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Homeland Security

UK House of Commons - Foreign Affairs Select Committee

Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism

2 July 2006

8  Afghanistan

Background

362. Previous Reports in this inquiry have described events in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA and the fall of the Taliban in November 2001. In June 2002, our predecessor Committee noted the importance of stabilising Afghanistan as well as the great challenges ahead.[ 470] Four and a half years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan has completed the institution-creating process outlined in the 2001 Bonn agreement, the post-Taliban plan for the country's political transition: Afghanistan now has an elected National Assembly and President. However, the extent of government authority remains limited, there are concerns over the lack of progress tackling the country's powerful military commanders, opium poppy cultivation remains endemic and the level of violence is increasing. Highlighting these concerns, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan in February 2006 warned that the country risks "sliding back into chaos if western countries do not step up efforts to bolster government control outside the capital."[471]

363. In January 2006, while making a statement about the deployment of British forces to Afghanistan, the then Secretary of State for Defence Dr John Reid, explained why Afghanistan is so important to the United Kingdom and the international community:

    Just over four years ago, on 11 September 2001, we were given a brutal lesson in the consequences of leaving Afghanistan in the hands of the Taliban and the terrorists. Since then, we in this country have been at the forefront of the international effort, under the auspices of the United Nations, to defeat international terrorism, to free Afghanistan from the ruthless grip of the Taliban and to rid the country of the menace of the terrorists and the greed of the drug traffickers…

    We cannot risk Afghanistan again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists. We have seen where that leads, be it in New York or in London. We cannot ignore the opportunity to bring security to a fragile but vital part of the world, and we cannot go on accepting Afghan opium being the source of 90 per cent. of the heroin that is applied to the veins of the young people of this country. For all those reasons, it is in our interests, as the United Kingdom and as a responsible member of the international community, to act.[472]

364. On 31 January-1 February 2006, the United Kingdom co-chaired the London Conference on Afghanistan. Foreign Office Minister Dr Kim Howells told the House that the Conference aimed:

    To launch the Afghanistan Compact, the successor to the Bonn Agreement. The Compact provides the framework for international community engagement in Afghanistan for the next five years.

    To provide an opportunity for the Government of Afghanistan to present its Interim National Development Strategy to the international community. The strategy sets out the Government's priorities for accelerating development, increasing security, tackling the drugs trade, and strengthening governance.

    To ensure that the Government of Afghanistan has adequate resources to meet its domestic ambitions and international commitments.[473]

The Conference resulted in pledges of over US$10.5 billion over the next five years; the United Kingdom pledged £500 million over the next three years.

365. Speaking at the opening of the Conference, the Prime Minister committed the United Kingdom to the task of stabilising Afghanistan:

    This is a struggle that of course primarily concerns the Afghan people, but it is also a struggle that concerns all of us, and it is why we are here today and it is why we are determined to see this through. It is why, whatever your challenges, we will be there with you, at your side, helping you. It is in your interest to do so, it is in our interest to do so, it is in the interest of the whole of the international community. This is a struggle for freedom, and for moderation, and for democracy and we are with you in it.[474]

366. We conclude that bringing stability to Afghanistan remains a key British interest. We commend the Government for its role in hosting and co-chairing the London Conference and welcome the Prime Minister's comments that the United Kingdom will remain by the side of the Afghan people in their struggle for freedom, moderation and democracy.

The Security Situation

367. In its last Report in this inquiry, our predecessor Committee described the military operations in Afghanistan. The Report noted that overall the security situation had improved, but that there remained a continuing threat to foreign nationals in the country.[ 475] Since that Report there have been worrying signs of a deterioration in the security environment.

368. More than 1,600 people were killed in 2005, and the violence is on the rise. In May, Afghanistan saw some of the fiercest fighting since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.[ 476] Moreover, similarities between the violence in Afghanistan and Iraq have prompted concern that the Taliban is learning from the insurgency in Iraq. There has been an increase in the number of kidnappings and roadside and suicide attacks.[477] There have already been more suicide attacks in 2006 than in the whole of 2005 (17) and 2004 (five).[478] There are also fears that the violence is spreading to previously safe provinces.

369. A field report by the Senlis Council, a drug policy advisory body, on the situation in the three southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar reveals a worrying picture. The report notes that the Afghan government has never established full control over the three provinces, but even its limited control is "rapidly diminishing, with political volatility now reaching urban areas."[ 479] There are reports that insurgent groups are operating more freely in the area and there has been an increase in the number of kidnappings and suicide attacks. Some of these strategies "point to an 'Iraqisation' of the Afghan insurgency tactics."[480] Taliban groups are using political violence and illegal economic activities to strengthen their powerbase.

370. We asked the former Foreign Secretary about this. In October 2005, Mr Straw told us: "I do not have the precise figures about Taliban activity. It is certainly the case that they are not completely defeated, and there remains quite a serious challenge."[ 481] In March 2006, he painted a bleaker picture; asked about the Taliban resurgence, he told us:

    The Taliban threat is certainly at least as severe as at any stage since the original removal of the Taliban four years ago. I cannot say exactly whether it is worse than at any other period… Let me say that it is serious and that is understood, and it is serious down in the Helmand province. It is one of the reasons we are going down there, because if we want to try and establish the writ of the elected government and deal with the drugs problem, we have to deal with the Taliban.[482]

371. We conclude that there has been a worrying deterioration in the security situation in Afghanistan, and that there are signs that the tactics that have brought such devastation to Iraq are being replicated in Afghanistan. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government indicate what steps it is taking to prevent further deterioration.

