[Senate Hearing 113-200]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-200
S. 980--THE EMBASSY SECURITY AND
PERSONNEL PROTECTION ACT OF 2013
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 16, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement. 3
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Miller, Hon. Bill A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
High-Threat Posts, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Starr, Gregory B., Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security, and Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Bob Corker................................................. 28
(iii)
S. 980--THE EMBASSY SECURITY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION ACT OF 2013
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 16, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Murphy, Kaine, Corker,
Flake, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Today, our real focus is ensuring the security of our
missions abroad and the safety of our Foreign Service
personnel. That has always been, and will remain, a priority of
this committee.
Having said that, I hope to have the support of my
Republican colleagues for The Embassy Security Act I have
introduced, named for Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods,
and Glen Doherty, who gave their lives in service to the Nation
in Benghazi on September the 11th. The lessons we have learned
from the tragedies in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Benghazi are
emblematic of the broader issue we will increasingly face in
the 21st century, and it will require our full, unequivocal,
unwavering commitment to fully protect our embassies and those
who serve this Nation abroad.
We have studied what went wrong, we have looked back, and
now it is time to look forward and do what needs to be done to
prevent another tragedy in the future. After Benghazi, the ARB
made 29 recommendations to State and to Congress. While we must
do our part in overseeing State's implementation, we must also
do our part to provide the resources and necessary
authorizations to ensure full implementation. And we must make
whatever investments are necessary to protect our embassies and
our missions.
Such investments are not an extravagance, they are not
simply another budget item. We must strike the proper balance
between sealing off vulnerabilities in high-threat areas and
continuing to conduct vigorous and effective diplomacy that
serves the national interests.
The fact is, we can never have absolute security in an
increasingly dangerous world unless we hermetically seal our
diplomats in steel tanks. But, security alone is not our
objective. At the end of the day, this is not an either/or
choice. We need to address both the construction of new
embassies that meet security needs, and we need to do what we
can to ensure existing high-risk posts where we need our people
to represent our interests and where new construction is not an
option.
The ARB stated it clearly, ``The solution requires a more
serious and sustained commitment from Congress to support State
Department needs, which, in total, constitute a small
percentage both of the full national budget and that spent for
national security. One overall conclusion in this report is
that Congress must do its
part to meet this challenge and provide necessary resources to
the
State Department to address security risks and meet mission
imperatives.''
The bill I have introduced as part of the solution, ``the
serious and sustained commitment,'' it takes the lessons we
have learned and turns them into action. As I said, total
security is next to impossible. Our diplomats cannot encase
themselves in stone fortresses and remain effective. And
disengagement is clearly not an option. So, the solution must
be multifaceted. It must include enhanced physical security
around our embassies and ensure that our diplomats are equipped
with the language skills and security training necessary to
keep them safe when they come out from behind the embassy walls
to do their jobs. It also requires us to ensure that the
persons protecting our missions are not selected simply because
they are the cheapest available force. Where conditions require
enhanced security, this bill gives State additional flexibility
to contract guard forces based on the best value rather than
the lowest bidder.
It also means holding people accountable. When an employee
exhibits unsatisfactory leadership that has serious security
consequences, the Secretary must have the ability to act. This
bill gives the Secretary greater flexibility in disciplinary
actions in the future. It authorizes funding for key items
identified by the Accountability Review Board on Benghazi,
including embassy security and construction, Arabic language
training, construction of a Foreign Affairs Security Training
Center to consolidate and expand security training operations
for State Department personnel so that, instead of piecing
together our training and facilities up and down the East
Coast, we streamline them in a single facility that can provide
comprehensive training to more people.
And lastly, the bill requires detailed reports from the
Department on its progress in implementing all of the
recommendations made by the Accountability Review Board, and
specifically requires the identification of, and reporting of,
security at high-risk, high-threat facilities.
At the end of the day, if we fail to act, if we fail to
address these issues, there will be another incident. The
responsibility is ours, and the failure to act will be ours, as
well. This is a time for solutions. The safety of those who
serve this Nation abroad is in our hands.
With that, let me turn to my distinguished ranking
colleague, who has worked with us to have this hearing, Senator
Corker, for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you for your efforts to focus on the issue of embassy security
and, candidly, just the way you conduct our efforts here in
Foreign Relations in a bipartisan way. It is much appreciated.
And I want to thank the State Department for bringing forth
the kind of witnesses that, you know, carry the weight on this
issue that matters to all of us. So, thank you both for being
here.
We have a procedural issue that is occurring at 11 o'clock
that is semi-important. I may be stepping in and out on the
phone, here, before that vote. But, I want to thank you both
for being here. I know our offices have been in contact with
you.
And let me just express a couple of concerns. I do not
imagine there is anybody here that does not respect what our
Foreign Service officers around the world do. And I think we
all know, especially after what has happened in Libya, the
threat that they are under. And we know those threats are
taking place all over the world.
I know that the State Department has requested funding for
numbers of new facilities that take many, many years to build,
and yet, at the same time, I know we have people today in
Peshawar and Harat, you know, where we just came from, or at
least generally came from, that are under a lot of duress now
and, candidly, you know, have some security issues. So, I do
hope, as we move along, we will figure out a way to balance
between some of the longer term projects that, candidly, are
taking place not under very serious threat with some of the
short-term needs that we have.
And I know there is also some focus on building a training
facility, which I know is very expensive, and yet we are aware
that maybe there are ways of doing that training in ways that
do not require, you know, spending hundreds of millions of
dollars to build it.
So, I just hope we will move along in an appropriate way.
And I certainly do not want to rehash the past. I think the
chairman knows we have tried to move away from some of the
things that have happened in the past. But, I would like for
somebody to explain to me, at some point, this ARB that we did
have. I know we have four employees that were involved in, you
know, some reporting on the ARBs. They are still on paid leave,
and nothing has occurred. And I would like, at some point, to
understand how we bring closure to that issue.
But, again, thank you both for being here. I thank you for
your service to our country. And I hope, in a bipartisan way,
we will move ahead in a way that certainly does the immediate
things that are necessary to make sure that our Foreign Service
officers are safe.
But, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I am pleased to introduce Bill Miller, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for High-Threat Posts, a new position
created post-Benghazi. And we also have with us Gregory Starr,
the Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and
Director of the Diplomatic Security Service. These two
officials sit at the nexus of policy development and
management, and we look forward to hearing their perspective on
this legislation and on the best way to secure our embassies
and keep our personnel as safe as possible.
With our thanks for both of you being here, we will begin
with your opening statements. Your full statements will be
included in the record. We ask you to synthesize it in around 5
minutes or so, so we can have members engage with you in a
dialogue.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. STARR, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, AND DIRECTOR OF THE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker.
I want to thank you for your invitation to appear here today to
discuss the future of embassy and diplomatic security.
We appreciate, and we share, your commitment to enhanced
security, as evidenced in the recently introduced Chris
Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, Glen Doherty Embassy
Security and Personnel Protection Act of 2013.
The attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities last
September, and subsequent attacks this year, as well, against
diplomatic facilities and personnel remind us every day that
the world is a dangerous place for diplomacy. Unfortunately,
this is nothing new. Being on the front lines of U.S. national
security has always been inherently risky. However, we strive
to mitigate this risk to the maximum extent possible.
The fact remains that we will not, even with the most
willing and capable government partners--as we have in many
places around the world--we will not stop terrorists or
extremists from attacking us in every instance. Rather, we must
carefully balance this risk against the value of pursuing our
national interests in these various countries. We have learned
some very hard and painful lessons out of Benghazi. We are
already acting on those lessons.
The State Department carries on the business of the
American Government and its people in 284 locations, many in
challenging security environments where key U.S. national
security interests are at stake. Every day, the Department
works to protect our people and missions by constantly
assessing threats and our security posture overseas.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security advances American
interests and foreign policy by protecting people, property,
and information. We do this by maintaining a security program
that includes analyzing the threats, managing the security
situation, and mitigating the risks.
DS constantly researches, monitors, and analyzes threats
against Americans, our diplomatic facilities, and U.S.
diplomatic personnel. This information, along with trend
analysis and case studies of political violence, terrorist
acts, and crime, form the basis of the threat assessments that
we use that are provided to Department senior managers to
support the operational and policy decisionmaking process. From
this analysis, we determine what additional security measures,
whether they be short term or long term, should be taken to
mitigate the potential threats against our diplomatic assets.
From DS analysts in Washington, DC, monitoring the threats
against our posts to our regional security officers abroad
managing the security programs at these posts, we strive to
provide the most secure platform for conducting American
diplomacy. Building on the recommendations of the independent
Benghazi Accountability Review Board, the interagency
assessment teams that were sent out, and our own considerable
experience and expertise, the Department is diligently working
to improve the way we protect our diplomats, not only at our
highest-threat posts, but at all of our facilities around the
world.
Thanks, in large part, to your generous support in 2013 and
the continuing resolution, progress is well underway. Pursuant
to the recommendations of the independent Benghazi ARB, we are
training more U.S. Foreign Affairs community personnel to deal
with high-threat and high-risk environments through our Foreign
Affairs counterthreat course. We are expanding the duration of
DS high-threat tactical training courses, and incorporating
elements of that training into other DS courses so that,
regardless of a diplomatic securities special agent assignment,
we have a flexible cadre of agents trained to operate in
varying security environments overseas.
We are hiring 151 new security professionals this and next
fiscal year--that is 151 total, not each year--many of whom
will directly serve at, or provide support to, our high-threat,
high-risk posts. We are also working very closely with the
Department of Defense to expand the Marine Security Guard
Program, as well as to enhance the availability of forces to
respond, in extremis, to threatened U.S. personnel and
facilities.
We recently worked with DOD and the U.S. Marine Corps to
elevate personal security--the security that we provide for our
people overseas--as a primary mission of the Marine Corps
security guards. Each of these efforts enhances the
Department's ability to supplement, as necessary, the host
government's measures in fulfilling its obligations under
international law to protect U.S. diplomats and consular
property and personnel. The increased security funds you have
provided will also support our colleagues at the Bureau of
Overseas Building Operations in providing facilities for
additional Marine security guard detachments, as well as the
construction of new facilities and security-upgrade projects at
some of our most critical posts.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security realizes our work in
securing our posts and protecting our people will never be
done. We take great pride in our accomplishments. We apply the
lessons learned, and we look forward to working with Congress
on embassy security.
I recognize that my opening remarks are brief, because I
wanted to allow plenty of time for questions, to answer your
specific questions. I will be glad to take those questions
after you have heard from my colleague Bill Miller, and he will
provide his remarks at this point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Corker.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Starr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregory B. Starr
Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and
distinguished committee members. Thank you for your invitation to
appear here today to discuss the future of diplomatic security. We
appreciate and share your commitment to enhanced embassy security as
evidenced in the recently introduced ``Chris Stevens, Sean Smith,
Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty Embassy Security and Personnel
Protection Act of 2013.''
Today's Diplomacy
The attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities last September, and
subsequent attacks this year against diplomatic facilities and
personnel, remind us that the world remains a dangerous place for
diplomacy. Unfortunately, this is nothing new. Being on the front lines
of U.S. national security has always been inherently risky; however, we
strive to mitigate this risk to the maximum extent possible. The fact
remains that we will not, even with the most willing and capable
governments as our partners, stop terrorists or extremists from
attacking us in every instance. Rather, we must carefully balance this
risk against the value of pursuing our national interests. We have
learned some very hard and painful lessons in Benghazi. We are already
acting on them.
The State Department carries on the business of the American
Government and its people at 284 locations, many in challenging
security environments where key U.S. national security interests are at
stake. Every day, the Department works to protect our people and
missions by constantly assessing threats and our security posture. The
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) advances American interests and
foreign policy by protecting people, property, and information. We do
this by maintaining a security program that includes analyzing threats,
managing the security situation, and mitigating risks.
Analyzing Threats
DS constantly researches, monitors, and analyzes threats against
Americans, our diplomatic facilities, and U.S. diplomatic personnel.
This information, along with trend analyses and case studies of
political violence, terrorist acts, and crime form the basis of threat
assessments that are provided to Department senior managers to support
operational and policy decisionmaking. From this analysis, we determine
what additional security measures, short-term or long-term, should be
taken to mitigate potential threats against our diplomatic assets.
Managing the Security Environment and Mitigating Threats
From DS analysts in Washington, DC, monitoring threats against our
posts to Regional Security Officers abroad managing security programs
at those posts, we strive to provide the most secure platform for
conducting American diplomacy. Building on the recommendations of the
independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board, the Interagency
Security Assessment Teams, and our own considerable experience and
expertise, the Department is diligently working to improve the way we
protect our diplomats not only at high-threat, high-risk posts but at
all of our facilities worldwide.
Thanks in large part to your generous support in the FY 2013
Continuing Resolution, progress is well underway.
Pursuant to the recommendations of the independent Benghazi ARB, DS
plans to train more of the U.S. foreign affairs community to deal with
high-risk environments through our Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat
course. We are expanding the duration of the DS high-threat tactical
training course and incorporating elements of that training into other
DS courses so that regardless of a DS special agent's assignment, we
have a flexible cadre of agents trained to operate in varying security
environments.
