[Senate Hearing 113-426]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-426
THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 14, 2013
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Deputy Staff Director
Harlan C. Geer, Senior Professional Staff Member
Michelle C. Taylor, Federal Bureau of Investigations Detailee
Keith B. Ashdown, Minority Staff Director
Christopher J. Barkley, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Daniel P. Lips, Minority Director of Homeland Security
Mark K. Harris, U.S. Coast Guard Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Lauren M. Corcoran, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Carper............................................... 1
Senator Coburn............................................... 3
Senator Johnson.............................................. 16
Senator Ayotte............................................... 19
Senator Levin................................................ 24
Prepared statements:
Senator Carper............................................... 41
WITNESSES
Wednesday, November 14, 2013
Hon. Rand Beers, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 5
Hon. James B. Comey, Jr., Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice...................... 7
Hon. Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence........ 10
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Beers, Hon. Rand
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Comey, Hon. James B. Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Olsen, Hon. Matthew G.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 65
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Beers.................................................... 76
Mr. Comey.................................................... 103
Mr. Olsen.................................................... 115
THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2013
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R.
Carper, presiding.
Present: Senators Carper, Levin, Coburn, Johnson, and
Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CARPER
Chairman Carper. This hearing will come to order.
Good morning, everyone. Welcome to our witnesses, Dr.
Coburn. I welcome all of you, and we will be joined by some of
our colleagues here as the morning progresses, but we are happy
you are all here bright and early.
Today's hearing will consider threats to the U.S. homeland
from terrorists, from cyber attackers, from homegrown
extremists, and from lone wolf offenders. The objective of this
hearing is for this Committee to gain a better understanding of
how these threats have evolved over the last year and if our
national security agencies are keeping up with these ever-
changing threats. I would add another purpose for these
hearings is to find out what we need to be doing on the
legislative side to better enable you to keep up with these
ever-changing threats.
As we know, 12 years ago, our country's sense of security
was upended when Al-Qaeda launched the most significant attack
on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor. In the years since that tragic
day, we have made significant progress in combatting the
terrorist threat to our homeland. On behalf of this entire
Committee, I want to express our thanks from the American
people for the very good work that has been done and continues
to be done to try to make sure that we stay safe in a very
dangerous world.
Our aviation system is more secure. Our borders are
stronger. Our government agencies share more terrorist
intelligence than ever before. Our first responders are better
prepared to deal with disasters and terrorist attacks.
Americans are safer because of these efforts.
And while we have made great strides, our system for
preventing terrorist attacks is not perfect, and as Dr. Coburn
knows, one of my guiding principles is, if it is not perfect,
make it better. This is not a time to rest on our laurels. This
is not the time to take a victory lap. It is a time to thank
those that are working hard to make us safe, keep us safe, and
let us continue to work hard and work smarter.
In this spirit, this Committee will continue its work to
improve America's defenses against terrorism and other threats.
Part of this process means understanding that the threat is
also evolving. If we are to make America safer from these
threats and secure our homeland, we must do a better job of
anticipating those evolving threats.
We do a good job at fighting the last war, but to secure
the homeland, we must be better at anticipating the next war.
We know that the threats from Al-Qaeda have changed over the
past decade and we are now dealing with a number of splinter
groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which was
responsible for the Christmas Day attack in 2009 and which
continues its efforts to attack us to this day.
And we know that American citizens, as well as Canadian and
European nationals, have taken up arms in Syria, Yemen, and
Somalia. The threat that these individuals could return home to
carry out attacks is real and troubling. Even as our borders
and ports of entry (POE) have become more secure, there are
still those within our borders who have become radicalized by
online Al-Qaeda propaganda and seek to carry out their own
attacks against the United States.
And there are other threats to our domestic security
unrelated to Al-Qaeda which we must be prepared to address. As
the September attack on the Washington Navy Yard and the
shooting at the Los Angeles airport just 2 weeks ago
demonstrate, there are a variety of threats to Federal
personnel and Federal facilities that we must be prepared to
defend against.
However, nowhere is the need to prepare for the next attack
more pressing than in the cybersecurity realm. In the words of
your predecessor, Director Comey, Bob Mueller, cyber threats
may ``equal or surpass the threat of terrorism in the
foreseeable future.'' With a few keystrokes, hackers can shut
down our electric grid. They can release dangerous chemicals
into our air that we breathe. They can disrupt our financial
markets. And now, more than ever, we must come together to pass
cybersecurity legislation that strengthens our defenses against
these cyber threats and others. The threat is too great, the
potential consequences too severe to do nothing. Today's
hearing will explore these threats as well as others.
Today, we will hear testimony from the leaders of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), from the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) about the greatest dangers to the homeland
and the steps that their colleagues are taking to further
secure our country.
The findings from today's hearing will help continue our
process of recalibrating our homeland defenses to address our
current threats as well as prepare for tomorrow's threats. It
will also help to ensure that we have a government in place
that can connect the dots before terror comes to our shores.
We look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses, and
the Members of our Committee do, as well, as we seek to defeat
those threats and keep our countrymen and women safe from those
who wish to do us harm.
Now, let me turn to Dr. Coburn for any remarks he wishes to
make.
Senator Coburn. Thank you, Senator Carper.
Chairman Carper. Good morning.
Senator Coburn. Good morning.
Chairman Carper. Good morning Mr. Johnson, and good
morning, Dr. Coburn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN
Senator Coburn. First of all, let me welcome you to the
Committee. I have expressed this to Senator Carper. I think we
are best when we have open hearings, but this Committee also
needs to have a closed hearing because the Members will not be
able to be made aware of the things they need to be made aware
of without a closed hearing. So, I would look forward to that
at some point in the future.
Secretary Beers, I want to thank you for the great work you
are doing, filling in at Homeland Security, and the cooperative
nature you have demonstrated. You have been great to work with
and I want to tell you I appreciate that and thank you for it.
Director Comey, it is a privilege to have you serving in
your position today. I supported your position, having worked
with you both on the Intelligence Committee and here. I
appreciate what you are doing.
And, Matt, you have been tremendous. People will never know
all the work that NCTC does because they cannot, but it is
tremendous and I applaud you being here.
Other than that, I will reserve most of my comments for
question and answer after we have heard the comments from our
panelists. But I do appreciate your service. This is an
important issue and it is important that we are having a
discussion in public about what the real threats are. There is
a discussion on how we address those. There is a difference of
opinion in how we do it.
The one final note I would make is we need to have some
reforms so this Committee has the authority and the
responsibility to do those things, like the Federal Information
Security Management Act (FISMA) reform and some of the other
reforms in terms of cyber. But it is going to be hard to move
on cyber until we create competency, and that is one of the
areas that we have to make sure we have right before we give
more authority.
So, with that, I would yield back and look forward to our
witnesses' testimony.
Chairman Carper. Thank you, Tom.
Let me take just a moment to introduce our panel of
distinguished witnesses.
Our first witness is Rand Beers. I was joking in the
anteroom that I knew Rand when he was six-foot-four and had
shoulder-length blond hair, but I really did not know him then,
and I do not know that he ever had hair that long. But, we are
delighted, and I just want to say, to back up to what Dr.
Coburn has said, you have taken on a tough job. First, you had
your day job at Homeland Security, and then you were asked to
be Deputy Secretary, and now you are asked to be the Acting
Deputy Secretary and now the Acting Secretary. That is a whole
lot for any one man or woman to carry, so thank you for doing
it in good spirit.
Rand has been serving as the Acting Secretary of Homeland
Security since early September, when Janet Napolitano left us
to head up the department at the University of California
system on the West Coast. Rand most recently served as the
Acting Deputy Secretary. Before that, he held the position of
Under Secretary of National Protection Programs Directorate at
the Department (NPPD).
Prior to coming to the Department of Homeland Security,
Secretary Beers served on the National Security staff under not
one, not two, not three, but four Presidents. He began his
professional career as a Marine Corps officer in Vietnam. I
think if we go back 5 days, there was a birthday for the Marine
Corps, so happy belated birthday and thank you for your service
in Southeast Asia and welcome home. But, thank you for joining
us today.
Our next witness is James Comey, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. He has a tough act to follow, as he
knows. We talked about it not long ago in my office. Thank you
for your willingness to do this and we are excited about your
leadership and the way you hit the ground running.
Jim is the seventh Director of the FBI since September, I
believe. He brings a wealth of law enforcement experience to
the FBI, having served as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York and as Deputy Attorney General (AG) at the
Department of Justice (DOJ). After leaving the Department of
Justice in 2005, Mr. Comey served as the General Counsel at
Lockheed Martin and then held the same position at the
investment management firm of Bridgewater Associates.
Thank you for your presence today and your testimony. Thank
you very much for your years of service to our country.
Our final witness is Matt Olsen, Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center. Matt, good morning. Mr. Olsen has
served as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
for just over 2 years. In this position, Director Olsen
oversees the analysis and the integration of all terrorism
intelligence in the U.S. Government, reporting directly to the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Additionally, he
oversees the strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism activities, a role that requires him to report
directly to the President.
Prior to joining the National Counterterrorism Center, Mr.
Olsen was the General Counsel for the National Security Agency
and the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department of
Justice's National Security Division.
Again, Matt, thank you for joining us today. We welcome
your testimony.
I am going to turn it over to you, and Mr. Secretary, if
you would like to lead us off, and after you have finished your
testimonies, we will get into a good conversation. But, you are
recognized. Please proceed. Thank you all, again, for joining
us.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. RAND BEERS,\1\ ACTING SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Beers. Thank you, Chairman Carper and Ranking Member
Coburn and the Members of the Committee today for the
opportunity to be here to testify.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Beers appears in the Appendix on
page 43.
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I would also like to thank my co-panelists, Directors Comey
and Olsen, for their partnership and strong collaboration as we
together meet the shared responsibility of keeping the American
people safe.
Before I begin my testimony, I would like to urge you all
and the Senate to confirm Jeh Johnson as my replacement and
confirmed nominee. I have known him for a long time and I think
he cares deeply about our mission and I think he has
considerable skill, intellect, and experience, and dedication
to deal with these evolving threats. And, Senator Coburn, I
appreciate your remarks to him yesterday. In short, I think he
will make an excellent Secretary.
I would also like to take a moment, as you did, Senator
Carper, to recognize Transportation Security Officer (TSO)
Gerardo Hernandez, who was killed at the Los Angeles airport on
the first of November. He was an exceptional officer and his
loss will be felt within the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and the Department. I had the honor and
somber experience of going to his memorial service yesterday.
It was a very moving event, and this----
Chairman Carper. Let me just interrupt, Secretary. Is there
another memorial service, maybe next Monday or something----
Mr. Beers. We are having one here at TSA, yes, that is
correct, sir.
Chairman Carper. That is one o'clock on Monday, I think?
Mr. Beers. I will get the time precisely to you, but yes,
we are going to have another one----
Chairman Carper. Thanks so much.
Mr. Beers [continuing]. Another one here.
That senseless act, as you said, sir, reminds us every day
of the dangers that the men and women who work on the front
lines of our Department, and other parts of the U.S.
Government, have very real sacrifices that they often have to
make on our behalf. We continue to work closely with the Bureau
and with State and local law enforcement to fully investigate
this crime and ensure that justice is done, as the Attorney
General said yesterday.
DHS works very closely with all of our partners across the
country to build critical capabilities at every level, whether
it is sharing information, protecting critical infrastructure,
or protecting our cyberspace. We work with the private sector
on improving preparedness and resilience and addressing the
evolving threats, such as I just mentioned. Because of this
work, our Nation, I believe, is stronger and better equipped to
handle these threats and we are more nimble in our ability to
respond and recover. Nevertheless, we continue to face a
dynamic threat environment that includes threats from abroad as
well as those that originate within our borders.