Counter-Narcotics Strategy

372. Previous reports in this inquiry have outlined the problem of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Our predecessor Committee noted that this is not only a problem for Afghanistan, but also for the United Kingdom and Europe; 95% of heroin in the United Kingdom originates from Afghanistan.[ 483] The United Kingdom is in the lead on an ambitious programme to reduce opium poppy cultivation. The last Report in this inquiry concluded: "the United Kingdom's lead role in co-ordinating the UN's counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan is one of the Government's most important responsibilities overseas."[484]

373. On 14 February 2006, Foreign Office Minister Dr Kim Howells set out to Parliament Afghanistan's revised National Drug Control Strategy. The Strategy has four main priorities:

  • disrupting the drugs trade by targeting traffickers and their backers;
  • strengthening and diversifying legal rural livelihoods;
  • reducing the demand for illicit drugs and treatment of problem drug users; and
  • developing state institutions at the central and provincial level. [485]

Previous Reports in this inquiry have noted the importance of using mosques to spread the anti-drugs message and the need to divert the entrepreneurial energies of profiteering warlord commanders into less harmful activities. The last Report in this inquiry noted that both of these approaches must be "essential parts of a successful strategy."[ 486]

374. The United Kingdom has helped set up Afghan counter-narcotics institutions and provided mentoring and training as well as equipment. On 14 February 2006, Dr Howells told Parliament about this:

    [T]he UK has helped to establish and provide training for the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan—the lead drug law enforcement agency, headquartered in Kabul, with 7 provincial offices. The UK is also providing training for the Afghan Special Narcotics Force, an elite and highly trained force equipped to tackle high value targets across the country. We are also working with the international community to recruit and train a counter narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force of Afghan investigators, prosecutors and judges to work with the Counter Narcotics Police, to be able to push through successful drugs investigations and prosecutions.

    The UK has funded the development of five drug treatment centres and is working with the Ministry of Counter Narcotics to determine how best to support activity in this area following the completion of UNODC's survey on drug use within Afghanistan late last year. We are also supporting the US led Poppy Elimination Programme (PEP) by funding the salaries of Afghan staff charged with raising awareness of the illegality of the opium industry and monitoring Governor-led eradication in priority poppy growing provinces.[487]

375. When our predecessor Committee visited Afghanistan in 2004, it heard that the absence of secure prisons hindered the development of the criminal justice system. In April 2006, the former Foreign Secretary wrote to us about this issue. The United Kingdom is a major donor to a UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) project to build a secure prison facility just outside Kabul. This facility will be used to house those convicted of serious drug trafficking offences and will be in operation from the beginning of August. Her Majesty's Prison Service has been advising the UNODC during the design of the facility and a team of UK prison officers has been involved in training Afghan prison officers in high security prison techniques. In addition, the USA is planning to build a secure detention facility near Kabul airport as part of a Counter-Narcotics Justice Centre. "These two facilities will enable the Afghan authorities to hold the most dangerous drug offenders. The Afghan authorities are also currently considering their infrastructure and training needs for the remainder of their prison estate and we will consider what further assistance we can provide to them, particularly in respect of increasing their capacity to house drug offenders at provincial level."[ 488]

376. Overall spending by the United Kingdom on counter-narcotics work in Afghanistan increased from £1.6 million in 2002-03 to around £20 million in 2004-05. In June 2005 that figure was more than doubled to around £50 million for 2005-06, which included £30 million for the development of alternative livelihoods for farmers and rural labourers.[ 489] A further increase was announced in September 2005, with a revised budget for 2005-06 of £50 million for alternative livelihoods and £6 million for eradication activity. Over the following three years, the United Kingdom plans to spend more than £270 million; £130 million will be provided by the Department for International Development, with the remainder coming from the FCO, the Ministry of Defence and other departments.[490]

377. We commend the Government's work assisting the Afghan authorities to establish secure prison facilities and in providing training in prison techniques. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what further assistance it could give in this area, particularly in respect of increasing the Afghan capacity to house drug offenders at the provincial level.

378. Cultivation of opium poppy increased dramatically following the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. However, there are signs that counter-narcotics strategies may be beginning to have an impact. According to the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005, opium cultivation decreased by 21% year on year from a record high of 131,000 hectares in 2004 to 104,000 hectares.[ 491] The report attributes this decline to several factors: the farmers' choice to refrain from poppy cultivation, the government's eradication programme, the ban on opium, and law enforcement activities. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remains the world's largest supplier of opium (87%). Moreover, production in 2005 was just 2.4% lower than in 2004; favourable weather conditions resulted in a 22% higher yield. Cultivation also increased in some provinces. Explaining this trend, UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa has said that opium is the only commercially viable crop in many parts of Afghanistan: "Assistance to farmers is needed until the legal economy takes over as the mainstay of growth in Afghanistan."[492]

379. The UNODC released its Opium Rapid Assessment Survey in February 2006. This survey provides an assessment of the situation at the middle of the cultivation cycle and collates information on the geographical distribution and dynamics of opium poppy cultivation and anticipated harvest times. The survey found that there was "an increasing trend in opium poppy cultivation in 13 provinces, a decreasing trend in three provinces and no change in 16 provinces as compared to the results of the Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2005."[ 493]

380. There are reports that friction has emerged between the USA on the one hand and the British and Afghan governments on the other over the pace and extent of eradication.[ 494] The United Kingdom approach has been to pursue eradication only where there is access to alternative livelihoods. We asked Jack Straw about this, and whether British forces would be involved in eradication in Helmand, which is one the main opium-producing provinces. He told us:

    We have been careful on the issue of forced eradication. We have certainly opposed aerial eradication because of its indiscriminate nature and the fact that it can eradicate other crops as well. I think it will be for the commanders on the ground, in consultation with the local authorities, to make judgments about any particular case if they come across a field full of poppies, what efforts are made to deal with that immediate problem.[495]

David Richmond, Director-General, Defence and Intelligence at the FCO, added:

    [T]here is a distinction to be made between eradication and interdiction. There is some eradication going on at this very moment in the Helmand province, but it is being carried out by the Afghan authorities themselves and I think the judgment is that eradication is best done by the Afghans, and that is indeed what is happening at the moment, but the interdiction of the actual trade in narcotics production of the opium, and so on, that is an area where I think British forces could play a role.[496]

