[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
WHAT DOES A SECURE MARITIME BORDER LOOK LIKE?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER
AND MARITIME SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 19, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-45
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
87-375 PDF WASHINGTON : 2014
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or
866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Chris Stewart, Utah, Vice Chair Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Rear Admiral William D. Lee, Deputy for Operations Policy and
Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
General Randolph D. Alles, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air
and Marine, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Maritime and Security Coast
Guard Issues, Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S.
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Captain Marcus Woodring, USCG (Ret.), Managing Director, Health,
Safety, Security, and Environmental Branch, Port of Houston
Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
WHAT DOES A SECURE MARITIME BORDER LOOK LIKE?
----------
Tuesday, November 19, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Duncan, Marino, Palazzo,
Jackson Lee, O'Rourke, and Gabbard.
Mrs. Miller. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the
characteristics of a secure maritime border.
We are pleased, certainly, to be joined by a very
distinguished panel, most of whom have been here before, some
have been, at any rate, of witnesses today. We have Rear
Admiral William ``Dean'' Lee, who is the deputy commandant for
Operations Policy and Capabilities for the U.S. Coast Guard. We
have General Randolph D. Alles, who is the assistant
commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine at the United
States Customs and Border Protection. Mr. Steve Caldwell is the
director of Maritime and Security Coast Guard Issues at the
Government Accountability Office. Captain Marcus Woodring is
the managing director for Security at the Port of Houston
Authority.
We welcome you all back.
Mr. Woodring, we were just chatting that you had the Vice
President yesterday at your port and then jumped the airplane.
So we were very pleased that you were able to join us again
today.
Earlier this year, this subcommittee convened a hearing to
ask, what does a secure border look like? During that hearing,
we exclusive examined security along our Nation's land borders.
An often-neglected aspect of border security, what we do in
the maritime environment is equally as important and as
critical to our overall border security approach. To minimize
its importance is certainly a mistake for our Nation. Any point
of weakness in our border security defenses can and will be
exploited. So it is incumbent on this committee to ensure that
the Coast Guard and the CBP have a plan to secure the very vast
maritime border.
The framework of the subcommittee used earlier this year
can be applied to the maritime environment: What does a secure
maritime border look like? How do we get there? How do we
measure success?
Millions of square miles of ocean make those questions
dependent on achieving situational awareness, or, to use the
Coast Guard's term of art, maritime domain awareness.
Intelligence-driven operations will have to become the
cornerstone of maritime operations so that we focus our limited
maritime resources in the most productive and efficient way.
That is especially true in an era of smaller budgets.
In many instances, due to the vastness of the maritime
domain, intelligence may be available but we just do not have
the assets or the personnel capable to respond in time. Beyond
using intel to focus operations, the Department of Homeland
Security components that are in the same geographical area must
coordinate and work together to increase effectiveness and to
make the best use of the resources Congress provides.
Last Congress, at the urging of this subcommittee, the
Department released the Maritime Operations Coordinating Plan,
or the MOCP, that established regional coordinated mechanisms
for the Department of Homeland Security agencies with a role in
maritime security, including the Coast Guard, CBP, and ICE. We
will be interested to hear from the witnesses today how that
structure is working and if Congress can help provide more
robust direction to keep moving toward consolidation
operational planning and coordination.
Threats to the border have evolved in the maritime
environment. As progress is made along the land borders,
illicit activity is driven off the coast. Drug cartels and
others who seek to do us harm will seek out the point of least
resistance. The recent surge of panga boats carrying drugs off
the coast of California is a very clear example of this. On
average, there is now a known panga event every 4 days, and, of
course, those are just the ones that we know about. Although we
haven't seen a resurgence of semi-submersibles, the threat that
they are being used and we fail to detect them is a very real
and present danger.
Achieving situational awareness in the maritime environment
requires persistent surveillance, which is why we were
disappointed to learn that we have used the maritime version of
the Predator B only a handful of times off the coast of
California, when it seems that this would be a very important
mission for a maritime-enabled UAV.
Other technologies must also play a role, especially as
panga boats move farther offshore and up the coast, trying to
evade our cutters and shore-based intercepters. We are
interested in hearing about other capabilities we are exploring
to expand our situational awareness as sea.
To that point, excess DOD surveillance equipment is headed
for the Rio Grande Valley in Texas to help detect illicit
activity in the busiest sector in the Nation. This might also
serve well in the maritime domain if attached to the right set
of sensors and radar. As we continue to retrograde advanced
surveillance technology from theater, CBP and the Coast Guard
should also consider testing such gear on the maritime borders
of the country.
When it comes to drugs, the focus of effort, rightfully so,
has been centered on source and transit zones in the Eastern
Pacific and Caribbean. We must continue to concentrate our
efforts where interdictions make the most impact. We will be
interested to hear from the witnesses as to the frequency that
we have intelligence on the movement of drug shipments without
the assets positioned to interdict them.
Pushing our borders out to secure the outer ring of border
security makes sense in the maritime world. We have been and
continue to be very strong supporters of leveraging our trusted
allies' work where appropriate so we don't duplicate security
efforts in inspecting maritime facilities overseas where
necessary to minimize risk to our country.
As is the case for our land borders, we have to determine
in a verifiable way if we are making progress. The American
people have a right to know if the money that we are spending
is moving the needle toward greater maritime security. How much
security we are getting for the patrol and flight hours is
something that we need to develop. I am certainly fully
cognizant of the metrics used for the land borders will not be
the right way to measure security offshore, but that cannot
mean that we do nothing or throw up our hands because it is
difficult.
So I want to challenge the Department to develop a series
of metrics that will help inform how we spend limited dollars
to buy new cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft and point the
way to progress in maritime security and situational awareness.
Especially in times of austere budgets, we have to be smart
about how we spend our money and find every efficiency that we
can.
With that, I will yield to my Ranking Member, the
gentlelady from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, thank you so very much
for your yielding. I believe that this is, together, a very
important hearing. I thank you and am delighted to join you on
this hearing.
I want acknowledge the presence of my Members, Ms. Gabbard
and Mr. O'Rourke, and acknowledge your Members, as well, and to
welcome Admiral Lee and Commissioner Alles, along with Director
Caldwell and Captain Woodring, who did make a quick leave of
Houston, Texas. We were both able to be there yesterday, Madam
Speaker, with the Vice President. So I couldn't think of a
better and more fitting next day for the captain.
As I was driving in from Ellington Field, I could see the
potency of your message, and one that I support, and that is
the importance of maritime security, as I passed one of the
major, No. 1 petrochemical corridors in the Nation and realized
the connectedness to our port and the importance of security.
I do want to, if I may have a moment, Madam Chairwoman,
just to acknowledge Mr. Robert Harvey of our Greater Houston
Partnership, who is willing to sit here and listen to this
hearing, partly, along with Bob Borochoff. I can assure you
that they are strong supporters of border security and maritime
security, as they are of immigration reform.
I partly represent the Port of Houston and am the former
chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security. Now
on this committee I have seen, collectively--because the port
has both rail, obviously, and water and, as I indicated, a
long, long legacy with the petrochemical industry. I have long
advocated for strengthening our maritime borders while
facilitating legitimate maritime trade.
I was pleased to have Vice President Biden and Secretary of
Transportation Foxx visit the Port of Houston yesterday. Their
visit provided an opportunity to discuss the opening of the
Panama Canal and the value of job creation from our Nation's
ports and related industries.
I join with the Chairwoman in her acknowledgment of a
matrix that should be created. My first-hand assessment,
traveling on a speedboat out on the outer sides of the Panama
Canal and listening to Coast Guard representatives talk about
the dangers that are posed by waters that are not supervised
and their impact on ports that necessarily need that security.
The Vice President's visit provided an opportunity to
discuss, as I indicated, jobs. Maritime trade is the heart of
the economy in many communities across this country, including
Houston.
A few facts and figures about the Port of Houston: Its 52-
mile channel opened in 1914. It is home to 150 public and
private companies. Handles nearly 230 million tons of cargo
annually, making it the No. 1 U.S. port in foreign waterborne
tonnage; Mexico's top import and export trading partner.
Therefore, it is busy, and the security is crucial.
The Port of Houston had over $200 million in operating
revenues last year, handling 42 tons of cargo, nearly 70
percent of the container cargo in the U.S. gulf annually. As a
result, the port generates over 650,000 jobs at its terminals.
A terrorist or an unfortunate incident could be
catastrophic, not only for the Port of Houston but for the
United States of America. This is an important topic, on how do
we develop the next steps for maritime security. With the
Nation's largest petrochemical complex, supplying over 40
percent of the Nation's base petrochemical manufacturing
capacity, what happens at the Port of Houston affects the
entire Nation. The Port Commission's and Port Authority's staff
are keenly aware of their role in ensuring that the port is
secured appropriately.
A few months ago, we joined full committee Chairman McCaul
at the port. I am very pleased to say they were the recipients,
along with others, of UASI grants dealing with increased
security and increased equipment. We are fortunate to have the
best emergency response assets and personnel available to
Houston to protect this National asset. The Federal
Government's use of these moneys in a responsible manner by
distributing to ports like Houston have been enormously
effective.
We also recognize that we must continue to identify
effective and efficient security solutions for our ports and
for securing maritime borders. While much of the border
security discussion in Congress today is focused on securing
our land borders, securing our maritime borders is essential to
any conversations focused on comprehensive border security.
Although the Mumbai incident was not a port per se, having
visited Mumbai and the site of the terrorist incident that
occurred, I can assure that you it was similar. The water area
penetrated onto the land.
When we discuss border security, whether we are talking
about narcotics, undocumented aliens, or those who might wish
to do us harm, we know that people will take the route they
perceive to offer the best opportunity to enter the country. If
we only secure our land borders, bad actors will exploit
America's maritime borders and vice versa. We are only as
strong as our weakest link, which is why it is imperative that
we support the work of the Coast Guard, CBP's Office of Air and
Marine, and State and local law enforcement agencies.
I would say that one of the necessities, Madam Chairwoman,
is an understanding of the matrix that can be created by the
Coast Guard and funding of those extra assets and also their
plan. I would like to see a plan from the Department, but I
think the Coast Guard is going to be the most effective.
Supporting these entities includes ensuring that they have
the funds necessary to carry out their core functions. Given
limited Federal resources, agencies across the Government
should do everything possible to share information technology
as appropriate, avoid duplication of efforts in order to secure
our borders as effectively and efficiently as possible.
Today I hope to hear how Coast Guard is collaborating with
Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and Marine to
leverage personnel assets and information to enhance the
maritime security. Among other things, I hope to hear from
Admiral Lee and Assistant Commissioner Alles about their joint
efforts to operate the Guardian Maritime Unmanned Aerial System
to increase awareness in the maritime domain, as well as Coast
Guard's on-going collaboration with the U.S. Navy to operate
smaller U.S.S.'s aboard its National security cutter fleet.
I would like to hear from Mr. Caldwell about how we define
and evaluate investments to secure our borders through
personnel, technology, and resources so that we can ensure that
our efforts are focused and streamlined toward a better-managed
maritime border. I would like to also hear how you are working
with those smaller technology companies and whether or not they
can be effective in helping us.
I look forward to the testimony of Captain Woodring, who
currently serves as the managing director for health, safety,
and security. We have known each other for a long period of
time. An outstanding representative of the U.S. Coast Guard for
27 years; and now committed to working with the Port of Houston
on one of the largest ports, and, of course, has served us well
in that position.
The size of the Port of Houston, having 52 miles of
chemical and petroleum facilities, bordering 21 communities,
represents a unique challenge. You can be assured they are
certainly in the eye of those who would want to do this Nation
harm. For these reasons and more, the Port of Houston is an
excellent example of the need for best practices and the use of
best practices and for this hearing, Madam Chairwoman.
Delighted to join you in it, because I think this is the right
step to be taking, is to ask real, hard questions on maritime
security.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady for her comments.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements might be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
November 19, 2013
I know the subcommittee has focused largely on our land borders in
its oversight hearings of late. While that is a critically important
issue, I am pleased to see the subcommittee examining the security of
our maritime borders as well. As challenging as managing our land
borders with Canada and Mexico may be, in many ways the maritime domain
poses an even greater challenge.
The variety of threats we face, the vast areas involved, and our
relatively limited resources make securing our maritime borders no easy
task. That task gets more difficult every day with sequester on top of
other recent budget cuts to the Coast Guard and Customs and Border
Protection's Air and Marine.
I hope we can have a frank discussion about these cuts and what
they mean operationally for the Coast Guard and CBP and their ability
to secure our maritime borders. I look forward to a discussion about
our current maritime border security priorities and what more needs to
be done to address those priorities.
Today, the Government Accountability Office is releasing a report I
requested on one threat to maritime security--small vessels. As we have
seen in incidents such as the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, small vessels
can pose a serious threat to U.S. interests both at home and abroad. I
look forward to hearing from our GAO witness, Mr. Caldwell, about this
report as well as what more remains to be done to address this threat.
I am concerned by GAO's findings in another of its recent reports--
this one regarding DHS's efforts to secure maritime cargo. It is my
understanding that GAO found CBP has not done an assessment of risks at
foreign ports related to its Container Security Initiative (CSI)
program since 2005.
GAO did its own calculations and determined that less than half of
the CSI locations are at high-risk foreign ports. If DHS has failed to
assess the security of foreign ports in the last 8 years, and if its
CSI is deployed mostly at medium-and-low-risk ports, can the program be
achieving its intended purpose?
These troubling findings certainly undermine DHS's contention that
it has a robust and dynamic risk-based container security regime in
place, despite its continued refusal to even attempt to implement the
100% cargo security scanning mandate.
Just as our land borders won't be secure until we know what is
coming through our ports of entry, our maritime borders won't be secure
until we have greater certainty about the cargo arriving at our shores.
Mrs. Miller. Again, we are pleased to have four very
distinguished witnesses with us today. I will give a little bit
more formal introduction before we ask them for their
testimony.
First, Rear Admiral William ``Dean'' Lee is the deputy
commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities at the United
States Coast Guard. In this role, Rear Admiral Lee oversees
integration of all operations capabilities, strategy, and
resource policy. He spent 13 years in six different command
assignments and spent a career specializing in boat operations
and search and rescue.
We welcome to you to the committee.
General Randolph D. ``Tex'' Alles is the assistant
commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine at United States
Customs and Border Protection. Air and Marine is the world's
largest aviation and maritime law enforcement organization, and
its mission is the use of Air and Marine assets to detect,
interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful
movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband across
the border.
Mr. Stephen Caldwell is GAO's director of Maritime Security
Issues. He has testified at more than 30 Congressional hearings
and led the research and publication of more than 150 GAO
reports. His recent GAO reports evaluated threats to and
programs to protect our maritime transportation system and its
supporting infrastructure, both far overseas and in our
domestic ports at well.
Again, Mr. Marcus Woodring retired from the U.S. Coast
Guard as captain of the Port of Houston, Galveston, in 2011 and
assumed his current position with the Port of Houston Authority
in July of that year. He is responsible for safety, security,
environmental stewardship, and emergency response at the eight
terminals along the Houston Ship Channel.
The full written statements will appear in the record.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Admiral Lee for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEE, DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS
POLICY AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Lee. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I
am honored to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard's role
in border security, and maritime border security in particular.
Indeed, border security is a significant priority for our
Nation, requiring comprehensive efforts across many departments
and agencies, including, of course, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. DHS secures the Nation's air, land, and sea
borders to prevent illegal activity while facilitating lawful
travel and trade.
As a Department, we have three objectives with border
security and management: No. 1, effectively securing the U.S.
air, land, and sea points of entry; No. 2, safeguarding and
streamlining lawful trade and travel; and, last, disrupting and
dismantling transnational criminal and terrorist organizations.
United States Coast Guard helps in this endeavor. We are
responsible for maritime safety, security, and stewardship in
U.S. waters on the high seas and in other waters subject to
U.S. jurisdiction. The Coast Guard plays a critical role in
addressing threats to our Nation's borders while facilitating
the safe and efficient flow of maritime commerce.
We are closely integrated with our partners in DHS, as well
as from the Departments of State and Justice, among others, to
meet mission responsibilities. To succeed, we must continue to
promote legitimate activity while carefully screening people,
cargo, and conveyances that could do harm to our Nation. To be
certain, the Coast Guard is part of a border security system in
the United States. We are closely integrated with our partners
in DHS, as well as from the Departments of State and Justice,
among others, to meet mission responsibilities.
