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Appendix F


1. Background

This appendix supports installation WMD response planning and provides example-planning information. This appendix provides a guide for use in support of preparing an installation WMD AT/FP response appendix. As part of the process, planners review the risk assessment completed in the installation's FP plan, examine their available response capability, and develop countermeasures in the event of a possible WMD incident.

2. AT/FP Planning Process

As part of the AT/FP planning process, see Figure F-1 for AT planning and response elements that could be used to contribute to installation preincident planning for postincident-related actions. Further, see Figure F-2 for basic planning considerations (in an OPLAN format) to also help facilitate AT/FP response templating and planning.

AT Planning and Response Elements: These elements contribute to the installation's ability to deter and employ countermeasures in the preincident threat condition (THREATCON) measures implementation mode and to respond, mitigate, and recover from a terrorist incident in the postincident response mode.

This planning tool uses sixteen planning and response elements, which combine joint-service vulnerability-assessment elements and FEMA's ESFs as a baseline for planning.

Specific functions exist on all installations that support the installation's ability to either deter or respond to terrorist threats and incidents. The installation may use the sixteen elements provided or break down or rebox to whatever level of detail is deemed necessary by the local command or staff. The following, however, are the recommended (this ensures continuity and comprehensiveness in preparation for vulnerability assessments) AT planning and response elements that will ensure the installation has considered all its functional areas and activities during its planning for both preincident and postincident activities. Using FEMA's ESFs ensures that incoming support can easily transition into the appropriate areas of expertise on the installation if federal assistance is required.

Element Number 1—Intelligence Process: This element focuses on how the installation at all levels deals with the intelligence process (e.g., planning/direction, collection, processing, and dissemination). The lead for this is the installation's Intelligence Officer (G2/J2).

Element Number 2—Information and Planning: This element focuses on preparing the installation to respond to a terrorist attack. In the event of a terrorist incident, the installation must coordinate a large contingent of internal and external support organizations for an effective incident response capability. The subtasks are MOAs and memorandums of understanding (MOUs), C2, EOC, and public information. The lead for this is the installation's chief of staff.

Element Number 3—Installation's AT Plan and Programs: This element focuses on the overall AT posture of the installation, including implementation of THREATCON measures, AT and emergency response plans, exercises, and personnel awareness and training. It also includes how the installation responds to threats with the appropriate use of THREATCONs. The lead for this is the installation's AT officer.

Figure F-1. AT Planning and Response Elements

Element Number 4—Installation Perimeter Access: This element focuses on the installation's ability to secure the perimeter against and control the access of a terrorist threat to include—

  • Entry procedures.
  • A high-speed approach.
  • An observable, existing guard force.
  • Vehicle searches.
  • Procedures for observing and reporting suspicious activity.
  • Placement of barriers, lighting, and gates.

The lead for this is the installation's provost marshal (PM) and the security office.

Element Number 5—Security System Technology: This element focuses on the technology components of the installation's security system to include—

  • Alarm systems.
  • Data-transmission media.
  • Interior/exterior sensors and detection systems.
  • Access points.
  • Closed-circuit television coverage.

The lead for this task is the installation's PM and the security office.

Element Number 6—Executive and Personnel Protection: This element focuses on protecting very important persons (VIPs) and high-visibility personnel on an installation (including home and office locations) and marking parking spaces, vehicles, and routes to and from work. The lead for this is the installation's PM and the security office.

Element Number 7—Mail Handling Systems: This element focuses on the installation's ability to secure, handle, and inspect incoming mail for possible terrorist threats. This includes procedures to report and investigate suspected items. The lead for this is the installation's administrative officer.

Element Number 8—Communication: This element focuses on an installation-wide system, which should be in place, for exchanging information about a terrorist threat or incident (e.g., dedicated alert system, giant voice). In the event of a terrorist incident, communications personnel must be able to respond to changing needs during the incident and be able to maintain (over a prolonged period) control of all incoming and outgoing communications, as well as, the communications channels included in the AT plan. The installation must have communications equipment that is compatible with the installation's response personnel and those external resources providing potential support. The lead for this is the senior communications officer.