At DHS, our chief operating principle has been to work with
partners to detect and deter these threats as early as
possible, to build the capabilities to respond if and when
required, and enhance our ability to recover after the fact. We
have sought to get information, tools, and resources out of
Washington, D.C., and into the partners that we work with on
the front line.
At the Federal level, with intelligence and law enforcement
partners like the Bureau and NCTC, we have made significant
strides, I believe, in information sharing and joint analysis.
Through State and major urban area Fusion Centers, we have
improved sharing of both classified and unclassified
information and built grassroots analytic capabilities at the
State and local levels.
With the FBI, we have now standardized how we train front
line law enforcement to recognize behaviors and indicators that
have historically been associated with terrorism and report
suspicious activities as part of the National Suspicious
Activities Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI). We have greatly
expanded our training and our outreach on encountering violent
extremism and active shooter threats, providing extensive
tools, workshops, and analysis on potential indicators of
terrorism and providing partners with resources and training to
effectively respond to active shooter threats.
We have also strengthened our ability to address improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) through training and awareness and
grants and information sharing. These investments directly
contributed to the comprehensive and well executed response at
the Boston Marathon attack and prevented more lives from being
lost on that tragic day.
We have also expanded our ``If you see something, say
something'' campaign to more than 250 cities and States and
transportation systems, universities, and private sector
entities nationwide to encourage the public to play an active
role in reporting suspicious activity.
With respect to our aviation sector, we have built upon the
successes of our risk-based intelligence-driven approach, which
includes prescreening of passengers, deployment of new
technologies, training of airport security and law enforcement
personnel to better detect those behaviors potentially
associated with terrorism and strengthening our air cargo
security.
Today, we are much better able to protect the aviation
sector because we vet those who are traveling--who seek to
travel or immigrate to the United States against a broad array
of law enforcement and intelligence information. We are working
with our components to identify ways further to enhance these
vetting operations to harness the power of data management
while providing better safeguards and access control. And we
also continue to leverage information and technology to
expedite trusted travelers through a successful program such as
Global Entry and TSA Pre-Check. To date, more than 16 million
travelers have already experienced Pre-Check.
Of course, as you said, one of our major threats, one of
our gravest threats that we continue to face is the threat to
our cyber networks and infrastructure. Our Nation confronts a
dangerous combination of known and unknown cyber
vulnerabilities and adversaries with strong and rapidly
expanding capabilities. Our focus at DHS remains securing
unclassified Federal system government networks, working with
critical infrastructure owners and operators, combating cyber
crime, building a national capacity to promote responsible
cyber behavior, and cultivating the next generation of front
line cybersecurity professionals, all the while protecting
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
To this end, we have deployed technology to detect and
block cyber intrusions and we are developing continuous
diagnostic capabilities while providing guidance to Federal
agencies on how to protect themselves. We have also worked
closely with infrastructure owners and operators to strengthen
their facilities through an onsite risk assessment, mitigation,
and incident response by sharing risk and threat information
through U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) and
other means.
Since 2009, we have also prevented $10 billion in potential
losses through our cyber crime investigations with domestic and
international partners and arrested more than 5,000 individuals
for participating in cyber crime activities. We have also
partnered with the Departments of Justice and Defense (DOD) to
ensure the whole of government approach when responding to
cyber incidents and threats.
While these accomplishments are significant, and President
Obama has further strengthened them through executive action,
we still need Congress to pass a suite of comprehensive
cybersecurity legislation to be best able to meet this growing
threat.
Thank you very much for this opportunity.
Chairman Carper. Thank you. Thank you for that testimony.
Before I turn it over to Director Comey, during the
question and answers (Q&A), we are going to come back to
cybersecurity----
Mr. Beers. Good.
Chairman Carper. And get just an update as to where the
Administration is, where are we with respect to implementing
the President's Executive Order (EO), the framework, and then
what you need from us and why you need it. So, just be ready
for that. That will be my first question. Director Comey.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. JAMES B. COMEY, JR.,\1\ DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member
Coburn, and Members of the Committee, for inviting me here
today, and most of all for your support of the men and women of
the FBI.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Comey appears in the Appendix on
page 59.
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As I think about threats to the homeland, I worry most
about terrorism and cyber attacks. First, terrorism. I think
about our terrorism threat today as a metasticizing threat in
two different ways. First, I worry most at home about the
individuals we call homegrown violent extremists (HVEs). They
are people who are inspired by Al-Qaeda but who direct
themselves and equip themselves to engage in their own version
of jihad on behalf of terrorist interests. They are certainly
encouraged by Al-Qaeda around the world. We have seen Al-Qaeda
propaganda already embracing the tragedy at the Boston
Marathon. And I worry very much that they are inspired also by
high-profile attacks around the world on so-called soft
targets.
The second aspect in which I worry about the homeland
terrorism threat is in Al-Qaeda itself. Although we as a Nation
have made great progress against core Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, the
threat posed by Al-Qaeda, in a way, has become Hydra-headed,
and by that I mean Al-Qaeda affiliates have blossomed and
flourished in places around the world, especially in the Middle
East and North Africa, and especially there in territories that
are ungoverned or poorly governed. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates,
as you mentioned, especially Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
pose the top terrorist threat to this Nation. They are
constantly working to develop operatives and techniques to get
past our defenses and wreak havoc in the homeland.
To combat these threats, the FBI relies upon our more than
100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) around the country which
bring together State, local, and Federal enforcers to assess
the threat and to disrupt the threat before it becomes a
reality. And we also work closely through our 60 legal attache
offices--more than 60--around the world with the Intelligence
Community (IC) and foreign partners to try to press out beyond
our borders to identify threats and disrupt them.
With respect to cyber, whether by foreign governments or
criminals or activists or terrorists, attacks on our computers
and the systems that connect them have become one of the most
serious threats to our Nation. As you said, Mr. Chairman, Bob
Mueller, my predecessor, testified and also told me privately
that he believed that this threat would, during my tenure term,
come to eclipse even the threat from foreign terrorism to our
homeland. And just based on my 2 months on the job, I believe
that he is accurate in that prediction, and the reason is
simple.
We have connected, all of us, all of our lives, personal,
professional, and national, to the Internet, and that is where
the bad guys will go because that is where our lives are and
our money, our secrets, and our intellectual property. And they
can go there at the speed of light. A trip around the world
takes milliseconds on the Internet. And there are no safe
neighborhoods. All of us are next-door neighbors on the
Internet in the blink of an eye.
In response, the FBI has been working very hard under my
predecessor and continues to buildup our capacity to identify
and respond to cyber threats, focusing on intrusions, both--our
work is done in the homeland and overseas. Here at home, the
National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) is a
grouping of 19 agencies--intelligence, military, and law
enforcement--that have come together to try and assess the
threat, deconflict our work, and work in a smart and quick way.
A critical partner in that is seated to my right, the
Department of Homeland Security, with whom we are working
better than ever, and the National Security Agency (NSA). We
have different responsibilities and different lanes in the
road, but it is essential that we work together, and the good
news for the American people is that we are doing that
incredibly well.
While national-level coordination is important, the local
level is also important to us and so we have stood up Cyber
Task Forces (CTFs) in each of our 56 field offices to focus on
cyber intrusions. And just as the JTTFs do, it is to bring
together Federal, State, and local enforcers to focus on this
threat and to blunt it.
And, as I said, overseas, we are working through 60-some
legal attaches to do the same with our foreign partners. We
have FBI agents now embedded with police departments around the
world, including in Romania, Estonia, Ukraine, and the
Netherlands, to identify emerging threats, because these
threats know no boundaries and move at the speed of light, and
to try to also identify the key bad actors.
But, I should add, as hard as we are working to work better
together, it is essential that the private sector work
effectively with the government. The private sector is, in
almost every circumstance, the victim of cyber crime and cyber
intrusions and we need their help to stop them.
And let me finish by just saying a couple of words about
how I think you and your colleagues in Congress can help us
combat these threats and carry out our mission. When I became
FBI Director, I did not know exactly what challenges I would
face. I knew it would be a hard job. I have discovered that the
challenge that I face most near field is the budget challenge
imposed on the FBI by sequestration. I am staring at a
situation where I need to reduce almost 10 percent of our
budget this year. We are eliminating 3,500 positions and face
the prospect of furlough.
We have, as you know, Mr. Chairman, an enormous portfolio
of responsibilities for the American people and the challenge
of sequestration makes it enormously difficult for us to
accomplish that mission. The FBI will always soldier on. We
have always tried to do more and more with less. I worry very
much, though, we are approaching a situation where we are going
to be doing less with less.
With that, I thank you very much for inviting me here today
and I look forward to discussing these important issues with
you.
Chairman Carper. Thank you. You said the prospect of
eliminating 3,500 positions in this fiscal year?
Mr. Comey. Yes. We have already done that. Through
attrition, we are not hiring, and it was Bob Mueller's plan,
which I agreed to, we are going to eliminate 3,500 to get our
numbers down.
Chairman Carper. Additional, on top of what you have
already done, or----
Mr. Comey. He started. He marked 3,500 positions for
elimination and I am continuing that. He took out almost $600
million last year and I am taking out over $700 million this
year, unless the sequestration cap on us goes away.
Chairman Carper. And one last quick question and then I
will turn to Mr. Olsen. Once the 3,500 positions go unfilled or
vacated, how many positions does that leave you in the FBI?
Mr. Comey. We will be down to where we were in 2009. So, we
are now at about 36,000 people. We will be down around 31,000
people.
Chairman Carper. All right. Thanks very much. OK.
Mr. Olsen, thanks.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. MATTHEW G. OLSEN,\1\ DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Olsen. Thank you very much, Chairman Carper, Ranking
Member Coburn, Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting
me here today. I also want to thank you for your consistent
support of the men and women at the National Counterterrorism
Center and I would invite you to come out to NCTC and see our
operations firsthand.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen appears in the Appendix 65.
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I am particularly pleased to be here with Jim Comey and
Rand Beers. We are close partners in our common fight against
terrorism.
It has been just over a year since I last testified before
this Committee, and at that time, I pointed to Al-Qaeda core,
as Director Comey referenced, really now as a shadow of its
former self. That assessment remains true today. At the same
time, Al-Qaeda and the senior leaders of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan
are a leader, or remain the leader of an ideological movement,
and that includes affiliated groups and followers worldwide,
particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, and this
results in a wide-ranging threat from a diverse and dedicated
array of actors.
The recent attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, which
was linked to Al-Shabaab in Somalia, illustrates the type of
threat we face from around the world: Committed extremists, the
availability of weapons, and vulnerable targets. Along with
January's attack at the gas facility in Algeria as well as last
fall's attack in Benghazi, all of these attacks serve as
sobering reminders of the persistent threat of terrorism that
we face in these regions of the world.
Today, Al-Qaeda's core leadership in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border region is still really trying to navigate its
response to the ongoing events in the Muslim world and working
to promote a global jihadist movement. Additionally, unrest in
the Middle East and North Africa, most notably in Syria, is
creating opportunities for veteran jihadists to recruit and
train what may be the next generation of militants, some of
whom are less dogmatic in their embrace of Al-Qaeda's ideology
but still support an anti-Western agenda, and these
developments are really blurring the lines between terrorist,
insurgent, and criminal groups operating in these regions.
