Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
28 March 2007
TO: Personal Representative
FROM: OIC, CSRT (28 Mar 07)
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL - HAMBALI, RIDUAN BIN ISOMUDDIN
1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.
2. An enemy combatant has been defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."
3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.
a. On 24 December 2000, 18 people were killed in church bombings in Indonesia.
b. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated sometime around mid-2000, the detainee called a meeting to discuss an operation targeting churches in Indonesia and the Singapore operation against the United States embassy. The detainee argued that the church was not being used only for prayer, and was responsible for the unrest in Ambon, Indonesia. The source stated the detainee wanted the churches attacked on Christmas Eve 2000.
c. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated the detainee was hiding in Pakistan and Afghanistan since February of 2001 because he was involved in the December 2000 attacks on the churches in Indonesia.
d. The detainee supervised the plan to bomb the United States, Australian, and British embassies in Singapore.
e. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source discussed the “Singapore plot.” According to the source, in 1999 the detainee gave the source a map and videotape of the Yishan mass rapid transit station in Singapore, and asked the source to write a proposal on how they would make an attack. In May 1999, when the source finished the proposal, he showed it to the detainee in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The detainee liked the proposal and told the source to take the tape toAfghanistan. The detainee put the source in contact with a high ranking al Qaida operative so the source could contact the al Qaida operative upon his arrival in Pakistan.
f. The detainee orchestrated and funded the Christmas Eve 2000 simultaneous bombings in Indonesia.
g. On 12 October 2002, at least 187 people were killed and over 300 injured when an explosion destroyed a nightclub packed with hundreds of foreign tourists on the Indonesian resort island of Bali.
h. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated the last contact he had with the detainee was in mid January 2002, in Thailand. The source stated the detainee discussed carrying out attacks. The detainee’s plan was to conduct small bombings in bars, cafes, or night clubs frequented by westerners in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The source also stated the detainee claimed he had one ton of explosives in Indonesia.
i. The detainee was the leader of the Malaysia Mujahedin group whose agenda was to topple the Malaysian government.
j. The detainee is linked to the recruitment of a foreign student organization in Pakistan called al Ghuraba, which was initiated to help develop the Jemaah Islamiyah organization in Pakistan.
k. The detainee was the operations chief of the Jemaah Islamiyah and its main contact and point man for al Qaida in Southeast Asia.
l. A document seized during the detainee’s arrest provided instructions for manufacture of vest bombs used by suicide bombers.
4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.
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