DS is hiring 151 new security professionals this and the next
fiscal year, many of whom will directly serve at or provide support to
our high-threat, high-risk posts. We are also working very closely with
the Department of Defense (DOD) to expand the Marine Security Guard
program, as well as to enhance the availability of forces to respond in
extremis to threatened U.S. personnel and facilities. We recently
worked with DOD and the U.S. Marine Corps to elevate personnel security
as a primary mission of the Marine Security Guards. Each of these
efforts enhances the Department's ability to supplement, as necessary,
the host government's measures in fulfilling its obligations under
international law to protect U.S. diplomatic and consular property and
personnel.
The increased security funds you have provided will also support
our colleagues at the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations in
providing facilities for additional Marine Security Guard Detachments,
as well as the construction of new facilities and security upgrade
projects at some of our most critical posts.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security realizes our work in securing our
posts and protecting our people will never be done. We take great pride
in our accomplishments, apply lessons learned, and look forward to
working with Congress on embassy security. I will be glad to answer any
questions you have.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL A. MILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR HIGH-THREAT POSTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Miller. Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Corker, and distinguished committee members. Thank you also for
your invitation to appear here today to discuss embassy
security.
I, too, appreciate and share your commitment to enhanced
embassy security, as evidenced by your recently introduced
Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty
Embassy Security and Personnel Protection Act of 2013.
Threats and attacks against our diplomatic facilities and
personnel have been a concern since the inception of embassy
security, almost 100 years ago. To counter these global
threats, the Office of the Chief Special Agent, the forerunner
of Diplomatic Security, was formed in 1916. It was not,
however, until 1985, in the aftermath of the Beirut bombings,
that Diplomatic Security became a Bureau within the State
Department.
The DS mandate was solidified when Congress passed the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. At
the same time, I was preparing to leave the Marine Corps, where
I had my position as a Marine Corps officer, and I wanted to
continue my service to the U.S. Government. And the mission
envisioned of DS was part of a team--or, demonstrated the part
of a team that I particularly wanted to join.
In 1987, I became a DS special agent, and since then, I
have devoted my 26-year career to fulfilling the mission of DS;
that is, providing a safe and secure environment for the
conduct of foreign policy.
Early in my career, I was a part of the Secretary of
State's protective detail. I have also served assignments in
our Washington field office as the Chief of the Security and
Law Enforcement Training Division, as the Chief of
Counterintelligence Investigations, and as the Director of
Contingency Operations. I have managed security programs as a
regional security officer, also known as an RSO, in Iraq,
Pakistan, Jerusalem, the Philippines, and in Egypt.
To demonstrate the depth of my experience and that of a DS
special agent, I would like to highlight a few of my
accomplishments.
As an RSO, I dealt daily with the possible terrorist acts
that impacted the lives of Americans, to include the kidnapping
of American missionaries in the Philippines, as well as
participating in the capture of Ramzi Yousef, one of the main
perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
When the United States returned to Iraq in 2003, I was
asked to serve as the first RSO and to manage the volatile
security environment as we reestablished our diplomatic
presence. Most recently overseas, I was the RSO in Cairo,
Egypt, during the Arab Spring. It is an experience that informs
my decisionmaking as I work to ensure adequate security
resources during the ongoing transition in Egypt.
After the September 2012 attacks on our facilities in
Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt and Sudan, the Department
reviewed its security posture and created my position, the
Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
High-Threat Posts, also known as HTP, along with providing a
staff of security professionals to support high-threat, high-
risk posts. The Department assessed our diplomatic missions
worldwide and weighed criteria to determine which posts are
designated as high-threat, high-risk. And there are now 27
posts which fall under this designation. This designation is
not a static process, and the list will be reviewed annually,
at a bare minimum, and more frequently, when needed. As
emergent conditions substantially change, for better or for
worst, at any post worldwide, high-threat, high-risk
designations will shift, and missions will be added or deleted
from this category. The high-threat protection directorate that
I lead oversees the security operations in these high-threat,
high-risk posts around
the world. We coordinate strategic and operational planning and
drive innovation across the broad spectrum of DS missions and
responsibilities. We continue to work closely, also, with the
regional bureaus to ensure that everyone has visibility of the
security threats at our posts.
As the Deputy Assistant Secretary for HTP, I am responsible
for evaluating, managing, and mitigating the security threats,
as well as directing resource requirements at high-threat
diplomatic missions. I closely follow developments, continually
assess our security posture, and take all possible steps to
mitigate threats and vulnerabilities.
While the Department has created a position for high-
threat, high-risk post designations, we must continue to focus
on embassy security worldwide. I coordinate closely with my
colleagues in Diplomatic Security throughout the Department and
the interagency to ensure that the threats and risk-mitigation
strategies are shared globally. As you have said, we can never
truly eliminate all the risks facing our dedicated personnel
working overseas who advance U.S. interests. However, as the
Department has said, we place the highest priority on the
security of our personnel and will continue to take the steps
necessary, which, in some instances, include extraordinary
measures to provide for their safety.
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to
appear before the committee today and discuss the future of our
embassy security. I'm available to answer any of your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bill Miller
Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and
distinguished committee members. Thank you for your invitation to
appear here today to discuss embassy security. We appreciate and share
your commitment to enhanced embassy security, as evidenced by the
recently introduced ``Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen
Doherty Embassy Security and Personnel Protection Act of 2013.''
Threats and attacks against our diplomatic facilities and personnel
have been a concern since the inception of embassy security almost 100
years ago. To counter these global threats, the Office of the Chief
Special Agent, the forerunner of diplomatic security was formed in
1916. It was not until 1985, in the aftermath of the Beirut bombings,
that Diplomatic Security (DS) became a Bureau within the State
Department. The DS mandate was solidified when Congress passed the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. When I was
preparing to leave my position as a Marine Corps officer and wanted to
continue my service to the U.S. Government, the mission and vision of
DS was a team that I wanted to join. In 1987, I became a DS Special
Agent. Since then, I have devoted my 25-year career to fulfilling the
mission of DS: providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct
of foreign policy.
Early in my career, I was part of the Secretary of State's
protective detail. I have also served in our Washington field office,
as the Chief of Security Training, Chief of Counterintelligence
Investigations, and Director of Contingency Operations. I have managed
security programs as a Regional Security Officer, also known as an RSO,
in Iraq, Pakistan, Jerusalem, the Philippines, and Egypt. To
demonstrate the depth of my experience and that of a DS Special Agent,
I would like to highlight a few of my accomplishments. As an RSO, I
dealt daily with possible terrorist acts that impacted the lives of
Americans, including the kidnapping of Americans in the Philippines, as
well as the capture of Ramzi Yousef, one of the main perpetrators of
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. When the United States returned to
Iraq in 2003, I was asked to serve as the first RSO to manage the
volatile security environment as we reestablished our diplomatic
presence. Most recently overseas, I was the RSO in Egypt during the
Arab Spring; an experience that informs my decisionmaking as I work to
ensure adequate security resources during the ongoing transition in
Egypt.
After the September 2012 attacks on our facilities in Libya, Yemen,
Tunisia, Sudan, and Egypt, the Department reviewed its security posture
and created my position, the Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant
Secretary of High Threat Posts, also known as HTP, along with a staff
of security professional to support high-threat, high-risk posts. The
Department assessed our diplomatic missions worldwide and weighed
criteria to determine which posts are designated as high-threat, high-
risk--there are now 27 posts which fall under this designation. This
designation is not a static process and the list will be reviewed
annually, at a minimum, and more frequently as needed. As emergent
conditions substantially change, for better or for worse, at any post
worldwide, high-threat, high-risk designations will shift, and missions
will be added or deleted from this category. The HTP Directorate I
oversee will lead the security operations in these high-threat, high-
risk posts around the world, coordinate strategic and operational
planning, and drive innovation across the broad spectrum of DS missions
and responsibilities. We continue to work closely with the Regional
Bureaus to ensure that everyone has visibility of the security threats
at our posts.
As the Deputy Assistant Secretary for HTP, I am responsible for
evaluating, managing, and mitigating the security threats, as well as
directing resource requirements at high-threat diplomatic missions. I
closely follow developments, continually assess our security posture,
and take all possible steps to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities.
While the Department has created a position for high-threat post
designations, we must continue to focus on embassy security worldwide.
I coordinate closely with my colleagues in DS, the Department, and the
interagency to ensure the threats and risk mitigation strategies are
shared globally.
We can never truly eliminate all the risks facing our dedicated
personnel working overseas to advance U.S. interests. However, as the
Department has said, we place the highest priority on the security of
our personnel and will continue to take
steps, which in some instances includes extraordinary measures, to
provide for their safety.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee
today and to discuss the future of embassy security. I am available to
answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your testimony. And
let me start the first round of questions, here.
You know, I have heard from some of my colleagues that
suggest that what we need is just greater oversight at State,
but we do not need any money. The question is, Can you, under
the existing budget, with no additional revenues, protect,
throughout the world, and particularly at high-risk posts, the
lives of those who are assigned to the diplomatic corps
representing us worldwide?
Mr. Starr. Senator, thank you for going right to the heart
of what is really important to us, in many ways: giving us the
resources to address this. Two parts to this answer.
The 2013 Continuing Resolution level of funding, plus the
generosity of Congress under the increased security proposal, I
believe gives us the proper level of resources that we can
utilize effectively now, this year and our 2014 budget request,
which essentially rolls both of those pots of money into our
request, as well. I believe that that amount of money gives us
the ability to move forward and do the things that we need to
do.
The second part of that question is, of course, as all of
us have mentioned, no, we cannot guarantee that we are going to
protect every single person, because we are working in highly,
highly dangerous areas, in many countries. But, that level of
funding, that level of resources, combined with the types of
actions that we are taking, gives us a level of confidence that
we have adequate and appropriate resources to address the types
of threats that we need to address.
Now, it does not mean that we are going to have equivalent
levels of security across the board. We are going to prioritize
where we put our resources--manpower, equipment, technical
equipment, where we build the new embassies--so we will
obviously have places where we have lower levels of resources.
The Chairman. Right. So, let me----
Mr. Starr. But, we will do it to the best we can, sir.
The Chairman. What I am trying to get is, is that, if I
zeroed out your account in the next year's budget, what would
you do?
Mr. Starr. If----
The Chairman. If I zeroed out--if you did not roll over
what, as you described, the largesse of the Congress, what
would you do?
Mr. Starr. We would prioritize very heavily----
The Chairman. But, you are not going to be able to secure
people across the globe----
Mr. Starr. No, sir.
The Chairman [continuing]. Understanding the context of
security.
Secondly, if I cut it in half, what would you do?
Mr. Starr. I think that would cause a reassessment of where
we could actually put people, sir. I do not think we would be
able to stay in the highest-threat locations, where the U.S.
national interests are most important.
The Chairman. So, there is--so, when the ARB identified--it
is number 10 of their many recommendations--identified $2.2
billion as an appropriate funding level for the Capital
Security Cost-Sharing Program, which the President's FY14
budget requested this amount, it was not just a number from the
sky, it was based upon an analysis of the Accountability Review
Board about what your challenges are, what your needs are, and
what you can realistically administer over a period of time. Is
that a fair statement?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir, that is very fair.
The Chairman. And so from a security standpoint, do you
have a sense of how many new facilities are needed,
particularly in high-threat, high-risk locations?
Mr. Starr. Sir, within the high-threat list of 27
countries, we have a certain amount of them that have gotten
new facilities, but there still are about 15 of those
facilities that we do not have
the proper level of what we call ``post-Inman buildings.''
There
are other places around the world where we do not have those
facilities.
Going back to about 2000, after the 1998 bombings in Dar es
Salaam and Nairobi, we made a calculation, which we stand to,
to this day, which is that we needed approximately 175 new
facilities around the world to be brought up to the highest
level of security standards. In the past 13 years, we have
constructed about 80 to 90 of those facilities. From 1988 to
1992, under the Inman era, we constructed 22 of those
facilities. So, we are at about the 110 mark out of 175
facilities that we would like to continue working diligently to
replace and put new embassies that meet blast standards, have
their proper level of standoff, as mandated by Congress, have
the antiram protection, and have the level of protection that
we seek for our people overseas.
The Chairman. Let me ask you, What are the factors that
would require the construction of a new facility versus a
security upgrade at an existing facility?
Mr. Starr. Primary factor, sir, is that, in many places
around the world, we do not have facilities that have setback.
We cannot retrofit many of our buildings to withstand blast or
direct attack without the ability to move to a new location,
acquire setback, and build a facility that meets the blast
standards.
The Chairman. Now, finally, where new construction is not
an option because of the inability to either secure land, find
a suitable location, or for other reasons, how does the
Department seek to mitigate risks at high-threat, high-risk
facilities?
Mr. Starr. Many of those locations, we have withdrawn our
families, we have cut down and moved our staffing levels to
only the personnel that we absolutely need, we have worked
closely with host governments, in many cases, and asked them to
close off streets around our embassies so that we can try to
maintain some setback. Many of them have done that for several
years, but also look to us eventually to move our facilities so
they can reopen their streets. We work closely in training our
personnel and then trying to train host-country forces in
antiterrorism capabilities.
It is a variety of things, sir. But, the real one, where we
really are faced with facilities that do not meet our security
standards, we work with the host government to try to increase
our setback, put up additional barriers, and harden the
facilities, and then make sure that we have only the people
necessary, at the post, that we need.
The Chairman. So, to recap, money is a consideration, here,
in terms of your ability to say to this committee, ``We are
doing as best as we can in order to secure our people across
the globe.''
Mr. Starr. I could not say it better, sir. Yes; absolutely.
The Chairman. All right.
And then, finally, when we look at new embassy
construction, I understand it is prioritized on the basis of
security. Is that a correct statement, or is that an incorrect
statement?
