Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability
Authored by Dr. Phil Williams, Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown.
April 2012
88 Pages
Brief Synopsis
Although challenges posed by various kinds of violent armed groups initially appear highly diverse and unrelated to one another, in fact they all reflect the increasing connections between security and governance and, in particular, the relationship between poor governance and violent armed groups. In many cases, these groups are overtly challenging the state; in others they are cooperating and colluding with state structures while subtly undermining them; in yet others, the state is a passive bystander while violent armed groups are fighting one another. The mix is different, the combinations vary, and the perpetrators of violence have different motives, methods, and targets. In spite of their divergent forms, violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) share certain qualities and characteristics. These violent armed groups represent a common challenge to national and international security, a challenge that is far greater than the sum of the individual groups, and that is likely to grow rather than diminish over the next several decades. This monograph focuses on the complex relationship between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement. It also seeks to disentangle the linkages between insurgency on the one hand and drug trafficking and organized crime on the other, suggesting that criminal activities help sustain an insurgency, but also carry certain risks for the insurgency.
Introduction
The rationale for this series is a reflection of the ways in which the world of armed groups has changed and is continuing to change, and the impact of these changes on threats and challenges to national and global security. Although challenges posed by various kinds of violent armed groups initially appear highly diverse and unrelated to one another, in fact they all reflect the increasing connections between security and governance—and, in particular, the relationship between poor governance and violent armed groups. The growth in the number of states with capacity gaps, functional holes, and legitimacy deficits helps to explain the resurgence of a new medievalism, and the rise of illegal quasi-governments in localized areas. The irony is that after several decades in which the number of sovereign states represented in the United Nations (UN) has increased significantly, relatively few of these states can truly claim a monopoly on force within their territorial borders.
Violent challengers to the Westphalian state have taken different forms in different parts of the world. These forms include tribal and ethnic groups, warlords, drug trafficking organizations, youth gangs, terrorists, militias, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations. In many cases, these groups are overtly challenging the state; in others they are cooperating and colluding with state structures while subtly undermining them; in yet others, the state is a passive bystander while violent armed groups are fighting one another. The mix is different, the combinations vary, and the perpetrators of violence have different motives, methods, and targets. In spite of their divergent forms, however, nonstate violent actors share certain qualities and characteristics. As Roy Godson and Richard Shultz have pointed out, “As surprising as it may seem, pirate attacks off Somalia, militias in Lebanon, and criminal armies in Mexico are part of a global pattern and not anomalies.” Indeed, these violent armed groups or, as they are sometimes called, violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) represent a common challenge to national and international security, a challenge that is far greater than the sum of the individual groups, and that is likely to grow rather than diminish over the next several decades. Although the U.S. military—especially the Air Force and the Navy—still place considerable emphasis on the potential emergence of peer competitors among foreign armed forces, more immediate challenges have emanated not from states but from various kinds of VNSAs.
Most obviously, on September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States became the target of extremist Islamic terrorist organizations based overseas. It has subsequently had to confront the homegrown offshoots of these groups. Most immigrants to the United States bring with them an allegiance to their new home; a small minority, however, retains allegiance to other entities and causes. Moreover, there are a small but growing number of cases in which American citizens go abroad to fight with extremist groups or to receive training so that they can return and carry out attacks on American soil. Although the killing of Osama bin Laden is seen by some observers as the beginning of the end for al-Qaeda, the threat posed by extremist Islamic terrorist organizations is likely to be far more enduring than any single individual or organization.
U.S. military interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been compelled to confront insurgencies and terrorist groups that have proved to be both more agile and more resilient than anticipated by many analysts. The counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq had some remarkable successes in 2007 and 2008, but with U.S. forces drawing down, questions remain about Iraq’s long-term stability. The insurgency in Afghanistan has also proved to be a devilish challenge, making it difficult to replicate there even the partial success in Iraq. In both instances, corruption in government has complicated and undermined the efforts to defeat the insurgency, while the insurgents have used a wide variety of criminal activities to fund their political and military campaigns. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has benefited enormously from its linkages with the opium and heroin industry and has been able to make a comeback using profits generated through taxation of farmers, protection of drug shipments, deployment of mobile laboratories, and a minor role in trafficking. Moreover, the problems of governance in Afghanistan are compounded by involvement of government officials and/or their family members in the drug business and by corruption—factors that are as pervasive as they are debilitating.
Drugs have funded insurgency not only in Afghanistan but also in countries as diverse as Colombia and Burma. Moreover, the drug industry has proved both resilient and adaptive. As the situation in Colombia has improved with the destruction of large drug trafficking organizations with a high degree of vertical integration, it has deteriorated in Mexico. As Mexican drug trafficking organizations have come to dominate wholesale markets in the United States, so the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico have become increasingly powerful and increasingly ruthless in their competition with one another. Indeed, the United States is facing a massive upsurge of drug-related violence on its southern border. Most of this is internecine violence among Mexican drug trafficking organizations themselves; some is directed against the Mexican government. The major Mexican drug trafficking organizations have a presence in almost all major U.S. cities and are closely linked to many gangs. According to a Congressional Research Service Report, however, the spillover of violence from Mexico to the United States predicted by many observers has not yet materialized fully, even though its potential is significant.
The United States has already experienced an influx of criminal organizations from countries as diverse as Russia, Albania, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, China, and Vietnam. This is not surprising. The United States (with the European Union close behind) is the most attractive market or host state for criminals seeking lucrative criminal opportunities. These opportunities can stem from factors as different as the demand for illicit drugs, the growth of electronic commerce, and the difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies when dealing with foreign groups able to use language and dialects as defense mechanisms. Consequently, the pattern of ethnic succession in organized crime in the United States has broadened into a diverse and sometimes bewildering kaleidoscope, with many of the emergent organizations maintaining criminal linkages in their state of origin.
The global commons (in both cyber-space and the oceans) has been subject to criminal behavior with serious direct and indirect implications for the United States. Because of the lack of a viably effective government in Somalia, Somali pirates are able to operate with a high degree of impunity, seizing and ransoming ships and crews moving through the Gulf of Aden. U.S. ships—as was evident with the seizure of the cargo ship, Maersk Alabama—are as vulnerable to such actions as those of any other state. Legal and regulatory asymmetries, while not as pronounced as state absence, can have a similar impact, enabling cyber-criminals, for example, to operate from safe havens, targeting individuals, financial institutions, and businesses in the United States and other countries.
Although these threats to national security are increasingly recognized, U.S. Government institutions and agencies are still in the process of adapting to them. Moreover, the U.S. military, including the Army, must adapt in a period of significant budgetary constraint. It is all the more important, therefore, that we understand the adversaries that we have to confront. This series is designed primarily to assist this process of knowing the enemies.
This first monograph, “Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability,” focuses on the complex relationship between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement. It also seeks to disentangle the linkages between insurgency on the one hand and drug trafficking and organized crime on the other, suggesting that criminal activities help sustain an insurgency, but also carry certain risks for the insurgency.
Subsequent monographs will focus on specific areas where violent armed groups operate, or they will delve into specifics about some of those groups. Some works will be descriptive or historical, while others are more analytical, but together they will clarify the security challenges that, arguably, are the most important now faced by the United States and the rest of the world. The series will include monographs on Mexico, the Caribbean, and various kinds of violent armed groups.
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