[Senate Hearing 113-135]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-135
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES AND PRIORITIES: ADDRESSING THE EVOLVING
THREAT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 20, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TIM KAINE, Virginia
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement. 2
Harman, Hon. Jane, director, president, and CEO, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, former Member, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Leiter, Hon. Michael E., senior counselor to the chief executive
officer, Palantir Technologies, former director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, McLean, VA............................ 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Wainstein, Hon. Kenneth L., partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft, LLP, former Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, Washington, DC.................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
(iii)
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES AND PRIORITIES: ADDRESSING THE EVOLVING
THREAT
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:35 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Murphy, Kaine, and Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Let me first apologize to our panel. There are some things
beyond my control, like when we vote. Unfortunately, a series
of votes were called for 2:15, which is when we would have been
in the midst of the hearing, and I thought they were going to
end by 4 o'clock, by my calculation; but, sometimes the best
calculations in the world go challenged. We just had the last
vote, on continuing to keep the government open. So, I
appreciate your forbearance, your willingness to stay and
enrich the committee with your knowledge. And you have our
thanks and our gratitude for waiting.
Today, as we investigate counterterrorism policies and
priorities to address the evolving threat we face, we want to
thank our panelists for being here today.
We know the core of al-Qaeda has been significantly
degraded. We know that Ayman al-Zawahiri is not Osama bin
Laden, and that the central organization is, as many have
stated, on a path of decline that will be difficult to reverse.
But, the threat that remains is now decentralized. We still
live in a challenging world. Al-Qaeda affiliates and other
emerging extremist groups still pose a threat to the United
States and our national interests.
Last week, this committee held a classified hearing, with
Under Secretary Wendy Sherman and NCTC Director Matt Olsen, to
gain a deeper understanding of the threats we face, the true
extent of the links between and among extremist groups, and
what that means for U.S. national interests.
From Al Qaeda in Iraq to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
from al-Shabaab to Lashkar-e-Taiba, emerging extremist groups
use
al-Qaeda ties for financial assistance, training, arms, and
messaging purposes. At the same time, they are often pursuing
independent goals. Groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula have emerged as one of the most dangerous threats to
the United States, targeting the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, and
making at least three unsuccessful attempts to bomb airlines
over United States airspace.
We also know that many of these extremist groups are
internally divided, torn between a local agenda and more global
set of goals. We need an effective strategy to counter these
new threats without losing sight of al-Qaeda's beleaguered core
in Pakistan.
Finally, the threat from extremist groups is not just a
military and intelligence challenge, it is a foreign policy
challenge, as well. We ask our diplomats to operate in often
dangerous, high-threat areas made all the more unpredictable by
these extremist groups. As we think through ways to better
protect our diplomats, we must also consider ways to make our
foreign policy more resilient to these ever-changing and
irregular threats. We need to look at every tool in our
toolkit, from development efforts to long-term governance-
building initiatives. From Somalia to Mali, we have seen that
weak governance only adds fuel to the proverbial fire. It gives
extremist groups the space they need to train, recruit, and
plan.
We also need to refine our efforts to understand and
address root causes of extremism and better target the
recruitment pipeline, and we need to strengthen and build our
global partnerships. In my view, we need to take a step back
and look at the whole board, and see the whole picture from
every angle if we are to develop a comprehensive
counterterrorism policy, and that is why we are here today.
The questions before us are clear. Yes, we have had
tremendous success in decimating al-Qaeda, but the threats have
shifted, and we need to know to what extent these new threats
put us and our allies at risk. Given this new paradigm, do we
need to revisit our approaches and reassess our overall
strategy? How has the Arab Spring and other recent events
changed both the threats and our options?
To answer these questions today, we are fortunate to have
three highly knowledgeable witnesses: Congresswoman Jane
Harman, the director, president, and CEO of the Woodrow Wilson
Center for International Scholars, and a former nine-term
Congresswoman from California who has served on the Armed
Services, Intelligence, and Homeland Security Committees; Mike
Leiter, who is currently the senior counselor to the chief
executive of Palantir Technologies, and the former Director of
the National Counterterrorism Center under Presidents Bush and
Obama; and Ken Wainstein, currently a partner at Cadwalader,
and formerly the Assistant to President Bush for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism.
Again, thanks to all of you.
Let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you all. And our apologies for what
has happened today. I think you know we had a CR that took a
little longer than the norm, but we are glad you are here. And
this will play a role as we shape things, going forward, even
at 4:35 in the afternoon. So, thank you very much.
Today, the Foreign Relations Committee is convening its
second counterterrorism hearing of the 113th Congress, and its
first open hearing on these matters.
Given recent events around the world, and the growing
influence of the al-Qaeda brand in places such as Syria and
North and West Africa, I think the chairman's decision to hold
these hearings is timely.
I recently traveled to North and West Africa, where I had a
chance to meet with key foreign leaders, our State Department,
and other U.S. Government personnel to discuss with them the
evolving threat posed by al-Qaeda, both in Africa and around
the world. What struck me most clearly, when considering groups
like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, is that the evolution of
al-Qaeda really requires an evolution of our response and
strategy.
First, the United States cannot do it all on its own. We
must work with other countries around the world, not just
Western countries, but the countries in which al-Qaeda
operates, no matter how difficult. Poorly governed and
ungoverned space presents an especially difficult challenge in
this respect.
Second, the evolution of al-Qaeda from a core-based entity
to one that has nodes around the world presents an entirely
different challenge than what we understood to be the threat in
the aftermath of 9/11. I hope this hearing will allow us to
have a full and frank discussion about the evolving threat
posed by al-Qaeda, and the U.S. Government's response to this
threat.
In particular, I would like to discuss the need for
Congress to play a more active role in authorizing the use of
force, in this conflict as well as others, and the need for
Congress to help set appropriate policies for confronting these
threats. We must ask and answer whether the act of Congress,
over a decade ago, that sought to address the threat of al-
Qaeda meets the requirements of today.
We must also ask whether it is appropriate for Congress to
play what has been largely a consultive role in the process of
our prosecution of this war against al-Qaeda, and whether that
meets our constitutional duties.
I hope this hearing is the beginning of an effort by this
committee, which has an exclusive jurisdiction in authorizing
the use of force, to look at these hard issues and to make the
tough calls that we were elected to make on behalf of the
American people.
And I thank you and look forward to your testimony today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
With that, let me invite Congresswoman Harman to start off.
Your full statements will be entered into the record, and
we will look forward to having a conversation with you once you
are finished.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANE HARMAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENT, AND CEO,
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, FORMER
MEMBER, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Corker. I served with both of you during my long time on the
Hill, and I commend you both for staying in the game. And I
hope you voted to keep the Government open. Did you?
The Chairman. Yes.
Ms. Harman. That is a relief. Then it was worth waiting.
The Chairman. That is a bipartisan ``yes,'' so----
Ms. Harman. As the former Member of Congress, here, I will
defer to my good friends for more of the tactical discussion,
but I thought I would raise a bigger policy issue, at least it
is one that troubles me, because I think that the Foreign
Relations Committee needs to consider this, beyond just the
assertion of kinetic power, to defeat--and we have defeated--
some of these enemies. And as I reflect on my own role, and the
role of many who tried to keep us safe after 9/11, I think we
got the tactics right, but my point today is, we got the
strategy wrong. We have yet to develop a narrative, a positive-
sum roadmap for where we are going and why others will benefit
by joining us.
Stan McChrystal recently was interviewed by Foreign Affairs
magazine, and he nailed it, at least the way I think about it.
He said that, when he first was involved with Iraq and
Afghanistan, he asked, ``Where's the enemy?'' As things
evolved, he then asked, ``Who is the enemy?'' Then he asked,
``What is the enemy trying to do?'' And finally, the question
that he asked was, ``Why is he the enemy?'' And that is
something that is sobering and I really think we have to think
about.
I am betting you agree with me that we cannot kill our way
to victory, because kinetics alone are more likely to inflame
than persuade. But, what is the United States doing to
persuade? Are we coordinated? Are we delivering the same
message? I want to say our tactics have had an impact. And, as
you said, Mr. Chairman, we have certainly decimated core al-
Qaeda. But, now al-Qaeda has morphed into a more horizontal
organization, and the question is, Is that growing? And are
some of the things we are doing causing it to grow?
I think I will skip how the threat has changed, because you
will hear it from my friends, but just to point out that the
10th issue of Inspire magazine is back online and as savvy as
ever. Extremist digital natives have also created something
called Muslim Mali. It is a computer game that simulates aerial
combat against French fighter jets and is designed to inspire
fellow extremists to take up arms against the French. Once a
user clicks ``Play,'' an Arabic message appears with the words,
``Muslim brother, go ahead and repel the French invasion
against Muslim Mali.'' And this kind of propaganda is appearing
in many places. And to beat this propaganda, we really have to
win the argument with some kid in the rural parts of Yemen
deciding whether to strap on a suicide vest or join society.
And what I am saying is, we may not be winning that argument.
So, quickly, let me just go to some recommendations.
First, stop piecemeal counterterrorism policy and
implementation. Stop stovepiped one-off CT efforts and create a
whole-of-government strategy. Give the Department of State's CT
Bureau more support to do its job. This is within your
jurisdiction. The Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Countering
Violent Extremism Grants, and coordinating efforts through the
Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, all a
mouthful, are important, but not adequate. A more robust CT
Bureau could help us better find the gaps in our nonkinetic
efforts, and to fill those gaps.
Two, smarter investments. Carefully analyze foreign aid
budgets and find ways to plus-up funds to countries that need
it most, and resist funding flavor-of-the-month countries.
Third, live our values. Our actions really do speak louder
than words. Semantics like ``rendition,'' ``enhanced
interrogation,'' ``targeted killing'' fuel the terror
propaganda machine. We have a perception problem and have to
apply a matrix of our interests and our values, and test it
against our future engagements. Again, we have got to win the
argument, not just play ``Whac-a-Mole.'' We need a public
conversation about tactics and strategy, and that is what this
hearing is designed to do, and I commend you for holding it.
Fourth, reduce overclassification of intelligence. Far too
much information is classified. Instead of safeguarding our
secrets, we are actually preventing ourselves from seeing the
bigger threat picture. One of my last accomplishments in
Congress was to author something called the Reducing
Overclassification Act, which President Obama signed in October
2010. I do not really know that it has led to much. I still
think this problem needs attention.
Finally, we have to drain the swamp. And, as a scholar at
the Wilson Center, Aaron David Miller, suggests, we will reduce
the pool of potential terrorists by encouraging reform efforts
by authoritarian governments. Secretary Kerry understands this,
and hopefully will implement it.
In conclusion, I urge you to play a major role in
developing this overdue strategy. After all, it is foreign
relationships, not more foreign enemies, that we need.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Harman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jane Harman
tactics v. strategy
It is fitting that this committee--the Foreign Relations
Committee--is holding this hearing. As I reflect on my own role and the
role of many who tried just as hard to keep us safe after 9/11, we got
many of the tactics right but the strategy wrong. We have yet to
develop a narrative, a positive-sum roadmap for where we are going and
why others will benefit by joining with us.
Retired General Stanley McChrystal--former head of Special
Operations Command and the International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan--recently nailed it. In an interview in Foreign Affairs on
Iraq and Afghanistan, he first asked ``Where is the enemy?'' As the
engagement evolved, he asked ``Who is the enemy?'' Then, ``What is the
enemy trying to do?'' Finally, he realized the question we most needed
to answer was: ``Why is he the enemy?''
