Go to report table of contents
1.0 Introduction
1.1: Importance of Security for Transit
1.2: U.S. DOT Strategic Goals
1.3: FTA Security Goals
1.4: Scope
1.5: Audience
1.6: Methodology
1.7: Organization
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has initiated an aggressive effort to assess and strengthen the security readiness of the public transit industry. For many transit agencies in the United States, particularly small- to medium-sized agencies, the need for greater security awareness and preparation has reshaped the task of providing transportation services to the public. To assist the public transit industry in managing these new demands, FTA has mobilized not only its own resources but also those of other stakeholders to develop an approach to protecting public transit that emphasizes the fundamental interconnectivity of transit systems and the importance of readiness and vigilance. This document offers preliminary security-oriented design considerations for transit bus vehicles, transit rail vehicles, and transit infrastructure as a whole. These considerations are intended to assist public transit agencies in their efforts to deter and minimize the effects of attacks against their facilities, riders, employees, and the general public. The public transit industry has a long history of defining its own infrastructure needs and designing and constructing to meet them; consequently, these design considerations are intended to supplement and assist, not to impose a standard.
This effort reflects an increased awareness of the importance of the physical components of public transit. The threat of terrorism and other acts of large-scale violence can be combated not only through administrative policies and new technologies-although both are important-but also through the physical protection of the structures of which public transit is comprised. The FTA security design considerations will provide the transit industry with suggested security-oriented modifications to the physical and technological infrastructure of rail and bus systems. In addition to providing guidance on three major components of transit systems-bus vehicles, rail vehicles, and transit infrastructure-this document addresses the topics of systems integration, access management, and communications, all of which are crucial to the protection of transit assets.
This chapter provides an overview of:
- The importance of security for transit
- U.S.DOT strategic goals
- FTA security goals
- Document scope
- Research methodology
- Audience for the document
- Organization of the document
1.1 Importance of Security for Transit
Possible Impacts of Attacks
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There are approximately 6,000 public transit agencies operating in the United States 1, the majority of which provide more than one type of service and operate more than one type of vehicle. Many agencies also contract for additional services from private operators, further increasing the complexity of the provision of public transportation services. The threat of terrorism against the U.S. public transportation system historically has been low but cannot be discounted. While worldwide there are more security incidents in public transportation than other modes, it is considered a safe environment for the riding public. Appendix A, "Chronology of Terrorist Attacks Against Public Transit," lists some of the more significant attacks against public transit both in the United States and the rest of the world. Transit systems must continue to enhance their security systems, facilities, and vehicle designs to ensure the safety and security of the riding public.
1See http://www.apta.com/research/stats/overview/overview.cfm.
Unlike an office building or even an airport, public transit systems cannot simply be closed off or tightly controlled without compromising their fundamental character. Security must be created in other ways, through physical modifications that do not impinge upon the openness of the system, through employee training and watchfulness, through passenger awareness and participation, and through careful planning for coordinated, efficient, and life-saving response. Each of these security-oriented elements must be knit together with the others, and with the other policies and procedures of the agency, so that security becomes a network, reflecting the integrated nature of public transit.
Despite differences of size, scale, and location, all transit agencies share the macro-level commonality of managing integrated systems and facilities, and all share the vulnerabilities inherent in that connectivity. All transit agencies:
- Have multiple physical assets, some owned, some leased, and some shared,
- Operate within a regulatory and legal framework that defines their relationships with their employees, their riders, and the rest of the transportation network, and
- Use technology.
Transit agencies across the country also face tight budgets and constrained sources of funding, limiting their ability to make unanticipated investments in expensive new equipment and technologies. Their commonalities make it possible to articulate shared vulnerabilities among transit agencies and to develop security-oriented design considerations that can be relevant throughout the public transit industry.