The U.S. maritime border is vast and very challenging. The
Coast Guard's fleet patrols over 95,000 miles of coastline
while exercising jurisdiction over 4.2 million square miles of
ocean. In the Western Hemisphere, transnational organized crime
networks are increasingly active. They traffic drugs, humans,
and weapons and are increasingly involved with activity that
accounts for recent spikes in regional violence.
As you know, the Coast Guard's resources are limited.
Securing our maritime borders requires a strategic approach to
maximize the impact of all of our efforts. Moreover, we must
continue to work closely with our partners to implement an
adaptable layered security strategy to counter maritime border
threats. Our risk-based approach relies upon effective
awareness of threats, proper threat prioritization, efficacy of
asset lay-down, and, as always, strong partnerships at many
levels.
The first layer of security starts overseas, where we
assess foreign port security and antiterrorism measures through
our International Port Security Program. These activities help
to ensure the security of cargo that is shipped to the United
States from our many international trading partners.
Offshore, on the high seas and in the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone, we forward-deploy major cutters and law
enforcement detachments to establish a presence and to respond
to an array of maritime threats. Coast Guard patrol aircraft
and cutter-deployed helicopters support this effort by
providing long-range detection and response capabilities.
Last year, our cutter and aircraft crews removed over 77
metric tons of cocaine and 35 tons of marijuana in the 6-
million-square-mile Transit Zone. This is a decrease of
approximately 30 metric tons from fiscal year 2012, which is
attributed, in part, to the reduction in aircraft and cutter
patrol hours under sequestration.
Interdicting illicit narcotics in wholesale, bulk, and pure
quantities continues to be the most effective approach to
counter the flow and impact of narcotics to the United States
and our Western Hemisphere neighbors. Perhaps equally as
important, it denies transnational criminal organizations
billions of dollars in profit and supports the international
effort to dismantle these organizations.
As an example, in late October, a maritime patrol aircraft
detected a high-speed vessel suspected of drug trafficking in
the central Caribbean, approximately 200 miles south of the
Dominican Republic. A Netherlands Navy warship, operating under
the tactical control of the Joint Interagency Task Force South,
launched a helicopter that stopped the vessel. Simultaneously,
a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment deployed from the
Dutch ship to board the vessel. The boarding team seized 2,700
pounds of cocaine and apprehended 4 suspects, who were turned
over to the Department of Justice for prosecution.
Closer to home, we work with interagency,
intergovernmental, and commercial entities to patrol maritime
approaches, escort vessels, monitor critical infrastructure,
and inspect port facilities. Last February, I testified before
you on the role interagency and international partners play in
protecting our maritime borders. These partnerships continue to
enhance our capability and effectiveness along our coast and
waterways.
Close coordination of activities through the regional
coordinating mechanism, or ReCoM, has been effective in
capitalizing on multi-agency DHS capabilities. Since October
2011, ReCoMs in California have been integral in the
interdiction of more than 1,000 illegal migrants and nearly
211,000 pounds of illegal narcotics.
To maximize the effectiveness of our efforts, we are a
member of the National intelligence community. We screen ships,
crews, and passengers bound for the United States by requiring
vessels to submit an advance notice of arrival some 96 hours
prior to entering any U.S. port. Using our maritime
intelligence fusion centers and Intelligence Coordination
Center, we work hand-in-hand with CBP to analyze arriving
vessels and highlight potential risks. Last year, we
collectively screened more than 118,000 vessels and 29.5
million people and identified more than 237 individuals with
terrorism or criminal associations.
Beyond our domestic interagency partnerships, we have also
developed strong partnerships with the governments of Canada
and Mexico through several joint initiatives. Using joint
standard operating procedures developed with Mexico, we
successfully conducted 30 joint interdictions and removed more
than 97,000 pounds of illegal drugs since 2008.
Through integrated cross-trained enforcement teams,
commonly referred to a Shiprider, Coast Guard, and Royal
Canadian Mounted Police Officers conduct joint interdictions
operations in each other's waters. Supported by jointly-
developed intelligence, these teams leverage each other's law
enforcement authorities to prevent suspect vessels from
escaping prosecution by fleeing into the other Nation's
territorial seas.
As I have outlined in my testimony, our strategy to secure
our borders relies on a layered defense that is supported by
effective awareness and threat prioritization to ensure the
most effective use of our limited resources. As always, we must
also rely on building and maintaining partnerships with a
variety of international, Federal, State, local, and Tribal
partners to detect, deter, and interdict any threats well
before they reach the waters of the United States.
In conclusion, the United States Coast Guard is an
important partner in securing the U.S. maritime border. We must
constantly improve our ability to detect, monitor, and
intercept in-bound vessels to our Nation from overseas, in the
Transit Zone, and in our ports. In doing so, we must ensure we
help to facilitate legitimate activity and support safe and
efficient maritime commerce.
Thank you for your opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral William D. Lee
November 19, 2013
introduction
Good morning Madame Chair Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here
today to discuss the Coast Guard's role in maritime border security.
The U.S. maritime border is vast and challenging in its scope and
diversity. It encompasses the expanse of our ports and internal waters,
our Territorial Seas, Contiguous Zone, and our Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) out to 200 nautical miles from shore and beyond in some cases for
Extended Continental Shelf Claims. Threats to our maritime border have
the potential to adversely impact our National security and economic
prosperity. These threats include illicit smuggling and trafficking
activities conducted by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs),
undocumented migration, illegal exploitation of our natural resources,
potential terrorist activities, and the disruption of maritime
commerce. Securing our maritime borders requires a layered, multi-
faceted approach of authorities, capabilities, competencies, and
partnerships. To accomplish its mission, the Coast Guard optimizes the
use of operational resources, leverages intelligence and maritime
domain awareness programs, and fosters domestic and international
partnerships. These activities deter, and disrupt threats as far from
the United States as possible. The Coast Guard is at the forefront of
securing the broad and varied expanse of ocean that makes up our
maritime border while facilitating the smooth and efficient flow of
legitimate maritime commerce and transportation.
maritime domain awareness
One of the most important aspects of the Coast Guard's layered
security approach is to understand the movement of vessels, people, and
goods across our maritime borders. By combining security operations
with effective governance such as vessel and cargo screening protocols,
enforcing notice of arrival requirements and leveraging intelligence
and information resources from across Government, the Coast Guard
facilitates the secure and efficient flow of commerce through our
Nation's waterways.
Vessel screening applies analytical criteria to inbound vessels to
develop a manageable set of targets for a potential Coast Guard
boarding and/or inspection. The Coast Guard screens ships, crews, and
passengers for all vessels required to submit a 96-hour Advance Notice
of Arrival (ANOA) prior to entering a U.S. port. Complementary
screening efforts occur at the National and tactical levels. At the
National level, the Intelligence Coordination Center's Coastwatch
Branch, which is co-located with CBP at the National Targeting Center,
screens crew and passenger information. Through our partnership with
CBP, we have expanded access to counter-terrorism, law enforcement, and
immigration databases and this integration has led to greater
information sharing and more effective security operations. In 2012,
Coastwatch screened approximately 118,000 ANOAs and 29.5 million crew/
passenger records.
At the tactical level, each of the Coast Guard's Area Commanders
receives support from a Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC),
which screens the commercial vessels operating within their areas of
responsibility (over 350,000 in 2012) for unique indicators, as well as
providing additional screening for vessels that submit an ANOA. The
MIFCs focus on screening characteristics associated with the vessels
itself, such as ownership, ownership associations, cargo, and previous
activity. Coast Guard vessel screening results are disseminated to the
appropriate DHS Maritime Interagency Operations Center, Sector Command
Center, local intelligence staffs, and CBP and other interagency
partners to evaluate and take action on any potential risks.
The Coast Guard also supports the CBP Container Security
Initiative, to ensure that all United States-bound maritime shipping
containers posing a potential risk are identified and inspected prior
to being placed on vessels. This initiative encourages interagency
cooperation through collecting and sharing information and trade data
gathered from ports, strengthening cooperation and facilitating risk-
informed decision making.
operations to counter maritime risk
Coast Guard cutters, maritime patrol aircraft, and Law Enforcement
Detachments (LEDETs) embarked on U.S. Navy and Allied nation vessels
are critical enforcement and deterrence assets in the offshore
environment. They are capable of responding to threats far from our
coasts and maintain a vigilant presence over U.S. interests on the High
Seas and in our EEZ. Closer to home, Coast Guard helicopters, patrol
boats, and boat stations monitor, track, and interdict vessels of
interest. In our ports, the Coast Guard partners with Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and industry stakeholders, to monitor critical
infrastructure, conduct vessel escorts and patrols, and inspect vessels
and facilities. The Coast Guard's mix of multi-mission cutters,
aircraft, boats, as well as deployable specialized forces, allows us to
exercise layered and effective security throughout the maritime domain.
To leverage existing programs, the Coast Guard established formal
partnerships to collaborate with CBP on their maritime Predator
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) program (land-based), and with the Navy
UAS programs. Incorporating the UAS capability with manned patrolling
will improve detection and surveillance activities at a significantly
reduced cost when compared to manned aviation.
During a recent proof-of-concept deployment aboard USCGC BERTHOLF,
the ScanEagle UAS proved to be a superb force multiplier in two
separate law enforcement cases, resulting in the removal of 570
kilograms of cocaine and the detention of six suspected smugglers.
When the Coast Guard is alerted to a specific maritime threat to
the United States that requires a coordinated U.S. Government response,
the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan is activated. The
MOTR Plan uses established protocols and an integrated network of
National-level maritime command and operations centers to facilitate
real-time Federal interagency communication, coordination, and decision
making to ensure a timely, unified, and decisive response to maritime
threats.
international partnerships
To detect, deter, and counter threats as early as possible, the
Coast Guard fosters strategic relationships with partner nations. The
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code provides an
international regime to ensure ship and port facilities take
appropriate preventative measures consistent with our domestic regime
under the Maritime Transportation Security Act. Through the
International Port Security Program, the Coast Guard conducts foreign
port assessments to determine the port security effectiveness and
antiterrorism measures of foreign trading partners. Since the inception
of the International Port Security Program in 2004, Coast Guard
personnel have visited more than 150 countries and approximately 1,200
port facilities. These countries generally receive biennial assessments
to verify compliance with the ISPS Code and U.S. maritime security
regulations, as appropriate. Vessels arriving in non-ISPS Code-
compliant countries are required to take additional security
precautions while in those ports and may be boarded by the Coast Guard
before being granted permission to enter U.S. ports. In specific cases,
these vessels may be refused entry.
To more effectively counter maritime threats in the offshore region
and throughout the Western Hemisphere, the Coast Guard maintains more
than 30 maritime bilateral law enforcement agreements with partner
nations. These agreements facilitate coordination of operations and the
forward deployment of boats, cutters, aircraft, and personnel to deter
and counter threats as close to their origin as possible.
To further address maritime threats and to improve security along
with Southwest Border of the United States, the Coast Guard, U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the Mexican Navy (SEMAR), and the Mexican
Secretariat for Communications and Transportation (SCT) have
strengthened relations through the Security and Prosperity Partnership
(SPP). Through the SPP, SEMAR and SCT are increasing their engagement
with the Coast Guard through training, exercises, coordinated
operations, and intelligence and information sharing. Furthermore, the
North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI) provides an
operational relationship between SEMAR, NORTHCOM, Canadian Forces, and
the Coast Guard built upon standard procedures for communications,
training, and operations. Since the inception of NAMSI in December
2008, there have been 30 joint narcotics interdiction cases resulting
in the seizure of 97,200 pounds of illegal narcotics.
Cooperation and collaboration with Canada remains one of the Coast
Guard's most enduring and effective international partnerships. As
outlined in the U.S.-Canada Beyond the Border declaration, border
security includes the safety, security, and resiliency of our Nation;
the protection of our environmental resources; and the facilitation of
the safe and secure movement of commerce in the global supply chain.
The Coast Guard is a key part of Integrated Border Enforcement Team
(IBET) activities, where U.S. and Canadian agencies share information
and expertise to support interdiction operations along our common
border. From this partnership, an operational relationship known as
Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO),
commonly referred to as Shiprider, has emerged. The ICMLEO arrangement
spans the shared waterways of U.S./Canadian maritime border, and
greatly facilitates cooperative, integrated maritime operations by
providing U.S. and Canadian law enforcement officers the authority to
conduct joint law enforcement operations on both sides of the border.
domestic partnerships
The Coast Guard coordinates and conducts joint operations with
other DHS components and interagency partners as part of a whole-of-
Government response to maritime border threats. Along the Southwest
Border, DHS partners continue to apply a broad-based approach to keep
communities safe from threats of border-related violence and crime, and
to weaken the TCOs that threaten the safety of communities throughout
the Western Hemisphere.
In our ports, the Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) is
designated as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC). In this
role, COTPs lead the Nation's 43 Area Maritime Security Committees
(AMSC) and oversee the development, regular review, and annual exercise
of their respective Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSPs). AMSC's assist
and advise the FMSC in the development, review, and implementation of a
coordination/communication framework to identify risks and
vulnerabilities in and around ports. Additionally, AMSC's coordinate
resources to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from
Transportation Security Incidents (TSIs). AMSCs have developed strong
working partnerships between all levels of Government and private
industry stakeholders.
On a National scale, the establishment of Interagency Operations
Centers (IOCs) for port security is well underway. In ports such as
Charleston, Puget Sound, San Diego, Boston, and Jacksonville, the Coast
Guard, CBP, and other agencies are sharing workspace and coordinating
operational efforts for improved efficiency and effectiveness of
maritime security operations.
The Regional Coordinating Mechanism (ReCoM) is another example of
the evolution of coordinated joint operations among interagency
partners. Located at San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, the
ReCoMs are manned with Coast Guard, CBP, and State and local law
enforcement agencies. The San Diego and Los Angeles/Long Beach ReCoMs
coordinated operations contributing directly to the interdiction of
1,002 illegal migrants and 210,900 pounds of illegal drugs in fiscal
year 2012 and fiscal year 2013.
To counter the drug and migrant smuggling threat in waters off
Southern California, the Coast Guard, in partnership with other
Federal, State, and local agencies increased our levels of effort for
the standing Coast Guard Operation Baja Tempestad.
This combined operation brings additional resources to the fight
against TCOs, including flight deck-equipped cutters with airborne and
surface use-of-force capability; increased Coast Guard and Customs and
Border Protection maritime patrol aircraft flights; additional non-
compliant vessel use-of-force endgame capabilities from our shore-based
boats; and enhanced intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination. In fiscal year 2013, this interagency effort has led to
the removal of more than 90,900 pounds of marijuana and the
apprehension of 400 illegal migrants.
On the high seas and throughout the 6 million-square-mile drug
Transit Zone, joint interdiction operations with Federal partners are
coordinated through Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) and
Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W). To support detection,
monitoring, interdiction, and apprehension operations in the Transit
Zone, the Coast Guard leverages maritime assets by forward deploying
cutters, patrol aircraft, and Law Enforcement Detachments embarked on
U.S. Navy and Allied (British, Dutch, and Canadian) assets. The Coast
Guard also works closely with the State and Justice Departments to
bring suspected illicit traffickers to the United States for
prosecution.
In Puerto Rico, the Coast Guard is part of a broad Federal effort
to strengthen current joint operations. As the lead Federal maritime
agency within DHS, the Coast Guard is conducting targeted surge
operations in the maritime domain and is collaborating with
international stakeholders to stem the flow of illicit drugs into
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. As a result of these joint
efforts, 7,165 kilograms of cocaine and 200 pounds of marijuana were
removed in fiscal year 2012 and 24,000 kilograms of cocaine and 9,500
pounds of marijuana were removed in fiscal year 2013.
conclusion
The Coast Guard's layered maritime border security strategy
addresses the broad range of offshore and coastal threats that have the
potential to impact our National security and economic prosperity. From
our efforts to expand maritime domain awareness to our international
and domestic partnerships, and investments in cutter, boat, and
aircraft recapitalization, the Coast Guard continues to improve
maritime border security while facilitating the safe flow of legitimate
commerce.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and thank you for
your continued support of the U.S. Coast Guard. I would be pleased to
answer your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Admiral.
As I recognize Commissioner Alles, let me just take a point
of personal privilege, since you were talking about interagency
partnerships between yourself and CBP. I see that every day in
my own district at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, where we
have Air Station Detroit. Colonel Ogden is your sector
commander there. Colonel Rembold does such a great job with the
Air and Marine Northern Border Wing there, as well. It really
is a wonderful thing to see them all.