Figure F-1. AT Planning and Response Elements (Continued)

Element Number 9—Incident Response and Recovery: This element focuses on the installation's ability to mitigate the effects and recover from a terrorist incident and resume normal operations (i.e., decontamination, mass care). This is a vulnerability assessment element and as a major category includes the remaining response elements Numbers 10 through 16. (However, to ensure inclusive and comprehensive planning, it is recommended that Numbers 10 through 16 be assessed as stand-alone elements.) The lead for this is the OSC or the senior fire official.

Element Number 10—Fire Fighting: This element focuses on the overall fire-protection system of an installation to include—

  • Fire-department availability and capabilities.
  • Building design and construction.
  • Automatic fire-suppression systems.
  • Alarm sensors and training.

In the event of an incident, fire-fighting response elements detect/suppress fires and WMD, effect rescue, render life-saving first aid, and provide water to the decontamination efforts. The lead for this could be the senior fire official.

Element Number 11—Hazardous Material: This element focuses on the expertise necessary to respond to a WMD incident on the installation. The first responders or Incident Response Team must be trained and equipped in HAZMAT response; they should be able to arrive immediately on the incident site, detect the presence of chemical/radioactive agent, assess the situation, advise the EOC, mitigate the situation (as resources dictate), and have reach-back capability for follow-on forces, as the situation dictates. A biological incident warrants a different type of response. The lead for this could be the senior fire official or the senior HAZMAT officer.

Element Number 12—Health and Medical Services: This element focuses on public health and medical care that the health and medical services provide following a terrorist incident, both at the incident site and in hospitals. The use of WMD weapons or systems will create large numbers of casualties in short periods, compromise both the quality and quantity of health care delivered by posing a serious contamination threat to medical personnel, constrain mobility and evacuation, and contaminate the logistical supply base. These factors have the potential of severally degrading health-care delivery and require detailed planning. The lead for this is the senior medical officer.

Figure F-1. AT Planning and Response Elements (Continued)

Element Number 13—Security: This element focuses on the military police, security, and response forces' performance to include their contribution to deterrence, detection, and delay and their response to terrorist activity, including activity with local police and response agencies. In the event of an incident, the security forces of an installation must provide physical security of the incident site and may conduct postincident investigations or must notify the proper investigative authorities. The site of a terrorist incident is a crime scene; the FBI (if CONUS) or the DOS (if OCONUS) must be notified. Witness testimony, physical evidence, and photographic evidence are important in pursuing leads on suspected terrorists. Security forces must maintain a continuous chain of custody on evidence obtained during an incident by documenting the location, control, and possession of the evidence from the time of custody until presenting the evidence to other authorities or in court. The lead for this is the installation's PM and the security office.

Element Number 14—Resource Support: This element focuses on the operational support necessary to obtain, maintain, store, move, and replenish material resources required to respond to the threat of a or an actual terrorist incident on the installation. This includes the ability to protect the means and the operators during the response support. The lead for this is the senior logistics officer.

Element Number 15—Mass Care: This element focuses on the coordination efforts necessary to provide sheltering, feeding, and emergency relief supplies following a terrorist incident. The provision of emergency shelter for disaster victims includes the use of preidentified shelter sites in existing structures, the creation of temporary facilities such as tent cities or the temporary construction of shelters, and the use of similar facilities outside the disaster-affected area if evacuation is necessary. There may be a need to provide food to victims and emergency workers. The lead for this is the senior logistics officer or the base engineer.

Element Number 16—Public Works: This element focuses on the efforts of public works to ensure that all facilities remain operational, damage is remedied or mitigated, and full recovery of affected elements is accomplished in a timely manner to allow for the recovery of the installation to normal operations after a WMD incident. The lead for this is the base engineer.

