuclear/ handling
Biological/ contaminated Chemical a
patients and (2) authorities on determining follow- on
medical resources, supplies, and equipment to resolve the incident.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer, Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate
and/ or victims from Provide
Provide Response
activities at Detect and decontaminate
the incident Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice U. S. Marine Samples, Performs Performs Performs first Corps
detects, and casualty search,
triage and aid, advanced ChemicalBiological identifies extraction, and
emergency cardiac life chemical decontamination. medical
support, and Incident
agents. treatment in trauma support
Response a contaminated initially for Force a
zone. 250 patients. Administers 1, 500 nerve
agent antidotes.
Department of Health and Human Services Management Coordinate the Support
Teams activities of
federal civilian medical teams. National Collect and
Provide Perform Provide Medical secure extensive
casualty extensive Response contaminated decontamina-
triage. medical care;
Teams material, e. g. tion capability. stabilize victims' clothing patients;
and
and any items administer that are antidotes and circumspectafter other
initial search for
medications. transition to The teams crisis manage-
each have a ment
supply of responders.
pharmaceuticals to treat 5, 000 people.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer, Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate
and/ or victims from Provide
Provide Response
activities at Detect and decontaminate
the incident Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Disaster Perform Provide Medical casualty emergency Assistance
triage. medical care Teams and patient stabilization. Can administer medical
treatments. Assist in the transport of victims from incident site to
medical facilities such as hospitals.
Disaster Perform Mortuary recovery, Operational
identification, Response and processing Teams of fatalities. Provide advice
on the effects of decomposing fatalities. Decontaminate
fatalities.
Department of Transportation
U. S. Coast Identify Decontaminate, Guard National
environmental collect, and Strike Teams
contamination secure of waterways.
contaminated material in waterways. U. S. Coast
Coordinate Conduct initial Direct efforts to Guard On
federal con site decontaminate
Scene tainment, assessment,
and clean up the Coordinators removal, and
to include incident site. disposal efforts evaluating the Activities can in
and around size and nature
include control coastal
of the released and stabilization waterways. substance and
of the agent, its potential on- site hazards.
treatment, and off- site disposal.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer, Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate
and/ or victims from Provide
Provide Response
activities at Detect and decontaminate
the incident Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Environmental Protection Agency
On- Scene Coordinate Conduct initial Direct efforts to Coordinators federal
site decontaminate
containment, assessment,
and clean up the removal, and to include
incident site. disposal evaluating the Activities can efforts. size and
nature
include control of the released and stabilization substance and
of the agent, onsite its potential treatment, hazards.
and off- site disposal.
Environmental Offers
Offers Response specialized specialized Team technical technical
assistance in assistance in areas such as areas such as air sampling
incineration and and ecological groundwater risk treatment. assessment.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Emergency Establishes Response field office if Team required.
Provides disaster assessment coordination and expertise to states and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. a These DOD teams have a
military wartime mission and may be unavailable for a domestic terrorist
incident.
Note: We identified the primary functions performed by a team when it
responds to a chemical terrorist incident, even though the team has other
capabilities. Source: Our analysis and discussions with agency officials.
Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a
Biological
Appendi x V I Terrorist Incident The primary functions federal response
teams may perform in a terrorist incident involving a biological agent or
weapon vary (see table 2). Based on our prior work, according to a wide
range of experts in science, health, intelligence, and biological warfare
and a technical report we reviewed, the most effective way to disseminate a
biological agent is by aerosol. This method allows the simultaneous
respiratory infection of a large number of people. A few biological agents
(e. g., plague and smallpox) are communicable and can be spread beyond those
directly affected by the
weapon or dissemination device. Every biological agent, even those that are
highly communicable, must be disseminated by some means that infects enough
individuals to initiate a disease epidemic. The release of a biological
agent or weapon may not be known for several days until victims present
themselves to medical personnel in doctors' offices, clinics, and emergency
rooms where the symptoms might be easily confused with
influenza or other less virulent illnesses. Accordingly, the critical
detection of the biological agent begins with the public health
infrastructure that detects outbreaks of illness, identifies the sources and
modes of transmission, and performs rapid agent laboratory identification.
Once diagnosis of a biological agent is confirmed, treating victims may
require the use of federal consequence management teams and the need for
items from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.
