[Senate Hearing 113-217]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-217
ARE WE PREPARED? MEASURING THE IMPACT OF PREPAREDNESS GRANTS SINCE 9/11
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 25, 2013
__________
Available via http://www.fdsys.gov
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Keith B. Ashdown, Minority Staff Director
Trina D. Shiffman, Chief Clerk
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARK BEGICH, Alaska Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
Pat McQuillan, Staff Director
Brandon Booker, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statement:
Page
Senator Begich............................................... 1
Senator Chiesa............................................... 3
Senator Paul................................................. 11
WITNESSES
Tuesday, June 25, 2013
Hon. Timothy Manning, Deputy Administrator, Protection and
National Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security........................... 4
Anne L. Richards, Assistant Inspector General, Office of Audits,
Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 6
David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 7
John W. Madden, Director, Alaska Division of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management Association, and Member, National
Governors Association.......................................... 23
Hon. William Euille, Mayor, City of Alexandria, Virginia, and
Member, U.S. Conference of Mayors.............................. 25
Josh D. Filler, Founder and President, Filler Security
Strategies, Inc.,.............................................. 27
Matt A. Mayer, Visiting Fellow, Heritage Foundation.............. 29
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Euille, Hon. William:
Testimony.................................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 82
Filler, Josh D.:
Testimony.................................................... 27
Prepared statement with attachment........................... 88
Madden, John W.:
Testimony.................................................... 23
Prepared statement with attachment........................... 71
Manning, Hon. Timothy:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Maurer, David C.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Mayer, Matt A.:
Testimony.................................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 96
Richards, Anne L.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 48
APPENDIX
Additional statements for the Record:
Richard W. Stanek, President Major County Sheriff's
Association (MCSA)......................................... 102
The Jewish Federations of North America...................... 110
National Assocation of Counties (NACO)....................... 125
ARE WE PREPARED?
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF PREPAREDNESS GRANTS SINCE 9/11
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TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emergency Management,
Intergovernmental Relations,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Begich,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Begich, Paul and Chiesa.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEGICH
Senator Begich. Thank you very much for being here this
morning. This meeting will come to order.
Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee on Emergency
Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and the District of
Columbia (EMDC).
I want to begin by thanking all our witnesses here today
for their willingness to participate as we examine the impacts
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA's) grants on
enhancing preparedness capabilities at the State and local
level and the role of metrics to measure our progress as a
Nation.
Since September 11, 2001, almost $40 billion has been spent
on equipment, training, and exercising for our emergency
management and homeland security professionals and our first
responders in an effort to enhance preparedness, response and
recover from natural and manmade events. These grants support
investments being made by cities and communities across the
country, and the funding is leveraged in a variety of ways to
encourage a whole-of-community response.
While our response to disasters has evolved over the years,
as lessons are learned and processes are streamlined, FEMA
continues to struggle to quantify improvements and achievements
that would inform future investments to address critical gaps
in our capabilities.
Congress has attempted to encourage the measurement of
preparedness numerous times in the past. The Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 directed FEMA to create
the National Preparedness System and a National Preparedness
Goal, which could be used to define the target level of
preparedness and require the development of a National
Preparedness Report (NPR).
FEMA has made progress toward addressing these
requirements, releasing the second National Preparedness Report
earlier this month.
Unfortunately, after significant delays, the report falls
short of truly measuring progress toward achieved stated goals.
As we will hear from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), FEMA has encountered challenges comparing current levels
of preparedness to clear, objective, scalable and measurable
baseline and standards.
FEMA has tried to measure preparedness in a variety of
ways, and reporting requirements have changed many times over
the years. There have been many changes recently in the
reporting and data requirements that the States and localities
must provide.
While FEMA's approach will naturally evolve as new
priorities emerge and methodology develops, stakeholders need
some sense of consistency in order to really make progress in
measuring capabilities.
In order to best leverage grant investments, States and
locals must be able to prioritize funding they receive for
their most pressing threats and hazards.
Local officials are best positioned to understand the
critical infrastructure that exists within their jurisdictions
and are fully invested in identifying the best ways to prepare
for emergency, emerging threats and consequences of disasters
of all types.
Our intention is not to increase the number of reports
local, State and Federal officials submit or make preparedness
assessments burdensome. We simply want to assure the reports
that are required truly measure progress in achieving goals
while leveraging metrics and standards that remain flexible and
not overly prescriptive. A single one-size-fits-all reporting
methodology may not be responsive to the unique threats,
hazards and organizational structures and priorities evident
across the Nation.
In my home State of Alaska, we understand the importance of
scaling generalized requirements and priorities. Our unique
position as an Arctic State shapes how we address threats and
hazards. Standards and metrics that are applicable in New York
City may not translate to Anchorage, Fairbanks or a small
village in our State. Flexibility is needed to allow States to
be responsive to their biggest hazards and react effectively
when new threats emerge.
Alaska's remote location means we must assess not only the
hazards we face internally, but we must also consider
consequences of events happening in other time zones.
Cascading effects from a disaster of the Port of Seattle or
the Port of Los Angeles would cutoff shipping lanes that
facilitate the movement of food to all of Alaska.
Even though the highways that transport vital resources
from the Midwest to the West Coast are thousands of miles away,
a terror attack on a critical bridge could impact the supply
chain and delay shipments of goods bound for Anchorage,
Fairbanks and the rest of the State.
Along the Yukon River in Alaska, spring breakup has
resulted in devastating flooding in a number of communities,
including Galena.
These events test a resolve in affected citizens and can
highlight investments made over years, utilizing Federal
Homeland Security Grant dollars and State general funds.
Since 2003, Galena has received over $190,000 to conduct
exercises for local residents, purchase critical equipment and
build interoperable communication capabilities. In addition,
the State coordinated with the Tanana Chief Conference to
facilitate a table-top exercise in March of this year, to
further develop their working relationship on disaster response
and recovery.
They say you should not be meeting critical partners for
the first time on the site of a disaster, and these exercises
contribute to the swift response and smooth recovery. I believe
these investments are worth making, and the Federal funds can
support actions already taking place at the State and local
level.
In pursuit of the national preparedness, we are greater
than the sum of the parts. State and local stakeholders have
worked diligently to remain accountable to taxpayers, in an
effort to use decreasing grants funds efficiently and
effectively in accomplishing major goals.
As the maxim goes, what gets measured gets done. We must
assure that we work collaboratively to actively support
investments that show clear progress. This is a national goal,
and it must remain a national priority.
I truly look forward to the testimony today.
And, before that, I would like to introduce our new member,
Senator Chiesa.
Did I say that right?
Senator Chiesa. Chiesa, yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Begich. Well, you are welcome. And, if you have a
few comments before we start, I would be happy to have you say
an opening comment.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHIESA
Senator Chiesa. Thank you very much.
Living in a State that has been so devastated over the past
year, I appreciate everything FEMA is doing to bring our State
back where it needs to be, and I look forward to our
conversation on these really important issues today.
So, thank you for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much and welcome to the
Committee in total.
We have the first panel here, and what I will do is
introduce all three, and we will just start from this side.
Timothy Manning, Deputy Administrator, Protection and
National Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency--we
welcome you here.
Anne Richards, Assistant Inspector General for Audits,
Office of Inspector General (OIG), again, U.S. Department of
Homeland (DHS).
And, David Maurer, Director of Homeland Security Department
of Justice.
Again, thank all three of you for being here.
And we have a second panel which we will introduce after
you all are done.
When the Ranking Member arrives, if he is able to be here,
we will have him do some opening comments. So I may have him
interject in between your testimony.
Let me first start with the Hon. Timothy Manning.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. TIMOTHY MANNING,\1\ DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
PROTECTION AND NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Manning. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Begich,
Members of the Committee.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Manning appears in the Appendix
on page 39.
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Good morning. I am Tim Manning, Deputy Administrator of
FEMA for Protection and National Preparedness. On behalf of
Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Craig Fugate, thank you
for the opportunity to be here this morning.
As you know, FEMA's preparedness grant programs have
contributed significantly to the overall security and
preparedness of the Nation. We are more secure and better
prepared to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and
recover from the full range of hazards and threats the Nation
faces than we have been at any other time in our history.
Much of this progress has come from the leadership at the
State and local levels, fueled by FEMA's grant programs. Over
the past 10 years, Congress, through the Department of Homeland
Security, has provided State, territorial, local and tribal
governments with more than $36 billion. We have built and
enhanced capabilities by acquiring needed equipment, funding
training opportunities, developing preparedness and response
plans, exercising and building relationships across city,
county and State lines.
And, although Federal funds represent just a fraction of
what has been spent on homeland security across the Nation
overall, these funds have changed the face of preparedness in
the United States. Response and recovery efforts from last
year's Hurricane Sandy, the recent tragedy in Boston and the
deadly tornadoes in Oklahoma bear witness to this.
In March 2011, President Obama signed Presidential
Directive 8 on National Preparedness, directing the
implementation and the establishment of a National Preparedness
Goal and a National Preparedness System to build, sustain and
deliver the core capabilities needed to achieve that goal. This
system allows grantees to use components to identify the
threats and hazards with which we are faced; build, sustain and
plan for the use of capabilities needed to face them; and
constantly review our effectiveness.
FEMA is tracking grantees' progress in implementing the
components of the National Preparedness System and working
toward closing the gaps. In 2012, FEMA released its
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201: Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA). The results
highlight the gaps in capabilities which gives FEMA a basis to
measure grantees' progress in closing those gaps against
specific core capabilities over time.
On December 31, 2012, States and territories submitted
their first THIRAs and the State preparedness reports to FEMA.
The summary of those results are published in the annual
National Preparedness Report.
The first NPR, released last year, included specific
accomplishments in the context of the core capabilities
identified in the goal. While this inaugural 2012 NPR
highlighted preparedness accomplishments in the decade
following September 11, 2001, the 2013 National Preparedness
Report recently transmitted to Congress focuses primarily on
accomplishments either achieved or reported during 2012.
The strengths and areas for improvement in the NPR are used
to inform planning efforts, focus priorities of Federal grants
and enable informed collaboration amongst stakeholders, working
together to improve the Nation's preparedness.
Our investments have paid off before and after recent
disasters and terrorist attacks. New York City's and New
Jersey's success in responding to Hurricane Sandy stems in part
from grant-fueled investments in personnel and supplies as well
as community outreach and warning systems.
New York City used the Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) funds to develop and train the Fire Department New
York's (FDNY's) Incident Management Team, which successfully
managed operations in Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island. It
supported the City's Office of Management in evacuation and
sheltering plans to move more than 3 million residents and
sheltered up to 605,000 people.
New Jersey used Public Safety Interoperable Communications
Grants to fund the construction of a statewide 700 MHZ trunked
radio system, which is one of the biggest public safety
communications success stories in Hurricane Sandy.
