Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign
Nationals to Remediate and Review Software (Letter Report, 12/23/1999,
GAO/AIMD-00-55).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) security controls over
information on the foreign nationals involved in remediating and
reviewing software, focusing on: (1) the extent to which foreign
nationals were involved in year 2000 code remediation and subsequent
code review activities at FAA; and (2) FAA's policies covering this
involvement.
GAO noted that: (1) FAA policy requires system owners and users to
prepare risk assessments for all contractor tasks, and to have
background investigations conducted for all contractor employees in
high-risk positions; (2) FAA also requires more limited background
checks for moderate- and low-risk positions; (3) FAA's mission-critical
systems requiring year 2000 repairs--including some of the most
important systems supporting the air traffic control system--were
remediated by a mix of FAA and contractor employees and, in the case of
commercial-off-the-shelf products, by the product vendors; (4) while FAA
did not maintain detailed information on individuals assigned to perform
year 2000 code remediation, FAA compiled some of this information in
response to GAO's request; (5) in doing so, FAA identified instances
where foreign nationals, employed by contractors, performed year 2000
code remediation activities; (6) of 153 mission-critical systems that
were remediated, 15 had foreign national involvement--including Chinese,
Ukrainian, and Pakistani nationals; (7) FAA was unable to provide any
information about the individuals who performed code remediation for 4
of the 153 systems; (8) with regard to code reviews, 20 key
mission-critical systems have been, or are in the process of being,
reviewed by two contractors who have foreign national employees; (9) one
code review contractor employed 36 mainland Chinese nationals while the
other employed one Canadian national; (10) FAA, however, did not perform
background searches on all of its contractor employees, as required by
policy; (11) the agency did not perform risk assessments and was unaware
of whether it or the contractor had performed background searches on all
the contractor employees, including the foreign nationals; (12) during
GAO's review, GAO found instances where background searches of foreign
nationals were not performed; (13) FAA's failure to perform risk
assessments, its lack of complete information on whether background
searches were performed, and the fact that some foreign nationals did
not undergo background searches have increased the risk that
inappropriate individuals may have gained access to FAA's facilities,
information, or resources; and (14) as a result, the air traffic control
system may be more susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: AIMD-00-55
TITLE: Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use
of Foreign Nationals to Remediate and Review
Software
DATE: 12/23/1999
SUBJECT: Computer security
Data integrity
Y2K
Computer software verification and validation
Contractor personnel
Air traffic control systems
Security clearances
Contract administration
Internal controls
Aliens
IDENTIFIER: Y2K
FAA Display System Replacement
FAA Automated Radar Terminal System IIIA
FAA Voice Switching and Control System
FAA Year 2000 Program
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Rev-LG logo.eps GAO United States General Accounting Office
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science, House of
Representatives
December 1999 COMPUTER SECURITY
FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign Nationals to
Remediate and Review Software
GAO/AIMD-00-55
GAO/AIMD-00-55
Page 1 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548 Accounting and Information Management
Division
B-284308 Letter
December 23, 1999 The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Chairman Committee on Science House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: To address the Year 2000 (Y2K) computing
problem, public and private organizations across the nation have
required large numbers of skilled computer programmers and systems
managers to remediate, test, and review mission- critical systems.
The nationwide demand for skilled programmers has raised questions
as to whether key organizations used foreign nationals in their
Y2K activities and how any such use was controlled. At your
request, we identified the extent to which foreign nationals were
involved in Y2K code remediation and subsequent code review
activities at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 1 and the
agency's policies covering this involvement. On December 16, 1999,
we
briefed your office on the results of our work. The briefing
slides are included in appendix I. This report provides a high-
level summary of the information presented at that briefing,
including FAA's internal policies on using foreign nationals and
its actual use of foreign nationals to remediate code and perform
Y2K code reviews. Results in Brief FAA policy requires system
owners and users to prepare risk assessments for all contractor
tasks, and to have background investigations conducted
for all contractor employees in high- risk positions. FAA also
requires more limited background checks for moderate- and low-
risk positions. FAA's mission- critical systems requiring Y2K
repairs including some of the most important systems supporting
the air traffic control system were 1 Code remediation involved
repairing and/ or testing systems software, while code reviews
involved an independent, line- by- line review of a copy of the
systems source code in order to identify any date dependencies.
B-284308 Page 2 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
remediated by a mix of FAA and contractor employees and, in the
case of commercial- off- the- shelf products, by the product
vendors. While FAA did not maintain detailed information on
individuals assigned to perform Y2K code remediation, FAA compiled
some of this information in response to our request. In doing so,
FAA identified instances where foreign nationals, employed by
contractors, performed Y2K code remediation activities (i. e.,
code repair and/ or testing). Of 153 mission- critical systems
that were remediated, 15 had foreign national involvement
including Chinese, Ukrainian, and Pakistani nationals. FAA was
unable to provide any information about the individuals who
performed code remediation for 4 of the 153 systems. 2 With regard
to code reviews, 20 key mission- critical systems have been, or
are in the process of being, reviewed by two contractors who have
foreign
national employees. One code review contractor employed 36
mainland Chinese nationals while the other employed one Canadian
national. FAA, however, did not perform background searches
investigations or checks on all of its contractor employees, as
required by its policy.
