[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
TSA'S SPOT PROGRAM AND INITIAL LESSONS FROM THE LAX SHOOTING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 14, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-43
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Richard Hudson, North Carolina, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Vice Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana Eric Swalwell, California
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Amanda Parikh, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Brian Turbyfill, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress From the
State of South Carolina:
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
The Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Daniel M. Gerstein, Deputy Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and
Investigative Service, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Mr. Charles K. Edwards, Deputy Inspector General, Office of
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
For the Record
The Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Letter From the American Alliance of Airport Police Officers... 5
Letter From the Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.............................. 7
TSA'S SPOT PROGRAM AND INITIAL LESSONS FROM THE LAX SHOOTING
----------
Thursday, November 14, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:39 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richard Hudson
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Hudson, McCaul, Brooks, Sanford,
Richmond, Thompson, Jackson Lee, and Swalwell.
Also present: Representatives Horsford, Payne, and Waters.
Mr. Hudson. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on
TSA's behavior detection activities and initial lessons learned
from the tragic shooting that occurred at Los Angeles
International Airport on Friday, November 1.
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing and thank
our witnesses for taking the time out of their schedules to be
with us here today.
Two weeks ago, a lone gunman opened fire at Los Angeles
International Airport, tragically killing one transportation
security officer, Gerardo Hernandez, and wounding two other
TSOs, along with a high school teacher. On behalf of the
committee, our sincerest condolences go out to the victims and
their families.
Transportation security officers take great personal risk
every day in order to secure our Nation's aviation system and
protect us against terrorism, and we thank them for their
service.
Before I continue with my opening remarks, I would like to
ask everyone to join me in a moment of silence to honor the
life of Officer Gerardo Hernandez.
[Moment of silence.]
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
In light of the recent tragedy that occurred at LAX, it is
critical, now more than ever, for TSA to work with stakeholders
to conduct a comprehensive review of security programs to
ensure that resources are being used in the most effective and
efficient manner and that coordination and communication with
local law enforcement is seamless.
The area prior to screening at an airport is a ``soft
target'' where masses of people gather, much like a shopping
mall or train station. This leaves airports open to virtually
anyone who wants to enter, including someone who may have
malicious intent. While it is the airport's responsibility to
provide security and law enforcement, we all know that there
are unavoidable risks of being in public spaces and incidents
like this one.
What is important now is to identify whether there were
unnecessary vulnerabilities that we can learn from. Did TSA and
airport police have seamless communication? Are there resources
that could be shifted around to create a more robust, layered
security posture?
I don't expect our witnesses to have all the answers here
today, but I do believe this hearing is a timely opportunity to
examine one program that has been heavily criticized by both
the Government Accounting Office and the DHS Office of
Inspector General.
TSA's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques
program, also known as SPOT, deploys over 3,000 behavioral
detection officers in an effort to identify passengers that may
pose a risk to aviation security. These TSA employees are not
trained law enforcement officers. As such, they rely on State
and local law enforcement to handle any situations that may
arise beyond the screening of passengers and their baggage or
if they think someone is acting suspiciously. The way to
determine if someone is acting suspiciously, according to the
Government Accountability Office, is not based on proven
science.
We know the threats to aviation are real. Our enemies
continue to plot against us. I think my colleagues would agree
that we need layers of security; but those layers have to make
sense; they can't be based on a hunch; they have to be proven.
I want to commend Administrator Pistole for his tremendous
effort to transform TSA into a risk-based agency. Programs such
as PreCheck are a huge step in the right direction.
But my concern with SPOT is that it doesn't necessarily
address threats emanating from overseas. It may not provide the
deterrence we are looking for, and I am not fully convinced it
increases safety in its current form. Calling it risk-based and
actually proving it being risk-based are two entirely different
things.
To my knowledge, there has not been a single instance where
behavioral detection officers referred someone to law
enforcement officers that has been deemed a terrorist. So that
is important that we measure the effectiveness of the program
and find a way to do that.
The latest study conducted by the Government Accountability
Office found that, first, human ability to accurately identify
deceptive behavior based on behavioral indicators is the same
or slightly better than chance; No. 2, that TSA has limited
information to evaluate SPOT's effectiveness; and, finally,
that it will be at least 3 years before TSA can report on the
effectiveness of its behavior detection activities.
GAO recommends that TSA limit further future funding for
behavioral detection activities until it can provide
scientifically validated evidence demonstrating that behavioral
indicators can be used to identify passengers who pose a threat
to aviation security. I look forward to hearing Administrator
Pistole's intentions to address this recommendation.
With that being said, I do see the value of using
behavioral analysis to bolster aviation security, but only when
we can prove that taxpayer dollars are being spent in the most
effective manner possible. Perhaps reinforcing local law
enforcement officers at airports who are well-equipped to
detect suspicious behavior would make more sense than having
3,000 employees directly employed by the TSA. But these are
questions that we should examine.
According to the Congressional Research Service, TSA's SPOT
program is the only stand-alone behavior detection program
within either DHS or DOJ. If this type of program worked, I
suspect we might see other agencies with similar missions
deploying stand-alone programs to detect suspicious behaviors,
but so far we haven't.
I look forward to hearing from TSA on how it plans to
address the GAO and IG recommendations, including how it plans
to assess SPOT's effectiveness.
[The statement of Mr. Hudson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Richard Hudson
November 14, 2013
Two weeks ago, a lone gunman opened fire at Los Angeles
International Airport, tragically killing one Transportation Security
Officer, Gerardo Hernandez, and wounding two other TSOs along with a
high school teacher.
On behalf of the committee, our sincerest condolences go out to the
victims and their families. Transportation Security Officers take great
personal risk every day in order to secure our Nation's aviation system
and protect against terrorism. We thank them for their service.
In light of the recent tragedy that occurred at LAX, it is
critical, now more than ever, for TSA to work with stakeholders to
conduct a comprehensive review of security programs, to ensure that
resources are being used in the most effective and efficient manner,
and that coordination and communication with local law enforcement is
seamless.
The area prior to screening at an airport is a ``soft target''
where masses of people gather, much like a shopping mall or a train
station. This leaves airports open to virtually anyone who wants to
enter, including someone with malicious intent.
While it is the airport's responsibility to provide security and
law enforcement, we all know that there are unavoidable risks of being
in public spaces, and incidents like this one, albeit tragic, are not
always preventable.
What is important now is to identify whether there were any
unnecessary vulnerabilities that we can learn from. Did TSA and airport
police have seamless communication? Are there resources that could be
shifted around to create a more robust, layered security posture?
I don't expect our witnesses to have all the answers yet. But I do
believe this hearing is a timely opportunity to examine one program
that has been heavily criticized by both GAO and the DHS Office of
Inspector General.
TSA's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program,
also known as SPOT, deploys over 3,000 behavior detection officers in
an effort to identify passengers that may pose a risk to aviation
security.
These TSA employees are not trained law enforcement officers. As
such, they rely on State and local law enforcement to handle any
situations that may arise beyond the screening of passengers and
baggage or if they think someone is acting suspicious. And the way they
determine if someone is acting suspicious, according to GAO, is not
based on proven science.
We know the threats to aviation are real. Our enemies continue to
plot against us. I think my colleagues would agree that we need layers
of security; but those layers have to make sense; they can't be based
on a hunch; they must be proven.
I want to commend Administrator Pistole for his tremendous efforts
to transform TSA into a risk-based agency. Programs such as Pre-Check
are a huge step in the right direction. But my concern with SPOT is
that it doesn't address the threats emanating from overseas; it doesn't
provide deterrence, and I'm not convinced it really makes us safer in
its current form.
Calling it risk-based, and actually proving it's risk-based, are
two entirely different things.
To my knowledge, there has not been a single instance where a
behavior detection officer has referred someone to a law enforcement
officer and that individual turned out to be a terrorist.
The latest study conducted by GAO found that:
The human ability to accurately identify deceptive behavior
based on behavioral indicators is the same or only slightly
better than chance;
TSA has limited information to evaluate SPOT's
effectiveness; and
It will be at least 3 years before TSA can report on the
effectiveness of its behavior detection activities.
GAO recommends that TSA limit future funding for behavior detection
activities until it can provide scientifically validated evidence
demonstrating that behavioral indicators can be used to identify
passengers who pose a threat to aviation security. I look forward to
hearing Administrator Pistole's intentions to address this
recommendation.
With that being said, I do see value in using behavior analysis to
bolster aviation security, but only when we can prove that taxpayer
dollars are being spent in the most effective manner possible.
Perhaps reinforcing local law enforcement officers at airports, who
are well-equipped to detect suspicious behavior, makes more sense than
having 3,000 employees doing behavior detection at TSA.
According to the Congressional Research Service, TSA's SPOT program
is the only stand-alone behavior detection program within either DHS or
DOJ. If this type of program worked, I suspect we would see agencies
with similar missions developing stand-alone programs to detect
suspicious behaviors. But we don't.
I look forward to hearing from TSA on how it plans to address the
GAO and IG recommendations, including how it plans to assess SPOT's
effectiveness.
Mr. Hudson. With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member
of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Richmond, for 5 minutes for his opening statement.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
calling this meeting and the bipartisan manner in which you
work.
I will yield a few minutes of my opening to the gentlelady
from California, Ms. Maxine Waters, so that she can make an
opening statement.
Madam Ranking Member, before you start, I need to ask
unanimous consent for Maxine Waters, Loretta Sanchez, Donald
Payne, and Steven Horsford of Nevada to participate in today's
meeting.
Mr. Hudson. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much.
I am very appreciative of Mr. Richmond for your allowing me
to take this time to give an opening statement. I would also
like to thank Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie
Thompson for allowing me to participate in this hearing, which
will consider the initial lessons learned from the tragic LAX
shooting incident, which occurred November 1 at Los Angeles
International Airport in my Congressional district.
I want to begin by joining with my colleagues to honor the
life and service of Gerardo Hernandez, the Transportation
Security Administration officer who was killed in the line of
duty during this tragic incident. I offer my deepest
condolences to his family and friends.
I also honor all of the TSA officers, LAX police officers,
and other first responders who risked their lives to stabilize
the situation and protect the public.
LAX is the sixth-busiest airport in the world and third in
the United States. LAX offers 680 daily flights to 96 American
cities and additional flights to 30 foreign countries. In 2012,
LAX served more than 63 million passengers, processed more than
1.9 million tons of air cargo, and handled more than 600,000
landings and takeoffs.
The safety and security of all of the people who work in
and pass LAX is of paramount importance. The LAX shooting
incident raises two specific security concerns that I will
highlight today. The first is the need for law enforcement
officers to be stationed at passenger screening checkpoints.
The second is the need for airport police to have access to
airport security cameras.