Figure F-1. AT Panning and Response Elements (Continued)

TASK ORGANIZATION: The installation must be prepared to implement the THREATCON measures in the form of preplanned, preincident action sets at increased THREATCONs. Most importantly, the installation must be prepared to respond if a WMD incident takes place. All installation personnel are responsible for developing a high state of readiness and responding to support this plan. Designate all organizations present for installation AT defense either here or, if voluminous, in an annex. Include the AT requirements of HN, US, and other civilian organizations quartered within the installation. The commander should consider each unit's ability to assist in the installation's AT plan.


Certain OCONUS installations are not authorized to discuss/reveal AT WMD planning with the HN. Recommend planners consult the installation's legal advisor to determine any such prohibitions.

NAME/LOCATION: Designate the installation's name, to include any short title or nicknames if they exist, and the exact location of the installation using universal transverse mercator/global-positioning system (UTM/GPS) coordinates.

MAPS OR CHARTS: Designate a reference to all maps and charts that apply to the installation's AT plan. Consider including an installation grid map, highlighting major infrastructures, utilities, and stockpiles. Use overlays to identify decontamination points; equipment storage and exchange points; field-expedient, decontamination equipment locations (such as fire-fighting equipment, pumps, and heavy machinery); evacuation routes; casualty collection points; and protection shelters. Additionally, due to the importance of environmental effects on WMD, consider including any relevant meteorological issues (e.g., prevailing winds). The installation commander and staff can use these maps during the AT planning and execution process.

TIME ZONE: Designate the time zone of the installation. Indicate the appropriate number of hours to calculate (plus/minus) Greenwich mean time (Z time).

REFERENCES: Designate either a compilation of DOD, joint, and service publications or the selected reference list the installation develops to include MOAs/MOUs pertinent to the AT plan.


a. General: This plan applies to all personnel assigned or attached to the installation. DESCRIBE the political/military environment in sufficient detail for subordinate commanders, staffs, and units to understand their role in the installation's AT operations.

b. Enemy Forces: The enemy is any adversary capable of threatening the installation's personnel, facilities, and equipment. Designate the general threat of terrorism to the installation, to include the intentions and capabilities, identification, composition, disposition, location, and estimated strengths of hostile forces. Include the general threat of terrorist use of WMD against the installation.

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format)

This information should remain unclassified. See paragraph 1f on identifying specific threats.

c. Friendly Forces: Designate the forces available (both military and civilian) to respond to a terrorist WMD attack. Include the next higher HQ and adjacent installations and any units/organizations that are under the installation's HQ command that may be required to respond to such an incident. These units/organizations may include HN and US military police forces; fire and emergency services; medical; federal, state, and local agencies; SOF; engineers; detection, decontamination, or smoke units; and EOD units. Include MOAs/MOUs and any other special arrangements that will improve forces available to support the plan. If in CONUS, the DOJ is responsible for coordinating all federal agencies and DOD forces assisting in the resolution of a terrorist incident. If OCONUS, the DOS is the lead agency.

d. Attachments and Detachments: The installation should develop a process for identifying and tracking individuals/units who are not permanently assigned to the installation. Consider including the ability to gather their WMD defensive status. Designate this process and identify the people, staff, or unit responsible. Also enter the attached or detached units. Incorporate any reserve units that are mustering and/or training at the installation. At increased THREATCON, consider providing nonpermanent duty personnel with an information packet, containing general information on where to obtain protective equipment, where to go, what to do, and other particulars in the event of a terrorist WMD incident.

e. Assumptions: Designate all critical assumptions used as a basis for this plan. Assumptions are those factors that are unlikely to change during the implementation of the installation's AT plan. They may range from troop strength on base to the major political/social environment in the surrounding area. Examples are as follows.

(1) The installation is vulnerable to theft, pilferage, sabotage, and other threats. It is also vulnerable to a WMD attack.

(2) An act of terrorism involving WMD can produce major consequences that will overwhelm almost immediately the capabilities of the installation.