Here in the United States, the attack on the Boston
Marathon highlighted the danger of violent extremism at home,
where terrorists who may have no formal or direct ties to Al-
Qaeda but still adhere to that ideology can use simple tactics
to wreak havoc on innocent victims. As the President observed
in his speech at the National Defense University, today, a
person can consume hateful ideology, commit themselves to a
violent agenda, and learn how to kill without leaving their
home.
So, NCTC's mission is to combat these threats both at home
and abroad. We examine threat information. We develop leads. We
work closely with domestic and international partners. And we
develop strategic plans to help unify our efforts.
And as part of these responsibilities, we are coordinating
and integrating the Intelligence Community's support, for
example, to the Winter Olympics in Sochi. I was just in Sochi
last week and I had the opportunity to meet with Russian
intelligence and security officials to discuss the threat
picture that we face there and the security preparations for
the games.
Closer to home, the dedicated workforce at NCTC works in
concert with our partners, particularly FBI and DHS, to protect
the homeland, and we are adapting as that threat evolves. I
would like to take just a quick moment to share with you some
of the measures that we have initiated over the past year.
First, in April, along with DHS and FBI, NCTC established a
new organization called the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment
Team (JCAT). This is the successor organization to the
Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG), which
this Committee helped to establish but which was really no
longer sustainable under current budget conditions. What JCAT
does is bring together State and local first responders from
around the country who come to NCTC to work side-by-side with
Federal intelligence analysts to research and produce and share
counterterrorism intelligence that is really tailored to the
State, local, and Tribal communities, and they do this in an
unclassified format as much as possible.
Outside of Washington, we continue to build our Domestic
Representative Program. We have representatives in a number of
cities now, and we just added Boston and Atlanta. These
individuals are intelligence analysts, senior intelligence
analysts who work in close coordination with the FBI and the
Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the Fusion Centers to bring the
national intelligence picture to the local level.
As the April attack in Boston demonstrated, there are times
we will have little or no warning when a homegrown violent
extremist mobilizes to violent action, and that is why we work
closely with the Federal, State, and local officials as well as
community partners to raise local awareness about the threat of
terrorism as part of our countering violent extremist effort.
It is through this whole of government approach that we are
collaborating with community leaders to counter radicalization,
recognizing, that it is community stakeholders who are best
positioned to prevent the exploitation of our youth and to
intervene when they spot signs of trouble.
On the pragmatic side, we recognize that we cannot prevent
every attack, so we work closely, again, with DHS and FBI to
prepare communities should they need to respond. For several
years, we have been involved in collaborating with DHS, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and FBI to conduct
awareness workshops throughout the United States and help
cities assess their readiness to respond to a terrorist attack.
One of our first such workshops was in Boston back in 2011, and
we think that helped contribute to the effective response we
saw in Boston to the Marathon attack.
Finally, to better detect and disrupt plots, we continue to
refine and improve our counterterrorism data layer and our
analysts' ability to have access to the information that they
need to have access to that is collected by other government
agencies. And it is our ability to examine a broad range of
information, combined with sophisticated analytic tools and the
expertise of our analysts, that is necessary to provide the
best all-source collaborative terrorism analysis.
In short, Mr. Chairman, after almost 10 years of service,
NCTC has become a center of gravity in our Nation's fight
against terrorism and it is our commitment to this team effort
with communities throughout the country, with the government at
all levels, and with the private sector that is at the core of
our ability to identify and prevent the threat of terrorism.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Carper. Thank you, each of you, for your
testimony. Very interesting. Very helpful. Very timely.
The first question I want to ask, as promised, I want to go
back to cybersecurity and I am going to ask you to--and you can
just weave in and out in responding, but a couple of things I
want to hear. How are we doing with the followup on the
President's Executive Order? How is the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) doing with respect to working
on the framework? How does the private sector feel? What is the
kind of feedback we are getting from the private sector as to
how that is proceeding?
Describe, if you will, the roles, the interrelationship,
the responsibilities, and how you cooperate and collaborate.
Just talk to us about your respective roles and how you
collaborate. And, finally, how could you work better together,
collaborate better, collaborate smarter together? And what can
we do to help you in that regard?
So those are a bunch of questions, but I think there is a
theme to it, but just give us a good update, if you will. That
will probably exhaust my 7 minutes. Thank you.
Rand, do you want to lead it off.
Mr. Beers. Thank you, sir. Let me start with the Executive
Order and the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD). With respect
to the National Cybersecurity Framework that the National
Institute of Standard and Technology has responsibility for
drafting, the first draft of that is completed. It is
available. We are seeking comment from the private sector and
government officials at all levels as well as, obviously, the
Congress. That draft was the result of a number of workshops
and outreach efforts that involved both NIST and the Department
of Homeland Security in order to find a way to make sure that
we brought the best and the brightest together in order to
produce this framework. The final framework is due in February
and we certainly anticipate meeting that deadline.
In addition to that, we have been mapping the information
sharing networks that exist within the government. We have been
looking at the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
that we are responsible for, weaving cyber and physical
infrastructure together, because, obviously, a cyber attack may
result in physical damage just as much as it might result in
cyber damage.
And all of those deadlines that were set up in the
Executive Order have been met up to date. The longest pole in
that tent is the science and technology report that we owe in a
couple of years. So, with respect to that, I think we are
moving forward in line with the expectations.
With respect to collaboration, and obviously, Director
Comey will comment on this, as well, what we have basically
instituted is a call to any one of us, that is, to the Bureau,
to the Department of Homeland Security, or to the National
Security Agency, will be responded to collectively because we
each bring a particular expertise and particular activities
that I think do allow us to most effectively help an affected
business or government entity to respond to an intrusion.
The Bureau, obviously, has the investigative lead, and I
will let the Director talk about that. Our responsibility is
to, as quickly as possible, know what happened and provide
outreach to others that will help them be able to prevent the
same kind of an intrusion from happening to them. And the
National Security Agency backs us up with all of the
intelligence capabilities that they can bring to bear on an
event.
With respect to the legislative issue that you asked, I
think while we are moving forward as we can with executive
authority, we really do continue to need your support in
passing that legislation. The areas that we can receive help
are, first, on information sharing, to make it easier for
private sector firms to share information with us without
crossing lines that are of concern to them, for instance, with
respect to personal information. We need your help in creating
incentives that would help firms adopt higher security
practices in cyberspace. The framework will be a good guide on
what to do. What we need your help in is helping them realize
why they need to do that.
We can also benefit from additional law enforcement tools
that were discussed in the draft legislation over a year ago.
We also, as Senator Coburn has mentioned, can use an update
on FISMA, as we have at DHS gotten additional responsibilities
while the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) remains in the
policy lead on this, as well as additional hiring flexibility
to allow us to hire in the same way that the National Security
Agency can hire cyber expertise.
And, finally, a national data breach reporting requirement
so that we can have a national reporting requirement rather
than a patchwork of State reporting requirements on personal
information. All of those would go a long way and can only be
provided by you, the Congress of the United States.
Let me stop there and turn it over to Director Comey on his
role.
Chairman Carper. I have used up about 6\1/2\ minutes. I
want to be responsible to my colleagues. I am going to come
back and ask you to just keep that question in mind, because we
will come back in the second round and drill down on it again,
so Dr. Coburn.
Senator Coburn. Well, thank you for your testimony.
One of the concerns, if you watched any of the testimony
yesterday and the questioning of who I presume to be our new
Secretary, it is about transparency and responsiveness.
Secretary Beers, we had forwarded to you all on October 18
asking information about the EB-5 system. What the legislative
staff here on the Hill did was offer to brief us, and, of
course, I do not want a briefing. I want the data and then we
will take the briefing after we look at the data.
And the problem has been at Homeland Security with timely
responses to Committee requests for information. I think I got
a pretty firm ``yes'' from Jeh Johnson yesterday about being
transparent with us as long as we are responsible in terms of
what we are asking for. So I would hope that you would redirect
the staff there to give us the information. We have a real
problem on EB-5s, both in terms of national security and also
fraud, and we need that information.
I have a letter going to Director Comey. It went October 1,
along with Senator Chambliss and Senator Grassley, in regards
to that same issue, and I would appreciate a response to that.
And then, Matt, we sent you a questionnaire on the Boston
bombing--and not only did you all not respond, you did not
respond to say--what you told us verbally was that the FBI was
answering for you. For us to really have a good working
relationship, some of the things that have to happen is
communication. And if the FBI is answering for you, you ought
to say, ``The FBI is answering for us,'' rather than just not
answer us, because all that does is raise the hair on the back
of my neck, and I have a great working relationship with you
through the Intelligence Committee and I trust you immensely.
But just common courtesy would tell us we are going to let the
FBI answer that.
Matt, when was the last time you got actionable
intelligence from a Fusion Center? Other than Boston. Boston
gave you some information. But I am talking actionable
intelligence.
Mr. Olsen. We work with the Fusion Centers really through
the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces and through, I mentioned in
my opening comments, our domestic representatives who work with
the Fusion Centers. The Fusion Centers are largely there to
support what is happening at the State and local level, and
they certainly serve their State and local customers. I have
had the opportunity to visit a number of Fusion Centers and
they seem to be doing a good job in that regard.
It is not the case, however, that they would typically
provide intelligence to, for example, me at the National
Counterterrorism Center, where we are focusing more on
national-level intelligence.
Senator Coburn. All right. So the point is, they are an
all-hazards, mostly State and local initiative, and the fact
is, they are mostly funded by Homeland Security. Yet the upward
flow of information that is actionable intelligence is almost
nothing. And so the question is, could some of those dollars be
better used, as far as Federal dollars, at the NCTC or at the
FBI, as the Director has said, in terms of what we have seen in
terms of sequester.
I just wanted to make the point--you have not gotten any
information that is actionable from a Fusion Center and very
little of it goes to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, for an
investigation. So it is not that--I am against them. It is that
we ought to look at what they are really doing, which is mainly
local and State, and it has as much to do with drugs and all
these other issues that local law enforcement deal with more so
than counterterrorism and the terrorism threat to the country.
Let us talk for a minute. One of the things that has to
happen on cyber has been referred to, and Secretary Beers, you
mentioned this, is the free flow of information from the
private sector to you all. And the problem with that is, the
liability concerns on private information. So, my question to
each of you is: do you think it is proper that any cyber bill
we put forward would create a liability protection for the
private sector in terms of sharing information with the
government?
Mr. Beers. Let me start, sir. That is one of the things
that we want. Obviously, we want to make sure, together with
you, that the liability protection that you are talking about
is carefully crafted in order to ensure that it protects
activity--information sharing that is legitimate under the
terms of that and not a total blanket liability protection. But
those are the kinds of things that would help with this so that
they are more willing to share that information instead of
having a long conversation between lawyers about the terms of
the information sharing, which very much slows it down.
Senator Coburn. Right. And nobody is talking about a
blanket liability. But the fact is, if a company is at risk,
fiduciary risk, with sharing something that the government
needs on a timely basis and we have not given adequate
liability protection for that, we are never going to get the
information on a timely basis. We may ultimately get it, but it
will be past the point which we could have utilized it most
effectively. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Coburn. Director Comey.
Mr. Comey. Yes, Senator, I would. Since I was last in
government, I have been the general counsel of two different
private companies and so I know the concern in the private
sector is that, and then a related concern, which is
reputational damage. Will the government keep their information
confidential? So they are worried on both fronts.
Senator Coburn. Right. Matt.
Mr. Olsen. I do not have anything to add to that.