Federal grant programs also helped bolster State and local
preparedness and response for the April 15 Boston Marathon
bombing. The Massachusetts State Police used a Forward Looking
Infrared (FLIR)--imaging unit purchased with DHS grants to
search, locate and apprehend the surviving bomb suspect. Boston
used funds to train the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
teams to better integrate with bomb technicians into tactical
operations--a crucial capability that was demonstrated to all
in the aftermath of that bombing.
And the Nation's ability to conduct collapse search and
rescue, as we have seen demonstrated too many times in recent
tornadoes, is significantly more advanced than it was 10 years
ago. Ninety-seven percent of the U.S. population now lives
within a 4-hour drive of a structural collapse team, up from 60
percent a decade ago.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the efficacy of our
grant programs through thoughtful analysis. The National
Preparedness Goal provides us with a clearly defined target to
work toward. And we have greatly improved our ability to assess
the needs and track spending toward meeting those goals.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss these important issues today. I am happy
to be here and very happy to respond to any questions you may
have.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Anne Richards.
TESTIMONY OF ANNE L. RICHARDS,\1\ ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OFFICE OF AUDITS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Richards. Good morning, Chairman Begich, Members of the
Committee. My testimony today will summarize the results of our
audits of the Homeland Security Grant Program. I will present
my testimony in two sections by first discussing the
deficiencies or challenges we have identified and then
highlighting some of the best practices being used by various
States and urban areas.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Richards appears in the Appendix
on page 48.
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Homeland Security grants are awarded to States, territories
and local and tribal governments to enhance their ability to
prepare for, prevent, protect, respond to and recover from
terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. The
Homeland Security Grant Program includes the State Homeland
Security Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative that
fund a range of preparedness activities.
Since 2007, we have audited States and urban areas to
determine whether they have implemented their Homeland Security
grants efficiently and effectively, achieved program goals and
spent funds according to grant requirements. As of May 2013, we
have completed audits of 36 States and 1 territory, some of
which included urban areas. We have 17 ongoing audits.
Through our audits, we determine that States generally
complied with applicable laws and regulation in distributing
and spending their grants. However, they face challenges in
homeland security strategies, obligation of grant funds,
reimbursement to subgrantees for expenditures, monitoring of
subgrantees' performance and financial management, procurement
and property management.
Of the 22 States we audited in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal
year 2013 to date, 17 had recommendations related to strategic
planning and measurement. Although State homeland security
strategies are to include specific, measurable, achievable,
results-oriented and time-limited goals and objectives, many
strategies, goals and objectives were too general to
effectively measure the States' performance and progress toward
improving capabilities. In addition, some States had outdated
strategies that did not reflect the most current priorities,
risks, needs and capabilities.
States did not always obligate Homeland Security grants to
subgrantees in a timely manner, which could have led to
increased administrative costs and may have hindered the
subgrantees' ability to complete projects and deliver needed
equipment and training. For example, 6 of the States we have
audited this fiscal year actually obligated the funds between
138 days and 842 days after the funds were available.
In our fiscal year 2013 audits, we have determined that 7
States had limited oversight of subgrantees, did not ensure
that subgrantees consistently tracked their accomplishments or
did not ensure their compliance with Federal laws and
regulations. Without adequate monitoring, States may have
limited their ability to meet their goals, assess capabilities
and gaps, take corrective actions and use funds to enhance
capabilities.
Some subgrantees did not fully comply with Federal and
State procurement regulations by not obtaining an adequate
number of bids, not properly justifying sole-source
procurements or not conducting required cost analysis for
noncompetitive procurements. As a result, subgrantees may not
have made fully informed decisions on contracted awards or
selected the best vendors.
We also identified weaknesses in property management,
including the subgrantees that did not regularly inventory
grant-funded equipment, maintain adequate property records and
inventory documentation, or properly mark grant-funded
equipment. Without good property management, States and
subgrantees may not be able to safeguard against equipment
loss, damage and theft.
Through our audits, we also identified several States and
urban areas using innovative and promising practices. For
example, the State of Texas created a registry for people with
disabilities, medical conditions or other problems who may need
assistance in case of a mandatory evacuation.
The San Diego urban area created a technology clearinghouse
to evaluate new technologies and independently assess equipment
and systems being considered by first responders.
Kentucky hosts grant workshops at various locations
throughout the State to assist agencies interested in receiving
grant funding.
In closing, I would like to note FEMA's efforts to improve
Homeland Security grants management and its plans to continue
these efforts by updating program guidance and better
monitoring grantees. FEMA has generally agreed to our
recommended actions and is taking steps to implement those
recommendations.
For our part, by August 2014, we plan to complete audits of
all States and territories receiving grants. Our overall
objective in these audits remains essentially unchanged--to
continue recommending actions that will make grant management
more efficient and effective while strengthening the Nation's
ability to prepare for and respond to natural and manmade
disasters.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome
any questions that you or the Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. David Maurer.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID C. MAURER,\1\ DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Maurer. Good morning, Chairman Begich, Ranking Member
Paul and other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here today
to discuss FEMA's ongoing efforts to assess our national
preparedness for natural and manmade disasters.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer appears in the Appendix on
page 56.
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Over the past decade, Congress has appropriated $41 billion
for a variety of grant programs designed to help the Nation be
better prepared for terrorist attacks and disasters. During
this time, GAO has been there, providing objective, nonpartisan
oversight, and what we have found has often not been
encouraging.
DHS and, more specifically, FEMA have struggled to
effectively manage and measure grant programs. It is difficult
to say what we have really gotten for our investment because
FEMA has been unable to measure how grant funding has enhanced
our national ability to be prepared.
Specifically, our work has found that FEMA lacks measures
to assess how well its individual grant programs are working
and whether, collectively, these programs have helped enhance
national preparedness. For example, we found that while FEMA
has performance measures for its largest grant programs, they
typically provide information on whether tasks or activities
have been completed. They do not generally provide an
assessment of the effectiveness of individual activities or the
overall grant program.
To put it another way, FEMA has developed output measures
for its individual programs but still generally lacks the
ability to assess their outcomes. And when you cannot do that
for individual programs, how do you assess the impact of all of
FEMA's grant programs?
That leads to an important national-level question: How
much better prepared do all these programs make us?
To answer that, it comes down to knowing how prepared we
are and how prepared we should be.
Over the past several years, we have found that FEMA has
been unable to assess these vital questions. FEMA, therefore,
lacks a clear view of where we have preparedness gaps. That
makes it very difficult to direct grant money to address those
gaps.
Now I need to be clear. It is quite difficult to measure
preparedness. FEMA has been working on this for years, and it
is very important to give them credit for what they have been
able to accomplish over the course of the last 2 years.
FEMA now has the basic elements in place for assessing
national preparedness capabilities. It has articulated a
national goal, developed a plan for achieving that goal, issued
two national reports on progress and enhanced the consideration
of risk and funding decisions.
For example, FEMA recently issued its second National
Preparedness Report. The report summarizes, at a nationwide
level, self-reported State and local progress in identifying
and closing preparedness gaps. These steps are vital, and they
make progress toward addressing GAO recommendations.
However, FEMA continues to face important challenges. Most
significantly, FEMA still lacks clear, objective and
quantifiable measures of how prepared the Nation is and how
prepared we should be. That means FEMA is not yet in a position
to target grant funding toward the most critical gaps.
FEMA's approach relies on States' individual, self-reported
judgments on their capability requirements and levels of
preparedness. In other words, funding decisions continue to be
informed by what each State says it needs rather than applying
a common, objective assessment across all of the States.
Without such standards, it becomes very difficult to identify
differences and compare capability levels between States.
In conclusion, billions of taxpayer dollars are being
invested in making the Nation better prepared for terrorist
attack and natural disaster. Measuring how much better prepared
this makes us is a very difficult task, but FEMA needs to do
it. The law requires it. The President requires it. And stacks
of GAO reports have recommended it.
FEMA efforts on this front over the past couple of years
are encouraging, but the bottom line remains--after years of
effort, FEMA cannot clearly and objectively articulate what $41
billion in grant funding has accomplished, what still needs to
be done and the magnitude of the remaining gaps. This is vital
for ensuring that in the future increasingly scarce grant
funding is focused on areas of greatest need.
Chairman Begich, thank you for the opportunity to testify
this morning. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
We will start with a 5-minute round, and let me first ask.
David, I want to followup just on your last comments here.
I know FEMA has recommended some consolidation of some of
their programs. Let me first ask you; from your perspective, do
you think that will have a positive impact in trying to
streamline their process and also to analyze their outcome
better?
Or, give me a thought on their recommendation.
Mr. Maurer. Sure. Absolutely. From GAO's perspective, we
have not seen enough detail yet in FEMA's proposal for
consolidating the different grant programs to make an
independent assessment of whether it will help or whether it
will not help.
At the highest level, you could envision how it could make
things easier for grant recipients to only have to provide
information and respond to queries on one program. However,
there is the potential for other downside risks as well.
So the devil is in the details, and the details are not yet
available.
Senator Begich. Sure. As a former mayor, we operated an
emergency management system and worked with FEMA and worked
with a lot of different groups.
How do you envision, or how does GAO envision, to measure
the success of preparedness?
In other words, we know investments. I will use Galena. We
had an exercise with our State in March, and I am glad that
happened. I mean, we had a lot of significant property damage
but not life lost, so it helped me understand.
How do you see that?
Or, what is the tool to measure?
I mean, I agree with you. There has to be a better
understanding of how we measure these grants and success.
Mr. Maurer. Absolutely. I think at the broadest level the
conceptual framework that FEMA has laid out would enable us to
get there eventually. I think the challenge that they are
facing right now is fully implementing it.
And probably the biggest challenge is the one that you have
mentioned--that at the State and at the local level there are
very specific requirements; there are very specific threats.
Trying to roll all of that up from local to State to the
national level and use that as a way to drive grant funding
decisions is a difficult thing to do. But, in order to get
there, you have to have clear, objective, quantifiable
measures.
And, like I said, I think the framework that FEMA has is a
reasonable approach toward doing that. It is just not fully
implemented yet from our perspective.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Mr. Manning, let me ask a couple questions.
I know FEMA has had, over the last several years, different
measurement levels of how you would measure success, and I know
that has changed quite a bit.
Help me create some assurance here that you are in the
process now or have some ability to ensure; here is where you
want to measure; here is how you want to measure; and 2 years
from now, or a year from now, it will not change again--because
I will tell you again as a person who managed an operation and
that had to always fill out the papers, when the measurement
changed every year or every 2 years, it was just more paper we
churned in order to satisfy the needs of FEMA.
What assurances can we have?