This realization is bone-chilling. Many senior policymakers know we
cannot kill our way to victory--because kinetics alone are more likely
to inflame than persuade. But what is the United States doing to
persuade? Are we coordinated in our actions? Are we delivering the same
message?
Our tactics have an impact--and playing whack-a-mole will not win
the argument with the kid in rural Syria or Yemen deciding whether or
not to strap on a suicide vest.
evolution of the threat
How has the threat evolved over time? We all know that what once
was a highly centralized structure--Core Al Qaeda leadership--has been
decimated. But, rather than disappear, it has morphed into a
decentralized horizontal organization--composed mainly of so-called
``affiliates.''
Our adversaries--many of them young, digital natives--have spent
the past few years--while the United States focused on eliminating core
leadership--building up their propaganda elements and their recruiting
shop. Smaller scale, easier to accomplish attacks are now the name of
the game--in an effort to cause as much chaos as possible.
Inspire magazine is back online and as savvy as ever. Extremist
digital natives have created a ``Muslim Mali'' computer game that
simulates aerial combat against French fighter jets, and is designed to
inspire fellow extremists to take up arms against the French. Once a
user clicks ``play,'' an Arabic message appears with the words,
``Muslim Brother, go ahead and repel the French invasion against Muslim
Mali.''
These digital natives can sit in their homes or computer cafes
anywhere in the world. What really keeps me up at night? That this
generation will turn to cyber attacks--even small ones, because the
information is sitting right at their fingertips. Let me be clear: the
United States is not just facing Chinese hackers seeking ballistic
missile blueprints or Russian hackers trying to steal credit card
numbers. We also face nonstate actors who have drunk the al-Qaeda Kool-
Aid.
the next ten years
Despite astonishing adaptation since 9/11--including a massive
reform of the intelligence community, in which I played a fairly big
role--Uncle Sam is still built for yesterday's threats.
So, what do we do?
Christopher Paul of the RAND Corporation says: ``The trick . . . is
to apprehend or otherwise deal with [the] residual threat without
creating a chain of events that renews motivations for participation
and support.''
Here are my recommendations:
1. Stop piecemeal counterterrorism policy and implementation
Stop stovepiped, one-off CT efforts and create a whole-of-
government strategy. Excuses about bureaucratic inertia and the
number of people involved should not stop us from doing what is
necessary. This includes our cyber defenses.
Give the Department of State's CT Bureau more support to do
its job. The Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Countering
Violent Extremism grants, and coordinating efforts through the
Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications are all
important but just not enough. A more robust CT Bureau could
help us better find gaps in our nonkinetic efforts and fill
them.
2. Smarter investments
Carefully analyze the foreign aid budgets and find ways to plus-up
funds to the countries that need it most--and resist funding for the
flavor-of-the-month countries. Foreign aid is in many cases the only
leverage we have--and should have serious strings attached. This will
also be a very difficult task--and requires a clear, reasoned message
to the American people about why such targeted investments are
necessary for the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, has urged
similar efforts as has a senior Republican Senator.
3. Live our values
Our actions really do speak louder than words. It should be
no wonder that the semantics America used in the past--when
extra judicial kidnapping became ``rendition,'' torture became
``enhanced interrogation,'' and assassination became ``targeted
killing''--only fueled the terror propaganda machine. We have a
perception problem.
We must apply a matrix of our interests and our values, and
test against it our future engagements. Then we stand a better
chance at defeating the negative narrative being created about
us. That means paying more than lip service to privacy
protections, and considering legal protections, especially
regarding ``Big Data.'' Trying more terror suspects in U.S.
Federal courts--like Sulaiman Abu Ghaith--is also the right
move.
We need a public conversation about tactics and strategy,
and Congress should legislate clear limits. Self-policing by
the executive branch was wrong in the Bush 43 administration,
and is wrong now. I have recently suggested that FISA could be
adapted to cover drones and offensive cyber.
4. Reduce overclassification of intelligence
Far too much information is classified. Instead of
safeguarding our secrets, we are actually preventing ourselves
from seeing the bigger threat picture. If we can't see all the
``dots'' of intelligence, how could we hope to get ahead of
future threats?
5. Drain the swamp
As Wilson Center Scholar Aaron David Miller suggests, we
will reduce the pool of potential terrorists by encouraging
reform efforts by authoritarian governments. Secretary Kerry's
efforts to persuade the Egyptians to move forward with reforms
are an example of what we need more of.
conclusion
In conclusion, I urge this committee to play a major role in
developing this overdue strategy. After all, it is foreign
relationships--not more foreign enemies--that we need.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Leiter.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. LEITER, SENIOR COUNSELOR TO THE
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES, FORMER DIRECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, McLEAN, VA
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, members of
the committee, thanks for having me.
I would note that, in my 4 years at the National
Counterterrorism Center, I do not believe I ever testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which, I have to
tell you, is not a good sign, and I think it is a good sign
that you are holding these hearings today and the Director of
NCTC is here before you, because this is not just an intel, not
just an Armed Services issue, this is very much for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. So, I am very happy you are doing
it.
In my written testimony, I go through, in some detail, my
assessment of the threat. I am not going to rehash that here,
but I do want to highlight a few things.
First of all, in my view, we are in a better position to
detect and disrupt a catastrophic attack like we saw on 9/11
than anytime since 2001. We have done very, very well in this
fight.
That being said, as both of you have already noted, we do
face a fragmented threat, but I would urge this committee not
to read too much into some of the recent events. They are
undoubtedly tragic; I do not mean to minimize the attack in
Benghazi and the death of four Americans, the attack in
Algeria, the rise of AQIM. But, in terms of large-scale,
catastrophic threats to the homeland, these are not anywhere
remotely on the same page. They threaten U.S. interests. We
will always, have always, and will continue to face threats in
these regions. We must continue to battle the terrorists, as
Jane Harman said, drain the swamp, all these things; but, on
average, I think we should actually be enormously proud of the
Congress, the executive branch, and, to some extent, the
courts, in enabling a fight against terrorism that has been
pretty successful.
Now, I do want to highlight a couple of areas where I think
we do face enormous challenges. We have mentioned North Africa
already. I think the other key place that we have to really
recognize a huge threat to the United States is Syria and what
we see in the al-Nusra Front. We are seeing a magnet for
foreign fighters, and we see enormous instability and tension
between Shias and Sunnis, with access to weapons of mass
destruction. And this is, if not an existential threat,
certainly an existential threat to our interests in the region.
Second, one that is, unfortunately, often forgotten in
these hearings, Hezbollah. And especially as tensions increase
between the United States, Iran, and Israel, and what was going
on in Syria, we have to keep our eye on Hezbollah, who has
gotten increasingly aggressive, both with kinetic strikes--the
attack in Bulgaria, killing Israeli tourists--and also,
destructive cyber attacks against Saudi Aramco and RasGas in
Qatar. Both of these are signs that Hezbollah is, indeed,
moving toward a more aggressive approach; the United States and
our allies.
Now, with that, let me offer four quick observations on
things that I think this committee should, in fact, focus on;
vis-a-vis, terrorism, writ large.
First, after 10-plus years, we really do, I believe, face a
terrorism fatigue problem. And that is, we have been talking
about this for 10 years, and people want to move on. And that
poses a real challenge, because we need to have discussions to
make sure that our tools to combat terrorism are on a solid
footing. In that regard, I am extremely heartened about the
conversations we have seen in the public and with Congress over
the past several months about targeted killings and potentially
reforming the authorization for use of military force. I
believe these are exactly the conversations we need to have so
these do have a strong footing for the years to come.
Second, for terrorism fatigue, I am extremely worried that,
with every terrorist attack, we now view it as a systemic
failure rather than, to some extent, a fact of life in
counterterrorism work. And I am all for examining these events
after the fact to see how we can do better, but I would plead
with this committee that these do not become ex-post
investigations and excoriations of terrorism professionals,
because it will chase the good people out of government.
Last, I do think that terrorism fatigue affects the
executive branch, and I am very worried that things that the
executive branch needs to push on quickly and hard, like
information-sharing, fall by the wayside.
Second significant issue: weapons of mass destruction. We
are, I think, faced with small-scale attacks, no matter what we
do. These are tragic, but we will live with them, and we will
prosper. Weapons with mass destruction pose a very different
threat. And securing nuclear material, trying to prevent
improvised nuclear devices, trying to prevent complex
biological weapons attacks, they are low-probability, but
enormous-consequence events, and we must keep our eye on these
things. And this committee has a huge role in that way.
Third, counterterrorism partnerships. With terrorism
fatigue has become a fatiguing of the partnerships that we rely
on. And, as you said, Senator Corker, especially in regions of
Middle East and North Africa, these partnerships, both in
willingness and capacity, have frayed significantly, and we
have to work very hard to work closely with our partners to
maintain them and maintain the programs within the U.S.
Government to support those partners.
And, last but not least, staying on the offense on all
fronts. And, to me, that means continuing programs of targeting
killing, where we have to take people off the battlefield, but,
equally if not more importantly, expanding our efforts on soft
power, because kinetic focus has, in fact, sapped much of the
focus within the executive branch of putting the resources and
the time and energy into those things that take time to, as
Jane said, drain the swamp and reduce the attraction of
terrorism.
And last, covering all of these things, as you all know
from having just voted on continuing to open the government,
after 12 years we have poured--it is difficult to estimate, but
probably about $100 billion each year into counterterrorism
efforts, including Iraq and Afghanistan. This money is not
going to be there in the future. So, this is exactly the time
that we have to do a far more rational look at mission-focused
budgeting--not department by department, but mission--to
understand where we can put our limited dollars that we have to
get the biggest bang for the buck for the whole of the U.S.
Government.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leiter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael E. Leiter
overview
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on my perspectives on
the evolving threat of terrorism and how it can be best addressed by
the United States and our allies. I believe now is an opportune time to
take stock of the threat we face and our associated response. While we
have made remarkable strides against the threat of catastrophic attacks
like that which we experienced on 9/11, the continued presence of al-
Qaeda in Yemen, the growing presence of al-Qaeda-associated elements in
North Africa and Syria, and increased instability across North Africa
and the Middle East highlight how the threat of terrorism continues.
Combined with a fiscal reality that precludes the sort of spending we
have maintained since 2001, this is a historic moment to rationalize
and calibrate our response to terrorism and related threats to our
national security.
the threat landscape
Today al-Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan are at their weakest
point since 9/11. The death of Osama bin Laden and the continued
decimation of senior ranks has made the organization a shadow of its
former self. Ayman al-Zawahiri is not bin Laden and although the
organization still attempts to provide strategic guidance and global
propaganda, its influence continues to wane. Whether this trajectory
can be maintained with a significant decrease of the U.S. presence in
Afghanistan and a continued challenging political landscape in Pakistan
will be, in my view, the biggest determinants of al-Qaeda Core's
relevance for the coming decade.
The degradation of al-Qaeda's ``higher headquarters'' and
relatively well-coordinated command and control has allowed its
affiliates and its message to splinter, posing new dangers and
challenges. Al Qa'ida affiliates or those inspired by its message have
worrisome presences in Yemen, East Africa, North Africa, Syria, Western
Europe, and of course to a lesser degree the United States.
Beginning with Yemen, in my view Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)--as I stated 2 years ago--continues to pose the most
sophisticated and deadly threat to the U.S. homeland from an overseas
affiliate. The death of operational commander Anwar al-Aulaqi
significantly reduced AQAP's ability to attract and motivate English
speakers, but its operational efforts continue with lesser abatement.