This point was reiterated in a letter to us from the former Foreign Secretary in April 2006. This said: "ISAF forces will not take part in the eradication of opium poppy or in pre-planned and direct military action against the drugs trade. As President Karzai has pointed out, this is a job for the Government of Afghanistan."[ 497]

381. Another problem is the limited range of alternative livelihoods for Afghan farmers. We asked Jack Straw about this. He told us:

    A great deal of thought and money is going into the creation of alternative livelihoods in Afghanistan and it is something which we are leading on for the UK, an awful lot of work and money, and there is no doubt that the long-term solution to drugs is the general raising of living standards and the creation of alternative livelihoods, as well as creating a secure environment.[498]

Nevertheless, there remain few options that offer anything close to the income derived from opium poppy. This fact lies behind a controversial proposal by the Senlis Council. The Senlis Council is critical of what it describes as "aggressive strategies", including eradication, which it says "primarily affect the most vulnerable actors of the opium economy—the farmers—destroying their livelihoods."[ 499] The Council argues that counter narcotics efforts have "proven largely ineffective in addressing this all-encompassing crisis—the illegal opium trade remains an impediment to sustainable development."[500] The Council's proposal is that in the context of the global shortage of opium-based medicines, Afghanistan could license opium production:

    [B]y re-directing the opium poppy into the formal rural economy through the implementation of a strictly controlled opium licensing system, opium could become a major driver for a sustainable and diversified Afghan rural economy. In view of the world shortage of essential medicines, the development of an Afghan brand of morphine and codeine could also be endorsed.[501]

382. The Government has expressed doubts about such an approach. On 2 March 2006, Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn told the House:

    The Afghan Government has expressed its opposition to licit cultivation of opium. The Afghan Minister for Counter Narcotics, Habibullah Qaderi has said recently: "The poor security situation in the country means there can simply be no guarantee that opium will not be smuggled out of the country for the illicit narcotics trade abroad. Without an effective control mechanism, a lot of opium will still be refined into heroin for illicit markets in the west and elsewhere. We could not accept this." The UK agrees that licensing opium cultivation in Afghanistan for medical use is not a realistic solution to its drug problem, not least because it risks a high level of diversion of licit opium into illegal channels. The production of opium is also contrary to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.[502]

383. We reiterate our predecessor's Committee's conclusion that "the United Kingdom's lead role in co-ordinating the UN's counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan is one of the Government's most important responsibilities overseas". We conclude that negligible progress has been made reducing opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report how it intends to make better progress in tackling this problem. We further recommend that the Government clarify its position towards eradication and that it set out what progress has been made on developing alternative livelihoods for Afghan farmers.

Role of the United Kingdom

384. In May 2006, the United Kingdom deployed the Headquarters Group of NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC Group) to Kabul to command the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for nine months. This period coincides with the expansion of the ISAF mission to Afghanistan's Western and Southern provinces (ISAF stage 3). As part of this expansion, the United Kingdom will deploy personnel to Helmand Province in the south of the country.[ 503] The deployment will set up a new British-led PRT at Lashkar Gar, the capital of Helmand Province.

385. The former Foreign Secretary wrote to us about the role of British troops in Afghanistan:

    They will work to counter insurgency and help the appropriate authorities build security and government institutions to continue the progress of recent years. Above all, their presence will help the Afghans create the environment in which economic development and institutional reform—both essential to the elimination of the opium industry—can take place. ISAF will be able to help with the provision of training to Afghan counter-narcotics forces and will, within means and capabilities, provide support to their operations. They will also help the Afghan Government explain their policies to the Afghan people. ISAF forces will not take part in the eradication of opium poppy or in pre-planned and direct military action against the drugs trade. As President Karzai has pointed out, this is a job for the Government of Afghanistan.[504]

386. Nevertheless, there is concern over both the dangers that British personnel will face and the possible blurring of their role. The former Defence Secretary admitted the size of the challenge to the House: "Southern Afghanistan is undeniably a more demanding area in which to operate than either the north or the west. The Taliban remains active. The authority of the Afghan Government—and the reach of their security forces—is still weak. The influence of the drugs traffickers, by contrast, is strong."[ 505] The Senlis Council has also outlined a number of concerns:

    British forces in southern Afghanistan are faced with the twin mission of counter insurgency and support to counter narcotics. However, in a region where opium cultivation is deeply entrenched, the war against opium could make the war against insurgency a much more difficult, probably impossible, task. It is important that the fundamental stabilisation mission of British troops is not compromised by the war against opium… The mission of the British forces in southern Afghanistan with regards to opium should be clearly defined in order to avoid any clash with the primary mission of counter insurgency. The terms "support" to eradication activities can take many shapes on the ground and should therefore be defined in more specific detail beforehand. In a province which is increasingly falling into the grip of Taliban and other insurgent groups, it is vital British forces win the trust of local communities by avoiding to undermine their livelihoods.[506]

387. In March 2006, the Defence Committee published a report on the United Kingdom's deployment to Afghanistan. This report flagged up a number of concerns. Principal among these was the role of the deployment to Helmand: "There is a fundamental tension between the UK's objective of promoting stability and security and its aim of implementing an effective counter-narcotics strategy. It is likely the more successful the deployment is at impeding the drugs trade, the more it will come under attack from those involved in it. In the short term at least, the security situation is likely to deteriorate."[ 507] Reflecting the difficult security environment in which British forces are operating, a British soldier was killed and two wounded in action against suspected Taliban forces in mid-June.[508]

388. The Defence Committee's report also highlighted the relationship between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. The Stage 3 expansion of ISAF takes it to areas that are the responsibility of the OEF counter-terrorism mission (ISAF's role is explicitly aimed at stabilisation and not counter-terrorism). "It is possible that after stage 3 is completed, ISAF and OEF Forces will, on occasion, operate in the same geographical areas. Certain assets—notably air support—are shared. Effective coordination is therefore essential."[ 509]