Senator Coburn. OK. Tell me about this National Cyber
Investigative Task Force between the DHS, FBI, and NSA. We have
had a couple of presentations, most of them in closed session,
just so the American public can hear this. I was pretty
impressed at the coordination and cooperation that I saw among
the agencies, and if any of you would talk about that, I think
it would be very good for the American people to see that,
government is not always dysfunctional. You guys are really
doing some stuff together across department and agency lines,
and I think hearing about that would be very reassuring to the
American public.
Mr. Comey. I can say the first word about that, Senator.
That was one of the first places I visited as Director, was to
go and see the NCIJTF, and it is, as I said, a grouping of 19
agencies that all touch a piece of cyber. Cyber is sort of an
evil layer cake. There are State actors trying to steal
information. There are terrorists. There are organized criminal
groups. There are ``hacktivists.'' There are identity thieves.
And there are a huge number of people in government worrying
about different pieces of that layer cake, but until the NCIJTF
was created, they were all sitting in different places worrying
about it in different ways that were inefficient and
conflicting.
So what this did was literally pull everybody together, get
them all in the same physical place so they could figure out
who should work what threat and how should it be worked, and
then parse that work out in the way that is most cost efficient
and most effective for the American people.
It is a great news story. A lot of its achievements are
things we cannot talk about in an open setting, but I agree
with you. I think it is something the American people should be
very happy about.
Senator Coburn. All right.
Mr. Beers. Let me second Director Comey's remarks. It is an
excellent way in bringing these people together, in addition to
deciding who should take responsibility for a case, but to
allow the people at the Task Force, when an incident comes up,
to know who may have information about it and to pool that
information so that when the lead investigator is determined,
that investigator has all of that information.
We have had cases where one or the other of us has been
contacted about dealing with something when the other of us was
already running a parallel investigation to that kind of
activity which provided absolutely critical information to
resolving that particular case.
The other thing to keep in mind for the American people is
these investigations are really hard because of the difficulty
in getting attribution about who is actually doing it. But with
dedicated investigators, we have brought down a number of these
bad actors.
Mr. Comey. And can I just add a word, Senator. I have
worked a lot of different kinds of investigations in my career,
and when you are doing a La Cosa Nostra investigation, you can
deconflict by calling each other or setting up a meeting for
next Wednesday. When the threat is moving at 186,000 miles per
second, as a photon does on the Internet, there is no time to
make that phone call. So the advantage of this, the genius of
this is the FBI and DHS person are sitting next to each other.
So, have you got this? Good. Go with that. We will give you
this piece. And they can respond in the way that is needed.
Senator Coburn. Thank you.
Chairman Carper. Senator Johnson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome everybody here and also thank you
sincerely for your service.
I want to talk a little bit about just the actual threat
level and the history of it, and so I want to start, first of
all, and ask each one of you quickly, when do you believe the
current, we will call it War on Terrorism, really began? Where
did this all start? Secretary Beers.
Mr. Beers. Sir, if we are talking about Al-Qaeda, I believe
that we really first experienced it with the embassy bombings
in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998.
Senator Johnson. OK.
Mr. Beers. We had evidence of them before, for example, in
Somalia during the U.S. intervention in Somalia, but that was
where it really came to the fore in terms of my own personal
experience.
Senator Johnson. Director Comey.
Mr. Comey. I trace the current threat back to the 1980s in
Afghanistan, a situation I worry about repeating in Syria,
where people were getting training and learning and meeting
each other, out of which Osama Bin Laden formed the base Al-
Qaeda.
Senator Johnson. Director Olsen.
Mr. Olsen. I would agree with both my colleagues. I mean,
this is a process that has evolved and we see today the
changing threat, as Director Comey described, a metastasized
threat. So, it is an evolving threat, but it can be traced back
to the 1980s.
Senator Johnson. OK. So, my next question is--I realize the
answer is going to have to be very subjective, but based on
that history, that evolution, is the threat level higher today?
I will start with you, Director Olsen.
Mr. Olsen. It is a complicated answer. The threat level as
we look at the threat is more dispersed geographically. The
threat has moved out from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
region to broad swaths of areas that are largely ungoverned
across North Africa and the Middle East. So, in some ways, it
has become more significant from a geographic perspective and
more complicated from an intelligence perspective.
I would not say that the threat to the United States of a
9/11-style attack is greater. In fact, I would say it is lower
today than it was in 2001. So, the threat of that type of
attack today is lower than it was 12 years ago.
Senator Johnson. Director Comey.
Mr. Comey. I would agree with that. I think because we took
the fight to the enemy and got our act together in the last 12
years in very important ways, the risk of that spectacular
attack in the homeland is significantly lower than it was
before 9/11. And what has popped up in its place are these, in
the homeland, the risks of the smaller attacks, which are no
less, obviously, concerning to us, but smaller, and similar
overseas. The Hydra head is less able to attack us in the
homeland, so it has pushed more overseas and gotten smaller and
more disparate in the homeland.
Senator Johnson. Secretary Beers.
Mr. Beers. I would concur with that and go back
particularly to Matt's comment. The dispersion makes it a
bigger challenge in terms of knowing what and where things
might happen, but the ``where'' is more likely now to be
overseas than it is to be in the homeland, which is not to say
that we should drop our guard in any way.
Senator Johnson. So, you really do think that the threat is
more severe in terms of a worldwide threat coming onto our
shore as opposed to the homegrown terrorists, is that what you
are saying?
Mr. Beers. No, that is not at all what I am saying. I am
saying, in terms of the consequences of a particular kind of
attack----
Senator Johnson. It is going to occur overseas as opposed
to in the homeland.
Mr. Beers. The dispersion of the Al-Qaeda brand in North
Africa, in Yemen, in Somalia, and in other places, and as it is
appearing to manifest in Syria now, means that the kinds of
activities that will be undertaken are likely to be undertaken
overseas----
Senator Johnson. Oh, OK.
Mr. Beers [continuing]. Rather than directed against the
homeland. That is not to say that we still do not face a
threat, and it is certainly not to say that homegrown violent
extremists are inconsequential. Far from it.
Senator Johnson. I have always felt that our strongest line
of defense against any of these threats really is a strong
intelligence gathering capability. To what extent has the NSA
disclosures--how extensive has the harm been in terms of those
intelligence gathering capabilities? Director Olsen.
Mr. Olsen. I would echo the comments recently of Director
Clapper, who characterized them as extremely damaging. There is
no doubt that those disclosures have made our job harder. We
have seen that terrorists, our adversaries, are seeking to
learn about the ways that we collect intelligence and seeking
to adapt and change the ways that they communicate in order to
avoid our surveillance. So, it has made our job significantly
harder.
Senator Johnson. How to repair the damage of it? Director
Comey. I mean, what does Congress need to do? What do we need
to resist, potentially?
Mr. Comey. Well, I agree with what Matt said about the
challenge. Just in 2 months on the job, I have seen changes in
terrorist behavior in response to the disclosures about our
communications intercept capabilities. I think that Congress
just needs to make sure that we do not--if there are changes
that need to be made at the margins or in oversight, that we do
not make those at the expense of the core capabilities we need
as a country.
Senator Johnson. Secretary Beers, what is your biggest
concern that Congress might do that would just be a huge
mistake?
Mr. Beers. I think Director Comey characterized it. What we
need to do is make sure that you are comfortable with the
oversight, but not to throw the baby out with the bathwater in
terms of lurching too far in terms of restrictions on our
intelligence--our ability to collect intelligence.
Senator Johnson. Director Olsen, you were talking about
going over to Russia for the Olympic games. Can you describe
the common interests we may have with Russia? Can you describe
a little bit about who really are some solid world partners in
this War on Terrorism? Where do we have some common interests?
Mr. Olsen. We have a number of very close partners around
the world in our fight against terrorism, obviously,
particularly in Europe and particularly the United Kingdom. In
Russia, we face a common threat of violent extremists, and
particularly in the North Caucasus area of Russia. So, there is
a consistent threat stream coming from violent extremists in
that area, from terrorists in that area. They are largely
focused on Russian government targets, but, obviously, that is
a concern as we approach the Olympics, which will be a very
high-profile event in February.
Senator Johnson. Just a quick followup. Do you find Russian
cooperation increasing or decreasing over the last, let us say,
decade?
Mr. Olsen. I would point to the last several months as a
period of increasing cooperation, and Director Comey may be
able to speak to this, as well, but since the Boston bombing,
there has been an increase in cooperation with Russian
intelligence authorities.
Senator Johnson. OK. Thank you.
Chairman Carper. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
Senator Ayotte, welcome. Good morning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman and the
Ranking Member. I want to thank each of you for what you do for
our country. You have very important positions in keeping us
safe.
Director Comey, I want to ask you about the attacks on our
consulate in Benghazi over a year ago, on September 11. I guess
the question that I have most of all, that you and I have
talked about in the past when we met, why has not anyone been
brought to justice? We are in a position now where I have seen
public reports of individuals like Ahmed abu Khatalla, who is
associated with Ansar Al-Sharia. The reports have been that he
has been indicted in New York with others that have not been
named, and yet no one has been brought to justice. Can you tell
us why?
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Senator. If charges are brought in a
case and they are under seal, it is not something that I could
talk about. What I can tell you is this is among the FBI's very
highest priorities. I have a lot of people working very hard on
it. We are committed to bringing to justice those responsible
for the attack and the murder of our folks. These are often
difficult cases to make, but as you have seen in our work--we
never give up and we will never rest until we bring to justice
the people responsible.
The challenge for me is I have twin goals. I want to bring
them to justice successfully and I want to make sure that any
witnesses I have stay cooperative with us and that the bad guys
do not know what I might know or what I might be doing, and so
I am limited in what I can say in an open forum.
Senator Ayotte. Well, one thing that struck me is on
October 5, there was the successful raid into Libya to capture
Al-Libi, which I congratulate the FBI and everyone who worked,
obviously, our military and intelligence agencies, on that
capture. And it just led me to raise, of course, in my own
mind, when we went into Libya on October 5, if there are
individuals that need to be captured, why we would not capture
them then, as well. And I know that may not be something you
can answer in an open setting, but people are frustrated that
these people have not been brought to justice. So, I do want
your commitment that they will be brought to justice.
Mr. Comey. You have it. I think the Al-Libi case, I hope,
illustrates for the American people what I said before. We will
never stop and we will never give up. He has been wanted, as
you know, for well over a decade. So, the work will continue.
Senator Ayotte. Well, let me ask you. Are you getting
cooperation from Libya on this issue of capturing and seeing
that those who committed the attacks on our consulate are
brought to justice?
Mr. Comey. I do not want to talk in particular about
particular operations or particular conversations, but I think
as we have said publicly, the Libyan government has been
cooperative with us in this investigation.
Senator Ayotte. Well, we expect them to be cooperative with
everything, obviously, we have done and the support we have
given them.
Let me ask you, in terms of the Al-Libi capture on October
5, as I understand it, he was captured on October 5, placed on
a ship, and then was interrogated for--this is according to all
public information, now he has been publicly indicted--until
the 12th, in which he was brought into civilian custody, is
that right?
Mr. Comey. I do not know the exact dates, but the general--
--
Senator Ayotte. So, it is about a week of interrogation?
Mr. Comey [continuing]. General contours sound right.
Senator Ayotte. So, Mr. Beers identified the beginning of
Al-Qaeda as the attacks on our embassies in Africa, and, of
course, Al-Libi has been charged with those attacks on our
consulate. He was a very major capture, was he not, of Al-
Qaeda?
Mr. Comey. He is alleged to be one of the founding fathers
of Al-Qaeda.