As we saw in 2009, 2010, and 2012, AQAP has remained committed--and
able--to pursue complex attacks involving innovative improvised
explosives devices. Although some of the organization's safe haven has
been diminished because of Yemeni and U.S. efforts, the inability of
the Government of Yemen to bring true control to wide swaths of the
country suggests that the group will pose a threat for the foreseeable
future and (unlike many other affiliates) it clearly remains focused on
transnational attacks.
East Africa, surprisingly to many, is a brighter spot in our
efforts. Although al-Shabaab remains a force and poses significant
risks in the region--most especially in Kenya and to the fledgling
government in Somalia--its risk to the homeland is markedly less today
than just 2 years ago. Kenya's offensive in the region shattered much
of al-Shabaab's power base and most importantly the attractiveness of
Somalia to Americans and other Westerners is radically less than was
the case. The relative flood of Americans has turned into a trickle,
thus significantly reducing the threat of trained terrorists returning
to our shores. Maintaining this positive momentum will require
continued U.S. attention and close cooperation with the African Union
in Somalia (AMISOM) to nurture what clearly remains a fragile recovery.
As the world witnessed over the past 6 months, Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has shifted the focus in Africa as the
organization has made gains in Mali, Libya, and the rural areas of
Algeria. To be clear, to those of us in the counterterrorism ranks this
is not particularly surprising. In my view while the attacks in
Benghazi and on the Algerian oil facility are tragic, the major change
to the region is not a massive increase in AQIM's attractiveness, but
rather the huge shift that occurred with the virtual elimination of
Libya's security services, the associated flood of weapons in the
region, and the coup d'etat in Mali.
AQIM has thus far proven a less tactically proficient and more
regionally focused criminal organization than other al-Qaeda
affiliates. Although we cannot blindly hope this remains the case, I
would argue that we should also not read too much into recent events.
Regional capacity building, targeted offensive measures, and forceful
engagement with government like France, Algeria, and Libya that have a
huge vested interest in the region should remain at the forefront of
our strategy. And we must roundly condemn (and try to limit) the
payment of ransoms that have proven to be the lifeblood of AQIM and its
affiliates.
One notable area of concern that we must forcefully combat in the
region--and one which the United States is uniquely able to address
given our global footprint--is the cross-fertilization across the
African Continent that has recently accelerated. Coordination amongst
al-Shabaab, AQIM, Boko Haram, and others is particularly problematic as
it allows each organization to leverage the others' strengths. We must
use our intelligence capabilities to define these networks and then
assist in disrupting them.
The most troubling of emerging fronts in my view is Syria, where
Jabhat al-Nusra has emerged as the most radical of groups within the
opposition. Given the enormous instability in Syria, which has to some
degree already spread to Iraq and elsewhere in the Levant, Jabhat al-
Nusra has become a magnet for al-Qaeda-inspired fighters from around
the globe. With virtually no likelihood of rapid improvements in Syria
(and a not insignificant risk of rapid decline caused by the use of
chemical or biological weapons), the al-Nusra front will almost
certainly continue to arm, obtain real world combat experience, and
attract additional recruits--and potentially state assistance that is
flowing to the FSA.
Moreover, Jabhat al-Nusra's ideology not only contributes to the
threat of terrorism, but more broadly it is contributing significantly
to the regional Sunni-Shia tension that poses enormous risks. The rapid
removal of Bashar al-Assad would not solve these problems, but an
ongoing civil war does in my view worsen the situation. Although there
is no easy answer to this devilish issue, I believe that with the
U.K.'s recent movement to providing lethal assistance to the FSA, we
too should move more forcefully with additional aid and the creating of
safe havens in border areas.
Without declaring victory, we should also have some optimism about
al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism in Western Europe and especially the
homeland. As recent studies have shown, there has been a continuing
decline in numbers of significant homeland plots that have not been
closely controlled by the FBI since 2009. In addition, the relative
sophistication of homeland terrorists has not increased. Combined with
successful counterterrorism efforts in Western Europe--most
particularly huge strides in the U.K.--the picture faced today is far
brighter than just 3 years ago.
Similar optimism cannot be applied to the threat posed by Lebanese
Hezbollah, especially given its successful and foiled attacks over the
past 2 years. Most notably, Hezbollah attack in Bulgaria killed six
tourists and highlights the extent to which the group (and its patrons
in Iran) continue to see themselves as being in an ongoing
unconventional war with Israel and the United States. Predicting
Hezbollah and Iranian ``redlines'' is a notoriously challenging
endeavor--as illustrated by the surprising 2011 plot to kill the Saudi
Ambassador to the U.S.--but both organizations almost certainly would
launch attacks at least outside the U.S. were there a strike on Iranian
nuclear facilities.
There is little doubt that both Hezbollah and the IRGC Qods Force
maintain a network of operatives that could be used for such strikes.
In this regard the heavy Iranian presence in Latin America and Iranian
cooperation with former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is of
particular concern. Although not every Hezbollah member and Iranian
diplomat is a trained operative, a significant number could in the case
of hostilities enable other operatives to launch attacks against
Israeli or U.S. diplomatic facilities, Jewish cultural institutions, or
high profile individuals.
In addition, and generally unlike al-Qaeda affiliates, the specter
of Hezbollah or Iranian-sponsored cyber attacks is disturbingly real.
Recent Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks on major U.S.
financial institutions, as well as even more destructive Iranian-
sponsored attacks on Saudi Aramco and Qatar-based RasGas, have
highlighted the extent to which physical attacks might be combined with
cyber attacks.
looking ahead
This threat picture, although complex and dynamic, is in many ways
more heartening than that which we faced from 2001 until at least 2010.
Numerous organizations continue to threaten terrorist attacks, but as a
very general matter the threats are away from the homeland and the
scale of the attacks is markedly less than what we saw in September
2001 or even 2006, when al-Qaeda came dangerously close to attacking up
to 10 transatlantic airliners. It is not that events like Benghazi are
not tragic. But threats to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Libya are of a
radically different type than planes flying into civilian facilities in
New York and Washington. In this regard, this is an appropriate
juncture to look at a few of our biggest risks and challenges.
Terrorism Fatigue. After 10-plus years of near constant public
discussion of terrorism--in our politics, the media, and through public
messaging--many have simply had enough. This is not all bad as an
unhealthy obsession with the threat of terrorism at the expense of
countless other societal woes, such as cyber threats and Iranian
nuclear ambitions, would in many ways hand our enemy a victory. On the
other hand, there is real value in public discussion of terrorism: it
can build resilience in the population and it can lead to the tackling
of tough public policy questions like targeted killings and domestic
intelligence. With terrorism fatigue we run a real risk of not
addressing these issues in a way that provides a lasting
counterterrorism framework. In this regard I actually see the current
discussion around the use of drones and the potential for updating the
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force as quite heartening
signs.
Terrorism fatigue poses at least two additional challenges. First,
with all of our counterterrorism success such victories have become
expected and any failure--no matter how small--can result in political
finger pointing and excoriation of our counterterrorism professionals.
In effect we have become victims of our own success and unlike in 2001,
perfection has become a political expectation. Although we should
continuously examine how we can improve our capabilities, we must guard
against ex poste investigations that lack a serious appreciation for
the ex ante difficulties of counterterrorism.
Second, terrorism fatigue can cause dangerous lethargy within the
executive branch on issues that do not appear to require immediate
attention but which can do longer term damage to counterterrorism
efforts. I have repeatedly seen urgency morph into bureaucratic
sluggishness as time passes since the last attack on issues like
information-sharing and interagency cooperation. Whether it is
countering violent extremism programs or information access for the
intelligence community, we must not take our foot off the gas pedal.
Weapons of Mass Destruction. There is no doubt that smallish
terrorist attacks or at least attempts will continue to occur at home
and abroad. Such attacks can cause enormous pain and suffering to
victims and their families, but they are clearly of a scale--at least
with respect to absolute numbers killed--that is dwarfed by other
societal ills such as routine criminal activity. The same cannot be
said of terrorists' use of weapons of mass destruction--and more
specifically biological weapons or an improvised nuclear device (IND).
Although we have also made progress in reducing the likelihood of
terrorists obtaining WMD, for the foreseeable future we are faced with
the possibility that a terrorist organization will successfully acquire
these weapons. In this case, technology is not yet our friend as the
ease with which these weapons can be obtained and hidden continues to
exceed our ability to detect them.
Weapons of mass destruction pose a unique challenge as they are the
prototypical low likelihood, high consequence event and thus
determining the proper allocation of resources to combat them is
particular contentious. That being said, we must continue to protect
against the most dangerous of materials (e.g., HEU) being obtained by
terrorists, secure weapons in the most dangerous places (e.g., Pakistan
and increasingly Syria), and pursue research and development that will
assist in detecting chemical and biological weapons in places where
they would do the most harm.
Counterterrorism Partnerships. Counterterrorism has always been and
continues to be a ``team sport.'' Although the United States can do
much alone, we have always been incredibly reliant on a vast network of
friendly nations that have extended massively our intelligence, law
enforcement, military, and homeland security reach. Even before the
Arab Awakening we witnessed some weakening of these partnerships.
Whether it was fatigue on our partners' part, their own resource
challenges, or differing views on the proper scope of counterterrorist
efforts (e.g., fights over data sharing between the United States and
the European Union), these partnerships have been under some pressure.
Post-Arab Awakening we face an exponentially more daunting task, having
lost some of our most valuable partners--and key security services even
where political leadership remains supportive--in the very places we
need them most.
Again, part of the challenge is that we have been a victim of our
own success. Al-Qaeda is simply not viewed as the same existential
threat that it was in 2001. But without robust partnerships it will be
increasingly difficult for us to detect and disrupt rising al-Qaeda (or
other groups') cells, thus making it more likely that they will
metastasize and embed themselves in ways that makes them more dangerous
and more difficult to displace.
To maintain our partnerships we must carefully preserve funding for
programs that provide critical capabilities--and potentially more
important, a positive U.S. presence--for our allies. The increase in
funding for special operations forces is a good step, but relatively
tiny investments in Department of State and Justice programs can also
deliver real results in this realm. In addition, we will have to
approach new governments in the Middle East with sophistication and
ensure they continue to view terrorism as a mutual threat.
Staying on the Offense--on all Fronts. Over the past month an
enormous amount has been said about targeted killings, especially of
U.S. persons. In my view, having served under both Presidents George W.
Bush and Obama, such targeted killings are a vital tool in the
counterterrorism toolbox. And regrettably, in some cases that tool must
also be used against U.S. persons like Anwar al-Aulaqi who was a senior
al-Qaeda operational commander who was continuing to plot attacks
against the United States.
From my perspective, the memorandum and administration practice
(contrary to claims by some) appropriately constrains the President's
authority, has provided significant congressional oversight and the
opportunity to limit the program, and provides realistic standards
given the inherent challenges of intelligence and counterterrorism.
As I have previously implied, however, I am equally supportive of
the current public debate on the issue. In fact, I believe bringing
greater visibility to some programs could be useful not only to build
U.S. support, but also to build greater international understanding if
not support--a key element in our ideological efforts. Moreover, I
would suggest that the current debate highlights the need to examine
seriously the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).