So, with that, Commissioner Alles.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RANDOLPH D. ALLES, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
General Alles. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller and Ranking
Member Jackson Lee and distinguished Members of the committee.
It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the
critical role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in securing
our Nation's maritime borders.
I appreciate the committee's leadership and commitment to
ensuring the security of the American people. I look forward to
discussing Air and Marine contributions to CBP's antiterrorism
and border security mission at and beyond our borders in
support of CBP's layered approach to security efforts.
So we are here to discuss what a secure maritime border
looks like. A security maritime border necessitates significant
domain awareness and involves partnerships, intelligence, and a
coordinated approach to the use of detection resources for
effective understanding of the threats associated with the
maritime domain that could impact the security, safety,
economy, or environment of the United States.
Maritime security cannot be measured by a single metric;
rather, a secure maritime border is one where ample
opportunities and capabilities are present to mitigate threats
and keep our communities safe.
Over the past 11 years, CBP has dedicated historic levels
of personnel and technology and resources in support of our
maritime security efforts. The number of Air and Marine agents
dedicated to supporting CBP's mission currently stands at 1,728
enforcement and support personnel throughout the United States
and its territories, which is about a three-fold increase since
we were first created.
In fiscal year 2013, Air and Marine interdicted over
820,000 pounds of illicit drugs, with a street value of almost
$12 billion; conducted 3,000 arrests; participated in the
apprehension of 48,000 illegal immigrants; seized $24 million
in currency and 3,100 weapons.
Our maritime border security mission is complex and
challenging. The maritime domain, generally less restricted
than the air and land domain, is an expansive pathway to the
world without fences. The pathway connects to more than 95,000
miles of U.S. maritime border.
Our aerial assets play a critical role in maritime security
efforts. Air and Marine P-3s are high-endurance, all-weather
aircraft used to intercept and track airborne smuggling
threats. In partnership with the Coast Guard, Air and Marine
developed a maritime variant of the Predator B called the
Guardian. Air and Marine pilots, augmented by Coast Guard
personnel, use the Guardian to conduct long-range surveillance
in support of joint counter-narcotics operations in the
southeast coastal, Gulf of Mexico, drug source, and transit
zones. Working in conjunction with aviation assets, Air and
Marine interceptor vessels operate in offshore coastal waters
to combat smuggling and protect the U.S. maritime border from
acts of terrorism.
To address the small-boat challenge and increase security
and maritime domain awareness, CBP's Office of Field Operations
implemented the Small Vessel Reporting System. It is a
voluntary on-line system for the reporting of foreign travel of
small vessels' operators and passengers. It segregates low-risk
vessels and boater traffic and increases our ability to
identify suspicious or unknown vessels approaching or traveling
U.S. waterways.
Additionally, a considerable threat along the maritime
border involves the use of pangas, as mentioned by Admiral Lee.
Smugglers use these wood or fiberglass homemade fishing
vessels, with relatively high-speed capabilities, their small
radar signature, and the cover of darkness, in an attempt to
evade detection by service patrol vessels and patrol aircraft.
They are used to quickly move contraband short distances.
Larger and high-powered pangas, ranging in size up to 50 feet
in length, are capable of carrying multi-ton loads of
contraband great distance. Of the 123 maritime seizures to the
San Diego region in fiscal year 2013, 81 were pangas, and they
accounted for 93,000 pounds of marijuana.
Air and Marine has been an integral part of successful
interagency counter-narcotics missions. For example, operating
in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force South,
Air and Marine assets, including P-3 aircraft, patrol a 6-
million-mile area of the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific
known as the Transit Zone. We heavily cooperate with the Coast
Guard in this region, I would say, on a daily basis.
Air and Marine continues to engage with the Coast Guard and
DOD to identify and deploy enabling technology to permit the
expansion of overall maritime domain awareness and the
integration of information and maritime sensor data throughout
DOD and DHS. Currently, we are collaborating with DOD to obtain
additional radar data from patrolling DOD air and service
assets along the California coastline to increase our maritime
domain awareness.
Coordination and cooperation among all entities that have a
stake in our mission have been and continue to be paramount to
an effective maritime security strategy. Air and Marine
continues to unify our enforcement efforts and expand
collaboration with other agencies.
Because of the continual support of Congress, Air and
Marine has been a significant contributor to CBP's progress in
securing our Nation's maritime borders. We will continue to
transform our aviation and maritime fleet to enhance detection
and interdiction capabilities and work with our international
and Federal partners to combat the risks that exist today and
be prepared for those of tomorrow.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss our role of Air and Marine and also
Customs and Border Protection. I look forward to answering your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Alles follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Randolph D. Alles
November 19, 2013
introduction
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you
today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) efforts to
secure our Nation's maritime borders.
We are here today to discuss what a secure maritime border looks
like. A secure maritime border necessitates significant domain
awareness and involves partnerships, intelligence, and a coordinated
approach to the use of detection resources for effective understanding
of the threats associated with the maritime domain that could impact
the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.
Maritime security cannot be measured by a single metric. Rather, a
secure maritime border is one where ample opportunities and
capabilities are present to mitigate threats and keep our communities
safe.
As America's front-line border agency, CBP is responsible for
securing America's borders against threats while facilitating the
lawful flow of people and goods entering the United States. To
accomplish our mission, CBP has deployed a multi-layered, risk-based
approach to enhance the security of our borders. This layered approach
to security reduces our reliance on any single point or program that
could be compromised. The ``defense-in-depth'' strategy extends our
zone of security outward, ensuring that our physical border is not the
first or last line of defense, but one of many.
overview of cbp maritime security operations
CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM) is the world's largest
aviation and maritime law enforcement organization, and is a critical
component of CBP's layered enforcement strategy for border security.
OAM protects the American people and the Nation's critical
infrastructure through the coordinated use of integrated air and marine
assets to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the
unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband toward
or across the borders of the United States.
Over the past 11 years, CBP has dedicated historic levels of
personnel, technology, and resources in support of our maritime
security efforts. The number of OAM agents dedicated to performing
CBP's mission has grown from 943 in fiscal year 2002 to a present force
of 1,728 enforcement and support personnel throughout the United States
and territories.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As of pay period 20, fiscal year 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OAM operations in the field are divided into three regions: The
Southwest Border Region, the Northern Border Region, and the Southeast
Border Region. Each region is split into Air and Marine Branches, and
then further divided into Air and/or Marine Units.
OAM also operates two unique operational entities: National Air
Security Operations (NASO) and the Air and Marine Operations Center
(AMOC). NASO, operating out of six centers Nation-wide, coordinates
operational activities, long-range planning, and project oversight for
the P-3 aircraft and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) programs. AMOC is a
state-of-the-art law enforcement operations and domain awareness center
that conducts air and marine surveillance operations. These air and
marine surveillance operations provide direct coordination and support
to OAM; CBP law enforcement agents performing interdiction missions;
and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies conducting
criminal investigations. The AMOC is located in Riverside, California,
with satellite operations centers in Puerto Rico and the National
Capital Region.
The OAM fleet consists of 289 coastal and riverine vessels and 242
aircraft including 105 fixed-wing, and 137 rotary-wing. These assets
provide critical aerial and maritime surveillance, interdiction, and
operational assistance to ground personnel to support CBP's maritime
security mission. CBP continues to modernize its fleet to enhance our
operational performance in diverse marine environments and increase our
ability to adapt to the challenges of securing the maritime approaches
to the United States.
Additionally, in support of OAM operations, CBP has assumed
responsibility for the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) Program
from the Department of Defense (DOD) in fiscal year 2014. TARS has
assisted CBP and its legacy agencies with providing air domain
awareness for more than 20 years--it is a multi-mission capability that
supports CBP's border security mission.
OAM provides surveillance of known air, land, and maritime
smuggling routes in an area that is twice the size of the United
States. With our partners, OAM agents detect, monitor, and disrupt
illicit activities before they reach the shore.
maritime threats and efforts
CBP's maritime border security mission is complex and challenging.
The maritime domain, generally less restricted than the air and land
domains, is an expansive pathway to the world without fences. That
pathway connects to more than 95,000 miles of U.S. shoreline.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ DHS, Small Vessel Security Strategy, April 2008, page 4. http:/
/www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
require many commercial, passenger, and fishing vessels to operate with
an Automatic Identification System (AIS), a tracking system to, among
other things, increase maritime awareness, the requirement does not
cover many small vessels.\3\ The United States Coast Guard (USCG)
estimates that, combined with unregistered watercraft, there are
approximately 17 million small vessels \4\ operating in U.S. waterways;
a majority of these vessels are not required to utilize AIS. Therefore,
detecting and assessing the risk of small vessels is particularly
challenging.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Small vessels'' are characterized as any watercraft,
regardless of method of propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Small
vessels can include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats and
yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, or any other
commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages. DHS, Small
Vessel Security Implementation Plan Report to the Public, January,
2001, page 1. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-uscg-small-vessel-
security-strategy-report-to-public-012011.pdf.
\4\ USCG 2006 boater statistics compiled from State boater
registration reports indicate there are 13 million registered boats in
the United States. When combined with unregistered boats, the figure is
estimated at 17 million total U.S. watercraft. DHS, Small Vessel
Security Strategy, April 2008, footnote 2, page i. http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the maritime environment contains both legitimate and
illegitimate traffic sharing the same transit routes. Smugglers use a
wide range of evolving methods, including the use of small vessels, to
move contraband and people across our borders. OAM adapts its strategy
and response to address emerging threats, tactics, and intelligence.
As part of CBP's comprehensive effort to improve the security of
our Nation's borders while enhancing legitimate travel specifically for
small boaters, CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) utilizes several
alternate inspection programs such as the Canadian Border Boater permit
(I-68), Nexus Marine program, and the Small Vessel Reporting System
(SVRS). SVRS, a voluntary, on-line program to report the foreign travel
of small vessel operators and passengers, was developed to better track
small vessels and make it easier to identify suspicious or unknown
vessels. Enrollment in SVRS includes completing an on-line application,
attending a face-to-face interview with a CBP officer, and, if needed,
providing biometrics for verification. Once enrolled, participants are
able to submit a ``float plan'' consisting of biographical information
of all persons intending on traveling, vessel registration information,
and itinerary information. By enrolling and submitting a float plan,
participants may not have to appear in person for inspection by a CBP
officer each time they enter the United States. Participants are still
required to report via telephone their arrival in the United States.
Initiatives such as SVRS provide CBP with advanced vessel information
and increased awareness of small vessels approaching or traveling U.S.
waterways. Segregating low-risk vessels facilitates legitimate
recreational boater traffic and increases CBP's ability to identify
higher-risk vessels and dedicate resources to address illicit maritime
activities.
A considerable threat along our entire maritime border involves the
use of ``pangas.'' Smugglers use these wood or fiberglass homemade
fishing vessels' relatively high-speed capabilities, small radar
signature, and the cover of darkness to attempt to evade detection by
surface patrol vessels and patrol aircraft. Small panga vessels are
used to quickly move contraband short distances; however, larger and
higher-powered pangas can range in size up to 50 feet in length and are
capable of carrying multi-ton loads of contraband greater distances.
A recent trend identified off the California coast is a shift from
using smaller panga vessels that make quick cross-border trips to beach
areas near San Diego to using larger pangas. Larger pangas are
typically used in the Western Caribbean transit zones from South
America, but are now transiting from Mexico farther offshore and
farther northward along the California coast.
In fiscal year 2013, the San Diego Maritime Domain along the
California Coast, had 243 maritime smuggling events and 123 seizures,
of which 81 were pangas, accounting for 93,240 pounds of marijuana.
OAM is taking the Southern California panga threat seriously and is
evaluating a number of options to aggressively address the significant
increase in smuggling events and the trends moving these panga trips
northward. Our response includes increasing the number of Multi-Role
Enforcement Aircraft (MEAs) and maritime UAS patrols; the realignment
of vessels and personnel in Southern California through surge
operations; and the expansion of our partnerships.
collaborative efforts
Through collaboration and coordination with our many partners, we
have made great strides with regard to the integrity and security of
our maritime borders.
In 2011, the CBP Commissioner, USCG Commandant, and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director signed the cross-
component Maritime Operations Coordination (MOC) plan. The plan
addresses the unique nature of the maritime environment and sets forth
a layered, DHS-wide approach to homeland security issues within the
maritime domain, ensuring integrated planning, information sharing, and
increased response capability in each area of responsibility.
OAM has been an integral part of successful interagency counter-
narcotics missions. For example, operating in coordination with the
Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S), OAM assets, including P-
3 aircraft, patrol a 6 million-square-mile area of the Western
Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, known as the transit zone, in search of
drugs and illicit migrants that are in transit toward United States'
shores. OAM's distinctive detection capabilities allow highly-trained
crews to identify emerging threats well beyond the land borders of the
United States.
In partnership with USCG, OAM developed a maritime variant of its
Predator B unmanned aircraft system (UAS), called the Guardian, to
increase reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and acquisition
capabilities in maritime operating environments. OAM pilots, augmented
by USCG personnel, use the Guardian to conduct long-range surveillance
in support of joint counter-narcotics operations in the southeast
coastal and Gulf of Mexico border regions and drug source and transit
zones, where maritime radar is necessary to detect a variety of
threats. The Guardian is a strategic asset for homeland security
operated at and beyond the Nation's borders to overcome threats moving
towards the United States.
CBP, with assistance from several NASO Centers, USCG, DOD, along
with State, local, and Tribal partners participate in Operation Blue
Tempest. OAM supports this operation using P-3, DHC-8, MQ-9 (Guardian
UAS) aircraft and marine interceptors. Operation Blue Tempest is
intended to disrupt and seize drugs moving from the source zone through
the transit zones on their way towards the United States. On-going
missions provide aerial and maritime surveillance in transit/arrival
zones allowing OAM to gather intelligence, develop a maritime database
and exploit targets of opportunity that are conducting drug and alien
smuggling in the California Coastal Region. The intelligence gained
from these missions is shared among all operational participants. This
intelligence may also be shared with the Government of Mexico (GoM)
using vetted GoM Liaisons on staff at the AMOC. This sharing of
information, which is done in coordination with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) as the single point of contact on behalf of the
United States with regards to drug-related matters in the foreign
environment, is critical in identifying potential departure locations
to better posture limited GoM and U.S. resources in response.
OAM continues to engage with the USCG and DOD to identify and
deploy enabling technologies that permit the expansion of overall
maritime domain awareness and the integration of information and
maritime sensor data throughout DOD and DHS. Through this partnership,
OAM is negotiating with DOD to receive radar data from patrolling DOD
air and surface assets along the California Coastline. AMOC already
receives feeds from airborne DOD aircraft and is looking to the Navy
Southern California Offshore Range as an additional source for enhanced
maritime domain awareness. With the support of the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate and the USCG Research and Development Center,
prototype technologies have been deployed to the AMOC and USCG Los
Angeles/Long Beach Sector, and are currently under evaluation. The
Coastal Surveillance System (CSS) pilot has already shown promise in
its ability to manage and coherently integrate various maritime sensor
systems into a single picture, which can be then shared between
stakeholders.
DHS and CBP have cooperated in various law enforcement and border
security efforts including conducting joint air interdiction operations
with Mexican forces to increase apprehensions of suspect air traffic.
CBP continues to enhance our partnerships with our international
counterparts, as well as Federal, State, local, and Tribal law
enforcement agencies and the public and private sectors to monitor,
collect, analyze, and produce intelligence reporting on smuggling
tactics, techniques, and procedures. Intelligence provides front-line
personnel with a better understanding of the illicit transportation
methods and concealment techniques they are likely to encounter.
Coordination and cooperation among all entities that have a stake in
our mission have been, and continue to be, paramount to an effective
maritime security strategy. OAM continues to unify our enforcement
efforts and expand collaboration with other agencies.
indicators of success
OAM will continue to work with our partners to increase maritime
domain awareness through shared intelligence, advancements in
technology, and continued cooperative efforts in detection and
interdiction.
OAM efforts, in coordination with our partners, have resulted in
the seizure of immense quantities of contraband, and disrupted
considerable illicit activity before it reaches our shores. In fiscal
year 2013, OAM conducted more than 73,500 flight hours and 44,500
underway hours, resulting in the arrest of 2,997 individuals, the
apprehension of more than 48,000 illegal migrants, over 3,100 weapons,
$24,696,873.00 in currency, and the seizure of more than 820,000 pounds
of illegal drugs which includes cocaine seizures valued at nearly $10
billion and marijuana seizures valued at $1.8 billion.