Both of these issues were raised in a letter from the
American Alliance of Airport Police Officers to TSA
Administrator John Pistole on September 28, 2012, more than 13
months before this tragic incident occurred. The letter was
signed jointly by Marshall McClain, the president of the Los
Angeles Airport Peace Officers Association, and Paul Nunziato,
the president of the Port Authority Police Benevolent
Association. In a response dated October 12, 2012,
Administrator Pistole agreed that both of these issues merited
further discussion.
I hereby request that the committee include both the
airport police officers' letter and Administrator Pistole's
response in the record for today's hearing.
[The information follows:]
Letter From the American Alliance of Airport Police Officers
September 28, 2012.
The Honorable John Pistole,
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, TSA-1
Administrator, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598.
Dear Administrator Pistole: Thank you again for taking time this
week to visit with our group to discuss our mutual goals of airport
safety and security.
As a follow-up to our discussion, please find below the five major
issue areas we discussed with specific examples and proposed solutions:
tsa and airport police screening point breach/incident protocol--
immediate notification
Issue: When security breaches and/or incidents occur in TSA
screening areas, TSA agents are attempting to investigate and/or self-
correct breaches, exposing the travelling public to risk, delaying
investigatory actions and causing unnecessary travel disruptions.
Example: In January 2012, two pipes which resembled pipe bombs were
removed from a traveler's bag at LaGuardia Airport and set aside in a
common area, prompting a security scare that was not reported to
airport police until 6 hours later. See http://www.nypost.com/p/news/
local/queens/bomb_botch_at_lag_cNNAisT- re0rBixGKlehknI.
Proposed Solution: TSA must be required to immediately notify
airport police of security breaches and/or incidents at passenger
checkpoints. Standard operating procedures must be prescribed between
TSA and airport police when dealing with security breaches and/or
incidents at passenger and baggage checkpoints.
real-time airport police access to closed circuit security cameras
Issue: Most airports do not have a coordinated airport-wide closed
circuit security camera system. Instead, TSA, airport management,
tenants, vendors, and others own and operate camera systems without a
common repository. Most importantly, there is no requirement that
stakeholders provide airport police with a camera feed should a crime
or incident occur. In all breaches, real-time access to video is
essential to airport police containing and assessing situations. The
absence of a standardization that requires that airport police must be
provided real-time access to any camera system on airport property has
led to unnecessary disruptions and numerous incidents when perpetrators
have eluded detainment.
Example: At Newark Airport in August 2012, traces of explosives
were identified on the hands of a woman at the TSA screening point. TSA
did not follow protocol and detain her for secondary screening nor did
they immediately contact airport police when they realized their
serious error. A half-hour after the incident when airport police were
notified, TSA could not even identify which of the three screening
areas within the terminal was the breach area. As a result, the
terminal was shut down for approximately 3 hours, delaying travel and
inconveniencing thousands of passengers. See http://www.myfoxny.com/
story/19199785/security-breach-at-newark-airport#ixzz22mr44BK7.
Proposed Solution: Any entity with security cameras at Category X
airports must provide a real-time feed to the airport police's primary
video surveillance system. Each entity is responsible for the cost of
providing the feed.
leo podium positions/screening rule--300 feet of screening area
Issue: Current statute requires that a law enforcement officer
(LEO) ``be able to provide prompt responsiveness to problems occurring
at the screening points.'' The definition of ``prompt'' has been
interpreted broadly.
Example: At large New York City area airports, an officer must
respond to ``problems'' at screening checkpoints within 5 minutes; a
feat virtually impossible if an officer is charged with patrolling the
entire terminal area and is performing other police functions. We share
the concern you expressed about officer responses to TSA. The
implementation of a 300-foot rule would address this matter and ensure
a LEO is immediately prepared to answer TSA calls.
Proposed Solution: A uniform standard should be applied to all
Category X airports which would require a LEO within 300 feet of the
passenger screening area.
mandatory screening for all airport employees and armed tsa
Issue: At various airports, prior to DHS permitting TSA to wear
metal badges, all TSA employees were screened with other airport
employees and passengers who enter the airport. TSA asserts that since
they now wear metal badges that will set off screening alarms, they
should be exempt from screening procedures. As a result, all TSA
employees at LAX and any item they carry or have on their body (i.e.
backpacks, purses, etc.) bypass the screening checkpoint.
Example: At LAX, all airport employees must go through the TSA
screening checkpoint except TSA, armed on-duty law enforcement
officers, and Federal Flight Deck Officers (who also carry weapons).
This issue is of great concern considering TSA agents have the
potential of bringing prohibited, dangerous, and/or illegal items with
them to work. Similarly, at JFK, airport employees are permitted to
enter the airport via a rudimentary metal turnstile that is located
immediately off the tarmac without passing through TSA screening.
Again, these airports are among the most vulnerable to terrorist
attacks in this country. In addition, two TSA agents are armed at LAX.
They are: Don McMullen, Assistant Federal Security Director for TSA/Law
Enforcement Division at LAX and a Task Force Officer on the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Force, and John Lingram, TSA Assistant Special Agent in
Charge at LAX and a former Federal air marshal.
Proposed Solution: Policy should revert to pre-badge protocol which
required TSA employees go through the TSA screening checkpoint before
entering secure areas of the airport.
tsa mission creep/definitive leo and tsa roles
Issue: TSA agents are charged with screening every passenger and
bag boarding commercial aircrafts. TSA agents are not law enforcement
officers and are not trained nor equipped to perform police work.
Airport police officers are vetted, attend an academy, and continually
receive criminal policing, hijacking, and terrorist training. They are
not screeners and do not seek to perform TSA-specific duties. TSA has
expanded the scope of their authority beyond screening areas to more
traditional ``police'' work without clear lines of delineation with
airport police, jeopardizing public safety, contributing to a break in
chain-of-command, and delaying timely law enforcement responses. This
``mission creep'' threatens the security of the airport.
Example: TSA's Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) program, which is
designed to detect threat behavior patterns, has received almost
universal criticism for its cost, lack of effectiveness, and racial
profiling claims. Our officers have become frustrated with the program
as BDO's have not produced a viable terrorist threat at any of our
airports, yet many police hours have been expended in dealing with BDO
claims to no avail. See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/us/racial-
profiling-at-boston-airport-officials-say.html?pagewanted=all and
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/304510.pdf.
Proposed Solution: TSA employees who are not trained as Federal law
enforcement officers should be restricted to conducting passenger and
bag screening and agents should have no jurisdiction beyond passenger
and baggage screening checkpoints. A pilot program should be conducted
at two or three Category X airports to test the feasibility of only
airport police, who have the foundational LEO training, knowledge of
the specific airport environment, and ability to make arrests, to
perform behavior detection activities in order to determine the
efficiency, effectiveness, and cost comparisons between airport police
BDO and TSA BDO programs.
The members of the American Alliance of Airport Police Officers
have a long and productive history and respected relationships with
numerous Federal partners including the FBI, Customs, and airplane-
based Federal Air Marshals. The key to the success of our mutual
efforts is that each participant has clear definitions of
responsibilities. The only Federal entity with which our officers
experience constant tension is with TSA non-law enforcement operations.
It is important that we address the underlying issues and adjust our
interactions to serve our mutual mission of keeping airports safe.
In this vein, we hope you will thoroughly review and advance our
recommendations. As we discussed, all airports are not created equally.
Our airports are among the most trafficked and terrorist-targeted in
the country and world. The rank-and-file officers we represent are
fully committed to our mission and we seek to have a productive and
more defined relationship with TSA to accomplish this goal. The
implementation of these five initiatives would promote these efforts.
We look forward to your responses and to working with you, House
Homeland Security Chairman Peter King, and others to address these
important concerns.
Sincerely,
Mr. Marshall McClain,
President, Los Angeles Airport Peace Officers Association.
Mr. Paul Nunziato,
President, Port Authority Police Benevolent Assoc. Inc.
______
Letter From the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security
October 12, 2012.
Mr. Marshall McClain,
President, Los Angeles Airport, Peace Officers Association.
Dear Mr. McClain: Thank you for your letter of September 28, 2012,
co-signed by Mr. Paul Nunziato, president, Port Authority Police
Benevolent Association, Inc. I appreciate that you took the time to
bring to my attention concerns held by some local airport law
enforcement officers regarding Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) operations.
As I mentioned during our in-person meeting on September 24, 2012,
I place a great deal of value on cooperation and collaboration between
TSA and our law enforcement partners at all levels. One of the many
lessons I learned during my 27 years in law enforcement with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the importance of
communication between different organizations that have a shared
responsibility for the safety and security of the American public. That
lesson has been reinforced during my tenure as the TSA Administrator,
and it is from that perspective that I am responding to your concerns
and recommendations.
When Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, they assigned overall
responsibility for security of the Nation's transportation systems to
the newly created TSA. In addition to requiring that security screening
operations for passengers be conducted directly by Federal employees of
the TSA or under direct TSA oversight, ATSA also conveyed to the TSA
Administrator broad responsibility and authority for security in all
modes of transportation. While most TSA personnel are assigned to
traditional passenger and checked baggage screening operations at
commercial airports, TSA responsibilities and operations are neither
limited nor restricted to these areas. Despite having overall
responsibility for transportation security, the authority of the TSA
Administrator to execute that responsibility is not unlimited, and in
reality is shared with other Government and private-sector entities.
Within the commercial airport context, TSA shares security
responsibility with airport operators, air carriers, airport assigned
law enforcement personnel, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the
FBI. Each of these entities operates under different authorities and
constraints. However, despite frequently divergent interests and
motivations, all these organizations share a common underlying interest
in protecting commercial aviation from acts of terrorism. I also
believe that each of these organizations strongly support TSA's effort
to fully implement risk-based principles in our approach to security
with the goal to provide the most effective security in the most
efficient way.
After reflecting on your concerns and considering the proposed
solutions proffered in your letter, I believe there is sufficient
common interest and agreement for us to engage in further discussions
that will improve our collective ability to protect commercial aviation
from acts of terrorism. The following provides my reply to your five
specific proposals:
require immediate notification to airport police by local tsa of all
security breaches and/or incidents at passenger checkpoints
TSA standard operating procedures require immediate notification to
local law enforcement upon discovery of a deadly or dangerous item
during security operations. Additionally, law enforcement notification
is required whenever potential evidence of criminality is identified
during TSA conducted searches of passenger and property. There are
several other situations that require immediate notification to law
enforcement, and I am happy to have my staff provide a more detailed
explanation of current TSA criteria for immediate notification.
Regarding the specific LaGuardia Airport example contained in your
letter, shortly after discovery, the item in question was determined to
be a non-hazardous homeopathic device by our Transportation Security
Specialist Explosives (TSS-E) assigned to the airport. As occurs
hundreds of times a day at airports around the Nation, TSS-E assist
with quickly resolving explosives alarms and potential suspect devices
identified during screening operations. This capability allows for
quick resolution of nearly all alarms without the need for bomb squad
response or shutting down and evacuating screening areas and directly
supports the concept of providing the most effective and efficient
security. At a higher level, the concern you raise really gets to the
larger question of unified command during a security incident where
incident response and management decisions are made based on the best
information available from all entities involved in the situation.