And then also I would like for you to comment on the
consolidation of FEMA programs--what does that mean, and when
would that happen in your eyes, and what will it take to make
it happen?
Mr. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess I could start with saying that Administrator Fugate
and I--and Secretary Napolitano--we were all, before we joined
the Department of Homeland Security, State officials
responsible for implementing these programs as well and were
subject to the very frequent changing of requirements. So we
are very cognizant of the detriments to the effectiveness of
building a homeland security program in a State or local
government by those constantly changing requirements.
The President's Directive No. 8 (PPD8)--on national
preparedness consolidated a number of different and divergent
directives from over the past decade and brought them all in
line with the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and
directed the executive branch to build this system to be
implemented.
One of the reasons, I believe, that we had a frequent swing
in the requirements over the past was new directives and new
requirements coming up and the recognition on the part of the
department that a particular scheme was not maybe as effective
as it needed to be. And, in order to address concerns raised by
both the IG and the GAO and Congress and our stakeholders
across the country, the department would come up with new
ideas.
You heard many times mentioned--and you yourself mentioned
in your opening comments--about the concerns with a one-size-
fits-all approach----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Manning [continuing]. And the ability to assess the
effectiveness of the programs from places as divergent as New
York City to Alaska to Oklahoma City.
So what we have tried to achieve in this National
Preparedness System, the THIRA and the goal that I mentioned is
the idea that working jointly between cities and towns and
counties around the country, and their States and FEMA and
through its regions in the department nationally, we assess and
understand the threats and hazards unique to a particular
community and the capabilities that community needs. So it is
no longer entirely just self-directed and self-assessed but an
actual objective analysis of those capability requirements.
And then prioritizing the grants and the national systems
to achieve those goals gives us the ability at FEMA, but more
importantly, nationally--to understand whether we have been
effective in closing those gaps.
And, when I say capability, I do not simply mean material.
I do not simply mean a truck or a bomb robot. I am talking
about people with the training to use particular equipment in a
timeframe to do a job, like we saw in Moore, Oklahoma, when the
technical rescue teams that were built, using the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) typing, using national
doctrine in a way that can be shared nationally, were able to
respond quickly to a disaster--those teams did not exist 10
years ago--and save many lives.
And, Mr. Chairman, our proposal on the National
Preparedness Grant Program in the President's budget includes a
consolidated proposal, or a proposal to consolidate all the
various grant programs.
The idea is exactly as you heard described--that if we can
more effectively synthesize the activities within an area,
within a State, recognizing the very important needs of the
high-risk urban areas, ports and transit systems that we have
worked with independently and separately over the years, if we
can pull those together and have coordinated efforts toward
filling the gaps, then there is less likelihood for duplication
and waste of resources.
Senator Begich. My time has expired. I am going to turn to
Senator Paul here, but let me ask you a quick question on that.
And that is, is it in your budget? Do you need legislative
action to make that happen?
Mr. Manning. Mr. Chairman, yes, the the grant proposal, as
envisioned, works as an evolution toward the grant systems that
were established in the Post-Katrina Act. We have been, and we
are nearly at completion on, working with our partners through
the executive branch on the legislative proposal we anticipate
delivering to the Committee soon that would outline what we
propose as changes to the authorization.
Senator Begich. OK. Very good.
Let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Paul, and then,
Senator Chiesa, I will turn to you right after that.
Senator Paul, I apologize. We started and I knew you were
on your way, and I just wanted to keep the meeting going. I
apologize that you were not here.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. No, that is great. That is a first in Senate
history to be on time.
I want to thank the panel members for coming today.
I was wondering, Mr. Manning; are FEMA preparedness grants
being used to purchase drones?
Mr. Manning. Senator, no drones. There have been some
grantees that have purchased remote-controlled low-level
aircraft--basically, RV, like what you would think of as hobby
aircraft--that have cameras for monitoring.
Senator Paul. Drones can be of different expenses. It
sounds like a drone to me, just a cheaper one.
And do you have a policy then for surveillance? If you are
giving out money that is being used to be purchasing
surveillance, do you have a policy in place for how the money
is spent and how the surveillance is done?
Mr. Manning. The department does have policies in place
with our grantees and with the various fusion centers on
protection of civil rights and civil liberties through our
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) in the
Intelligence Analysis Directorate.
Senator Paul. So what is the policy then for using drone
surveillance?
Mr. Manning. Senator, I would have to defer to my
colleagues across the department for specifics on those
answers, but I know that they work to ensure that they are
compliant with all the Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations.
Senator Paul. Does anybody on the panel know anything about
the drone surveillance program or any of the money being used
for drones?
David, did you have a comment?
Mr. Maurer. We have not done any work specifically looking
at use of FEMA grants for purchasing of drones. We have done
broader work on drones, but not specific to FEMA grants.
Senator Paul. Right. So the problem is that your fusion
centers have not always been the best at defending civil
liberties.
There have been instances where the fusion centers have
targeted people for their political beliefs. We are in the
midst of a huge crisis in the country with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) apparently being used for political purposes, but
a few years back the Missouri fusion center was targeting
people for their political beliefs. Third-party candidates,
pro-life people and people with different bumper stickers on
their car were said to be targeted by the fusion centers.
There is a big concern that allowing your money--our
money--to be used to purchase drones without any rules in place
or without an awareness of what the rules are is disconcerting.
There are some who believe that once you get outside your
house you have no privacy. I tend to disagree, and I think
these are things we are going to have to revisit.
But we now have the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
director saying that drones are being used. He was not aware or
forthcoming with any specific policy on privacy.
So these are not something of passing concern.
I am also concerned about where these grants are going.
Apparently, some grants are being used to pay office rent. Some
grants are given to a fusion center that had zero percent
progress toward its goals.
David Maurer, would you have any comment on exactly how we
would go about trying to have better oversight?
Mr. Maurer. Absolutely. Last year, we issued a report
looking at that aspect of FEMA grants programs. We looked at
the four largest programs and identified the amount of
visibility that FEMA had over the specific uses of the funds,
and we found that for some of the largest programs FEMA may not
know specifically how the funds are being used at the time they
make decisions to provide the money. That creates a problem.
It also, in our mind, raises the potential risk of
unnecessary duplication. In other words, grantees could
potentially receive funds from more than one program for the
same or similar activities without the internal workings of
FEMA being aware that that was happening.
Now we looked into that. We looked at a thousand different
grant awards. We did not find any examples of specific
duplication, but there were a couple hundred cases where if you
just looked at the data they had in their FEMA systems--it
looked like on paper they were being funded for the same things
from different programs.
Senator Paul. Senator Begich, I think this is a good
example of really where the bill that you and I have talked
about--trying to pay people to save money, give people within
the bureaucracy of government more pay to save money--would be
a good example because, I mean, one, it is just so enormous and
nobody has the proper incentives.
If it were my money, I would be watching it. But since it
is not my money, I do not really care. That seems to be the
attitude of most people in government.
We had the trailers that sat in Arkansas for years and
years. We had the ice that was stored by the hundreds of
thousands of pounds for Hurricane Katrina that never got there.
We had the inmates in Baton Rouge who were receiving displaced
money from FEMA. We had people staying in resorts.
We had all kinds of things, but it is not really because
there is one particularly bad person or one particularly bad
policy. It is really because there is no incentive for anybody
to protect the money because it is just not theirs.
And I think the enormity of how much money will always lead
to abuse.
I think the distance from the problem, being in
Washington--really, most of this stuff ought to be locally
collected and locally handled. It is really why when certain
States want $62 billion, they want it all at once. They cannot
stand to get it a little bit at a time so there could be more
surveillance or more oversight of whether the money is being
spent properly. It is really why things ought to be done
differently.
And instead of giving $62 billion after Hurricane Sandy, in
1 lump sum, I feel certain that we will be back here in 5 years
talking about how that money was abused as well. Thanks.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Let me go to Senator Chiesa, but let me also--Mr. Manning,
if I could ask that you could ask the department to submit to
the Committee whatever written policies or documentations on
utilization of drones, or whatever the right term is, for
protection of civil liberties and how that is done. If you
could have that--whoever the right person is there to submit
that--I think we would all be very interested in what written
policies there are on that.
Let me turn to Senator, again, Chiesa. Thank you very much.
Welcome again, to the opportunity to be here at the
Committee. Thank you.
Senator Chiesa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for your testimony this morning.
I understand that we want to be as careful as we can in
closing the preparedness gaps, and so we are creating national
standards to be sure that there is some way to measure what we
are doing.
And I also appreciate, as the former attorney general of my
State, that it is not the easiest thing to measure because
people want to feel safe all the time. And I think because of
the tremendous work that gets done by law enforcement and our
first responders, people do feel safe.
What I would like to ask you, Mr. Maurer, is understanding
the need for some type of objective national criteria, is there
a recognition that--and we have three States here. We have
Alaska, Kentucky and New Jersey--very different States, very
different sorts of vulnerabilities in each of those States. How
does that get calculated into the ability to create a national
standard?
How do you recognize each State's individuality as part of
the balance in creating those national standards?
Mr. Maurer. Well, I think as a general proposition the
approach that FEMA is taking makes some level of sense.
In other words, you start at the local level, you buildup
to the State level, go to the regional level, and then build to
the national level so that you are able to take advantage of
the local-based knowledge and information.
I mean, obviously, in New Jersey, the local officials in
New Jersey are much better informed about the risks and the
capabilities in New Jersey than folks here in Washington, DC.
The difficult part is trying to roll it up in a way that
allows comparisons and information, and fair comparisons,
across States to help inform some of this decisionmaking.
And I think having the core set of capabilities that FEMA
has established at least is a start toward a framework. In
other words, having 31 core capabilities that at a national
level we want to see progress in achieving helps develop a
common framework that everyone can work within.
On the FEMA side, it is going to be increasingly important
for the folks at FEMA regions to be watching this process very
closely and provide effective oversight of the information that
is coming up from the States and locals, to sort of take a look
at it and make sure that it makes sense and it can be pulled
together in a way that is consistent and comparable across
States.
Senator Chiesa. And I guess that dialogue continues with
the States on an ongoing basis to make sure, as you said, that
the information is coming from and within any State, even a
State that is geographically relatively small, like New Jersey.
Every community there has a different vulnerability and a
different core set of issues that they need to be managing to
keep their people and their community safe.
Mr. Manning, could you tell me--we see that States--and I
recall this in dealing with the grants that came into New
Jersey, that some of these grants are not being obligated as
quickly as they should be and there are timeframes. And your
audits, that Ms. Richards talked about, see these things
happening on a delayed basis.
What steps are we taking--because States want the money,
right? They want to keep their citizens safe. They want to use
the money as effectively as they can. No one is trying to lose
the ability to use this money.