Table 2: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence Management
Response Teams in a Biological Terrorist Incident Dismantle, transfer,
Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate
and/ or victims from Provide
Provide Response
activities at Detect and decontaminate
the incident Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Department of Defense
Joint Task Commands all Force for Civil federal military Support
forces on site for consequence management and coordinates these activities
with the lead federal agency.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer, Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate
and/ or victims from Provide
Provide Response
activities at Detect and decontaminate
the incident Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Chemical/ Provides Biological specialized
Rapid technical Response advice to the Team
Joint Task Force for Civil Support. Offers links to U. S. Army experts in a
variety of disciplines,
such as agent detection and disposal and assistance from medical
laboratories. U. S. Army Provides Special advice to Medical (1) medical
Augmentation treatment Response facilities on Team- Nuclear/ handling
Biological/ contaminated Chemical a
patients and (2) authorities on determining follow- on
medical resources, supplies, and equipment to resolve the incident. U. S.
Army Provides highly
Provides Special specialized limited patient Medical patient care care in
isolation Augmentation during units. Response evacuation to Team-
AeroMedical medical
facilities. Isolation a
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer, Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate
and/ or victims from Provide
Provide Response
activities at Detect and decontaminate
the incident Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice U. S. Marine Has capability Corps to detect four Chemical- biological
Biological agents. Incident Response Force a
Department of Health and Human Services
Management Coordinate the Support Teams activities of
federal civilian medical teams. National .Perform Provide Medical casualty
extensive Response triage.
medical care, Teams
stabilize patients, and administer antibiotics and other medications.
Disaster Perform Provide Medical casualty emergency Assistance triage.
medical care Teams and patient stabilization. Assist in the transport of
victims from medical points
of distribution to medical facilities such as area hospitals.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer, Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate
and/ or victims from Provide
Provide Response
activities at Detect and decontaminate
the incident Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Disaster Perform Mortuary recovery, Operational
identification, Response and processing Teams of fatalities. Provide advice
on the effects of decomposing fatalities. Decontaminate
fatalities. National Personnel who Pharmaceutical accompany the
Stockpile stockpile advise and assist in the organization of bulk stockpile
medications into individual doses. They also advise and assist in the
implemen- tation of plans to distribute and dispense stockpile
medications.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Emergency Establishes Response field office if Team required.
Provides disaster assessment coordination and expertise to states and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency regions.
a These DOD teams have a military wartime mission and may be unavailable for
a domestic incident. Note: We identified the primary functions performed by
a team when it responds to a biological terrorist incident, even though the
team has other capabilities.
Source: Our analysis and discussions with agency officials.
Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response Teams in a
Appendi x V
Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident The primary functions federal
response teams may perform in a terrorist incident involving a radiological
agent or weapon vary (see table 3). A radiological terrorist incident could
expose people at the incident site to dangerous levels of radioactive
material and contaminate a geographic area. One possible delivery mechanism
is an explosive device containing
radioactive material such as cesium- 137, iridium- 192, and cobalt- 60. The
radioactive material could be removed from a stolen source, crushed into
powder, and placed in the explosive device. In addition to the damage caused
by the explosion itself, the disbursed radioactive material could irradiate
people who come into contact with it, ingest it, or inhale it. If the
exposure level is high enough, these people could become sick or die. The
radioactive material could also contaminate the incident site and be
disbursed in the smoke resulting from the blast. 1 Such an incident would
warrant a quick response from local fire and rescue and law enforcement
personnel. If these local responders are unable to manage the situation or
are overwhelmed, the incident commander has access to federal assets.
1 This delivery mechanism is described in the December 15, 1999, report of
the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Mock terrorists in the Washington, D.
C., area also used explosive devices to disburse radioactive material during
the May 2000 exercise that is discussed elsewhere in this report. Terrorists
could also use a more passive system, such as aerosol, to deliver
radiological agents.
Table 3: Primary Functions Performed by Federal Consequence Management
Response Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident Dismantle,
transfer,
Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate and/ or
victims from Provide Provide Response
activities at Detect and
decontaminate the incident
Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Department of Defense
Joint Task Commands all Force for Civil federal military Support
forces on site for consequence management
and coordinates these activities with the lead federal agency.
U. S. Army Provides Special advice to Medical (1) medical Augmentation
treatment Response facilities on
Team- Nuclear/ handling Biological/
contaminated Chemical a patients and (2) authorities on determining
follow- on medical resources, supplies, and
equipment to resolve the incident.
U. S. Army Monitors Provides Radiological contaminated guidance about
Advisory medical health hazards Medical Team a
facilities and from
equipment. radiological
contamination. Provides advice for appropriate medical treatment. Can treat
victims.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer,
Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate and/ or
victims from Provide Provide Response
activities at Detect and
decontaminate the incident
Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Department of Energy
Radiological Conduct initial
.Advise Assistance site decisionmakers Program assessments. on Teams
Small, steps that can regionally be taken to based teams
evaluate and provide quick minimize the response hazards of a capability to
radiological calls for
emergency. radiological assistance.