Rather than focusing narrowly on notification requirements, I would
prefer discussions that get to a better understanding of how TSA and
local law enforcement can operationalize a unified command approach
that is more effective in responding to and mitigating the impact of
security incidents.
require real-time cctv systems access be provided to airport police
In most instances, TSA does not own or operate airport CCTV systems
except for those associated with access points into TSA direct leased
spaces. Although local TSA officials have direct access to CCTV systems
that were purchased and installed with funding provided to the airport
authority by TSA, we do not have direct access to every CCTV camera
installed at every airport. Even within the counter-terrorism context,
questions exist about whether TSA has the authority to compel real-time
CCTV access. If local law enforcement agencies lack the authority to
compel private companies to provide them with real-time CCTV access, it
is doubtful that the Federal Government has this authority--especially
when the intended use of CCTV footage broadens into criminal
investigation and away from strict counterterrorism. That being said, I
do believe that this issue warrants additional discussion and that we
can reach an agreement on an approach to gain cooperation from all of
the operators of the various CCTV systems at an airport to grant access
to local law enforcement personnel. However, lack of direct CCTV access
during the Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) incident
referenced in your letter was not the reason why the terminal was shut
down and evacuated for over 3 hours. In fact, the Federal Security
Director (FSD) determined within 35 minutes that there was no reason to
evacuate the terminal and directed that passenger screening operations
continue. This determination, made by the senior TSA official with
overall responsibility for aviation security at EWR, was communicated
to the senior local law enforcement official on scene, airport
authority, and air carriers. Despite this risk-based determination, law
enforcement decided unilaterally to order the terminal evacuation and
barred passengers from entering the security checkpoint. This incident
again points to the need for more effective unified command and
progress is being made at Newark towards that end.
implement a fixed 300-foot patrol perimeter for checkpoint support law
enforcement personnel
When TSA decided to allow local FSDs the discretion to work with
local law enforcement to adopt a flexible response protocol for
checkpoint security incidents, the intent was to allow local officials
to determine how to structure the best approach based on local
conditions. Allowing law enforcement officers assigned to checkpoint
support operations to roam beyond the checkpoint increases the
visibility of these officers, security posture in other areas of the
airport, and staffing flexibility. As budgets for all Federal, State,
and local agencies become tighter, adopting a standard that removes
flexibility may prove counter-productive to the overall security
posture at large airports. However, I am willing to have my staff
engage in a broader discussion on the topic of law enforcement support
for checkpoint security operations to determine if a change in approach
would better support unified incident command.
implement mandatory screening for all airport employees and armed tsa
personnel
I do not support your suggestion, and do not feel it makes sense
for several different reasons. First, the two armed TSA personnel at
LAX: Assistant Federal Security Director for TSA/Law Enforcement
Division (AFSD-LE) Don McMullen and TSA/AFSD-LE John Lindgren, formerly
Assistant Federal Air Marshal in Charge (ASAC) of the FAMS Los Angeles
field office, identified in your letter, are sworn Federal law
enforcement officers with full authority to carry a firearm, which
allows them to make an arrest without a warrant for any offense against
the United States committed in their presence or for any felony under
the laws of the United States. They are also authorized to seek and
execute warrants of arrest or perform seizure of evidence. It makes
little sense to adopt a policy that would treat TSA law enforcement
personnel differently than other armed Federal, State, or local law
enforcement officers engaged in official duties at an airport. Second,
your suggestion with respect to the uniformed Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) workforce is counter to implementing a risk-based
approach to aviation security. These individuals are trusted to operate
on the front lines executing the TSA mission at our airports and
requiring them to be subject to physical screening diverts resources
with little if any counterterrorism impact. Finally, as I mentioned
during our meeting, TSA is not resourced to conduct 100 percent airport
employee screening. Based on the experience gained through several
pilot efforts mandated by Congress, TSA would require a significant
increase in the number of TSOs to fully implement your proposal, which
are not currently available.
conduct a pilot program where local law enforcement personnel are
trained and exclusively perform behavior detection screening
Your comment that airport police officers ``have become frustrated
with the program as BDOs have not produced a viable terrorist threat''
indicates the need for a better understanding of the BDO program. TSA's
Behavior Detection Program currently provides a behavior awareness
briefing to law enforcement entities who have regular interactions with
BDOs, upon request from the law enforcement department. I am willing to
explore a pilot program to assess the overall security benefits of
providing law enforcement officers further training in behavior
detection screening to augment TSA behavior screening operations, but I
do not concur with the rest of your proposed solution or its underlying
premise. As I noted above, TSA authority and jurisdiction is not
limited to passenger and baggage screening locations and I have no
intention to impose any such limitations. With respect to the BDO
program, the vast majority of anomalous behaviors indicative of a
potential elevated threat to aviation are quickly resolved by our BDO
cadre through casual conversation. Across all TSA screening operations,
a very small percentage of passengers are identified for more thorough
screening as a result of observed behaviors, and an even smaller amount
of those BDO interactions result in a request to local law enforcement
for assistance. As example, of the nearly 24 million passengers
screened at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) over the past
12 months, only a few thousand were identified for additional screening
by our BDO teams, and a marginal amount resulted in a request for law
enforcement assistance. Clearly these statistics do not support the
contention that many police hours are being expended in support of our
BDO program. Of more important concern to me is the fact that despite
averaging a low number of requests for law enforcement assistance per
month resulting from the BDO program at JFK, law enforcement officers
failed to respond to those requests too frequently.
I am confident that through improved communication we can reach a
better understanding and clarity with respect to roles and
responsibilities, and that this achievement will diminish the potential
for unhealthy tension between TSA and our security partners at
commercial airports. These communications are needed at both the
National level as well as within each individual airport community
where the shared responsibility for aviation security plays out each
and every day. Because of the multiple interests at play, these
discussions need to include broader participation beyond the American
Alliance of Airport Police Officers (AAAPO).
As you allude to in your letter, improved understanding and
communication are important drivers towards a highly effective aviation
security system. To that end, I have directed the TSA Assistant
Administrators for the Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service and
Security Operations to further discuss with AAAPO and the Airport Law
Enforcement Association Network (ALEAN) how to improve the level of
cooperation and communication between TSA and local airport law
enforcement. Based on your specific suggestions, these discussions will
include improving unified command structures during incident response;
improved access to CCTV systems at airports where access by law
enforcement is problematic; review of policies for deployment of law
enforcement resources in support of checkpoint screening operations;
and, expanding current LEO behavior briefing to the appropriate
additional law enforcement personnel. However, I am mindful that any
proposed solution must involve other entities such as the leadership of
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police, Los Angeles World
Airways Police, American Association of Airport Executives, the
Alliance for Airlines, and the individual airport operators potentially
impacted by any proposed changes.
I appreciate that you took the time to share your concerns with us
and hope this information is helpful. An identical letter is being sent
to Mr. Paul Nunziato.
Sincerely yours,
John S. Pistole,
Administrator.
Ms. Waters. There are two methods by which police may
provide law enforcement support for TSA's passenger screening
checkpoints. The fixed-post method requires a police officer to
be stationed at the passenger screening checkpoint. The
flexible response method allows the police to roam the
surrounding area but requires that they be able to respond to a
problem at the checkpoint within a specified time period.
The airport police officers' letter explained that it is
virtually impossible for an individual police officer to
respond quickly to a problem at a screening checkpoint if the
officer is responsible for patrolling an entire terminal area
and performing other police functions. The letter recommends a
uniform standard for all major airports which would require a
law enforcement officer within 300 feet of the passenger
screening area.
It is my understanding that LAX police officers did indeed
provide both fixed-post and roaming police officers at LAX at
the time this letter was written. Then last April, 6 months
after Administrator Pistole agreed to discuss the issue, a
decision was made to waive the requirement for fixed-post
officers at LAX. In any event, there was apparently no fixed-
post officer stationed at the affected LAX checkpoint when the
shooting began.
The LAX's police officers' letter also raised the issue of
real-time airport police access to airport security cameras. As
the letter explained, most airports do not have a coordinated
airport-wide security camera system. Instead, TSA airport
management, airlines, and vendors own and operate their own
security camera systems. There is no requirement that they
provide airport police with a camera feed should an incident
occur. This is certainly the case at LAX. It is my
understanding----
Mr. Hudson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much.
I know that this was about the TSA SPOT program. I did not
refer to it specifically because I just don't think it is
viable or doable and I do believe that it is profiling. So I
wanted to talk about some of the real issues that I think you
could entertain.
Thank you very much, and I yield my time.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentlelady.
The Ranking Member's time has expired.
[The statement of Mr. Richmond follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Cedric L. Richmond
November 14, 2013
I want to give a special thanks to Administrator Pistole for your
service and leadership in the wake of the tragic shooting at LAX on
November 1.
Yet again, a committee is meeting on Capitol Hill to discuss a
shooting by a lone wolf. Another in a seemingly endless series of
tragic shootings that have separated husbands from wives, parents from
children, and friends from colleagues. From Aurora to Newtown to the
Navy Yard, it seems that every week we are back in the Capitol, a
committee is holding a hearing to explore how and why a senseless act
of gun violence occurred, garnering National headlines.
Rarely are there simple answers and rarely do we address the core
issues that allow these events to occur time and time again. Nor do we
examine all, or even more than a small sample, of the total number of
incidents of gun violence that occur each day, week, and month in our
Nation.
This time, we are meeting to explore the circumstances surrounding
the targeted killing of a Transportation Security Officer. Gerardo
Hernandez, the first TSA employee to be killed in the line of duty. But
Officer Hernandez was more than that. He was, by all known accounts, a
loving husband and father, loyal friend, and dedicated Federal
employee. A man who, like so many other Transportation Security
Officers, took pride in his job, defending our Nation from those who
seek to do us harm.
Despite a constant barrage of criticism from Members of Congress,
the media, and a litany of bloggers who fancy themselves security
experts from behind their computer screens, Officer Hernandez and his
fellow TSOs continued to do their part to secure our Nation, even
during the shutdown, when political grandstanding put their paychecks
in jeopardy. It is unclear whether there are any policies or procedures
that can be put into place or dollars that can be spent to prevent what
happened at LAX from happening again.
But in Washington, proposals for new policies will come fast and
furiously. I would caution that we should guard against taking any
steps prior to having a full understanding of the events that occurred
at LAX and the impact policy changes would have on the Nation. Maybe
there are common-sense steps that could be taken to improve
coordination between local law enforcement agencies and TSA, such as
ensuring they can communicate via radios during emergencies--this
wasn't the case at LAX on the day of the shooting.