Mr. Starr. The primary driver is security, sir. We provide
a list, with the Overseas Buildings Office, of our highest
priorities. Within that list, as we understand, that obtaining
real estate and property deals and then building a facility are
a long-range and very difficult in certain places, OBO has
certain flexibility, but we have reinforced with OBO, most
recently as a month and a half ago, that we want them to relook
at our highest-threat posts on the high-threat list and
determine whether or not we can make significant progress on
them.
I can give you one example, sir. After 30 years of trying
to find land for a new facility in Beirut and start the
construction of a new facility, we believe we are going to be
successful in the next couple of years. It looks like we have a
land deal, and it looks like we are going to be able to
actually replace the facility in Beirut that we have been
trying to replace for many, many years.
The Chairman. Great.
And, for those of us who are not acronym proficient, OBO
is?
Mr. Starr. I am sorry, sir. It is the Office of Overseas
Buildings Operations.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you. And thank
you both for coming here.
And I know the chairman has asked, sort of, a line of
questions that--which I expected that he would. And when we had
the hearing--I guess, the first hearing, with the leadership
that put forth the ARB, I mean, immediately they were talking
about money. And it seems like whenever there is a problem,
that is the first place we go. And I understand we may need to
look at that.
At the same time, as we look at your plans, I know you
currently have $1.4 billion, and you have asked for $800
million more. And I see that we are spending a huge amount of
money on facilities at The Hague, Oslo, Port Moresby. And even
in places where we have construction underway, like Beirut, the
new Embassy will not be ready for another 6 years. And, at the
same time--so, this is a lot of money that is being spent in
places that, candidly, the security issues are not necessarily
urgent, like we have in some of the places I mentioned earlier,
in Pakistan and Sudan.
So, it just seems to me that, from the standpoint of the
immediate security issues that our personnel has, and all of
us, including you, wanting them to be safe, our priorities are
not aligned with what it is we are hoping to do for our
outstanding Foreign Service officers. And I just wish you would
respond to that.
Mr. Starr. Sir, I appreciate the point that you are making.
And, in very many ways, on an everyday basis, we are trying to
address the immediate security concerns, through programs like
increased training of our personnel and our officers; lessons
that we learned from Benghazi, like, you know, How do we
increase our fire safety awareness and how do we provide
safety?--or, How do we provide countermeasures to fire as a
weapon? In those places where we cannot get new facilities, we
are doing security upgrades and working our host governments,
to the best that we can.
But, I think it is clear that, while we are doing the
immediate and short-term needs that we need to be addressing,
we are also asking for the ability to address the long-term
needs so that, as we move forward in the future, we put
ourselves, overall, in a better position.
In 1997, our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were
essentially rated as low-threat posts. We did not know, at that
point, that we were going to be seeing the phenomenon of
terrorism working outside of the small Middle East number of
posts that we were mostly concerned with.
Today, we know that global terrorism is exactly that:
global. It is a worldwide phenomenon. We do not know where we
are going to be, a decade from now. We did not foresee the Arab
Spring rise. We did not really foresee, in many cases, the
challenges that we would be facing through the Middle East.
So, our best answer, on a long-term basis, is, while we are
addressing the short-term, immediate needs that we have to for
our personnel and their safety, is also to address the long-
term needs so that we put ourselves, overall, in a better
position.
As I said, when we looked at our facilities from a
vulnerability standpoint, back in 2000, we looked at it and
said we need probably 175 new facilities. The facility in Oslo
does not have any setback. It has no blast resistance. It is
not bullet resistant. It provides a very low level of safety
for our personnel. I hope to be able to replace even facilities
in countries like that, as we go along, for the future.
Senator Corker. Well, I mean, is the answer yes or no? Are
you going to use some of this $800 million to harden and deal
with some of the immediate issues? Yes or no?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. We are going to try to address our
immediate issues and our long-term issues. But, it is a
combination of both. But, certainly our immediate issues come
first. We sent out combined State Department and military ISAT
teams to look at our highest threat-level posts in the
aftermath of Benghazi. We have dedicated an immense amount of
resources to trying to upgrade even further those places that
we have on our high-threat list, and continue to do that.
Senator Corker. What about the training facility? I have
received some calls from folks, other Senators about this. I
understand training now takes place in facilities that are
already built, though I have not visited them, personally. You
can share with me your own experiences--but, why would we go
ahead and--you know, at a time when we need capital to harden
facilities to deal with some of the longer term needs you are
talking about--why would we be expending so much money to build
a new training facility, when apparently those needs are being
taken care of in another existing facility?
Mr. Starr. Thank you for that question, Senator. This is a
question that is very close to my heart.
We are currently using a leased facility that is, on
weekends, a racetrack facility in West Virginia. We use it 5
days a week. We can train approximately 2,500 Foreign Service
officers a year in what we call ``fact training,'' the types of
training that--not for DS agents like Bill and myself, but for
regular Foreign Service officers. We give them high-speed
training in driving vehicles, antiram training. We give them
training--basic firearms training on how to make weapons safe,
first-aid training. We expose them to explosives so that the
first time they hear a bomb going off, they can understand
that, if they have survived it, what their next responsibility
is--you know, deal with themselves and then deal with others
and first aid. This level of fact training, we have found
through the years, has definitely saved lives overseas and
prepared our people to serve in the environments that we are
sending them.
Regretfully, the 2,300 people that I can train per year
does not come close--does not even meet the number of people
that we have at our high-threat posts, alone. We have certain
of our high-threat posts where we can only give our people a 4-
hour online course and say, ``Please take this course.''
So, the capacity of the current facility that we are
leasing in West Virginia cannot meet our training needs. Our
long-term goal, given where we are putting people out overseas,
is to train every single Foreign Service officer every 5 years
on the types of hard-skills security training that we believe
Foreign Service officers need; and, in many cases, their adult
family members, as well.
So, the current facility does not meet our requirements,
does not even meet our highest threat-level requirements, and
is a leased facility that, at some point, may not be available
to us.
So, we are seeking to put, in one place, close to where we
have our partners, the Marine Corps, military, intelligence
community, and the rest of the Foreign Service training
apparatus--we are seeking to build a hard-skills training
center where we can put 8 to 10,000 people a year through this
type of training. We believe that that will give us the
ability--in addition to hardening our facilities, the most
important side--training our people before they go overseas.
Senator Corker. And if I could just ask one last question.
You know, we have talked at a 30,000-foot level here about
capital expenditures. And I know we are going to be in much
more detail between our staffs. I mean, we now have talked a
little bit about training, and I understand how important that
is, and we certainly plan to get into more details with you
there as we move ahead.
I guess the last piece is, then, you know, you require
people within the State Department to execute. And again, I
know we have had a situation where the State Department has
reviewed functions. We had four personnel that have been put on
leave and are still being paid. And, just for what it is worth,
it does feel that there is a degree of lack of accountability,
to put it nicely. And I just wonder if you might address that,
also. Because you build great facilities, you train well, but,
if people do not execute and there is not that accountability,
we still have breakdowns and people are in situations that they
should not be in. So, could you address that issue for us
today?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
I think my first answer would be--is that Bill Miller,
sitting next to me, and my coming back after 4 years at the
United Nations and 29 years in Diplomatic Security, there is
nobody that takes this responsibility more seriously than we
do.
The people that we manage and the staffs that we have, the
agents that we train, the security protective specialists, the
engineers, the people that we have in Diplomatic Security are
dedicated and ready to give their lives to protecting our
people overseas. And I will simply say that you will not find
anybody more ready to take the responsibility or make the
decisions that have to be made than myself or Bill Miller or
the rest of my senior staff in Diplomatic Security.
I understand that there are still questions about the four
individuals. I was not here at the time. I do understand that
it is complex, because there are sets of rules and procedures
within the Foreign Service about disciplining people. It is my
clear understanding that this entire issue is at the Secretary
of State's level, that he is getting recommendations on how to
deal with this, and he will, finally, make the decision on what
is going to be the outcome with the four people there.
I will tell you, sir, that three of those four individuals,
I know well and have worked with closely. These are people that
have given their careers to Diplomatic Security, as well, and
the security of the Department of State. And I have a great
deal of admiration for them. It does not excuse the fact that
we had a terrible tragedy in Benghazi. And I think that the
Secretary and his staff will make the proper decisions on the
disposition of those cases.
But, I do want to tell you that that is the same management
team that was in place when our embassies were attacked in
Cairo, in Tunisia, in Khartoum, all through the years that we
have had multiple attacks in Yemen, in Afghanistan, and in
Iraq. Those people performed admirably. And it is my hope that
their entire career is not blotted by one single action,
because they are, in many ways, as dedicated as we are.
But, I will tell you that Bill and I will do our absolute
best, and we will bear whatever responsibility needs to be
taken.
Senator Corker. Well, listen, I thank you for that. And I
just would say that, look, I do not think anybody here is on a
witch hunt. And, candidly, I could not pick these four
individuals out of a lineup. I do not know that I have ever
even met them. I do think it is important for the culture of
the State Department and, candidly, for the U.S. Government in
general, that either, you know, it be stated that these people
made mistakes that should not have been made and are held
accountable, or not. And again, whatever is the right decision,
I think we will all be there. But, this sort of vague place
that we are in probably needs to end soon.
And again, I thank you for your response, and I hope the
Secretary of State will deal with this quickly, because it has
been a long time. But, I thank you, and I look forward to
working with you and the chairman as we move ahead.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Corker.
Because this is--I take this obligation very seriously. At
least on my watch, to the extent that I can, I am not going to
have anybody exposed and at risk as a result of inaction by
this committee. So, I am going to, at times here, engage in a
followup so that we have a sequential record that makes the
facts. There are two things that Senator Corker said and you
responded to that I want to get a little clarity, so I will
hope my colleagues will indulge me as I move to them next.
He asked you a very good question--you know, immediate
needs versus long-term needs. And you responded that you are
working on immediate needs. Of course, ``immediate needs''
means to the extent that you can mitigate what exists at a
post, because if you do not have a setback, you are not going
to be able to mitigate that fully until you have a new site and
a new construction. If you do not have a setback, and you are
talking about hardening--OK, fine, but hardening without a
setback has limited capabilities.
So, when you say, in the balance between what some may view
as the long term, which you described as, hopefully, getting to
a point in which all of our locations are as best protected
under the threats that we could envision today, regardless of
where they are located in the world, because we do not know
where the next high-risk posts will be, where the movement of a
terrorist activity will take place, and then we will all regret
that, well, we did not think that an Oslo meant that much, by
way of example. So, when you say you are mitigating, you are
mitigating--correct me if I am wrong, here, and I would like
the record to reflect whatever it is that--what are you
mitigating in the short term--what are you capable of
mitigating in the short term if you have an embassy or other
site that is not fully living to the specifications of what you
and the Congress have devised as what is a secure location?
Mr. Starr. Mr. Chairman, what we can mitigate in those
locations is, first, a function of what our analysis, in terms
of the threat and the overall situation in the country, tells
us. In a place like Oslo today, we have a full-functioning
staff and a fully functioning embassy, despite the fact that we
do not have a setback or a secure facility. The reason we can
do that is that we have excellent cooperation from the host
government, we do not have information that indicates to us
that we are running a tremendously high risk by leaving them in
this facility for the time being, and we have national security
imperatives that we are carrying out, Foreign Service officers
working on different things every single day.
But, to give you another example, sir, is--in Cairo today--
and Cairo is a--not an Inman building; it is a pre-Inman
building, but quite a robust facility--when the situation
changed dramatically in Cairo, when we saw specific threats,
when we saw the social upheaval happening on the ground--in the
last several weeks, we have evacuated what we call ``ordered
departure.'' We have moved out all of our families and we have
moved out all nonessential personnel, nonemergency personnel.
And these are the types of things that we can do to mitigate
threats, where we do not have a facility that necessarily
meets, you know, the highest level of standards.
There are things that we can do, in terms of, as I say,
asking the host government to block off streets for us, if they
will cooperate----
The Chairman. I gather that. I do not want to cut you
short, but----
Mr. Starr. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. What I am trying to get to is
Senator Corker's concern--or at least it seems to me his
concern, as expressed at various times now, and today as well--
between the immediate and the long term. To the extent--Is this
a fair statement? To the extent that you can mitigate something
in the immediate term, you are seeking to do that. Is that a
fair statement?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely, sir.
The Chairman. Now, that does not mean that mitigation of
the immediate is the desired goal, because, in fact, you may
not be able to mitigate beyond--if you do not have a setback,
if you do not have a hardened facility, if you do not have all
the other elements that are in play for what we consider a
fully secured facility. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Starr. Exactly. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right. Now, that gives us a little
balance as to what the immediate versus the long term means.
With reference to the question of employees, I agree. I
agree in accountability, and I agree in performance. Now, I
read the ARB's recommendation, number 23, which said that,
``The Board is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory
leadership performance by senior officials in relation to the
security incident under review should be a potential basis for
discipline recommendations by future Accountability Boards, and
would recommend a revision of Department regulations or
amendment to the relevant statute to this end.'' In essence,
when they were here, as well, and testified to this question,
they said, ``Under the existing statutory authority, there are
limitations.'' What is the proof point that you have to have in
order to discipline somebody?