So what steps can we take to (a) better educate the States
and (b) create a sensible protocol that allows the money to be
obligated in a way that makes sense and is within the
timeframes that are created by the source of the money?
Mr. Manning. Senator, thank you.
You, of course, hit the issue right on the head. There is a
number of different complexities into the program that have led
to some of that.
There has been a requirement at the beginning of the grant
program that it be obligated in a very short period of time,
and that has always been defined. It could be defined as
identified for a particular subgrantee against maybe not
specific projects but allocations against the general areas,
against the straight strategies.
Those all--that does happen.
The time lags tend to then build on a number of different
factors. Some is compliance with NEPA; the environmental review
process can take a deal of time, especially in port and transit
programs where there is significant capital improvement
happening. There is a coordination of the 80 percent pass-
through of the grants to the local governments. There is a
number of administrative procedures that all kind of compound.
So I think the combination of a refocusing into using the
National Preparedness System and the idea of using the grants
to achieve specific capabilities that can be shared nationally,
to build both local and State capabilities but our national
disaster and terrorism preparedness, will help facilitate that
because the projects will be identified ahead of time.
An element to that program is that once you identify your
threats and hazards you have to achieve them using specific,
typed resources--what we call our National Incident Management
System Typing--so that it is, as I mentioned before, people and
equipment and training to do a task. Those are identified.
So it is no longer a nebulous idea of wanting to buildup
your rescue capability. You want to build to a Type III search
and rescue team, which is a more easy thing to achieve
administratively.
And further, if I may mention, to another--there was an
issue of draw-downs for many years, where the grant programs
are multi-year appropriations. They have multiple years against
that program, and this system has led to grantees having delays
in the implementation of the expenditure of those funds.
And we have worked very hard--all the grantees working in
partnership with us--in changing some of our rules, changing
some of the implementation rules, and have achieved some great
progress. We had roughly $8 billion in unspent money as of last
February. As of this month, it is down to $4 billion, and that
burn rate is on track.
So I think we have made great progress in what you have
heard this morning.
Senator Chiesa. Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time.
I just ask that we continue to work with the States as
carefully as we can because, as I said, they want to use this
money. They are desperate to make sure that they are taking all
the steps that they need to take. And we just need to create a
conversation that makes sense so that people can do the things
they need to do to get the resources where they should be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
We will do another quick round, and then we will move to
the next panel.
I wanted to followup on some of the questions I know
Senator Paul had. I guess, Mr. Manning, you could answer this,
and then anyone else could add to it.
I feel, Ms. Richard, you have not said anything. I do not
want you to not have anything to say, but you are probably
thinking please get done with this testimony so I can sit down.
[Laughter.]
But I understand your feeling there.
We have these minimum grant levels that happen. I forget
what Alaska is. I think it is 3.5 or somewhere right in that
range, and there are several that are in that kind of level.
But they are really spend plans. I mean you allocate the
money, and then the States say here is what we are going to go
spend it on versus here is what we need to do to fill our gaps;
can we get this money? It is kind of a different twist.
Do you see an opportunity or some way to improve that?
And I guess because I look at this, and I am listening to
all the testimony, and there is no--I do not want to offend
anyone here, but I am listening carefully, and it sounds like a
lot of mill-churning for what really people want is to have
capability to respond to manmade or natural disasters.
But as we and maybe Congress has done this. We have created
so many layers that are required now that it is not as easy for
the agencies to operate. I do not want to say that we are not
to blame for some of this.
But I am listening carefully, and I just am visualizing my
days back as mayor and the mill that we had to create in order
to satisfy the paper checks so all the boxes are checked.
I could tell you that from a mayor's perspective we want to
make the cities safe and able to respond, but we are not going
to wait for a box to be checked to do that. We are going to go
do it.
So I am trying to understand. Is there a better way to
approach this that maybe FEMA, where it is today, is evolving
into something much different because we have such different
local response?
I mean local communities are always and will always be--I
say local, and I look at my friend, John, there.
Locals or States, depending on how the situation is laid
out, always are going to be the first responders, period.
I do not care what FEMA does. I do not care how much they
plan, how much money they have. They cannot respond as well as
a local responder can and should because they understand how
the nuances of that community work.
So are there any thoughts on that?
I do not know if there was a question there that I gave.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Manning. I heard a question.
Senator Begich. OK. Thank God because I am not sure I heard
one, but go ahead.
Mr. Manning. Well, you raise important points, Mr.
Chairman.
Our approach--the grant programs have always been about
building a national capability to respond to what may strike
the Nation and doing that and supporting State and local
governments because they are the first responders.
Frankly, often, the public is the real, true first
responder. The official government agencies--come in, and the
Federal Government is really one of backfill. We support the
Governors and the mayors in their tasks.
So the grant programs have always been about building
capability, building capacity to protect against acts of
terror, and build our ability to respond and protect for
anything else.
We take that approach with the recognition that risk is
everywhere. We do--the grants are focused on the highest risk
community, highest risk States and urban areas, and it
includes----
Senator Begich. Except, Mr. Manning, I would say that
because you have the minimum amounts for each State, it does
not really differentiate. I mean Louisiana and Alaska get the
same amount of money.
Mr. Manning. That is correct.
Senator Begich. I am sure if Senator Landrieu was here she
would want to add a zero to her number, but I am just saying
that the population centers are different. We are more broad-
range.
So how does that work as a risk-analyzed approach?
Mr. Manning. The distribution of grant funds follows a risk
formula established in law in the Post-Katrina Act. It is a
combination of State minimum amounts basically on population
and then in addition based on a risk formula that is an
analysis of the threat vulnerability and consequences, largely
of an act of terror, on large urban areas around the country--
an analysis of the top 100 and this year, in the appropriation,
limited to an award of the top 25 riskiest places and the
cities. So it is a combination of both.
There is a minimum for the communities that do not have as
high a risk and then are not awarded additional funds. For
every State, there is a floor minimum, essentially, with the
understanding that risk is everywhere and that there are
requirements everywhere.
Oklahoma is a very good example, and there are disasters in
Alaska and Kentucky and many other minimum States.
I come from New Mexico. It was a minimum State as well.
Where responses are performed using capabilities developed
under the grant but, more importantly, that grants fill a
national purpose--we are building national preparedness, and
the national--the ability of the United States to respond to a
national crisis is an aggregate of the capabilities that exist
in local governments.
In Hurricane Katrina, there were 80,000 State and local
responders that traveled from around the country. Hurricane
Sandy was similar. When we have national-level crises, there is
mutual aid from every small town in America, and that is a
capability that is built for the Nation with a national-level
grant program.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Ms. Richards, again, I did not want to leave you not having
an opportunity to say something. I know there have been a lot
of questions that have been laid on the table. And I will turn
to Senator Paul here in just 2 seconds. But any comment on the
general issues in regards to everything from the consolidation
to the things we can be doing better to ensure that we are
fairly managing these from a risk perspective?
Is there data that we are not asking for?
Give me your thoughts there.
Ms. Richards. Thank you, sir. I do have a few comments.
Two years ago, we published a report where we looked at the
efficacy of a grant management program, and we had a number of
recommendations that identified legislative barriers to the
efficiency of the program, where the simple facts of different
grant programs have different deadlines and the money is
available at different times makes it more difficult for the
applicants to----
Senator Begich. That is legislatively?
Ms. Richards. Yes.
Senator Begich. And I am assuming--and I am just guessing
here as a new member--Congress has done nothing with those?
Ms. Richards. Well, we make recommendations to FEMA. FEMA
is making applications----
Senator Begich. The answer is yes. I hear you.
Ms. Richards. Yes. I would say yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. I am just guessing because we have all
these reports we love to get, and then we go onto the next
crisis.
So, OK. Good. That is something for us to do.
Ms. Richards. And also, it goes back to Senator Chiesa's
question as well, on the difficulty to get the grant funds
obligated in a timely manner. A lot of that is administrative
because to complete the obligation there has to be a signature
from the recipient at the subgrantee level.
Because those recipients are oftentimes local or small
organizations, they do not meet every day like a State
administrative agency does. And so, because they cannot predict
when the money is going to be available and when the paperwork
is going to come down, they may not have a meeting scheduled.
So the funding just sits until they are available to sign for
it.
So some greater regularity and some greater consolidation
of when these timeframes would be helpful to both FEMA and the
recipients.
Senator Begich. Very good. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. I started, and we mentioned some of the
abuses from past FEMA expenses, but I thought it would be good
to go through a few more.
Mr. Manning, have you read Senator Coburn's report?
Mr. Manning. Yes, I have.
Senator Paul. OK. Well, here is one. This is Montcalm
County. This is not from his report.
It says, the United States is fighting terrorism one snow
cone at a time. The West Michigan Shoreline Regional
Development Commission, with a grant from FEMA, bought 13 snow
cone machines valued at $11,700.
That would embarrass me if I were in charge of any of this
money, and I would want to respond and do something about that.
I think most people saw this when this was in the news--the
Halo Counter-Terrorism Summit in 2012 in San Diego with the
zombie apocalypse demonstration. Forty actors dressed as
zombies did some kind of simulated terrorism thing. The cost, I
think, was offset by grant money from FEMA.
That, I think, would embarrass me also if I were in charge
of any of this money, but I would want to know if something had
been done about it.
We are buying all these armored vehicles. And there
probably is a need for an armored vehicle maybe in New York
City or Washington, DC. or somewhere, but in Keene, New
Hampshire, there have been two murders in the last 15 years. We
bought a $285,000 armored vehicle.
I am sure that even the people in Keene thought that was
kind of ridiculous.
Montgomery County, Texas got a $300,000 ShadowHawk drone
with UASI dollars.
I would be a little concerned about not only the expense of
it but what are our rules with regard to how that drone is
being used.
See, some people have interpreted this open spaces doctrine
to mean you can fly a drone anywhere. There are a lot of open
spaces in Kentucky and Alaska, and I think you do deserve some
privacy even when you are out hunting, sledding, whatever you
are doing.
I think really we should be going to a court and saying: We
think this person is committing a crime. Will you give us a
warrant to look at them?
But we should not just be flying these. The whole
government, from top to bottom, is buying these drones. I mean
it is outrageous.
EPA has them. They are flying them everywhere. But if you
think someone is a polluter and they are a farmer, go after
them, but let's get a warrant.
We just cannot be funding this. Plus, it just gets so
large, and this money is not accountable. It is just flowing
everywhere, and nobody--snow cone machines, drones.
Long-range acoustic devices--they bought one in Pittsburgh
for $88,000. Apparently, it can cause permanent hearing loss,
but it is this ear-splitting noise. And it is like we have got
to have $90,000 for an ear-splitting noise device?