But even common-sense fixes have potentially unintended
consequences and costs associated with them. Regarding cost, the
Government Accountability Office has pointed Congress to a TSA program
without scientific merit that the agency funds at over $200 million per
year. I am, of course, speaking of TSA's SPOT program and GAO's report
released yesterday.
I, for one, needed no further convincing the SPOT program
represents an inefficient use of taxpayer dollars. Indeed, I have
proposed legislation to use the funds allocated to this program as an
offset for student loans.
Hopefully, GAO's report, along with the previous work of the
Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, will help other
Members come to the conclusion that TSA's SPOT program is a failed
experiment that no longer merits hundreds of millions of dollars in
funds per year. Frankly, with resources scarce and Members looking for
offsets anywhere they can find them, I cannot imagine how this program
continues to garner Congressional support in the wake of GAO's report.
To that end, I would encourage Administrator Pistole to include
within his review of security procedures at checkpoints an assessment
of how SPOT funds could be allocated to enhance and expand the use of
security technologies and procedures that have been proven effective.
Mr. Hudson. The Chairman will now recognize the Chairman of
the full committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for
any statement he may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Chairman Hudson, for holding this
important hearing.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here.
At the outset, I would like to first commend Administrator
Pistole for his leadership, particularly with the positive
development of the PreCheck system that you and I have talked
extensively about, in terms of rolling out across the Nation.
You have done an outstanding job.
In fact, finally, I think we got Southwest Airlines now to
sign up, and that is going to be a huge sea change, if you
will, at the airports in terms of the traveling public and
being passenger-friendly while targeting the threats. I want to
thank you for that.
From your time at the FBI to your years at TSA, you have
been a true public servant. This committee certainly
appreciates your dedication to homeland security and,
importantly, aviation security, which many people forget is
still very much an unfortunately viable threat to the traveling
public.
Two weeks ago, a lone gunman carried out a senseless and
shocking act of violence at Los Angeles International Airport,
targeting transportation security officers. The individual who
carried out this vicious assault took one life of our officers
and wounded three others. Our thoughts and prayers are with the
victims and their families during this difficult time.
What this incident demonstrates, once again, is just how
vulnerable public spaces can be to those who wish to carry out
such attacks. The swift response by local law enforcement is
laudable. However, there are still some unanswered questions
about the shooting itself.
A week after the incident took place, I was surprised to
learn that the police officer assigned to patrol around the
security checkpoint at LAX may not have been in the correct
vicinity of the checkpoint to immediately respond when the
shots were fired. To me, this is very significant. While we
have since been told the officer may have, in fact, been within
the required 3-minute radius of the checkpoint, this issue does
raise new questions about the response protocols currently in
place and how they work.
More importantly, in the chaos of evacuating the
checkpoint, which no doubt saved many lives, according to the
airport operator, no one at the screening checkpoint pushed the
panic button that is supposed to be used in these situations to
alert local authorities. A landline at the checkpoint was
almost used by a TSO to communicate with police, but the phone
was understandably abandoned during the evacuation because it
wasn't mobile. Police responded based upon a phone call from an
airline contractor rather than the TSA.
The response to the LAX shooting, by all accounts, was
swift and successful. Local police, TSA personnel, and the
medical personnel who responded deserve tremendous praise.
Having said that, terrorists are constantly looking for
vulnerabilities in our system. We must do everything we can to
secure the perimeters of airports, ensure robust coordination
and communication systems are in place between local law
enforcement and TSA, and use the limited resources effectively
at airports across the United States.
While the response from local authorities undoubtedly saved
lives, the gunman had 4 unobstructed minutes--4 minutes. Four
minutes in a time like this is a long time; with 150 rounds, is
a very long time. It is extraordinary that more lives were not
taken. It is a miracle that that didn't happen, and we thank
God that didn't happen that day. But 4 unobstructed minutes to
wreak havoc in one of the largest, busiest airports in the
country. If his goal was to produce mass casualties rather than
target TSA personnel, the outcome would have been more severe.
Several questions come to mind in light of this incident.
Are emergency response times at airports adequate? Does TSA
have appropriate plans and means to communicate with law
enforcement in the event a checkpoint is evacuated?
Fortunately, LAX had recently exercised--and I commend the
administrator, John Pistole. They actually did an exercise for
this type of situation just weeks before this event.
I am pleased that TSA will be undertaking a review to see
what lessons can be learned from LAX, and I look forward to
discussing those results. I encourage TSA to fully engage
stakeholders as part of its review. Private industry obviously
has a significant role to play when it comes to securing
airports and airplanes from bad actors.
In addition, today's hearing is an opportunity to also
examine some of the findings in GAO's most recent report on
TSA's Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program,
commonly referred to as SPOT.
I had the opportunity to observe this program first-hand a
few years ago, during a visit to Boston Logan Airport on the
anniversary of 9/11. I am a fan of this program; don't get me
wrong. I have seen it work first-hand. I have been a strong
advocate for this program. However, we have had results of the
GAO study that are less than favorable.
GAO recommends that TSA limit future funding for the
program until an accurate study is completed that supports
using behavioral indicators to identify threats to aviation.
Based on TSA's own plans, it will be at least 3 years before we
can begin measuring the effectiveness of SPOT.
I know TSA disagrees with GAO's findings, and I look
forward to hearing that, and also argues that SPOT is risk-
based, which I think is a good premise. I would like to hear
TSA's explanation and information used to support this.
Frankly, I am disappointed with the findings of the report
because I believe, as I said, there is value in assessing
behavior in the aviation environment. There are century-old
techniques and tools of law enforcement and other security
organizations, including Israel--many people point to Israel as
a model--that allow individuals to assess behavior, but if this
program isn't working, we need to find something that will more
effectively.
I am concerned that TSA will continue to so-called spin its
wheels with this program instead of developing a more effective
and efficient approach. I hope I am wrong on that point, but I
look forward to not only discussing GAO and DHS IG's
recommendations for this program but also whether there are
better ways of integrating behavior analysis into aviation
security, perhaps by reinforcing local law enforcement and
other alternative approaches.
I look forward to discussing the elements of TSA's review
of the LAX shooting. The bottom line is we need to do all we
can to protect our aviation system and to evolve our security
measures, just as the threats against us are evolving.
Let me just to close by, again, to John Pistole, I admire
what you are doing. It is not easy representing an agency that
comes under so much scrutiny. It is sometimes the face of
Homeland Security, and I think you are doing a good job making
that face a better face across the country and making it more
passenger-friendly and more targeted toward the terrorist.
I do believe this program--I don't believe, as some would
say--I got asked on the nightly news last night, do you favor
scrapping this program? I said, no, I don't. I believe
detecting behavior can be so important, in terms of stopping
the threat. But I do believe that it could be more effective
and efficient for the American taxpayer, and I think that is
what we are all here to do.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me. I
know my remarks went a little bit over. I appreciate you
holding this hearing.
[The statement of Mr. McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
November 14, 2013
Two weeks ago, a lone gunman carried out a senseless and shocking
act of violence at Los Angeles International Airport, targeting
Transportation Security Officers. The individual who carried out this
vicious assault took one life and wounded three others. Our thoughts
and prayers are with the victims and their families during this
difficult time.
What this incident demonstrates, once again, is just how vulnerable
public spaces can be to those who wish to carry out attacks.
The swift response by local law enforcement is laudable. However,
there are still some unanswered questions about the shooting itself. A
week after the incident took place, I was surprised to learn that the
police officer assigned to patrol around this security checkpoint at
LAX may not have been in the correct vicinity of the checkpoint to
immediately respond when shots were fired. To me this is very
significant.
While we have since been told the officer may have, in fact, been
within the required 3-minute radius of the checkpoint, this issue does
raise new questions about the response protocols currently in place and
how they work.
More importantly, in the chaos of evacuating the checkpoint, which
no doubt saved many lives, according to the airport operator, no one at
the screening checkpoint pushed the panic button that is supposed to be
used in these situations to alert local authorities. A landline at the
checkpoint was almost used by a TSO to communicate with police, but the
phone was understandably abandoned during the evacuation because it
wasn't mobile. Police responded based on a phone call from an airline
contractor rather than TSA.
The response to the LAX shooting, by all accounts, was swift and
successful. Local police, TSA personnel, and the medical personnel who
responded deserve tremendous praise.
Having said that, terrorists are constantly looking for
vulnerabilities in our system. We must do everything we can to secure
the perimeter of airports, ensure robust coordination and communication
systems are in place between local law enforcement and TSA, and use
limited resources effectively, at airports across the United States.
While the response from local authorities undoubtedly saved lives,
the gunman had 4 unobstructed minutes--4 minutes in a time like this is
a long time and with 150 rounds it's extraordinary more lives were not
taken. He had 4 unobstructed minutes to wreak havoc in one of the
largest, busiest airports in the country. If his goal was to produce
mass casualties, rather than target TSA personnel, the outcome would
have been more severe. Several questions come to mind in light of this
incident:
Are emergency response times at airports adequate?
Does TSA have appropriate plans and means to communicate
with law enforcement in the event a checkpoint is evacuated?
Fortunately, LAX had recently exercised for this type of
situation just weeks before this event.
I am pleased that TSA will be undertaking a review to see what
lessons can be learned from LAX, and I look forward to discussing the
results of that review.
I also encourage TSA to fully engage stakeholders as part of its
review. Private industry obviously has a significant role to play when
it comes to securing airports and airplanes from bad actors.
In addition, today's hearing is an opportunity to examine some of
the findings in GAO's most recent report on TSA's Screening Passengers
by Observation Techniques Program, commonly referred to as SPOT. I had
the opportunity to observe this program first-hand a few years ago,
during a visit to Boston Logan Airport on the anniversary of 9/11.
However, the results of GAO's study are less-than-favorable. GAO
recommends that TSA limit future funding for the program until an
accurate study is completed that supports using behavioral indicators
to identify threats to aviation. Based on TSA's own plans, it will be
at least 3 years before we can begin measuring the effectiveness of
SPOT.
I know TSA disagrees with GAO's findings, and argues that SPOT is
risk-based, which I think is a good premise. I would like to hear TSA's
explanation and the information used to support it.
Frankly, I am disappointed with the findings of the report because
I believe there is value in assessing behavior in the aviation
environment. There are centuries-old techniques and tools of law
enforcement and other security organizations, including Israel, that
allow individuals to assess behavior; but if this program isn't
working, we need to find something that will work more effectively.
I am concerned that TSA will continue to spin its wheels with this
program instead of developing a more effective and efficient approach.
I hope I am wrong on that point.
I look forward to not only discussing GAO and DHS IG
recommendations for this program, but also whether there are better
ways of integrating behavior analysis into aviation security, perhaps
by reinforcing local law enforcement, or other alternative approaches.
I also look forward to discussing the elements of TSA's review of
the LAX shooting. The bottom line is we need to do all that we can to
protect our aviation system, and to evolve our security measures just
as the threats against us are evolving.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the Chairman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of
the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Thompson, for any statement he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing today.