Specifically, the agency did not perform risk assessments and was
unaware of whether it or the contractor had performed background
searches on all of the contractor employees, including the foreign
nationals. During our review, we found instances where background
searches of foreign nationals were not performed. For example, no
background searches were performed on the 36 mainland Chinese
nationals who performed code reviews, according to FAA and the
contractor, Primeon. FAA's failure to perform risk assessments,
its lack of complete information on whether
background searches were performed, and the fact that some foreign
nationals did not undergo background searches have increased the
risk that inappropriate individuals may have gained access to
FAA's facilities,
information, or resources. As a result, the air traffic control
system may be more susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks.
To address these issues, we are making recommendations to the FAA
Administrator to improve FAA's security controls, identify the
risk of malicious attacks on critical systems, and mitigate this
risk. FAA has
agreed with our recommendations in these areas and is moving to
implement them. In addition, FAA officials stated that the agency
has five layers of system protection, which they believe make the
risk of intrusion 2 FAA officials stated that these four systems
were commercial- off- the- shelf products.
B-284308 Page 3 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
extremely low. We anticipate evaluating the five layers of system
protection as part of our continuing efforts to monitor the
agency's progress in addressing computer security weaknesses.
Background The Y2K computing challenge provides a vivid example of
the need to protect critical systems. It illustrates the
government's widespread dependence on systems and their
vulnerability to disruption. During the Y2K conversion period, it
was important that agencies be especially
attuned to security issues because most agencies were under severe
time constraints to make an unprecedented number of software
changes. To the extent that this was not done, there is the danger
of already weak controls being further compromised if agencies
bypassed or truncated security in an
effort to speed the software modification process. This increases
the risk that erroneous or malicious code could be implemented and
that inadequately tested systems could be rushed into use.
FAA's primary mission is to ensure safe, orderly, and efficient
air travel throughout the United States. FAA's ability to fulfill
this mission depends on the adequacy and reliability of the
nation's air traffic control (ATC) system, a vast network of
computer hardware, software, and communications equipment that
provides information to air traffic controllers and aircraft
flight crews to ensure safe and expeditious movement of aircraft.
FAA's ATC network is an enormous, complex collection of
interrelated systems,
including navigation, surveillance, weather, and automated
information processing and display systems that reside at, or are
associated with, hundreds of ATC facilities. Complex
communications networks that separately transmit both voice and
digital data interconnect these systems
and facilities. As stated in our 1997 and 1999 reports on high-
risk issues, 3 while the use of interconnected systems promises
significant benefits in improved government operations, it also
increases vulnerability to anonymous intruders who may manipulate
data to commit fraud, obtain sensitive information, or severely
disrupt operations. In May 1998, we reported that FAA had weak
computer security practices that jeopardized flight safety and
concluded that FAA was ineffective in all critical areas reviewed
facilities physical security, operational systems information
security, future systems modernization security, and
3 High- Risk Series: Information Management and Technology
(GAO/HR-97-09, February 1997) and High- Risk Series: An Update
(GAO/HR-99-1, January 1999).
B-284308 Page 4 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
management structure and policy implementation. 4 First, we
reported that there were known weaknesses at many ATC facilities
and that FAA was unaware of weaknesses that might have existed at
other locations. Second, FAA was ineffective in managing systems
security for its operational systems and was in violation of its
own policy. Third, FAA was also not
effectively managing systems security for future ATC modernization
systems. Finally, we reported that FAA's management structure and
implementation of policy for ATC computer security was
ineffective, with security responsibilities distributed among
three organizations that had all been remiss in their ATC security
duties. To address these weaknesses, we made a series of
recommendations on
physical security at FAA facilities, operational ATC systems
security, future ATC modernization systems security, and
management structure and policy implementation. FAA generally
agreed with these recommendations and is in the process of
implementing them. For example, in February 1999, FAA established
a Chief Information Officer position with responsibility for
developing, implementing, and enforcing the agency's information
security
policy. FAA's efforts to address physical and systems security
weaknesses are underway. FAA Security Policies Require Background
Searches for
Contractor Employees Security program management and the related
security controls over
access to data, systems, and software programs are central factors
affecting an organization's ability to protect its information
resources and the program operations that these resources support.
Federal agencies must protect the integrity, confidentiality, and
availability of the information resources they rely on. FAA has a
personnel security program order, a human resource policy manual,
and a required contract clause that detail the requirements to be
met by both FAA and contractor employees
and the actions FAA must take to ensure the credibility of these
individuals. All three policies allow for the hiring of foreign
nationals.
FAA's personnel security program order requires background
investigations to be conducted for all FAA employees. In addition,
this order requires system owners and users to prepare a risk
assessment to determine the level of risk associated with
contracts. Depending on the level of risk identified, the order
then requires FAA to perform background searches 4 Air Traffic
Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety
(GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998).
