Backgrounder: The Rise of al-Qaedaism
Council on Foreign Relations
Author: Eben Kaplan, Assistant Editor
June 30, 2006
Introduction
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the organization responsible for the attacks, al-Qaeda, has greatly changed. Experts say what was once a hierarchical organization with a large operating budget has been transformed into something more akin to an ideological movement. Whereas al-Qaeda was once able to train its own operatives and deploy them to carry out attacks, today al-Qaeda inspires individuals or small groups to carry out attacks, often with no operational support from the larger organization. Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert at RAND, says this has always been al-Qaeda's aim and that it has simply "gone back to its roots."
What did the “old” al-Qaeda look like?
Prior to 2001, al-Qaeda enjoyed the support of Afghanistan's Taliban government, which provided both financial support and safe haven in which to operate terrorist training camps. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the group had an annual operating budget of $30 million and from 1996 to 2001, 10,000 to 20,000 fighters underwent training in al-Qaeda's Afghan camps.
Under these conditions, al-Qaeda planned and carried out the 9/11 attacks as well as the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS Cole in Yemen, and the simultaneous 2002 attacks on a Mombasa hotel and an Israeli passenger jet. At the same time, al-Qaeda funneled money and fighters to conflicts in such places as Chechnya, the Balkans, Tajikistan, and Kashmir. According to a 2001 U.S. State Department report, as al-Qaeda grew in profile, it became an "umbrella organization for a worldwide network [of] Sunni Islamic extremist groups."
What have governments done to target al-Qaeda?
The international crackdown that followed the 9/11 attacks greatly cut into al-Qaeda's resources. Many of al-Qaeda's former leaders have been captured or killed.
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Copyright 2006 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.
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