Over the last decade, OAM has evolved to counter the egregious
threat of non-compliant vessels. OAM has developed capabilities to
disable non-compliant vessels and prevent the more serious violators
from reaching our communities. Since 2003, OAM has engaged in 108
incidents involving marine warning and/or disabling rounds, and one
incident involving air-to-vessel warning and disabling rounds. In each
case, the criminals were safely brought to justice without incident or
injury.
We acknowledge that there is still work to do. The path forward is
to improve our maritime domain awareness by continually enhancing our
detection capabilities, maximizing maritime intelligence integration,
increasing our resources, enhancing and expanding our technologies, and
strategically aligning our resources to allow flexibility in responding
to potential threats. OAM will continue to use a risk-based approach to
adapt and align our personnel and assets as needed to address emerging
and dynamic threats and to keep our maritime borders secure.
conclusion
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify about the work
of CBP and OAM. With your support, we will continue to refine and
further enhance the effectiveness of our detection and interdiction
capabilities. I look forward to answering any questions you may have at
this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Commissioner Alles.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Caldwell for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, MARITIME AND
SECURITY COAST GUARD ISSUES, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE
TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Caldwell. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
and other Members of the committee, thank you very much for
inviting GAO to be here today to discuss how we secure our
maritime borders.
Based on GAO's prior work, there are several factors that
are critical to securing those maritime borders. These are:
Robust maritime domain awareness; assessment of risks from
foreign ports; international partnerships; maritime
surveillance, interdiction, and security operations; domestic
partnerships along our coast and in our ports; and measuring
maritime security.
So Admiral Lee and General Alles have already discussed
many of these same factors, so I think I will concentrate my
comments on the last factor, which is: How do we measure the
security of our maritime borders? My comments are in the spirit
of the bill you had in the last Congress, H.R. 1417, a bill
with bipartisan support from Chairman McCaul, Chairman Miller,
as well as Representatives Thompson and Jackson Lee.
H.R. 1417 called for DHS to develop and implement metrics
on the effectiveness of security in the maritime environment.
Some of these potential metrics, for example, were undocumented
migrant interdiction rates, illicit drug removal rates, cocaine
removal rates in the Transit Zone, response rates for assets to
arrive on scene.
These metrics are definitely a good start. However, there
are going to be many challenges coming up with additional
meaningful metrics. As you know, some of the H.R. 1417 metrics
depend on estimates of things that are pretty hard to estimate,
such as the actual flow of illegal migrants and drugs.
GAO's prior work has shed some light on both some of the
progress and the challenges that we have made as a Nation in
terms of measuring the security of our maritime borders. Some
of the problems I have noted in my written statement, including
cases where there is a lack of reliable or accurate data. There
is a case where we have data but it is not being used to manage
our programs. In some cases, there is just a lack of outcome-
based measures.
In our November 2011 report, we took a detailed look at the
Coast Guard's attempts to measure risk reduction related to its
maritime security mission. Coast Guard, to its credit, did try
to develop a measure that identified the percentage of
reduction in maritime security risks resulting from various
Coast Guard activities. However, given the relative dearth of
actual maritime attacks or incidents, the Coast Guard used
subject-matter experts to estimate these risks as a proxy
measure to try to get at how we may have prevented, say, the
radical terrorist attack.
This exercise demonstrated that estimating risk reduction
itself is inherently uncertain, as this measure is based
largely on subjective measures of Coast Guard--subjective
judgments of Coast Guard personnel. Therefore, the risk-
reduction results that were reported and have been reported for
several years were not based on measurable or observable
activities but on those judgments.
Looking at the Coast Guard's broader maritime mission set,
things like search-and-rescue and vessel safety, that makes it
even more difficult for Coast Guard to use such measurements of
security measures to manage its resources. So one of the
challenges is going to be, can you combine a variety of the
missions combined by Coast Guard and CBP to look at some of
these broad measurements of mission success as well as some of
the more specific ones?
In closing, GAO will continue to work with this committee
and the Congress as a whole to help agencies develop and refine
performance measures that can measure the security of our
maritime borders. Such measures can help agencies better gauge
their progress and better manage their workforce and their
assets.
Thank you very much. I will be happy to respond to
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Caldwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell
November 19, 2013
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-14-196T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Maritime borders are gateways to our Nation's maritime
transportation system of ports, waterways, and vessels--which handle
billions of dollars of cargo annually. An attack on this system could
have dire consequences and affect the global economy. In addition,
criminals could use small vessels to smuggle narcotics, aliens, and
other contraband across U.S. maritime borders. Within DHS, the Coast
Guard is responsible for many homeland security efforts in the maritime
domain, including conducting port facility and commercial vessel
inspections and coordinating maritime information-sharing efforts,
among other things. In addition, CBP is responsible for screening
incoming vessels' crews and cargo to facilitate the flow of legitimate
trade and passengers.
This testimony identifies key factors important to secure the
maritime borders, and discusses progress and challenges in related DHS
programs. This statement is based on products GAO issued from July 2003
through October 2013.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports to strengthen
its maritime security programs. DHS generally concurred with these
recommendations and has taken actions, or has actions under way, to
address them.
maritime security.--progress and challenges in key dhs programs to
secure the maritime borders
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work has identified several key factors important to
secure the maritime borders. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and its components have made progress (e.g., coordinating with
partners), and in some cases also experienced challenges with their
related maritime security programs.
Maintaining robust maritime domain awareness.--It is
critical that Federal agencies maintain maritime domain
awareness--the understanding of anything associated with the
global maritime environment that could adversely affect the
security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.
The U.S. Coast Guard has developed systems--including
information-sharing and vessel-tracking systems--to enhance
maritime domain awareness. GAO's prior work has found that the
Coast Guard has made progress in developing its systems, but
that it also experienced some challenges. For example, in July
2011, GAO reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of
building a system intended to enable the sharing of information
among its new offshore vessels and aircraft. GAO recommended
that the agency take actions to address this challenge. DHS
concurred and stated it planned to take actions.
Assessing risks coming from foreign ports.--The security of
maritime borders also depends upon security at foreign ports
where cargo bound for the United States originates. U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the Coast Guard have
developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports, foreign
vessels entering U.S. ports, and the cargo carried by these
vessels from these ports. In September 2013, GAO found that CBP
has taken steps to enhance the security of U.S.-bound cargo,
but CBP does not periodically assess the supply chain security
risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States.
GAO recommended that CBP periodically assess the supply chain
security risks from these ports. DHS concurred with GAO's
recommendation and reported that it planned to take actions to
address it.
Conducting maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security
operations.--Along the coasts and in ports, maritime
surveillance, interdiction, and operations are conducted to
ensure the security of the maritime borders. For example, CBP's
Office of Air and Marine is to provide maritime surveillance
and interdiction capabilities. In March 2012, GAO found that
the office did not meet its National performance goal and did
not provide higher rates of support in locations designated as
high-priority. GAO made recommendations to help ensure that the
office's assets and personnel are best positioned to
effectively meet mission needs and address threats, among other
things. DHS concurred and reported that it planned to take
action to address the recommendations by the end of March 2014.
Measuring performance.--In securing our maritime borders,
DHS and its component agencies have faced challenges in
developing meaningful performance measures. For example, GAO's
prior work found that they have experienced challenges
collecting complete, accurate, and reliable data; among other
things. In January 2011, GAO reported that both CBP and the
Coast Guard tracked the frequency of illegal seafarer incidents
at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied
considerably between the two component agencies and between the
agencies ' field and headquarters units. GAO made a
recommendation to improve the accuracy of DHS data, and DHS
concurred and has made progress in addressing the
recommendation.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss key aspects of a
secure maritime border. Maritime borders are gateways to our Nation's
maritime transportation system of ports, waterways, and vessels, which
handle billions of dollars of cargo annually. Accordingly, maritime
borders are critical to our National security. For instance, an attack
on this system could have a widespread effect on global shipping,
international trade, and the global economy, and an attack on a
domestic port could have dire consequences because of the size of ports
and their general proximity to metropolitan areas. Further, criminals
could use small vessels to smuggle narcotics, aliens, and other
contraband across U.S. maritime borders. Balancing maritime security
concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of people and
commerce remains an on-going challenge for the public and private
sectors alike.
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Coast
Guard has much of the responsibility for ensuring the safety and
security of U.S. maritime interests and leading homeland security
efforts in the maritime domain. In this capacity, the Coast Guard
conducts port facility and commercial vessel inspections, coordinates
maritime information-sharing efforts, and promotes maritime domain
awareness, among other things.\1\ Also within DHS, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for screening incoming vessels'
crews and cargoes for the presence of contraband, such as weapons of
mass destruction, illicit drugs, or explosives, while facilitating the
flow of legitimate trade and passengers. Several other DHS components,
such as the Transportation Security Administration, the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
also have roles in securing our maritime borders.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Maritime domain awareness is the understanding by stakeholders
involved in maritime security of anything associated with the global
maritime environment that could adversely affect the security, safety,
economy, or environment of the United States.
\2\ The Transportation Security Administration has responsibility
for managing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
program, which is designed to control the access of maritime workers to
regulated maritime facilities in the United States. The Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office is responsible for acquiring and supporting
the deployment of radiation detection equipment, including radiation
portal monitors at domestic seaports to support the scanning of cargo
containers before they enter U.S. commerce. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency is responsible for administering grants intended to
improve the security of the Nation's highest-risk port areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My statement today identifies key factors that are important to
secure the maritime borders and discusses progress and challenges in
related DHS programs. Specifically, I will address the following
factors: (1) Maritime domain awareness; (2) risks from foreign ports;
(3) international partnerships in global supply chain security; (4)
maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations; (5)
partnerships and coordination along the coasts and in ports; and (6)
measuring performance.
My statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from
July 2003 through October 2013 related to maritime, port, vessel, and
cargo security and other related aspects of maritime border security.
To perform the work for our previous reports and testimonies, we
visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents,
port security plans, and other documents; and interviewed officials
from the Federal, State, local, private, and international sectors,
among other things. The officials we met with represented a wide
variety of stakeholders including the Coast Guard, CBP, port
authorities, terminal operators, vessel operators, foreign governments,
and international trade organizations. Further details on the scope and
methodology for the previously-issued reports and testimonies are
available within each of the published products. We conducted the work
on which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
several factors are important to secure maritime borders and dhs has
made progress to address them, but challenges remain
Our prior work has identified several key factors important to
securing the maritime borders, which include: (1) Maintaining robust
maritime domain awareness, (2) assessing risks coming from foreign
ports, (3) leveraging international partnerships, (4) conducting
maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations, (5)
coordinating with partners along the coast and in ports, and (6)
measuring performance. Our prior work has also shown that DHS and its
components have made progress, and in some cases experienced
challenges, with their programs to address these factors.
Maintaining Robust Maritime Domain Awareness
To ensure the security of our maritime borders, it is critical that
Federal agencies maintain robust maritime domain awareness. According
to the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, the maritime
domain provides an expansive pathway around the world that terrorist
organizations could exploit for moving equipment and personnel, as well
as a means for launching attacks. Timely awareness of the maritime
domain and knowledge of threats helps the Coast Guard to detect, deter,
interdict, and defeat adversaries. For example, according to the Coast
Guard, maritime domain awareness played a key role in allowing it to
interdict narcotics, intercept thousands of alien migrants, detain
hundreds of suspected smugglers, board foreign vessels to suppress
illegal fishing, and rescue thousands of people.
To enhance maritime domain awareness, the Coast Guard works with
its maritime partners to facilitate the sharing and dissemination of a
wide array of information and intelligence to better secure the
Nation's maritime transportation system against potential threats. The
Coast Guard has made progress in developing its maritime domain
awareness systems--including its Common Operational Picture--by
increasing user access and adding data sources.\3\ The Coast Guard also
has related systems that can be used to provide enhanced maritime
domain information to Coast Guard units and port partners. However, as
we previously reported, the Coast Guard experienced challenges in
developing and implementing these systems. For example, in July 2011,
we reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of building a
single, fully interoperable Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance program
system intended to enable the sharing of information among its new
offshore vessels and aircraft.\4\ In addition, in February 2012, we
reported that the intended information-sharing capabilities of the
Coast Guard's WatchKeeper software--which was designed to gather data
to help port partner agencies collaborate in the conduct of operations
and share information, among other things--met few port partner agency
needs. This is, in part, because the Coast Guard did not determine
these needs when developing the system.\5\ Further, in April 2013, we
reported that, among other things, the Coast Guard had not followed its
own information technology development guidance when developing one of
its new maritime domain awareness systems, known as Coast Guard One
View.\6\ We recommended, and the Coast Guard concurred, that it take
actions to address these challenges. DHS stated that it planned to take
actions to address these recommendations, such as developing necessary
acquisition documentation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Common Operational Picture is an interactive, map-based
information system that can be shared among Coast Guard commands.
\4\ GAO, Coast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater Program
Remains Unachievable, GAO-11-743 (Washington, DC: July 28, 2011).
\5\ GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and
Management of Interagency Operations Centers, GAO-12-202 (Washington,
DC: Feb. 13, 2012).
\6\ GAO, Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for
Common Operational Picture Development Would Strengthen Program, GAO-
13-321 (Washington, DC: Apr. 25, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to its own systems, the Coast Guard also relies on
systems operated by other entities to help it track vessels and enhance
maritime domain awareness. For example, to track vessels at sea, the
Coast Guard uses a long-range identification and tracking system and an
automatic identification system that broadcasts information on the
vessels and their locations. To track vessels in U.S. coastal areas,
inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard operates a land-based
automatic identification system and also obtains information from radar
and cameras in some ports. In March 2009, we reported on the challenges
of tracking small vessels using available technologies.\7\ For example,
we reported that although the Coast Guard and other agencies may have
technology systems that can track small vessels within some ports,
these did not always work in bad weather or at night. In September
2012, we reported that the expansion of vessel tracking technology to
all small vessels may be of limited utility because of, among other
things, the large number of small vessels, the difficulty in
identifying threatening actions, and the challenges associated with
getting resources on scene in time to prevent an attack once it has
been identified.\8\ DHS and its components--such as the Coast Guard and
CBP--have started or completed initiatives to improve maritime domain
awareness in order to address small vessel security risks, including an
initiative to help CBP better track small vessels arriving from foreign
locations and another initiative to assist the Coast Guard in assessing
and monitoring small vessel launch sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO, Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key
Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, GAO-
09-337 (Washington, DC: Mar. 17, 2009).
\8\ GAO, Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after
the Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO-12-1009T (Washington, DC:
Sept. 11, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assessing Risks Coming from Foreign Ports
The security of maritime borders also depends, in part, upon
security at foreign ports where cargo and vessels bound for the United
States may originate. CBP and the Coast Guard have developed models to
assess the risks of cargo carried by these vessels, foreign ports, and
foreign vessels entering U.S. ports. In particular, CBP developed the
Container Security Initiative (CSI) program that places officials at
select foreign ports to use intelligence and risk assessment
information to determine whether U.S.-bound cargo container shipments
from those ports are at risk of containing weapons of mass destruction
or other terrorist contraband.\9\ CBP's selection of the initial 23 CSI
ports in 2002 was primarily based on the volume of U.S.-bound
containers, but beginning in 2003, CBP considered more threat
information when it expanded the number of CSI ports.\10\ In our
September 2013 report, we reported that CBP had not assessed the risk
posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States since
2005.\11\ In 2009, CBP developed a model that ranked 356 potential
expansion ports for a related program on the basis of risk, but it was
not implemented because of budget cuts. We found in September 2013 that
by applying CBP's risk model to fiscal year 2012 cargo shipment data,
CSI did not have a presence at about half of the ports CBP considered
high-risk, and about one fifth of the existing CSI ports were at lower-
risk locations. As a result, we recommended that CBP periodically
assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship
cargo to the United States and use the results to inform any future
expansion of CSI and determine whether changes need to be made to
existing CSI ports. DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported
that by December 2014 it plans to develop a process for conducting
periodic assessments of the supply chain security risks from all ports
that ship cargo to the United States and use information from the
assessments to determine if future expansion or adjustments to CSI
locations are appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ As of July 2013, there were 58 CSI ports in 32 countries that,
collectively, accounted for over 80 percent of the container shipments
imported into the United States.