Senator Ayotte. That is right. So, yesterday, we had the
nominee to take over for Mr. Beers, Jeh Johnson, and he
described interrogation as a treasure trove, as an opportunity,
of course, for us to gather information and protect our
country. You would agree with that, would you not, Director
Comey?
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Was 7 days enough, long enough
interrogation, in your view, to find out everything that Al-
Libi knew about Al-Qaeda and its operations?
Mr. Comey. I do not want to comment on the particular case.
Longer is always better. More is always better. Interrogation,
I agree with Jeh Johnson. Interrogation is a critical tool and
is often a treasure trove----
Senator Ayotte. So, here is our conundrum. Here is the
problem we face. Let us take it out of Al-Libi for a moment. He
was put on a ship instead of being brought to Guantanamo
because, obviously, this has been a policy, political decision
of the Administration of not wanting to put anyone in
Guantanamo. But, is it practical that we can put everyone on
ships, of his nature?
Mr. Comey. That is a hard question for me to answer.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I guess the question I have is,
tomorrow, let us say we get Zawahiri. Let us say we get the
current titular head, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, tomorrow. Where do we
put him? You need to interrogate him, not only you, but our
intelligence officials to protect our country. What do we do
with him? I would hope that we are not going to only
interrogate him for a week, so do you know what we do with him,
where we detain him, how he is treated?
Mr. Comey. I do not in particular. I am aware of a variety
of options. My goal would be just what you said, to have our
agents and our Intelligence Community colleagues have the
opportunity to interrogate him to get that information.
Senator Ayotte. Do you think he should be Mirandized?
Mr. Comey. Who are you asking about? I am sorry.
Senator Ayotte. Zawahiri. If we get Zawahiri tomorrow, when
we capture him, do you believe that he should be read his
Miranda rights?
Mr. Comey. Well, I, as my predecessor did, believe that the
more flexibility we have to delay the reading of those rights,
the better. But, again, the reason I am hesitating is it would
depend upon where he is and whether there was a court case
pending against him and all those kinds of things. But, sure,
the more flexibility, the better for us.
Senator Ayotte. And that is because, obviously, you capture
a known terrorist, someone who is the head of Al-Qaeda, you
tell him he has the right to remain silent, that obviously
could have the potential to interfere with your interrogation,
is that right?
Mr. Comey. Sure. It would end the interrogation. And in
situations like that, it is not that I am looking for
confessions to be able to use in a court----
Senator Ayotte. No. You are using----
Mr. Comey. I am trying to get intelligence----
Senator Ayotte. You are looking for information to protect
the country, right?
Mr. Comey. Exactly.
Senator Ayotte. And that is different than gathering--
certainly, they can be concomitant and together, but the
priority has to be in gathering information to protect the
country, is that right?
Mr. Comey. Sure, and that is the way we approach it.
Senator Ayotte. Well, the one thing I will just say is that
I worry about the Zawahiri situation, because right now, the
Administration has chosen not to use Guantanamo. The
Administration is putting people on ships. But Al-Libi, to only
interrogate someone like that for 7 days, it seems to me that
we are losing opportunities to gather intelligence. And I hope
that--Director Comey, you are new to this position--that we can
work on a policy for detention and interrogation that will
allow you to fully interrogate the worst terrorists that
continue to pose threats for our country. So, I thank you all
for what you are doing.
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Carper. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
I want to return to my earlier question. Secretary Beers,
you had a chance to respond to it. We are under cyber attack
every day. It is not just something that could happen. It does
happen, and it happens in a lot of different ways and a lot of
different directions.
I want to come back to it, and my original question,
Director Comey and Mr. Olsen, was are you guys working
together? How well are your agencies working together? What are
you doing better than you were? Where can you do better still?
How can we help? Please.
Mr. Comey. I think two things that I could add to the
answer that Rand Beers gave you already, one is I agree very
much what we are doing better together is talking to each other
and sharing information very quickly so that we can discharge
our responsibilities quickly. So that is my first response.
My second response is, it is our need to get information
from the private sector quickly that is critical. Otherwise, we
are patrolling--I picture us as police officers patrolling a
street where the walls on either side of the street are 50-feet
high. We can make sure that the street is safe, but we cannot
tell what is going on in the neighborhood. That neighborhood in
my metaphor is all the private networks and all the private
companies that are the victims of these attacks. So, we need to
find a way to lower those walls so that we can learn the
information we need quickly to be able to respond to the
attacks. That is what we could do better.
Chairman Carper. How can we help?
Mr. Comey. Well, I think, as Secretary Beers said, I think
one of the things that is very important is to create
incentives for private companies to cooperate, to address their
concerns primarily about liability, and second, their concerns
about their reputation. And so I think that liability issue
sits with Congress that can offer them that protection. So, I
think that is very important.
Chairman Carper. Talk more about that liability protection.
Mr. Comey. Well, private companies are concerned that if
they turn over information, they will end up getting sued by
people whose personal information may be somewhere in the data
they supply, or competitors may complain about them turning it
over, or that it will be used against them in some fashion in a
government contract competition down the road. And all of these
things make their general counsels, which I used to be, say,
great idea. We really want to share. We do not want to hurt the
stockholders of this company by sharing, so what is our
protection? That conversation just took me 10 seconds to say
it. That is a several hour conversation inside any company. In
the meantime, that threat, as I said, has moved at the speed of
light, and so that is just not sustainable.
Chairman Carper. What are a short menu of options that we
should consider in addressing those liability concerns?
Mr. Comey. I do not think I am expert enough in the pending
legislation to offer you a specific view, so I would defer to
Secretary Beers, who I think knows it better than I.
Chairman Carper. Is that true? Do you know better than he
does?
Mr. Beers. I have been at it longer, Senator.
Chairman Carper. All right. Do you want to take a shot at
that, a menu of options for us to consider on the liability
side?
Mr. Beers. Well, as explored with Senator Coburn, I think
what we need is for the liability protection to create the
willingness for the private sector to share information about a
data breach as soon as they experience it, so that we can help
them as quickly as possible and we can protect others as
quickly as possible.
So, how the liability protection is constructed, I am not a
lawyer. I cannot define that in the legal terms that you all
need to put into the law. But I certainly would be ready and
willing to help with technical assistance on trying to define
precisely what that ought to look like, as we tried earlier on
with the last attempt to write the legislation in this body.
Chairman Carper. All right. Mr. Olsen.
Mr. Olsen. I do not have anything to add on the cyber
legislation.
Chairman Carper. All right. Thank you.
Let us talk a bit about the lone wolves, the folks,
American citizens in many cases, who become radicalized, in
some cases by traveling abroad, being exposed to jihadist
activities, in other cases just being radicalized here, over
the Internet or maybe in their own communities. I worry a lot
about that. I know you do, too. Share with us what we are doing
to try to address that threat and how you are working together.
How can we help you?
Mr. Beers. Let me go ahead and start. In addition to the
great investigative work that the Bureau does, the three of us,
along with the Department of Justice leadership, have a regular
dialogue among ourselves about how to craft a common approach
to assist in the identification of individuals, the prevention
of them carrying out their acts.
We do this under three large categories of activity. The
first is to look at all of the events that have occurred and
see what transpired in those events so that we can create a
body of knowledge about behaviors and indicators that can
inform us and State and local law enforcement and citizens of
what kinds of indicators might provide us with a warning of an
event.
We then take that information and provide it to all of our
law enforcement partners. We conduct training in association
with that. We conduct exercises in association with that. And
we, as Matt Olsen indicated, that is not just before the event,
but also what do you do after an event has begun to occur. All
of the active shooter training that we do is designed to assist
in that, although it is a much broader resonance in terms of
those kinds of events.
And then the last is community engagement, to talk to
people in the communities, to hear what their concerns and
issues are and to provide that information to them, as well.
And all three of us participate in that effort, either as
individual agencies or in concert with one another. That is the
broad scheme of how we work together.
Chairman Carper. All right. Director Comey, would you add
to that, please.
Mr. Comey. The only thing I would add is that with respect
to the travelers--in some ways, the travelers are easier for
us--they are still a huge challenge--than the homegrown violent
extremist who stays in his basement the whole time,
radicalizing himself through the Internet. There, it is a huge
challenge, as Secretary Beers said, trying to develop a set of
indicators. What are we looking for? What should we equip the
police officers patrolling that neighborhood to look for? So,
that is something we are focused on.
The travelers, we can see them come in and out of the
country, and so figuring out smart ways to assess what they are
doing and to have conversations with them that are useful to us
is something we are working together on.
Chairman Carper. Good. Mr. Olsen.
Mr. Olsen. If I could just really echo the comments of my
colleagues. I mean, the challenge of the homegrown violent
extremist is exactly as Director Comey described. This could be
an individual who does not travel, does not communicate, maybe
a passive consumer of radical information on the Internet, so
really does not hit any of the trip wires that help us discern
when somebody is mobilizing to violence.
So, we are working closely together as a team to implement
the strategy. The strategy has the three broad categories that
Rand Beers laid out--engagement, training and expertise with
State and local law enforcement, as well as countering the Al-
Qaeda narrative.
We talked a minute ago about Fusion Centers. Fusion Centers
do provide a very good way for us to help develop the expertise
at the State and local level. Around the country, there are a
million first responders between the police officers and
firefighters. Those are the individuals who are going to be
most likely to see someone who is on that path from
radicalization to mobilization. And helping equip them with how
to find those signs is a key part of the strategy.
Chairman Carper. All right. Thanks. My time has expired.
Let me just ask you, take 10 seconds apiece and answer this
question. If somebody sees something--they are saying, see
something, say something. If someone sees someone that they
believe is being radicalized in their own community, maybe in
their own family, who should they say something to? Rand.
Mr. Beers. Usually, the first instance is the local law
enforcement agencies.
Mr. Comey. I Agree, and I would urge people, listen to that
feeling on the back of your neck and do not write an innocent
narrative over facts that initially strike you as strange. Just
tell somebody.
Mr. Olsen. And if I could just add, a key element of this
is to build trust with those communities, particularly the
American Muslim community, so they have the confidence and
trust in our law enforcement agencies to, if they see something
that gives them concern, to come forward.
Chairman Carper. All right. Thanks so much.
Senator Levin, it is good to see you. You are recognized.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Director Comey, let me start with you. The law now does not
allow detainees to be brought from Guantanamo to the U.S. for
detention and trial. Should this law be changed?
Mr. Comey. That is----
Senator Levin. Should we allow people to be brought from
Guantanamo to the U.S. for detention and trial? Can they be
properly tried? Can they be safely detained?
Mr. Comey. The policy question, I think, Senator, is one
better answered by the Department of Justice. I know from my
personal experience, though, terrorists can be safely detained
and tried. I have been involved in many cases myself in
civilian courts in the United States. So, that part, I can
definitely answer and the answer is yes.
Senator Levin. Well, what is that personal experience?
Mr. Comey. Well----
Senator Levin. More specifically, have we tried individuals
for terrorism in Federal courts?
Mr. Comey. Many we have. I was the U.S. Attorney in
Manhattan after September 11, 2001, and we had cases pending
then. We are very good in the United States at safely detaining
bad people with all kinds of threat. We are successful in
detaining them. The Bureau of Prisons, I used to supervise when
I was Deputy Attorney General, and there is nobody better in
the world. And our courts are, as they have proven in a track
record going back to probably the largest case was the initial
East Africa bombings case brought in the Southern District of
New York, which was tried, and it is actually the case that Al-
Libi was just arrested on. It is a long track record.
Senator Levin. Now, are trials that are held in Federal
court more likely to be conducted in a speedy manner compared
to trials before military commissions?