See, I just wonder how the controls are, but some of it is
just because nobody is paying attention to the dollars spent.
We are a trillion dollars in debt every year, and we should do
some things.
I mean, we had 9/11. We had this terrible thing happen, but
we have a terrorism center--I think an anti-terrorism center in
Somerset, Kentucky. I figure if the terrorists get to Somerset,
Kentucky, we are probably done for, if they get that far.
But we do these things because they are work projects and
communities like them because they bring money instead of
saying, where do terrorists attack us?
It is sort of like who attacked us on September 11, 2001.
Sixteen of the 19 were here on student visas. So we had a
special program looking at student visas for 10 years, and we
just de-funded that.
So we have money for ear-splitting devices and for snow
cone machines, but we did not have enough money to look at
people who are on student visas.
We, apparently, do not have enough analysts to look and see
when you are targeted, when a foreign government, like Russia
reports you, like the Tsarnaev brothers, to know that you are
flying back to a part of the world where you may become
radicalized.
So I think we empty our pockets spending money everywhere,
but then the things we ought to be doing we are not doing, and
the things we ought not to be doing we are doing. But I think
it is really because of the overall philosophy of just throwing
money at problems.
And I would appreciate if there had been any reforms, Mr.
Manning, done since the zombie apocalypse and maybe on the snow
cone machines and anything else.
Mr. Manning. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, we have done, as you can imagine, a very close
analysis of all of the examples raised in the report and many
that we hear.
Senator Paul. If you have a response--a formal response--I
would not mind seeing that if you can send that to our office.
Mr. Manning. Sure. We do, and we will be happy to provide
it to your office as well.
There are usually, as you would imagine, answers and
reasons for those. The ice machines were, well, intended for
exactly that. Anybody who has been hospitalized will probably
recall that they are often given ice chips when they are
recovering rather than water, and the idea was to provide
shaved ice in large quantities for a heat response.
But, nonetheless, we have processes in place to scrutinize
the equipment that is being purchased. But, more importantly,
what we have in place through the grant program now and what we
propose going forward would eliminate those kinds of
acquisitions because we are talking about defined
capabilities--a particular number of individuals with training
on certain equipment that is defined as a typed resource--to be
able to achieve and much less of the kind of more vague ``This
is something I think might be useful, so I am just going to go
ahead and do it'' as we might have seen in the past.
Senator Paul. But I am not sure why we send any money to
these cities. Why do we send money for terrorism to little,
tiny cities around the country?
I come from a little town. I am all for little towns, but I
am not for sending anti-terrorism grants to any little cities.
I mean, New York is a problem. D.C. is a problem. L.A. is
probably a problem. But by sending them to all these little
cities, it sort of seems to me as if somehow politicians got
involved.
I think there was a report a few years ago that said--I
think this was in Indiana. There were like 9,000 requests for
preparedness grants--the pumpkin factory, the popcorn festival,
all of these cute little things that my family goes to in a
small town, but they do not need terrorism grants.
Someone should just say no.
Mr. Manning. Well, Senator, in the case of small
communities it is often that capability is procured by the
State through local governments, and the idea is that you build
response capabilities. There are prevention and interdiction of
an attack that may occur somewhere, but you build the response
often in the outlying areas to come in as mutual aid.
In the case of the snow cone machines, for example, if I
recall correctly, that was in the Detroit area. And
Abdulmutallab--had that device not failed, that aircraft would
have blown up over Detroit and----
Senator Paul. And the snow cone machine was going to save
anybody?
Mr. Manning. The snow cone machine, as I described,
Senator, was to build capability for their mass casualty
response, to be able to have shaved ice available. And, of
course, as we all know and have seen reports, it was used for
other purposes, and we have procedures in place to prohibit
that from happening again.
The BearCats are another good example--the armored
vehicles. I think we all saw the utility in the Boston area.
And, as I described, the idea is to build statewide
capability on the part of the State that can come together as a
statewide response to wherever a threat may occur.
And we do know that Zazi, the Times Square bomber, was
building his bombs and planning in kind of remote, ex-urban
Denver and transited most of the United States in route to New
York.
So our grant program going forward has what we propose as
more constraint on capabilities developed against specific
identified threats and hazards that we have all worked jointly
on identifying.
Senator Begich. Mr. Manning.
Mr. Manning. Yes.
Senator Begich. Can I ask you a question? Would you mind
submitting this--and then we will end this panel here.
The point I think Senator Paul is making is: How are these
expenditures managed? What are really the capabilities and
needs?
But you are also indicating that you have a newer approach
to how you are dealing with the grants in the future. I would
be interested if you could do this.
I am very visual. One thing about the Senate--we love to
create mills of paper with a lot of writing. Can you show how
the grant program existed before and what it looks like in the
future in just a very simple chart style?
In other words, here is what it used to or could be used
for, and these are some examples, and here is what now is
happening that will preventing that or not, depending on what
the subject matter.
Is that something that you could do?
It does not need to be complicated. When I say this--I
always like to say this because I know Federal Agencies love to
just inundate us with paper because they figure that is how we
will get blurry-eyed and forget.
But I just want something very simple that says: Here is
our current program. Here is what we are moving to.
And that, I think, would be a very interesting point to see
because that would help us understand how you have kind of
plugged these problem areas that have occurred.
Would that be within reason?
Mr. Manning. Most definitely.
Senator Begich. Great.
For the two others, if I can ask you to do one thing--and
it just dawned on me as you were talking. We probably do not do
enough of this, and it is something I am trying to do with this
Committee and another committee that I chair, and that is
better oversight not just when something bad happens but--you
know.
Can you submit not the ones that we have right now, but
even you had mentioned you did a report a couple years ago with
some legislation.
Can you submit to the Committee: Here is what we
recommended, maybe even the last two reports, and what we have
done?
Ms. Richards. Absolutely.
Senator Begich. Again, I do not need a big fancy document.
I just need: Here is the recommendation--completed, partially
completed, not completed. What is your analysis of why--because
one of the things we do not do here--it just dawned on me even
more and more after 5 years now, sitting here.
We have great professional staff from the IG and your
group, GAO, doing all this work. And then 3 years later since I
have been here, 60 percent of the Senate has changed.
So, of course, we all come in with new ideas, and we say,
why haven't you done this?
And you actually politely say, as you did--and it was very
good--well, 2 years ago, we did this.
Then all of us say, well, we never saw it because, of
course, we were new.
This might give us a better understanding of what we should
be doing or not doing and, when there are recommendations, what
is our followup to make sure that is done because, otherwise,
we spend lots of time in committee meetings having committee
meetings about something we talked about a year and a half ago.
And you all or the agency folks--I know what you will do.
No disrespect; you will leave, and you will go, we told them
this 2 years ago.
Well, help us do a better job in oversight.
So, if you would not mind doing that?
Ms. Richards. Absolutely.
Senator Begich. And you select. I mean I would say the last
report or last 2, whatever you feel is more relevant because if
it is 10 years old it may be times have changed quite a bit.
But something that just says: Here is what we recommended.
Here is what happened.
And then even if you can show what agency or the elected
body--was supposed to be doing something.
Would that be OK?
Mr. Maurer. Absolutely.
Senator Begich. Great.
Thank you all very much. I appreciate your time and thank
you for being at the panel here.
We do have another panel. If they are ready, we will do a
little switch-out here. [Pause.]
Thank you very much. Thank you all very much for being here
for our next panel. Again, I will just mention who is here, and
then I will start.
And I will start with you, John, but let me first introduce
everyone that is here.
John Madden, Director of Alaska Division of Homeland
Security and Emergency Services; William Euille, Mayor, city of
Alexandria--thank you very much. We love mayors. As you know, I
was in the mayors' conference just a couple days ago. So we are
glad that you are here.
Next is Josh Filler, President of Filler Security
Strategies, and Matt Mayer, Visiting Fellow from the Heritage
Foundation.
Thank you all very much for being here.
John, welcome. I know you are dealing with some significant
tragedies and disasters in Alaska. I think we have one
literally every 2 weeks, and I think there was an analysis done
that we always have some sort of situation in Alaska. And I
know you have done some incredible work. So let me turn to you,
and then we will just kind of go down the row here.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN W. MADDEN\1\, DIRECTOR, ALASKA DIVISION OF
HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, AND PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, AND MEMBER, NATIONAL
GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Madden. Well, thank you, Senator Begich and Ranking
Member Paul for the opportunity to speak today on an
increasingly critical and often overlooked aspect----
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Madden appears in the Appendix on
page 71.
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Senator Begich. John, can I interrupt you a second. I
forgot to say one other thing.
Mr. Madden. Yes.
Senator Begich. You are also now the President of the
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), not just from
Alaska, but you represent the whole group. I just want to give
you that proper introduction. Sorry, John.
Mr. Madden. Thank you, sir.
Before I proceed, I do extend my thanks to you, Senator,
and your staff and Senator Murkowski and Representative Young
for your support during the recent historic floods on the
Yukon, particularly in Galena. I was there just 4 days ago,
working with the community.
We learned just in this last month that our investments in
building capabilities did save lives, did alleviate human
suffering and did reduce property damages.
And I do speak today for both the National Emergency
Management Association, of which I am the President, and the
Governors' Homeland Security Advisory Council in the National
Governors Association (NGA), of which I am a member.
The question, what is the return on our investment, is not
new and neither are the considerations from the States and our
local partners.
The National Preparedness Task Force, comprised of leaders
from State, local, tribal and territorial governments,
addressed this in their report to Congress in September 2010.
Many of the task force recommendations focused on building a
problem-solving system based on investments in capabilities
made through skilled analysis and continuous assessment of
risk.
In January 2012, the National Emergency Management
Association presented to Congress a proposal for a
comprehensive grant system based on flexibility but balanced
with accountability, where States set priorities and make
investments in capabilities in support of their local
governments for their risks, and measure performance and
effectiveness of those investments.
In June of this year, the National Governors Association
submitted its Governors' principles for Homeland Security grant
reform including many of the measurement needs.
The Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment--
must be at the center of this enterprise and be the basis for
our priorities.
But the initial THIRA in 2012 held on to some past
assumptions--that complex risk can be simplified and quantified
by classifications like red, green, yellow/low, medium, high.
It also limited the range and the variability of hazards and
fit everything into a snapshot on the day. It did not enable
and encourage collaboration between States that share the same
hazards or where one may be a resource provider for the other
through mutual aid. Most importantly, it did not recognize that
threats and hazards and the risks from them do not stop at the
State line, the county line or the city limits.
We must measure and manage risk. We must invest in
capabilities based on risk. And we must measure the
effectiveness of our investments in drawing down those risks.
And with each investment and with each assessment of its
effectiveness, we must feed this back in and adjust our
priorities.