B-284308 Page 5 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
investigations or checks for contractor employees who have
comparable exposure to FAA's facilities, information, or
resources. 5 Specifically, FAA requires that background
investigations be conducted for contractor employees in high- risk
positions and that more limited background checks be conducted for
contractor employees in moderate- and low- risk positions.
FAA's human resource policy manual restricts hiring to U. S.
citizens and nationals (residents of American Samoa and Guam) but
allows for exceptions. Specifically, FAA may hire foreign
nationals if (1) there are an insufficient number of well-
qualified applicants and/ or (2) there is an emergency, in which
case, these individuals can be hired for a brief period
of time. FAA officials noted that they were not aware of any
instances in which FAA had hired foreign nationals. In addition,
FAA specifies that all of its contracts include a clause requiring
contractors to hire U. S. citizens or aliens that are in the
country legally as evidenced by either a green card 6 or the
appropriate work visa, if work is likely to be performed at an FAA
location. There was, however, some confusion about this clause
within FAA. Some FAA employees considered the clause mandatory,
while others considered it optional. As a result, the
clause may have been inappropriately excluded from some of the
contracts under which the Y2K code remediation activities were
performed.
FAA Contractors Used Foreign Nationals for Y2K Code Remediation,
But Not All Had Required Background Searches
FAA contractors used foreign nationals to help remediate mission-
critical systems. Of 153 mission- critical systems that underwent
code repair and/ or testing, FAA advised us that 15 had some
degree of foreign national involvement. These 15 systems included
key ATC, communications, and administrative systems. For example,
the Traffic Flow Management Infrastructure- Enhanced Traffic
Management System, which is used to manage traffic flow across the
National Airspace System, was remediated with the assistance of
two Chinese, one Ethiopian, one Irish, and one Ukrainian. The
Oceanic Automation System, which provides oceanic controllers with
a situation display of aircraft positions, was remediated
5 FAA does not require background searches on temporary contractor
employees in low- risk positions. 6 A green card is an alien
registration receipt card, which documents that a foreign national
has obtained permanent residency in the United States.
B-284308 Page 6 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
with the assistance of two British nationals. For four mission-
critical systems, the degree of foreign national involvement, if
any, was unknown by FAA. 7 In overseeing these contracts, however,
FAA did not adhere to its own
policy requiring background searches to be performed for all
contractor employees. When asked about the required background
searches, the Y2K Program Office acknowledged that it was unaware
of this requirement and did not know whether background searches
had been performed for all contractor employees, including the
foreign nationals involved in Y2K code
remediation activities. The Associate Administrator for Research
and Acquisitions stated the Office of Acquisitions was also
unaware of the requirement to conduct background searches of
contractor employees. In addition, we contacted three contracting
officer technical representatives for key air traffic control
systems, who stated that they had not performed
background searches of contractor employees and, in some
instances, did not review resumes.
By not following sound security practices, FAA has increased the
risk of inappropriate individuals gaining access to FAA's
facilities, information, or resources. As a result, there is
inherently more risk that unauthorized changes, which are
difficult to detect, could have been made during code
renovation. In addition, program errors detected during testing
may not have been identified for correction by individuals
intending harm, resulting in potential system errors. While the
scope of our work did not include identifying instances of code
tampering or illegal activities and we did not find any such
instances during our review, FAA's failure to adhere to its own
policies has increased the risk that malicious code tampering may
have occurred and may not have been detected.
7 FAA stated that these four systems the BandWidth Manager
Network, the Operation Support Telephone System, the ASU- 400
Local Area Network, and CCMail were commercial- off- the- shelf
products.
B-284308 Page 7 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
FAA Contractors Used Foreign Nationals to Perform Y2K Code
Reviews, But Not All Had Required Background Searches
FAA hired two contractors (Primeon and Computer Generated
Solutions, Inc.) through the General Services Administration to
perform Y2K code reviews of 20 mission- critical systems. With
respect to Y2K compliance, code reviews entail a line- by- line
analysis of a copy of the program source code to identify and
evaluate date- related fields. According to FAA officials, a copy
of the program source code was provided in its entirety to the
contractors on various media (e. g., floppy disk, zip drive) and,
in most cases, via express mail. 8 For each system, the
contractors were required to provide a final report of the review
results to the appropriate Y2K program office, and the system
owners were expected to address any identified issues. FAA also
required both contractors to sign nondisclosure agreements
requiring the return or destruction of all copies of the program
source code provided by FAA.
These code reviews have been and continue to be performed for
systems that FAA has identified as the most important. To date, 17
of 20 systems have been reviewed with 2 currently being reviewed
and 1 scheduled for review, according to FAA officials. The
universe of systems is comprised of key ATC, communications, and
administrative systems. For example, systems that have undergone
code reviews include the Display System Replacement (DSR), which
displays radar data to controllers in the en route environment,
and the Automated Radar Terminal System IIIA (ARTS IIIA), which is
the critical data processing system used in terminal radar
approach control facilities to provide essential aircraft position
and flight plan information to controllers.