\10\ We reported in September 2013 that CBP subsequently added 35
ports to the CSI program from 2003 through 2007 on the basis of
additional criteria, such as strategic threat factors and diplomatic or
political considerations.
\11\ GAO, Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security
by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO-13-764
(Washington, DC: Sept. 16, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While CBP is focused on the security of the cargo shipped to the
United States from foreign ports, the Coast Guard is focused on the
security of ports and the vessels arriving in the United States. Under
the International Port Security program, Coast Guard officials visit
foreign ports to evaluate their antiterrorism security measures against
established international standards. We reported in October 2007 that
the Coast Guard had found that most of the over 100 countries it
visited had substantially implemented international standards.\12\ More
recently, the Coast Guard reported in November 2013 that it had visited
over 150 countries. In September 2012, we reported that the Coast Guard
had made progress with implementing its International Port Security
program despite a number of challenges.\13\ For example, we reported
that the Coast Guard was able to alleviate sovereignty concerns of some
countries by including a reciprocal visit feature in which the Coast
Guard hosts foreign delegations to visit U.S. ports. Further, as we
reported in September 2013, the Coast Guard developed a risk-informed
model--that it updates annually--as part of its International Port
Security program to regularly assess the potential threat foreign ports
pose to the maritime supply chain and make operational decisions.\14\
According to the Coast Guard International Port Security Program:
Annual Report 2012, the Coast Guard uses the model to make informed
decisions on how to engage each country with the International Port
Security program, including: (1) How often to visit ports, (2) how many
staff to assign to a particular visit, and (3) whether the country
requires assistance.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO, Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and
Implementation One Year Later, GAO-08-126T, (Washington, DC: Oct. 30,
2007).
\13\ GAO-12-1009T.
\14\ GAO-13-764.
\15\ U.S. Coast Guard, International Port Security Program: Annual
Report 2012 (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to assessing the security of foreign ports, the Coast
Guard also uses the results of the International Port Security program
to help determine which arriving foreign vessels to board and inspect
through its Port State Control program. In particular, according to the
Coast Guard's International Port Security Program: Annual Report 2012,
the Coast Guard is to use risk-based criteria to identify which foreign
vessels entering U.S. ports and waterways it considers to be at risk of
noncompliance with international or domestic regulations, and perform
compliance examinations of these vessels. The risk-based criteria used
to make these decisions include the vessel's management, the flag state
under which the vessel is registered, and the vessel's security
compliance history resulting from previous examinations.
Leveraging International Partnerships in Global Supply Chain Security
International partnerships based on international standards are
another key aspect of secure maritime borders. For example, the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was developed
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to establish measures
to enhance the security of ships and port facilities with a
standardized and consistent security framework. The ISPS Code requires
facilities to conduct an assessment to identify threats and
vulnerabilities and then develop security plans based on the
assessment. The requirements of this code are performance-based;
therefore, compliance can be achieved through a variety of security
measures. Additionally, in collaboration with 11 other members of the
World Customs Organization, CBP developed the Framework of Standards to
Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework), which is based, in
part, on the core concepts of CBP programs and provides standards for
collaboration among customs administrations and entities participating
in the supply chain.\16\ The SAFE Framework was adopted by the 173
World Customs Organization member customs administrations in June 2005;
and as of our last report on this topic in July 2008, 154 had signed
letters of intent to implement the standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The World Customs Organization is an intergovernmental
organization representing the customs administrations of 173 countries
that aims to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of customs
administrations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP and the Coast Guard also leverage relationships with private-
industry stakeholders and foreign partners to promote the security of
maritime borders, given that protecting domestic ports begins outside
the United States where inbound shipments enter the supply chain. For
example, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
program is a voluntary program that enables CBP officials to work in
partnership with private companies to review and approve the security
of their international supply chains.\17\ Companies that join the C-
TPAT program commit to improving the security of their supply chains
and agree to provide CBP with information on their specific security
measures. In addition, the companies agree to allow CBP to verify,
among other things, that their security measures meet or exceed CBP's
minimum security requirements. This allows CBP to ensure that the
security measures outlined in a member's security profile are in place
and effective.\18\ In April 2008, we reported that the C-TPAT program
holds promise as part of CBP's multifaceted maritime security
strategy.\19\ We also reported that the program allows CBP to develop
partnerships with the trade community, which is a challenge given the
international nature of the industry and resulting limits on CBP's
jurisdiction and activities, and provides CBP with a level of
information sharing that would otherwise not be available. However, our
reports raised concerns about the overall management of the program and
challenges in verifying that C-TPAT members meet security criteria. We
recommended that CBP strengthen program management by developing
planning documents and performance measures, and by improving the
process for validating security practices of C-TPAT members. CBP agreed
with these recommendations and has addressed them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ In November 2001, CBP announced the C-TPAT program as part of
its efforts toward facilitating the free flow of goods while ensuring
that the containers do not pose a threat to homeland security. In
October 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of
2006 established a statutory framework for the C-TPAT program, codified
its existing membership processes, and added new components--such as
time frames for certifying, validating, and revalidating members'
security practices. 6 U.S.C. 961-973.
\18\ In return for their participation in the program, C-TPAT
members are entitled a reduced likelihood of scrutiny of their cargo.
CBP has awarded initial C-TPAT certification--or acceptance of the
company's agreement to voluntarily participate in the program--to over
10,000 companies, as of February 2012.
\19\ GAO, Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges
Remain in Verifying Security Practices, GAO-08-240 (Washington, DC:
Apr. 25, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, through mutual recognition arrangements with foreign
partners, the security-related practices and programs established by
the customs or maritime security administration of one partner are
recognized and accepted by the administration of another.\20\ Both CBP
and the Coast Guard have entered into such arrangements. For example,
CBP can expand the reach of its supply chain security programs (such as
C-TPAT) through mutual recognition arrangements. According to the World
Customs Organization, mutual recognition arrangements allow customs
administrations to target high-risk shipments more effectively and
expedite low-risk shipments by, for example, reducing redundant
examinations. As we reported in September 2013, mutual recognition
arrangements may allow the Coast Guard to allocate resources more
efficiently and reduce risks.\21\ For example, we further reported that
the Coast Guard signed a memorandum of understanding with the European
Union that establishes a process for mutually recognizing security
inspections of each other's ports.\22\ According to DHS documents and
Coast Guard officials in Europe, by signing this memorandum of
understanding, the Coast Guard plans to reassign some International
Port Security officials from Europe to Africa, where certain countries
are having more difficulties than others in implementing effective
antiterrorism measures in their ports. Further, we reported that one
trade-off of signing the memorandum of understanding is that Coast
Guard's International Port Security officials will not have the same
opportunities to have face-to-face interactions and share port security
information and practices directly with their European Union
counterparts as in the past. Despite this trade-off, Coast Guard
officials stated that entering into such arrangements increases
efficiencies and noted that they intend to negotiate additional
memorandums of understanding with other foreign governments that have
strong port inspection programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Mutual recognition arrangements can be entered into with other
countries as well as other governing bodies, such as the European
Union. For the purposes of this testimony, the countries and governing
bodies that enter into mutual recognition arrangements with the United
States are considered partners.
\21\ GAO-13-764.
\22\ According to DHS officials, the European Union characterizes
its port visits as ``inspections.'' Under the memorandum of
understanding procedures, the Coast Guard recognizes a successful
European Union inspection of its member states' ports in the same
manner as it would recognize a successful country visit by Coast Guard
inspectors. Coast Guard officials stated that they have collaborated
with their European counterparts to develop standard operating
procedures for these port inspections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conducting Maritime Surveillance, Interdiction, and Security Operations
along the Coast and in Ports
Along the coast and in ports, maritime surveillance, interdiction,
and security operations are conducted to ensure the security of
maritime borders. For example, CBP's Office of Air and Marine provides
maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities. Its strategic
assumptions include the ability to provide a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week
response to border penetrations anywhere along the U.S. border, with a
1-hour response time for areas designated as high-priority.\23\ We
reported in March 2012 that as of May 2011, the Office of Air and
Marine had placed about half of its air assets on the Southwest Border
region and the remainder in the northern and southeast regions, while
marine resources were distributed fairly evenly across the northern,
southwest, and southeast regions.\24\ Further, our analysis of the
Office of Air and Marine's fiscal year 2010 performance results
indicate that they did not meet its National performance goal to
fulfill greater than 95 percent of Border Patrol air support requests
and did not provide higher rates of support in locations designated as
high priority based on threats. We made recommendations to help ensure
that the Office of Air and Marine's assets and personnel are best-
positioned to effectively meet mission needs and address threats, and
to help DHS better leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary
duplication, and enhance efficiencies. DHS concurred with these
recommendations, and described actions it was taking, or planned to
take to address them, including making strategic and technological
changes in its assessment of the mix and placement of its resources by
the end of March 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ CBP's Office of Air and Marine resources are divided among 70
air and marine locations across three regions (southeast, southwest,
and northern); the National Capital area; and National Air Security
Operations Centers throughout the continental United States, Puerto
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In deciding how resources should be
allocated, considerations include historical location, Congressional
direction, and differences in geography and relative need for air and
marine support to address threats.
\24\ The Office of Air and Marine has 23 branches and 6 National
Air Security Operations Centers across these regions, and within the
branches, the office may have one or more air or marine units. See GAO,
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of
DHS's Air and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518 (Washington, DC: Mar. 30,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to CBP's Office of Air and Marine interdiction and
response activities, the Coast Guard conducts a number of activities to
deter potential threats to the United States' maritime borders. For
example, the Coast Guard escorts a certain percentage of high-capacity
passenger vessels--cruise ships, ferries, and excursion vessels--and
energy commodity tankers to protect against an external threat, such as
a waterborne improvised explosive device. The Coast Guard also provides
additional security response capabilities through its Maritime Safety
and Security Teams and Maritime Security Response Teams. Created by the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Maritime Safety and
Security Teams constitute a maritime security antiterrorism force.\25\
The teams are managed as assets that may be deployed Nation-wide, and
are responsible for safeguarding the public and protecting vessels,
harbors, ports, facilities, and cargo in U.S. territorial waters. The
teams are to maintain readiness to deploy to events such as terrorist
threats or incidents and storm recovery operations, and routinely
deploy to National special security events such as Super Bowls and
presidential inaugurations. They are also to enforce security zones
around high-interest vessels in transit and at other times when
additional levels of security are needed within the Nation's ports and
waterways. The Coast Guard's Maritime Security Response Team
complements the Maritime Security and Safety Team, and is charged with
maintaining a high readiness posture 365 days a year. The Maritime
Security Response Team is the Coast Guard's advanced interdiction force
for counterterrorism and law enforcement operations of a high-risk
nature. The team provides a variety of advanced capabilities or skills,
including addressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and
vertically deploying from helicopters to engage potentially hostile
personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See 46 U.S.C. 70106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coordinating with Partners along the Coast and in Ports
Along the coast and in ports, partnerships and coordination among
various stakeholders contribute to the security of the maritime
borders. To target the threat of transnational terrorist and criminal
acts along the coastal borders, the Maritime Operations Coordination
Plan, established in 2011, directs CBP, the Coast Guard, and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations
to utilize the fusion of their intelligence, planning, and operations
capabilities through the formation of Regional Coordinating
Mechanisms.\26\ The Coast Guard serves as the lead agency responsible
for planning and coordinating among components. We reported in
September 2013 that, according to the Coast Guard, there were 32
Regional Coordinating Mechanisms as of June 2013 that aligned with
Coast Guard sectors' geographic areas of responsibility.\27\ In
addition to the lead agencies, other stakeholders include the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the U.S.
Attorney's Office; State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies;
and foreign law enforcement agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ The Maritime Operations Coordination Plan was signed by the
Director of Homeland Security Investigations, the Commissioner of CBP,
and the Commandant of the Coast Guard.
\27\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to
Enhance Visibility over Collaborative Field Mechanisms, GAO-13-734
(Washington, DC: Sept. 27, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In ports, Area Maritime Security Committees consist of key
stakeholders who: (1) May be affected by security policies, and (2)
share information and develop port security plans. These committees,
which are required by Coast Guard regulations that implement the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, also identify critical
port infrastructure and risks to the port, develop mitigation
strategies for these risks, and communicate appropriate security
information to port stakeholders.\28\ Recommended committee members
include a diverse array of port stakeholders, including Federal, State,
and local agencies, as well as private-sector entities such as terminal
operators, yacht clubs, shipyards, marine exchanges, commercial
fishermen, trucking and railroad companies, organized labor, and trade
associations. Area Maritime Security Committees also are to serve as
forums for developing Area Maritime Security Plans. The Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 required the Coast Guard to develop
Area Maritime Security Plans--to be updated every 5 years--for ports
throughout the Nation.\29\ The Coast Guard develops these plans for
each of the 43 geographically-defined port areas with input from
applicable Governmental and private entities, and the plans are to
serve as the primary means to identify and coordinate Coast Guard
procedures related to prevention, protection, and security. In March
2007, we reported that there was a wide variance in ports' natural
disaster planning efforts and that Area Maritime Security Plans--
limited to security incidents--could benefit from unified planning to
include an all-hazards approach. We recommended that DHS encourage port
stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-hazards
planning.\30\ DHS concurred with our recommendation and implemented it
through the fiscal year 2007 Port Security Grant Program supplemental
program, which was designed, in part, to facilitate the development of
a Port-Wide Risk Management/Mitigation and Business Continuity/
Resumption of Trade Plan.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ 33 C.F.R. 103.300-.310.
\29\ 46 U.S.C. 70103(b)(2)(G). In 2006, the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) added a
requirement that AMSPs include recovery issues by identifying salvage
equipment able to restore operational trade capacity. 46 U.S.C.
70103(b)(2)(G).
\30\ 46 U.S.C. 70103(b). GAO, Port Risk Management: Additional
Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery.
GAO-07-412 (Washington, DC: Mar. 28, 2007).
\31\ Fiscal year 2007 Port Security Grant Program supplemental
program funding supports the development of a plan that emphasizes
port-wide partnerships, regional management of risk, and business
continuity/resumption of trade. The central plan focuses on security
across the port area and articulates a strategy for ensuring business
continuity and resumption of trade within the port in the event of an
emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measuring Maritime Security
Another important aspect of a secure border is measuring maritime
security. In the DHS component agencies' implementation of the various
maritime security related programs I have described today, and as we
have previously reported, one of the challenges that DHS and its
component agencies have faced has been the lack of adequate performance
measures. The following are some of the performance measurement
challenges we have reported on:
Lack of reliable and accurate data.--DHS and its component
agencies have experienced challenges collecting complete,
accurate, and reliable data. For example, in January 2011, we
reported that both CBP and the Coast Guard tracked the
frequency of illegal seafarer incidents at U.S. seaports, but
the records of these incidents varied considerably between the
two component agencies and between the agencies' field and
headquarters units.\32\ As a result, the data DHS used to
inform its strategic and tactical plans were of undetermined
reliability. We recommended that CBP and the Coast Guard
determine why their data varied and jointly establish a process
for sharing and reconciling records of illegal seafarer entries
at U.S. seaports. DHS concurred and has made progress in
addressing the recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Illegal seafarers include both absconders (seafarers CBP has
ordered detained on-board a vessel in port, but who depart a vessel
without permission) and deserters (seafarers CBP grants permission to
leave a vessel, but who do not return when required). GAO, Maritime
Security: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Risks Posed by
Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO-11-195 (Washington, DC:
Jan. 14, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not using data to manage programs.--DHS and its component
agencies have not always had or used performance information to
manage their missions. For example, we reported in February
2008 that Coast Guard officials used their Maritime Information
for Safety & Law Enforcement database--the Coast Guard's
primary data system for documenting facility inspections and
other activities--to review the results of inspectors' data
entries for individual maritime facilities, but the officials
did not use the data to evaluate the facility inspection
program overall.\33\ We found that a more thorough evaluation
of the facility compliance program could provide information
on, for example, the variations we identified between Coast
Guard units in oversight approaches, the advantages and
disadvantages of each approach, and whether some approaches
work better than others. We recommended that the Coast Guard
assess its Maritime Information for Safety & Law Enforcement
compliance data, including the completeness and consistency of
the data and data field problems, and make any changes needed
to more effectively utilize the data. The Coast Guard agreed
and has reported taking actions to address the recommendation.