(3) Security personnel, both military and civilian, may be insufficient to provide total protection of all installation resources; therefore, the principal owner or user of a facility, resource, or personnel must develop adequate unit awareness and safeguard measures.

(4) No single unit on the installation possesses the expertise to act unilaterally in response to WMD attacks.

(5) Responders will not put their own lives at risk if protective equipment is not available.

(6) Local, nonmilitary response forces will arrive within specified times.

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)

(7) After notification, units specializing in WMD response will arrive according to an established schedule.

(8) The HN is supportive of US policies and will fulfill surge requirements needed to respond to a WMD incident according to MOAs/MOUs.

f. Intelligence: Designate the person, staff, or unit responsible for intelligence collection and dissemination. The installation commander must have a system in place to access current intelligence. National-level agencies, CINCs, and intelligence systems provide theater or country threat levels and threat assessments. Obtain these assessments as they will serve as a baseline for the installation's tailored assessment. The installation should have a process in place for developing the installation's tailored threat assessment or "local threat picture." As directed by the installation commander, the installation's threat assessment should be continuously evaluated, updated, and disseminated, as appropriate. The commander should determine the frequency and the means of dissemination of the installation's tailored AT plan. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) does not issue a Threat Level for CONUS installations; the FBI has that responsibility. Therefore, the installation must obtain the terrorist Threat Level by querying the FBI through the installation's law-enforcement element, local law-enforcement, and federal agencies. The CONUS installation will obtain threat-specific information from the FBI.


Provide a clear, concise statement of the command's mission and the AT purpose or goal statement supporting the mission. The primary purpose of the installation's AT plan is to safeguard personnel, property, and resources during normal operations. It is also designed to deter a terrorist threat, enhance security and AT awareness, and assign AT responsibilities for all installation personnel. DODD 2000.12 states that it is "DOD policy to protect DOD personnel and their families, facilities, and other materiel resources from terrorist acts." In meeting this goal, the installation should meet the following four objectives:

a. Deter terrorist incidents: Installation commanders will dissuade terrorists from targeting, planning against, or attacking the US's DOD assets by communicating the US's intent and resolve to defeat terrorism.

b. Employ countermeasures: Installation commanders will employ the appropriate mix of countermeasures, both active and passive, to prevent terrorists from attacking the US's DOD assets.

c. Mitigate the effects of a terrorist WMD incident: Installation commanders will employ the full range of active and passive measures to lessen the impact of terrorist events against the US's DOD assets.

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)

d. Recover From a Terrorist WMD Incident: Installation commanders will design plans to recover from the effects of a terrorist incident.


This focus will be on the installation's required, immediate response to a WMD threat or incident; the first responders' specific actions to make an appropriate assessment of the situation suspected as being an NBC incident; and follow-on forces' actions.


a. Commander's Intent: Designate how the commander envisions the development and implementation of the AT Preincident and Postincident Plan and the establishment of the overall command priorities. Provide subordinates sufficient guidance to act upon if contact or communications with the installation's chain of command is lost or disrupted.

b. Concept of Operations: Designate how the overall AT operations should progress. The plan stresses deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventive and response measures to all combatant commands and services.

During day-to-day operations, the installation should stress continuous AT planning and passive, defensive operations. This paragraph should provide subordinates sufficient guidance to act upon if contact or communications with the installation's chain of command is lost or disrupted. The installation's AT CONOPS should be phased in relation to preincident and postincident actions. AT planning and execution requires that staff elements work with a much greater degree of cohesiveness and unit of mission than that required during the conduct of normal base-sustainment operations. The AT mission, and the unpredictability of its execution, requires very specific "how to" implementation instructions of DOD THREATCON measures and in what manner these actions must be coordinated. This "how to" element is not normally included in the CONOPS paragraph; however, the necessity to provide "how to" guidance in the AT plan requires a different manner of data presentation to ensure brevity and clarity. The implementation instructions are put into the form of action sets and displayed in the form of an execution matrix (Preincident Action Set Matrix). It is recommended that this subparagraph be in the execution-matrix format, as it best captures the complex data required to execute the AT plan.

