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Homeland Security

VOICE OF AMERICA
SLUG: 2-315043 9/11 Probe (L O)
DATE:
NOTE NUMBER:

DATE=4/14/2004

TYPE=CORRESPONDENT REPORT

TITLE=9-11 PROBE (L O)

NUMBER=2-315043

BYLINE=JIM MALONE

DATELINE=WASHINGTON

CONTENT=

VOICED AT:

INTRO: The director of the U-S Central Intelligence Agency said Wednesday that it will take another five years to improve the agency's ability to counter al-Qaida and other terrorist threats. C-I-A Director George Tenet made the comment to the independent commission investigating the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. More now from National Correspondent Jim Malone.

TEXT: Director Tenet was one of several witnesses who testified before the commission Wednesday as it probed intelligence failures related to the September 11, 2001 attacks.

The commission released an interim report critical of U-S intelligence agencies, including the C-I-A regarding how they tracked the activities of al-Qaida operatives before the 9-11 attacks.

Phillip Zelikow is the staff director for the 9-11 commission. He says the C-I-A knew pieces of the al-Qaida puzzle before the attacks, but was never able to put the information together to provide an overall picture of what Osama bin Laden was planning.

/// ZELIKOW ACT ///

There were no complete, authoritative portraits of his strategy and the extent of his organization's involvement in past terrorist attacks, nor had the (intelligence) community provided an authoritative depiction of his organization's relationships with other governments or the scale of the threat his organization posed to the United States.

/// END ACT ///

C-I-A Director Tenet says budget cutbacks hurt the agency during the mid-1990's. But he also acknowledged U-S intelligence agencies simply made too many mistakes in trying to figure out what al-Qaida was up to.

/// TENET ACT ///

We never penetrated the 9-11 plot overseas. While we positioned ourselves very well with extensive human and technical penetrations to facilitate the takedown of the Afghan sanctuary (for al-Qaida), we did not discern the specific nature of the plot.

/// END ACT ///

In addition to finding out what went wrong before the 9-11 attacks, the independent commission will also make recommendations to Congress to help prevent future attacks.

Some changes in intelligence gathering have already been implemented in the wake of the September 11th attacks, including better cooperation with the F-B-I, which is responsible for monitoring domestic terror suspects.

But C-I-A Director Tenet cautioned the 9-11 commission that shoring up the nation's ability to both gather and analyze intelligence information will take a lot longer than most people think.

/// 2ND TENET ACT ///

It will take us another five years to have the kind of clandestine service our country needs. There is a creative, innovative strategy to get us there that requires sustained commitment, leadership and funding.

/// END ACT ///

F-B-I Director Robert Mueller also testified before the 9-11 commission and said that while the agency has made some improvements to its intelligence gathering operation, in his words, "institutional change takes time."

Mr. Mueller also said he opposed one possible intelligence reform in the wake of the 9-11 attacks, the establishment of a separate domestic intelligence agency that would take over the F-B-I's traditional role in that area.

/// MUELLER ACT ///

I do believe that creating a separate agency to collect intelligence in the United States would be a grave mistake. Splitting the law enforcement and intelligence functions would leave both agencies fighting the war on terrorism with one hand tied behind their backs. A distinct advantage we gain by having intelligence and law enforcement together would be lost in more layers (of bureaucracy) and greater stove-piping (withholding) of information.

/// END ACT ///

The focus on intelligence gathering came one day after the commission issued a report highly critical of the F-B-I's performance prior to the 9-11 attacks. Recommendations for improving both the F-B-I and the C-I-A are expected in the commission's final report due by the end of July. (Signed)

NEB/JBM/KL



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