389. The last Report in this inquiry described plans to "increase synergy and better integrate the two operations".[ 510] Our predecessor Committee concluded that: "the proposal for increased synergy between and better integration of NATO's operations in Afghanistan and those of the US-led coalition is a potentially positive move, which if correctly implemented should enhance the effectiveness of security, reconstruction and counter-terrorist activities alike. However, we would not support such a process being used as cover for a significant withdrawal of US forces from the country or for a material reduction in the US commitment, unless there was a corresponding threat reduction."[511]

390. In its response to this Report the Government agreed that "It will be important that achieving single mission status leads to no reduction in capability to undertake the tasks currently performed by OEF." [ 9  Non-proliferation

392. The FCO has made non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction one of its strategic priorities. In its strategy paper "Active Diplomacy for a Changing World" the FCO wrote:

    Preventing terrorist groups and states of concern from acquiring WMD will remain a high priority. Regional stability and the strength of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime will depend on preventing and containing destabilising military nuclear programmes. We will use the full range of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation tools to do so. This includes continuing to support effective international agreements, taking part in practical multilateral action and implementing our own legal obligations.[514]

393. Professor Paul Wilkinson agrees about the importance of non-proliferation efforts: "In view of al Qaeda's serious efforts to acquire [Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear] weapons much more intensive efforts are required to tighten and police the international arms control and counter-proliferation regimes to enable them to encompass prevention of proliferation to non-state groups. Far more than changes in international treaties is required. We urgently need powerful international agencies to police such regimes. The IAEA is an encouraging, though far from perfect model. We need to build similar mechanisms to deal with chemical and biological weapons."[ 515]

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

394. The chief safeguard against the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Signed in 1968, the NPT permits the possession of nuclear weapons by the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China—the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)—and forbids other states from joining the nuclear club. In exchange, the NWS will reduce their arsenals towards eventual disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, which states: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."[ 516]

395. The NPT enshrines states' rights to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy programme. At present, 188 states are members of the NPT. Three states with nuclear weapons—India, Pakistan and Israel—remain outside the Treaty regime[ 517] and North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT.

396. We asked Jack Straw about the NPT. He told us:

    [T]he more states that have nuclear weapons and the less the behaviour of those states is constrained by international laws and obligations, the greater the likelihood is that there will be either by accident or by design a nuclear war…While it is easy to make points that the Permanent 5 have got nuclear weapons, the Permanent 5 have nuclear weapons in historical circumstances we all know about but by international agreement, and that was the purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. President Kennedy and others said in the early 1960s that if the world carried on this arms race it could by the turn of the century just gone end up with 20-30 countries with nuclear weapons and who knows what would be the consequences. That was the political origin of what became the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was a deal between the so-called nuclear weapon states, the P5, and all others by which everybody agreed that there would be no more nuclear weapon states. In return for that, the non-nuclear weapon states would have this very clear right — it is not an unqualified right — to develop nuclear power and in certain circumstances nuclear weapon states would be able to ensure the availability of civil nuclear technology to the non-nuclear weapon states. Meanwhile, the nuclear weapon states were under an obligation to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons.[518]

397. Last year, our predecessor Committee expressed the hope that the May 2005 Review Conference would strengthen the NPT, and called on the Government to encourage the USA to take steps towards disarmament.[ 519] The Government agreed and wrote in its response to our Report:

    The Government is making every effort at this May's NPT Review Conference to ensure that all three pillars of the Treaty, namely non-proliferation, peaceful uses and disarmament, are strengthened. The Government believes that strengthening each element of the NPT is in the interest of all States Parties to the Treaty. However, the Government recognises that many Non Nuclear Weapon States will need to be convinced that Nuclear Weapon states have demonstrated their ongoing commitment to their NPT Article VI obligations concerning nuclear disarmament if there is to be a constructive dialogue in other areas, in particular on non-compliance issues.[520]

398. Non-proliferation measures were high on the agenda at the May 2005 meeting, and included proposals limiting the production of weapons-usable material, developing nuclear energy systems that do not generate weapons-grade material, promoting multinational approaches to management of material, including the potential establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank, and the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the adoption of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).[ 521] However, differing visions of the NPT regime crippled the May Review Conference. While the NWS contended that control of the nuclear fuel cycle was essential to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) demanded disarmament in line with Article VI, arguing that a two-tier international system of nuclear haves and have-nots was emerging.[522]

399. Assessing why the Conference failed, Arms Control Today wrote:

    The nuclear-weapon states were probably pleased to avoid any new disarmament obligations, some [Non-Aligned Members] could take satisfaction in preserving the 2000 NPT Review Conference package rather than having it supplanted by a weaker set of commitments, and Iran had to be relieved to escape without an official rebuke of its nuclear activities.[523]

However, the failure of the Review Conference casts serious doubt on the willingness of the five NWS to pursue disarmament measures, on the implementation of other controls over the nuclear fuel cycle put in place under the framework of the NPT, and perhaps most importantly on the future of the NPT regime itself.

400. Part of the responsibility for that failure lies with the NWS, which continue to maintain their nuclear weapons. However, the former Foreign Secretary was quick to defend the United Kingdom's record on disarmament. Jack Straw told us: "We, in this country, have got a better record than any of the other nuclear weapon states. We have reduced the number of weapon systems from three to one. We were in the forefront of trying to secure a constructive outcome to the revision conference which took place in May of last year. I regret that no such outcome was possible but it was not for the want of trying by us."[ 524] However, the question of the renewal of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent raises doubts about the Government's commitment to disarmament and is the subject of a current inquiry by the Defence Committee.[525]

401. We conclude that the failure of the May 2005 NPT Review Conference is a matter of serious concern. We recommend that the Government do all in its power to sustain the NPT, as the most effective tool for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