In Postincident planning, the installation should focus on its responsibilities during the first 4 hours upon notification of a terrorist incident and the procedures for obtaining technical assistance/augmentation if the incident exceeds the installation's organic capabilities. National-level responders, FEMA, the Red Cross, and the FBI may not be immediately accessible or available to respond to an installation's needs. Therefore, each installation must plan for the worst-case scenario by planning its response based on its organic resources and available local support through MOAs and MOUs. The situation may dictate that the installation not only conduct the initial response but also sustained response operations. Many installations do not have WMD officers or specialized response elements.

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)

Therefore, this template provides generic guidance and instructions so that installations can address each element by assigning the appropriately trained individual(s), regardless of duty title/job description. This paragraph will include specific implementation instructions for all functional areas of responsibility and the manner in which these actions must be coordinated. The implementation instructions will be put in the form of actions sets and displayed in the form of a synchronization matrix (Postincident Action Set Synchronization Matrix). The synchronization matrix format clearly describes relationships between activities, units, supporting functions, and key events that must be carefully synchronized to minimize the loss of life and to contain the effects of a terrorist incident. The planning steps are as follows:

(1) Step One, Risk Assessment and Risk Management.

  • Conduct a threat assessment and define the threat.
  • Conduct a criticality/vulnerability (C/V) assessment.
  • Conduct an AT planning and response-element assessment.
  • Develop a C/V Graph.
  • Develop an AT planning and response element effectiveness graph.

(2) Step Two, Build Action Set Matrix and Synchronization Matrix.

  • Establish a baseline for THREATCON normal; use "outside-in" approach.
  • Develop the preincident action set matrix.
  • Develop the postincident synchronization matrix.

(3) Step Three, Write the Plan.

c. Tasks and Responsibilities of Key Elements: Designate the specific tasks for each subordinate unit. Key members of the installation have responsibilities that are AT and/or WMD specific. The commander should ensure that a specific individual, unit, or element within the installation is responsible for each action identified in this plan. Each individual, unit, and element must know the tasks and responsibilities, what the responsibilities entail, and how these will be implemented. While the tasks and responsibilities for each AT planning and response element will be delineated in the preincident and postincident action set matrices, it is recommended that the installation commander identify or designate the primary lead for each element and enter that information in this paragraph.

d. Jurisdiction: Designate the jurisdictional limits of the installation's commander and key staff. Although the DOJ has primary law-enforcement responsibility for terrorist incidents in the US, the installation commander is responsible for maintaining law and order on the installation. For OCONUS incidents, the installation commander must notify the HN and the geographic combatant commander; the geographic combatant commander will

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)

notify the DOS. Once a TF (other than installation support) arrives on the installation, the agencies fall under the direct supervision of the local incident commander.

In all cases, command of military elements remains within military channels. The installation should establish HN agreements to address the use of installation security forces, other military forces, and HN resources that clearly delineate jurisdictional limits. The agreements will likely evolve into the installation having responsibility "inside the wire or installation perimeter" and the HN having responsibility "outside the wire or installation perimeter." There may be exceptions due to the wide dispersal of work and housing areas, utilities, and other installation support mechanisms, which may require the installation to be responsible for certain areas outside of the installation perimeter.

e. Coordinating Instructions: This paragraph should include AT-specific coordinating instructions and subparagraphs as the commander deems appropriate. In addition, this section of the AT plan outlines aspects of the installation's AT posture that require particular attention to guarantee the most effective and efficient implementation of the AT plan. For the purposes of this plan, there are five types of coordinating instructions: AT planning and response elements, procedural, security-posture responsibilities, threat-specific responsibilities, and special installation areas. The sections listed below are representative and may not be all-inclusive.