Primeon was tasked with reviewing the code of eight mission-
critical systems, including DSR, ARTS IIIA, and the Voice
Switching and Control System (VSCS) a critical system that
supports ground- to- ground and airto-
ground communications in the terminal radar approach control
environment. According to Primeon and FAA, 36 mainland Chinese
nationals performed these code reviews. However, neither FAA nor
Primeon had performed background searches on these employees. 8
Code reviewers were not given direct access to operational
systems, so they did not have the ability to directly insert code.
B-284308 Page 8 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
Computer Generated Solutions, Inc. (CGS) was tasked with reviewing
the code of 13 mission- critical systems, 9 including the Terminal
Doppler Weather Radar and the Host Environment the key information
processing system in FAA's en route environment. According to CGS
and FAA, there
was one Canadian national whose involvement was limited to
contract administration. This person should have undergone a
criminal background investigation under CGS' recruiting policy,
but FAA did not confirm that this had occurred. According to an
FAA official, the agency did not conduct background searches of
CGS' employees.
As stated earlier, while FAA requires background searches to be
performed for all contractor employees, regardless of citizenship
status, this policy is not being adequately enforced. FAA's
failure to conduct background
searches increases the risk that unauthorized individuals will
gain access to FAA's facilities, information, or resources. In the
case of code reviews, individuals intending harm may not bring to
FAA's attention program errors that may have been detected during
the code review process. In addition, copies of the code could be
sold and/ or reviewed to identify systems weaknesses that could
later be exploited.
While the scope of our work did not include identifying instances
of intrusions or illegal activities and we did not find any such
instances during our review, FAA's failure to adhere to its own
policies has increased the risk that its critical systems could be
copied, distributed, and studied for weaknesses. Additionally,
given the nature of code reviews, this type of
activity may have occurred but not have been detected. Conclusions
By not following sound security practices, FAA has increased the
risk that inappropriate individuals may have gained access to its
facilities,
information, or resources. FAA has not adequately (1) enforced its
policy requiring background searches of contractor employees, (2)
instructed its personnel on when to use the contract clause
regarding citizenship requirements for contractor personnel, and
(3) maintained records of all individuals assigned to work on
mission- critical systems. FAA now faces a major task in assessing
and addressing the increased risks to several of its mission-
critical systems as a result of its failure to ensure that
background
searches were conducted. The implications of FAA's actions extend
well 9 Because both contractors reviewed ARTS IIIA, there are a
total of 21 code reviews on 20 systems.
B-284308 Page 9 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
beyond the Y2K date rollover and, as such, require FAA to act
swiftly and decisively in its efforts to identify and mitigate the
potential risk of intrusions and malicious attacks.
Recommendations In order to address weaknesses in the enforcement
of its policies and to
identify and mitigate the risk of malicious intrusions or attacks
on missioncritical FAA systems, we recommend that the FAA
Administrator direct:
FAA's Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security to
clarify the requirements for contractor employee background
investigations or checks and establish a process under which
background investigations
or checks are performed for all contractor staff where applicable.
To increase the effectiveness of such an action, the Associate
Administrator must also ensure that risk assessments are prepared
with appropriate input from system owners and users.
FAA's Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions to
provide guidance on contract provisions, such as mandatory versus
optional clauses, and enforce the appropriate use of these
clauses. The Associate
Administrator should instruct personnel to review current and
pending contracts to ensure that all applicable contract
provisions are included. In addition, the reasonableness of all
clause limitations should be reviewed. The appropriate FAA entity
to maintain records of the individuals, both
FAA and contractor employees, working on systems, especially
missioncritical applications. The appropriate FAA entity to
perform security reviews of critical
systems that have been remediated under contract. The appropriate
FAA entity to carefully control access to and
distribution of program source code, in conjunction with security
reviews. The appropriate FAA entity to perform a risk assessment
for code
reviews conducted by Primeon to determine the potential exposure
and consider retroactively performing background investigations of
Primeon's staff.
Agency Comments On December 13, 1999, we discussed the results of
our review with FAA officials and incorporated their comments as
appropriate. FAA officials agreed with our findings and the
necessary corrective actions. Senior FAA officials also informed
us that the agency had issued a policy memorandum
B-284308 Page 10 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
effective December 10, 1999, calling attention to the requirements
of FAA's personnel security program order. The agency has also
begun the process of identifying the extent to which it or its
contractors have performed background checks or investigations of
contractor employees. In addition, FAA has tasked its Servicing
Security Elements organization with the responsibility of
maintaining records of individuals, both FAA and
contractor employees, who are working on systems. On December 21
and 22, 1999, FAA officials, including the Acting Deputy
Administrator, the Assistant Administrator for Information
Services and Chief Information Officer, the Associate
Administrator for Research and Acquisitions, and the Associate
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, provided additional
comments. These officials stated that because FAA has five layers
of systems protection, they believe that the risk of intrusion is
extremely low. We anticipate evaluating FAA's layers of systems
protection
as part of our continuing efforts to monitor the agency's progress
in addressing computer security weaknesses. Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
As requested, our objectives were to determine whether FAA had
policies governing the use of foreign nationals for Y2K code
remediation activities, the extent to which foreign nationals and
offshore facilities were used to
remediate code, and the extent to which foreign nationals were
involved in code reviews. To achieve our objectives, we
interviewed officials within several administrative offices, 10
the Y2K program office, and the Y2K program office for each
respective line of business. We also contacted system
representatives and officials of both the Facility Services and
Engineering Division and Civil Aviation Security at the William J.
Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
To determine whether FAA had policies governing the use of foreign
nationals for Y2K remediation activities, we met with officials
and requested copies of policies developed by administrative
offices within FAA. To assess the degree of foreign nationals and
offshore facilities involvement in Y2K code remediation, we
reviewed and analyzed
10 These administrative offices included the Office of Information
Services/ Chief Information Officer, Office of Civil Aviation
Security Operations, Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and
Planning, Office of Personnel, and Office of Acquisitions.
B-284308 Page 11 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
information provided from the various Y2K program offices and
interviewed system officials on a sample of mission- critical
systems. To assess the degree of foreign national involvement in
code review activities,
we also reviewed and analyzed information provided by FAA
officials. During the course of this review, we did not focus on
identifying any instances of code tampering or other malicious
activities.
We conducted our work at the Federal Aviation Administration in
Washington, D. C., and the William J. Hughes Technical Center in
Atlantic City, New Jersey. We performed our work from October
through December
1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. We provided a copy of the briefing materials used in
preparing this report to FAA and Department of Transportation
(DOT) officials. FAA and DOT
officials including the Deputy Assistant Administrator of the
Office of Information Services/ Chief Information Officer (CIO),
the Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions, the
Chief of Staff of the Office of the Administrator, the Director of
Airway Facilities Service, the Year 2000 Program Office Manager,
the Year 2000 Program Manager for Air Traffic Services,
representatives from the Office of Civil Aviation Security
and Office of Acquisitions, and a representative for the DOT CIO
Office provided oral comments on the briefing. In addition, we
provided a draft of this letter to FAA for comment. We have
incorporated FAA's comments as appropriate throughout this report.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
until 30 days from the date of this report. At that time, we will
send copies to Senator Robert F. Bennett, Senator Christopher J.
Dodd, Senator Fred Thompson, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator
Richard C. Shelby, Senator Frank R.
Lautenberg, Senator Slade Gorton, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV,
Representative Ralph M. Hall, Representative Constance A. Morella,
Representative James A. Barcia, Representative Steven Horn,
Representative Jim Turner, Representative Frank R. Wolf,
Representative Martin O. Sabo, Representative John J. Duncan, and
Representative William O. Lipinski in their capacities as Chair or
Ranking Minority
Members of Senate and House Committees and Subcommittees. We are
also sending copies of this report to the Honorable Rodney E.
Slater, Secretary of Transportation; the Honorable Jane Garvey,
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration; the
Honorable John Koskinen,
B-284308 Page 12 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
Chairman of the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion; and
the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director of the Office of Management
and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon
request.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this letter,
please call me at (202) 512- 6408 or Colleen Phillips, Assistant
Director, at (202) 512- 6326. We can also be reached by e- mail at
willemssenj. aimd@ gao. gov and phillipsc. aimd@ gao. gov,
respectively. Key contributors to this assignment were Cynthia
Jackson, William Lew, and Keith Rhodes.
Sincerely yours, Joel C. Willemssen Director, Civil Agencies
Information Systems
Page 13 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
Page 14 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science Appendi x I
1
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Use of Foreign Nationals in Year 2000 Code Remediation and Review
Activities
at the Federal Aviation Administration U. S. House of
Representatives
Committee on Science December 16, 1999
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 15 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
2
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology FAA Policies Governing Use of
Foreign Nationals FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals or
Offshore
Entities to Remediate Code FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals
to Review Code Summary of Observations Suggested Actions
Briefing Overview
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 16 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
3
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability Objectives
Determine whether FAA has policies governing the use of foreign
nationals for Year 2000 code remediation activities
Determine the extent to which FAA used foreign nationals or
offshore facilities to remediate code
Determine the extent to which FAA used foreign nationals to
perform code reviews
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 17 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
4
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability Scope
FAA Administrative Offices Year 2000 Program Office Year 2000
Program Office for each respective line of
business (LOB) William J. Hughes Technical Center
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology (cont'd)
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 18 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
5
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability Methodology
Identified FAA policies governing the hiring of foreign nationals
by FAA and contractors Assessed information on the use of foreign
nationals and offshore
entities to perform or oversee Year 2000 code remediation
activities Interviewed FAA system officials on a sample of
mission- critical
systems Obtained FAA comments on a draft of the slides and
incorporated
changes as appropriate Performed work in accordance with
generally accepted
government auditing standards from October through December 1999
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology (cont'd)
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 19 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
6
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability FAA Policies Governing
Use of Foreign Nationals
FAA's Personnel Security Program Order requires background
investigations to be performed for FAA
employees requires background checks or investigations to be
performed for
contractor employees who have comparable exposure to FAA's
facilities, information, or resources, except for temporary
contractor employees in low- risk positions the type of
background check or investigation required is based on
the level of risk determined by the FAA system owner and users
However, the Year 2000 Program Office was unaware of this
requirement we identified instances where background checks or
investigations were not performed for contractor employees
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 20 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
7
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability FAA Policies Governing
Use of Foreign Nationals (cont'd)
FAA's Human Resource Policy Manual restricts hiring to U. S.