During my tenure at the National Counterterrorism Center the AUMF
provided adequate authority for the use of force, but it was not always
a simple or straightforward application. With the continued evolution
of the terror threat and most notably its increasing distance from the
9/11 attacks and Core Al Qaeda, I believe it is the time to reevaluate
the AUMF to better fit today's threat landscape.
As supportive as I am of targeted killings in appropriate
circumstances, I am equally (if not more) supportive of ensuring that
these are not our only counterterrorism tools employed. I do believe
that our reliance on kinetic strikes has in some cases allowed other
efforts to atrophy or at least pale in comparison. This is enormously
dangerous, as we cannot strike everywhere nor can we lethally target an
ideology. As we increase targeted killings we must double down on our
soft power and ideological efforts--building capacity in civilian
security forces, increasing the rule of law to diminish undergoverned
or ungoverned safe havens, and the like--lest we win a few battles and
lose a global war. This committee must stand at the very center of
these efforts, as I fear in the current fiscal climate that the
programs that support our ideological efforts will be given short
shrift.
Resources. Finally, and not entirely inappropriately,
counterterrorism resources will undoubtedly decline significantly in
the coming years. It is difficult to estimate accurately how much has
been spent on counterterrorism over the past 11 years, but the amount
certainly comes close if not exceeds $100 billion a year. Some of this
was undoubtedly well spent, but it is folly to think that
inefficiencies and redundancies do not exist widely. In this sense, a
bit of frugality is likely a very good thing.
The question, however, is whether we will be willing or able to
make smart reductions to preserve critical capabilities. Our historic
ability to direct funds where the threat is greatest--as opposed to
where the political forces are strongest--have not been good. Perhaps
the declining threat will mean that we can continue to spend
imperfectly, but this is surely a dangerous bet to make.
We should use this imposed frugality to do serious mission-based--
as opposed to Department and Agency-specific based--budgeting in the
Federal Government. This approach will require enormous changes within
the executive and congressional branches, but looking across the
counterterrorism budget, identifying the critical capabilities we must
preserve, and then figuring out how that matches Department-specific
budgets can be done. And if we are serious about maintaining these
capabilities we have little choice.
conclusion
More than a decade after 9/11, combating terrorism isn't over. No
one should be surprised by this fact. Nor should anyone be surprised
that we are fighting in different places and, although some approaches
are the same as they were in 2001, many of our tools must evolve with
the evolving threat. Moreover, having the benefit of almost 12 years of
national effort we are in a better place today to balance our
counterterrorism efforts with other significant threats to our national
security, most notably state-sponsored cyber intrusions, theft, and
attacks, and broad instability across much of North Africa and the
Middle East.
Thank you for inviting me to testify, and for this committee's
leadership on these critical issues. I look forward to working with
this committee to ensure that we as a nation are protecting our
citizens, our allies, and our interests from the scourge of terrorism.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wainstein.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN, PARTNER, CADWALADER,
WICKERSHAM & TAFT, LLP, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Wainstein. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker,
Senator Kaine, I want to thank the three of you and the
committee for the invitation to join in this discussion of the
evolving threat that our Nation faces today.
And it is a particular pleasure for me to be here with my
two copanelists and colleagues, who are proven experts in this
field and have devoted much of their professional lives to
protecting our country against terrorist adversaries.
It is vitally important that we, as a nation, continually
gauge our readiness to meet the evolving threat that we face.
And we have seen the consequences of failing to do that
throughout our recent history. Go back to 1941, when we were
completely unready for the threat that struck us at Pearl
Harbor. We built up after that and ultimately defeated the Axis
Powers, and then the subsequent Soviet threat of the cold war,
but then we sort of dropped our guard again a little bit when
we failed to anticipate the looming threat that was posed by
globally connected terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda.
Since 9/11, the last two administrations have made
tremendous efforts to bring our counterterrorism readiness back
in line with the post-9/11 threat. As a result of these
efforts, as Mike Leiter just said, we, as a nation, are
significantly better prepared to meet that threat than we were
on the morning of 9/11, and I think there is no better gauge of
that than--or evidence of that than--the number of top-echelon
al-Qaeda leaders who are no longer on the battlefield and the
list of terrorist plots that have been foiled over the past few
years.
It has become clear, however, that the al-Qaeda threat that
has occupied our attention and our focus since 9/11 is no
longer the threat that we will need to defend against in the
future. Due largely to the effectiveness of our
counterterrorism operations, the centralized leadership of al-
Qaeda that directed operations from the sanctuary that it held
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, known as al-Qaeda core, is now
just a shadow of what it once was. The result of that has been
a migration of operational control and operational authority
away from core al-Qaeda into al-Qaeda's affiliates in other
regions of the world--Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al
Qaeda in Iraq, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, to name a
few.
In light of this evolution, we are now at a pivot point
where we need to reevaluate the means and reevaluate the
objectives of our counterterrorism program. And the executive
branch, by all reports, is currently engaged in that process,
and has made a number of policy shifts to reflect the altered
threat landscape, including, for example, focusing on the
development of stronger cooperative relationships with those
countries, or governments in those countries, like Yemen, where
these franchises are operating.
It is important, however, that Congress also participate
closely
in that process. Over the past 12 years, Congress has proven
its value in the creation of the post-9/11 counterterrorism
program. It has been instrumental in strengthening our
counterterrorism capabilities. It has helped to create a
lasting framework and structure for the long war against
international terrorism. And its actions have provided one
other very important element to our counterterrorism program,
and that is a measure of political legitimacy that can never be
achieved through unilateral executive action, alone. Therefore,
as Mike Leiter just said, it is heartening to see that Congress
is again starting to ratchet up its engagement in this area,
with a discussion of a variety of different legislative
proposals.
Now, in assessing these proposals, Congress should be
guided by a pair of principles that it has largely followed
over the past 12 years. First, it is important that any legal
authorities that it consider be crafted in a way that permit
operators and decisionmakers in the executive branch to act and
react without undue delay. For instance, any scheme for
regulating the use of targeted drone strikes should be designed
with an appreciation for the need for quick decisionmaking and
action in the context of war and targeting.
Second, Congress should continue to resist any legislation
that unduly restricts the government's flexibility in the fight
against international terrorists. Flexibility is the key to
operational success in counterterrorism operations, and it
should be the watchword for any national security legislation.
Congress is to be commended for having largely followed
these principles over the last 12 years, and also commended for
playing a vitally important role in the construction of our
national counterterrorism program since 9/11, which is a role
that Congress should continue to play in the years to come.
And, as my colleague said, this committee is, specifically, to
be commended for recognizing the recent evolution of the
terrorist threat we are facing, and recognizing the need to
reassess our strategy and our terrorism program in light of
that evolution.
It has been an honor to be a part of that effort today, and
I look forward to any questions that the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wainstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker and members of the
committee, thank you for the invitation to join in this discussion of
the evolving threat that our Nation faces today. My name is Ken
Wainstein, and I'm a partner at the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft. It is an honor to appear before you along with my two
copanelists, both proven experts in this field who have devoted much of
their professional lives to defending our Nation against its terrorist
adversaries.
Today's topic is particularly timely, given that we are now seeing
a transition in the scope and nature of the terrorist threat we face--a
transition that requires us to assess whether we have the right
counterterrorism strategy, organization, and authorities to
successfully meet this evolving threat.
It is vitally important that we, as a nation, continually gauge our
readiness to meet the threat we face. Our Nation's history since World
War II illustrates both the importance and the mixed record of
calibrating our readiness to meet overseas threats. In 1941, we found
ourselves completely unready to meet the threat that struck us at Pearl
Harbor. After building the warmaking machine that defeated the Axis
Powers, we then recognized the new threat from the Soviet bloc and
designed a governmental infrastructure and a foreign policy that
successfully contained the Communist threat.
In the aftermath of the cold war, however, we let our guard down
again. We enjoyed the peace dividend while the threat of international
terrorism evolved from the relatively isolated operations of the Red
Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof gang and the other violent groups of the
1970s into the more globally integrated organizations of the 1990s--a
threat that emerged in its most virulent form in the network of violent
extremists operating out of its safe haven under Taliban rule in
Afghanistan.
Despite its potency, we did not reorient our defenses to meet this
threat and continued to operate with an intelligence and military
apparatus largely designed for the cold war. As we had in the 1930s
when the storm of fascism was gathering overseas, we failed throughout
the 1980s and 1990s to anticipate and prepare for the looming new
threat posed by a globally networked terrorist organization with the
resources, the operational sophistication and the fanatical following
to mount a sustained campaign against the United States and its allies.
Since 9/11, the last two administrations have made tremendous
efforts to bring our counterterrorism readiness more in line with the
post-9/11 threat. These efforts have included a fundamental
restructuring of our government's counterterrorism infrastructure, new
and expanded investigative authorities for our intelligence and law
enforcement personnel, the reorientation of our military to fight an
asymmetric war against a nontraditional and shadowy foe, and the
adoption of a foreign policy designed to enlist and coordinate with
foreign partners in the global fight against international terrorism.
Thanks to the concerted efforts of both administrations, the past
seven Congresses and countless committed public servants, we as a
nation are significantly better prepared to meet the international
terrorist threat than we were on the morning of
9/11. There is no better evidence of that fact than the number of top-
echelon
al-Qaeda leaders who have been removed from the battlefield and the
list of terrorist threats that have been foiled over the past few
years.
It has recently become clear, however, that the al-Qaeda threat
that occupied our attention after 9/11 is no longer the threat that we
will need to defend against in the future. Due largely to the
effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts, the centralized
leadership that had directed al-Qaeda operations from its sanctuary in
Afghanistan and Pakistan--known as ``Al Qaeda Core''--is now just a
shadow of what it once was. While still somewhat relevant as an
inspirational force, Zawahiri and his surviving lieutenants are reeling
from our aerial strikes and no longer have the operational stability to
manage an effective global terrorism campaign. The result has been a
migration of operational authority and control from Al Qaeda Core to
its affiliates in other regions of the world, such as Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb.
As Andy Liepman of the RAND Corporation cogently explained in a
recent article, this development is subject to two different
interpretations. While some commentators diagnose al-Qaeda as being in
its final death throes, others see this franchising process as evidence
that al-Qaeda is ``coming back with a vengeance as the new jihadi
hydra.'' As is often the case, the truth likely falls somewhere between
these polar prognostications. Al Qaeda Core is surely weakened, but its
nodes around the world have picked up the terrorist mantle and continue
to pose a threat to America and its allies--as tragically evidenced by
the recent violent takeover of the gas facility in Algeria and the
American deaths at the U.S. mission in Benghazi last September. This
threat has been compounded by a number of other variables, including
the opportunities created for al-Qaeda by the events following the Arab
Spring; the ongoing threat posed by Hezbollah, its confederates in Iran
and other terrorist groups; and the growing incidence over the past few
years of home-grown violent extremism within the United States, such as
the unsuccessful plots targeting Times Square and the New York subway.
We are now at a pivot point where we need to reevaluate the means
and objectives of our counterterrorism program in light of the evolving
threat. The executive branch is currently engaged in that process and
has undertaken a number of policy shifts to reflect the altered threat
landscape. First, it is working to develop stronger cooperative
relationships with governments in countries like Yemen where the
al-Qaeda franchises are operating. Second, they are coordinating with
other foreign partners--like the French in Mali and the African Union
Mission in Somalia--who are actively working to suppress these new
movements. Finally, they are building infrastructure--like the reported
construction of a drone base in Niger--that will facilitate
counterterrorism operations in the regions where these franchises
operate.