(1) AT Planning and Response Elements: For instructional purposes, this template outlines AT planning and response elements on the installation that are required to respond to a terrorist/WMD incident. Initial and sustained responses to an attack must be a coordinated effort between the many AT planning and response elements of the installation, based on the installation's organic capabilities. As the situation exceeds the installation's capabilities, it must activate MOAs/MOUs with the local, state, and federal agencies (CONUS) or the HN (OCONUS). For the purposes of this plan, an installation's capability is divided into AT planning and response elements. These tailored, installation-level elements parallel necessary national-level FEMA's ESFs and the joint-service evaluation criteria to the greatest degree possible.

AT Planning and Response Elements

(a) Information and Planning
(b) Communications
(d) Security
(e) Fire Fighting
(f) Health and Medical Services
(g) Resource Support
(h) Mass Care
(i) Public Works
(j) Intelligence Process
(k) Installation's AT Plans/Programs
(l) Installation's Perimeter Access




Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)

(m) Security-System Technology
(n) Executive Protection
(o) Response and Recovery
(p) Mail Handling

*   Derived from FEMA's ESFs

+   Derived from joint services' vulnerability-assessment criteria

(2) Procedural:

a. Alert Notification Procedures: According to CJCSM 3150.03, the installation will submit an operations report (OPREP)-3 in the event of a terrorist WMD incident, directly to the NMCC. The goal is to make initial voice reports within 15 minutes of an incident, with message reports submitted within 1 hour of the incident. The initial report must not be delayed to gain additional information. Follow-up reports can be submitted as additional information becomes available. The installation will submit voice reports sequentially to the NMCC, appropriate CINCs, and the reporting unit's parent service and intermediate superior command. Conference calls or concurrent telephone calls should be considered if no delays are encountered and security can be maintained. There will remain an open line between the NMCC and the installation throughout the duration of the incident. NMCC telephone numbers are: DSN Primary: 851-3840; DSN Secondary: 725-3530; DSN Tertiary: 227-6340; Commercial: 703-521-1014; Washington Switch: 703-697-1201; Drop: DSN 312-1048/1049/1050/1051. All OPREP-3 will be submitted as soon as possible after an event or incident has occurred and sent at FLASH or IMMEDIATE precedence. Message Address: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3 NMCC//. (Designate the person, staff, or unit responsible for establishing the proper notification systems and procedures. Enter a description of the alert-notification procedures here. Include alert rosters for all units and organizations on the installation.)


Establish procedures for notifying the appropriate staff elements, the crisis-management team, responding forces, the installation's units, service personnel, and other installation occupants of an impending or actual situation.

b. ROE for the Application of Force: Designate the standing operating procedures for the use of deadly force. (This may include information on the minimum standards for weapons qualification before issuing of a weapon.)


Establish the procedures for the use of force and educate and train on-site security elements and the auxiliary force in these procedures. When force is used, apply only the minimum force necessary to effectively control the situation. Applying force in degrees ensures that deadly force will not be used inadvertently. Ensure that

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)


installation personnel are aware of the degrees of force and who authorizes the application thereof.

c. Installation's AT Exercise: Designate the appropriate methods and frequency to exercise the AT plan.

d. Incident Response: Designate the several plans that will be activated upon initiation of the incident (assassination, assault, hostage and barricade, hijacking, kidnapping, bombing, civil disorder, WMD, and information operations).


Each case may require a different series of forces to successfully respond to and conclude the incident. Establish mechanisms to respond to a variety of terrorist incidents and integrate them into the installation's AT plan. Describe the interaction with local authorities that use MOAs and MOUs.

e. Consequence Management: Designate information on how the installation will handle the consequences of a terrorist incident. This section does not apply to WMD, but to other terrorist incidents. This section should include references to coordination with the PAO, medical personnel, and mortuary affairs. Describe the interaction with local authorities that use MOAs and MOUs.

f. Executive or Distinguished-Visitor Protection Procedures: Designate the person or staff with overall responsibility for protection procedures. This person or staff will identify the forces available for executive or distinguished-visitor protection. This plan should facilitate the coordination with the visitor's security office or protection and security detail.