These actions include hiring a full-time management and program
analyst to consistently review the data for trends and gaps,
and developing training resources, help desks, and conferences,
among other things, to help field personnel track changes to
Maritime Information for Safety & Law Enforcement and to
improve data entry time and consistency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and
Correct Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's
Staffing, Practices, and Data, GAO-08-12 (Washington, DC: Feb. 14,
2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lack of outcome-based performance measures.--DHS and its
component agencies have also experienced difficulties
developing and using performance measures that focus on
outcomes. Outcome-based performance measures describe the
intended result of carrying out a program or activity. For
example, although CBP had performance measures in place for its
C-TPAT program, these measures focused on program participation
and facilitating trade and travel and not on improving supply
chain security, which is the program's purpose. We made
separate but related recommendations in July 2003, March 2005,
and April 2008 that CBP develop outcome-based performance
measures for this program.\34\ CBP concurred, and, in response
to our recommendations, identified measures to quantify actions
required and to gauge C-TPAT's impact on supply chain security.
The Coast Guard has faced similar issues with developing and
using outcome-based performance measures. For example, we
reported in November 2011 that the Coast Guard developed a
measure to report its performance in reducing maritime risk,
but faced challenges using this measure to inform
decisions.\35\ The Coast Guard reported it has improved the
measure to make it more valid and reliable and stated it
believes it is a useful proxy measure of performance, but notes
that developing outcome-based performance measures is
challenging because of limited historical data on maritime
terrorist attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs
Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770
(Washington, DC: Jul. 25, 2003); Cargo Security: Partnership Program
Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved
Security, GAO-05-404 (Washington, DC: Mar. 11, 2005); and Supply Chain
Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its
Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in
Verifying Security Practices, GAO-08-240 (Washington, DC: Apr. 25,
2008).
\35\ GAO, Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but
More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and
Operations, GAO-12-14 (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Captain Woodring for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN MARCUS WOODRING, USCG (RET.), MANAGING
DIRECTOR, HEALTH, SAFETY, SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL BRANCH,
PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY
Captain Woodring. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee.
Chairwoman Miller, thank you for holding this important
hearing today.
To Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you for again inviting
the Port of Houston Authority as the industry witness.
As you know, the Port of Houston is in the Ranking Member's
district, and we appreciate her supportive engagement.
The Port of Houston is comprised of the Port Authority's 8
terminals, along with more than 150 private terminals. For 17
consecutive years, the port has ranked first in the United
States in foreign waterborne tonnage, trading with over 200
ports of call globally, making us a true maritime border.
Results of a recent economic impact study show that ship-
channel-related businesses at the Port of Houston are
responsible for more than 2.1 million jobs, generate $499
billion in annual economic activity, and contribute over $52
billion in annual tax revenue nationally. Just yesterday, we
had the Vice President of the United States stop to visit our
Bayport Container Terminal, underscoring the importance of our
Nation's ports in economic growth, as he traveled to visit the
expanding Panama Canal.
We have heard about a layered approach to border security,
starting with offshore interdiction, all the way to the sea
buoy. My focus today will be on the industry efforts to secure
the border within the port. Our efforts use both physical
assets and professional partnerships.
For physical assets, the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and
Border Protection, the Harris County Sheriff's Office, and the
Houston Police Department all maintain patrol vessels.
Surveillance flights are also conducted on a regular basis by
these same agencies.
Those are the Federal and local resources, but how does
industry link in? The story of the Houston Ship Channel
Security District, a unique public-private partnership, clearly
shows the direct relationship between assets and partnerships.
In the aftermath of 9/11, Government began putting more
stringent controls in place in the maritime domain. The
industrial facilities and companies of the Port of Houston came
to the table and essentially said, we don't have law
enforcement authority or jurisdiction, but we want to help, as
our businesses have the most to lose if things go wrong.
In 2007, the Texas legislature, backed by industry, passed
a bill creating the Houston Ship Channel Security District.
Assessments are paid annually by the facilities within the
boundaries of the district. The overarching purpose is to
provide greater security by supporting initiatives to enhance
capabilities and joint operational readiness, ultimately
ensuring maritime commerce flows unabated, therefore drives our
economy.
Examples include: Providing matching funds for a port
security grant to purchase a Harris County Sheriff's Office
patrol vessel; providing matching funds for Harris County to
install over 100 cameras at 33 sites to monitor the maritime
domain; purchasing the fuel used by the Houston Police
Department helicopter to patrol the ship channel; and funding a
watch center to monitor the camera system.
Besides funding projects, the district also enhances
partnerships. The Houston Ship Channel Security District
cameras are linked to the U.S. Coast Guard and the Port of
Houston Authority, with the district receiving access to both
our camera systems in return. The force-multiplying effect is
tremendous.
I will conclude my remarks by focusing on the collaborative
nature of maritime security in the Port of Houston.
We meet regularly as part of the Area Maritime Security
Committee, the Central Texas Coastal Area Committee, and the
Lone Star Harbor Safety Committee. Each of these committees
provides a constant opportunity for industry to interact with
key local, State, and Federal agency leaders.
We recently held our annual security drill at the Barbours
Cut Container Terminal. Over 170 participants from 50 different
agencies, entities, or companies came together to address a
dirty bomb scenario.
Within their budgetary constraints, both the U.S. Coast
Guard and Customs and Border Protection provide outstanding
service to the Port of Houston. They come to work daily with
the mentality that they must keep commerce flowing for the
National good while also enforcing the mandated regulatory
requirements. At the local level, they are considered leaders,
partners, and valued teammates.
An excerpt from a U.S. Coast Guard study summarizes my last
point: ``Port partnerships are predictably strongest, most
collegial, and most productive where major calamities have
necessitated life-or-death relationships of trust. This is most
evident in the partner interviews in New York and Houston,
where partners seek each other out for after-work social and
morale activities in addition to a high degree of work-focused
collaboration.''
I submit to you today that technology and resources are
critical to maintaining maritime security, but dedicated people
and trusting partnerships are equally as important. The
industries of the Port of Houston are proud to contribute to
both.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Captain Woodring follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Marcus Woodring
November 19, 2013
Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
Members of the subcommittee, I am Marcus Woodring. I serve as the
managing director for Health, Safety, Security, and Environmental
(HSSE) at the Port of Houston Authority.
We would like to thank Chairman Miller for holding this important
hearing today. I must also recognize Ranking Member Jackson Lee for
again inviting the Port of Houston Authority as an industry witness. As
you know, the Port of Houston is in the Ranking Member's district and
we continue to benefit from her leadership and advocacy on behalf of
the Port.
The Port of Houston is comprised of the Port Authority's eight
public terminals along with more than 150 private terminals. The port
is consistently ranked first in the United States in foreign water-
borne tonnage, trading with over 200 ports of call globally, making us
a true maritime border.
Results of a recent economic impact study show that ship channel-
related businesses at the Port of Houston are responsible for more than
2.1 million jobs, generate $499 billion in annual economic activity,
and contribute over $52 billion in annual tax revenue Nationally. Just
yesterday, we had the vice president of the United States stop to visit
our Bayport Container Terminal, underscoring the importance of our
Nation's ports in economic growth, as he travelled to visit the
expanding Panama Canal.
At the most basic level, the Port of Houston would be unable to
sustain its operations and economic significance in the global
marketplace without border security. This ``border security''
encompasses many things, ranging from keeping unauthorized cargo and
people from entering the United States, to protecting our environment
from invasive species.
We have heard about a ``layered approach'' to border security,
starting with offshore interdiction all the way to the sea buoy. My
focus today will be on the industry efforts to secure the border within
the Port of Houston. Our efforts use both physical assets and
professional partnerships.
For physical assets, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Harris County
Sheriff's Office, and the Houston Police Department all maintain patrol
vessels for the Houston Ship Channel. The majority of the Houston Ship
Channel has been designated a ``security zone'' since shortly after 9/
11. Other major channels into our Bayport and Barbours Cut Container
Terminals are also designated security zones, i.e. ``off limits'', to
recreational boaters. With the density of industrial activity, and
really no recreational reason to be there, the overall impact to the
public is minimal--yet provides safety for boaters and security for our
Nation's largest petrochemical complex. Surveillance by helicopters is
also conducted on a regular basis by these same agencies.
Those are the Federal and local resources, but how does industry
link in? The story of the Houston Ship Channel Security District, a
unique public/private partnership, gives us the answer and clearly
shows the direct relationship between assets and partnerships.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Federal, State, and local governments
began putting more stringent controls in place within the maritime
domain of the Houston Ship Channel. The industrial facilities and
companies of the Port of Houston came to the table and essentially
said--we don't have law enforcement authority or jurisdiction, but we
want to help as our businesses have the most to lose if things go
wrong. In 2007, the Texas Legislature passed a bill creating the
Houston Ship Channel Security District. The legislation enabled the
industry to tax itself and collect assessments paid annually by the
facilities and companies within the boundaries of the District, with
the goal of ensuring commerce continues to flow in an unimpeded
fashion.
The ultimate purpose of the Houston Ship Channel Security District
is to provide a regional approach for providing greater degree of
security and safety for facilities, employees, and communities
surrounding the ship channel by supporting projects and initiatives to
enhance the capabilities, communication, and joint operational
readiness of existing law enforcement organizations.
Examples include providing the matching funds for a Port Security
Grant to purchase a Harris County Sheriff's Office patrol vessel,
providing matching funds for Harris County to install 33 cameras to
monitor the maritime domain, purchasing the fuel used by the Houston
Police Department helicopter to patrol the ship channel, and funding a
watch center to monitor the camera system.
Each of these projects directly benefits industry's desire to
secure the maritime border and keep commerce moving, reducing their
liability for interruptions in the supply chain. None would have been
possible without the mechanism called the Houston Ship Channel Security
District.
I'll conclude my remarks by focusing on the collaborative nature of
maritime security in the Port of Houston. We meet regularly as part of
the Area Maritime Security Committee, the Central Texas Coastal Area
Committee, and the Lone Star Harbor Safety Committee. Each of these
committees provides a constant opportunity for maritime personnel to
interact with key local, State, and Federal agency leaders. We recently
held our annual security drill, SECUREX 2013, at the Barbours Cut
Container Terminal. Over 170 participants from 50 different agencies/
entities came together to address a ``dirty bomb'' scenario. While we
pray that we never convene in a real-life scenario similar to this, we
are well-prepared as a maritime community to respond.
The partnerships extend well beyond these committees. The Houston
Ship Channel Security District cameras I mentioned earlier are linked
in to the U.S. Coast Guard and Port of Houston Authority, with the Ship
Channel Security District receiving access to both our camera systems
in return. The force-multiplying effect is tremendous.
Within their budgetary constraints, both the U.S. Coast Guard and
Customs and Border Protection provide outstanding service at the Port
of Houston. They both come to work daily with the mentality that they
must keep commerce flowing for the National good, while also enforcing
the mandated regulatory requirements. At the local level, they are
considered leaders, partners, and valued teammates in the maritime
community.
In 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard conducted a series of interviews at
various ports around the Nation and published the results in the ``Port
Interagency Information Sharing Study''. Maritime professionals from
all segments of industry and Government were interviewed. An excerpt
from this study summarizes the extremely strong nature of maritime
security in the Port of Houston:
``Port partnerships are predictably strongest, most collegial, and most
productive where major calamities have necessitated life-or-death
relationships of trust. This was most evident in the partner interviews
in New York and Houston, where partners seek each other for after-work
social and morale activities, in addition to a high degree of
professional work-focused collaboration''.
I submit to you today that technology and resources are critical to
maintaining maritime security, but dedicated people and trusting
partnerships are equally important. The industries of the Port of
Houston are proud to contribute to both.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Attachment.--2013 Houston Ship Channel Security District Factsheet
The Houston Ship Channel Security District
the harris county houston ship channel security project
Surveillance System
19 Landside Sites with Cameras/Sensors/Equipment
14 Waterside Sites with Cameras/Sensors/Equipment
Command-and-Control System integrating Security Project,
Harris County, and Sheriff's Office assets
24/7/365 monitoring by the Harris County Sheriff's Office
Security Monitoring and Analysis Center (SMAG)
Video Links to Regional Partners such as the United States
Coast Guard and the Port of Houston Authority Police Department
Upcoming: Select video links to industry partners and
District Members
Landside Assets
9 Harris County Sheriff's Office Trucks
3 Harris County Sheriff's Office, Baytown Police Department,
and Galena Park Police Department Sedans
5 Port of Houston Authority Police Department Trucks
Radiological Detection Equipment
Waterside Assets
Four HCSO Marine Patrol Boats
One HCSO 36 SAFE Patrol Boat
Submersible Remotely Operated Vehicle
Communications Infrastructure
The Ring of Steel: a fiber communications network connecting
regional First Responders, Law Enforcement, Governmental
Planners, and Infrastructure Support Teams
14 Public Safety LTE E-Node-B Sites Completed--the first
functional Public Safety LTE system in the Nation
hscsd law enforcement support
HSCSD supports the Houston Police Department with funding for
training and deployment of assets including:
MD500 Patrol Helicopter
Bell 412EP Twin Engine Tactical Support Helicopter
Three Rapid Response Trucks for the HPD Bomb Squad
Fast-Rope and Rappelling Equipment
Assault Armor Kits, Masks, and Radios
An Airborne Radiation Detector
HSCSD supports the Harris County Sheriff's Office with funding for
training, deployment, and maintenance of HCSO assets including:
Marine Unit Boat Fuel and Maintenance
Marine Unit Vehicle & Trailer Fuel and Maintenance
Landside Infrastructure Patrol Vehicle Fuel and Maintenance
SMAG Third Shift Surveillance Personnel
HSCSD supports the city of Baytown with equipment designed to
facilitate the deployment of the city's multi-mission Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive Weapons equipped boat
that provides Type I HazMat and Bomb Squad/Explosives Team support and
Type II Regional Structure Collapse/Technical Rescue services.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Captain. We appreciate
that.
We appreciate the testimony of all the witnesses.
You know, I can remember when I first came to Congress
about a decade ago--hate to date myself here--but my first trip
down to the border, looking at the vast expanses that we had on
the land border and thinking that--at that time, we really
weren't even using UAVs to assist in border security, and, of
course, that has changed.
I am just a huge proponent of UAVs. I think the
application--I think they have been so incredibly in theater,
and they have the application, certainly, of border security,
whether that is in the land or the maritime environment. So I
was listening to some of your testimony there and thinking
about the Predators that you have.
Also, just as you were talking about the panga boats that
are continuing to move up the northern border of California
there, more northerly than Los Angeles or San Diego, sort of,
away from your cutters or your stations, et cetera, and the
utilization of Predators--and we were looking at the amount of
instances that you use the Predators, and apparently it has
been a very limited amount in California.
So I guess that is part of my question. How you are really
utilizing the resources that you have in the maritime
environment, not only along California, the California coast,
but even along the--it is my understanding that the one that
you have in Cape Canaveral is not functioning at this time and
that there are three now in Corpus Christi.
So they are all in Corpus Christi; is that so? If so, is
that your plan going forward? Do you expect that you would keep
them all there or move them around a bit? Or how is your vision
of all of that? How short do you think you are on the amount of
UAVs that you could really utilize optimally?
That question for Commissioner Alles and perhaps Admiral
Lee a bit, too.
General Alles. All right, thank you, ma'am.
As you indicated, the Predators are now all based out of
Corpus Christi. There are currently two there; one was damaged
in a hard landing and is being repaired currently at General
Atomics in California.
As I look at the Predator--so, one of the questions you
asked is really about California operations. We have an
operation called Blue Tempest, that we have done some limited
Guardian operations out there. Guardian is the maritime variant
of it, which has the sea view radar on it. We have flown around
100 hours out on the California coast with that particular
asset.
We do have some limitations out there. There are a number
of FAA restrictions to our California operations. So we have
found the aircraft is working very effectively for us on the
borders. It is working very effectively for us in the Transit
Zone. It is currently in the Transit Zone with some Coast Guard
personnel conducting a deployment there and is working well for
us there. In the actual offshore U.S. environment, we are still
working through a number of issues with the FAA to get the best
employment out of the Predator.
So partly why you don't see as much use there is I have
based other maritime patrol aircraft--we have P-3s in
Jacksonville. I have the Dash 8s in Jacksonville and Puerto
Rico and New Orleans. I have the new maritime enforcement
aircraft that we are building in San Diego. Those don't have
those kinds of unmanned restrictions. So those have been the
bulk of my maritime patrol capability out there, as opposed to
the Guardian UAV.