Federal Acts as the Gathers and Radiological control point for
assesses Monitoring and all federal radiological Assessment
assets that are data from Center monitoring and
multiple assessing sources, off- site including radiological Radiological
conditions.
Assistance Program teams and the Aerial Measuring System. Also provides
assessments to the state and
the lead federal agency.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer,
Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate and/ or
victims from Provide Provide Response
activities at Detect and
decontaminate the incident
Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Aerial Detects and Measuring
surveys the System location of
radioactive material deposited on the ground or the path of a radioactive
plume. Fixedwing aircraft provide quick surveys over a large area to
determine the severity of the incident. Rotary- wing aircraft provide more
detailed
measurements. Radiation
Provides Emergency medical Assistance consultation Center/
and on- site Training Site assistance for the treatment of all types of
radiation
exposure incidents.
Department of Health and Human Services
Management Coordinate the Support Teams activities of federal civilian
medical teams. National Extract and Perform Provide limited Medical
decontaminate
casualty medical care. Response victims from triage. Teams b
contaminated area.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer,
Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate and/ or
victims from Provide Provide Response
activities at Detect and
decontaminate the incident
Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Disaster Perform Provide Medical casualty emergency Assistance
triage.
medical care Teams and patient stabilization.
Can administer medical treatments. Assist in the
transport of victims from incident site to medical facilities such as
hospitals.
Disaster Perform Mortuary recovery, Operational
identification, Response and processing Teams of fatalities.
Provide advice on the effects of potential contamination resulting from
fatalities.
Decontaminate fatalities.
Department of Veterans Affairs
Medical Monitors for Provides Provides Emergency
radioactivity capability to
specialized Radiological
beyond the decontaminate medical care Response contaminated victims.
for radiation Team site.
trauma.
Environmental Protection Agency
On- Scene Coordinate Conduct initial Direct efforts to Coordinators federal
con- site
clean up the tainment, assessment, to incident site. removal, and include
Activities can disposal evaluating the
include control efforts.
size and nature and stabilization of the released of the agent, on substance
and site treatment, its potential
and off- site hazards.
disposal.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Dismantle, transfer,
Extract and/ or dispose of,
decontaminate Coordinate and/ or
victims from Provide Provide Response
activities at Detect and
decontaminate the incident
Triage medical technical team
incident site evaluate agent property
site victims treatment
advice Radiological Conducts Emergency
sample Response preparation Team and analysis in
mobile laboratories.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Emergency Establishes Response field office if Team required. Provides
disaster assessment coordination and expertise to states and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency regions.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regional Lead and Incident coordinate Response federal actions Teams related
to the radiological technical
response at incident site. Review actions the regulated entity is taking
to correct problems. Provide analysis and consultation for
actions taken to protect public health and safety.
a These DOD teams have a military wartime mission and may be unavailable for
a domestic terrorist incident. b These functions are performed by a special
unit within one of the National Medical Response Teams.
Note: We identified the primary functions performed by a team when it
responds to a radiological or nuclear terrorist incident, even though the
team has other capabilities. The magnitude of devastation caused by a
nuclear weapon would overwhelm state and local assets quickly. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation ranks use of nuclear weapons by domestic- origin
terrorists on the low- end of the threat spectrum.
Source: Our analysis and discussions with agency officials.
Appendi x VI
Organizations and Locations Visited During the course of our review, we met
with officials from the following organizations: Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support,
Arlington, Va.
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Arlington, Va. Joint Task Force- Civil
Support, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. U. S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases,
Frederick, Md. U. S. Army Technical Escort Unit, Aberdeen, Md. U. S. Army
Chemical/ Biological Rapid Response Team, Aberdeen, Md.
Department of Health Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
and Human Services Office of Emergency Preparedness, Rockville, Md.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Ga. National Center for
Infectious Diseases National Center for Environmental Health National
Medical Response Team, Arlington, Va.
Department of Energy Office of Emergency Response, Germantown, Md.
Albuquerque Operations Office, Kirtland Air Force Base, N. M.
Sandia National Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, N. M. Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Los Alamos, N. M. Remote Sensing Laboratory, Nellis Air
Force Base, Nev.
Department of U. S. Coast Guard, Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
Transportation
Environmental Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
Protection Agency Region VIII, Denver, Colo.
Environmental Response Team, Edison, N. J. Radiation and Indoor Environments
National Laboratory,
Las Vegas, Nev.
Federal Emergency Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
Management Agency Region VIII, Denver, Colo.