(3) Security Posture Responsibilities:

a. Operations Security (OPSEC): Designate the person, staff element, or unit responsible for the installation's OPSEC. This person, staff element, or unit should produce the C/V reports. The commander will use these reports to enhance the installation's AT posture, design countermeasures, and facilitates incident response and postincident planning.

b. Access Controls: Designate the person(s), staff(s), or unit(s) responsible for pedestrian, vehicular, and package and mail access onto the installation. Describe the installation's access control system.


An installation's access control system may include several discrete systems (i.e., perimeter, key facilities, secret compartmented information facilities [SCIFs]). Coordinate all elements in the access control plan with other security measures.

c. Barriers: Designate the person, staff, or unit responsible for planning barriers for the installation's AT plan.

d. Lighting: Designate the person, staff, or unit responsible for the lighting plan.

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)

e. On-Site Security Elements: Designate the person or staff with overall responsibility for installation security. List the military and civilian security force that is specifically organized, trained, and equipped to provide the physical security and law enforcement for the command.

f. Technology: Designate the person, staff, or unit to identify emerging technologies, which could enhance the overall protection of the installation.


Emerging technologies are particularly important to the terrorist WMD threat (e.g., responder equipment, detection equipment, plume plotting, etc.)

g. Security Training: Designate the person, staff, or unit responsible for the preparation and execution of individual security training. Establish an effective security education and training program for the entire installation (which includes the required actions to different threat alarms and specific training for civilian personnel, contractors, family members, and tenant units.

(4) Threat-Specific Responsibilities:

a. Weapons of Mass Destruction: The threat of a terrorist attack poses different and, in some cases, more difficult challenges. Designate a special task-organized staff or unit to plan for a WMD attack against the installation. Ensure that the proper response equipment is on-hand.


The responsible staff or unit should build the WMD plan with checklists and develop tools appropriate to the installation.

b. Information Operations: Terrorists may choose to strike at an informational source to terrorize an installation or DOD asset. Designate the person, staff, or unit responsible for information operations.


The responsible planner should develop a plan for the safeguarding of information and integrate this plan into the overall AT plan.

(5) Special Installation Areas:

a. Airfield Security: Designate the person, staff, or unit responsible for airfield security. Enter the airfield security plan here (or include as an annex) as part of the overall AT plan.

b. Port Security: Designate the person, staff, or unit responsible for port security. Describe the port security plan here (or include as an annex) as part of the overall AT plan.

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)

c. Buildings: Designate the person, staff, or unit to review each building on the installation according to the installation's C/V assessments.


The responsible person, staff, or unit should develop a plan, series of checklists, or other tools to bring the installation to a level of AT protection consistent with the installation's THREATCON.


Designate the logistics and administrative requirements to support the AT plan, which should include enough information to make clear the basic concept for planned logistics support. Ensure that the staff conducts logistical planning for both preincident and postincident activities The staff should address the following: locations of consolidated WMD defense equipment, expedient decontamination supplies, IPE exchange points, special contamination-control requirements, retrograde contamination monitoring sites, WMD equipment/supplies controlled supply rates and prestockage points, and procedures for chemical-defense equipment "push" packages. Specific logistics and administrative requirements will emerge throughout the planning process outlined in the CONOPS, specifically when developing the action sets. These requirements should be incorporated into this paragraph.

  • Readiness and Concept of Combat Service Support: Designate service-support instructions and arrangements pertinent to the AT plan. If the arrangements are lengthy, include in an annex or separate administrative and logistics order. When planning for a postincident response, include ways to cope with decontamination of equipment; clothing exchange and showers; equipment recovery and evacuation; mortuary-affairs policy, standards, and procedures; contaminated remains; and emergency destruction of munitions.