So, I do not know if you have had the opportunity to look
at section 203 of the legislation that I have promoted, S. 980,
that I believe satisfied the ARB's recommendation in that
regard, which would then give the Secretary the authority to
fire individuals who have exhibited unsatisfactory leadership
in relation to a security incident. Do you believe that that
section would give the Secretary that ability?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir, I do. I believe it is important to
give that additional flexibility, and I think that helps us.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Cardin, thank you for your forbearance.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just
concur with your observation.
Our committee has a very important responsibility for
oversight. And I appreciate the two witnesses that are here. It
is our responsibility to review the steps that you have taken
and resources that you have. But, we also have a responsibility
to make sure that tools are available for embassy security. And
that is a responsibility of the entire Senate. The
Appropriations Committee has the responsibility on the
resources. This committee has the responsibility as to whether
the policies are right. And I just want to applaud the chairman
for S. 980. I think that gives us a way to make sure that you
have the adequate tools in order to manage the security of our
embassies. And the chairman's followup questions, I think,
underscored some of those issues, and I thank you very much,
Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this issue, but also
recognizing the dual responsibility we have on oversight and to
make sure that the tools and resources are available.
I want to follow up on facilities, because I have had a
chance to visit many of our embassies. And there is a common
theme, except for the very new embassies, when you are able to
talk frankly with the embassy personnel, there is always
concerns about the facilities, that they could be better. And I
know that you did a review and a list was compiled several
years ago, and I know that we have also made progress. And I
expect that this list is updated by circumstances in country,
et cetera. But, is it time for us to do another evaluation,
globally, of our facilities, recognizing that circumstances
have changed?
I, personally, believe we need to do a better job. Oslo is
an important ally, a friend. I have been to that embassy. I
understand that it is not a high-risk area, but they should
have adequate facilities, based upon the security needs and
efficiency factors. And, in many embassies around the world,
the United States does not have the combination of space,
efficiency, and security that is ideal for us to carry out our
mission.
Mr. Starr. Sir, I believe that is an accurate statement. It
is, in many cases, more than just security, but certainly
security is our overriding factor at this point. But, I believe
you are accurate when you say that, in many cases, we do not
have either the space or the types of facilities that we need.
That is why, when we build new facilities, the primary
thing that we are trying to achieve is security, but the Office
of Overseas Buildings looks clearly at what our staffing levels
need to be, where we are going to be in the future, what types
of operational and functional space we need; and that includes
things like much larger consular operations, in many places. We
have many other agencies in our embassies, as well. And that is
all wrapped into what it is that we are doing and how we build
buildings and where we build buildings.
So, sir, I could not agree with you more. It is a
combination of factors. But, we believe we still need probably
at least another 75 or so major buildings.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, I would urge that we look at
a way in that we can get an updated realistic inventory of what
we need, globally, to meet the challenges.
I really do applaud former Secretary Clinton and President
Obama for recognizing the important role that our diplomatic
missions play in our national security. They need to have the
resources in order to be able to carry that out in a safe
manner, in an efficient manner. And I just think we could use a
better blueprint than the one that was developed 5 or 6 or 7
years ago.
Mr. Starr. Senator Cardin, I will take that back, and I am
sure the Office of Overseas Buildings Operations, and probably
with us, would be willing to come up and work with any of your
staff and give you the information that you would like.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that.
Let me move on to a second issue on security, and that is
the confidence and support that we have from the local
government and authorities. I know that it varies by country.
And that is evaluated as part of the security mission that you
have to undertake.
Can you just briefly outline how the confidence we have in
the local government's ability to respond or to work with us on
security issues, factors into the equation on our security
needs?
I wanted to give Mr. Starr a break. So, Mr. Miller, if you
could respond that, that would be good.
Mr. Miller. I appreciate that, sir. I was beginning to feel
a little left out. [Laughter.]
If I could go back a moment to the ISAT teams that went out
in November, I led one of those teams as we went about
assessing our various missions, the 19 missions that we very
quickly assessed and felt that were our most vulnerable at that
time. One of the things, one of the legs that we were assessing
was our host nation's willingness and capability to defend the
mission in accordance with their Vienna requirements. As we
look at that, we have to roll that into ``If it's weak on one
leg, we have to strengthen the other.'' And that would be our
ability to withstand an attack, say, for instance, as we did
for quite some time in Khartoum and in Tunisia, about 8 hours
as those facilities were attacked in early September, as well.
So, if we have a weakness on one side, we have to be able
to mitigate that by strengthening on another. It is not always
possible, however. And that calls into play, then, a greater
requirement for our diplomatic cadre to work with the host-
nation political counterparts to ensure that they live up to
their responsibilities, just as we do here for them in the
United States.
It is something that we try to address, where we can, with
training, through our antiterrorism assistance programs and
other bilateral training programs that the U.S. Government
provides to help bolster their own professional capabilities
and, hopefully, build it up to the point where we can trust, as
we do in most places, their ability to secure us.
Senator Cardin. I would just make one observation. I would
hope that we engage the political apparatus of our country at
the highest levels if we need more cooperation from host
countries.
I want to ask one more question on one of the ARB
recommendations to address language capacity. Could you just
briefly update us as to how that recommendation is being
implemented?
Mr. Miller. Certainly. And as this applies primarily to the
capacity for Arabic language skills, the Foreign Service
Institute has been working very diligently with the rest of the
Department, to include with Diplomatic Security, to assess what
our language requirements are for our special agents as they
engage with their host-nation counterparts.
We anticipate, I believe, that the first class begins this
next month, or early September, to give those skills, or the
opportunity to acquire the skills for our special agents in
such a way that they will be able to work in an emergency
situation. Realizing that it is a long-term process to acquire
proficiency that allows them to converse proficiently, that
process can be upward of 2 years for someone like myself,
shorter for those who are a little brighter. But, it is a very
difficult process. We are hoping to achieve that with a short-
term objective with our immediate security language course in
Arabic.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Cardin.
And, Mr. Miller, feel free to join in on any answers that
you want. We want a full record, as much as possible, so do not
hesitate to jump in.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you. And I apologize for not being
here. And I apologize if this has been asked and answered
probably three times by now with regard to the legislation that
has been introduced.
Assuming that legislation were in place and implemented,
would it have affected the outcome in Benghazi, simply because
it was not an embassy or even a consulate? Would it have made a
difference there or--in your opinion?
Mr. Starr.
Mr. Starr. Benghazi was at a threat level that we should
have reprioritized what we were doing within our existing
capabilities. I thank the chairman for introducing this
legislation. In the long term, it will help us on a number of
different fronts. But, I am not going to sit here and tell you
that the tragedy in Benghazi could have been avoided, had we
had this legislation. I think that was a question that we did
not understand the situation that we were in, and perhaps we
should have had more resources or we should have made a
decision to evacuate that post earlier.
But, you know, we very much appreciate this legislation. It
will help us in many, many ways. It will strengthen our
capability to stay in places where the threats are greater.
But, I am not going to blame Benghazi on the lack of this
legislation.
Senator Flake. Do you have anything to add?
Mr. Miller. No, sir.
Senator Flake. OK.
Benghazi was a particular situation there, given the makeup
of the government and the situation just to--you know, the
newness of all this. What lessons have we learned from that,
that can be applied elsewhere, in terms of our relationship
with a host nation? The host nation did not even know this
facility was there, I understand, or they were not informed of
it. What protocols have we put in place, if any, after that, to
make sure we have better cooperation with the host nation, in
terms of security needs?
Mr. Miller. One of the chief issues, I think, that we have
realized, and was addressed in the ARB, was the fact that all
of our facilities should meet OSPB standards--Overseas Security
Policy Board standards--for physical security. In this
instance--and I was not in a position to know why--but, in this
instance, they were not met. There were no waivers that were
granted. That has been rectified. We will not have a temporary
facility that has not been signed off on at the highest levels,
wherein a balance of our national security interests and the
diplomatic imperatives are weighed against the security threat.
So, I would say that is one positive outcome of the ARB.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Flake.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And, to our witnesses, I appreciate you being here today.
My first hearing as a Senator was the hearing with
Secretary Clinton to talk about the Benghazi incident and the
ARB recommendations, and it was a very memorable one; I will
never forget that first hearing. I reviewed the ARB in advance
of the hearing, to prepare--and, Mr. Chair, I imagine you know
this--there are so many recommendations that you kind of
personally fix upon a couple, and there are a couple that I was
particularly interested in.
One was the recommendation about the expansion of the
Marine Security Guard program. And the second was the
recommendation about training of our State Department
personnel.
In the packet of materials that we were given for this
hearing, there is a New York Times graphic, where there is a
summary, as of May 20, how far along we are in meeting the ARB
recommendations. And there is sort of a spectrum in each of
these various recommendations, from, basically, ``not started''
to ``completed.'' And in each of the recommendations, there is
sort of a New York Times assessment of where we are.
The Marine Security Guard one is sort of lower than the
midpoint, but the lowest one, the one that is most near ``not
even started yet,'' is the recommendation about: to improve the
training of employees headed to high-threat posts and expand
the number of posts where additional security training is
required.
Assistant Secretary Starr, you talked about the issue, in
response to questioning from Senator Corker, about the need for
the training facility for State Department employees. And you
and I have met about this previously. And the chairman's
proposed legislation addresses this. But, just to give some
history for everyone here, the State Department began trying to
find a training facility to replace the racetrack, that was
used during the week, about 4 years ago. They began this long
before Benghazi, long before the ARB. And there has been a 4-
year effort that considered 80 different sites for this
training facility, and it eventually dwindled down, whittled
down--some communities did not want it--and with the particular
requirements, largely to involve a facility that would be close
to partners, synergy with the Marine Security Guard and others,
it dwindled down and there was a preference for expanding this
program at a Guard base--a National Guard base in Virginia,
Fort Pickett. And that was, basically, the preference that we
were moving toward before Benghazi and before the ARB.
After the incident at Benghazi, the ARB report has a
recommendation, recommendation number 17, that specifically
focuses upon the need to move out of this rented facility and
find a permanent facility for embassy training.
In February, just a few months ago, the State Department
communicated to Congress and indicated that they were about to
issue an EIS for Fort Pickett, but, in April, there was another
letter that suggested this was now delayed, largely because of
an inquiry from the OMB about whether or not we could maybe do
this kind of a half version or a knockoff version at some other
facility. And I gather that there has been some exploration of
an existing facility in Georgia that would not have the
synergies with the Marine Security Guard Program, that would
not have synergies with the other intelligence agencies with
whom our Department of State staff worked.
So, it appears that this process that was moving forward
before Benghazi and before the ARB to actually require this
training capacity is now, after Benghazi and after the ARB,
being thrown into kind of a question-mark status.
It would be ironic--that is the wrong word. It would be
tragic if a process that was moving toward better training,
optimizing training for Secretary of State--or Department of
State staff before Benghazi and before the ARB, would be now
slowed down, watered down, diluted after we know what we know
as a result of those horrible incidents on September 11, 2013.
And so, Secretary Starr and Mr. Miller, what I would like
to ask--Assistant Secretary Starr--what I would like to ask you
is, From the State Department's standpoint, is it still your
professional belief that the site that was identified by the
Department of State at Fort Pickett is the most consistent with
both the desire to increase training and also most consistent
with the ARB recommendation that was forwarded to Congress by
the committee?
Mr. Starr. Senator Kaine, thank you for your question. The
answer is simple: yes, sir. We still believe that the site that
we chose at Fort Pickett gives us the best ability to train the
numbers of personnel that we need to train; to incorporate our
partners in the various other U.S. Government agencies, that
are critical to our training, into that training; to build the
synergies that we have with our own Foreign Service Institute
and our own training regimens up here. Yes, sir, we still
believe that is the best answer.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Miller, from your standpoint?
Mr. Miller. I can only echo what Assistant Secretary Staff
said. We have to have the synergy in order to develop the
relationships with our training partners as well as for the
students who are going through. And we both could give you
numerous examples of opportunities that foreign affairs
officers have had to participate in actual lifesaving events,
where they have benefited from the training that they had at
the racetrack, which has so well served us throughout my
career. But, we can do better. And if we can do better, we
absolutely have to, because we are talking about people's
lives.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. I do not have any other
questions.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, the security of brave men and women serving our
Nation overseas is critically important. To me, the
Accountability Review Board made it clear that the State
Department did not give the mission in Benghazi the personnel
and resources needed to ensure their security. So, I just
wanted to make sure that we are learning from those failures
and implementing real reforms.
With regard to risk mitigation, I understand that we must
accept a certain amount of risk to operate in areas like
Benghazi. The Accountability Review Board stated, ``Risk
mitigation involved
two imperatives: engagement and security, which require wise
leadership, good intelligence and evaluation, proper defense,
and strong preparedness, and, at times, downsizing indirect
access,'' they say, ``and even withdrawal.''
So, the question: What are the factors that the Department
of State considers when determining whether a location is
simply too dangerous to support a diplomatic presence?
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.
We look at three basic questions: the host nation's
capability and willingness, as I said earlier. We look at the
current threat streams, those threats which have developed,
that we are aware of, that direct themselves to our facilities.
And then, we also look at the physical presence that we are
able to maintain, based on our physical security posture at
post. And, as we balance those three and any possible
mitigation, we then move forward with our diplomatic
engagement. If we cannot balance those three, then we have to
assess those options which you have just addressed.
Senator Barrasso. Are there posts, currently, that you have
identified as needing to either be downsized or closed?
Mr. Miller. I can point back to Bangui, which we evacuated
late last fall--late December. We are constantly evaluating
other posts. A good example is our U.S. Embassy in Cairo, over
the past month, as they have gone through the large
disturbances, not only in Cairo, but throughout the country.