At the outset, I would like to join my colleagues in
expressing condolences to Officer Hernandez's wife, children,
friends, and family, and all of the employees of the
Transportation Security Administration.
Today, I will be joining Chairman McCaul, Chairman Hudson,
Ranking Member Richmond, and Congresswoman Waters in
introducing a resolution condemning the shooting at LAX and
expressing condolences to Officer Hernandez's family.
Unfortunately, it appears that the Majority leader's protocol
will not afford for the resolution to be considered on the
House floor.
To Administrator Pistole, please know and take back to the
workforce that this committee stands with the agency in this
trying time.
The shooting that took place at LAX was a tragic and
senseless act of violence. All evidence points to a shooter
with extreme anti-Government views who intentionally and
exclusively targeted TSA employees. These are some of the
Federal officers responsible for protecting our Nation against
terrorist attack. I hope this incident will result in less
rhetoric about, and demonizing of, transportation security
officers.
It is also my hope that TSA takes a comprehensive look at
how such an incident can be prevented or further mitigated in
the future. I applaud Administrator Pistole for taking the
initial step of announcing that he will conduct a review of
security procedures at checkpoints. I also applaud the
administrator for conducting outreach to a wide variety of
stakeholders and Federal partners before defining the scope of
his review. This review should serve as an opportunity to
examine not only TSA's partnerships and coordination with local
law enforcement but also of TSA's policies, programs, and
partnerships affecting checkpoint operations.
Today, in addition to discussing the initial lessons from
the shootings at LAX, we will examine reports issued by the
Government Accountability Office and the Department of Homeland
Security's Office of Inspector General regarding TSA's
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program,
commonly referred to as SPOT.
GAO's report pulls no punches when it comes to this
behavior detection program that costs taxpayers more than $220
million per year, recommending that Congress consider the lack
of scientific evidence to support the program when making
funding decisions. The Inspector General's report, released in
May, concluded that TSA could not provide evidence of the cost-
effectiveness of the SPOT program.
Given the limited post-sequester dollars available for
transportation security activities, we do not have the luxury
of spending hundreds of millions of dollars per year on
programs for which TSA cannot prove the effectiveness of or
scientifically validate.
Since 2007, TSA has spent nearly $1 billion on this
misguided program. Even TSA admits that it will be years before
the agency may be able to display the effectiveness of the SPOT
program. That means hundreds of millions more in taxpayer
dollars will need to be spent just to find out whether the
program is effective.
It is no secret that I have been a critic of the SPOT
program since its inception and expansion prior to being
validated. In June of this year, I offered an amendment on the
House floor to prohibit TSA from using funds for the SPOT
program. Even if I were the program's most vocal proponent, I
would not be able to justify continuing to fund it following a
review of the GAO and DHS IG report that will be examined
today.
To be clear, I have no doubt that the men and women working
on the front lines of this program, the behavior detection
officers, are performing as instructed and believe in their
service. But we cannot continue to fund programs with the hope
that they will work. We must prioritize limited funds for
programs that have been proven effective.
The SPOT program does not fit that description. You can't
have a program validated without science. I have requested that
validation on a number of occasions, and all reports say there
is no science in it.
So I have real concerns about it. There are people who talk
about other models, but you talk about countries where civil
rights and civil liberties are not a part of the protocol. So
you can do behavior detection in countries where civil rights
and civil liberties are not part of the protocol, but in
America you can't profile people without protecting their civil
rights and civil liberties. So I am concerned about that.
I also just want to thank each of the witnesses for
appearing before the subcommittee today. I look forward to your
testimony and the responses to Members' questions.
I would also like to thank all my colleagues on the
Minority side for attending this hearing. Obviously, it is of
importance to a lot of us, as well as Majority Members. I look
forward to the testimony.
I yield back.
[The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
November 14, 2013
At the outset, I would like to join my colleagues in expressing
condolences to Officer Hernandez's wife, children, friends, and family
and to all of the employees of the Transportation Security
Administration. Today, I will be joining Chairman McCaul, Chairman
Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Congresswoman Waters in
introducing a resolution condemning the shooting at LAX and expressing
condolences to Officer Hernandez's family. Unfortunately, it appears
that the Majority Leader's protocols will not afford for the resolution
to be considered on the House floor.
To Administrator Pistole, please know, and take back to the
workforce, that this committee stands with the agency in this trying
time. The shooting that took place at LAX was a tragic and senseless
act of violence. All evidence points to a shooter with extreme anti-
Government views who intentionally and exclusively targeted TSA
employees.
These are some of the very Federal officers responsible for
protecting our Nation against a terrorist attack. I hope this incident
will result in less rhetoric about, and demonizing of, Transportation
Security Officers.
It is also my hope that TSA takes a comprehensive look at how such
an incident can be prevented or further mitigated in the future. I
applaud Administrator Pistole for taking the initial step of announcing
that he will conduct a review of security procedures at checkpoints. I
also applaud the administrator for conducting outreach to a wide
variety of stakeholders and Federal partners before defining the scope
of his review.
This review should serve as an opportunity to examine not only
TSA's partnerships and coordination with local law enforcement, but
also all of TSA's policies, programs, and partnerships affecting
checkpoint operations.
Today, in addition to discussing the initial lessons from the
shooting at LAX, we will examine reports issued by the Government
Accountability Office and the Department of Homeland Security's Office
of Inspector General regarding TSA's Screening of Passengers by
Observation Techniques program--commonly referred to as SPOT.
GAO's report pulls no punches when it comes to this behavior
detection program that costs taxpayers more than $220 million per year,
recommending that Congress consider the lack of scientific evidence to
support the program when making funding decisions. The Inspector
General's report, released in May, concluded that TSA could not provide
evidence of the cost-effectiveness of the SPOT program.
Given the limited post-sequester dollars available for
transportation security activities, we do not have the luxury of
spending hundreds of millions of dollars per year on programs for which
TSA cannot prove the effectiveness of, or scientifically validate.
Since 2007, TSA has spent nearly $1 billion on this misguided
program. Even TSA admits that it will be years before the agency may be
able to display the effectiveness of the SPOT program.
That means hundreds of millions more in taxpayer dollars will need
to be spent just to find out whether the program is effective. It is no
secret that I have been a critic of the SPOT program since its
inception and expansion prior to being validated.
In June of this year, I offered an amendment on the House floor to
prohibit TSA from using funds for the SPOT program. Even if I were the
program's most vocal proponent, I would not be able to justify
continuing to fund it following a review of the GAO and DHS IG reports
that will be examined today.
To be clear, I have no doubt that the men and women working on the
front lines of this program, the Behavior Detection Officers, are
performing as instructed and believe in their service.
But we cannot continue to fund programs with the hope that they
will work. We must prioritize limited funds for programs that have been
proven effective. The SPOT program does not fit that description.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Thompson.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
Before we continue, I would like to ask unanimous consent
to insert a statement into the record for the gentleman from
South Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The statement of Mr. Duncan of South Carolina follows:]
Statement of Honorable Jeff Duncan
November 14, 2013
The senseless act of violence that occurred at Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX), which resulted in the death of a TSA
officer and injuries of many, is a harsh reminder of the daily threat
our airports and traveling public face. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) was created following the September 11 attacks to
strengthen the security of our Nation's transportation systems.
In an effort to further enhance passenger screening, in 2007, TSA
deployed the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT)
program. This program employs Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) to
observe, visually assess, and identify potentially high-risk passengers
by analyzing their behaviors that may indicate stress, fear, or
deception.
Unfortunately, while TSA insists they have added an additional
layer of security at our Nation's airports, according to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) this is not the case. In their November
2013 report, which I requested, GAO states that with an absence of
scientific evidence for using behavioral indicators to identify
aviation security threats, the SPOT program is not completely valid.
After analyzing over 400 studies, GAO found that ``the human ability to
accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral indicators
is the same as or slightly better than chance.''
The GAO had also previously issued a report on TSA's SPOT program
in 2010. This report found that TSA deployed the program without first
validating the scientific basis behind SPOT. GAO recommended that TSA
conduct a validation study to prove the program's effectiveness. While
TSA did conduct a study in 2011, GAO reported that with several design
limitations, methodological issues, and faulty data collection, the
results of the study were hindered. To date, TSA has been unable to
show whether the program has helped in catching a single terrorist.
This program costs the American taxpayer over $200 million per year
and has already spent almost $900 million since its implementation.
That's $900 million gambled away for a program that may or may not
work. While I do believe that transportation security is of the utmost
importance, I think it's time that we re-evaluate this costly program
to be better stewards of taxpayer dollars. This is one of the reasons I
voted in favor of Ranking Member Thompson's amendment to the Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for 2014 to prohibit the use of
funds for the program. While this amendment ultimately failed, its
intent was reaffirmed when GAO's recommendation called for the
Secretary of Homeland Security to direct TSA to limit future funding
for this program until TSA can provide scientifically validated
evidence to support the effectiveness of SPOT.
Additionally, not only has GAO examined the validity of this
program, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) issued a report in May ofthis year which also
questioned the capabilities of SPOT. Based on the findings of their
audit, the OIG determined that ``TSA cannot ensure that passengers at
United States airports are screened objectively, show that the program
is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the program's expansion.''
From this report and the GAO reports, it is obvious to me that there
has an abundance of poor decision making that has cost millions of
taxpayer dollars, and that is absolutely unacceptable.
Deploying this program before knowing its effectiveness and then
continuing to fund a faulty program on a yearly basis is illogical and
irresponsible considering our Nation is buried in $17 trillion in debt.
I hope this hearing today will bring answers as to what course of
action TSA will take next and how taxpayer dollars will not be
needlessly wasted.
Finally, although I believe it is important to have a witness from
the OIG's office to discuss their audit's findings, I find it
questionable that the Office of the Inspector General provided Mr.
Edwards to testify. While we have yet to see the results of the Senate
Subcommittee's investigation or the on-going review being conducted by
CIGIE, the nature of the allegations against Mr. Edwards are extremely
serious. Mr. Edwards should have taken unpaid administrative leave
until the findings of the investigations were completed. Instead, he
has become a distraction to the important work of the Inspector
General's office. The role of an IG in rooting out waste, fraud, and
abuse demands a permanent leader with an untarnished reputation.
Mr. Hudson. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this important topic. The
witnesses' full written statements will appear in the hearing
record.
Our first witness, the Honorable John Pistole, has been the
administrator of the Transportation Security Administration at
the Department of Homeland Security since 2010. As TSA
administrator, he oversees the management of approximately
60,000 employees, the security operations of more than 450
Federalized airports throughout the United States, the Federal
Air Marshal Service, and the security for highways, railroads,
ports, mass transit systems, and pipelines.