Department of Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
Veterans Affairs Office of Emergency Preparedness/ Emergency Management
Strategic
Healthcare Group, Martinsburg, W. Va. Nuclear Regulatory
Headquarters, Rockville, Md. Commission
Office of Management Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
and Budget
Appendi x VII Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendi x VI II Comments From the Department of Energy
Appendi x IX Comments From the Department of Justice
Comments From the Department of Health Appendi x X and Human Services
Comments From the Department of Veterans
Appendi x XI Affairs
Comments From the Federal Emergency
Appendi x XII Management Agency
Comments From the Environmental
Appendi x XI II Protection Agency
Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory
Appendi x XI V Commission
Comments From the Office of Management
Appendi x XV and Budget
Appendi x XVI
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Stephen L. Caldwell (202)
512- 9610 Acknowledgments Deborah Colantonio, James A. Driggins, Thomas W.
Gosling, Harry L.
Purdy, and Raymond J. Wyrsch made key contributions to this report.
Related GAO Products West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health
Preparedness (GAO/ HEHS- 00- 180, Sept. 11, 2000). Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Challenges to Building a Comprehensive Strategy for Information
Sharing and Coordination (GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 268, July 26, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources (GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 00- 218, July 26, 2000). Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but
Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 181, July 19,
2000). Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD's Actions to Combat Weapons Use
Should Be More Integrated and Focused (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 97, May 26, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H. R. 4210 to Manage Selected
Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 172, May 4, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 85, Apr. 7, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 00- 145, Apr. 6, 2000). Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate
Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 64,
Mar. 21, 2000). Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical
Supplies Are Poorly Managed (GAO/ T- HEHS/ AIMD- 00- 59, Mar. 8, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies are Poorly
Managed (GAO/ HEHS/ AIMD- 00- 36, Oct. 29, 1999). Food Safety: Agencies
Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate Contamination (GAO/
RCED- 00- 3, Oct. 27, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological
Terrorism (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 50, Oct. 20, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163, Sept. 7, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises (GAO/
NSIAD- 99- 157BR, June 25, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard
Response Teams is Unclear (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 184, June 23, 1999). Combating
Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99-
181, June 9, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency
Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 151, June 9,
1999). Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear
(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 110, May 21, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be
Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135, May
13, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health
Initiatives (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 112, Mar. 16, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism
(GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating Terrorism:
Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency
(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 3, Nov. 12, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on the
Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 16,
Oct. 2, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat and
Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/
NSIAD- 98- 74, Apr. 9, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39, Dec. 1, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
and Strategy (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 254, Sept. 26, 1997).
(702031) Lett er
GAO United States General Accounting Office
Page 1 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Contents
Contents Page 2 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Page 3 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism United States General Accounting
Office
Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 3 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
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Page 34 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix I
Appendix I Compendium of Selected Federal Response Plans and Authorities
Page 35 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix I Compendium of Selected Federal Response Plans and Authorities
Page 36 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Page 37 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II
Appendix II Selected Information About Federal Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear Consequence Management Response Teams
Page 38 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II Selected Information About Federal Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear Consequence Management Response Teams
Page 39 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II Selected Information About Federal Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear Consequence Management Response Teams
Page 40 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II Selected Information About Federal Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear Consequence Management Response Teams
Page 41 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II Selected Information About Federal Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear Consequence Management Response Teams
Page 42 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Page 43 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III
Appendix III Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Chemical Terrorist Incident
Page 44 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Chemical Terrorist Incident
Page 45 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Chemical Terrorist Incident
Page 46 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Chemical Terrorist Incident
Page 47 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Page 48 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV
Appendix IV Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Biological Terrorist Incident
Page 49 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Biological Terrorist Incident
Page 50 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Biological Terrorist Incident
Page 51 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Biological Terrorist Incident
Page 52 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Page 53 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V
Appendix V Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident
Page 54 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident
Page 55 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident
Page 56 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident
Page 57 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident
Page 58 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V Selected Functions of Federal Consequence Management Response
Teams in a Radiological/ Nuclear Terrorist Incident
Page 59 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Page 60 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VI
Appendix VI Organizations and Locations Visited
Page 61 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Page 62 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VII
Page 63 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VIII
Page 64 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IX
Appendix IX Comments From the Department of Justice
Page 65 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Page 66 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix X
Page 67 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XI
Page 68 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XII
Page 69 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XIII
Page 70 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XIV
Page 71 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XV
Appendix XV Comments From the Office of Management and Budget
Page 72 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XV Comments From the Office of Management and Budget
Page 73 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Page 74 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XVI
Page 75 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Related GAO Products Page 76 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
Related GAO Products Page 77 GAO- 01- 14 Combating Terrorism
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