The Challenge of Drug Trafficking to Democratic Governance and Human Security in West Africa
Authored by David E. Brown.
May 2013
105 Pages
Brief Synopsis
International criminal networks mainly from Latin America and Africa—some with links to terrorism—are turning West Africa into a key global hub for the distribution, wholesaling, and production of illicit drugs. These groups represent an existential threat to democratic governance of already fragile states in the subregion because they are using narco-corruption to stage coups d’état, hijack elections, and co-opt or buy political power. Besides a spike in drug-related crime, narcotics trafficking is also fraying West Africa’s traditional social fabric and creating a public health crisis, with hundreds of thousands of new drug addicts. While the inflow of drug money may seem economically beneficial to West Africa in the short-term, investors will be less inclined to do business in the long-term if the subregion is unstable. On net, drug trafficking and other illicit trade represent the most serious challenge to human security in the region since resource conflicts rocked several West African countries in the early 1990s. International aid to West Africa’s “war on drugs” is only in an initial stage; progress will be have to be measured in decades or even generations, not years and also unfold in parallel with creating alternative sustainable livelihoods and addressing the longer-term challenges of human insecurity, poverty, and underdevelopment.
Summary
West Africa is under attack from international criminal networks that are using the subregion as a key global hub for the distribution, wholesale, and increased production of illicit drugs. Most drug trade in West Africa involves cocaine sold in Europe, although heroin is also trafficked to the United States, and the subregion is becoming an export base for amphetamines and their precursors, mainly for East Asian markets and, increasingly, the United States. The most important of these criminal networks are drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) from Latin America—primarily from Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico—partnering with West African criminals. These criminals, particularly Nigerians and Ghanaians, have been involved in the global drug trade for several decades, first with cannabis and later with heroin. The problem has worsened to the point that these networks represent an existential threat to the viability of already fragile states in West Africa as independent, rule of law based entities. As part of this new Latin America-West Africa criminal nexus, Guinea-Bissau is generally recognized as a narco-state where state-capture by traffickers has already occurred.
There is also increasingly strong evidence linking terrorist organizations or state sponsors of terrorism to the West Africa drug trade, including Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Hezbollah (allied with elements in the Lebanese diaspora), Venezuela, and Iran. These criminal and terrorist groups are also a threat to U.S. national security, because the illicit profits earned by Latin American drug cartels operating in West Africa strengthen the same criminal elements that traffic drugs to North America, and the same North African and Middle Eastern terrorist groups and nations that target the United States. The link to AQIM takes on particular significance in light of this terrorist organization’s recent takeover of a vast sector of ungoverned space in northern Mali, along with Touareg allies.
West Africa’s geographical location between Latin America and Europe made it an ideal transit zone for exploitation by powerful drug cartels and terrorist organizations—much as the Caribbean and Central America had long suffered for being placed between South America’s cocaine producers and North America’s cocaine users. West Africa’s primary operational allure to traffickers is not actually geography, however, but rather its low standards of governance, low levels of law enforcement capacity, and high rates of corruption. Latin American traffickers recently relocated a share of their wholesale distribution from the Western Hemisphere to West Africa, with the subregion moving from being merely a short-term transit point to becoming a storage and staging area for wholesale repackaging, re-routing and sometimes (re-)sale of drugs.
While West African states have made remarkable progress in democratic and economic development over the past decade, the insidious effects of narcotics trafficking have the potential to reverse many of these gains. The proceeds of drug trafficking, by far the most lucrative transnational criminal activity in illicit economies, are fueling a dramatic increase in narco-corruption in the region, allowing drug traffickers to stage coups d’état, hijack elections, and co-opt or buy political power. West African countries could develop along similar lines to Mexico, where drug gangs have a symbiotic relationship with the state and political parties, and drug-related violence increases significantly. Besides a spike in drug-related crime, narcotics trafficking is also fraying West Africa’s traditional social fabric and creating a public health crisis, with hundreds of thousands of new drug addicts. While the inflow of drug money may seem economically beneficial to West Africa in the short term, investors will be less inclined to do business in the long term if the subregion is unstable. On net, drug trafficking and other illicit trade represent the most serious challenge to human security in the region since resource conflicts rocked several West African countries in the early-1990s.
International aid to West Africa’s “war on drugs” is only in an initial stage. Until recently, the United States, preoccupied by September 11, 2001 (9/11), and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, dedicated too few resources to monitoring, much less combating, transnational organized crime (TOC) in West Africa. Large-scale cocaine seizures in West Africa started in 2004, but the laying of the Latin America-West Africa illicit drug pipeline started well before that. After the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a regional action plan on drugs and organized crime in 2008, the United Nations (UN) responded with a 2010-14 plan, and the United States with its own modest initiative in 2011. West Africa’s progress in combating drugs will have to be measured in decades or even generations, not years, and also unfold in parallel with creating alternative sustainable livelihoods and addressing the longer-term challenges of human insecurity, poverty, and underdevelopment.
This paper concludes with specific counter-narcotics policy recommendations for the U.S. Government, including:
1. Expanding the U.S. Government’s physical presence in the subregion, including reopening the U.S. Embassy in Guinea-Bissau, and considering new DEA offices, e.g., in Bissau or Conakry, Guinea.
2. Seeking adequate, multiyear funding: to include support for the U.S. Government’s new West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI); for DoD to continue to support the Liberian Coast Guard under Operation ONWARD LIBERTY; and to expand counternarcotics/illicit trafficking training efforts under AFRICOM’s West Africa Regional Engagement Plan.
3. Fostering closer partnerships with third countries on West Africa. For example, the U.S. Government could increase cooperation with European Union (EU) member-states, including expanding intelligence-sharing with the EU’s Maritime Analysis Operations Center (MAOC) in Lisbon; with Japan and Korea to jointly address the increasing problem of methamphetamine production in West Africa that is sent for sale to Asia and the United States; with China to support the maritime capacity of West African navies to carry out coast guard functions; and with Brazil, which is already cooperating with African countries including Cape Verde.
4. Deepening cooperation with UN Agencies and INTERPOL, such as expanding cooperation with the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO), including its efforts to work with the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and ECOWAS transport ministries.
5. Aiding West Africa to expand maritime domain awareness and cooperation by supporting ECOWAS efforts to develop a regional maritime strategy and operational capacity through ongoing technical assistance.
6. Promoting international and regional agreements, and changes in domestic law. The international community could help West African nations to strengthen: a) their legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms against organized crime, money laundering, and corruption; and, b) their law enforcement agencies’ operational capabilities, including air, maritime, and land border controls.
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