An effective THIRA must follow the supply lines from
production to consumption. It must follow the watersheds and
rivers and not just the geopolitical boundaries on the map. The
THIRA must consider the interdependence of our systems and the
possibility that a single investment may reduce the risk from
several hazards.
But we must measure far more than we do now. We must
measure the effectiveness of our decisions, of our assumptions
and of our actions.
I can measure the effectiveness with great precision of a
three-legged sled dog, but perhaps I should question the
effectiveness of my decision based upon the ability to win the
race.
Consider this statement developed and supported by the
National Governors Association and the National Emergency
Management Association in documents provided to the Congress:
We must build and sustain a skilled cadre across the Nation
that is well organized, rigorously trained, vigorously
exercised, properly equipped, prepared for all hazards, focused
on core capabilities and resourced for both the most serious
and the most likely threats and hazards.
There are 13 opportunities in this statement to measure
performance, and we need those 13 and more.
While not endorsing the National Preparedness Grant Program
overall, both the National Governors Association and NEMA
believe that any grant framework should have consistent methods
to measure or assess progress in achieving those core
capabilities. Only through the comprehensive grant reform can
we ensure continuous assessment of risk across all levels of
government, encourage strategic planning rather than spending
planning and base funding on the priority needs of the
communities and to measure progress to fill gaps in our
capabilities.
This Nation is not well served when the grant system or the
measurement system is an impediment to our national ability to
be agile and adaptive, to swiftly confront changing hazards,
emerging threats and increasing risks.
And I will stand ready for any questions at the end of the
panel.
Thank you.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Mayor, thank you again. As I said in the opening, I am
biased toward mayors. You know that.
And at the end of the day--no disrespect to my friend,
John, sitting to your right--mayors have to deliver the end
product, and so I really appreciate that you are here and
represent the conference. Please.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. WILLIAM EUILLE,\1\ MAYOR, CITY OF
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA, AND MEMBER, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS
Mr. Euille. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Paul.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Euille appears in the Appendix on
page 82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Certainly, your comments are very appropriate--that mayors
are the closest to the people and we have to deal with these
issues on a daily basis and be responsive.
And I appreciate the opportunity, on behalf of the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, to testify before you on the suite of
Homeland Security Grant Programs and how they have helped not
only my city and the region, but also cities across the
country, to prevent, mitigate, prepare for and respond to both
acts of terrorism and natural disasters.
Senator Begich, we especially appreciate the way as you
mentioned, you were with us this past week in Las Vegas for our
annual convention. You have continued to reach out to mayors
and represent our interests and those of our cities in many
different areas since your office moved from city hall to the
Nation's capital. We know that you have not forgotten where you
came from, and we know that we have a real friend here in the
Senate.
My basic message today--again, your opening comments are a
good segue in terms of why I am here representing the mayors.
And my basic message today is that mayors and other local
officials across the Nation strongly support the existing menu
of Homeland Security programs.
As I believe my testimony will show they are working. We
recognize that they may not be perfect and some changes may be
needed, but they are the product of years of work by Congress,
the Administration, State and local governments, and first
responders. The Federal grant funds, which the Department of
Homeland Security and its Federal Emergency Management
Administration have provided, clearly have improved the
Nation's planning, mitigation, preparedness, prevention,
response and recovery capabilities.
The April 15 bombing at the Boston Marathon provides an
excellent example of how DHS's investments provided through the
Urban Area Security Initiative Program have paid off. There can
be no doubt that they contributed significantly to the Boston
area's quick and effective response to this horrific act of
terrorism.
Here is one specific example. UASI funds provided the
salaries for nine intelligence and GIS analysts and high tech
equipment at the Boston Regional Intelligence Center. These
assets were critical in protecting and providing information to
the first responders in the field. The analysis monitored,
vetted and triaged information concerning over 280 suspicious
or criminal acts within Boston following the bombing.
The Tucson area has used Metropolitan Medical Response
Systems (MMRS), funding to pay for planning, equipment and
training to help first responders, public health, private
health, law enforcement and emergency managers across Southern
Arizona prepare for a mass casualty event. This capability
played a major role in the effective interdisciplinary response
to the January 8, 2011 shooting of Representative Gabrielle
Giffords and 19 others.
In Alexandria, and the National Capital Region we have used
learned lessons from various incidents to guide investment
decisions, to increase our capabilities, to protect against
future occurrence. For example, after the anthrax attacks in
2001, the NCR and UASI funds were used to enhance secure and
interoperable communications, information sharing and the
situational awareness in the region, and produce NCRnet, a
secure fiber optic network connecting the NCR regions, Essence,
a public health surveillance system, and the installation of
chemical and biological sensors in the Metro system, where I am
also a member of the board of directors.
As we are all aware, the fiscal year 2013-2014 budget
submitted by the Administration proposed a major reform and
consolidation of FEMA's Homeland Security Grant Programs, which
would replace the current programs with the new National
Preparedness Grant Program.
It is no secret that the U.S. Conference of Mayors and
other organizations which represent local governments, first
responders and emergency managers have registered serious
concerns with regards to this proposals to convert the current
suite of Homeland Security Grant Programs into State-
administered block and competitive grant programs in which
funding decisions are based on State and multi-state threat
assessments. This proposal would no longer guarantee the
retention of key programs, remove 25 percent set-aside for law
enforcement terrorism prevention and expand the eligible
applicants for the portion of the funds which must be passed
through to local governments, and to include port and transit
authorities and private organizations.
We especially appreciate the fact that, thus far, Congress
has rejected the Administration's proposed changes to the
Homeland Security Grant Programs and agreed with us that
changes must be considered by the authorizing committees.
We know that you will carefully examine any proposals that
they send to you. The U.S. Conference of Mayors and other
organizations which represent local governments, first
responders and emergency managers have urged FEMA and the
Administration to work with us and Congress to develop programs
reforms which incorporate the successful elements of past and
current programs, that identify new approaches which can have
broad-based support.
Finally we suggest that any program improvements increase
transparency, increase local involvement, provide flexibility
with accountability, protect local funding, sustain terrorism
prevention, provide incentives for metropolitan area
regionalization.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I stand
ready for any questions you may have.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mayor.
Let me go to Mr. Filler.
TESTIMONY OF JOSH D. FILLER,\1\ FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, FILLER
SECURITY STRATEGIES, INC.
Mr. Filler. Thank you.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Filler appears in the Appendix on
page 88.
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Good morning, Chairman Begich and Ranking Member Paul.
I am Joshua Filler, President of Filler Security
Strategies, a homeland security consulting firm in Washington,
DC. It is my privilege today to discuss with you, issues
surrounding our Nation's preparedness, how to evaluate it and
what impacts Homeland Security grants have had on preparedness
at the local, State and national levels.
The purpose of Homeland Security grants, such as the Urban
Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security
Program, is to supplement local and State spending to allow
urban areas and States to build capabilities that bridge
traditional domestic public safety, largely handled by the
States and localities, with national security imperatives
traditionally managed by the Federal Government. Without such
funding, States and urban areas would not have the resources to
develop capability levels necessary to integrate those
missions.
Measuring the effectiveness of specific grant programs is
different than measuring overall preparedness. Grant
effectiveness is about how grants specifically impact
capabilities. However, the overall level of preparedness in an
urban area or State is influenced by numerous other factors--
most importantly, State and local resources.
While Homeland Security Grant Programs are critical to
enabling urban areas and States to enhance preparedness, they
represent a small fraction of the tens of billions of dollars
spent by States and urban areas on public health and safety
each year.
To measure grant effectiveness and preparedness, States and
urban areas must establish their own capability targets and
performance measures and metrics based on their unique risk
profile and planning assumptions. That risk profile should also
determine which capabilities are a priority to address high
risks, threats and hazards. We cannot measure everything, and
no single part of the Nation needs to be fully prepared for
every conceivable hazard.
These locally developed targets, measures and metrics
should all fit under a common framework, such as the Core
Capabilities under the National Preparedness Goal. This will
ensure a consistent, strategic approach while recognizing the
differences across a country as large and diverse as the United
States.
With these targets, measures and metrics in hand, States
and urban areas should engage in a regular assessment process,
involving self-evaluations, quantitative modeling and
performance evaluations, particularly involving exercises and
especially real-world incidents--all in order to build a
consistent picture of preparedness over time.
In each case, the following steps should be addressed:
First, identify the gaps in a State's or urban area's priority
capabilities. Next, outline grant and other expenditures to
close the identified capability gaps. And, based on the
measures and metrics, identify the outcomes produced from grant
and other expenditures in terms of closing capability gaps and
attaining the capability target.
Throughout such a process, the best way to determine grant
effectiveness and overall preparedness is to review how
capabilities performed in a real-world incident. Based on the
need, what were the strengths; what were the gaps, when a
jurisdiction or agency had to perform?
In the end, we are making these investments in preparedness
to more effectively operate when we have a threat or disaster.
That is what matters most.
To date, I have worked on five grant effectiveness studies
and have developed tools to evaluate overall preparedness in
numerous regions across the Nation. These include in the San
Francisco Bay Area, San Diego, Hampton Roads, Riverside and
Anaheim/Santa Ana.
From that experience, I can say with certainty that there
is no silver bullet or single answer to addressing the
questions of grant effectiveness and overall preparedness.
What I have learned is that grant effectiveness and
preparedness cannot be measured by just looking at the United
States as a single operating entity, which it is not. Rather,
the United States is a vast network of independent actors--
towns, villages, cities, counties, States, the private sector
and Federal Departments and Agencies--that must unify to
achieve homeland security priorities and perform critical
operational tasks before, during and after an incident.
When attempting to answer how effective a grant program is,
or how prepared a region or the Nation as a whole may be, we
must take a varied approach that addresses the question through
multiple lenses. These lenses should include a look from the
local perspective, the State perspective and the national
perspective as well as others. Taken together, each lens will
help provide a more complete understanding as to grant
effectiveness and overall preparedness across the Nation.
Thank you.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Mr. Mayer.
TESTIMONY OF MATT A. MAYER,\1\ VISITING FELLOW, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
Mr. Mayer. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you for
having me this morning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mayer appears in the Appendix on
page 96.
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Now the question we are trying to address here is: Are we
prepared?
And we have to ask the followup question: Are we prepared
for what?
In over 10 years and $40 billion plus of spending, the fact
that we do not know what we have, where we have it and at what
level it exists is problematic.
I do not envy Mr. Manning or any of the folks at FEMA.
Having sat in those chairs, along with Mr. Filler, is not a
place that you want to sit as you try to struggle through these
very difficult issues after September 11, 2001. But we have to
do so because we are entrusted with the public's money and we
have an obligation to do so in the most effective and efficient
manner we can.