You have a big job, sir, and I commend you for the job you
are doing and appreciate your being here today.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Pistole to testify.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Chairman Hudson, Ranking
Member Richmond, Ranking Member Thompson, and other
distinguished Members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today.
Let me start off by expressing my deep appreciation to you,
Chairman, and other Members of the committee who have expressed
condolences on behalf of Transportation Security Officer
Gerardo Hernandez and his family and the two other officers who
were shot and wounded on November 1 there.
There was a great outpouring on Tuesday at the memorial
service that was held in Los Angeles by the city of Los
Angeles, by the police, the law enforcement community pulling
together and demonstrating support for Officer Hernandez's
family and the two other officers and their families. So thank
you for that, the expressions and condolences.
But the bottom line is there are challenging times right
now for members of TSA, TSA employees, especially those at LAX
and Terminal 3, who have been directly affected by this, who
have lost a well-liked and well-respected colleague, and so
there is a lot of grieving going on.
But I do want to commend the actions of the officers, the
TSOs, and others at the checkpoint that day for their actions
in helping move passengers away from the point of danger. In
fact, the two officers who were injured, the air protection
officer, Tony Grigsby, and then a screening training
instructor, James Speer, were actually wounded because they
probably stayed too long in the checkpoint helping an elderly
gentleman away from the checkpoint, and they were shot as they
were leaving the checkpoint as the shooter came up onto that
upper level there.
So we have had this tragic incident, and the question is,
what is our response? Let me just outline, briefly, five things
that we have done since November 1.
Obviously, during the shooting, I convened a crisis action
team meeting by senior leadership, among senior leadership at
TSA, to assess what was going on even during the lockdown after
the shooting and challenged the senior leadership team to come
up with recommendations, both short-term and long-term, on what
can be best done to protect transportation security officers at
checkpoints around the country.
We coordinated closely with airport law enforcement
organizations around the country to deploy uniformed officers
in and around checkpoints in a much more visible way in the
hours and days following that. That is continuing.
Third, we have redeployed a number of our VIPR teams, the
Visible Intermodal Protection Response teams, to airports,
again, for that response to and just the notion of having
additional security officers protected with this additional
show of force.
Fourth, we have communicated frequently with the workforce
regarding the events, because the absence of information is a
concern. We have listened to their concerns, particularly at
LAX, where I have visited twice now in the last 10 days, to
hear their concerns and provide grief counselors, who--hundreds
of TSOs have availed themselves of those services.
Then, fifth, as was mentioned last Thursday, we convened a
meeting at TSA headquarters of stakeholders both from the
aviation sector writ large, law enforcement agencies,
representatives from 30 different agencies, including the
Aviation Security Advisory Council, the ASAC, basically to
listen, to hear their views on what may happen or what may be
some of the solutions as we look forward. So that review is on-
going, and I look forward to updating the committee and,
obviously, getting input from all of the committee on possible
steps that we can take.
Second, the other issue that we are here for today is on
the behavior detection officer program, SPOT, as it is referred
to. The context has been referred to, but let me just emphasize
that.
So, over the last several years, both from this
subcommittee, the full committee, and from the American people,
there have been calls for TSA to use more common sense in how
we go about doing things, to be less invasive--fewer pat-downs,
fewer of the imaging machines that provide the graphic images.
We have done those things. So that is what risk-based security
is all about.
We have taken 15 steps, including TSA PreCheck, which you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman; Known Crewmember for pilots and flight
attendants; the announcement we made yesterday expanding the
partnership with DOD to allow DOD members to go through
expedited screening around the country now; 75 and older, 12
and under--all these initiatives to try to bring more common
sense and less invasiveness into the process.
One of those things we also do is what we call managed
inclusion. As part of that, our behavior detection officers
serve a key function. Just for example, on Monday this week, we
had over 80,000 passengers around the country go through
expedited physical screening because of behavior detection
officers observing no suspicious behaviors, so 80,000
passengers in 1 day.
The other part of this is, under RBS, risk-based security,
for the last 10 days we have actually met or exceeded the goal
of 25 percent of the traveling public going through expedited
physical screening on any given day. So the last 10 days we
have met or exceeded that goal, which we had set for the end of
the year.
In closing, the GAO has done several studies recently on
the BDO program. The 2010 review was very helpful to us in
terms of recommending 11 different steps that we could take to
strengthen and improve the program. We have implemented 10 of
those. We are still working with GAO on the eleventh, but we
recognize the significant work they have done. This most recent
study, we do disagree with the conclusions but recognize some
of the valid points.
So we can and will strengthen the program. I commit to
doing that. This initiative, though, is one that looks at
intent and motivation rather than a prohibited item. So that's
important. This looks at that.
So defunding the program is not the answer. I would just
say, if we did that, if Congress did that, what I can envision
is there would be fewer passengers going through expedited
screening, there would be increased pat-downs, there would be
longer lines, and there would be more frustration by the
traveling public.
So I would like to work with the subcommittee and the full
committee to strengthen this valuable program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole
November 14, 2013
Good morning Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and other
Members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Behavior Detection and Analysis (BDA) Program.
TSA is a high-performing counterterrorism agency with a dedicated
workforce executing our mission around the clock and across the globe.
To fulfill this vital mission, TSA employs a layered approach to
security through state-of-the-art technologies, intelligence analysis
and information sharing, behavior detection techniques, explosives
detection canine teams, Federal Air Marshals, and a well-trained front-
line workforce, among other assets. All of these layers are essential
to securing the Nation's transportation systems and improving the
experience of the nearly 1.8 million air passengers who fly each day.
While the technological equipment TSA deploys at the checkpoint is
designed to detect prohibited items, the BDA program is broader in
scope and is designed to detect unknown threats. Terrorists have used a
variety of items to attempt to inflict harm to aircraft, including
underwear and shoe bombs, liquid explosives, and toner-cartridge bombs.
Consistent across all methods of attack, however, is the malicious
intent of the actor. BDOs focus on behavioral indicators, rather than
items. Since we cannot always predict the form evolving threats will
take, BDOs provide a crucial layer of security. Over the last several
years, BDOs have demonstrated that these techniques are an effective
means of identifying people engaged in deceptive and/or illegal
activity, and those who harbor a fear of discovery, all consistent with
behaviors that might appear in individuals planning to do harm on board
an aircraft. In 2012 there were 2,116 BDO screening referrals to law
enforcement, which resulted in 30 boarding denials, 79 investigations
by law enforcement entities, and 183 arrests.
behavior detection and analysis (bda) program
The BDA program utilizes non-invasive behavior detection techniques
based on scientifically-validated behaviors to identify individuals who
potentially pose a threat to the Nation's transportation network. These
individuals are deemed potentially higher-risk and subjected to
additional scrutiny by TSA. The program was formally established in
2006 after 3 years of operational pilot testing. Today, TSA deploys
more than 3,000 full-time Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) in the
aviation and surface transportation sectors, the latter through
participation in Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)
teams in surface modes of transportation.
The BDA program identifies potentially high-risk individuals
exhibiting behavior indicative of excessive fear or stress and re-
routes them for additional screening by looking for a combination of
individual indicators that warrant follow-up. BDO observations and
referrals are not dispositive of high-risk activity, but result in
additional screening, similar to an Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)
alarm needing to be resolved. BDOs are trained to identify behavior
cues that have been shown through research, science, and decades of
domestic and international law enforcement experience to be reliable
indicators and predictors of anomalous or suspicious behavior. BDOs
engage in conversation with individuals displaying anomalous behaviors,
looking at possible verbal cues indicative of a high-risk passenger and
refer those individuals exhibiting such behavior for additional
physical screening and/or to law enforcement.
scientific validation
Behavior detection techniques have been an accepted practice for
many years within the law enforcement, customs and border enforcement,
defense, and security communities both in the United States and
internationally. As a law enforcement professional with 30 years of
experience, I can personally attest to the effectiveness of behavior
detection principles. TSA has completed extensive studies in
partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) and the academic community to examine the
validity of the BDA program. An S&T validation study in partnership
with the American Institutes for Research (AIR) completed in 2011
represents the most thorough and rigorous analysis of a behavioral
screening program completed to date. The study included over 70,000
random samples at 41 airports. Notably, the validation study found that
TSA's behavior detection identifies high-risk travelers at a
significantly higher rate than random screening. The study concludes
that a high-risk traveler is 9 times more likely to be identified using
behavioral detection versus random screening. The 2011 independent
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Validation
Study Technical Advisory Committee composed of respected subject-matter
experts from academia, law enforcement, and the intelligence community
concurred with the study's main conclusion.\1\ Without behavior
detection, TSA would have had to randomly subject over 50,000 more
travelers to additional invasive screening to achieve the same results
as did the BDOs during the time frame of the 2-year study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ SPOT Validation Study Final Results: 2011 Technical Advisory
Committee (TAC) Review Report, HumRRO, June 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
international behavior detection partnerships
TSA has long partnered with international counterparts to develop
and strengthen behavior detection practices. In December 2011, TSA
partnered with Canada, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC),
France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom to create the Behavior
Detection in Aviation Security Study Group (BDIAS-SG) to exchange
operational and programmatic information and best practices between/
among BDIAS-SG Members in order to refine domestic programs. This
framework facilitates the sharing and alignment of on-going research
and science in the field of behavior detection, with a focus on
validating the effectiveness and efficiency of behavior detection
across cultures and identifying an optimal approach to behavior
detection in the future. It also creates international awareness
concerning the use of behavior detection as an aviation security
measure through the production of non-sensitive outreach materials that
clearly define behavior detection. The BDIAS-SG is also creating common
tools for use by members and, in the future, regional governmental
organizations or possibly industry to support countries/actors with
robust security structures to build anomalous behavior detection
capability tailored to the relevant domestic environment. This
international exchange has been instrumental to the growth and
validation of TSA's BDA program and has produced a framework and
materials that will assist additional interested countries to establish
their own behavior detection programs.
risk-based security
The BDA program is a critical part of TSA's Risk-Based Security
(RBS) efforts, which moves TSA's checkpoint screening away from a ``one
size fits all'' approach to more effective security measures that use
the best available intelligence to differentiate levels of screening
based on risk. As concluded in a recent RAND National Defense Research
Institute report, ``[T]here is current value and unrealized potential
for using behavioral indicators as part of a system to detect
attacks.''\2\ TSA behavior detection procedures, including
observational assessments and the equally important verbal interaction
with passengers, are an essential element in a dynamic, risk-based
layered security system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Davis, P.K., Perry, W.L., Brown, R.A., Yeung, D, Roshan, P.,
and Voorhies, P. (2013). ``Using Behavioral Indicators to Help Detect
Potential Violent Acts: A Review of the Science Base''. RAND
Corporation, National Defense Research Institute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One key element in expanding RBS is the Managed Inclusion concept,
which routes passengers into expedited screening lanes using passenger
screening canine teams or sampling with explosives detection
technologies to screen passengers and their belongings for explosives
while BDOs assess passengers for suspicious behaviors. If the
explosives detection teams do not alert on an individual and a BDO does
not observe suspicious behavioral indicators, the individual may be
eligible for expedited screening through a TSA PreCheckTM
lane.
zero tolerance for unlawful profiling
Racial profiling is not part of the TSA's BDA program and is not
tolerated by TSA. Not only is racial profiling generally prohibited by
Federal law and under Department and agency policy, but it is also an
ineffective security tactic. TSA has zero tolerance for this kind of
behavior and has taken several steps to reinforce the agency's
nondiscrimination and anti-profiling policies with our workforce.