citizens and nationals (residents
of American Samoa and Guam) but allows for exceptions FAA may
hire foreign nationals if
there are an insufficient number of well- qualified applicants,
and/ or there is an emergency, in which case, these
individuals can be hired for a brief period of time
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 21 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
8
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability FAA Policies Governing
Use of Foreign Nationals (cont'd)
FAA's Required Contract Clause requires contractors to hire U. S.
citizens or aliens who
have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence as evidenced
by a green card, or who meet other Immigration and Naturalization
Service requirements
However, the clause is applicable only if contractor employees
are likely to
perform work at FAA locations some FAA employees consider the
clause mandatory
while others consider it optional
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 22 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
9
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability FAA Policies Governing
Use of Foreign Nationals (cont'd)
FAA's Required Contract Clause (cont'd) according to the Year
2000 Program Office,
information was not readily available regarding the inclusion of
this clause in current contracts
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 23 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
10
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability FAA's Utilization of
Foreign Nationals for Y2K Code Remediation
Neither the Year 2000 Program Office nor the respective LOBs Year
2000 Program Offices routinely maintain information on the
individuals who performed code remediation FAA did not know if
background checks or investigations were
performed for contractor employees Risk assessments were not
prepared However, according to FAA, remediation work was
performed
with existing contractors In response to our request for
information on contract staff,
FAA contacted the system owners and respective contracting firms
and inquired as to the use of foreign nationals
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 24 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
11
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Summary of foreign national involvement in FAA's Y2K code
remediation activities
15 (10%) of 153 mission- critical (MC) systems had foreign
nationals performing code repair and/ or testing, according to FAA
officials 1 Commercial- off- the- shelf (COTS) system was
remediated by a
foreign- owned firm ACT Telecommunications System was remediated
by Northern
Telecom, a Canadian firm The number of foreign nationals
performing code repair and/ or
testing is not known for 4 (3%) of 153 MC systems
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals for Y2K Code Remediation
(cont'd)
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 25 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
12
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Based on our review of information provided by FAA and our
observations, we did not identify any FAA employees who were
foreign nationals who performed code remediation There were
several instances where information was unavailable
FAA does not know whether background checks or investigations
were performed for all foreign national contractor employees who
performed code remediation
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals for Y2K Code Remediation
(cont'd)
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 26 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
13
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability FAA's Utilization of Foreign
Nationals for Y2K Code Remediation (cont'd)
Table 1: Summary of Reported Foreign National Involvement in Code
Repair and/ or Testing for Mission- Critical Systems Repaired
SOURCE: FAA
LOB Number of MC systems requiring repair
Number of MC systems repaired
with no foreign national involvement
Number of repaired MC systems with foreign national
involvement Number of MC
systems repaired with foreign national
involvement unknown Associate Administrator for Research and
Acquisitions (ARA)
26 15 7 4 Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services (ATS)
65 63 2 0 Associate Administrator for Airports (ARP)
3 2 1 0 Administrative Systems (AAD) 50 49 1 0 Associate
Administrator for Regulation and Certification (AVR)
6 2 4 0 Associate Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation (AST)
0 0 0 0 Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS)
3 3 0 0 Office of System Safety (ASY) 0 0 0 0
Totals 153 134 15 4
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 27 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
14
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Table 2: Summary of Mission- Critical Systems Repaired with
Reported Foreign National Involvement in Code Repair and/ or
Testing
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals for Y2K Code Remediation
(cont'd)
SOURCE: FAA *-- Information unavailable 1 Information of the
nationality of FAA employees also unavailable
L O B S y s te m N a m e C o n tr a c to r N a m e
N u m b e r a n d n a tio n a l i t y o f f o r e ig n n a ti o n
a ls
C o n tr a c to r w a s fo r e ig n
o w n e d o r c o n tr o l l e d ?
