Chapter 2 briefly addresses the principles that apply to WMD CST operations, C2 of CSTs, emergency management assistance compacts (EMAC), and preparedness/response postures for CSTs.
2-1. WMD CST operations occur under various scenarios and conditions. Regardless, the principles that support conduct of CST operations include objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, and security.
2-2. Every CST operation should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective(s). The IC or lead local or state agency will provide the objective(s), often after the unit arrives on the scene. All commanders and soldiers must understand the objectives and integrate their efforts with those of the supported civil authorities. Hazards and METT-TC factors determine intermediate or subordinate objectives that must be accomplished.
UNITY OF EFFORT
2-3. CST operations achieve common purpose and direction through unity of command, coordination, and cooperation. To achieve unity of effort, CSTs must have a clear, concise chain of command that maximizes accomplishment of the mission. In all crisis management or CM situations, CSTs will support civil authorities. They must coordinate closely with these authorities and clearly understand the lines of authority and control. Unity of effort also requires coordination and cooperation among the other local, state, and federal agencies involved. CSTs primarily respond to a CBRNE event on orders from their respective governors or TAGs. CSTs may be federalized, in which case they operate under federal military control.
2-4. To support unity of effort, CSTs participate extensively in advance planning, coordinating, and training processes with potential supported and supporting local, state, and federal agencies. The fundamental basis for effective execution is preparation. Sharing doctrine and procedures, providing and receiving training, and rehearsing missions in response to most likely targets foster team building with local, state, and federal civil-military partners.
2-5. Each CST must be aware of the state and/or federal military guidance and the legitimate interests, prerogatives, and authorities of the various levels of civil government and military commands involved; and each CST must act accordingly.
2-6. CST operations prepare for the measured application of military capabilities in support of assigned missions. CST response operations may require long periods of time to achieve the desired affects and the flexibility to adjust operations, as required, to achieve overall mission success.
2-7. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. This protection may be exercised against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to the operation (such as terrorists or looters after a CBRNE incident). The IC has overall responsibility for security at the incident site; however, the CST commander is responsible for ensuring adequate security for his unit.
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS
2-8. The CST prepares for and, on order of the governor of its assigned state through TAG, deploys to perform its mission in support of civil authorities. The CST is responsible for planning and responding in the state area of operation (AO) as its primary response area, throughout the FEMA region that is its secondary response area; and the US, Puerto Rico, and US possessions and territories when assigned to national response status (see Figure 2-1).
Figure 2-1. CST Command, Control, and coordination
COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-9. The CST is always under the C2 of military authorities, yet works in support of the civil authorities, as directed by the governor. The unit will be under the operational control (OPCON) of TAG while at the home station. The CST will be engaged in sustainment, contingency planning/coordination, and predeployment or postdeployment activities.
2-10. When deployed in Title 10 status, the CST will be under the combatant command command authority (COCOM) of a C2 element designated by the support combatant commander or under the OPCON of a DCO. The team will provide support, within its capabilities, through the designated element to the on-scene commander representing the lead federal agency (LFA).
2-11. The CST may operate under the tactical control (TACON) of another CST while engaged in multiple team operations or extended duration operations.
2-12. The CST, a primary state response force, will normally remain under the control of the governor, through the adjutant general. In this capacity its mission is conducted under the state emergency management framework.
2-13. A CST assigned to a state could operate within its state of assignment or within another state under one of four potential authorities.
2-14. Under DOD Directive (DODD) 3025.1, imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate action by military commanders or responsible officials of other DOD agencies to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.
2-15. Several interstate compacts provide for mutual aid between states for disaster response. These agreements occur between the states; however, the states may provide DOD with information on their interstate agreements. The most comprehensive of these, the EMAC, provides habitual relationships that facilitate emergency planning. NG support under EMAC occurs in state active-duty status. Therefore, the EMAC is not applicable to the CSTs who perform their mission exclusively in Title 32 or Title 10 status.