402. The adoption of the Additional Protocol on Safeguards to the NPT in 1997 gave the IAEA a crucial role in monitoring compliance with the NPT, formalising an informal process that began in 1993. The Additional Protocol established four main provisions: a much expanded provision of information to the IAEA; an expansion of the number of facilities open to IAEA inspections; improved short notice inspection thanks to speedier visa processing for inspectors; and provision for the right to use environmental sampling. As of January 2005, 62 states had adopted Additional Protocols which were in force, while 28 had them pending.[ 526]

403. At present, the IAEA has 138 member states, whose representatives meet annually for the General Conference to elect the 35 members of the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors meets five times a year and is a consensual body which prepares decisions to be made by the General Conference. General Conference sessions are held annually in Vienna. Additionally, the IAEA supports a research centre in Trieste (Italy) that is administered by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

404. The IAEA and its Director General were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 2005.[ 527] At the time, Dr ElBaradei said that the award would strengthen his resolve, and in a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) he pointed to three particular challenges facing the IAEA. These were the proliferation of nuclear material and technology, the emergence of clandestine procurement networks such as the AQ Khan network (which ran an international nuclear material and know how supply network), and progress on disarmament.[528] He then outlined a six-pronged strategy to resolve the problem, calling for:

  • Improved control on access to the nuclear fuel cycle, since the fuel cycle is a recognised 'choke point', perhaps by establishing an international system of supply for nuclear fuel.
  • Enhanced verification measures, by expanding the membership of the Additional Protocol to the NPT Safeguards agreement, and by extending the IAEA's authority to investigate weaponisation programmes that do not directly relate to the nuclear material. At present, the IAEA funds its verification with a budget of US$120 million, with which it oversees 900 faciliities in 71 states.
  • Strengthened enforcement mechanisms, by introducing a prohibition on withdrawal for states parties.
  • Greater protection of nuclear material, in line with legal obligations under UNSCR 1540 and the new International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Reducing the number of reactors that enrich unranium to 90% or higher, the standard necessary for nuclear weapons.
  • Accelerated disarmament efforts, by finalising the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and starting negotiations on a Fissile Material (Cut Off) Treaty.
  • An alternative security strategy providing for increased sustainable development, building social, political and economic links.[529]

405. We met Dr ElBaradei and other IAEA officials in Vienna in January 2006. During these meetings we heard that the IAEA may not have the tools to tackle the threat of nuclear terrorism, as it is geared towards working with states. In addition, we heard that the IAEA's funding for dealing with non-state actors comes from ad hoc contributions, and although these are generous, this system makes it difficult to plan a budget and programme of work. We fear that without measures to improve work on non-state actors, the IAEA may be unable to limit the spread of nuclear technology or materials as effectively in the future as it has in the past.

406. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what it is doing to strengthen the non-proliferation tools available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and set out its views on the proposals for strengthening the IAEA put forward by Director General Dr Mohammed ElBaradei. We further recommend that the Government work with its IAEA partners to establish a permanent section of the IAEA dealing with nuclear proliferation by non-state actors, with adequate and sustainable funding arrangements.

India

407. In September 2005, the USA agreed a deal with India on nuclear co-operation; President Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed the deal in February 2006. The essence of the agreement is that in exchange for civilian nuclear support from the USA, India, which remains outside the NPT regime, will divide its nuclear programmes into civilian and military sectors, sign the Additional Protocol on Safeguards, and allow IAEA inspections of its civilian sector.[ 530] The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a group of states that seeks to control nuclear proliferation through lists of controlled goods, and the US Congress, could then adopt the legislative changes required to permit civil nuclear trade (nuclear co-operation with India is currently illegal in the USA). However, the agreement faces opposition in both New Delhi and Washington, particularly from within the US Congress. [531] The NSG has also cast doubt on the deal, by refusing to approve the changes necessary to permit the export of items on trigger lists to India, despite applications by the USA.[532] This agreement has enormous implications for the non-proliferation regime and we intend to consider it further in our forthcoming Inquiry into the Sub-Continent.

408. Previous efforts to reform the NSG have not succeeded fully. The FCO wrote to the Quadripartite Committee in December 2005, saying: "The UK, as G8 Presidency, played a leading role in using the G8 to try and leverage changes to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines. Revised proposals were put forward to establish objective criteria that a state must meet in order to receive transfers of sensitive nuclear technology, together with agreed factors that suppliers should take into account before allowing such transfers to take place. But, because of reservations on the part of a number of key suppliers, attempts to strengthen the guidelines were only partially successful. We remain committed to taking this work forward."[ 533]

409. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what impact the agreement between New Delhi and Washington on nuclear co-operation might have on the existing non-proliferation framework. We also recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out what progress has been made on introducing revisions to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

410. Following the end of the Cold War, and spurred on by nuclear testing moratoria introduced by Russia, France, and the USA, multilateral negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) took place, concluding in August 1996. The treaty, which "prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" aims to constrain the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, curb proliferation, and advance disarmament. The primary purpose of the CTBT is to prevent the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons.[ 534]

411. To date, 176 states have signed and 120 have ratified the treaty. However, the CTBT will only enter into force after 44 designated 'nuclear-capable states' have ratified it; of the 44 states, India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed the treaty, and only 33 have ratified the treaty. The United Kingdom has ratified the CTBT. [ 535]

412. The CTBT verification system, managed by the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), includes the International Monitoring System (IMS), the International Data Centre, and the On-Site Inspection regime. The IMS comprises 321 monitoring stations worldwide with sensors that can detect possible nuclear explosions using four technologies—seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound. The International Data Centre collects information from the IMS and disseminates data for feedback. In the event of a suspected nuclear explosion, states can request inspection of an alleged violator under the On-Site Inspection regime, and the CTBT allows states-parties to pursue strong measures to tackle non-compliance.[ 536] The CTBTO Preparatory Committee completed its 25th Session in November 2005, at which Tibor Toth, the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Committee, outlined the CTBTO's work to establish an effective system of monitoring.[537]

413. On a visit to the CTBTO in January 2006, we saw first hand the progress which the Organisation has made towards establishing an effective and global monitoring system, and were most impressed by the confidence of the CTBTO staff that they would be able to detect almost any nuclear test worldwide. However, we also heard about the need for more states to ratify the treaty before it enters into force. Three states in particular have not ratified the treaty for technical reasons—Colombia, Indonesia, and Vietnam—but other influential states, such as the USA, are also a concern.