These design considerations offer guidance for an industry that is not static, and recognize that system-wide security-oriented modifications will take time to implement.
go to top of the page1.2 U.S. DOT Strategic Goals
Security is only one characteristic of a successful, efficient transportation system. The U.S. Department of Transportation's current strategic plan calls for "Safer, Simpler, Smarter Transportation Solutions," and identifies five strategic goals for achieving this vision: safety, mobility, global connectivity, environmental stewardship, and security.2 Three of these goals-safety, mobility, and security-speak specifically to the mission of this document-to present integrated security design guidance which transit agencies of all sizes would find practical and effective to implement as part of a strategy to protect and minimize the impact of a terrorist attack. Though they do not speak directly to this mission, the remaining two-global connectivity and environmental stewardship-are vital to the success of a robust, vibrant public transit system and should not be overlooked when determining appropriate security strategies.
go to top of the page1.3 FTA Security Goals
This project is part of an aggressive and multi-faceted FTA program to evaluate and strengthen the security readiness of the public transit industry. Globally, as shown in the "Chronology of Terrorist Attacks Against Public Transit" (see Appendix A), public transit is a frequent target of terrorist attack, an easy and accessible way to take lives, cause damage, spread fear, and impact local, regional, and national economies.
The FTA has based its transit security program on the objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which was issued on July 17, 2002, and represented one of the initial undertakings of the White House Office of Homeland Security, created in October 2001. Its program emphasizes asset protection, public awareness, and emergency response.
This project to develop security design considerations for the protection of transit assets stands alongside the other efforts described here as part of a holistic, FTA-guided process to develop and reinforce the tools needed to guard against transit-oriented terrorist attacks. Besides developing security design considerations, other FTA-sponsored security activities include:
- Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism (PROTECT)3
- Threat and vulnerability assessments of the 36 largest transit agencies
- Technical assistance to the 50 largest transit agencies
- Connecting Communities Regional Security Forums
- Top 20 Security Program Action Items for Transit Agencies
- Transit Threat Level Response Recommendations4
- Public Transportation Security Volumes I and II 5 (prepared by TCRP)
- Security roundtables with transit agency general managers and security chiefs
- International outreach
2See the U.S. DOT Strategic Plan 2003 - 2008 at http://www.dot.gov/stratplan2008/strategic_plan.htm#_Toc52257030 for a more detailed description of the U.S. DOT's vision, strategic goals, and objectives.
3 http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/security/pdf/protect_factsheet.pdf.
4http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/Security/Default.asp, January 3, 2003.
5Public Transportation Security Volume 1: Communication of Threats: A Guide. Transportation Cooperative Research Program Report 86 (2002); Public Transportation Security Volume 2: K9 Units in Public Transportation: A Guide for Decision Makers. Transportation Cooperative Research Program Report 86 (2002).
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1.4 Scope
Transit Security Components Assets to Product:
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This document provides transit agencies with a resource for considering and selecting security-oriented design approaches to protecting transit systems and minimizing the impacts of terrorist attacks. The document can be used by a transit agency to establish a comprehensive design strategy for hardening its assets or for selecting strategies or solutions that best meet the agencies' needs.
This document provides an overview of the major assets of transit systems-bus vehicles, rail vehicles, and transit infrastructure and communications-as well as a preliminary assessment of the vulnerabilities to various methods of attack inherent in each asset. In addition, this document addresses the topics of access management, systems integration, and communications-all crucial to the protection of transit assets. Although many of the subject areas are addressed discretely in the document, agencies should recognize the interconnectivity of the design considerations and hardening strategies presented. For example, the sections on both infrastructure and access management will provide additional value when developing a strategy for protecting and hardening a maintenance facility or a rail terminal.
This document offers an initial assessment of the vulnerabilities common to diverse public transit systems, along with descriptions of the types of attack a public transit system might experience and their consequences. Using that measure, it offers guidance for public transit systems to modify both the design of their physical assets and the framework of their security procedures. And based on the recent history of transit-oriented attacks, it provides some insight about the trends in terrorism against public transit.