The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and training for TSA's BDA
program, in coordination with the DHS Office of Civil Rights and
Liberties (CRCL), provide clear instructions to ensure that referrals
for additional screening are made based on specific observed behavioral
criteria without regard to nationality, race, color, ethnicity, or
religious affiliation. BDOs are required to complete a report
documenting specific behaviors observed for each passenger identified
for additional action. BDA program analysts audit these reports
regularly to ensure that BDOs are employing techniques properly,
including protecting any privacy information that results from a law
enforcement referral.
Additionally, BDOs are trained specifically in preventing race,
ethnicity, or religious profiling, and in 2012, TSA reviewed and
revised all training documents to underscore that unlawful profiling
violates agency policy and anti-discrimination laws. BDOs are
instructed to immediately notify management if they believe profiling
has occurred. That instruction is reinforced during recurring training,
shift briefs, employee counseling sessions, and other avenues. All BDOs
and BDO training managers are required to take a pledge against
unlawful profiling, and all TSA employees are required to take biannual
DHS Notification and Federal Employee Anti-discrimination and
Retaliation Act of 2002 (No FEAR Act) training that provides
information to employees regarding rights and protections available
under Federal antidiscrimination, whistleblower protection, and
retaliation laws.
TSA expects every member of the workforce, including BDOs, to
report allegations of profiling to local management or directly to the
TSA Office of Civil Rights and Liberties, Ombudsman and Traveler
Engagement (CRL/OTE) or Office of Inspection (OOI) without fear of
retaliation. TSA also modified its complaint reporting procedures to
make it easier for travelers to report allegations of racial profiling
through TSA's website or mobile phone app. If allegations do arise, TSA
takes immediate steps to investigate the issue.
In 2013, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an
investigation at the request of TSA into allegations that BDOs at Logan
International Airport (BOS) in Boston, MA, racially profiled passengers
in order to meet secondary inspection referral production quotas. In a
Report of Investigation provided to TSA on August 22, 2013, DHS OIG
stated there was no indication the BDOs at BOS racially profiled
passengers.
government accountability office (gao) recommendations
TSA appreciates input and recommendations to enhance its programs
including the GAO's feedback on the BDA Program. Its recommendations
have led to significant improvements in program management and
deployment, including the risk-based allocation mentioned above. In
addition, GAO's comments on the behavior indicator set have helped
shape TSA's efforts to strengthen detection and evaluation
methodologies, including the following actions:
Condense and strengthen the behavior indicator list and
optimize the weights and protocols used, which will likely
result in significant changes to behavior detection procedures
and include a simplified scoring and referral process.
Explore additional performance metrics that could be used to
examine overall program effectiveness, individual and
combinations of indicator effectiveness, and reliability across
individuals and locations.
Incorporate more robust data collection and authentication
protocols similar to those used in TSA operational tests of
screening technologies in any future studies.
While TSA appreciates GAO's partnership in improving the BDA
program, we are concerned that its most recent report relies heavily on
academic literature regarding the detection of individuals who are
lying. The report, however, fails to recognize all of the available
research or that S&T, which conducted a validation study with an
independent review process, relied in part upon unpublished studies not
included in literature reviews. It is important to note that TSA's
behavior detection approach does not attempt to specifically identify
persons engaging in lying; rather, it is designed to identify
individuals who may be deemed high-risk based on objective behavioral
indicators. The National Research Council's (NRC) 2008 report \3\ cites
scientific evidence that supports this method.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ National Research Council (2008). Protecting individual privacy
in the struggle against terrorists: A framework for assessment.
National Academies Press, Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on TSA's objective to identify individuals who may be deemed
high-risk based on objective behavioral indicators, TSA believes the
program should continue to be funded at current levels while the
improvements outlined below are implemented.
future of the program
Strong program management is critical to any program and this
includes performance metrics, strategic planning, and quality assurance
measures. The BDA program is currently undergoing rigorous review to
further improve TSA's vital behavior detection capability, which is
consistent with many of the OIG recommendations made in their May 2013
report. Within 90 days of the report issuance, TSA closed half of the
recommendations and is working on closing the remainder. Specifically,
TSA has taken the following actions:
Strategic Planning and Performance Measurement.--Finalized a
strategic plan and performance measurement plan and began
implementing many of the objectives in these framework
documents.
Data Accuracy.--Implemented controls to ensure completeness,
accuracy, authorization, and validity of referral data entered
into the Performance Management Information System.
Training.--Implemented a plan to provide mandatory
recurrent/refresher training to all BDOs and BDO instructors.
In September 2013, The National Training Team Academy, which
trains BDO instructors, graduated a class of 25 trainers on
September 26. TSA also finalized a plan to assess BDO
instructor performance in required core competencies on a
regular basis.
Monitor and Evaluate BDO Activity.--Developed and
implemented an automated tool to help evaluate airports' use of
BDO resources.
Employee Engagement.--Implemented processes, including focus
groups, for identifying and addressing issues raised by the
workforce that may directly affect the success of the BDA
program.
TSA anticipates optimized behavior detection procedures to begin
testing by the third quarter of fiscal year 2014 using robust methods
similar to the operational testing conducted in support of technology
acquisitions. TSA should have sufficient information on the performance
of the new processes to update the National behavior detection
deployment strategy within 6 months of the commencement of the tests.
Additionally, TSA has established an Optimization effort in partnership
with S&T and academia, industry, and other Government and community
stakeholders to enhance behavior detection principles and provide the
tools to quantify its effective contribution to transportation
security.
conclusion
The Nation continues to face evolving threats to our transportation
system, and TSA's BDA Program provides a critical security capability
to defend against our adversaries. TSA appreciates the work of the GAO,
DHS OIG, and this committee to identify opportunities to strengthen the
program as we move forward. Our on-going progress demonstrates our
continuing commitment to TSA's mission of securing our Nation's
transportation systems in the most effective way. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering
your questions.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Administrator Pistole.
Dr. Daniel Gerstein is the acting under secretary for
science and technology at the Department of Homeland Security.
Dr. Gerstein gained extensive experience in the security and
defense sectors while serving in various positions in civilian
government, uniform, and private industry. Before joining DHS,
he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Dr. Gerstein, I have to say, I am disappointed that you
failed to comply with the committee rules for not submitting a
written testimony, a written statement for the record. I
believe this is your first appearance as acting under secretary
for S&T. I am willing to waive this requirement, in
consultation with the Ranking Member, rather than barring you
from giving an oral presentation here today. But, again, please
know that we are making a generous exception for you, and
failure to submit a written statement impedes the oversight
role of this committee because it prevents our ability to
prepare and plan ahead. So I just ask for your cooperation in
the future with getting those written statements in, in a
timely manner.
But, at this point, the Chairman does now recognize you to
testify, sir. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL M. GERSTEIN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Gerstein. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry for that
indiscretion.
Good morning, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and
other Members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today with Administrator Pistole to discuss
the collaboration between TSA and the Science and Technology
Directorate. This collaboration occurs across a broad range of
projects, including TSA's behavior detection and analysis
capabilities.
Let me emphasize from the outset that all of our efforts
are ultimately designed to support TSA in their efforts to
improve security effectiveness and passenger experience with
transportation screening.
During my opening remarks, I will develop three overarching
themes.
First, the SPOT program is part of a layered security
system and must be considered within that context. It does not
exist in isolation and, therefore, must be considered in terms
of its incremental contribution to improving the overall
probability of detection of persons that knowingly and
intentionally attempt to defeat the security process.
Relying on any single process, technology, or capability is
not an acceptable strategy. This layered security system
consists of several opportunities to screen passengers and
verify travel documentation. Checks are done when a passenger
purchases a ticket and obtains a boarding pass. Behavior
detection officers and canine units check for hostile intent or
threatening materials, respectively. Carry-on items and checked
bags are also screened before they are allowed in the terminal
area.
Past this stage, TSA has unpredictable protocols on planes,
Federal air marshals, and trained flight crews to identify and
mitigate any incidents or threats. The focus of all this
activity is to increase the probability of detection of a
person trying to defeat the security process.
Second, the underlying concepts employed in the SPOT
program are based on scientific research and represent the best
practices from defense, intelligence, and law enforcement
organizations. These practices have become accepted based on
years of experience in these fields in attempting to identify
persons that should receive additional scrutiny in the
screening process.
What the SPOT process does that has not been done
previously is to methodically identify and assess a broad range
of behavioral characteristics and provide a scoring system that
adds a structure to the intuitive and highly subjective
processes that many have relied on in the past.
As part of the SPOT effort in 2009, S&T, at the request of
TSA, initiated a research program to assess the validity of
existing screening protocols and indicators. S&T contracted
with American Institutes for Research, or AIR, one of the
Nation's largest nonprofit behavioral research organizations,
to design and execute an independent assessment. The primary
finding was that the SPOT identified high-risk travelers at a
significantly higher rate--on average, nine times more often--
than random screening.
In considering the use of behavioral indicators, it is
worth noting that a number of other governments--Australia,
Canada, France, Israel, Switzerland, United Kingdom, to name a
few--have developed and deployed behavior detection screening
protocols. I have personally toured the facilities and received
briefings on the use of behavior detection in Australia and
Israel.
We do recognize that the results of the study must be
considered in the context of the limitations that are described
in detail in the SPOT validation report. We identified many of
these limitations. Nonetheless, we believe that the sampling
and measurement errors that are cited are due to limitations,
and they are relatively minimal, given the study's design
features that included a large sample, multiple outcomes around
important population parameter estimates. S&T does agree with
the primary context of the study's design limitations and
recommendations for additional research.
Furthermore, additional research efforts, both laboratory
and field studies, that could be conducted would include a more
extensive examination of the underlying behavioral construct,
an indicator optimization study, a comprehensible reliability
study, and an empirical comparison of SPOT with other screening
programs. Some of these efforts are on-going at TSA today,
although S&T is not involved in those study efforts.
My third and final point concerns current collaboration
between TSA and S&T. In this regard, our relationship has never
been stronger. This can be seen through objective measures as
well as anecdotal information.
In fiscal year 2013, S&T conducted R&D supporting TSA
requirements on 19 projects, for a total of $108 million.