So, it is a constant evaluative process that we go through and
assess, then, what our next steps may possibly be.
Senator Barrasso. Could I ask about the Inspector General's
audit of June 30, came out--2013--released its audit of
compliance with physical and procedural security standards at
select high-threat-level posts. And I am concerned that it has
been 10 months since the terrorist attacks in Benghazi, yet the
Inspector General found that there are high-threat-level posts
are failing to comply with security standards. I do not know if
you have seen the audit yet. Can you explain to the committee
why these problems are happening, and what the plan and
timeline is for, you know, remedying these issues?
Mr. Miller. Thank you. I think it is important that we do
point out some differences that we may have with the Office of
Inspector General when they do provide a report, as this one. I
think it is important to note that the high-threat, high-risk
posts that I am responsible for leading and supervising the
management of their programs, I do not believe they visited any
of those posts. When they are referring to high-threat, that is
a very often-used and not-well-defined term. So, as they look
at the various recommendations, it should be parsed very
carefully when we look at the HTP posts for which I am
responsible.
I will say that we are continuing to work with the OIG to
address their concerns. We want to ensure that our people do
have the best-possible protection, and we value the OIG's
perspective. But, I know DS, or Diplomatic Security, is working
with the OIG to find common ground.
Senator Barrasso. Well, thank you for that clarification.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Let me thank both of our witnesses, not just for your
testimony, but for the incredible service that you are
providing our country. It is an extremely difficult time, and
obviously the safety of our personnel is an important
responsibility. So, we thank you very much.
We also appreciate your willingness to work with this
committee. There has been a lot of questions asked that I think
will involve us working together to make sure that we have safe
facilities and personnel in the right place, et cetera.
As I said earlier, we have a responsibility, not only of
oversight, but to be your partners, and we look forward to
working with you to protect the dedicated men and women who
serve our Nation in foreign posts around the world.
With that, the committee will stand adjourned.
[Recess.]
The Chairman [presiding]. The committee will come to order.
I apologize for the confusion.
I understand that facility training had a indepth
discussion, I assume. Is that correct? So, let me ask, if I
may, a couple of questions, just to conclude, then.
One is, I want to go back to the questions that Senator
Flake raised with you. And, for my purpose, they are not
Benghazi-specific, but they are about temporary and mixed-use
facilities. My understanding is that the U.S. Special Mission
in Benghazi was a temporary facility, and that the Overseas
Security Policy Board standards for facilities apply to all
facilities, including temporary facilities.
In a report that the ARB issued, the State Department noted
that it would reissue this long-established policy to all posts
by January of this year. Do we know, was that policy reissued?
Mr. Miller. It was reissued. I believe it was January the
23rd.
The Chairman. OK. And how are the Overseas Security Policy
Board standards enforced at temporary facilities?
Mr. Starr. Sir, when we move back into a country--and this
is really where we are going to experience temporary
facilities--one of the things that we are going to have to do
is determine what our presence is going to be, and then we are
going to have to determine what facilities are available and
whether or not we can balance the need versus the safety.
Part of the process is looking closely at what facilities
are available, what it will cost to do those facilities, and
whether or not we have the ability to do it.
We are currently not in Somalia. We send temporary-duty
personnel into Somalia because we do not have a facility that
we think could meet our requirements at the moment. And I think
that, perhaps, is the best judgment I can give you.
We are very vocal and very clear when we think that we do
not have an answer that can meet the security requirements.
We are very concerned about places like Goma. We only allow
temporary-duty travel in, working very closely with the United
Nations. We do not have a facility that meets our needs there
at the moment.
Should the Department make a determination that we need to
go back into those places, we use the integrated planning cells
to determine what we need to have. We have to make a
determination whether we have the internal resources to meet
those needs or have to come to Congress for a supplemental to
do it. We have developed certain new tools to help us.
One of the things we learned out of Iraq, when we had many,
many people in trailers in many places, and then we would take
these trailers and we would put sandbags around them, and then
we would put overhead cover, and then we would put walls around
them--we have developed something called ``a hardened-
alternative trailer system,'' which is a highly blast-
resistant, bulletproof trailer, at this point, that provides a
high degree of overhead protection built right in. So, we are
trying to develop new tools that will give us reasonably safe
and secure accommodations, and even offices, in these
temporary-type situations.
The Chairman. So, let me go to part B of this particular
Benghazi-type set of circumstances. And that is: In instances
where a facility is shared or is used principally by a U.S.
Government agency other than the Department of State, how does
the interagency process address security needs at that
facility? Who takes the lead?
Mr. Starr. The individual agency will be responsible for
upgrading the facility, but it still is upgrading to the OSPB,
the Overseas Security Policy Board, standards. And if they do
not meet
the standards, they go through the same waiver and exception
processes.
The Chairman. Very good.
Now, I want, for the records purposes, to establish
something that I think we, on the committee, know--you,
certainly, in the Department, know--but I do not think the
general public knows. And that is the Marine Guard attachment
to embassies. Until now--correct me if I am wrong--the Marine
Guard attachments to embassies was, in essence, for the
security of sensitive and classified documents. Is that
correct?
Mr. Starr. That is essentially correct, sir. The staffing
levels of marines that we were putting in facilities was
essentially to meet that requirement: 24-hour protection for
classified assets and operations and information.
The Chairman. Now, most people see the Marine Guards--
I think even Members of Congress, when they visited abroad--and
thought that somehow they were about protecting the embassy,
its personnel, and whatever else, including documents, was in
there. But, that really was not the core focus. Their core
focus, up until a new recent agreement, was to give the time,
should an embassy be overrun, for the purposes of being able to
deal with classified documents. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Starr. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. All right. Now, I understand that, at least
at high-threat posts, there is an additional mandate or
responsibility that we have asked the Marines to perform. Is
that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And what would that be?
Mr. Starr. We have renegotiated the Memorandum of Agreement
with the Marine Corps between the Department of State and
clearly emphasized that our new mandate is equal protection for
our personnel and our facilities in our embassies while
protecting classified information.
Sir, if I may----
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Starr. Even when we had our smaller numbers assigned to
our detachments, in many cases, you know, six or seven marines,
and the primary responsibility was protection of classified
information, there was not a marine out there, and there was
not an RSO out there, that did not understand that, in
extremis, their job was to protect the people. But, we were not
staffing with enough marines, necessarily, to take on that
role. And what we are working with the Marine Corps is in--
particularly in our high-threat locations, to increase the
numbers of marines at each one of these posts so that they are
better capable of doing the defense portion, as well.
The Chairman. I appreciate you expounding upon that,
because I did not suggest to mean that marines would stand by
and see people killed. But, certainly there was no staffing
level to be able to accomplish that, particularly at high-
threat posts.
Is the new Marine understanding that has come together with
the State Department on high-threat posts or globally?
Mr. Starr. The Memorandum of Agreement is global. The
reality is that we are concentrating on our highest-threat-
level posts and increasing our marine staffing at those
locations.
The Chairman. OK.
And then, finally, I want to get to host-government
capacity. The Accountability Review Board found that the Libyan
Government's response to be profoundly lacking on the night of
the attacks. A host government's support posture relies on both
the host government's capacity as well as their will. Those are
two--critically important. You can have the will but not have
the capacity; you can have the capacity but not have the will.
They both need to be there.
So, as we look beyond Libya--and we are looking, now,
globally--how do you assess these variables? How do you
quantify them? How do these determinations go into your overall
security assessment? And is the provision that we have included
in the legislation which deals with the question, not of the
lowest cost, but the best cost for performance, as well, to
give you the flexibility, particularly in places where that
will be critical to security, a desired flexibility?
I know there are multiple questions in there, so----
Mr. Starr. let me take the last part of it and then turn to
Bill on part of this.
On the contracting, sir, we believe that it is critical.
And we thank you very much for recognizing that the situations
in almost all of our posts are different. And, in certain
cases, where we do not have, perhaps, the level of support,
because of willingness or capability, from the host government,
situations may arise where the idea of lowest-cost technically
acceptable contracting is not going to give us the guard force
that we think that we could get if we had another instrument to
contract with.
So, we want to thank you. We do believe that adding this
capability, not just at our high-threat posts, but where we
believe there is a clear indication that this will increase
significantly our security capabilities, it gives us a tool to
do that, sir.
So, yes, I think it is an important step that allows us to
address some of the inherent capabilities when we do not
necessarily have the level of support from our host government
that we would like.
On the specific----
The Chairman. How about the questions of, How do you assess
the host-government's ability, willingness? How do you quantify
it? How do you make those determinations to factor in your
overall security assessing?
Mr. Miller. To some extent, it is a subjective call. But,
we quantify it, as much as we possibly can, through our various
partners with us at the embassy who help to assess the training
that the host services have received. Historically, in many
posts, we have a relationship that has gone back for a number
of decades, and we can quantify, then, what our expectation
should be and how well they can live up to those expectations.
In some instances, because of recent instability, that
expectation has been nullified. And then it is a matter of us
taking the opportunity, as I said in my opening statement, to
go to extraordinary measures, above those measures which are
standard. And, in those instances of--the best-value
contracting gives us the opportunity
to achieve a level of competence with our local guard forces
that
we would not necessarily be able to achieve with the host-
nation services.
Mr. Starr. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think we can quantify
the capabilities pretty well by working closely with our
Defense colleagues or intelligence colleagues, our own security
staff. We can see pretty well, and make a pretty good
determination of, the capabilities of the host government.
Much more subjective is this question of what is the
particular willingness at a time. And we are much more
sensitive, the entire Department is, to having a better
analysis capability and having our political officers and our
ambassadors really weighing in on what is the particular host-
government desire to help us in a particular time.
There are certain places where we could have a great deal
of willingness on a Tuesday afternoon, and, in some cases, by
Friday afternoon it may not be there. And this is, I think,
part of the dilemma, but it is also part of our solution, which
is for our security personnel, Bill and I and others, to work
much more closely with our regional bureaus and with our
ambassadors.
The Chairman. I have one final question, and that is on the
question of intelligence and its use, integration into your
analysis, and to looking at changing events, which might
indicate a different threat level, that we may not have
traditionally thought of as necessarily looking at a different
threat level. In the new paradigm in which we live in, which,
unfortunately, requires us to think outside of the box, you
know, the terrorists have to get only lucky once; we have to
get it right 100 percent of the time. That is a tough
challenge, but that is our challenge.
How are you integrating the use of intelligence? Are you
receiving the flow of information that is essential, I would
think, for you to continue to make an analysis on an in-real-
time ongoing basis so that you can adjust accordingly where you
need to?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. The relationship across the spectrum
of
intelligence community and us has broadened and deepened. We
have officers that--from other agencies--that are working with
us at our desks, in our offices, now. The level of coordination
that goes on, in terms of discussion of threats, is deeper and
wider, and held both at the working level and at the national
security staff level. The coordination that we have with our
regional bureaus now--every weekday morning, and Saturdays and
Sundays as necessary, we start off looking at the threats that
have come in most recently. In those same meetings, we have
representatives from the regional bureaus of the Department of
State so that we are linking up the political with the
intelligence that is coming in.
If I can say one thing, sir, that--one major strategic
lesson that came out of Benghazi. One of the observations of
the ARB was that there was no specific intelligence in Benghazi
to indicate that there was a threat--going to be a threat that
night. And I think it--you can lull yourself into a position,
where, if there is no specific intelligence, you say, ``OK, we
must be OK.'' I think one of the major changes that has
happened is that we are much more aware of the larger
atmospherics in these countries--the political, the social,
what is going on in terms of Web activity, social networking--
trying to keep abreast of what we see is going on in that
country, in addition to whether or not we have specific
intelligence threats, is a much deeper, much broader effort
than we have had before, as well.
So, I think it is really both sides. It is the intelligence
side that is deeper, broader, and more important to us, but it
is also keeping much more abreast of what is really happening
in that location, and melding the two into our decisionmaking,
and then what we do as recommendations further up in the
Department.
The Chairman. And when you say that your use or access or
universe of intelligence is deeper and wider, are you referring
to that deeper and wider as post-Benghazi?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Yes.
All right. With that, and seeing no other members before
the committee, with the thanks of the committee both for your
service and for the men and women who serve under you in
protecting our diplomats abroad, you have the thanks of the
committee. We look forward to a continuing engagement with you
as we try to move this legislation forward.
The record will remain open until the close of business
tomorrow.
And, with that, the hearing now is truly adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Gregory Starr to
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
long-term embassy construction versus immediate threat mitigation
The Department is requesting and S. 980 would authorize an $800
million increase from the $1.4 billion we currently spend on new
embassy construction in the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program
(CSCSP). In his testimony, Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security, Gregory Starr, informed the committee that this increase
would be spent on addressing immediate security deficiencies at
existing posts that are not able to initiate new construction. Yet in
May, committee staff were briefed about the 2013 and 2014 build plans
to spend the total $2.2 billion for embassy construction, and State
indicated plans to use the entire funding for long-term, new
construction projects such as new embassy and consulate construction,
Marine Security Guard quarters, and land acquisition.
Question A. Since S. 980 authorizes $2.2 billion for CSCP, which is
used to fund new construction projects, what specific amount from this
fund would be used for immediate threat mitigation in high-risk, high-
threat posts that are not currently under construction for more secure
facilities and how is that reflected in the 2013 and 2014 build plans
that were provided to the committee?
Answer. There are 27 posts designated as High-Threat High-Risk. The
Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has either completed or
has under construction new, secure facility projects at 12 of these
posts.