While it is important that the administration is undergoing this
strategic reevaluation, it is also important that Congress participate
in that process. Over the past 12 years, Congress has made significant
contributions to the post-9/11 reorientation of our counterterrorism
program. First, it has been instrumental in strengthening our
counterterrorism capabilities. From the Authorization for Use of
Military Force passed within days of 9/11 to the Patriot Act and its
reauthorization to the critical 2008 amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress has repeatedly answered the
government's call for strong but measured authorities to fight the
terrorist adversary.
Second, congressional action has gone a long way toward
institutionalizing measures that were hastily adopted after 9/11 and
creating a lasting framework for what will be a ``long war'' against
international terrorism. Some argue against such legislative
permanence, citing the hope that today's terrorists will go the way of
the radical terrorists of the 1970s and largely fade from the scene
over time. That, I'm afraid, is a pipe dream. The reality is that
international terrorism will remain a potent force for years and
possibly generations to come. Recognizing this reality, both Presidents
Bush and Obama have made a concerted effort to look beyond the threats
of the day and to focus on regularizing and institutionalizing our
counterterrorism measures for the future--as most recently evidenced by
the administration's effort to develop lasting procedures and rules of
engagement for the use of drone strikes.
Finally, congressional action has provided one other very important
element to our counterterrorism initiatives--a measure of political
legitimacy that could never be achieved through unilateral executive
action. At several important junctures since 9/11, Congress has
undertaken to carefully consider and pass legislation in sensitive
areas of executive action, such as the legislation authorizing and
governing the Military Commissions and the amendments to our Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. On each such occasion, Congress' action
had the effect of calming public concerns and providing a level of
political legitimacy to the executive branch's counterterrorism
efforts. That legitimizing effect--and its continuation through
meaningful oversight--is critical to maintaining the public's
confidence in the means and methods our government uses in its fight
against international terrorism. It also provides assurance to our
foreign partners and thereby encourages them to engage in the
operational cooperation that is so critical to the success of our
combined efforts against international terrorism.
These post-9/11 examples speak to the value that congressional
involvement can bring both to the national dialogue about
counterterrorism matters and specifically to the current reassessment
of our strategies and policies in light of the evolving threat. It is
heartening to see that Congress is starting to ratchet up its
engagement in this area. For example, certain Members are expressing
views about our existing targeting and detention authorities and
whether they should be revised in light of the new threat picture. Some
have asked whether Congress should pass legislation governing the
executive branch's selection of targets for its drone program. Some
have suggested that Congress establish a judicial process by which a
court reviews and approves any plan for a lethal strike against a U.S.
citizen before that plan is put into action. Some have proposed
legislation more clearly directing the Executive branch to send
terrorist suspects to military custody, as opposed to the criminal
justice system. Others have argued more generally that the AUMF should
be amended to account for the new threat emanating from Ansar al-
Sharia, Boko Haram, and the other dangerous groups that have little
direct connection to al-Qaeda and its affiliates or to anyone who
``planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001.'' While these ideas have varying
strengths and weaknesses, they are a welcome sign that Congress is
poised to get substantially engaged in counterterrorism matters once
again.
In assessing these and other proposals for national security
legislation, Congress should be guided by a pair of principles that
their legislative efforts have largely followed over the past 12 years.
First, it is important to remember the practical concern that time is
of the essence in counterterrorism operations and that legal
authorities must be crafted in a way that permits operators and
decisionmakers in the executive branch to react to circumstances
without undue delay. That concern was not sufficiently appreciated
prior to 9/11, and as a result many of our counterterrorism tools were
burdened with unnecessary limitations and a stifling amount of process.
In fact, the tools used by our national security investigators who were
trying to prevent terrorist attacks were much less user-friendly than
those available to criminal investigators who were investigating
completed criminal acts. The result was slowed investigations and an
inability to develop real-time intelligence about terrorist threats,
like the one that hit home on 9/11.
The Patriot Act and subsequent national security legislation helped
to rectify that imbalance and to make our counterterrorism tools and
investigations more nimble and effective, while at the same time
providing for sufficient safeguards and oversight to ensure that they
are used responsibly and consistent with our respect for privacy and
civil liberties. Any future legislation should follow that model. For
instance, any scheme for regulating the use of targeted drone strikes--
which may well raise myriad practical and constitutional issues beyond
the concern with operational delay--should be designed with an
appreciation for the need for quick decisionmaking and action in the
context of war and targeting.
Second and more generally, Congress should maintain its record of
largely resisting legislation that unduly restricts the government's
flexibility in the fight against international terrorism. For example,
there have been occasional efforts to categorically limit the executive
branch's options in its detention and prosecution of terrorist
suspects. While there may well be good principled arguments behind
these efforts, pragmatism dictates that we should not start taking
options off the table. We should instead maximize the range of
available options and allow our counterterrorism professionals to
select the mode of detention or prosecution that best serves the
objectives for each particular suspect--development of intelligence,
certainty of successful prosecution, etc.
Flexibility should also be the watchword when approaching any
effort to amend the Authorization for Use of Military Force. The
diffusion of terrorist threats that has led to the call for amending
the AUMF is bound to continue, and new groups will likely be forming
and mounting a threat to the United States in the years to come. Any
amended AUMF must be crafted with language that clearly defines the
target of our military force, but that also encompasses all such groups
that pose a serious threat to our national security.
Congress is to be commended for having largely followed these
principles in its legislative efforts over the past 12 years and for
playing a vitally important role in the construction of our national
counterterrorism program since 9/11--a role that it should continue to
play in the years to come.
This committee is specifically to be commended for recognizing the
recent evolution of the terrorist threat and the need to assess our
counterterrorism program and policies in light of that evolution. It
has been an honor to be a part of that effort, and I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Well, thank you all for your insights.
And I see we have had several colleagues join us.
So, let me start off with exploring some of what you have
suggested a little greater in depth.
Most of the government's most critical counterterrorism
effort takes place at the strategic level, from countering
violent extremism programs to the Global Counterterrorism
Forum. Have we done enough, though, to target the recruitment
pipeline? And how can we enhance our efforts to undercut--I
think it goes to Congresswoman Harman's comments--the extremist
narrative and address the grievances that are the underlying
fuel instability? Any thoughts on that?
Ms. Harman. Well--by the way, it is a great personal
pleasure to see ``Senator'' Murphy. I have not called him that
yet, so--a former colleague.
That is what I was really talking about. We have to win the
argument with this pipeline of potential recruits. And we
cannot win the argument if all we are doing is playing ``Whac-
a-Mole,'' as I call it, knocking off some folks, whom we should
either apprehend or kill, depending on what the options are.
Obviously, capturing is a better option, I think, when it is
possible. But, nonetheless, if that is all we are perceived to
do, if we have a drone-centric foreign policy, I do not think
that wins the argument.
And therefore, both Mike and Ken have suggested things that
we can do. I think we should put a strict legal framework
around the use of drones. Congress should do this. I have
recommended that we could bring drones under the FISA
framework, which most in Congress supported, including then-
Senator Obama. And these FISA courts, I--although some
disagree--I think can work to improve the framework for the use
of drones--not the operations, but the framework. And Congress
can provide oversight. That is just one example of how we could
win the argument with potential recruits, because then we have
a rules-based program for the use of force against certain
high-value targets.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. And maybe--I invite your answers, but let me
specify my question a little bit more. It seems that having a
framework for the use of drones, assuming you give the
flexibility necessary that was referred to here, may be
desirable, but, at the end of the day, we do not win hearts and
minds because we have a rule framework about how we might
strike at somebody. We win hearts and minds because we change--
or, we work to change the realities of their lives on the
ground.
I mean, the Arab Spring, in my mind, is a challenge of a
very young population, mostly in or near poverty, having no
future--the aspirations for the future not on the horizon with
any possibility of that future----
Ms. Harman. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. Being better, and then having
that despair being manipulated against--whether it be the West
or Israel or others.
So, should not our policy consider--and this might be a
longer term context, but, nonetheless, we are in this for--
despite fatigue, we are in this for a while, it certainly seems
to me--aren't there other things that we should be considering?
Ms. Harman. Yes.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, in my view, this has been--and
this is a self-indictment, since I was in both administrations,
and we did not effectively do this, in my view--countering
violent extremism, that ideological fight, has been woefully,
in my view, underfunded and under-focused-on, compared to the
kinetic piece. Now, there are a variety of reasons for this. It
is really easier to get funding for weapon systems that are
built in people's districts than it is to build up a mini-army
of people who are going to work the Web and get our message out
there, and counter al-Qaeda's message from the basement of the
State Department. It is much easier to see tangible results
from a kinetic strike, using a drone or anything else, than it
is to understand, you know, a 1-point or a 2-point change in
perceptions in the United States, as opposed to bin Laden. That
is a much longer program, which requires much greater patience.
So, in my view, we can do a couple of things on this front.
First of all, I do think, again, we have significantly
underfunded ideological efforts at the State Department; to
some extent the Department of Homeland Security; and the people
who actually have the most money to do these sorts of programs,
the Department of Defense. Now, with all respect to my Defense
colleagues, they tend to be the worst people to actually carry
the message that the United States is not at war with Islam,
because they are wearing uniforms. So, we have to reallocate
funds to the people who can responsibly go out and take this
message.
Second, this is about acts and not just words, so we have
to maintain foreign-aid programs and rule-of-law programs that
are now going to help work with these emerging democracies,
which we hope are democracies. And we have to work closely with
them even if some of their views are very much in tension with
some of our interests. These are two quick things that I would
offer.
I do think that there is something heartening, also, about
the Arab Awakening, though, Mr. Chairman. And I would offer
that, frankly, al-Qaeda's message did not drive the Arab
Awakening.
Al-Qaeda was largely irrelevant to the Arab Awakening, and it
is exactly the motivation that you identify, as opposed to a
purely al-Qaeda-driven: we must get rid of the old regimes and
move in through violence. The Arab Awakening proved that you
can do this without violence. And, in that sense, we actually
have an opportunity, now, going forward; although we have lost
partners and we have lost some counterterrorism kinetic
capability, this was actually a win for us, ideologically.
Mr. Wainstein. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up on
that last--Mike's last point.
I think the challenge was clear, from the beginning of the
Arab Spring, that there is going to be a bit of a tradeoff for
the United States. In the short term--if you are looking at the
Arab Spring just through the counterterrorism lens--in the
short term we were going to lose partners who had been reliable
in the efforts against terrorism. And we have seen that. We
have certainly lost some partnerships. We have lost some
cooperation that we used to be able to rely on in that part of
the world, a very volatile part of the world. But, the long-
term solution for terrorism is not just, you know, stamping out
the fires, day by day, it is to change the circumstances under
which people live in that area. And the Arab Spring was a way
to do that as a source of hope for democracy and economic
development; and it was very important that the United States
was seen on the side of the people who were looking for reform.
The additional danger, as Mike pointed out, though, is, al-
Qaeda now is getting a foothold in some parts of the Arab
Spring; whereas, they were completely irrelevant to the
beginning of it. And so, it is all the more important that we
solidify whatever cooperative relationships that we can before
al-Qaeda gets more of a foothold.
The Chairman. You know, it seems to me that one of our--and
I will turn to Senator Corker next--it seems to me that one of
our challenges, as we think about this, whether it is the rules
of engagement, the question of Congress revisiting the
authorization of under what set of circumstances we use force--
but, one of the key questions that we seem to sweep under the
rug, which is the whole question that I was trying to get to
you, I think several of you alluded to, which is that there is
an underpinning here, of people's economic circumstances. And
unless we deal, whether through partnership with others--and
that is why I would be interested, when I come back, after the
other colleagues get their chance here to question you--about
what partnerships really work and how we could foster
partnerships that look at, for example, development assistance.
