Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
08 February 2007
TO: Personal Representative
FROM: OIC, CSRT (08 Feb 07)
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL - AL LIBI, ABU FARAJ
1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.
2. An enemy combatant has been defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."
3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.
a. The detainee was a supervisor at the al Qaida training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan.
b. The detainee assisted in the creation of an urban warfare training camp in Kabul, Afghanistan.
c. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated he met the detainee in July-August 2001 at the al Qaida guest house in Kabu, Afghanistan. The same source also stated the detainee managed the guest house, and the guest house also served as the Kabul communications hub for Al-Qaida.
d. The detainee was the supervisor of an al Qaida communications site in Afghanistan, in 2002.
e. The detainee was a senior al Qaida facilitator. His primary duty was the care of al Qaida families residing in Pakistan. Additionally, the detainee was involved in vetting and transporting al Qaida fighters to Afghanistan.
f. Individuals wanting to fight in Afghanistan were required to be sponsored by an al
Qaida member and be interviewed by the detainee to verify their bona fides. Once the detainee, a former commander in Afghanistan, was comfortable with the individual's background, the detainee would arrange travel to Afghanistan for the individual.
g. The detainee was the deputy to al Qaida's third in command and was responsible for al Qaida activities and logistics throughout Pakistan.
h. In December 2003, a large group of Islamic extremists; including the detainee, representatives of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and Taliban officials met in Raiwand, Pakistan and discussed operations against the United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan.
i. In September 2004, several members of al Qaida involved in terrorist operations, including the detainee, met in Syria to discuss a variety of terrorist operations, including planned operations in the United States, Europe and Australia.
j. A computer seized during the capture of the detainee contained manuals related to explosives, detonator circuits, chemicals, military tactics, missiles and tanks.
k. A computer seized during the capture of the detainee contained a detailed manual on fabricating and using circuitry for detonators.
l. An al Qaida and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group associate requested assistance from the detainee in acquiring explosives and weapons according to seized letters found on the
4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.
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