Mr. Comey. I do not have enough experience--I guess we do
not as a country--with the military commissions for me to say
about that. So, what I can say is I do know the Federal courts
have long been able to move these cases, protect classified
information, and get them done in a reasonably prompt time.
Senator Levin. Now, the argument has been made that this
bringing terrorists to trial, either directly for trial in the
United States or from Guantanamo, somehow or other creates a
security threat for those communities in which they are held.
Do we have any evidence to support that kind of a conclusion?
Mr. Comey. I do not know of any, Senator, with respect to a
threat created in the area of a prison facility. Our ADMAX, our
supermax prison in the high desert in Colorado, is fairly
remote. I do not know of any threat surrounding that facility.
We have housed in that facility some really bad people for a
long time.
Senator Levin. And, Mr. Beers, is there any position that
DHS has taken about any security threat from trying and
detaining terrorist defendants?
Mr. Beers. Sir, I do not have any information indicating
any significant threat to a particular trial that has taken
place.
Mr. Olsen. Senator Levin, if I may, just to jump in for a
moment here, I would want to fully endorse Director Comey's
comments about the Federal courts. I share, at least in part,
the experience of having been a Federal prosecutor and the
ability of our Federal courts to handle these cases.
And the one element I would add is--what we have seen in
certain cases, in certain important cases, is the ability to
obtain intelligence information from individuals who are
brought into that system. From my perspective at the National
Counterterrorism Center, of course, it is very important that
we do whatever we can to gain that intelligence, and we have
been able to do that in a number of important cases where
individuals have been cooperative and provided important
information.
Senator Levin. Is there any evidence--or maybe, Director
Comey and others, you can compare the kind of intelligence both
in terms of quantity and quality that the FBI has been able to
obtain from terrorist suspects compared to their being held by
other elements of our Federal Government.
Mr. Comey. Senator, I am not in a position to compare
because I do not know enough about the track record in getting
information by other agencies, so I can only speak to the
FBI's, which is long, and it is one of the things we do best,
is get information from people, especially bad guys.
Senator Levin. And is that also consistent with the
guarantees in the law for interrogation of suspects?
Mr. Comey. Absolutely.
Senator Levin. Let me ask you a question, Director, about a
bill that Senator Grassley and I have introduced relative to
U.S. States and the United States incorporating entities that
have hidden ownership. Is there a problem from a law
enforcement point of view in not knowing the real owners of
corporations? In this regard, I think you may be familiar with
what happened at the G-20 summit, where 20 leaders, including
President Obama, reached a consensus that it was time to stop
creating corporations with hidden owners, and President Obama
has issued a National Action Plan which calls for Federal
legislation, such as we have introduced, to require our States
to include on their incorporation forms a question asking for
the names of the real owners of the corporation being formed.
Now, do you support that bill? Does the FBI want to know
the real owners of corporations? Is there a law enforcement
purpose, because we have had all kinds of letters from law
enforcement groups, Federal Law Enforcement Officers
Association (FLEOA), Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), Assistant
U.S. Attorneys Association, on and on, saying it is critically
important that you know the beneficial owners of corporations
because, otherwise, suspected terrorists, drug trafficking
organizations, and other criminal enterprises continue to
exploit the anonymity afforded to them through the current
corporate filing process. That is quoting the letter from the
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association.
Do you support, as Director of the FBI, our passing a bill
which would require States to ask one question on the
incorporation forms: who are the real owners, who are the
beneficial owners of the corporation that you seek to
incorporate? And if you do support it, will you tell us why?
Mr. Comey. I do not know enough about the bill in
particular to have a position. I am sure the Department of
Justice is working on it. But I agree with your premise. It is
very important to our investigations across a whole range of
cases to be able to learn that information.
Senator Levin. Why?
Mr. Comey. Because----
Senator Levin. Give us examples. Why does it make a
difference in law enforcement?
Mr. Comey. Well, if you are conducting an investigation of
a transnational organized crime group that is involved in human
trafficking or drug smuggling and they are laundering their
money through a particular corporate entity, connecting that
entity to the bad guys is going to be a critical step in your
investigation. I mean, and you could take that and make it an
analog in any different kind of a terrorism financing case, a
bank fraud case, a Ponzi scheme. All of those require you to
find the people who are hiding behind particular names or
shells.
Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Carper. And just to followup on the question, that
exchange that you just had with Senator Levin, this is an issue
that he has pursued for some time. And, interestingly enough,
the States are uncomfortable with the manner that it has been
pursued. The States, especially the States that have expressed
their concern through their Secretaries of State, and we have
encouraged our own Secretary of State in Delaware to work with,
partner with other Secretaries of State across the country to
meet with the FBI, engage in a conversation with the FBI and
other law enforcement agencies to find a way that addresses the
concerns that Senator Levin has expressed and that you, and I
think many Americans, would share, but to do so in a way that
the States do not find overwhelmingly difficult to administer.
I think there is a sweet spot there and there is a negotiation
that has begun. We appreciate the participation of the FBI and
other law enforcement agencies in that discussion.
Back to Senator Coburn.
Senator Coburn. Thank you.
Director Beers, you mentioned a minute ago the National
Suspicious Activities group--what was the full name of that?
Mr. Beers. ``National Suspicious Activities Reporting
Initiative.''
Senator Coburn. This morning, a news article broke that
4,904 people, personal Social Security numbers, addresses, and
professions, and lots of other detail came out of the DHS,
whose Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was leading an
investigation on some information about how to get around a lie
detector test and a book that was sold. And if you read this
report--I do not know if you are familiar with this or not----
Mr. Beers. No, I have not seen it, sir.
Senator Coburn [continuing]. But I would tell you, this is
really concerning to me. First of all, it looks sloppy on its
face in terms of the number of people. And what I would direct
you to is today's McClatchy news story.
But this is the kind of thing where, because it is not done
right, it looks to be very inappropriate. As a matter of fact,
in the story, it is quoted that the agencies will keep this
information for long periods of time on these individuals, and
the American people are going to want to know why and what did
they do wrong. Because they wanted to read a book, now the
Federal Government has shared all our information with 20-some
other agencies, including our personal data.
I think there is a balance to where we are going and I
would love for you to both brief my staff and also respond to
this news story, if you would, later today. I know I am
catching you off guard, but we need to protect ourselves, but
we also need to protect the Fourth and First Amendments. To me,
on the face--and I will reserve final judgment until I hear
from you--this is way overboard and way beyond, and I would
hope you would address this.
Director Comey, as you know, Senator Graham has held up and
is holding up all nominations of the President coming before
the Senate because, in his opinion, the Congress ought to have
the right to interview and discuss what happened in Benghazi
with the survivors. That has been resisted. And I have two
questions for you. No. 1 is why does the Congress not have the
right to do that? And No. 2 is, is Senator Graham inappropriate
in trying to have the American people know what happened in
Benghazi by interviewing those survivors?
Mr. Comey. My reactions are, I do not know. This is the
first question. And no as to the second question. It does not
strike me as inappropriate. As I said in response to an earlier
question, my interests are in making sure that we balance the
FBI's need to be able to protect our witnesses and find those
people and bring them to justice, but I do not see anything
inappropriate with the inquiry.
Senator Coburn. Well, but it is my understanding he has
been told he cannot interview those survivors. Is that correct?
Mr. Comey. Certainly not by me. I do not know. I----
Senator Coburn. The FBI has no problem with Congress
interviewing the survivors of Benghazi?
Mr. Comey. No.
Senator Coburn. All right. Thank you.
One of the concerns that I hear from the private sector,
Secretary Beers, on the Executive Order--and, by the way, I
compliment the President on his Executive Order on cyber. I
think they listened well. They built a good plan. And, so far,
it has been executed very well. So, I congratulate him and you
on what has been done on that.
But, one of the concerns is about what is coming with the
Executive Order in terms of regulations, one of the things that
I believe is stifling our economy now, is just tremendously
excessive, and if we want private data shared with the
government so we can actually protect us. Do you have any
concerns on that part, or do you have any feel for what we are
going to see in terms of regulations?
Mr. Beers. Sir, at this particular point in time, as we
negotiated the original cyber bill that was considered in this
body and in this Committee, it was not our intention to seek
regulation in association with that. It was a very light touch.
I think that remains our posture with respect to going forward.
The part of the Executive Order that seeks to catalog
regulatory authorities is an effort to pull that together to
see what authorities do currently exist that allow regulation
that is already underway----
Senator Coburn. You would----
Mr. Beers [continuing]. And see where we go from there. We
have not completed that particular----
Senator Coburn. You would agree that voluntary compliance,
if people were made aware of it and made aware of the benefits
of it, is a better scenario than forced compliance, or at least
forced compliance should come after we see a failure of
voluntary compliance? Would you agree to that?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Coburn. All right. Thank you. I have no further
questions.
Chairman Carper. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to followup on questioning by both Senator
Ayotte and Senator Coburn on Benghazi. Director Comey, for 14
months, it has been the consistent excuse of this
Administration that the reason Members of Congress do not have
access to the survivors of Benghazi is because of the FBI
investigation. I mean, you are aware of that, correct?
Mr. Comey. I am not, Senator. I am not.
Senator Johnson. So, just getting back to what Senator
Coburn said, there should be no reason that the FBI
investigation should be used as an excuse for us not to have
access to question those witnesses, whether it is in an open
hearing or in a secure briefing setting?
Mr. Comey. As the FBI Director, I do not have an objection
to it. I do not know whether the prosecutors would feel
differently or there is some other reason I am not thinking of,
but speaking from my perspective, yes, I do not have an
objection to that.
Senator Johnson. Director Olsen, I would just like to talk
about the difference between our desire to prosecute and the
difference between gathering intelligence. I mean, from my
standpoint, with the threats that you are far more aware of
than I am, to me, it sounds like intelligence gathering is a
far higher priority than bringing people, I guess, to eventual
justice, particularly when we can hold them as unlawful enemy
combatants. Can you just kind of discuss the difference between
the desire to prosecute, which we all want people brought to
justice, but the need, the absolute requirement for
intelligence gathering?
Mr. Olsen. I think there is no conflict in that. In other
words, from everything I have seen in my work at the National
Counterterrorism Center and before, the No. 1 goal in any of
these instances involving terrorist suspects is to gather
intelligence. That is the overriding objective. At the same
time, we need to have an option for disposition, and with
respect to, for example, Abu Anas Al-Libi, who we discussed,
this was an individual who was indicted and where a disposition
option was readily available in the Federal courts. But every
case is different and every case is treated on the basis of the
facts presented, and in every case, intelligence gathering is
the priority, and that is what I have experienced----
Senator Johnson. I made a trip down to Guantanamo with
Senator Ayotte and we spoke to the people they are continuing
to interrogate over a very long period of time, the detainees
down there. The very strong opinion of those individuals doing
those interrogations say that the most effective interrogation
occurs over years, where you gain their confidence, and slowly
and surely you obtain the little threads of information, the
types of threads that, I think, eventually led to the killing
of Osama Bin Laden. Do you disagree with that? I mean, to me, I
think it is absurd that we think we can actually gather the
types of intelligence that is possibly there in a week on a
ship, or a couple days before we Mirandize somebody. Do you
disagree with that?
Mr. Olsen. I mean, as a general proposition, I think it is
clear that the longer opportunity we have to gather
intelligence, to interrogate someone, the better. There are----
Senator Johnson. So, do you not believe we really ought to
be using that absolute first class facility down in Guantanamo
to detain these individuals so we can gather the type of
intelligence we need?