414. We conclude that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a crucial tool for the control of the spread of nuclear weapons, and the work of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) is both technically impressive and of great worth. We recommend that the Government urge those states that have not yet ratified the CTBT to do so, concentrating its efforts on the states which have not ratified for technical reasons, such as Colombia, Indonesia and Vietnam.

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

415. Last year, our predecessor Committee commented that the lack of a verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention was an extremely serious gap in the international non-proliferation regime, and recommended that the Government work to garner support for a verification regime, particularly from the USA. The Committee also recommended that the Government outline the most important developments relating to the BWC, in areas such as the implementation of a code of conduct for biological weapons scientists.[ 538]

416. In its response, the Government said that the United Kingdom "has always played a leading role in the negotiations and implementation of the Convention and has strongly supported all measures that would strengthen the BWC, including attempts to establish an effective verification regime."[ 539] However, it rejected the Committee's calls for the establishment of a "coalition of the virtuous" which would establish a verification mechanism for the BWC, since an "optional arrangement would inevitably mean that those States about which the UK had most concerns could opt out of a protocol leaving those inside any such coalition with more onerous obligations than others, without providing us with any more security."[540] Nonetheless, we remain concerned about the lack of a verification regime.

417. Another concern is the forthcoming BWC Review Conference. The Government described current work on the BWC in its response to the last Report:

    Following the 5th Review Conference in 2002 States Party agreed a three-year programme of work leading up to the 6th Review Conference in 2006. This programme consists of annual meetings of technical experts and representatives of the States Party to "discuss and promote common understanding and effective action" on a number of specific issues. Meetings in 2003 and 2004 were successful. The UK (John Freeman, Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva) is chairing the international meetings during 2005. The topic in 2005 is "the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists". It is too early to know what can be achieved in 2005, but the Government hopes to ensure the fullest possible exchange of views between States Party and science stakeholders in the expert session in June, so that the discussion by States Party later in the year can lead to a successful outcome.[541]

418. Daniel Feakes from the University of Sussex and other academics raised concerns about the BWC Review Conference. He wrote to us saying: "It is essential that states parties carry out a comprehensive and effective review of the treaty at the 2006 Review Conference, as this has not been achieved since the 3rd Review conference in 1991 (the 5th review conference (2001) could not even adopt a final declaration, while the 4th Review Conference focused on the negotiations for the compliance protocol, which subsequently failed)…A successful outcome is vital to avoid the risk that the BWC may be seriously undermined at a time when biological weapons are recognised as a growing threat to international security. It is therefore imperative that constructive preparations and consultations for this year's review conference begin as early as possible."[ 542] We agree that a successful review conference is crucial to maintain international confidence both in the BWC and—after the failure of the NPT review conference—in the existing non-proliferation framework in general.

419. We conclude that a successful outcome of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference is essential in order to preserve confidence in the global non-proliferation regime. We recommend that the Government outline what progress has been made by the various meetings of experts and state parties since the middle of 2005, and set out what it hopes to achieve at the Review Conference. We also recommend that the Government explain how it proposes to ensure compliance with the BWC without the existence of a verification mechanism.

Chemical Weapons Convention

420. Our predecessor Committee concluded that the United Kingdom's continued support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is essential, and recommended that the Government continue to proceed with its chemical weapons disarmament programme, in compliance with all terms of the CWC. The Committee also recommended that the Government offer support to states that lack capacity in the implementation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Action Plan.[ 543] The Government said in its response that it offers full support to the OPCW's Action Plan on National Implementation Measures, and that it works to support states without capacity in the adoption of the Action Plan through the EU, and has made technical assistance visits to Ethiopia and Cambodia.[544]

421. At present, 175 states are full members of the CWC, and universal adoption is becoming a realistic goal for the CWC. However, gaps still exist in the CWC regime; for instance, a number of Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, have not ratified the convention; other problems are in the implementation of the CWC, including the slow pace of destruction of chemical weapons by some states, such as the Russian Federation and the USA.[ 545]

422. We conclude that universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention is a most desirable objective, and we recommend that the Government step up its efforts to encourage Middle Eastern states such as Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria to ratify the CWC. We also conclude that the destruction of chemical weapons is a priority, and recommend that the Government urge other states to accelerate the destruction of their chemical weapons.

The G8 Global Partnership

423. The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction seeks to secure and destroy WMD, particularly in the former Soviet Union. The Partnership was launched in June 2002 at the G8 summit at Kananaskis in Canada, when the G8 states pledged '10 plus 10 over 10'—US$10 billion from the USA and US$10 billion from the other member states over the next ten years to manage Russia's WMD legacy.

424. A joint statement issued by the G8 at Kananaskis in 2002 stated:

    Under this initiative, we will support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists. We will commit to raise up to US$20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years.[546]

Last year, our predecessor Committee concluded that "the ongoing work under the G8 Global Partnership is of critical importance, and we strongly support the Government's efforts to improve the security of the former Soviet's WMD stockpile and to have it rendered non-harmful."[ 547] The Committee also expressed support for the Government's work at the Schuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility in the Russian Federation, but raised concerns about the plutonium disposition programme.[548]

425. Outlining the scope of the G8 Global Initiative's focus, the FCO wrote in its response to the Report:

    The UK's programme is expected to remain focused for the next few years on making spent nuclear fuel safe and secure, assisting in the redirection of weapons scientists and technicians, enhancing security and nuclear facilities, reducing stockpiles of weapon grade plutonium and chemical weapons destruction.[549]

The Government also agreed with the concerns about the slow progress on the plutonium disposition project.[ 550]