Further, the Department's FY 2013 plan includes $462 million for
design and construction of new Embassy compounds at three posts
(N'Djamena, Nouakchott, and Beirut) designated as High-Threat High-
Risk.
Site searches for the remaining 11 posts designated as High-Threat
High-Risk are underway, but without a site, construction cannot be
scheduled for a specific fiscal year and it would be premature to
allocate funding. Once sites are acquired at any of those locations,
the capital project schedule can be revised to include construction
award at those posts as soon as possible.
Until sites can be acquired and new projects are underway, the
Department will take steps to increase the physical security at these
posts. As described in the response to question B, funding for this
type of immediate security upgrade comes from outside the Capital
Security Cost Sharing program. For example, a $34 million project in
Tripoli funded from Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance
Overseas Contingency Operations (ESCM/OCO) and other agency
contributions is underway to include a perimeter wall, compound access
control facilities, compound emergency sanctuaries, and other security
enhancements recommended by the State-Department of Defense (DOD)
Interagency Security Assessment Team (ISAT).
Additionally, OBO has also obligated $26 million of FY 2013 ESCM/
OCO funding to implement immediate security upgrades at 19 posts (13 of
which are designated as High-Threat High-Risk) in response to the
recommendations of the ISAT.
Question B. If funding for immediate threat and security mitigation
for U.S. personnel serving at unsecure posts that are not eligible or
able to initiate new construction for safer facilities does not come
from the CSCP account, what account does such funding come from and how
much money is specifically allocated to such immediate threat
mitigation in FY 2013 and 2014?
Answer. The Department has several options to mitigate security
concerns at posts that are not immediately scheduled to receive Capital
Security funding for the construction of new facilities.
Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) Funding Options:
First and foremost is the Compound Security Program which provides
physical security upgrades to existing facilities. These upgrades
include perimeter walls, compound access control facilities, vehicle
barriers, mantraps, compound emergency sanctuaries, and forced-entry/
ballistic-resistant doors and windows. Our plan for the FY 2013 Embassy
Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) appropriation includes
$85.3 million for the Compound Security Program and the FY14 budget
request includes $101 million. Since the inception of the Compound
Security program in 1999, Congress has provided nearly $2 billion,
allowing the Department to undertake security upgrades and enhancements
at many posts worldwide.
In addition to the Compound Security Program, security enhancements
may be incorporated into larger renovation projects that are funded
from OBO's Maintenance Cost Sharing (MCS) and Major Rehabilitation
Programs. The FY 2013 appropriation provides an overall program level
of $270 million for MCS program, which is cost-shared between the
Department ($156 million from the ESCM appropriation) and other agency
contributions ($114 million) to support maintenance requirements at
functional facilities occupied by multiple agencies. In FY 2013, the
Major Rehabilitation Program provides $35.3 million from the ESCM
appropriation for State-only functional and all residential facilities.
The Department's FY 2014 budget request includes $35 million for the
Major Rehabilitation Program and $130 million for the Department's
share of the MCS program, which totals $167 million with other agency
contributions.
Construction of new facilities that is driven by factors other than
security, and is therefore not eligible for Capital Security funding,
is funded from the Strategic Capital program with the ESCM account.
While security vulnerability is not the reason for undertaking these
projects, all facilities will be constructed to the Department's
security standards. Our plan for the FY 2013 ESCM appropriation
includes $69.9 million in Strategic Capital to fund the Department's
share of the second phase of the new NATO headquarters facility in
Brussels. There is no Strategic Capital funding in the FY 2014 budget
request.
The Department also has the authority to retain the proceeds from
the sale of excess and underutilized properties and use them to
purchase or construct new facilities. New Embassy facilities in Berlin
and Luanda were funded from proceeds of sale, as is the new London
Embassy project.
Diplomatic Security (DS) Funding Options:
In FY 2013, the Department, through the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, has allocated $27.3 million of FY 2013 funds for Worldwide
Security Protection (WSP) within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs
(D&CP) account for physical security upgrades to mitigate security
vulnerabilities at certain high-threat high-risk posts.
In addition to the $27.3 million of funds available for high-
threat, high-risk physical security upgrades, $177.5 million of
``undistributed'' D&CP/WSP funds are available to meet emerging
security needs as they arise, for a total of up to $204.8 million as
needed to mitigate physical security concerns outside of CSCS.
In FY 2014, if fully funded, the President's request would provide
funds within the D&CP/WSP account to mitigate physical security
concerns on an as-needed basis.
Question. What actions is Diplomatic Security taking to monitor
requests from overseas posts seeking security exceptions and waivers
and to ensure that such exceptions and waivers are only granted where
absolutely essential? Who is the most senior Department officer that is
required to authorize security exceptions and waivers for high-threat
posts?
Answer. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of
1999 (SECCA) requires that all newly constructed/occupied overseas U.S.
diplomatic facilities possess a 100-foot setback from their perimeter,
and that all U.S. Government operations be collocated on one chancery
or consulate compound. Any deviation from these SECCA provisions
requires a waiver from either the Secretary (all newly constructed
chancery and consulate buildings that do not meet SECCA requirements)
or the Assistant Secretary of Diplomatic Security (all other requests).
In addition to SECCA's requirements for colocation and setback,
security standards are established by the Overseas Security Policy
Board (OSPB), an intergovernmental board comprised of representatives
from all agencies that operate in an overseas environment under Chief
of Mission authority. The Board is chaired by the Department of State's
Bureau of Diplomatic Security. OSPB physical security standards include
standards for doors, perimeter walls, compound access controls, etc.
The Department strives to meet as many OSPB security standards as
we can in all facilities. New construction rarely poses a problem, but
it can be a challenge to retrofit an existing facility. OSPB exceptions
may be granted by the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. If
an exception to an OSPB standard is needed, the requestor must explain
the justification for such an exception. All areas that fall short of
the required standards must be identified and mitigating measures must
be described to explain how the facility will address the shortfall.
There are times when U.S. national interests require our immediate
presence. In these circumstances, we must find a suitable facility and
enhance security to the maximum extent possible. Time and the limits of
construction feasibility circumscribe our ability to retrofit an
existing structure to meet our full standards. In the future, secure
expedient facilities will likely remain a critical need, and we
continue to examine how to best meet this need based on the totality of
the operating environment and host country capabilities.
Question. According to testimony from Secretary Clinton before the
committee, she and other senior leaders at the Department were never
briefed on pleas from Ambassador Stevens for increased security
personnel. Specifically, the Secretary, when asked whether she
participated in meetings regarding the deteriorating security in Libya,
she stated that ``. . . with specific security requests, they did not
come to me. I had no knowledge of them.'' The Secretary also testified
that ``the ARB made very clear that the level of responsibility for the
failures that they outlined was set at the Assistant Secretary level
and below.''
Under the new procedures the Department put in place after
the Benghazi
attacks, what are the specific roles and decisionmaking
requirements, if any, of each of the top three officials at
State (Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary for
Management) for addressing security requests and crises at
high-risk, high-threat posts, like in Benghazi, and how will
that role and involvement in decisionmaking be documented?
Answer. Decisions on security requests from posts are made by
consultation within the Department. Working with Regional Security
Officers and other officials at posts, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of
the Regional Bureaus, their staff, Department leadership, and the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security interact daily to ensure that threats and
security needs not only at the high-threat, high-risk posts, but
worldwide, receive the appropriate scrutiny and response. Secretary
Kerry has noted that we can never provide a 100-percent risk-free
operating environment. Nevertheless, the Department is determined to
take measures to mitigate risks whenever and wherever possible. The
Department works every day to balance security with the ability of our
diplomats to get out and do their jobs.
We are working to ensure that our risk-management process for high-
threat locations is institutionalized, repeatable, and transparent.
Reviews of the U.S. Government presence and mission, and our security
posture, will take place at least annually following the update of the
high-threat, high-risk posts list. This process will also provide for
such reviews on an ad hoc basis in the event the security situation in
a location deteriorates.
This review for each location determined to be a high-threat, high-
risk post will be documented via a memorandum approved by the highest
levels of the Department.
Question. Based on briefings and information provided by the State
Department, we understand that OMB rejected the Department's $950
million proposal for a consolidated facility and directed the
Department to undertake a review of existing training capabilities
associated costs.
Is that process completed, and if so, and what has been
determined?
Answer. Because of the ongoing, serious fiscal challenges facing
the U.S. Government, including the order of sequestration, which went
into effect on March 1, the administration asked the General Services
Administration (GSA) and the Department of State (DOS) to perform
additional due diligence to determine the best use of taxpayer funds.
As a result, the Department is conducting additional cost studies for
the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) project. The
Department has also been asked to work with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to evaluate whether any training capacity for DOS
personnel is available at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC) in Glynco, GA. Further work on the FASTC project at Fort
Pickett has been put on hold, pending the results of the additional due
diligence effort with FLETC.
Based on information FLETC has provided to date, the Department
does not believe FLETC has excess training capacity available to
provide the necessary and timely platform for a dedicated DOS training
facility. DOS continues to support Fort Pickett as the best location to
build FASTC. The Department is committed to an open and transparent
process and will provide more information to the committee as it
becomes available and decisions are made regarding the future of FASTC.
Question. Is there no combination of existing government or private
sector training facilities (including but not limited to federal law
enforcement training centers and DOD facilities like the Naval Support
Activity Charleston) that could be combined to provide the same
training that a brand-new FASTC facility would provide?
Answer. Since 2009, the Department of State and the General
Services Administration (GSA) have invested considerable time and
effort in reviewing over 70 properties, including the Department of
Defense (DOD) facilities and law enforcement facilities before
identifying 1,500 acres of land on and near Fort Pickett, an
underutilized military base located in Blackstone, VA, that meet our
specific requirements for a hard-skills training facility.
Over the last 2 years, the Department of State and GSA have worked
extensively to conduct environmental studies, start negotiations for
land use agreements, secure community support at Fort Pickett, and
ultimately reassess the scope of the FASTC project at Fort Pickett.
Through these efforts, it was determined that a smaller platform at
Fort Pickett was more fiscally prudent.
The proximity of Fort Pickett, which allows the Department to
maintain and strengthen synergies due to its proximity to Department
Headquarters, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center (also known
as the Foreign Service Institute), DOD, and the Intelligence Community
(IC), cannot be overstated. The evolving overseas mission and
continually changing worldwide security environment requires greater
coordination with our partners, particularly DOD on the ``new normal,''
and positioning FASTC at Fort Pickett will allow the Department to meet
this need well into the future.
Question. Has the State Department requested, initiated, or
completed any internal or external cost analyses of its different
options for future training of diplomatic personnel, including an
analysis of alternatives like using existing government or private
sector facilities? If the answer is yes, please provide any and all
materials indicating or discussing these cost analyses, including any
internal correspondence discussing cost analyses, whether or not such
analyses were ever completed.
Answer. Since 2009, the General Services Administration (GSA) and
the Department of State (DOS) have undertaken an extensive process in
the search for a possible site for the proposed Foreign Affairs
Security Training Center (FASTC). Over 70 sites have been evaluated for
their potential to meet the needs of the security and law enforcement
training for the State Department. Project costs, as well as
socioeconomic and environmental impacts are just a few of the many
variables evaluated as part of the site selection process.
Currently, security and law enforcement training functions for the
State Department are conducted in approximately 19 separate leased and
contracted training facilities dispersed around the country. The fact
that the existing training facilities are widely geographically
separated creates difficulties in managing and coordinating activities.
Additionally, because the existing training facilities are located in
leased space or contracted facilities, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS) must modify or adjust training to fit within the
limitations of the facility. The lack of a dedicated training facility
also results in scheduling inefficiencies, increased costs, and
decreased productivity. DS security and law enforcement training
courses often need to be postponed or canceled at the existing training
facilities as they must compete for time and space with other Federal
agencies' activities, including training requirements of the military.
In addition, there are very few commercially available training centers
to accommodate the specialized training needs of DS. The development of
the FASTC would establish a consolidated hard-skills training center
from which DS could efficiently conduct training for a wide array of
participants, including the foreign affairs community and DS personnel
to meet increased demand for well-trained personnel. Consolidation
would also meet the directives of a June 2010 Presidential Memorandum,
``Disposing of Unneeded Federal Real Estate,'' which directs U.S.
Government agencies to eliminate lease arrangements that are not cost
effective and to pursue consolidation of operations.
As part of the Master Planning process, the Department of State and
GSA developed a detailed cost estimate to construct FASTC at Fort
Pickett. Additionally, a socioeconomic impact analysis was completed as
part of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement. This analysis
indicated a substantial economic benefit would be realized by Ft.
Pickett/Nottoway County, and the surrounding area.
Because of the ongoing, serious fiscal challenges facing the U.S.
Government, including the order of sequestration, which went into
effect on March 1, the administration asked GSA and the Department to
perform additional due diligence to determine the best use of taxpayer
funds. Accordingly, the Department reassessed the scope of the FASTC
project; determining a smaller, hard-skills-only training platform at
Fort Pickett was more fiscally prudent. Preliminary estimates indicate
that project construction costs could be reduced by approximately $375
million to $461 million. Additionally, the annual per-student cost
could be reduced by over 50 percent compared to the cost of current
hard-skills training methodologies.
The Department is happy to provide a briefing on the FASTC Project,
including cost estimates and cost benefit analysis.
Question. What contingency plans were in place for Benghazi?