Mr. Olsen. I mean, in every case, there are going to be
other considerations that are going to come into play, and
that, in fact----
Senator Johnson. Any higher consideration than gathering
the intelligence we need to keep the homeland safe?
Mr. Olsen. There are going to be other considerations, and
that was, indeed, what was in play with Abu Anas Al-Libi. So,
again, though, the No. 1 goal is to gather intelligence, and
that is what I have seen in these cases.
Senator Johnson. OK. Well, I wish that were the top
priority. It does not seem to be so.
Secretary Beers, on May 23, 2012, we held a hearing in this
Committee on the very unfortunate events in Cartagena. We were
pretty well led to believe by the then-Director of the Secret
Service that was a one-time occurrence. I really wanted to
believe that. I think it is incredibly important that the
Secret Service has total credibility and that their important
mission of securing high government officials and national
security information is paramount. In my capacity as Ranking
Member on a Subcommittee that had oversight of that, we
continued to dig into exactly what happened in Cartagena,
hoping it was a one-time occurrence. It does not appear that it
was.
We have, through whistleblower accounts, found out that
similar instances occurred in 17 countries around the world.
And, again, that is just a limited snapshot. We have had very
limited access to individuals that might know better. Just the
other day, two Secret Service individuals were disciplined for
sexual misconduct in a hotel here in Washington. One of those
men, Ignacio Zamora, we have come to find out actually was
involved in the Cartagena incident and interviewed Secret
Service personnel.
The question I have for you is we have been waiting for a
culture report from the Inspector General's (IGs) office now
for 18 months. Do you know when that culture report will be
released?
Mr. Beers. Sir, I do not have a specific date. I know that
it is near completion and we are expecting it shortly. But I
cannot give you----
Senator Johnson. Do you think 18 months is kind of an
inordinate amount of time to take to determine something I
think is so critically important, to find out whether there is
a real cultural problem in the Secret Service?
Mr. Beers. Obviously, we would prefer to have the report
sooner rather than later, sir.
Senator Johnson. Can I get your commitment to check into
that and get that report completed and released as soon as
possible?
Mr. Beers. Yes, you have it.
Senator Johnson. OK. Thank you. No further questions, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Carper. Dr. Coburn, please.
Senator Coburn. I just had one other thought. As we went
through the Boston Marathon bombing and we look at the
Tsarnaevs, the one thing that was never covered is the parents
came here under an asylum visa, except the parents are back
home and have been for a number of years. Has anybody looked at
our techniques, processes, requirements for granting asylum to
individuals, because, obviously, with the ability to return
home to their home city from which they were granted asylum in
the first place, something has changed. Either we got it wrong
or something markedly changed in Chechnya. I do not think that
is the case. So, has anybody looked at that? And I know that is
a State Department issue probably more than Homeland Security,
or maybe it is not. Any comments on that?
Mr. Beers. Sir, let me start. The Tsarnaev family sought
asylum from Kyrgyzstan, where they had moved to avoid the
violence in their home area of Dagestan. Their request for
asylum was that they were being discriminated against in
Kyrgyzstan for being from Dagestan and that was the basis of
the initial granting. So, that was the way that it happened,
and then they, as you quite correctly say, chose later on for
presumably personal reasons to go back to the place that they
were actually from, that they were actually born in. Those are
the facts of the case.
With respect to the asylum, yes, we are looking at this as
a regular issue, since DHS is a participant in the granting of
asylum, because, in part, it leads often to legal permanent
resident status and naturalization. So, we are very much a part
of that.
Senator Coburn. All right. Thank you very much.
Chairman Carper. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Director Comey, I wanted to followup on a discussion that
we had on the JTTF and the Memorandums of Understanding (MOU),
because when Commissioner Davis had testified before our
Committee about the Boston bombing, and I think all of us agree
that there was great cooperation there and the Boston Police
Department did a phenomenal job, along with the Federal
partners, he had some concerns about how the MOU was operating,
and you and I talked about that, and I wanted to followup with
you on as to where we are with the communication on the JTTF
for the Memorandum of Understanding. He was concerned that his
local officers, the information was not flowing downward.
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Senator. Yes, that is a concern that
we have been discussing with the major city chiefs and the
sheriffs. I had a lunch meeting last week with them to followup
on that. So, it is a work in progress, but I think we are going
to--our goal is to, when you and I discussed, which is to make
sure there are not impediments, either real or perceived, and
so his concern is being acted on. I do not have a date for when
it will be done, but it will be very soon.
Senator Ayotte. Good. I would very much love if you would
report back to the Committee to just give us that answer,
because I know it is an issue that is of importance to you,
just so we know that this is operating and the information is
flowing correctly downward and upward.
Mr. Comey. Sure. I will.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. Also, Mr. Olsen, I wanted to ask
you about your testimony. You mentioned something about the
withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan could enable
core Al-Qaeda veterans to reconstitute there. Right now, the
Administration, we are in a key moment with regard to what
happens in Afghanistan, decisions that are going to have to be
made on what the follow-on force will be in 2014. And so I
guess I want to hear from you, does it matter? I have heard
some people say, what can we accomplish there, and I was
intrigued by what you said because I share the belief that we
could have a reconstitution of Al-Qaeda or other terrorist
groups there. So, could you enlighten us on that.
Mr. Olsen. I mean, I think from an intelligence
perspective, we are concerned about Afghanistan and Pakistan
and the border region, no doubt, because of the presence of
extremist groups, including the remnants of core Al-Qaeda in
that region. We have seen that there has been an interest in
Al-Qaeda in parts of Afghanistan, particularly Northeastern
Afghanistan, and it is just going to be an issue that we are
going to have to monitor very closely after 2014 to see what
types of activities Al-Qaeda or other allies of Al-Qaeda, for
example, the Haqqani network, undertake in that region.
Senator Ayotte. And, in fact, have we not seen reactivity
by Al-Qaeda, or activity by Al-Qaeda in Iraq with what is
happening there right now. We were not able to come to an
agreement on a follow-on force in Iraq and now we are certainly
seeing some follow-on there. Can you describe that?
Mr. Olsen. Sure. Senator, we have seen an uptick over the
last several months in violence in Iraq, much of it, we
believe, perpetrated by Sunni extremists in Iraq, almost all of
it focused on Iraqi targets, not U.S. targets necessarily. But,
certainly, there has been an uptick in the violence in that
country.
Senator Ayotte. And we certainly want to avoid the scenario
where Afghanistan becomes a launching pad for terrorists again,
do we not?
Mr. Olsen. Absolutely.
Senator Ayotte. All right. Thank you all.
Senator Coburn. [Presiding.] Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you. I just have a few more questions.
Director, you indicated that you do not have a personal
problem with Congress interviewing the witnesses from Benghazi
but that you have not talked to your prosecutors, is that what
you said?
Mr. Comey. I do not know. I have not discussed it with the
Department of Justice to see whether there are separate
concerns about--from the Assistant U.S. Attorneys handling the
matter about it. And when I said witnesses, I thought the
question was about the survivors, which are the U.S. personnel
who were there.
Senator Levin. Correct.
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Senator Levin. Is it possible that you would have a
different opinion if you talked to those prosecutors?
Mr. Comey. It is always possible, sure.
Senator Levin. OK.
Mr. Comey. I do not know.
Senator Levin. My other question has to do with going back
to the beneficial ownership issue of corporations and the
national security problems that are created when we do not know
who owns the corporations. We have some, apparently, testimony
or some indication from some of the Secretaries of State that
the FBI could obtain--and other law enforcement agents could
obtain corporate ownership information from the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) on a form, I guess it is called SS-4, but
the corporations have to fill out those forms to get a U.S.
Taxpayer ID Number. Does that work from the FBI's perspective,
to try to get the important information that you described from
the IRS instead of from the applications for corporate
incorporation?
Mr. Comey. I do not know enough to say, Senator. I just do
not know.
Senator Levin. So you are not familiar with the argument
that the FBI could get that information from the IRS?
Mr. Comey. I am not.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Those are the only questions that
I have, and I just want to thank you all.
Mr. Olsen. Senator Levin, if I could go back to your
question with respect to Benghazi, the one point I would like
to offer to the Committee is over the course of the last year
and several months since the Benghazi attacks, we have
presented a number of briefings to Members of this Committee as
well as a number of other members, probably over a dozen
briefings that presented a multimedia presentation, including
surveillance video, overhead imagery, witness statements
describing every facet that we had from an intelligence
perspective about those attacks. So, we have had a number of
opportunities to present everything that we know from an
Intelligence Community's perspective about the attacks in
Benghazi. We would certainly offer that again if the Committee
was interested in seeing that.
Senator Levin. Well, I was just curious about the
Director's comment about not having talked to the prosecutors
and whether or not that might impact his opinion as to whether
or not for some reason Congress should not have access to those
survivors. I do not know of any reason, either, by the way, I
have to tell you. I think this whole thing has been not handled
appropriately, but that is not the point. The point is, I do
not see any reason myself why Congress should not have access
to anybody Congress wants to have access to. Whether it has
overdone it or not, I will leave that up to my own personal
opinion and to others to resolve. But, I do not have a personal
problem, either.
But, I, sure as heck, if I knew prosecutors had a problem
with it, I would want to hear their view before I reached my
conclusion. I was kind of surprised that the Director said,
well, it is his opinion that there is no problem, but the
prosecutors may have a different approach. So, that was the
reason I was pressing the Director on this issue, and I can
leave it at that.
Going back just to clarify one question about some of the
positions that Secretaries of State have taken about the FBI
going to the IRS to get the beneficial ownership information,
would you find out and give us an answer for the record as to
whether or not the FBI believes that is a satisfactory
alternative to knowing the beneficial owners from the
incorporation documents? Would you let us know for the record?
Mr. Comey. Sure, Senator.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Carper. [Presiding.] All right. I have a couple of
closing questions, and then I will give you an opportunity, if
you want, just to make a short closing statement of your own,
so think about that while I ask these questions.
Probably most Americans are concerned about their personal
security in this country, either from crime in their own
communities or own States or the threat of a terrorist attack.
I think people are more mindful of the threat of cyber attacks
than they have ever been, and we are reminded of those threats
every day. People in this country are also concerned about
their own privacy and the ability to have their privacy
protected, and sometimes there is a tension between those two
desires. We all want to be safe. We also want to make sure that
our rights to privacy are protected.
Please talk about the tension that exists between those two
rights and concerns and how we are trying to strike the right
balance, please. Mr. Olsen, do you want to go first.
Mr. Olsen. Sure. This is an issue, obviously, that is front
and center today, and I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, and the
Committee that it is an issue that is part of what we think
about every day at the National Counterterrorism Center, and I
know it is true from my experience at the other places I have
worked, including the National Security Agency and the
Department of Justice.
Particularly with respect to where I am now, at the
National Counterterrorism Center, we are charged with the
responsibility of preventing terrorist attacks. We do that by
integrating and analyzing information. We understand that we
need to have access to a lot of information, government-
collected information, in order to do that, in order to analyze
that information, look for particular threads, look for
threats, share that information, again, with agencies like the
FBI and others who can act upon it.
But we also understand that in so doing, in handling that
information, we are responsible for being stewards of that
information and that we are entrusted by the American people
with protecting it. And it is part of our training, it is part
of everything we do in terms of having access to information
that we understand the laws and the policies and the
regulations that apply to protecting that information to ensure
that we do so in a way that is consistent with the civil
liberties and privacy of all Americans.
Chairman Carper. What further could you say to the American
people who have these concerns about the right to privacy and
their concern it is being violated or could be violated? What
more could you say to reassure them that this is, indeed, a
concern that the Administration and those with whom you work
are mindful of?