I would like to use it more in the future. We still, you
know, are working through with the FAA as a process. They have
been very cooperative. But they have a safety issue to work
with, so we have to work through--I am talking about air
traffic control clearance. So we just have to work through
those issues with the FAA to get better utilization of it off
of our coasts.
Then, as far as equipment is concerned, I think we have a
satisfactory quantity of the aircraft. It is really the amount
of flying hours that I can put on the airplane, and that is
based on the amount of flying-hour money I get per year. So I
currently fly 5,000 to 6,000 hours a year for all the systems.
I could go much higher than that, probably towards 9,000 or
10,000, given sufficient funding, ma'am.
Mrs. Miller. Appreciate that.
Admiral.
Admiral Lee. Yes, ma'am. My counterpart here in CBP is far
more invested in the UAS program than we are. We are still in
the test and evaluation phase. We have already tested the UAS
ScanEagle on the Cutter Bertholf and the Stratton. We are going
into Phase 2 of that test and evaluation right now. We see
great potential for this in the realm of MDA.
However, I must add this caveat: All the MDA in the world
will be of little use unless we have an end-game in place. So
we can detect and we can monitor, but if we don't have the
capability to intercept and stop those threats--in this case,
pangas and other sorts of surface vessels running illegal
migrants or narcotics--then we lose the game. So we have to
have the end-game to couple with the advancements in UAS.
Mrs. Miller. Do you think the pangas are the greatest
threat, really, to the maritime security of the coast?
Admiral Lee. Well, I wouldn't necessarily say that, but I
would say they are a significant threat. They are a significant
threat because they are running around us.
My counterparts in CBP and Border Patrol have done a
fantastic job of securing the land border in the Southwest, and
so that has pushed them into the maritime. Their tactics have
changed over the past few years, and now they are going further
and further out and further and further north up the coast of
California. We are seeing them land as far north as San
Francisco now. Where it used to be a southern-California issue,
now it is a whole-of-California issue. They have the logistics
in place do it, and we don't have enough patrol craft to be on
top of them at this particular time.
Mrs. Miller. To both of you, one other question: Talking
about types of resources that we have had, the taxpayers have
already paid for, that we gotten a good bang for our buck in
theater, that have been successful, like the UAVs, et cetera,
how are you doing--continuing to do?
I know you have both advantaged yourself a bit of some of
the returning equipment from theater. Is there anything that we
can do to help you, as you are looking to resources that might
be available? I know you are starting to use some of the
rheostats and some of the various things, et cetera. Any
comment on that or any help that we can assist you with in that
regard?
General Alles. I think, honestly, ma'am, we are getting
good help from the committee on that. Most of those assets are
going on the land borders. They are not--as you know,
Afghanistan, Iraq have primarily been land issues. So most of
that equipment fits better in that environment.
We are getting--CBP is getting from the Marine Corps some
UH-1Ns, some Iroquois that are going out of service. They were
used overseas. So those are advantageous for us and will help
us out as we do some of our service-life extensions on our UH-
60s.
But I think overall have we gotten good cooperation on that
and are starting to get good re-use out of some of the--
particularly the aerostat balloons along the Southern Border.
The RGV balloon, the Rio Grande Valley balloon, as I recall, is
now up.
Mrs. Miller. The last thing before I recognize my Ranking
Member, I hope you all look at this committee as a conduit to
assist you with challenges that you run into, not just where
you come and testify. You know, we are here to work together
with you.
As you are mentioning, Commissioner, about some of the
challenges you are running into with the FAA, the FAA has their
mission, right? But they have this airspace thing all over the
country they will keep running into with various kinds of
strategic deployments that we are trying to do for border
security or homeland security, et cetera.
So, believe me, I appreciate the job that the FAA does, but
if there is anything that we can do, again, to be a conduit to
assist you with that, please don't hesitate to ask us about
that, as well.
With that, I would recognize our Ranking Member.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairwoman.
Let me thank the witnesses for their testimony and their
presence before this hearing.
I want to start, Director Caldwell, with you, and hopefully
we can weave through what I think are very important findings
by the GAO.
Just with an opening point of your report here that says
why GAO did this study, just to frame it: ``An attack on this
system could have dire consequences, and criminals could use
small vessels to smuggle narcotics, aliens, and other
contraband.'' Certainly, this is a system that handles billions
of dollars of cargo, and so, in essence, this is a system that
should not be ignored.
I would like to take you through some of your suggestions,
or recommendations, rather, and have you expand on them a
little bit more.
I believe that, with the potential opening of the Panama
Canal, we could not have a larger question mark and need for an
answer than the issue of maritime security. This is going to be
a new frontier for our region. The magnitude of incoming ships
will broaden, the competition will broaden, and, certainly, the
potential for wreaking havoc will likewise be broadened.
You indicated that you want a robust--or suggested a robust
maritime domain awareness. Go into just--be pointed beyond your
written testimony, please, regarding the United States as it
relates to maritime security. What are those key words,
``maritime domain awareness''? Do we need to have collaborators
on that?
Mr. Caldwell. Well, ``maritime domain awareness'' is very
broad, and it starts very far out. So it starts with,
obviously, the foreign waters and foreign ports that actually
ship the things to us. Panama Canal is a good example of that.
It is quite far from our waters, but it is going to be a case
where we may have much larger ships with much larger cargos,
many more containers, coming through there.
So the main requirement in terms of that maritime domain
awareness starts out there; it comes all the way into our own
ports so that we know what is going on. You can even expand it
to economic and issues of natural disasters.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But how do you to that? Is that
technology? Is that ships on water? Is that expanding Coast
Guard? Obviously, there are waters within our boundaries and
then beyond, open seas. What is your, just, pointed answer to
that?
Mr. Caldwell. Well, I think further away, obviously, it
depends very heavily on international partnerships with other
countries. A good example of these have already been cited in
the deep Caribbean, where we are working with the Dutch, the
French, the British, and other countries in terms of gathering
information, sharing information, so that we can work as
partners to identify the threats as they come in.
Then closer to our shores, it depends maybe more on
technology and coordination among the forces that we have,
whether that is CBP, Coast Guard, Department of Defense, and
others.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask this other question. Your
October 2012 report on CBP's model for assessing risks of
inbound cargo containers--the Automated Targeting System model,
also known as ATS--had some troubling conclusions about CBP's
failure to regularly assess the performance of the ATS
methodology used to assess risk and the rate at which ATS was
currently identifying high-risk containers.
Can you elaborate on what you found?
Mr. Caldwell. Yes. We found that the ATS system was
critical for CBP in identifying high-risk containers. We found
that CBP was not regularly assessing that system, nor, when it
did an update, was it evaluating whether the new updates were
better than the model weights that they were replacing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Where are we now?
Mr. Caldwell. We made recommendations that they do regular
assessments, and the Department has pledged to do so, both DHS
and CBP. We will be doing our update on that soon to find out
what the status of that recommendation is, to decide whether we
can close that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. They have the tools and all to do the
assessment, right?
Mr. Caldwell. Yes. I think it is a question of focused
attention, and, obviously, it requires people, as well, to
provide that focus----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So that is something that we can help
with, is the idea of human resources, to be able to do that
assessment.
Mr. Caldwell. Sometimes I think it is just attention, you
know, being paid at the top level of leadership, in terms of
making sure that those regular assessments are done.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But this was 2012 when you did your
report. So you are going back again in 2014. You don't have an
update, an interim----
Mr. Caldwell. I can provide that for the record.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Pardon me?
Mr. Caldwell. I can provide that for the record----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you, please?
Mr. Caldwell [continuing]. To you, in terms of a detailed
status.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Great.
Let me go quickly to your point about conducting maritime
surveillance. I know this seems to go along with the question
that I previously asked, but I am concerned about having on the
waters those who are assessing threats regularly and then
designing a response to those threats.
I am going to also ask our admiral to answer that, as well.
Mr. Caldwell. Let me just start. I think----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Caldwell [continuing]. Admiral Lee has already talked
about that you have to have a balance between what you can
actually find through your surveillance resources and whether
you actually have the resources to then persecute. You know,
you know those threats are out there; do you actually have the
boats to go out to get them at that distance, you know, armed
as needed and meeting other requirements?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Admiral, I know that Mumbai was not an
example of, I believe, anything on our coast, but maybe there
are places that are exposed. That was an unsecured little wharf
with individuals coming up on little boats in the dark of
night.
But how are you assessing threats and revising strategies
on those threats? Do you feel comfortable that you are able to
assess those threats regularly?
Admiral Lee. Well, I am going to answer that question in
two parts.
First off, how do we assess them? We are putting most of
our energy and efforts into those ports and waterways where the
most traffic flows, those large ports like New York, New
Orleans, Los Angeles, et cetera, et cetera, because that is
where someone with ill intent can do the most damage to our
maritime transportation system.
What keeps me and my colleagues up awake at night is the
vulnerability that we have along our entire 95,000-mile
maritime border, where anybody can pretty much come and go as
they need. It is almost free-range. If somebody wanted to get
into some smaller port to deliver something, they are proving
that almost daily with the--all you have to do is look at the
panga threat to see how easy it is for somebody to deliver a
commodity to our shores. In that case, the commodity is
marijuana. That commodity could be anything else. We are
vulnerable. We are very vulnerable.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This last question, may I just get to
Captain Woodring?
As a port that will benefit from the opening of the Panama
Canal, as a port that handles an enormous amount of cargo, do
you have the tools to be prepared for any enhanced security
questions with the opening of the Panama Canal?
Captain Woodring. Yes, ma'am, we do. We have already worked
with Customs and Border Protection. They understand the plans,
they understand the Panama Canal is expanding and are looking
forward to making their internal resource request to make sure
that we have enough officers there to keep commerce flowing out
our gates.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairwoman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here. As a
State and Federal prosecutor, I have seen what your efforts
have done, and I commend you on it. Thank you so very much.
Let me start out with asking you, with the assets that are
seized and the cash that is seized--Rear Admiral Lee, if you
would start--what happens with those funds? I think I know what
the answer is, but I want the American people to hear it.
Admiral Lee. Well, the assets that are seized are turned
over, and after litigation is completed, the funds go into the
Treasury. They don't come back to us.
Mr. Marino. All right. That is the point I wanted to get
across.
Does anyone else have a different answer or would like to
follow up on that?
General Alles. Yeah, the only, kind-of, technical point on
that is, as the admiral mentioned, they go into general fund.
Any assets, like a conveyance, if it is seized and utilized by
the Government, then, you know, that obviously becomes an asset
of the Government. Otherwise, typically, for boats, since they
tend to reappear over and over, we have them destroyed.
Mr. Marino. Yeah. So nothing really--I am sorry, do either
of you gentlemen have any comments on that?
So none of those assets are really handed over, which I
think should be, directly to your agencies, to your efforts. Is
that correct?
General Alles. If it is an asset we can utilize, yes, we
can seize it and use it internally in the organization. We have
in the past.
Mr. Marino. You mean, ``an asset,'' that could be a boat,
that could be an airplane, that could be weapons. Is it ever
cash?
Admiral Lee. No. Cash is going to be turned in.
Mr. Marino. I see.
So, given the fact that the biggest problem we have here in
this country right now is revenue flow, particularly $17
trillion in debt, but I think it is critical that agencies such
as yours should at least reap part of that benefit to hire more
personnel, to purchase more equipment.
So that segues into my next question: If you each had a
choice of what piece of equipment you would like to have more
of, could you please share that with us?
Admiral, you can start, and then move down the line,
please.
Admiral Lee. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question.
We all have our wish list. Right now, our wish list is to
recapitalize our deepwater fleet that is aging and going off-
line with great speed. Without that deepwater fleet, we will
not have the capability to push our borders downrange, in this
case the Transit Zone, and conduct maritime operations that
really have an impact on our Nation's security.
We know through past practice that the most effective way
to take narcotics off the streets of the United States is to
intercept those narcotics out of its shipping point, at its
sources, down in the Transit Zone. We get the cocaine and
marijuana in its largest quantities, in its purest form.
When we seize operators in the Transit Zone, the intel that
we get from those operators to feed back into the intelligence
community is the purest we can get. Those folks are only one or
two layers down from the cartels themselves. Once those
narcotics are delivered back landside and it is broken up into
smaller packages and delivered across the border landside,
those operators are so far removed, we get limited intel out of
those.
So the bottom-line answer to your question is we need the
funds to recapitalize our deepwater fleet so we can continue to
push our borders out where they need to be.
Mr. Marino. Sir, please.
General Alles. From my standpoint, sir, our current biggest
need is recapitalizing our UH-60 fleet. Those are currently
expiring from service. They are actually the oldest UH-60s in
service in the United States.
After that is our multi-role enforcement aircraft that we
are currently procuring; our coastal interceptor vessels that
we are due to procure next year. I would just mention the TARS
radar system, Tethered Aerostat Radar System, is used along the
Southern Border to interdict people that are attempting to
cross the border illegally.
Mr. Marino. Thank you.
Anyone else? Mr. Caldwell or Captain Woodring.
I see I only have 30 seconds left. Have any of you seen any
connection between the drug cartels, the trafficking of drugs,
and/or terrorists or potential terrorism? Have you actually
seen any of those cross paths?
Admiral Lee. I do not have an anecdote from the Coast Guard
point, sir.
Mr. Marino. Okay.
General Alles. I think as we look at Mexican drug cartels,
we are concerned. Particularly as we look at the Iranian
influence into Mexico, it would be one of our concerns.
Mr. Marino. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I will be there
pitching for you every step of the way.
I yield back. Thank you, Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman for his questions.
I thank the admiral for mentioning again about
recapitalizing your deepwater fleet. Again, in an effort for
this committee to help you, we are going to be thinking what we
can do as we get into the next appropriations season on that.
Because we are reaching a critical juncture, as you are well
aware, with the Coast Guard of not being able to meet their
mission that we have tasked you with and loaded you up since 9/
11 and yet are not really resourcing you as we need to.
The Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I am hoping to get a concise answer to the question posed
in the title of the hearing, in terms of what a secure maritime
border looks like.
This subcommittee and the full committee of which we are a
part has decided, when it comes to land borders, as imperfect a
measure as this is, we have decided on operational control and
have decided that 90 percent operational control at our land
borders is a sufficient level to protect the public safety and
interest, and it prevents us from overspending and receiving
diminishing returns as a result.
Is there--and I will start with Mr. Caldwell--is there
something like that for maritime security?
In your answer to the Ranking Member's question about
maritime domain awareness, you included some criteria that seem
out of our control. You know, we are somewhat dependent on
international partners, issues that take place away from our
ports. What is within our domain of influence and control that
we can hold the admiral, the commissioner accountable for, that
we can use to understand how wisely we are spending taxpayer
dollars?
Mr. Caldwell. Thank you.
In terms of the concept of operational control, I cannot
say I have seen something like that for the maritime domain.
Generally, what we are looking at is drug seizures, either in
tonnage or as a rate of estimates of what the total flow is.
In terms of the criteria, I think it is hard to give a
really concise answer because you want the criteria to capture
some of the other things we worry about in the maritime domain,
not just terrorists, not just drugs, not just illegal migrants,
but maybe some other things out there.
As you know, Coast Guard has a broader mission, too, in
terms of environmental safety. You don't want oil spills. You
don't want--you know, recovery from disasters in ports, a lot
of other things, as well.
Mr. O'Rourke. For the commissioner, you know, just
anecdotally getting the information in terms of tonnage seized,
hearing you describe what is involved in executing your
mandate, it sounds like you are being very effective with your
resources.
What is a good way for this committee to know that for
sure, to, again, ensure that we are holding you and the men and
women who serve under you accountable and that we are getting
true value for taxpayer dollars spent, and if there is a
request for additional resources, we know how to gauge what
those dollars will buy and understand what the return should be
back from that investment?
General Alles. I think we can measure, you know, those--you
mentioned a couple of specifics, sir. We can measure the
performance of our fleet based on what it does. So, I mean, I
can tell you, for instance, a P-3, for each hour it flies in
the Tran Zone, it delivers about $1.2 million worth of
cocaine--a pretty good metric for the platform. Similar for the
UAVs working down in that Transit Zone. I can use those kind of
metrics to assess performance when it comes to drug
interdiction. I can look at it in terms of illegal immigration
flows, as far as some accountability there.
I would offer, though, that the, really, MDA metric--or,
not the MDA--the maritime security metric, really, I don't find
a single metric as being adequate there. It is really going to
be a combination of things inside of a risk-based approach that
talks about things like intelligence, the enforcement
statistics you already mentioned, maritime events, technology
integration, and then risk analysis.