Organizations tasked throughout this plan to provide logistics support during an increased THREATCON should ensure that they constantly maintain the capability to do so. In the event that any specific requirement cannot be met for any reason, the unit commander responsible for the activity in question must notify the AT planner to reallocate resources.

  • Material and Services: Designate supply, maintenance, transportation, construction, and allocation of labor that apply to AT efforts before a terrorist incident. Establish mission essential equipment requirements for a WMD defense. Determine the types and quantities of supplies and equipment needed to support the plan (decontamination, individual protection, collective protection, and communications). Determine the requirements of what to issue, to whom, and when and the training required when issued.

  • Weapons and Ammunition: Designate the weapons and basic ammunition allowances required to support the AT augmented security forces.

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)


Planners should identify the location, authority for, and basic level of issue. Planners should determine whether a predetermined allocation of ammunition exits, where the allocation of ammunition is stored, who has access to the ammunition, and whether the AT package contains explosives.

  • Medical Services: Designate plans, policies, and local/HN agreements for AT and WMD treatment, hospitalization, and evacuation of personnel, both military and civilian. Planners should include aerial medical-evacuation support, the nearest trauma center, the ability to set up a crisis center, response capabilities for NBC and radiological agents, contamination and decontamination assurance, and the ability to support a mobile medical hospital. Installation planner should ensure that all medical personnel are properly trained and maintain a high state of readiness.

  • Personnel: Designate procedures for strength reporting and replacements and other procedures pertinent to base defense, including handling civilians. Enter specific procedures for processing casualties; include coordination with medical services for documentation and installation procedures for notification of next of kin.

  • Civil Affairs: Designate the person, staff, or unit responsible for coordinating and interfacing with the local population to provide assistance for civilian needs in the event of casualties.


Planners should also develop community relations to support the installation's needs or requirements during a time of crisis.

  • Updates to the Installation's AT Plan: Designate the appropriate person, staff, or unit responsible for developing a process for updating the installation's AT plan (derived from this template) and for the distribution of those updates.


Enter instructions for command and operation of communications-electronics equipment. Identify the primary and alternate locations of the CP and EOC. Enter the installation's chain of command. Highlight any deviation from that chain of command which must occur as a result of a WMD incident. The chain of command may change based on the deployment of a JTF or an NCA-directed mission. Identify the location of NBC staffs or any technical support elements that could be called upon in the event of a terrorist WMD incident and the means to contact each. The installation must provide for prompt dissemination of notifications and alarm signals and the timely and orderly transmission and receipt of messages between elements involved in and responding to the incident.

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)

a. Command: Designate command relationships to include command succession.


The installation commander must ensure that the key AT staff members understand the differences inherent to the installation's incident response command structure, with special considerations to the location of the installation (CONUS/OCONUS). Whether these operations occur in CONUS or OCONUS, the relationships should be represented in the plan to reflect the agreements between the supporting government agencies or the HN. These relationships may be presented in a chart as an annex to the plan. This is an excellent tool to formulate the alert-notification procedures to be placed in the front of the AT plan and paragraph 3c. Also note that the command, control, and reporting responsibilities for foreign terrorist attacks on DOD property or personnel belong to the geographic combatant commander within whose area of responsibility (AOR) the attack has occurred. The functional combatant commander with assets under his control will coordinate with the affected geographic combatant commander for an appropriate division of responsibilities. The installation commander should ensure that proper reporting procedures are in place with the higher HQ.

b. Signal: Communications for AT contingency operations will be the normal base communications augmented by portable radio, landlines, courier, and runners and will be according to OPSEC and communications security (COMSEC) requirements. Ensure that communications are compatible between the installation responders and local community responders. Designate information on the requirements for additional equipment (computers and hand-held radios), its type, and its dissemination; pertinent communications nets; operating frequencies; codes and code words; recognition and identification procedures; type of alarms and required responses; and electronic emission constraints.

Figure F-2. AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format) (Continued)

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