Answer. As the independent Accountability Review Board on Benghazi
noted in their report, following the initiation of the attack on the
Special Mission Complex (SMC), the Diplomatic Security Agents
immediately reacted according to their emergency plan. `` Following the
SMC's emergency plan, Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO) 1
entered Villa C to secure the Ambassador and the Information Management
Officer (IMO) in the safe area and to retrieve his kit; ARSOs 2, 3, and
4 moved to retrieve their kits, which were located in Villa B and the
Tactical Operations Comman (TOC) . . . From Villa C, ARSO 4 ran to his
sleeping quarters in Villa B to retrieve his kit, while ARSOs 2 and 3
ran to the TOC, where ARSO 3 had last seen the Ambassador, and where
ARSO 2's kit was located.'' (ARSO 2's sleeping quarters were in the
TOC, making him the designated ``TOC Officer'' in their emergency react
plan.) Additionally, the Regional Security Office was responsible for
planning and conducting evacuation operations of Chief of Mission
personnel in the event of a significant attack or substantial
deterioration of local security. As such, the office had developed a
written evacuation plan which depending on security conditions and
specific threat information may have meant the evacuation of personnel
from the compound to the Annex, to the east toward Tobruk or from the
country entirely.
Because of the tumultuous conditions and natural disasters faced
periodically around the world, the Department has robust contingency
planning at all posts; this planning involves the interagency,
including the Department of Defense. Generally, when the Department is
faced with evacuating post personnel, we seek to inform private U.S.
citizens in that country, under a ``no double standard'' policy, and
may urge our citizens to leave the country. Typically, U.S. Government
employees and citizens will leave via commercial aircraft; on occasion
we have asked airlines to add flights to their schedules. If commercial
aircraft are not available or lack capacity, we have a process in place
to charter aircraft. Our third option is military aircraft; DOD is
always receptive to any Department requests.
U.S. diplomatic missions maintain an Emergency Action Committee
(EAC), which is comprised of members of the country team, including DOD
elements present at post. The EAC is chaired by the Deputy Chief of
Mission and validated by the Chief of Mission. The EAC also reviews
security policies, such as post's travel policy, which may recommend
particular modes of transport and prohibited times and/or locations of
travel, and develops post's Emergency Action Plan (EAP). The EAC must
review the capabilities and limitations that may impact post's ability
to operate, to communicate with the private U.S. citizen community, and
to carry out post plans in response to a crisis.
In addition, the Crisis Management Training (CMT) division of
State's Foreign Service Institute provides training in crisis
management and emergency preparedness for over 100 overseas posts each
year. The CMT division's mission is to help prepare U.S. Government
employees and teams operating within the foreign affairs community to
effectively respond before, during, and in the aftermath of all crises.
The CMT division distributes guidance on lessons learned and best
practices developed from past crises; provides example EAPs; and has
developed distance learning courses for Crisis Management.
Question. Were these contingency plans implemented when the
Benghazi compound was attacked, and if so, what went wrong?
Answer. Emergency react plans were implemented as the
Accountability Review Board on Benghazi noted in their report:
``Following the SMC's emergency plan, Assistant Regional Security
Officer (ARSO) 1 entered Villa C to secure the Ambassador and the
Information Management Officer (IMO) in the safe area and to retrieve
his kit; ARSOs 2, 3, and 4 moved to retrieve their kits, which were
located in Villa B and the Tactical Operations Command (TOC) . . . From
Villa C, ARSO 4 ran to his sleeping quarters in Villa B to retrieve his
kit, while ARSOs 2 and 3 ran to the TOC, where ARSO 3 had last seen the
Ambassador, and where ARSO 2's kit was located.'' (ARSO 2's sleeping
quarters were in the TOC, making him the designated ``TOC Officer'' in
their emergency react plan.) The report further states, ``Around the
same time, the temporary duty (TDY) Regional Security Officer (RSO)
working in the TOC heard shots and an explosion. He then saw via
security camera dozens of individuals, many armed, begin to enter the
compound through the main entrance at the C1 gate. He hit the duck-and-
cover alarm and yelled a warning over the radio, and recalled no such
warning from the February 17 or Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards, who
had already begun to flee to points south and east in the compound,
toward the Villa B area. ARSOs 1 and 2 heard an attack warning from the
BML guards passed on over the radio. The TDY RSO also alerted the Annex
and Embassy Tripoli by cell phone.''
The Regional Security Office in Benghazi was responsible for
planning and conducting evacuation operations of Chief of Mission
personnel in the event of a significant attack or substantial
deterioration of local security. As such, the office had developed a
written evacuation plan which depending on security conditions and
specific threat information may have meant the evacuation of personnel
from the Benghazi compound to the Annex, to the east toward Tobruk,
Libya or from the country entirely. Additionally, if it was determined
an attack warranted the full evacuation of the compound, RSO staff
``will contact the Annex and notify them of the intention to
relocate.''
With respect to coordination with the Annex, the ARB weighed in by
noting that ``just prior to receiving the TDY RSO's distress call
shortly after 21:42 local time, the head of Annex security heard
multiple explosions coming from the north in the direction of the SMC.
The Annex security head immediately began to organize his team's
departure and notified his superiors, who began to contact local
security elements to request support. The Annex response team departed
its compound in two vehicles at approximately 22:05 local time. The
departure of the Annex team was not delayed by orders from superiors;
the team leader decided on his own to depart the Annex compound once it
was apparent, despite a brief delay to permit their continuing efforts,
that rapid support from local security elements was not forthcoming.''
The interagency also worked quickly and collaboratively to respond
to the attack in Benghazi on September 11, and the ARB stated that
``Washington-Tripoli-Benghazi communication, cooperation, and
coordination on the night of the attacks were effective. . . .''
The ARB further went on to state ``The interagency response was
timely and appropriate, but there simply was not enough time given the
speed of the attacks for armed U.S. military assets to have made a
difference. Senior-level interagency discussions were underway soon
after Washington received initial word of the attacks and continued
through the night. The Board found no evidence of any undue delays in
decisionmaking or denial of support from Washington or from the
military combatant commanders. Quite the contrary: the safe evacuation
of all U.S. Government personnel from Benghazi 12 hours after the
initial attack and subsequently to Ramstein Air Force Base was the
result of exceptional U.S. Government coordination and military
response and helped save the lives of two severely wounded Americans.''
The Department is working more closely to coordinate with the
Department of Defense and other interagency colleagues as we adjust our
posture in light of the new landscape we face today around the world.
However, operating overseas presents unique challenges, and there is
never a complete guarantee of safety--but in the face of ever-evolving
threats, the Department strives to provide the most secure environment
possible for the conduct of America's foreign policy.
Question. Why would an independent review by the inspector general
regarding the Department's contingency planning be of concern to the
Department?
Answer. The Department has no concerns with independent review by
the inspector general of any of the Departments operations. The
Department appreciates the recommendations of the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) in their audits and inspections of our various
bureaus, offices, and programs. We take all reports and recommendations
seriously, prioritize the OIG findings and address the corresponding
recommendations accordingly.
Question. Please explain the coordination between the State
Department and Department of Defense in coordinating drills at U.S.
overseas posts as it pertains to Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams
also known as FAST. How often are these drills conducted?
Answer. A robust training program is essential for emergency
preparedness. Providing post personnel with skill sets and essential
information for emergency situations leads to an efficient and cohesive
response to emergencies. The post's Emergency Action Committee is
responsible for conducting drills, including their preparation,
execution, and evaluation. Drills provide an opportunity to practice
and evaluate the responses to emergencies. Emergency Action Committees
are compromised of representatives of all U.S. Government agencies at
post, including when applicable, Department of Defense representation.
The Marine Security Guard (MSG) Detachment, led by the Regional
Security Officer (RSO), is trained to respond to an array of
contingencies and many of these are practiced in set drills. These
drills include: internal defense, fire, bomb, mass casuality, emergency
destruction, and intruder. Drills are conducted on an established
schedule and must be reported to the Department per established policy.
Coordination of training with other United States Marine Corps
(USMC) elements such as USMC Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST)
or USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are facilitated by the Bureau
of Diplomatic Security (DS) routinely in training scenarios in the
continental United States (CONUS) and occasionally in theater. In
CONUS, DS Special Agents with overseas experience are called upon to
brief MEU personnel prior to deployment. DS Special Agents are involved
in a yearly contingency exercise with the Quantico-based USMC
Expeditionary Warfare School and DS Special Agents engage with the MEUs
as role players in table top exercises. Forward deployed USMC elements
are also provided exposure to DS and embassy security contingency
planning through geographic command theater exercises. A DS Special
Agent (LNO) is assigned to each geographic command and is involved in
joint-planning and exercise of contingency plans. Most frequently, DS
LNOs are involved in rehearsal of concept and broader theater exercises
that target the prospect of noncombatant evacuation planning.
When FAST has been deployed to U.S. diplomatic facilities, it falls
under the operational control of the Chief of Mission through the RSO.
When the RSO conducts drills with the MSG Detachment and with mission
staff, the RSO familiarizes the FAST with the drill scenarios and
enlists the FAST participation in some level or aspect of the mission
drill.
Question. What is the step-by-step process by which FAST assistance
is requested, approved, deployed?
Answer. The Department of State requests military assistance
through official correspondence between the Executive Secretaries of
the Department of State and Department of Defense. When requesting such
assistance, the Department of State defers to the Department of Defense
to determine the appropriate type and level of assistance necessary.
The Department of State refers the Senator to the Department of Defense
for information in the decisionmaking process to approve or deploy
FASTs.
Question. How many current Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)
personnel have criminal records?
Answer. DS agents undergo a background investigation and have been
determined suitable for the position and issued a security clearance
prior to employment. In addition, they go through clearance
reinvestigations every 5 years. Federal security clearances are
governed by Executive Order 12968, and adjudicated under the
``Government-wide Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility
for Access to Classified Information.'' Adjudicative Guideline J-
Criminal Conduct is one of the 13 guidelines used in making an access
determination. That guideline provides that security concerns may be
raised, and a person may be disqualified from holding a security
clearance, for a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses. The
guideline also lists conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) So much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior
occurred, or it
occurred under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely
to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the
act and those pressures are no longer present in the person's
life;
(c) Evidence that the person did not commit the offense; and
(d) There is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including
but not limited to the passage of time without recurrence of
criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job training or
higher education, good employment record, or constructive
community involvement.
These considerations, and others, are taken into account when
determining whether a prospective DS agent with a criminal record
should receive a clearance, and whether a current agent should maintain
their clearance if an offense is committed. Each case is judged on its
own merits. It is important to note that an offense that might result
in a criminal record could include, but is not limited to, jaywalking,
public intoxication, shop lifting, and driving under the influence.
We can determine that since entering the Department, 46 of the
1,930 DS agents (less than 2 percent of agents) have been arrested at
some point over the course of their career. The criminal records for
these individuals are mostly alcohol or domestic incident related. If a
DS agent commits a misdemeanor offense, the Department determines the
nature of the security concern and whether it can be mitigated. An
agent who is convicted of a felony will lose their security clearance,
and disciplinary action will be taken to remove them from their
position. Furthermore, all Department employees, including those in DS,
must immediately report information of a potentially derogatory nature,
including adverse involvement with law enforcement agencies, to the
Director, Office of Personnel Security and Suitability. Depending on
the nature of that involvement, it could lead to the suspension and
revocation of the employee's security clearance.
Question. How many current DS personnel are not permitted to engage
in sensitive assignments because of their prior criminal records or
involvement?
Answer. Currently, 3 of the 1,930 Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(DS) Special Agents have been removed from law enforcement duties due
to criminal charges or pending charges, or nonfelony convictions during
their employment with DS.
Question. How many current DS personnel have been removed from
sensitive assignments or other duties because of misconduct or other
inappropriate workplace behaviors?
Answer. Currently, 19 of the 1,930 Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(DS) Special Agents have been removed from sensitive assignments or
other duties because of misconduct or other inappropriate workplace
behaviors.
Question. How many DS personnel have been terminated or relieved of
duties
because of post-hire revelations of prior criminal records or
involvement?
Answer. We have reviewed records for the last 5 years and find that
no DS personnel have been terminated or relieved of duties based on
prior criminal records or involvement.
Question. Are individuals with criminal records legally eligible to
work for DS?
Answer. In most circumstances, individuals with criminal records
are not automatically barred from working for the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security. There are a number of ways, however, in which a criminal
record may render an individual ineligible to serve as a Diplomatic
Security Special Agent.
The existence of a criminal record may result in the denial of a
federal security clearance, which is a prerequisite for a variety of
positions with the Federal Government, including DS Special Agents, who
are required at hiring to be eligible to be granted access to Top
Secret/Sensitive Compartmented information (TS/SCI). DS Special Agents
also are sworn Federal Law enforcement officers and must be eligible to
possess a firearm. The Lautenberg amendment to the Gun Control Act, 18
U.S.C. Sec. 922, states a person convicted of a felony or misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence may not possess a firearm, which would also
bar employment as a Diplomatic Security Special Agent.
In addition, candidates for DS Special Agent positions must pass a
suitability review. DS works under the direction of the Bureau of Human
Resources Office of Recruitment, Examinations, and Employment (HR/REE)
in the recruitment and assessment of DS Special Agents.
If agent candidates pass all phases of pre-employment screening/
testing (application prescreening, written and oral assessments), they
are given a conditional offer of employment and provided with the
security and medical clearance paperwork. Once clearances are obtained,
candidates will undergo the final suitability review process.