With the involvement of industry and technical experts, FTA developed practical, feasible, and useable security design considerations that focus on the physical protection of a transit system's assets. Recognizing that the core mission of public transit is to equitably, efficiently, and safely serve the public, the emphasis is on methods for protecting transit assets that simultaneously protect the public and their access to transit.
go to top of the page1.5 Audience
This document is intended to provide information and ideas on security-oriented design modifications to transit executives, to transit senior managers, members of transit design and construction departments, operations departments, and security and law enforcement personnel. It includes general information that is intended to raise the awareness of senior staff to the importance of physical design in matters of security, and also contains some technical guidance for use by transit staff members with expertise in procurement, vehicle design, and infrastructure design. This document should be distributed to appropriate administration, engineering, and operations personnel-keeping in mind the potentially sensitive nature of the material. The document may also be of interest to project management oversight teams, consultants, contractors, and others working with public transit agencies.
go to top of the page1.6 Methodology
The first step in developing these transit security design considerations was to create a baseline of the vehicles most frequently used by the industry, and to determine the infrastructure components most commonly found at transit agencies. The baseline also included a review of transit system assets, threats to the system (including a review of acts of terror against transit world-wide), and the scenarios under which these assets and threats have or could come together in the form of a terrorist attack.
The next step was to review the threat and vulnerability assessments (TVAs) completed during 2001 and 2002 of the country's 36 largest transit properties.6 These TVAs, which followed the methodology outlined in the Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) report Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide, provided important insight into what the most critical threats and assets are for transit agencies. This review was followed by extensive meetings with working groups of industry professionals and representatives, to discuss the needs, problems, and solutions of various transit operators, manufacturers, and researchers.
6FTA commissioned Booz Allen Hamilton to conduct threat and vulnerability assessments on the nation's 36 largest transit agencies. This work was commissioned for use by the particular transit agency and contains information that is sensitive to each agency. Consequently, only generalized information was made available for preparing this report.
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1.7 Organization
This document consists of nine chapters and seven appendices.
Chapter 2: A Systems Approach to Security Design defines the concept of integration in a way that may help practitioners think about their security systems in a new way. Achieving integration is as much a conceptual challenge as a logistical challenge.
Chapter 3: Security in the Transit Environment presents the context for the treatment of security in public transportation systems today. This chapter briefly describes how security priorities have changed in recent years, and the domestic and international events that have impacted these changes. It also provides an overview of known threats to transit systems, as well as various countermeasures that have been effective at reducing some or all impacts of these threats or of the risk of the threat itself.
Chapter 4: Developing a Security Strategy presents the steps that should be followed if an agency chooses to embrace the approach offered in this document. It describes the steps involved in determining the strategy that an agency settles on, and offers a context for making this determination while considering the cost, efficiency, and effectiveness of these decisions.
The document then discusses each major component group within a transit system in its own chapter: Access Management (Chapter 5), Infrastructure (Chapter 6), Vehicles (Chapter 7), and Communications (Chapter 8). Each chapter describes the major characteristics of the highlighted component and offers design considerations that a transit agency might adopt when embarking on a comprehensive security program. They describe the threats specific to the highlighted component in each chapter, as well as the impacts that might be incurred if threats are realized. The guidance offered explains how design can reduce known security risks or their impacts and how decisions might affect other functions of a transit system and/or other components of a system.
Chapter 9: Security Systems Integration offers specific tools and guidelines for integrating the major components of a transit system. This chapter proceeds as though one has embraced the concepts presented in Chapter 2: A Systems Approach to Security, and describes the steps involved in developing and implementing the strategy adopted as a result of the considerations offered in Chapter 4: Developing a Security Strategy.
Appendices include a chronology of terrorist attacks against public transit, case studies of transit security initiatives, performance measures, vehicle barrier selection and implementation, vehicle barrier types; codes, standards, and regulations; fire safety recommendations, lessons learned from transit communications emergencies, and a list of transit industry working groups, references, and acronyms.
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1.8 Navigating this document
Sections of this document will be more or less relevant to readers during different phases of a security program or of asset procurement, and readers may need to consult several sections as they make decisions. The document, therefore, contains hyperlinked text where additional information can be found on concepts or processes. If concepts are closely related and contained within the chapter they are marked in bold, blue underlined text. Where concepts are broader or more extensive, they are marked with the following graphic:
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concept overview - refer to Section XXX |
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