We have a challenge here on foreign aid, in general, even
though it is, approximately 1 percent of the Federal budget, it
is one of the most powerful tools that we have, especially when
I look at this universe. You are just not going to do this by
striking at individuals, which I agree, those who, in fact, are
of great threat to the country and you can capture, because if
you could capture them, you would want to capture them for the
information flow that comes from that then you have to strike
at them, but in the longer term, the changing of the dynamics
here comes from how we engage in changing people's lives. And
we cannot do that alone, but we certainly could engage in
partnerships to do that. And the messages that flow from that
are pretty dramatic, I think.
And it is something I would like to explore, because we are
going to be having some challenges as we look at our budget and
we look forward--and, as you said, we are not going to have
$100 billion in counterterrorism money, moving forward, in the
foreseeable continuous future. So, then the question is, How do
we change the dynamics? How do we get better bang for our buck?
And how do we change the underpinnings? That is what I am
looking to get at.
With that, Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy, if you would take over the
chair while I----
Senator Corker. He is moving from Senator to chairman
awfully quickly, but--it is an amazing thing. So--yes.
[Laughter.]
So, again, thank you for your testimony. And I appreciate
all the comments regarding some of the softer pieces, if you
will, that need to be pursued. And I agree that those certainly
have not been pursued in the way they should.
And I want to go back to the legal case first. And I think
each of you have said, look, al-Qaeda is more amorphous and,
you know, spread around. Core al-Qaeda's been, basically--I
will use somebody else's word--``decimated.'' But, it also
makes it--does it not?--much more difficult to tie the groups
that we are actually pursuing today back to 9/11, which is what
generated the authorization for the use of military force on
September 18. I think all of you would agree, it is very
difficult to tie these groups back to that authorization. Is
that correct?
Mr. Leiter. Yes.
Ms. Harman. Yes. And I would add that, those of us who
voted for it--I certainly did; everyone except for one Member
of Congress voted for it, as I recall--thought it would be
limited in time and space. I never imagined that it would still
be in force over a decade later and would be used by the
executive branch to underpin a huge variety of actions against
disparate enemies. That does not mean that there should not be
a legal framework. I think there should be a legal framework.
But, maybe one that is more attuned to the new threats, and
also the goal of, I would say, Senator Corker--the goal of
winning the argument, not just ``whacking'' people. That is our
challenge now. And unless we can win the argument, there will
be more and more people in more and more countries who are able
to produce propaganda tools to recruit more and more people.
And so, that is why I said, in my testimony, that we need a
whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism, which
certainly includes diplomacy and development as tools. We need
smarter investments. We need foreign aid budgets that do not
just pick the flavor-of-the-month country, but that bear down
on those countries that are the most serious threats, and
perhaps condition aid based on changing some government
policies. And then, we do need to live our values. And that
means that everything we do should be rules-based.
Senator Corker. So, I believe, in order for that to happen,
in order for Congress and the executive branch to work together
to drive that kind of effort, I really do think this entire
authorization needs to be updated, and I think the debate that
comes from that will cause people to look at what you are
saying, and drive that. Otherwise--you know, as you mentioned,
I mean, there is fatigue; people really do not want to deal
with it. The executive branch is dealing with it.
And, candidly, as we travel in the field, most of the folks
that we deal with, in intelligence and other places, say there
is a very thin thread, if any, back to the original
authorization. And I think all of you are agreeing with that.
So, let me just ask you, on that point, What would be--I
know we have talked about the idealism issues. I know there are
all kinds of things we need to do to help people understand our
values and all those kinds of things. But, if you got back to
the authorization of military force, what would some of the
characteristics be of this one that are different from the one
we put in place on September 18?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I would, first, say that, in my view,
the current AUMF is too broad, too narrow, and too vague. It is
too broad, because, as Jane Harman said, we are now 12 years
later, and I think a lot of people, when they voted for it, did
not quite realize that it would still be applying. It is too
narrow, because, honestly, by the end of my tenure in the U.S.
Government, you were having to do some shoehorning to get some
groups or individuals in there that posed a very clear and
imminent threat to the United States into the language of the
AUMF. And it is too vague, because I think it is very difficult
to look at it and say, How would that apply to a group like
Jabhat al-Nusra?--which the American people and this Congress
should know, up front.
So, my suggestion would be that you have some--first of
all, I would commend the Hoover Institution report on the AUMF,
on reforming the AUMF. I think it is quite good. I don't agree
with every word of it. I think it is a good theoretical way of
considering what has to be changed.
In my view, there should be some process, somewhat similar
to the designation of terrorist groups, that happens through
the State Department now, where groups are nominated by the
executive branch, they are approved by the executive branch,
then there is some period for the U.S. Congress to review
whether that group should be included in a new authorization of
military force. And I would say that should include groups that
pose a near-term threat to the United States through acts of
terrorism. And that is going to be broader than al-Qaeda
affiliates, but it will also give the Congress some opportunity
to, not necessarily vote, but to at least review executive
branch determinations of the types of groups that the executive
branch thinks should be targeted. That is how I would approach
it.
Senator Corker. Kenneth.
Mr. Wainstein. Senator, I subscribe to the idea of having a
list, and the Executive can then propose that additional groups
be put on that list as those groups become a serious threat to
the United States. And that was one of the points I made in my
initial remarks, that it needs to be a system that is flexible
enough to account for the changing situation, because the
threat picture today is going to be very different a year from
now, and radically different 10 years from now. So, I think
something along the lines of what Mike just described would be
perfect.
Let me just sort of go up to 30,000 feet for a second.
There are a couple of benefits to Congress considering this, at
this time or any time. First, by looking at possibly revising
the AUMF, it will be a recognition of what I think many of us
have known for years, which is, this effort against terrorism
is a long-term war. It is going to be around for a long time.
This is not a threat that is going to go away once we destroy
core al-Qaeda. It is going to extend well beyond 9/11 and the
years since 9/11. So, it will be sort of a national recognition
that we need to account for the fact that this is going to be a
permanent state of life.
Also, as I mentioned in my initial remarks, right now the
administration seems to be able to shoehorn their activities
into the AUMF, and what they have done seems to have been
covered
by the law. But, there really is an element of Congress lending
legitimacy to their actions when Congress deliberates over the
authority that it is considering giving to the executive
branch, looks at all the implications of it and vests that
authority in the executive branch. I think it is good for all
branches, and I think it would be good for our counterterrorism
program.
Ms. Harman. Could I just raise one caution? Because I was
thinking about this as both Mike and Ken were talking.
I am not sure Congress should give a blanket authorization
for the use of force. I think Congress' role is to consider
carefully different circumstances around different assertions
of the use of force. And I do not mean that every 2 days,
Congress has to consider some terrorist organization that we
have not heard of before, and authorize the government to do
something specifically there. But, Congress' role in oversight
and legislating has to be much more assertive than it has been,
in my view, over the last 12 years. And one size does not fit
all. That is one point.
The second point is, calling this the ``war on terror,'' as
many have, I think has not helped us win the argument. Terror
is a tactic. How do you fight a war against a tactic? That was
modified by the Obama administration to say it was a ``war on
al-Qaeda and affiliates.'' I thought that was an improvement.
But, again, I think we should be careful with our language. And
perhaps this committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, that
does do positive-sum things--passes a foreign aid budget, helps
us project diplomacy, not just kinetic power in the world--
should consider some form of authorization or some process for
oversight that weighs other factors in addition to the use of
force.
Senator Corker. Well, I could not agree more. And again, I
think a real debate about how broad, how narrow, how vague, how
blanket an authorization is, I think will drive us to focus on
all these things, which we have not been focusing on. So, I
could not agree more. And I think the administration--I do not
know where they are. I mean, on one hand, they are able to do
whatever it is they wish; and many people in Congress like
that, because they have no ownership over the outcome. But, I
do think that, you know, there is almost no thread of tieback
to where we were. I think it is time to update this and to
create another authorization that is different. And I do think
we should take some ownership over this and, hopefully, drive a
little bit different approach to how we deal with this.
This is long term, you are exactly right. There is not
going to be a finite end. And I think this whole debate would
help invigorate the approach, and actually overcome the fatigue
that we are talking about. It still is a threat, we still have
issues of nation-states that we have to deal with. And
obviously that is a whole nother component. But, this is one
that certainly we need to be paying attention to for a long,
long time.
And I thank you for your testimony.
Senator Murphy [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Corker.
I will take it as no coincidence that Congresswoman Harman
showed up and I got elevated to chairman, so I appreciate your
bumping me up.
I want to fit in two questions, one on winning the argument
and one on Syria.
Congresswoman Harman, you talked about working with
actions, not just words. Or it actually may have been Mr.
Leiter. And I have a question about how actions that we take
here in the United States are viewed abroad, and to what extent
they factor into the recruitment tools.
After September 11, there was, frankly, a remarkable
restraint showed in this country, in terms of anti-Islamic and
Islamic-phobic--Islamophobe behavior. That worm has turned in
the last 8 years, and whether it is State legislators looking
at bans on shariah law or mosques being ridden out of
neighborhoods or advertisers pulling their money from shows
about Muslim families in the last 5 to 10 years, we have seen a
remarkable increase in some pretty bad behavior toward the
Islamic religion here in this country.
And I guess my question--and I will direct it to you first,
Congresswoman Harman--is, How much does this matter? How much
does this matter, when set against the other drivers of
recruitment, whether it be our drone policy, our military
policy, or economic factors within these regions? How much
should we be paying attention to this turn that's happened in
the United States, I would argue, in the last 5 years or so, as
a means toward trying to ultimately win this argument across
the globe?
Ms. Harman. Well, Chairman Murphy--has a nice ring--it
matters a lot. I actually think our record is mixed. There are
some good stories, too. Let us remember that, shortly after 9/
11, a Sikh, not a Muslim, I think, gas station attendant was
murdered by a mob just because he looked like he might have
been Muslim, or that was what the folks who murdered him
thought; and it was a black eye for America, that that
happened. And there have been some very bad actions.
On the other hand, I know quite a bit about Los Angeles,
where I am from and where my congressional district was, and
the police department there, and the sheriff's office, have
made major efforts to reach out for Muslim communities and to
have advisory task forces and so forth, both to project a
friendly image, but also, it is very smart policing, because if
you build trust in a community, they are more likely to come
forward and identify some of these folks who have clean records
but who are contemplating some very bad deeds.
And, in fact, if I remember this, right in Virginia, there
were five guys, who moved to Pakistan, who were plotting
against America, and they were identified by their own
community. These were kids, college-age or high-school-age
kids, who were basically identified by their own communities so
they could be apprehended, stopped.
So, it is a big part of the counterterrorism--of a good
counterterrorism strategy to project tolerance and build
positive relationships with a community that 99 percent of
which is peace-loving and patriotic Americans. And those are
the folks in the United States, and it is true around the
world, too.
And one other fact to point out, and that is that more
Muslims have been the target of terror attacks by al-Qaeda and
affiliates than have non-Muslims. So, hopefully, the community
itself--again, if we project the kind of relationship we
should--will push against its own bad apples. That is a big
part of the solution here.