State-To-State Memorandums of Agreements
2-16. In an emergency, the governor or other appropriate officials, according to state laws, could rapidly develop a simple memorandum of agreement (MOA) addressing support by a CST. This process is commonly used by states that are not EMAC signatories but wish to receive or provide support on a case-by-case basis.
Mobilization Under Title 10 United States Code
2-17. A CST could be called to active duty under the mobilization statutes (voluntary mobilization, presidential selective reserve call-up, partial mobilization, or full mobilization) and then be employed as directed by the President of the United States (POTUS) or his designee. (See JP 4-05.1 for more detailed information.) The decision to mobilize CSTs is the responsibility of the POTUS based on a recommendation from the SECDEF. If a CST is mobilized, the unit will be assigned to the C2 element of the designated, supported combatant commander.
State-To-State Support Issues
2-18. Several issues must be considered when a CST is requested to provide support to another state. These issues include C2, liabilities, and resource implications.
2-19. While in a Title 32 duty status, the CST personnel are under the C2 of the governor and TAG of their state. When support is provided across state borders, the losing and gaining governors and TAGs should be cognizant of issues regarding reimbursable charges that may be incurred and the liabilities the state receiving support may assume.
2-20. While operating in Title 32 status, the CSTs can respond operationally to an incident either within its state of assignment or in another state, as directed by authorized state authorities. When deployed under Title 32, the mission will be conducted under the state's emergency management framework or as agreed by the supported and supporting governor in question.
CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE POSTURE
2-21. CSTs will maintain a level of readiness that will allow for a rapid response within objective timelines. The readiness posture of the unit will vary based upon a number of factors, including state requirements, the DOD force protection conditions, the National Guard Bureau (NGB)-assigned operational management (national response) category, or the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat condition. The commander also ensures that professional development, leave, training and exercise participation, and administrative requirements are met (consistent with mission requirements).
UNIT RESPONSE POSTURE
2-22. CST response posture is based on threat and alert information. This information is derived from local, state, and federal sources. State and local authorities prescribe response postures based on their requirements. Federal requirements are established in a similar fashion by the Office of Homeland Security, DOJ, and DOD. For example, within DOD, commanders at any level can establish FPC or other threat/alert postures, and subordinate commanders may establish a higher FPC as local conditions warrant.
2-23. The unit response posture will affect the objective for time-on-scene arrival. Other factors that affect response times and capabilities include the time of day an incident occurs, the distance to an incident site, the method of transport required to arrive on scene, and any other movement factors (such as weather or road restrictions).
2-24. Pre-positioning is a means of employing the CST and decreasing the unit response time. Pre-positioning can be used to support a designated national special security event, such as a national political convention.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS
2-25. An increased risk of attack can cause government agencies to establish heightened threat conditions. These threat conditions characterize the risk of terrorist attack, and the advisory system can vary among federal agencies. Specifically, CSTs use and know the DOD FPC system (which can influence a CST that is collocated on a DOD military installation), the NGB operational management program, and the HSAS.
2-26. FPC Normal exists when there is no known threat. The unit has received no notice of an impending incident.
2-27. FPC Alpha exists when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel. The exact nature and extent are unpredictable, and circumstances do not fully justify full implementation of FPC Bravo. However, it may be necessary to implement selected FPC Bravo measures because of intelligence or as a deterrent. FPC Alpha must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
2-28. FPC Bravo exists when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPC must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.
2-29. FPC Charlie exists when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent. Implementation of this measure for a long period of time will probably create hardship and affect peacetime activities of a unit and its personnel.
2-30. FPC Delta exists when a terrorist incident has occurred or when intelligence indicates that a terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this FPC is declared as a localized warning.
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
2-31. CST preparation for deployment includes being assigned in one of three NGB-assigned national response categories. The assigned response category prescribes how rapidly a CST must be prepared to deploy to an incident scene outside its home state after an official notification. The three response categories include priority (gold), ready (silver), and standby (bronze):
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