426. The 2005 Annual Report on the G8 Global Partnership from the FCO, DTI and MOD, assessed progress over the last year, during the United Kingdom's Presidency of the G8 and its chairmanship of the Global Partnership Working Group, saying: "As well as ensuring the momentum of the Global Partnership has been maintained during 2005, the [Working] Group carried out a detailed review of priorities to ensure that the Kananakaskis Priorities were still broadly correct. The Group's work has further enhanced the good working relationships that have developed between donors and beneficiaries. The Group has also helped to address the concerns over taxation and access that had some impact on earlier projects."[ 551]

427. The Annual Report states that the Global Partnership has managed the dismantlement of two Oscar class nuclear submarines; maintained work to establish a storage site for spent nuclear fuel at the Atomflot site in Murmansk; secured US$210 million to maintain the Chernobyl storage facility and developed support projects for the Schhuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility, among other projects.[ 552] The Partnership has also expanded membership and continues to grow in momentum, according to the Annual Report. However, the plutonium disposition programme is not yet in place, which raises continued fears of the acquisition of radiological material by terrorist groups; expansion of its work beyond the FSU to cover other WMD materials attractive to terrorist groups would strengthen the effectiveness of the Global Partnership.

428. We conclude that the work of the G8 Global Partnership makes a valuable contribution to the reduction of nuclear and chemical weapons material in the former Soviet Union, although the slow progress on plutonium and chemical weapon destruction is a serious concern. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report how it will maintain the momentum behind the G8 Global Partnership. We also recommend that it explore the possibilities of expanding the Partnership's work beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union.

The Missile Technology Control Regime

429. Established in 1987, the MTCR has 34 members who restrict their exports of missile technology. The states parties implement export controls on missile technology, according to certain criteria. These are; whether the intended recipient is working towards a WMD programme; the purposes of the missiles and space programmes; potential contribution to the recipients WMD delivery capacity; and whether a transfer would conflict with any multilateral treaty. The MTCR is voluntary and has no penalties for transfers, although the USA identifies any states or entities in breach of the MTCR as proliferators.

430. Last year, our Predecessor Committee concluded "we recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what it is doing to encourage other states, such as China, to conform to MTCR standards."[ 553] In its Response, the Government wrote:

    The Government takes every appropriate opportunity to lobby in support of the MTCR in bilateral contacts on export controls. For those states that lack the legal and regulatory infrastructure to implement and enforce effective export controls the UK also has an active export control outreach programme. This helps the Government to build the links that facilitate an exchange of information and allows the UK to promote the benefits of export controls and the MTCR. Officials carry out a number of outward and inward outreach visits each year, the most recent being an inward visit from China.[554]

431. At its latest Plenary Meeting, the MTCR re-emphasised the impact of UNSCR 1540, which obliges states to take measures to control the transfer of missile technology, and welcomed India's decision to adhere to MTCR guidelines on a unilateral basis. Work on the growing complexity of dual use technologies also took place, given the growing trend of trade in high technology which could have applications on missile construction. Technological ability is most visible in the proliferation of cruise missile technology and in the growing number of space programmes around the world, of which China's is perhaps most notable.[ 555]

432. We welcome the Government's outreach work on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and we recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out what further steps it is planning to take in this area. We also welcome India's decision to comply with MTCR guidelines voluntarily, and we recommend that the Government work to encourage India to become a full member of the MTCR. However, we conclude that the spread of knowledge of cruise missile and space programme related technology may outpace the MTCR's best efforts, and we recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report how it will ensure that the MTCR keeps pace with the spread of technology and what steps it will take to give the MTCR greater enforceability.

The Wassenaar Arrangement

433. The Wassenaar Arrangement, formally established in July 1996, is a voluntary export control regime whose members exchange information on transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. Through such exchanges, Wassenaar aims to promote "greater responsibility" among its members in exports of weapons and dual-use goods and to prevent "destabilizing accumulations". To promote transparency, Wassenaar calls on states to make a series of voluntary information exchanges and notifications on their export activities related to weapons and items appearing on the arrangement's two control lists.

434. Although Wassenaar has overcome initial difficulties, problems persist. Foremost among these is the fact that members are divided over its role, primarily over whether the arrangement should be more than a body for exchanging information; Wassenaar operates by consensus, so any state can block a proposal. Additionally, no consensus exists on which countries are "states of concern" or what constitutes a "destabilising" transfer. Another limiting factor is the fact that some major arms exporters—such as Belarus, China, and Israel—are not members.[ 556] However, the arrangement has made recent efforts to tackle the problem of terrorism by agreeing on non-binding criteria to guide exports of shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles, formally referred to as Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), which are a weapon well suited to terrorist groups, as well as endorsing voluntary best practices for disposing of surplus military equipment, enforcing national export controls, and controlling Very Sensitive dual-use exports. [557]

435. The FCO wrote to the Quadripartite Committee outlining recent progress by the Wassenaar Arrangement, pointing to work to keep up with developments in technology, amendments to the trigger lists, including items of interest to terrorists such as jamming equipment and unmanned aerial vehicles, and the admission of South Africa to the arrangement. Commenting on its other work on small arms, the Government also told the Quadripartite Committee about its work in 2005 to destroy over 100,000 small arms and light weapons in Bosnia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Mozambique, as well as its funding of United Nations Development Programme initiatives on weapons destruction.[ 558]

436. We had an opportunity to meet the Secretary General of the Wassenaar Arrangement, Sune Danielsson, on a visit to Vienna in January 2006, where we learnt that the Wassenaar Arrangement is not represented in meetings at the UN. Notwithstanding the progress outlined above, we fear that a lack of engagement with the UN could limit the arrangement's ability to cooperate with important international bodies charged with dealing with small arms at a time when moves towards the establishment of an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) are underway.