Candidates must pass the final suitability review before being placed
on the hiring register and assigned an entrance on duty date.
The final suitability panel consists of two members--an examiner
from HR/REE and a former Special Agent subject-matter-expert from DS.
Both panel members review the reports of investigation prepared by the
Office of Personnel Security and Suitability (DS/SI/PSS) and make a
suitability determination, based on the Final Review Panel (FRP)
criteria. If the panel members are not in agreement, the HR/REE
Director assigns a third individual to serve as the tie breaker. If the
candidate fails the final suitability review, their candidacy is
terminated.
Terminated candidates may appeal a finding of unsuitability.
Appeals must be submitted in writing within 60 days of receiving a
denial letter, or the candidate must request an extension in writing
from the HR/REE Director. As outlined in the FRP denial letter, an
appeal must provide new or additional information that specifically
addresses the grounds for denial as laid out in the letter, which
clearly indicates that the panel's decision was based on inaccurate
information, and thus was in error. An appeals panel consisting of two
assessors with no previous contact with the case will adjudicate
appeals.
In adjudicating the case, the panel is limited in its review to the
reasons for the initial denial of suitability cited in the letter to
the candidate and must base its decision only on the new information
provided by the candidate in the appeal. The chair of the panel will
draft a report of findings, and the approval or denial letter for the
HR/REE Director's signature. If the panel fails to reach consensus, the
HR/REE Director will make the final determination.
In assessing candidates' suitability, the panel applies the
Department's Standards for Appointment and Continued Suitability, which
are set out in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). The FAM 4130 states
that ``criminal, dishonest, or disgraceful conduct'' may constitute
grounds for disqualifying an applicant based on suitability. During the
suitability review, the panel considers such factors as criminal
history, past drug or alcohol abuse, and misconduct in prior
employment. Although a past criminal violation does not automatically
disqualify a person for service, it would be a strong indicator against
employment and would be scrutinized intently, considering the nature of
the offense, the age when it occurred, and any extenuating
circumstances. Because DS Special Agents serve as law enforcement
officers, they are held to a higher standard than other applicants and
their suitability review is more stringent.
Question. Is DS functionally a federal law enforcement agency?
Answer. Yes. To counter global threats, the Office of the Chief
Special Agent, the forerunner of diplomatic security, was formed in
1916. It was not until 1985, in the aftermath of the Beirut bombings,
that DS became a Bureau within the State Department. Diplomatic
Security (DS) Special Agents are sworn federal law enforcement officers
who are responsible for the security of U.S. Government personnel,
property, and sensitive information throughout the world. DS Special
Agents are also responsible for the protection of the Secretary of
State, certain foreign dignitaries visiting the United States, and
others as designated by the Secretary of State. Major activities
include protective services, management of security programs for
Foreign Service posts, criminal investigations, and background
investigations.
The Diplomatic Security Service operates under several statutory
authorities, including: The Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act, signed in
1986, which is the basic authorizing legislation. Under this act, the
Secretary of State has responsibility to develop policies and programs
for the protection of all U.S. Government personnel, including military
personnel who fall under Chief of Mission authority, on official duty
abroad; security at U.S. diplomatic missions abroad; and security at
State Department facilities in the United States.
In addition, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2709 provides Special Agents of the
Diplomatic Security Service with the authority to conduct criminal
investigations concerning passport or visa fraud. DS agents have the
statutory authority to protect visiting foreign dignitaries, the
Secretary of State, and other official representatives of the U.S.
Government as directed. The statute also gives DS agents the authority
to carry firearms and to obtain and execute federal search and arrest
warrants.
The National Intelligence Reform Act gives DS the lead authority in
the United States for developing a plan to stop U.S. visa and passport
fraud worldwide. In April 2005, a new law was signed by President
George W. Bush, which expanded legal authorities for DS agents. DS
Agents are also authorized to make arrests without a warrant for any
federal offense committed in their presence or for probable cause.
These expanded authorities are a tremendous benefit to DS agents in
that they immediately enhance DS's effectiveness in fulfilling its
critical law enforcement role.
Question. Have any State Department personnel ever instructed any
DS personnel or other State Department personnel to make exceptions to
otherwise applicable hiring rules and regulations, or otherwise take
any actions outside the normal course of their duties, with respect to
the hiring of an individual with a criminal record to work in DS? If
the answer is yes, please provide their names and all correspondence
and documents related to such requests.
Answer. No; there is no record that any State Department personnel
have ever instructed any DS personnel or other State Department
personnel to make exceptions to otherwise applicable hiring rules and
regulations, or otherwise take any actions outside the normal course of
their duties, with respect to hiring an individual with a criminal
record to work in DS.
Question. Please provide a detailed analysis comparing the benefits
State Department personnel would receive under S. 980, as introduced
(e.g., death gratuity, supplemental life insurance, survivors
education, intern gratuities, and retroactive payments) to comparable
benefits for:
(a) Current FSO benefits;
(b) Benefits for DOD service members;
(c) Benefits for federal employees in the intelligence
community serving overseas; and
(d) Benefits for other non-FSO federal civilian employees.
Please include in this analysis the amounts paid into any such
benefit programs by each category of beneficiaries.
Answer (a). The death gratuity and associated benefits that are
payable to the designated beneficiaries of a Department of State
employee who is killed in the line of duty are highly variable, and
depend largely on such factors as the employee's current salary, total
years of creditable service, the total life insurance coverage
selected, the number of surviving dependents, and how long the
survivors live to collect benefits. The various benefits and options
available can be found in the attached tab regarding compensation
available to families of Foreign Service and Civil Service Employees.
Answer (b). As of July 2012, our understanding of the broad
outlines of certain relevant Department of Defense benefits to service
members is as follows:
Death Gratuity: $100,000 or one year's salary, whichever is greater
Burial Costs: up to $8,800
Insurance: $400,000
Educational Benefit: $936 per month for full-time attendance (per
spouse/child) [up to 45 months]
Children (per child): $486 per month (up to age 22 if still in school)
Social Security Benefits: [per SSA entitlement]
Pension: average of 3 high salary x 75% x 55%
We refer you to the Department of Defense for more detailed
information.
Answer (c). The Department of State does not possess this
information. We refer you to the individual agencies, which would be
better positioned to provide the information.
Answer (d). The chart provided in the attached tab also discusses
the benefits available to Civil Service employees, regardless of agency
(only Title 22 authorizations are limited to the Foreign Service). We
refer you to individual agencies for additional information.
ATTACHMENT:
COMPENSATION THAT MAY BE PROVIDED TO ELIGIBLE FAMILIES OF DECEASED U.S. PERSONNEL: U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE (FS)
EMPLOYEES, CIVIL SERVICE (CS) EMPLOYEES, AND FOR THOSE EMPLOYEES KILLED IN THE LINEOF DUTY AND/OR A TERRORIST
INCIDENT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FECA5 U.S.C 8133-8137............ Central benefit: Reductions: Length of survivor Funeral or burial
Surviving spouse Monthly survivor benefits: Tax- expenses:
receives monthly-- benefits are free spousal Contingent upon
50% of employee's reduced if: monthly benefit written approval
salary; if employee was is paid for life by DOL. Usually,
dependent covered under or until several months
children, 45% of FERS or FSPS and remarriage if are required for
salary plus survivors receive before age 55. processing. DOL
additional 15% SS benefits based pays up to $800
for each child up on deceased's to personal
to a total of 75% Federal representative.
of salary. employment. DOL pays up to
$200 to personal
representative.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retirement benefits.............. Survivor annuity: Election choice: FECA benefit: Most
Paid based on If FECA benefit survivors choose
applicable is chosen over FECA benefits
retirement retirement because FECA pays
system: FERS, annuity, a higher amount
CSRS, FSRDS, survivors may and are tax
FSPS. Not payable receive a lump exempt.
if FECA payments sum payment of
are made. the deceased's
contributions to
relevant
retirement fund.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social Security. Survivor benefits: Benefit Amount: Benefit condition:
Payable to Lump sum of $255 Amount depends on
qualifying is payable to SS earnings and
surviving spouses qualifying number of
and dependent surviving spouse. survivors
children. If no qualifying eligible for
Dependent parents spouse, lump sum benefits.
and former is paid to
spouses may children eligible
qualify. for benefits.
Otherwise no lump
sum is payable.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title VI, Section 651 of Public Death Gratuity Reduction: Payment Benefit reality:
Law 104-208 (The Omnibus (for funeral and must be reduced Since FECA
Consolidated Appropriations Act burial expenses): by amount of DOL typically pays
of 1996). Up to $10,000 payment toward out $1,000 for
payable to funeral and funeral and
personal administrative administrative
representative of expenses (up to expenses, State's
deceased $1,000). death gratuity
employee. payment is
usually $9,000
and is taxable.
FECA provision
(*8102a) cited
below effective 1/
2008 increased
the death
gratuity payment
up to a maximum
of $100,000
offset by other
death gratuities
paid out.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*FECA 8102a (Section 1105 of Death gratuity: Benefit Amount: Beneficiary
Public Law 110-181) January 2009. The USG pays a The death Reality and Form:
death gratuity of gratuity payable For an employee
up to $100,000 to under this who has no
or for the section shall be surviving spouse
survivor reduced by the or child and is
prescribed by amount of any eligible to
subsection (d) death gratuity receive the death
immediately upon provided under gratuity, the
receiving section 413 of employee may
official the Foreign designate any one
notification of Service Act of or more of his/
the death of an 1980, section her parents or
employee who dies 1603 of the brothers or
of injuries Emergency sisters to
incurred in Supplemental receive specific
connection with Appropriations shares of the
the employee's Act for Defense, gratuity.
service with an the Global War on
Armed Force in a Terror, and
contingency Hurricane
operation. Recovery, 2006
[unclassified],
or any other law
of the United
States based on
the same death.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 413 of Foreign Service Death gratuity: Recipient: Condition: Death Complications:
Act, 22 U.S.C. 3973. Payment equal to Surviving must be first Processing by
one year's salary dependents of accepted by DOL, DOL may take
of the employee Federal employee in writing, with several months.
at the time of who die as a qualifying FECA Complications
death. Surviving result of provision noted, should be
dependents of injuries before State can expected if
Federal employee sustained in the authorize terrorism or
who dies as a performance of payment. foul play is
result of duty abroad. involved. Nexus
injuries between death
sustained in the and employment
performance of must be
duty abroad. established.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victims of Terrorism Compensation Benefit: Payment Reduction: Payment Benefit Reality: Delegated
Act, 5 U.S.C 5570 and 22 CFR 192. provided if must be reduced Because of other Authority:
President by any other payment Secretary of
(through DOJ-FBI) amount payable by authorized above, State, in
determines that USG in connection including FECA consultation
death was caused with death or and Section 413 with the
by hostile action disability. of FS Act Secretary of
and resulted from authorizing 1- Labor.
individual's year salary, this Department
relationship with benefit is rarely regulation
the Government. paid because of provides death
the offset benefit payment
provision of the for either an
law. employee or a
family member of
an employee is
equal to 1
year's salary of
the principal at
the time of
death.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income Tax Relief 26 U.S.C. 692.. Federal Income
Tax: Not
applicable, if
death resulted
from injury
incurred outside
the U.S. in a
terrorist or
military action
for the tax year
of the death and
any prior taxable
year in the
period beginning
with the last
taxable year
ending before the
year in which the
injury was
incurred.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Life Insurance: Federal Employees Payment: Basic Optional Insurance Accidental Death: Beneficiary:
Group Life Insurance (FEGLI). Life Insurance benefits: Pays additional Unless employee
equal to an Employees may benefits for designates a
employee's rate also be entitled those who elected specific
of annual basic to additional Basic Life beneficiary, the
pay (rounded to optional coverage Insurance and benefit is paid
the next $1,000) payment, if Option A. according to the
plus $2,000, or employee elected order of
$10,000, it before death precedence
whichever is and paid the full mandated by law.
greater. USG cost of Optional Proceeds of
Payment: \1/3\ of Insurance. FEGLI policies
the cost of Basic paid to
Insurance. designated
beneficiaries
are not taxable
as income to the
beneficiary.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Employees Health Benefits Eligibility: Condition: At
Program (FEHBP). Eligible least one family
survivors may member is
continue entitled to a
enrollment if monthly annuity
deceased employee as the survivor
was enrolled for of the deceased
self and family employee.
at the time of
death.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)........ Payment: Federal Tax: To
Employee's TSP postpone paying
accounts are federal tax, all
distributed or any part of
according to the the payment may
employee's be made to an
Designation of IRA.
Beneficiary form.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unpaid Compensation (Final pay Payment:
and unused Annual Leave). Designated
survivor(s) of
USG employee who
are killed may
receive lump sum-
payment covering
final pay and
unused annual
leave from the
employee's
agency.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Payment: Section 4 Past Practice: DOS Collective Payments to
Consular Services Authority. of the Department used this Expenses: DOS families: DOS
of State Basic authority to make paid for used this
Authorities Act, expenditures collective authority for
22 U.S.C. 2671, related to the expenses on airfare, local
provides that the Nairobi bombing. behalf of all transportation,
Secretary is American victims lodging, and
authorized to (ie., costs of other
make expenditures arrival ceremony miscellaneous
for ``unforeseen of surviving expenses
emergencies family members, associated with
arising in the meeting for the arrival
diplomatic and families, and 1- ceremony,
consular service. year anniversary funeral
commemoration arrangements,
ceremonies). and anniversary
commemorations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revised November 2011
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