I will say congratulations to the department and FEMA for
pushing for a reduction in the number of Urban Area Security
Initiative cities. It had ballooned to over 60 cities--a
ridiculous number--and now has come down to 31, to 25. That is
a great investment so we do not squander resources trying to
put a thin layer of peanut butter on a piece of bread that is
very big.
I also think the idea to consolidate the programs is a very
good idea. It is not a new idea. We tried that during the Bush
Administration several times, and special interests and other
groups said no. But I think we have to be looking at
consolidating so we can target funds where the risk is the
greatest based upon that current risk model that the
intelligence is driving there.
One of the mistakes I think we make is we assume that the
risk is everywhere, and if we do so, that means protecting
America from that risk is incredibly hard.
There is risk everywhere, but we do not live in a nanny
State. We cannot make it a 100 percent safe place to live. If
we do so, we sacrifice our civil rights and civil liberties in
the process.
So we have to be smarter about saying, where is the risk
and where is a meaningful level of risk where finite funds,
finite resources, finite time and people can be applied, so
that we can raise our preparedness to the highest degree
possible in order for us to prevent an attack and if we are hit
to respond effectively.
Boston is a great example. It shows over the years we have
spent a whole lot of money on the response side and can respond
fairly effectively, whether it is a tornado or it is the Boston
attack.
Our problem still remains in preventing those attacks. And
Boston was a preventable attack that we missed on opportunities
because we failed to learn some of the lessons over the last
decade that we should have learned.
And so, when we think about it, one of the things we do--
and, Chairman, you noted this in the turnover in the Senate. I
would say the turnover in the department is just as high or
higher, and as a result, you see enormous amounts of churn on
doctrine.
This is not the first National Preparedness Goal. I think
it might be the fourth iteration of it.
It is not the first Core Capabilities. It may be the third
or fourth iteration of those capabilities first announced in
September 2004.
So this process has been an ongoing process where enormous
amounts of churn have resulted, federally, in a lot of inaction
and ineffectiveness.
But at the State and local levels, what that creates is an
enormous problem. They do not have the resources to deal with
this constant churn of policy, and all they do then is try to
chase the next iteration. Do the mill burning, as you spoke of.
And, as a result, we are just constantly shifting to kind of
what is the next shiny object that we are trying to get money
for.
We need to settle one policy so that States and locals can
start building toward this idea of capabilities--what are they?
What do we need? How high do we need them? And let's then
figure out what the gap is that remains to be funded, which we
often do not do enough.
Another problem that we have not addressed is the
subjectivity of the measurement process, whether we measure
effectiveness, which is an incredibly subjective measurement.
You and I may see something completely different in terms of
whether it is effective or not, and that subjectivity is a
problem.
So we need to put more rigor and objectivity into the
evaluation process so that we know when you and I both say that
capability is working, it has common language; it has common
understanding.
And, between jurisdictions, what I say is an effective
urban search and rescue squad is what you say is so that when I
call for yours under mutual aid it does not fail because it
cannot do what I thought you said it could do.
So we need to make sure that there is commonality across
the spectrum in order for us to do that.
Again, self-evaluations are problematic. I think you see in
my testimony that I submitted for the hearing the 2012
assessments and the 2013 assessments, and we have lost ground
enormously somehow in a year even though we gave more money
out.
I know FEMA will say they are measuring different things,
but that actually demonstrates the problem of how we measure
things.
So we need to move further down the line of being smarter
about what we measure, how we measure it and where we put the
money.
I would suggest that the high risk urban areas are the
place we need to focus our funding. After 10 years and more
than $40 billion, if we have not secured Small Town, Ohio,
which is where I am from, it is time to let Small Town, Ohio
take care of itself. We need to focus our Federal funds in the
big places where we know there is risk of a terrorist attack.
With that, I will end my testimony and be happy to take any
questions you might have.
Thank you for having me today.
Senator Begich. Thank you all very much for being here.
And let me start, John, if I can, with you. It sounded from
your testimony, as you look at the Federal land--and I think of
the phrase of spending plan versus strategic plan. I think you
said strategic--that is the better approach. I think everyone
on the panel probably would agree with that.
Do you think FEMA is moving in the direction that makes
that really the focus? I will use what Mr. Mayer just said at
the end.
I agree. I just quickly looked at the 2012 versus 2013.
When you look at the numbers, you get terrified that we have
gone the wrong direction. But then you hear the arguments from
FEMA that, well, we are measuring things differently, which
then means mayors and State folks have to churn paper to
respond to that.
And, yet, what are measuring, are we doing it right, and
what is the answer in this?
I am going to ask the same question to you, Mayor.
Are States trying to get FEMA to be on one set of
parameters at some point, or is it just that FEMA is directing
and you all are just trying to chase it and make sure that you
fill the paperwork out so we get the resources that we think we
need on the ground?
Does that question make sense?
Mr. Madden. Yes, sir, and it is constantly a chase between
intent and execution.
In the heyday of all the funding--and there used to be
several--many times more of what it is now, annually. It was
all about spending. If I give you this money, can you spend it?
Senator Begich. Mm-hmm----
Mr. Madden [continuing]. Ask the question, how you can
spend it?
Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Madden. And the performance measurement was I said I
need three things, and I bought three things; therefore, I am
successful.
Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Madden. There has been movement away from that, but we
have not fully abandoned it.
Senator Begich. Abandoned the spending concept.
Mr. Madden. The spending concept.
Senator Begich. Right. Is that because of just entrenched--
I mean, these two were there many years ago. So, I mean, is it
just that change is difficult to adapt to in the way this
program should operate?
Mr. Madden. We live in a time that cries out for
innovation, but unfortunately, we have to create the innovation
within a bureaucracy.
Senator Begich. Bigger----
Mr. Madden. And bureaucracies do not change rapidly. So
they need to measure something, so they will measure the
comfortable things before they will measure the difficult
things.
And the real challenge that comes in under the National
Preparedness System is trying to integrate it across. If you
are thoughtful in this and say that this element is very
critical for a recovery of a community that would be hit by any
disaster, are we taking that knowledge and priority and putting
it over into then let's make that an emphasis for mitigation;
let's make that an emphasis for protection?
We do not have that cross. Therefore, we are still
emphasizing on execution.
And the strategic value of all these is to emphasize the
thinking, the planning, the setting of priorities that then
yield the spending.
Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Madden. We need to start at the beginning of this
thoughtful process rather than at the end.
Senator Begich. Mayor, what is your thought on that?
Then I am going to ask both of you if you agree with that
kind of analysis. Mayor.
Mr. Euille. Well, thank you, sir.
While I am not directly involved on a daily basis in terms
of overseeing emergency preparedness, we have professional paid
staff that does that very well.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Euille. But I will certainly agree with John's
comments.
But I think really what we are looking for here is, first,
a comfort level that works for all--the localities, the States
and the Federal Government. We are also committing to making
certain that we are effective and efficient in terms of what we
do and how we do it.
But, this talk about small towns versus large towns and not
having the need to have the same type of equipment, or adequate
equipment, and services that other cities and towns have--that
makes sense in terms of----
Senator Begich. Of risk analysis.
Mr. Euille. Yes, risk analysis, in terms of concern.
But the reality of it all is--take my city of Alexandria,
Virginia. We are caught in the middle of being right next to
the Nation's capital. We are the small pea in a pot, but yet,
we have just as much of a major commitment to helping to secure
and protect the region----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Euille [continuing]. In terms of our mutual aid,
whether it is equipment, manpower or what have you. So we need
to also have the resources to be able to be responsive.
Senator Begich. A good example might be--and I will use
Alaska as an example, and then I am going to turn to Mr. Mayer
and Mr. Filler for kind of additional comments.
Galena is not a terrorist location, but there is a flood
disaster. So you have different risk levels on different
levels. We know a natural disaster could occur there much more
rapidly than a terrorist activity.
Then we go into Valdez, Alaska, where we have a small town,
but we have the oil terminus for the pipeline. Higher risk but
also on multiple fronts, wouldn't you say, John?
I mean especially last week when it was 90 degrees there. I
am sure they love it, but also the fire risk now has increased
dramatically. But it also has oil terminals that have a huge
risk factor.
So it has kind of multi-layered tasks. Is that a fair
statement, John?
Mr. Madden. Yes, sir, it is, and that illustrates the need
for that interdependence.
Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Madden. Alaskan oil is an economic driver for the
entire West Coast----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Madden [continuing]. That enables them to have the
economy to ship things back to Alaska.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Madden. The vulnerability for the State of Alaska
exists outside of our State as much as it does inside.
Senator Begich. The State, right.
Mr. Madden. And that is the part where any assessment of
risk has to recognize that the vulnerability for a city or a
county or a State often resides outside of its borders and that
every city, county and State protects things that are of value
to others. We protect a strategic national oil supply. Others
protect food supplies.
Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Madden. There are pipelines that run from Louisiana to
New England through many States.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Madden. And each State is viewed differently for how
they are assigned a risk.
Senator Begich. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Madden. And, to go on what you said earlier, there are
34 States that have received the identical Homeland Security
grant funds last year and this year, and that just cries out--
--
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Madden [continuing]. For it is not based on risk if 34
States get the identical amount.
Senator Begich. And I think, Mayor, you would probably
agree with that in a broad sense, not the specifics, but that
last statement. I could sit here in my own limited knowledge
and say certain States have a higher risk than other States,
but 34 all the same seems odd.
But maybe----
Mr. Euille. Absolutely. I remember last year, maybe 2 years
ago, when we got word in terms of the Washington Metropolitan
Area about the grant funding that we were receiving, we all
said, well, this is ridiculous.
I mean, we should almost be equal to what New York City is
receiving, but yet the Washington Metropolitan Area suffered a
tremendous reduction.
So I do not think that should be based on just allocations
across the board. It should be, again, based on risk.
Senator Begich. Risk.
Either one of you want to respond on that analysis?
And you have unique experiences, both of you, because you
have worked inside this system--and I am correct on that,
right--at different times. So you kind of saw the beginning of
these grants as well as now you are on the outside, looking in.
So I think it is a unique experience you bring here to the
Committee.
Either one? Mr. Filler or Mr. Mayer.
OK.
Mr. Filler. Yes, it has been a unique experience having to
live with the consequences of some of your decisions from the
outside. It definitely gives you a unique perspective.
On the risk side, I think what has been happening here is
that the risk analysis that is being used is pushing more and
more of the funding to the top which, by default, leaves so
little funding for what is left, that everybody gets the same
amount.
Senator Begich. So the bulk of the money goes here. There
is a little bit left. So just spread it.
Mr. Filler. Just spread it because the real risk analysis
is taking place at the very top of the urban area list or the
State list, depending on which list you are actually looking
at.