Mr. Olsen. Well, I think what I would say is that, again,
the training and the oversight that we are subject to is unlike
anything I have seen anywhere in the world, and it surpasses
that which we experienced 10 years ago or even 5 years ago. So,
the degree of oversight that we are subject to by Congress, by
the judicial branch, by other elements of the executive branch,
I believe should give the American people confidence that we
are handling this information in a way that is appropriate and
that secures privacy and civil liberties.
That said, we depend on the confidence of the American
people in being able to do our job, so we are committed to
being as transparent as possible in how we do that in order to
continue to gain and maintain their confidence.
Chairman Carper. All right. Director Comey, we have people
that are concerned that folks at NSA are reading their e-mails,
looking at their text messages, listening to their telephone
conversations. What can you say to reassure almost all
Americans that is not a concern they need to have, or can you?
Mr. Comey. The first thing I would say is I agree very much
with Director Olsen, that this is something every American
should care about. Every American should care about how the
government is using its authorities to protect them and where
the government is also being mindful of the liberties that make
this country so special. And what I tell folks is, look, our
Founders were geniuses. They divided power and created three
parts of government to check power.
So, if you care about these issues, and everybody should,
you should first ask, is the government working? Is there
oversight? How is that oversight being done? Is it balanced?
And the second thing is, I tell people, you should participate.
Everybody should ask questions about how government is using
its authorities and ask whether the system is working.
I happen to think the angel is in those details, that what
has gotten lost in a lot of the discussion about how we use our
authorities is just how the design of the Founders is operating
to balance and to oversee the use of those authorities.
The challenge for all of us who are in charge of protecting
the American people is finding the space in American life to
have that conversation, because it cannot be on a bumper
sticker. It requires me to say, look at how Congress oversees
me. Look at how the Inspector General oversees me. Look at what
the courts do. Look at what I report on. And that seems kind of
boring, but that is the most important part of what we do, to
show people that the government is working.
Chairman Carper. All right. Thank you. Secretary Beers.
Mr. Beers. I would certainly associate myself with the
comments of both of my colleagues. The only thing that I would
add is as a practical and operational matter at DHS, we have a
Privacy Office with a Chief Privacy Officer, and we involve
them in all of our projects to both collect, store, and share
that information. Almost none of it is what you would call
intelligence, but it is information and it is private
information about applications for citizenship or travel
information or visas. There is a lot of it and it is certainly
one of the major activities that we engage in order to ensure
that we are good stewards of that information as we obtain,
store, and share.
Chairman Carper. Should there be a similar kind of entity
within, say, NSA that also, or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISA Court), focuses on privacy, as well?
Mr. Beers. What works for us is what works for us, sir. I
do know that they do have individuals who work on these issues
with their staff, just as Director Olsen mentioned they do at
NCTC. It just happens that, uniquely, we have an office that is
formally part of the organization with a Chief Privacy Officer.
Chairman Carper. Could you say to the American people with
assurance that the gathering of all this information--and I
realize it is impossible for NSA to actually listen to every
telephone conversation, to read every e-mail, to be mindful of
all the text messages that might be sent--but is there some way
that you could reassure the American people that all the effort
that is underway that we are talking about is actually for some
good purpose, but actually for a demonstrated purpose because
it has made us safer again and again and again? Can you provide
any reassurance along those lines?
Mr. Comey. What I can tell you, Senator, and the American
people, is this is an agency that is not some rogue actor, the
NSA. We work very closely with them. They have a very strong
compliance culture. And they are overseen in many different
ways in their activities. What I say to folks who discuss it
with me is, look, if you think the law ought to change, well,
that is a discussion to have with Congress. But I have seen no
indication that the NSA is acting outside the law or outside
the scope of their oversight responsibilities. I just know from
working with those folks, they are obsessed with compliance and
with staying within the law.
Chairman Carper. Mr. Olsen.
Mr. Olsen. I would agree with Director Comey, and I, as I
mentioned, served as the General Counsel at the National
Security Agency. It is an extraordinary agency and it is an
agency that is committed and, I think, using Director Comey's
word, obsessed with compliance. They have a Chief Compliance
Officer. They have an Inspector General. They have a General
Counsel's Office. The leadership on down reiterates and
reinforces the importance of complying with the law and the
civil liberties and privacy of Americans. They follow the law
when it comes to the collection of information involving U.S.
persons. They do not indiscriminately collect information
around the world. They serve to protect American lives, and
that is what I saw when I served there.
Chairman Carper. All right. Thank you.
Let us turn to the issue of dirty bombs, devices that could
use radiological material, could sicken a lot of people, could
cause significant psychological and, really, economic damage on
a community. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the
Department of Energy's, I think it is the National Nuclear
Security Administration, I believe they are responsible for the
security of radiological sources. I think there was a GAO
report, I want to say it was about a year ago, maybe September
of last year, an audit that revealed that the U.S. medical
facilities that house radiological material still face some
challenges securing their supplies from potential theft.
Director Olsen, I do not know if you have any thoughts that
you could give us, but what is the Intelligence Community's
assessment of the likelihood that Al-Qaeda or one of its
affiliates will seek to acquire radiological materials in order
to try to make a dirty bomb?
Mr. Olsen. I think what I can say in this setting is that
we have seen over time some degree of interest along those
lines, but nothing at this point that I would consider to be
more than the sort of most basic aspirational type of interest
by a terrorist organization. And I am not familiar with the
report that you referenced.
Chairman Carper. OK. And, Director Comey and Secretary
Beers, what roles do your agencies play in preventing
terrorists from building and potentially detonating a dirty
bomb in the United States?
Mr. Comey. I could probably answer for both of us. We share
a responsibility that, at the FBI, we execute through our
Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, one of whose
responsibilities is to work with DHS to understand what are the
potential sources of materials that terrorists could use to
harm us and what are the trip wires we put in place so that we
can know if something suspicious is happening around that
material.
Chairman Carper. All right. Secretary Beers.
Mr. Beers. The only thing that I would add is we do have
the ability to at least screen with radiation detectors at our
ports of entry. Obviously, it is possible that you could shield
that information, but at least it gives us a first order sensor
system to try to determine whether or not that information
comes into the United States. We have also, through our grants
program, helped State and local authorities obtain first order
radiation detectors so that they can also look for that
material within the country. But the key here is that we and
the Bureau work together very much on this kind of effort.
Chairman Carper. OK. Good. We talked a little bit earlier
about travel, terrorist travel, going to a place for a while
overseas and in a place from which they can freely travel back
to the United States. Let me just ask each of you, what are we
doing to better track and monitor people traveling to war zones
and terrorist safe havens and then deciding to return to the
United States? Mr. Olsen.
Mr. Olsen. It is an important question and a matter of
significant concern for us, Mr. Chairman. In particular, I
would reference Syria as a place that we are concerned about
because of the ongoing conflict there and the presence of
extremist elements, including a group connected to Al-Qaeda
such that it has become a place where literally thousands of
individuals from other countries have gone to Syria to join in
the fight, a number of them to join with Al-Nusra, this group
that is connected to Al-Qaeda.
At NCTC, we work closely with the FBI and DHS to track the
travel of any individuals that we have identified as an
extremist and to, if appropriate, place those individuals on
the watch list. We maintain the central database of known and
suspected terrorists. That central database for the government
provides a resource for all of our agencies as well as some of
our partners around the world to identify those individuals and
then to do what we can to look for the ways in which they are
traveling, the facilitation routes, how they are funded, where
they are going, and to disrupt their travel if possible, but at
least to identify them so if they do return to their home
country, and especially, obviously, the United States, we have
a handle on what their activities are.
Chairman Carper. All right.
Mr. Beers. Let me add to that. This is truly an integrated
effort. We sit together in terms of trying to pull together the
lists of individuals that we have identified as potential
threats to the United States. We also have a program with our,
particularly our European allies because of the visa waiver
program, to share information that they and we might have
nationally with one another in order to add to the database
that we have of the individuals who are of concern.
We at DHS also support this effort through our travel
analysis, looking for people who we do not know might have gone
to Syria--or might have gone to Syria for nefarious purposes.
We have a number of indicators that help us identify
individuals who we might want to speak to at ports of entry as
they return to the United States.
I do not want to go into the details of that because I do
not want to give away the way we actually do that, but we have
a number of techniques which will allow us to identify somebody
who it is not clear in terms of their travel record leaving the
United States and coming back that they were anywhere near
Syria. But there are other indicators that can give us
indications that we might want to talk to those individuals,
and that is part of finding the unknowns as opposed to tracking
the knowns, which I think we are pretty good at.
Chairman Carper. Good. Thank you for responding to that
question.
That is the last question I have except this is an
opportunity for you, if you would like to each just give a
short closing statement, please. And it could be something that
has come to mind, something that you want to reiterate,
something that you heard another colleague say that you think
is worth emphasizing. Go ahead, please.
Mr. Olsen. Well, Mr. Chairman, first, let me just thank you
and this Committee for holding the hearing and really for your
consistent and steadfast support for the Intelligence Community
and for all of our efforts with respect to protecting the
homeland.
The one issue, I think, that comes to mind goes back to
Director Comey's opening comments, and that is on the budget.
We are struggling, like all other government agencies, to deal
with the sequester cuts, and this is a real issue that strikes
at the core of our workforce and it is something that I think
bears raising in this forum.
Chairman Carper. And I am glad you did. Thank you.
Mr. Olsen. But, otherwise, I would just offer, again, to
continue to work closely with you and the Committee going
forward for whatever you need from us as we work together.
Chairman Carper. Great. Thank you. Director Comey.
Mr. Comey. Mr. Chairman, I would just thank you for having
this hearing. These conversations are critically important to
the American people. They should demand to know how we are
doing our jobs and how we are using the power we have been
given and we ought to answer and have those conversations. I
should not be doing anything--we should not be doing anything
we cannot explain. Sometimes it has to be in a closed setting
so that the bad guys do not know what we are doing, but these
conversations are what the Founders intended, so thank you.
Chairman Carper. You are welcome, and thank you. Secretary
Beers.
Mr. Beers. I certainly would be remiss in not piling on the
budget question. It obviously affects us enormously at DHS,
with 240,000-plus individuals and a vast array of programs.
The second point I would make is the point that we talked
repeatedly about. We really do need the cyber legislation. I
know that you and this Committee are trying to do something on
that, but as we have sat here and told you and you have told us
that this is a critical vulnerability that the United States
faces, not having that legislation leaves that vulnerability
open and we owe it to the American people to be able to protect
them and protect them better.
Chairman Carper. Well, those are all really good notes on
which to close.
I want to, again, thank you for your preparation, for
clearing your schedules to be with us and spend time with us.
Dr. Coburn said to me that it is too bad the other Members
of our Committee could not have been here to hear this and to
participate in the conversation. All of them have several
Committee hearings going on simultaneously and it is just
difficult for them to go to every one of them. But about half
of our colleagues were able to join us for part of it. Their
staffs were, in many cases, here, but also watching on closed-
circuit television back in their offices, as you know.
Director Comey, this is the first time that you have been
before us to testify and I am very impressed by the way you
handled yourself. These other two fellows are seasoned pros and
they lived up to their reputation.
Rand, thank you for taking on all these responsibilities
over at DHS and doing them well while we work very hard to try
to get a Secretary confirmed and a Deputy Secretary confirmed
so you can be a little less frenetic.
Thank you very much, and I think the hearing record is
going to remain open for 12 days. That is until November 25, at
5 p.m., for the submission of statements and questions for the
record.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you again
very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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