C o d e r e m e d ia te d
o ff s h o r e ? C o m m en ts
A R A C T X 5 0 0 0 ( E x p lo s iv e D e t e c t i o n S y s t e
m )
I n V is io n * * * C o m m e r c ia l -o f f -th e s h e l f ( C
O T S ) p r o d u c t. T e s tin g d o n e u t i l i z in g G e r
m a n e n g in e e r s A C T T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n s
S y s te m 1 N o r th e r n
T e le c o m *Ye s ,
C a n a d ia n * C O T S p r o d u c t
T ra ff ic F lo w M a n a g e m e n t I n f r a s tr u c tu r e E
n h a n c e d T r a ff ic M a n a g e m e n t S y s te m
V o lp e 2 C h i n e s e 1 E th io p ia n
1 I r is h 1 U k r a in ia n
N o U n k n o w n C o n tr a c t s ta f f in v o l v e d in m o d
i fic a tio n a n d t e s tin g a c ti v i t i e s
E n te r p r is e N e tw o r k /H e a d q u a r te r s
D a ta N e t w o r k A M T I 1 V e n e z u e la n N o N o C O T S
p r o d u c t
V o i c e S w i t c h in g a n d C o n tr o l S y s te m 1 I n te
l li s o u r c e * * * F A A s y s t e m
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s n o te d th a t th e r e w a s 1 fo
r e ig n n a tio n a l i n v o l v e d i n t e s tin g a t th e T
e c h n ic a l C e n te r O c e a n ic A u to m a t io n
S y s te m R a y t h e o n 2 B r itis h N o N o
O c e a n ic S y s te m D e v e lo p m e n t a n d S u p p o r t P
r o d u c ts
R a y t h e o n 2 B r itis h N o N o
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 28 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
15
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Table 2: Summary of Mission- Critical Systems Repaired with
Reported Foreign National Involvement in Code Repair and/ or
Testing (cont'd)
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals for Y2K Code Remediation
(cont'd)
SOURCE: FAA *-- Information unavailable **-- However, the
individual is now a United States citizen according to FAA
LO B S yste m N a m e C o n tra c to r N a m e N um b er a n d n
atio n ality o f fo reig n n atio nals
C o n tra c to r w a s fo reig n
ow n ed o r c o n tro lle d ?
C od e re m ed ia te d
o ffsh o re? C o m m e n ts
A T S In fo rm a tio n D isp la y S y ste m
S ystem s A tla n ta, In c.
1 L ib e rian N o N o C O T S p ro d u c t. In d iv id u a l in
sta lled c o m m e rc ia l o ff th e sh e lf h a rd w a re N atio
n al A irsp a c e D ata In t erchange
N etw o rk II H u g h e s N etw o rk
S yste m s, D im e n sio n s In tern atio n al, T R IO S , D IT C
O ,
T ech n ical M an agem e nt
A ss is tan ce 2 B ri tish N o N o C O T S p ro d uct.
In d iv id u a ls w ere inv o lv ed in te stin g
A R P A ir C ar r ier A ctiv ity In fo rm a tio n
S yste m V olp e 1 Jap an ese N o N o In d iv id u a l in vo lv ed
in p ro g ra m testin g A A D D ep a rtm e n ta l
A cco u ntin g a n d F in a n cial In fo rm a tio n
S yste m M TS I
CEX E C 6 M a la y sia n s,
1 Pak i stan ia n , 1 In d ia C it izen **
1 V ietn am e se N o
N o N o
N o
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 29 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
16
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Table 2: Summary of Mission- Critical Systems Repaired with
Reported Foreign National Involvement in Code Repair and/ or
Testing (cont'd)
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals for Y2K Code Remediation
(cont'd)
SOURCE: FAA *-- Information unavailable **-- Contractor expressed
privacy and discrimination concerns about releasing employees'
countries of origin
L O B S y s t e m N a m e C o n t r a c t o r N a m e
N u m b e r a n d n a t i o n a l i t y
o f f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s
C o n t r a c t o r w a s f o r e i g n
o w n e d o r c o n t r o l l e d ?
C o d e r e m e d i a t e d
o f f s h o r e ? C o m m e n t s
A V R O n l i n e A v i a t i o n S a f e t y I n s p e c t i o n
S y s t e m
G a l a x y S c i e n t i f i c C o r p o r a t i o n
5 * * N o N o S a f e t y P e r f o r m a n c e
A n a l y s i s S y s t e m C o m p u t e r
S c i e n c e s C o r p o r a t i o n
A k u n a T e c h n o l o g i e s ,
I n c . 1 I n d i a
C i t i z e n 1 N i g e r i a n
N o N o
C l i e n t S e r v e r A p p l i c a t i o n s :
F i n a n c i a l T r a c k i n g S y s t e m A i r T r a n s p o
r t a t i o n O v e r s i g h t S y s t e m
D o c u m e n t I m a g i n g W o r k f l o w S u b s y s t e m
E l e c t r o c a r d i o g r a m S u b s y s t e m
J W I n t e r n e t T e c h n o l o g i e s
C G H , I n c A f f i l i a t e d C o m p u t e r
S e r v i c e s M o r t a r a
1 C h i n e s e 1 I n d i a C i t i z e n
2 S o u t h A f r i c a n s
8 I n d i a C i t i z e n s
1 I t a l i a n N o
N o N o
N o N o
N o N o
N o
M a i n f r a m e A p p l i c a t i o n :
I n t e g r a t e d S a f e t y I n f o r m a t i o n S y s t e m
O A O C o r p o r a t i o n
1 , n a t i o n a l i t y
u n k n o w n N o N o
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 30 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
17
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Table 3: Summary of Mission- Critical Systems Repaired for which
Foreign National Involvement in Code Repair and/ or Testing is
Unknown
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals for Y2K Code Remediation
(cont'd)
SOURCE: FAA *-- Information unavailable 1 Information on the
nationality of FAA employees is also unavailable
LOB System Name Contractor Name
Number and nationality of
foreign nationals
Contractor was foreign
owned or controlled?