We look at--our organization internally measures each air
branch yearly by what it performs, in terms of what it turns
out in terms of vehicles, drugs, cash, illegal immigration
flow, those kind of things, to decide where we are most
effectively positioned. Based on that analysis, we will move
personnel or move aircraft or vessels based on that
performance.
Mr. O'Rourke. I guess, for Admiral Lee to continue with
this line of questioning, I believe either you or the
commissioner mentioned that during--or, as a result of the
sequester and fewer flight hours, fewer resources deployed, we
saw less tonnage interdicted. From the commissioner's answer
just now to my question, it seems like if we spent more, we
would interdict more, but that is certainly not limitless.
So, again, where do we want to be? Because we could spend
unlimited dollars and never get there unless we know what the
goal is.
Admiral Lee. Thank you for that question, sir.
ONDCP's goal in terms of tonnage removed is about 36
percent. Last year, we only removed 13.4 percent--the
interagency. I am not talking just about the Coast Guard, but
that is the interagency writ large.
Mr. O'Rourke. That is all illegal drugs?
Admiral Lee. Illegal drugs.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay.
Admiral Lee. Here, let's just talk cocaine for a second.
Last year--and I am just giving you rough estimates. Last year,
we estimate that the source countries, which are Bolivia, Peru,
and Colombia, produced and shipped about 600 metric tons of
cocaine. We, the U.S. Coast Guard, seized about 78 metric tons,
which was down significantly from the previous year.
So we received 78 metric tons. Just by virtue of another
bar to measure, back in 2008, which was a banner year for us,
we seized 166 metric tons. The interagency and our partner
nations seized about an equal amount. Twenty metric tons of
that was seized at the border. Where is the rest of it going?
That is the real metric. They ship 600. We, collectively,
stopped 124 metric tons.
I would submit, sir, that the real metric that the United
States needs to be measuring is not how much we are seizing,
but what is the impact to organized crime of that that we do
seize? How much money are we taking out of their pockets, and
how is that affecting instability downrange in our nations
south of us?
We have to keep our eye on that because it is a National
security concern. We don't want any more nations down south of
us to get to the point such that we have in Honduras right now,
where they have the highest murder rate per capita of any
country in the world. Right now, 91 persons per 100,000 are
murdered year-to-year. The United States right now, to give the
other benchmark, is 4.7 per 100,000.
It is vitally important that we keep the pressure on those
transnational organized criminal networks, those cartels. If we
back away from that mission, if we stop taking that dope off of
the street by way of seizing it in large quantities in the
Transit Zone, we will fail in our National strategy.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, who is looking particularly dapper, all in an effort
to raise awareness of men's prostate cancer.
Mr. Duncan. That is exactly right. November is prostate and
pancreatic cancer month, and I support this in memory of State
Representative David Umphlett, a good friend of mine that died
June 2011 of pancreatic cancer. So thanks for recognizing that.
Sitting here thinking about the cooperation that we have
had with the country of Colombia and the impact it has had on
really knocking back the amount of cocaine produced and the
activity of the cartel, and really just rhetorically thinking
about how that could be applied to Nicaragua and Honduras and
some of the other Latin American countries, as well, it is
really not my line of questioning but it is something that I
think we need to talk about.
Admiral Lee, you raised that awareness with your comments
just now.
I want to shift to the UAVs that are being utilized by both
the Coast Guard and the CBP, because it is interesting to folks
back in my district how they are utilized. There is a lot of
groovy technology out there.
So, Admiral Lee, can you discuss how the UAVs are being
used? I know a Predator B has just been tasked to California to
help with the pangas, and, also, I understand some of the
cutter technology for launching and recovering some of those
aircraft possibly.
So if you could touch base on what you are doing with UAVs,
whether they are cost-effective, whether they are operational-
effective.
Admiral Lee. Yes, sir.
I stated earlier we are still in the test and evaluation
phase for operating our UASs off of our cutters. We are going
into Phase 2 of that test and evaluation next month off of the
Cutter Stratton.
The Predators are being used by my counterpart here,
General Alles, so I defer to him for more specificity on that
program.
Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you this before we go to
Commissioner Alles. How are they being flown? Are they being
flown remotely out of--like, the CBP flies those UAVs out of
South Dakota or somewhere. How is the Coast Guard flying those?
Are you flying them from shipboard controls, or is that on
land-based pilots?
Admiral Lee. Yes, sir, so far, we are launching and
retrieving from aboard ship.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. So you are recovering the aircraft on a
cutter?
Admiral Lee. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. That is interesting. I would love to see
that someday.
Commissioner Alles, could you respond?
General Alles. Yes, sir. So, just for clarification, the
Coast Guard participates with us in the Predator program as
pilots in the program actually flying the aircraft and
operating the aircraft. Then the actual shipborne devices he is
talking about I think have been the ScanEagle.
Correct?
Admiral Lee. ScanEagle, yes.
General Alles. Yeah. So that is a different UAV than we are
using.
Mr. Duncan. Right.
General Alles. So, primarily, our UAVs are used along the
borders. In fact, they are restricted by FAA certificates of
authorization to the borders, within about 75 miles of the
borders.
Our primary efforts, our UAV bases are in Corpus Christi,
Cape Canaveral, Sierra Vista, which is where Fort Huachuka is
down in Arizona, and then also up in Grand Forks, North Dakota.
So the bulk of our effort goes along the Southwest Border in
the Rio Grande Valley, in the Arizona area, New Mexico, other
parts of Texas, and then, after that, some limited patrols off
the California coast.
We are doing more Transit Zone operations with the UAVs,
and then also along the Northern Border. We use those using a
synthetic aperture radar to do what is called change detection,
which can actually detect border intrusions in low-traffic
zones. So we use that actual change detection radar in our UAVs
along our low-traffic areas in Texas and New Mexico, Arizona,
and also along the Northern Border to basically see if we are
having any activity.
Mr. Duncan. Yes, sir. I visited the program out in the
Tucson sector and was highly impressed with what I was learning
there. That was a Predator B, I believe.
But I guess we are talking about maritime. So you are
flying off the coast of California to help with the panga
interdiction. Anywhere else with maritime? Out of Corpus
Christi, I am assuming.
General Alles. So it is primarily--we do some operations
out of Corpus Christi over the water. We are not seeing a lot
of traffic there for interdiction. We have done operations off
the Florida coast. Again, not seeing a lot of traffic for
interdiction, plus having those maritime assets out there that
can work more easily.
So, again, along the coastal areas of the United States, I
am still working with the FAA to get more unlimited use of the
UAV in those areas. So we haven't used them as much there as we
have over land or in the Transit Zone. So we are still working
those particular issues on the FAA side. We are making
progress, good progress, with them too.
Mr. Duncan. Let me pivot back to Admiral Lee.
Are we seeing the use of UAVs out of some of our ports,
say, in El Salvador, to replace any of the P-3 flights, manned
flights? Are they more cost-effective and efficient, or are
they similar cost?
Admiral Lee. Well, the Coast Guard doesn't fly P-3s. We fly
C-130s. But the bottom line is, again, we are still in the test
and evaluation phase. We do offer personnel for the Predator
program that General Alles is running.
I would have to get back with you for questions for the
record if you want more specificity on it than that. That is
all I can offer to you, sir.
Mr. Duncan. Right. Well, thank you for that.
[The information follows:]
The Coast Guard is not yet replacing manned aircraft operations
with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) because the Service is in pre-
acquisition for a land-based UAS. Until the state of technology can
accommodate all Coast Guard missions, the Service will continue to
collaborate with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and conduct
maritime security missions as part of the joint UAS program.
Notionally speaking, UAS can be a more cost-effective and efficient
option than their manned counterparts, but this is highly dependent on
the specific system and payloads that are ultimately procured, as well
as the type of flight operations that are required.
Mr. Duncan. Madam Chairwoman, I know that UAVs can fly a
lot longer. They can stay on station 24 hours or longer, the
new technology. It just seems like a great platform for drug
interdiction because that is a 24/7 attempt to smuggle drugs in
the country.
So I thank the gentlemen for what they do, and I want to
see use of more technology as we can put it in the field and
apply it under the budget constraints that we have.
With that, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady
from Hawaii.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Miller and
Ranking Member Jackson Lee. I appreciate the opportunity to
discuss these very important issues of maritime security. I
would like to thank our guests for being here today and sharing
their own expertise and insights on these issues.
I would like to follow up a little bit on Mr. Duncan's
questions regarding the UAV and UAS systems.
Admiral Lee, if you could speak in a little bit more detail
about the test and eval process that the Coast Guard is
undergoing with these systems now? You are saying you are about
to move into Phase 2. If you could speak about these different
phases.
I am specifically interested if any of these tests are
being conducted in District 14 currently.
Admiral Lee. No, the tests right now are not being
conducted off of District 14. The next test is going to be
conducted off of Wallops Island off of the Coast Guard Cutter
Stratton.
I could read to you the paragraph that my staff prepared
for me on this, if you would desire. I am sorry I can't right
off the cuff give you the specificity that you are looking for.
But let me just read this to you.
It says, ``The Coast Guard completed UAS demonstrations
aboard the Cutter Stratton in August of 2012''--that was Phase
1--``and Bertholf in May of 2013.'' That was Phase 2 alpha.
``Phase 1 focused on the basic engineering, installation,
certification, and operation of UAS. Phase 2 alpha applied
lessons learned in an actual shipboard deployment, along with
an embarked MH-65''--that is one of our Dauphin helicopters--
``as envisioned in our CONOPS. The final demonstration, which
will be Phase 2 bravo, will explore a variety of sensor
payloads, continue to validate CONOPS, and provide tangible
data on how the UAS contributes to our National Security
Cutters' overall effectiveness.''
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
The Container Security Initiative really centered around
U.S.-bound maritime containers that potentially pose a risk
being identified and inspected--I think you and General Alles
spoke about this earlier--as they are leaving international
ports.
What specifically is the Coast Guard's role in that
program? I was wondering if you can speak on the benefit of
having Coast Guard personnel on the ground in foreign ports as
opposed to being able to interact remotely from here.
Admiral Lee. All right. I hope I understood your question.
Going back to the layered approach that we use for trying
to provide a maritime secure border, we start overseas in our
foreign ports. We have an IPSP program, that is the
International Port Security Program, whereby we send inspectors
to--there are 157 ports internationally that ship goods to the
United States. We visit those ports routinely to ascertain what
kind of security measures they have in place, and do they meet
the requirements that satisfy our needs for receiving those
shipments on those vessels entering through their ports and
waterways?
The next layer is that layer in between, which is the open
sea. That is where we have patrol craft that, if we get
intelligence that something is inbound that might be a threat
to our National security, we can intercept, board, and deal
with it.
Then, of course, the last layer is here in our own ports,
whereby Customs and the Coast Guard team up with the port
directors to do this Port Security Program here.
I defer to the general for----
Ms. Gabbard. Thanks.
Before, General, you comment on that, I just had a quick
question about CBP's Office of Air/Marine not having any
presence or operations in my home State of Hawaii. Considering,
obviously, our geographic location and some of the challenges
that we face with both air and marine security there, I am
wondering about your lack of presence there. Is it a lack of
threats or resources? Or if you could explain why you don't
have a presence there.
General Alles. Yes, ma'am. As we looked at the overall U.S.
posture of air and marine assets and where we consider the most
likely avenues of approach and highest-threat locations, Hawaii
was not one that we considered a high-threat location. Of
course, it is a fiscal question of how many offices we can
actually stand up. I mean, that is the basic issue for Hawaii
and why we have not been based there to that point.
It is the same, similar situation as we have in Alaska. We
have no presence up there. So, in this case, we are relying on
the Coast Guard presence that is already established there.
Ms. Gabbard. Do you have any unmanned aircraft systems
deployed in the region, either in the Pacific and, really,
looking out past the West Coast?
General Alles. No. No, ma'am. They are not deployed that
far afield.
Ms. Gabbard. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady.
Before we conclude, the Ranking Member has a follow-up
question.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, thank you so very much.
To follow up some of the comments made by colleagues, I
have always opposed this sequester, as it impacts the assets
that, General, both you have and, Admiral, both you have. As
someone who is asking the Budget Committee, chaired by the
Chairman of the Budget Committee, Mr. Ryan, to remove the
sequester, let me ask you about these decreased assets.
Admiral, quickly, you said it was that number from--it
appears in my head, 36 to 13 percent. Impacts on the kinds of
assets--not assets, but the kinds of ability to be able to get
a certain amount of metric tons out of the cycle.
General, I am asking you, as well, the impact that it has
on the Air/Marine when you have cut the assets and also cut
human resources.
Finally, Captain Woodring, if you would speak to the impact
and the value of Federal dollars, both in terms of security and
otherwise, in ports as large as yours.
Gentlemen, if you could, what is the sequester, what are
the diminished resources doing to the basic mission for both of
you and the assets? Responding to my colleague's question of
assets not being in many places where you might want them.
Admiral Lee, if you would start first.
Admiral Lee. Yes, ma'am.
As a result of the sequester, we had to curtail operations
25 percent across the board for Coast Guard operations. Most of
that came out of our Transit Zone operations because that is
where most of the fuel money goes. That was a 32 percent
reduction last year as a direct result of the sequester. That
obviously had an impact on the tonnage that we were able to
remove.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
General.
General Alles. On the CBP side, the primary impact was to
our flying-hour program. It substantially reduced that
probably----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am sorry, flying what?
General Alles. Flying-hour program, the amount of hours we
fly our aircraft per year. I think we are at about a 10,000-
hour impact as a result of the sequester.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Help us, because hours and flying--when
you reduce 10,000 hours of flying, how does that diminish your
service and diminish the security here in the United States?
General Alles. So, for instance, as a metric, any hour I
lose in the Transit Zone is $1 million of cocaine that gets by
us. So any P-3 hour I have to cut back on, which there were
cutbacks as a result, there is going to be cocaine that passes
through.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Any hour lost, you lose $1 million in
collection of metric tonnage. Is that----
General Alles. In the Transit Zone, yes, ma'am, that is
correct. Now, that is just for the P-3s. You have to be
careful. That is just for the P-3 aircraft.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The other aircraft you have been able to--
--
General Alles. Well, the other hour impacts, the other
aircraft, they affect things like illegal immigration flow and
those. Those I can't give you numbers. I can take that for the
record, if you would like me to, to get those numbers.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would appreciate that greatly, General.
Thank you for your service.
Admiral Lee, thank you.
Captain Woodring, you were going to say how Federal funds
impact your work.
Captain Woodring. Yes, ma'am. The Federal funding for the
port is mostly through the Port Security Grant Program. We also
received recently a TIGER grant to expand one of our docks.
Again, industries interested in commerce, the economy, moving
cargo, and making money. Obviously, security impacts that, or a
lack of security could impact that.
I can tell you, as the Port of Houston Authority, since the
inception of the Port Security Grant Program, we have received
over $60 million in funding. It has bought things such as an
expanded port coordination center for us, vehicles, our three
new fireboats that just came on-line, a lot of fiber
infrastructure, a lot of TWIC card readers and things of that
nature.
On the Port Security Grant Program, we would like to see
the funding level not shrink any further. We would also like to
see the program kept separate from being bundled together with
other grant programs that we would then have to compete for.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So it has been vital to the existence and
the workings and operations of the Port of Houston.
Captain Woodring. Yes, ma'am. Those other things that I
mentioned earlier with the Houston Ship Channel Security
District, they were providing matching funds for port security
grants. So, again, that may not have come to the Port of
Houston Authority specifically, but certainly benefited the
greater Port of Houston.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, thank you.
Again, I want to thank everyone for their service, but
particularly I want to acknowledge Admiral Lee and General
Alles and Captain Woodring, and I certainly thank Director
Caldwell. I thank the gentlemen for their service to this
Nation.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, all of you gentlemen, so
very, very much. Again, we so appreciate your service to the
Nation and, certainly, the men and women that serve under you
24/7 and what they do for homeland security and protecting our
Nation and our country. We think about it all the time.
I appreciate many of the questions and the answers today,
particularly about resourcing and how important it is for us to
be able to give the resources as we can within the confines of
a restrictive budgetary environment for all of the various
missions that we have tasked you all with.
So we thank you for that.
I will also note that, pursuant to committee rule, the
hearing record will be held open for 10 days if there are any
other Members of the committee that might have additional
questions for the witnesses.
With that, again, we thank you all so very, very much for
your time and for your service and for being here today.
The committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