Senator Murphy. Any thoughts from----
Mr. Leiter. I guess I call you Senator or Half-Chairman at
this point, Senator Murphy. [Laughter.]
Senator Murphy. Same thing.
Mr. Leiter. At some risk, I am going to disagree with my
friend Jane Harman. I, frankly, think that these are bricks in
a wall, and the wall is the narrative that the United States is
at war with Islam. And if the United States--if there was a
lack of Islamophobia in the United States, al-Qaeda would still
attack the United States, without a doubt. They are factors,
but they are not driving, and I do not think they are
dispositive factors.
The piece that I think is most important about this,
besides the fact that, from my perspective, it is abhorrent and
un-American and, you know, horrible that we would judge anyone
by their religion in this country--the piece that I do think is
important is, it undermines the willingness, in many cases, of
the American Muslim community, which is the single most
important community to messaging to the rest of the Muslim
world that the United States is not at war with Islam--it makes
it less likely that they are really going to be motivated to
help and be a part of this fight. You know, despite all the
Islamophobia, they are.
And I adamantly reject the view that the American Muslim
community has not spoken out against al-Qaeda. The American
Muslim community that does that does not get a lot of press
time, but I have worked with Muslims for the past 8 years who
are adamantly against them.
But, when they see Islamophobia, they are less likely to
stand up and say, ``America is a great place to be, and the
United States is not at war with Islam.'' And that is an
important set of messengers that we can either embrace or chase
away.
Senator Murphy. Mr. Wainstein, if I could just turn to my
second question, regarding Syria, which is connected to your
comment about some of the optimism that comes out of the Arab
Spring, in that, (a) anti-Americanism was not necessarily a
driver of those revolutions, and (b) we were largely seen as
being on the right side of those conflicts. What are the
lessons, then, that we draw to the current conflict in Syria?
Certainly, a lot of concern has been expressed, in this body,
about whether or not, when Assad falls, we will be perceived on
the right side, and what consequences that ultimately has for
the very bad actors affiliated with extremist groups to hold
sway in a democratic or semidemocratic process that plays out
once Assad is gone.
Mr. Wainstein. Senator, that is a very good question. And,
in many ways, Syria is sort of the perfect storm, because it
has developed into this civil war of horrific proportions, a
human tragedy on a major scale. And then you throw in the
prospects that it is now also the launching pad for a
rejuvenated al-Qaeda presence in that part of the world, and,
you know, it is the perfect conditions for
al-Qaeda.
Obviously, you know, we have--as a matter of foreign
policy--we have every reason to see the Assad regime get
ushered out, but we also want to make sure that what comes in
after he leaves, or is kicked out, is something that is hostile
to al-Qaeda and is accom-
modating to our interests.
I know it is a balancing act, and the administration is in
a tough position because they are trying to sort of keep al-
Qaeda suppressed, but, at the same time, try to help the
opposition, which, in many ways, is indistinguishable from al-
Qaeda, in certain quarters.
So, I think that it is a tough one to draw lessons from,
because it is the perfect storm.
Senator Murphy. But, would you agree, today, that we are
not perceived to be on the right side of this, and the danger
is, is that if circumstances change and Assad goes, in the next
several weeks or months, that, unless our disposition changes,
that we are not really balancing that question very well right
now?
Mr. Wainstein. Right. You can see where we have been with
other countries. Just take Libya and our decisions as to how
and when to get involved, and how much to be involved, and how
that was calibrated, and how that turned out. I think, in Syria
right now, if Assad were to walk out, there would be a large
percentage of the incoming government who would think that we
were not there for them. And so, if they are looking for
support, they would be less likely to look to us and more
likely to look to other regimes that are less friendly.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I am intrigued with the winning-the-narrative argument that
the Chairman raised and, Congresswoman Harman, that you raised
in your testimony. And I am thinking of the winning-the-
narrative argument in a slightly different way. So, one way to
do it is to be truer to our principles and portray the right
values to the world, and to do it in such a way that our own
Muslim-American population feels like they can communicate the
message. But, another thought that I have is a narrative does
not have to be won by us, it can be won by other nations and
other actors, globally, that can offer a countermodel to
terrorism as a path to success.
And so, although this is not my area of the world, I would
say, you know, a Turkey, that is a cochair with United States
in the global counterterrorism forum, that has a growing GDP,
that is a nation, you know, that is in the Muslim world, but
that has a strong, kind of, economic track record now, that, on
the sectarian-to-secular scale, is a little more over to the
secular side than many; or a Morocco, with a constitutional
monarchy, where the king is a lineal descendant of Mohammad,
again with some tradition of respect for religious liberty, but
strong--obviously, a strong Muslim nation, and an economy that
has been stronger than some others--you know, helping our
allies, you know, elevate their posture so that there is an
alternative success model for young populations that are prone
to be recruited into terrorism, that a success model is, you
know, a functioning--more or less functioning government and a
path to economic success.
So, some of the winning-the-narrative is not just about us,
but I think some of the winning-the-narrative is about nations
that many in these countries might feel more immediately akin
to than us in helping them tell their stories. And I am just
intrigued by that, especially, I guess, as a result of Turkey's
role in cochairing this global counterterrorism forum with the
United States. And I would just be interested in your thoughts
on that.
Ms. Harman. Well, I strongly agree with you, and I think
there is a big opportunity right now, especially given a
reasonably close relationship between President Obama and Prime
Minister Erdogan, of Turkey, to work together in partnership to
do more, together, to frame a narrative and show a model to
other parts of the region.
That is not to say that some of the recent actions of
Turkey have been attractive. The anti-Israel and anti-Semitic
rhetoric is horrible, and I think we have to condemn it. But,
by and large, Turkey offers a more moderate model of an
Islamist society.
Islamist political parties are not necessarily bad. I think
it is much better to have these religious parties inside the
tent than trying to blow up the tent, which is the al-Qaeda
model. So, I am for that. But, I do agree that there are some
models better than others.
And final comment on the Arab Awakening, because--we have
talked about that. And certainly, the aspirations of the people
who overthrew their government are enormously impressive, and
their personal courage is impressive. But, some of these
governments--new governments--have yet to succeed in a way that
reflects democratic pluralism or tolerance. And that is very
worrisome. Which is another reason why better models should be
out.
So, you know, I strongly favor collaboration with Turkey to
do this, and think you have a great idea.
Senator Kaine. Additional thoughts on that?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think you can look across and
outside the region throughout the Muslim world for some really
good examples. The United States partnership with Indonesia has
been fantastic. And you may remember, in 2001-2002, people
talked about how Indonesia could be the next Afghanistan, next
home of al-Qaeda. And it simply has not. And why? Because the
Indonesians have taken this seriously because of significant
foreign aid, good intelligence, and good defense partnerships.
Real success story.
I think the transition that Jordan is going through, slowly
moving toward greater democratization in that region, in the
heart of a region that has been affected by al-Qaeda--a very,
very important example.
I absolutely agree with Jane Harman, as well, that, in
places like Libya and Egypt, two very different challenges, we
have to use our foreign aid in ways that makes them walk the
right path, but we also have to take a very sophisticated look
at the pressures they are under and who are in these
governments. And we cannot simply look and say, ``Oh, they are
a member of x group. We cannot work with them on anything.'' If
we do that, we will cut off our nose to spite our face.
Senator Kaine. Well, one additional question, a kind of a
separate topic. I am on Armed Services, as well, and we have
been having a series of briefings by commanders in different
AORs--AFRICOM and Southern Command--talking a lot about things
like the drug trade--really, criminal networks from South
America to North America, or across the Atlantic into Africa
and then up to Europe. And it always strikes me, as we are
talking about these criminal networks, if it is easy to move
drugs, if it is easy to do human trafficking, if it is easy to
move arms, if it is easy to move cash, it would be easy to
move, you know, nuclear materiel or something else that could
cause a significant challenge. And so, it strikes me that part
of our counterterrorism challenge is the disruption of criminal
networks that are not, in and of themselves, part of the same
group of people that are terrorists, but that are now getting
so blended together, or at least have a financial interest in
working with people who have terrorism as a motive. And the
more hearings I go to, the more nervous I get.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I actually just spent 2 hours, before
this, with staff from Senator Rockefeller's office and Senator
Reid's office, talking about illicit networks, and you are
absolutely right that it is simply the movement of people,
materials, and, to some extent, ideology and money, and it is
all the same networks. And especially as we have seen in North
Africa, the Tuaregs and what they have enabled. It was 5 years
ago; it was drugs and other things. And now it is weapons,
Libya, and the like.
So, we have to get better at those networks. Those networks
require not just traditional military force, which is in this
region, but requires real enabling by us, in terms of aid and
significant training on the Customs front, Department of
Homeland Security, law enforcement, DEA. We have to look at
this in a more holistic way than we have in the past.
Ms. Harman. That is why----
Mr. Leiter. Thank you.
Ms. Harman [continuing]. I just--if I might add something--
--
Senator Kaine. Yes.
Ms. Harman [continuing]. I advocated a whole-of-government
approach to counterterrorism. If you just stay in silos and
think, ``What can the State Department do?'' or, ``What can the
Homeland Security Department do?'' you are not going to get at
this problem. You have to put all the pieces together and
remember that instead of a top-down structure that we saw on 9/
11, now we have a horizontal structure of loosely affiliated
groups, and some of them are criminal networks, and they are
parasitic. They attach to each other for the purpose of funding
an operation or moving goods, and then they disconnect. And we
really have to see all of this as linked, and we have to think
about how it will evolve. It won't look this way in 3 months or
a year.
And they use the most modern technology. We should not
assume that we are better digital natives than they are. These
are the kids in the cafes who are inventing, I think, state-of-
the-art cyber attacks and other things. And if you ask, What
should we worry about at 3 a.m.? We should worry about these
kids and what they are up to.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
One last set of questions, because you have been so
gracious with your time. The whole question of ``drain the
swamp.'' What do you envision--and I invite any of you and,
Jane, you specifically mentioned it--but, what do you envision
as the elements that you would promote to ``drain the swamp''?
And, second, what are the partnerships that have
particularly worked well or the partnerships that we have not
engaged in yet but that we should be engaging in toward this
goal?
Any of you want to--it is a ladies-first----
Ms. Harman. All right. Well, I think we have talked about a
number of them already. You know, ``draining the swamp.'' I
said whole-of-government approach, looking at foreign aid not
as a flavor of the month, making sure that some of these
programs in the State Department are considered in a broader
context, which is, Do they really help our CT capability, or
not?
But, I think some other things that were raised--
partnerships with other countries; and this is the other piece
that no one has discussed yet, and that is public/private
partnerships. The private sector has many tools that--and a lot
of agility that the public sector does not have. And especially
if you look at create--I would not say ``changing''--inventing
education systems and models that fit some of these countries.
Illiteracy is a huge terrorism recruitment tool. If people do
not have any hope that they can change their circumstance, they
can be more easily recruited. They also cannot get employed if
they lack basic skills.
So, I think there are approaches to this that the private
sector, in particular, has, and the NGO community, that we
should lash onto, that would magnify, geometrically, our
capability.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I would offer, first, on the words
front.
Domestically, we have to do a better job of actually engaging
the American Muslim community in this. The U.S. Government is
pretty darn bad at this. Different elements of the government
are OK at it. The FBI has some skills at it. The DHS has some
skills. But, overall, we have not effectively engaged the
American Muslim community.