Code remediated
offshore? Comments
ARA BandWidth Manager Network 1 * * * * COTS product
received from the Department of Defense Operation Support
Telephone System 1 * * * * COTS product ASU- 400 Local
Area Network * * * * COTS product
CCMail Lotus Development
Corporation * No * COTS product
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 31 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
18
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
FAA hired two contractors (Primeon and Computer Generated
Solutions, Inc.) through the General Services Administration (GSA)
to perform code reviews of 20 mission- critical systems
Code reviews have been and continue to be performed to identify
potential Year 2000 issues within the remediated code The reviews
entail a line- by- line analysis of a copy of the program
source code to identify and evaluate date- related fields For
each system, a final report with the review results is provided to
the appropriate Year 2000 Program Office and identified issues are
expected to be addressed by system owners
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals to Review Code
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 32 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
19
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Year 2000 system code reviews
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals to Review Code (cont'd)
Primeon-
Display System Replacement Automated Radar Terminal System
(ARTS) IIIA*** Common ARTS National Airspace System Resource
System (Operational Data Management System) Voice Switching and
Control System Traffic Flow Management Infrastructure
Enhanced Traffic Management System Dynamic Ocean Track System
Plus Host Interface Device/ National Airspace
System/ Local Area Network
Computer Generated Solutions, Inc.-
ARTS IIIA*** Flight Service Automation System U. S. Notices to
Airmen System Terminal Doppler Weather Radar Aeronautical
Information Systems- DEC Alpha HOST Environment* Micro- En Route
Automated Radar Tracking
System** Remote Maintenance Monitoring System* Integrated
Communication Switching System Litton
Type 2, 3 Departmental Accounting and Financial Information
System Integrated Personnel Payroll System Aviation Safety
Analysis System Airport Air Carrier Reporting System
*-- Code review in process **-- Code review tentatively scheduled
***-- System reviewed by both Primeon and Computer Generated
Solutions, Inc.
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 33 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
20
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Primeon Neither the GSA contract nor FAA's statement of work
under that contract prohibited the use of foreign nationals
contractor has a written internal security policy but does not
perform background investigations of employees employees are
hired based on academic credentials and experience
According to Primeon and FAA, 36 mainland Chinese nationals
performed code reviews (4 with green cards, 32 with work visas) A
nondisclosure agreement was signed by Primeon and
certifications were provided to FAA denoting the return or pending
destruction of the media and the purging of electronic copies of
the code
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals to Review Code (cont'd)
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 34 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
21
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Computer Generated Solutions, Inc. (CGS) Neither the GSA contract
nor FAA's statement of work under
that contract prohibited the use of foreign nationals at FAA's
request, contractor prepared a written internal security
policy contractor conducts a criminal background investigation
prior to
employment According to CGS and FAA, 1 Canadian national was
involved
in contract administration A nondisclosure agreement was signed
by CGS requiring the
return or destruction of all copies of software/ firmware and all
documentation provided by FAA or developed by CGS during its
review
FAA's Utilization of Foreign Nationals to Review Code (cont'd)
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 35 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
22
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
FAA has a policy that requires background checks or
investigations to be performed for contractor employees based upon
the level of risk associated with the project or task, however,
the policy has not always been followed FAA has a contract clause
that specifies the citizenship criteria for
contractor employees, however, the clause only applies if the
contractor employees are likely to work at
an FAA location FAA employees have differing views as to whether
the contract clause is
mandatory or optional FAA did not maintain information on
individuals assigned to perform
code remediation and/ or code reviews FAA does not know if
background checks or investigations were
performed for all foreign nationals involved in code remediation
activities
Summary of Observations
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 36 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
23
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
One of FAA's two code review contractors did not conduct
background investigations of its employees
By not following sound security practices, FAA introduces the risk
of inappropriate individuals gaining access to FAA's facilities,
information, or resources
unauthorized changes, which are difficult to detect, could be
made during code renovation program errors detected during
testing and code reviews may not be
identified for correction copies of the code could be sold and/
or reviewed to identify system
weaknesses that could later be exploited
Summary of Observations (cont'd)
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 37 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
24
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Clarify requirements for contractor employee background checks or
investigations, and establish a process to ensure that background
checks or investigations are performed for all contractor staff
where applicable Ensure that risk assessments are prepared
Provide guidance on contract provisions, such as mandatory versus
optional clauses, and ensure that the clauses are used
appropriately Review current and pending contracts to ensure that
all applicable contract
provisions are included Review reasonableness of clause
limitations Maintain records of the individuals, both FAA and
contractor
employees, working on systems, especially mission- critical
applications
Suggested Actions
Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 38 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
25
G A O
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Perform security reviews of critical systems that have been
remediated
In conjunction with security reviews, FAA should ensure that
access to and distribution of programs is carefully controlled
Perform a risk assessment for code reviews conducted by Primeon
to determine the potential exposure and consider retroactively
performing background investigations of Primeon's staff
Suggested Actions (cont'd)
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Appendix I December 16, 1999, Briefing Before the House Committee
on Science
Page 40 GAO/AIMD-00-55 FAA's Use of Foreign Nationals
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