So, when you do that, you only have a certain amount of
money left. If there are statutory minimums, you have to meet
those statutory minimums, and that basically----
Senator Begich. You have kind of got two pressures going
on--the minimums and then the high risk--and then what is left
is----
Mr. Filler. Exactly.
So, when those two forces come together, it produces the
result where 30 or some odd States may get the same amount of
money even though there is no way those States have the same
amount of risk. There just is not enough money to differentiate
those risk levels when you are putting so much money at the
top. I think that is probably what is happening.
Senator Begich. Mr. Mayer.
Mr. Mayer. Yes, there are a couple responses to some of the
issues that you raise.
One of the challenges we have, right, is that we have a
dual sovereignty system, that States are sovereign entities, as
are local governments, and so this tension between the Federal
Government telling States what they need to do or not do and
States wanting to have some control over that. After all, it is
the States' money that comes to Washington, coming back to
them.
So that tension is always there, and it is a challenge, I
think, to try to navigate that for any issue, including
homeland security.
On the risk issue, it was interesting. When Mr. Filler and
I were there, in preparing for the 2006 allocations, we thought
we would try to get creative with the risk formula and add
natural disaster risk to the formula to see how it would impact
things as we were going through the analysis.
And what we discovered is if you put natural disaster risk
into the risk formula it overwhelmed terrorism risk because the
risk of fires, floods, tornadoes----
Senator Begich. Huge.
Mr. Mayer. It is huge.
Senator Begich. Huge and more frequent.
Mr. Mayer. More frequent.
So, again, that gets into that tension between what are we
preparing for. Are we preparing for the natural disasters, or
are we preparing for terrorism? And that, I think, helps us
define and target where we need to go.
And on that risk, I think it was the 2007 to 2008 year on
the Urban Area Security Initiative program, where they added 4
cities, and literally, every city got cut by 3 percent exactly,
from top to bottom. It did not matter.
And, again, that----
Senator Begich. In order to take care of the four.
Mr. Mayer. Yes. And that goes to the question of, how in
the world, mathematically--and I am not that smart. So I cannot
do this. But what is the algorithm that gets you the exact same
outcome--a 3 percent cut for every city, from top to bottom?
It was basically to try to feed more mouths, and so they
had to essentially rob from Peter to pay Paul.
Senator Begich. Right, with an amount that was shrinking
overall.
Mr. Mayer. Correct.
Senator Begich. So it created even another problem.
Mr. Mayer. That is exactly right.
Senator Begich. Do you think--and let me ask again to
whoever wants to answer this.
We have these grants. It is about preparedness. We have two
kind of major areas--terrorism and natural disasters. I think
you defined it.
I think that is a fair national security, and terrorism,
kind of this category, and then natural disasters.
I had a panel here about a month ago, and we had some
folks--a gentleman from the insurance industry. And their risk
analysis on natural disasters is being incorporated much
greater than they have ever had to do--the size and the
frequency.
Do you think FEMA is understanding that there--or Homeland
Security/FEMA is understanding--that there is an ever growing
now on the natural disaster end, that is bigger?
The price tags are bigger and the frequencies are more
often than maybe what the model or the thought was back a
decade ago, because terrorism was kind of the driver. We had
some natural disasters, but they were--I do not want to say
they were infrequent, but they were not like they are today, or
what we classify as natural disasters.
No one would have anticipated what happened in Hurricane
Sandy, for example, 10 years ago. They would have never had
that on kind of the risk analysis plan. Now they do, due to the
frequency and intensity of some of these disasters.
Do you think the model has to be updated because you made
me think about it when you said the natural disaster issues
overwhelm the system when you calculate that in, which is going
to be even bigger in the future, it seems to me.
Any thought on that?
Mr. Mayer. Yes. I mean, I have written extensively at
Heritage on this issue of kind of the growth of the
declarations coming out of FEMA for natural disasters. And we
have taken the position that the vast majority of those are not
being issued because they are creating--they are greater
catastrophic events. Hurricane Sandy, obviously, is an
exception to that.
But what you have is because we have not moved the number
that gets you qualified for the declaration in a long time,
average, routine fires, floods, tornadoes, severe storms are
starting to qualify. And, as a result, lots of money is being
poured into that.
Our position is we actually need to decentralize that and
get that back as the primary responsibility of mayors and
Governors that they need to fund and prepare for rather than
have Federal funds and FEMA's time, frankly, being used for
that smaller-scale, routine issues just because, well, there
are more people living in certain places and those places have
routine issues, whether they be a tornado in the Oklahoma alley
or a flood in the Toledo area----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Mayer [continuing]. Or for you and the issues you deal
with.
Senator Begich. Like Alaska.
Mr. Mayer. Exactly.
Senator Begich. Very good.
John or Mayor, any----
Mr. Madden. Well, sir, I am one of the 22 States--Alaska
is--where the responsibility for homeland security and
emergency management are combined into a single division.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Madden. So I get to look at this in a little different
way.
And that is why the integration of our efforts needs to be
the objective.
There are very similar consequences to terrorist acts as
there are to natural disasters. There is disruption of central
services and disruption to the population. There is suffering.
There are injuries. And that is why if we build capabilities
that well serve the Nation for natural disasters, for the
consequences, it well serves the Nation against the terrorists,
but we need to take different preventive and protective and
mitigative measures in those.
But we have some universal risks, almost transcendent
risks, that we need to have at the foundation.
Senator Begich. No matter what those subject matters----
Mr. Madden. No matter what.
Senator Begich [continuing]. We always have a base.
Mr. Madden. Because cyber attack can happen anywhere. It
can be Portland, Oregon or Portland, Maine.
At any time. Any community. Any industry.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Explosive
can happen at any place within the Nation.
Mass casualty from many forms--it could be a terrorist
attack, or it could be an airplane crash or a collapsed
building.
There are some of these capabilities that we can increase
that well serve across a range of those hazards.
The separation between terrorism and natural disasters--not
only is it artificial when it comes to consequences. It
actually invites the extreme measures, or--what Senator Paul
brought out--it invites the spending of money to accomplish the
spending of money.
If we bring this back in and recognize that terrorism is
not a logical, rational, predictable element, but it is a non-
zero every place in the Nation--Oklahoma City in 1995 was not a
rational terrorist attack. It was symbolic. And that can happen
anywhere.
But Oklahoma City also has tornadoes.
The same skills they use for the one can be used for the
other--command structure, communications, mass casualty.
Senator Begich. Debris cleanup.
Mr. Madden. Debris. All those things are capabilities that
well serve the entire range of those hazards.
And that is where the separation--not only is it
artificial, but it is a detriment to the strategic thought of:
How do we develop the capabilities, for what purpose, and how
do we integrate that between cities, between States?
Senator Begich. Mayor, do you have any comment?
I mean, it is interesting.
Mr. Euille. Just very briefly, and we had this discussion
at the mayors' conference just recently in Las Vegas.
In terms of, again, being responsive, it is all about
flexibility and the fact that for most cities and towns and
States across the Nation we do have all of this under one
umbrella. You do not have a separate office on homeland
security and a separate office on emergency management--it is
one umbrella.
Senator Begich. All one place.
Mr. Euille. Yes. They work as a team together and
everything else.
And in terms of natural--at least in terms of homeland
security, rather, the eye is always on the prize. We are always
focused and looking and making certain that our communities and
our cities and towns are safe from terrorism and everything
else.
But I just had on my monthly TV show a campaign--See
Something, Say Something--not so much on--well, it focused on
the terrorism elements of it, but in terms of natural disaster
you cannot see something and say something relative to a
natural disaster because you do not know when it is going to
occur. And it will happen, and then you have to be ready to
respond.
So, for all the comments and the expressions by Mr. Madden
here, I certainly support and believe that we need to keep the
two intertwined, again, but I think it is flexibility that is
the key here.
Senator Begich. Is the key.
Any last comments, and again, Mr. Filler, did you have any
comment you want to make before I close out?
Mr. Filler. I would just add that from the earliest days
the department has embraced the concept of dual use, which is
basically if you acquire a capability you can use it for either
a natural hazard or a terrorist event.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Filler. Obviously, there is a difference in prevention.
And I think States and urban areas around the country have
embraced that--that this split between terrorism and natural
hazards, when you get to the ground level, really does not
exist.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Filler. Obviously, on the prevention side and the
intelligence side, but for all other practical purposes it is
really an academic issue and one that I think most of the
community has worked through and understands.
Now, if you change how you allocate funding based on
terrorism risk or natural hazards risk, that will have a
change. Obviously, New York is a greater terrorism risk than it
is from an earthquake or even a hurricane despite Hurricane
Sandy.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Filler. But, for purposes of once the money goes out
and is used, dual use has been embraced for almost 10 years.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Let me say to all of you; thank you very much for being
here. The first panel, second panel--you guys are kind of on
the ground, dealing with it.
Again, your two unique experiences have been in the system
and now outside the system. Like you said, sometimes you
wonder, do I really want that regulation, and now I have to
deal with it?
You get what you sow, right?
But it is helpful. I mean, I think we have--it is clear to
me more and more as we look at this issue of FEMA. How do we
create some consistency?
How we do not just do the churn and burn on the material or
do as--the thing that bothered me the most was kind of the
spending plan approach versus what is strategically necessary
and where those gaps are, you fill them. I think a couple of
you talked about that and how we do that.
A piece of what the mayor brought up--and I think in
Alaska--we are kind of unique because we have this unique
relationship with our cities and our State. But I can tell you
in other cities and other States it is not as clean-cut as it
should be.
John, you are an exception. I will tell you that, to be
frank, with all the mayors that I know around the country.
And we have to figure this out--how to make sure that
cities who are always going to be, no matter how much you
strategize, will be the first person on the ground.
It may be a terrorist act as we saw in Boston or a natural
disaster in Galena. It is the first. It is that body that is
right there who may be a volunteer firefighter, a firefighter,
police officer, EMT, or nurse, whoever it might be. And then
right next door to them will be the State system and then the
Federal system.
And if we are going to be responsive, not only in a
preventive--or in a response mode but also in the preventive
mode, which is also the hardest to measure but probably one of
the most important. We can do certain things, but there are
these risk factors.
It is going to be interesting to see over the next period
of time as we see some recommendations on how we analyze this
money and use it for risk factor strategic planning versus,
well, we have a certain amount; spend it; we hope you do well
with it because that is not the kind of money we have available
anymore and we have to be much smarter about it.
So your ideas and your testimony, as well as your written
testimony--I want to say on behalf of the Committee, thank you
very much for being here.
Let me just check one thing. [Pause.]
The record will be kept open for 15 days for additional
questions or comments from Members of the Committee. We may
submit some written questions for you. We would be anxious for
your response.
But, again, thank you all very much for being here.
This Committee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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