Second, we have to accept that what the United States says
about Islam on a global basis is generally dismissed. We are
not a credible speaker on this subject. So, what we ought to
seek to do, following on what Jane said, is, we ought to seek
to empower moderate voices, rather than be the amplifier,
ourselves. We have to provide funding so people can understand,
so American Muslim groups and other Muslim groups around the
world who counter
al-Qaeda's message know how to use the Web and can actually
counter al-Awlaki's message, or inspire his message more
effectively, and they know how to use those tools. If it comes
from a U.S. Government speaker, it probably is not going to be
that effective.
On the acts front--because just the words without acts is
simply hollow rhetoric--the pieces that have worked incredibly
well for us in the past, disaster relief has been spectacular.
If you look at the--not all the time, but what we have done in
Pakistan for disaster relief and the like, Indonesia with the
earthquake and tsunami--these sorts of programs, which really
show a nonmilitary face, or perhaps a military face, but a
military face using--doing humanitarian acts, have been
incredibly effective.
Last, but not least, we should not think that we are going
to win this alone. In part, we should simply be highlighting
how bankrupt al-Qaeda's ideology is. If you look at the
countries that have seriously rejected al-Qaeda--places like
Jordan--it was not because of anything we said; it was because
of al-Qaeda's acts. And we have to get better at showing how
bankrupt the ideology is, how successful something like an Arab
Awakening peaceful revolution can be, versus the killing of
Muslims that al-Qaeda brings.
To me, those are the three main components that I would
advocate for.
Mr. Wainstein. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow on
Mike's comments about the domestic side. We have talked about
outreach and countering radicalization here in the United
States, and whether those efforts have translated into a
positive message going out--emanating from the United States
out to the rest of the world. Keep in mind, I think we all
recognize this, but that message is also important here in the
United States, as a counterterrorism matter, because we are
seeing, more and more over the last few years, the phenomenon
of homegrown terrorism, and we have people who are getting
radicalized, here within our midst, in a way that did not
happen before.
It has not happened to the degree that we saw over in
Europe in the early '00s; in part, I think, because the Muslim
community here in the United States--those communities
generally feel a lower level of alienation than many of the
communities over in Europe. But, we are starting to see an
uptick over the last few years, and that is troubling.
And I believe that messaging that comes out from the United
States Government--whether it is the prosecution of hate crimes
or the FBI going out and doing outreach to the Muslim
community--directly translates into a diminution of any
interest on the part of your potential recruit to actually move
up to the level of being an extremist.
And so, it has a very tangible impact on our national
security here in the United States. And, the better we get at
detecting the movement of terrorists around the world--and
therefore, being able to interdict terrorists when they come
into our country--the bigger the threat from terrorists who are
here--who are ourselves. And so, that message is important.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. I will just--one last question.
Again, I appreciate the testimony and look forward to
talking to you all as we move along.
And I want to change the subject. I know you all have
talked about a lot of things that I agree with, on the soft
side, the message side, and in trying to deal with some of the
economic issues that drive this. But, back to the
authorization, and back to dealing with what we actually do,
kinetically or in other ways.
As we are looking at a potential different type of
authorization, do--when we deal with people kinetically--do
they have to pose a direct threat to the United States? And
does that threat have to be against U.S. facilities here at
home, or can they be U.S. facilities abroad? Or can the United
States, through--or should the United States, through an
authorization like this, actually target--and I know I am using
a word that you all have said we should not use--but, should we
direct our activities toward people that, candidly, just
disagree with our way of life, and maybe tried to hamper other
Western societies? I mean, how do you--as you walk down that
chain, how do you deal with an authorization in a way that
really gets at the threat that we now have?
Ms. Harman. Carefully, is my answer. I do not think we want
to trade the AUMF, which is outdated and designed for a
different problem, for something that may be updated but is
overly broad. I would suggest, first, that we understand what
current and future threats are, and we define them carefully,
if we are thinking about one statute. And I am not sure it is a
good idea to think about one statute that would be the
predicate for all of our actions. But, at any rate, that is
where I would start.
The second point that I would make is, there should be an
explicit statement that U.S. interests or U.S. persons have to
be involved in order for us to target an individual. There
should be no other reason to do it, unless we are in a--you
know, in a ground combat or a--some kind of situation that fits
the standard law-of-war definition, which this probably,
presumably, would not.
Senator Corker. But, can I just----
Ms. Harman. I----
Senator Corker. Can I just--let me just ask you, on that.
So, you know, I was just in Mali, and you have got three groups
who have come together in northern Africa, with--by the way,
with very differing reasons for being together. The Tuaregs
actually have a political issue that has caused them to be a
part of the conflict. It is not really, maybe, even a full
insurgency, from that standpoint. But, you have--you know, it
is criminality that people are dealing with there. They are,
you know, a threat to Mali. They are a threat to Western
thinking.
So, how would we--let us say we were in partnership, today,
in a little different way, maybe more like the French are, on
the ground--how would you differentiate? I mean, you know, a
lot of this is just pure criminality. I mean, you've got
hostage-taking, you've got drug-running. At some point, they
may pose a threat. How do you deal with that?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I would disagree a little bit with my
friend Jane, in that I--first of all, I would--let me say,
unequivocally--you know, you said, ``Should we target people
who we just disagree with?''--we should only be targeting
people who pose a threat of violence.
Now the question becomes, ``Violence toward whom? And how
imminent must that violence be?'' And, in my view, certainly
violence toward the United States, our interests globally; that
would be enough. It would not have to be a threat to the
homeland.
Second, I do believe that we should have some authorization
to use force against groups that pose a threat of violence
against our allies in this fight. Because if we are talking
about building up partnerships, one of the ways you build up
partnerships is when your friends in x country come to you and
say, ``These guys are planning a terrorist attack against us
now. We cannot target them. They are part of a group that has
targeted you in the past, but now they are targeting us.'' It
is very important that we can assist them with military force.
So, in fact, you build that partnership up.
So, I think it should not be limited only to threats
against the United States. We should have some more expansive
language to use force against our close allies in this global
fight.
And, in terms of imminence, I would not use language, as
was used in the justification for targeting Americans--U.S.
persons, American citizens, by--that was released recently--or,
not released, but obtained. I think that is appropriate for
targeting U.S. persons; but for non-U.S. persons, I would
include a looser standard that--not ``imminent,'' but some sort
of immediacy, beyond imminence, so that, if there were
historical plotting and the organization was still aligned
against us, we could use military force.
But, the key is, Whom are they using force against, and how
close is it? And I think, on both those, there does need to be
some operational flexibility, as my friend Ken Wainstein said.
Senator Corker. So, your friend Jane seems to be differing
with you.
Ms. Harman. Well, I am differing. I certainly think we
should prevent and disrupt plots against us around the world,
and we should use appropriate means to do that. That is not
always kinetic means. I think we would agree about that. But,
if Congress is acting--this is why I am pausing--I think some
very broad statement of U.S. interests in and aiding our
allies, and so forth, will end up backfiring. I think it should
be something much narrower. We do have agreements with allies,
and we have section 5 of NATO, which----
Senator Corker. Right.
Ms. Harman [continuing]. Is a common defense provision. And
those things should stay in place. But, Congress legislating
all this in one blanket statute, I would find--if the goal is
to come up with a narrative that is going to persuade others to
join us, I think this would not be a constructive part of that
narrative.
Senator Corker. Ken.
Mr. Wainstein. If I may, Senator, just if I could follow
on, on what Mike said. In terms of imminence, there has been a
good bit of talk about the imminence of the threat that al-
Awlaki posed at the time that he was killed, and people said,
``Well, you know, he didn't have his finger on the trigger, and
he wasn't about to set off a bomb.'' But that is not the
imminence you need, whether it is an American or a non-
American. He had a clear track record of targeting the United
States, of fomenting and bringing recruits in to commit
terrorist acts against the United States. It was clear, the
threat that he posed.
But, I think it is important to recognize that, if you
adopt a scheme, such as what Mike was describing--where
different terrorist groups are found to be terrorist
organizations and put on a list, and the government's now
authorized to use military force against those organizations--
then we are at war with those organizations.
And, traditionally, when you are at war against a state
actor, you do not have to wait for the soldier to pull a gun
out at you before you kill him. You can kill him on the
battlefield, and you can kill him as he is preparing and
getting poised to come out at the battlefield. So, imminence
that is well back from the battlefield can justify the use of
force in a war. And in this war against terrorist
organizations, I think that same paradigm would apply.
Ms. Harman. If I could just add one more thing. I think it
would--we were totally justified in the action we took against
Awlaki. No question about it. There was a strong predicate
there. He was inciting people to commit violent acts in the
United States, and there was a long track record. And the fact
that he was an American did require us to be careful in how we
identified him. But, we were, and we did the right thing, in
that case.
However, I think, as we go forward, saying, as Ken just
did, ``We are at war with a number of organizations,'' is a
storyline that is troubling. We are trying to tell a story
about America that is a positive story to persuade kids not to
become suicide bombers and terrorists. And Congress has a big
role in deciding how we tell that story. Yes, there should be
legislative oversight and specific legislation to authorize
kinetic acts. But I, again, would caution that it should
deliver a message that is not just about being at war; it
should deliver a message about trying to find ways to win the
argument and to be at war as a last resort against those who
are beyond rehabilitation.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I know we are over time, but I just
want to--I have to clarify one thing that Jane said.
Anwar al-Awlaki was not just inciting Americans, because I
think there is a question whether simply being--inciting
violence would be enough to be targeted. Anwar al-Awlaki was an
operational commander who was actively recruiting and training
bombers who were trying to blow up planes over the United
States.
Ms. Harman. And I agree with that. I--that was--inciting
people to commit violent acts was one of the things he was
doing. I think we were totally justified.
And one more point that none of us has raised, which is
that Congress is entitled to see the legal documents prepared
by the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, in
my view, that authorize acts like the targeting of Awlaki. Some
of those documents should only be seen, I think, in classified
settings and by appropriate committees, but, nonetheless, it is
not OK--and I think Ken said this, as well--for the executive
branch to police itself. I think we have seen that movie
before, and what should happen is, the separation of powers
should work, and Congress should have the ability to conduct
adequate oversight and to legislate.
The Chairman. Well----
Mr. Wainstein. May I just respond?
The Chairman [continuing]. You will have the last word,
because we are going to have to close out the hearing.
Mr. Wainstein. OK. Just to respond to Congresswoman
Harman's point. She makes a good point about the messaging.
When I talk about war in this context, I am just making the
point that when Congress authorizes the use of military force
against an organization, we are using the tools of war against
an organization. Nobody should fool themselves. War is what it
is, and so we draw on the traditions of war.
But, Jane makes a very good point about the messaging. And,
you know, the more we talk about being at war with terrorism,
the more that is misconstrued by the Muslim world, and used
against us.
So, I think the terminology now from the executive branch,
about ``being at war with al-Qaeda'' is dead on, because we are
at war with al-Qaeda, but not with anybody who is not an
adherent of al-Qaeda. I think it is important to draw that
distinction, and it is important, as Jane said, just to keep
mindful of the language we use, because that has real-life
impacts on our relationships overseas.
The Chairman. Well, this has been incredibly helpful, and
it has been insightful, and obviously there are some
differences of opinion, when we get to this authorization, on
what is the universe of it and what it looks like. But, it has
been helpful to start that conversation.
So, again, with the thanks of the committee for all of your
insights, your past service to our country, and for your
forbearance today, it has been very helpful to us.
The committee's record will stand open until Friday for any
members who have any questions.
And, with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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