437. We welcome the expansion of the Wassenaar Arrangement, both in terms of membership and its trigger lists, but fear that the organisation will continue to work at the lowest common denominator. We recommend that the Government explore means to strengthen the Wassenaar Arrangement, perhaps by establishing an inspections regime. We also conclude that the lack of interaction between the Wassenaar Arrangement and UN bodies dealing with small arms and light weapons hinders the effective implementation of an international non-proliferation regime on small arms and might have a deleterious impact on the establishment of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). We recommend that the Government work to bring the Wassenaar Arrangement into closer collaboration with the UN and other international efforts related to the ATT.

The Arms Trade Treaty

438. Last year, the Quadripartite Committee commented on the prospects of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and concluded: "While we cannot realistically expect an International Arms Trade Treaty to happen immediately, the UK's language and action must keep the pressure on other nations to add their weight to this initiative. This is the start of a long road, and the UK will need to be a vital driving force if the endeavour is to be successful. We urge the UK Government to use its influence as President of the G8 in 2005 to lobby other countries, particularly fellow G8 members, to support the proposed International Arms Trade Treaty."[ 559]

439. In a letter to the Quadripartite Committee in December 2005, the FCO described progress on an Arms Trade Treaty, saying:

    The Government has been actively pursuing the initiative for an international Arms Trade Treaty during the UK's Presidencies of the G8 and of the EU. At Gleneagles in July, Leaders of the G8 agreed that the "development of international standards in arms transfers…would be an important step toward tackling the undesirable proliferation of conventional arms". On 3 October European Union Foreign Ministers added the EU's voice to the growing support for an international treaty to establish common standards for the global trade in conventional arms, and called for the start of a formal negotiation process at the United Nations at the earliest opportunity. The Committee may also wish to note that, on 27 November, Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Malta added their support to calls for work on such a treaty to commence in the UN. We are now working to generate further support for such a process among international partners in order to build momentum towards our objective of beginning initial discussions in the UN later in 2006.[560]

440. We welcome progress towards an international ATT and recommend that the Government continue its work to garner support for such a treaty. However, we recommend that the Government does not allow its desire to establish internationally accepted norms lead to a treaty that operates only at the lowest common denominator.

514   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK's International Priorities, Cm 6762, March 2006 Back
515   Ev 4 Back
516   The Non-Proliferation Treaty, available at: www.fas.org Back
517   Ibid Back
518   Ev 196, Q 10 (Oral evidence taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 8 February 2006, HC (2005-06) 904-i) Back
519   HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 362 Back
520   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June 2005 Back
521   Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, "The 2005 Review Conference: Understanding the Challenges and Devising Response", 30 October 2004 Back
522   "Politics and Protection: Why the NPT Review Conference failed", Disarmament Diplomacy, Acronym Institute, issue 80, Autumn 2005 Back
523   "Nuclear non-proliferation treaty sputters", Arms Control Today, August 2005 Back
524   Ev 196, Q 10 (Oral evidence taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 8 February 2006, HC (2005-06) 904-i) Back
525   "The Future of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context", Defence Committee Press Release, January 2006 Back
526   "The 1997 Additional Protocol at a glance", Arms Control Association, January 2005 Back
527   "UN watchdog receives Nobel prize", BBC News Online, 10 December 2005, news.bbc.co.uk Back
528   Remarks by Mohammed ElBaradei, IISS Alistair Buchan Lecture, 6 December 2005 Back
529   Ibid Back
530   "Bush promises India nuclear co-operation", Arms Control Today, September 2005 Back
531   "Complexity of N-deal with US throws India in a bind", The News (Pakistan), 9 December 2005 Back
532   "Doubts raised on US-India deal", Financial Times, 28 March 2006 Back
533   Evidence received by the Quadripartite Committee (Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development, Trade and Industry), to be published as HC 873 Back
534   "Subject resources: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty", Arms Control Association Back
535   In total 176 States have signed the CTBT. The following 126 states have deposited their instruments of ratification of the CTBT (states with an asterisk have also ratified the CTBT): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria*, Argentina*, Australia*, Austria*, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh*, Belarus, Belgium*, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil*, Bulgaria*, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada*, Chile*, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland*, France*, Gabon, Georgia, Germany*, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary*, Iceland, Ireland, Italy*, Jamaica, Japan*, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico*, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands*, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway*, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru*, Philippines, Poland*, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea*, Romania*, Russian Federation*, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia*, Slovenia, South Africa*, Spain*, Sudan, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey*, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine*, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu and Venezuela. Israel has signed but not ratified the CTBT. Back
536   "The international security value of the nuclear test ban treaty", Arms Control Today, 2 November 2002 Back
537   Press Release, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, 2 December 2005 Back
538   HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 391 Back
539   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June 2005 Back
540   Ibid Back
541   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June 2005 Back
542   Ev 191 Back
543   HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 391 Back
544   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June 2005 Back
545   "OPCW director seeks Middle East inroads", Arms Control Today, November 2005 Back
546   Statement by G8 Leaders, Kananaskis Summit, 27 June 2002, available at: www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit Back
547   HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 388 Back
548   HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 388 Back
549   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June 2005 Back
550   Ibid Back
551   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Department of Trade and Industry, and Ministry of Defence, The G8 Global Partnership; Third Annual Report 2005, p 4 Back
552   Ibid, p 5 Back
553   HC (2004-05) 36-I, para 420 Back
554   Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Session 2004-05; Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism; Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6590, June 2005 Back
555   "Land attack cruise missiles pose growing threat", Defense News, April 2006 Back
556   Arms Control Association, The Wassenaar Arrangement at a glance, January 2005 Back
557   Press Release, Wassenaar Arrangement, December 2005 Back
558   Evidence received by the Quadripartite Committee (Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development, Trade and Industry), to be published as HC 873 Back
559   Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees, First Joint Report of Session 2004-05, Strategic Export Controls; HMG's Annual Report for 2003, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, HC 145, para 161 Back
560   Evidence received by the Quadripartite Committee (Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development, Trade and Industry), to be published as HC 873 >Back



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