Additionally, we continue to work with TSA on examining
checkpoint operations in order to determine how combinations of
technological developments, use of knowledge products, business
process reform, and other capabilities can holistically be
employed in a synergistic manner to enhance checkpoints two to
three times their capability over the next 3- to 5-year period.
This could significantly enhance security operations, boost
effectiveness, efficiency, and substantially improve customer
experience at checkpoints.
Finally, S&T appreciates the opportunity to work with TSA,
the GAO, and this committee on questions surrounding the
behavioral detection program and, more broadly, improving
performance of existing and emerging operational screening
programs.
I thank you again for this opportunity before you today and
for allowing me to present oral remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel M. Gerstein
November 14, 2013
Good morning Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and other
Members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today with TSA administrator John Pistole to discuss the
collaboration between TSA and the Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate. This collaboration occurs across a broad range of projects
including the TSA's behavior detection and analysis capabilities. Let
me emphasize from the outset that all of our efforts are ultimately
designed to support TSA in their efforts to improve in both security
effectiveness and passenger experience with transportation screening.
During my opening remarks, I will develop three overarching themes.
First, the SPOT program is part of a layered security system and must
be considered in that context. It does not exist in isolation and
therefore must be considered in terms of its incremental contribution
to improving the overall probability of detection of persons that
knowingly and intentionally attempt to defeat the security process.
Relying on any single process, technology, or capability is not an
acceptable strategy. This layered security system consists of several
opportunities to screen passengers and verify travel documentation.
Checks are done when a passenger purchases a ticket and obtains a
boarding pass. Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) and canine units
check for hostile intent or threatening materials, respectively. Carry-
on items and checked bags are also screened for threats before being
allowed in the terminal area. Past this stage, TSA still has
unpredictable protocols and on the plane, Federal Air Marshalls and
trained Flight Crews to identify and mitigate any incidents or threats.
The focus of all this activity is to increase the probability of
detection of a person trying to defeat the security process.
Second, the underlying concepts employed within the SPOT program
are based on scientific research and represent the best practices from
defense, intelligence, and law enforcement organizations. These
practices have become accepted based on years of experience in these
fields in attempting to identify persons that should receive additional
scrutiny in a screening process. What the SPOT process does--that has
not been previously done--is to methodically identify and assess a
broad range of behavioral characteristics and provide a scoring system
that adds a structure to the intuitive and highly subjective processes
that many have relied on in the past. As part of the SPOT effort in
2007, S&T--at the request of TSA--initiated a research program to
assess the validity of the existing screening protocol and indicators.
S&T contracted with the American Institutes for Research or AIR, one of
the Nation's largest non-profit behavioral research organizations, to
design and execute an independent assessment of the extent to which
using SPOT led to correct screening decisions at security checkpoints.
The resulting field study compared over 71,000 (71,589) random
referrals with over 23,000 (23,265) Operational SPOT referrals
collected over 9 months from December 2009 through October 2010 across
43 airports. The primary finding was that Operational SPOT identified
high-risk travelers at a significantly higher rate--on average, 9 times
more often--than random screening.
In considering the use of behavioral indicators, it is worth noting
that a number of foreign Governments--Australia, Canada, France,
Israel, Switzerland, and United Kingdom to name a few--have developed
and deployed behavior-based screening protocols supporting aviation and
mass transit environments. I have personally toured the facilities and
received briefings on the use of behavior detection operations in
Australia and Israel.
We do recognize that the results of this field study must be
considered in the context of its limitations that are described in
detail in the SPOT Validation Final Report. Many of these limitations
are inherent in operational field research in general and in the
examination of security programs in particular. These limitations
potentially introduced some degree of uncontrolled error in the
validation analysis; thus, results should be considered in this context
and additional research should be conducted. Nonetheless, sampling and
measurement error due to these limitations are believed to be
relatively minimal, given the study's design features that included a
large sample, multiple outcome measures, and sensitivity analyses
around important population parameter estimates. S&T agrees with the
primary finding within the context of the study's design limitations
and recommendations that additional research would be required to more
fully validate the SPOT Referral Report.
Furthermore, additional research efforts, both laboratory and field
studies, could be conducted that would include a more extensive
examination of the underlying behavioral construct, an indicator-level
optimization study, a comprehensive reliability study, and an empirical
comparison of SPOT with other screening programs. Findings suggest that
there may be potentially other indicators not presently included in
SPOT that may assist in identifying high-risk passengers. As a result,
S&T believes that research could be conducted to broaden the range of
potential indicators beyond those contained in the existing SPOT
Referral Report would be very useful. S&T had also recommended
conducting analyses to empirically compare TSA's SPOT protocol with
other operational screening and suspicious behavior detection
protocols.
My third point concerns current collaboration between TSA and S&T.
In this regard our relationship has never been stronger. This can be
seen through objective measures as well as anecdotal information. In
fiscal year 2013, S&T conducted research and development supporting TSA
requirements on 19 projects for a total of $108 million. Additionally,
we continue to work with TSA on examining checkpoint operations in
order to determine how the combinations of technological developments,
use of knowledge products, business process reforms and other security
capabilities can be holistically employed in a synergistic manner to
enhance throughput at checkpoints 2 to 3 times over the next 3-5-year
period. This could significantly enhance security operations, boosting
effectiveness, efficiency, and substantially improving passenger
experience at checkpoints.
S&T appreciates the opportunity to work with TSA, GAO, and this
committee on questions surrounding the behavioral detection program and
more broadly to assist with establishing performance baselines and
conducting research and development to improve the performance of
existing and emerging operational programs.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
Mr. Stephen Lord is the managing director of the Forensic
Audits and Investigative Service team at the Government
Accountability Office. In this capacity, Mr. Lord oversees
high-quality forensic audits and investigations of fraud,
waste, and abuse.
We are pleased to have you before the subcommittee again,
Mr. Lord. The Chairman now recognizes you to testify.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FORENSIC
AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Thank you, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member
Richmond, as well as Ranking Member Thompson. I am really happy
to be here today to discuss the findings of our new report,
just released yesterday, on TSA's behavior detection program.
The recent events at LAX provide an unfortunate reminder of
the important role that TSA plays in providing security at
airports. I would first like to preface my comments by noting
that I do agree with Mr. Pistole in two important areas: That
it is important that TSA adopt a risk-based approach to ensure
resources are focused in the areas of the highest need and
potential; and also focusing on screening for potential bad
actors and moving away from screening for prohibited items and
objects, or ensuring sufficient resources are devoted to that.
The question I am hoping today's hearing can answer: What
is the best way to do that?
This is an important issue, as TSA has spent $900 million
on the so-called SPOT program since 2007. Today I would like to
highlight two important issues from a recent report: First,
research supporting the use of behavior indicators to identify
threats; and, second, whether TSA has the data necessary to
really assess the effectiveness of its program.
A first key point is the research completed to date, both
public and non-public, does not clearly show whether behavior
indicators can be used to reliably identify threats to aviation
security--that is, to identify deception or mal-intent.
Hundreds of studies we reviewed completed over the last 60
years showed that the ability of humans to accurately identify
deception based on behaviors is the same or roughly--
essentially the same as chance, slightly greater than chance,
54 percent.
Moreover, DHS's 2011 validation study of the program, while
we view it as a very important initial step, had several design
limitations. Therefore, you have to be very cautious about
using any of the findings. In fact, the study itself made 13
additional recommendations to ensure reliability and validity
moving forward.
Also, the study relied on a database that we found in our
prior work was unreliable for conducting the statistical
analysis of associations between behaviors and desired
outcomes. One key weakness was the database only allowed BDOs
to enter a certain number of behaviors, even though, as you
probably know, the behavior detection officers are trained to
identify 94 separate indicators.
In addition, when we visited airports, we interviewed the
behavior detection officers, and they wholeheartedly agree some
of these indicators are subjective and difficult to interpret.
This is clearly evident in the data we reviewed. For example,
we found that passenger referral rates--that is the rate
passengers are pulled out of line for subsequent screening--
ranged from 0 to 26 passenger referrals per month for the
average behavior detection officer. The average rate on an
overall basis was 1.6 referrals a month. So, anyway, when we
saw this variation, it really raised questions in our mind
about the usefulness of these indicators and whether the
officers can consistently interpret them.
We also found that TSA has limited information to evaluate
the effectiveness of the program. Well, the good news is they
are taking major steps as we speak to help them craft better
performance measures. The good news is they plan to develop 40
metrics, 40 performance metrics, within 3 broad categories. I
think this is really going to help them gain valuable insights
into the program, especially on the performance of individual
BDOs, and also ensure they are more consistently applying these
techniques across passengers. The bad news is, of course, they
are going to need 3 more years to do this. This is something we
discuss in more detail in our report.
In closing, it does not appear that behavioral indicators
can be reliably used to identify individuals who might pose a
threat to aviation, and that continues to concern us. Although
TSA is still in the process of evaluating the effectiveness of
the program, I think it is important to note that they first
started deploying this in 2007. Typically you validate a
concept first, then deploy. TSA chose, which, you know, they
are free to choose, a strategy which I deem higher risk: They
deployed at the same time they were validating.
This is one of the reasons we are recommending that TSA
limit future funding to the program until they can develop
additional empirical evidence that these indicators can be used
in a reliable manner.
I know TSA believes very strongly in the program. We
interviewed people at all levels of the agency. They are
working hard to make it work. They have faith it works. They
have hope it works. But, again, from a GAO standpoint, the
program should be based on sound, empirical evidence and not
hope and faith alone.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I look forward to
any questions you have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Lord
November 14, 2013
aviation security.--tsa should limit future funding for behavior
detection activities
gao-14-158t
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here to discuss the findings of our
November 2013 report assessing the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) behavior detection
activities, specifically the Screening of Passengers by Observation
Technique (SPOT) program.\1\ The recent events at Los Angeles
International Airport provide an unfortunate reminder of TSA's
continued importance in providing security for the traveling public.
TSA's behavior detection activities, in particular the SPOT program,
are intended to identify high-risk passengers based on behavioral
indicators that indicate mal-intent. In October 2003, TSA began testing
the SPOT program, and by fiscal year 2012, about 3,000 behavior
detection officers (BDO) had been deployed to 176 of the more than 450
TSA-regulated airports in the United States. TSA has expended a total
of approximately $900 million on the program since it was fully
deployed in 2007.
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\1\ GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit Future Funding for
Behavior Detection Activities, GAO-14-159 (Washington, DC: Nov. 8,
2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through the SPOT program, TSA's BDOs are to identify passenger
behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception and refer passengers
meeting certain criteria for additional screening of their persons and
carry-on baggage. During SPOT referral screening, if passengers exhibit
additional behaviors, or if other events occur, such as the discovery
of a suspected fraudulent document, BDOs are to refer these passengers
to a law enforcement officer (LEO) for further investigation--known as
a LEO referral--which could result in an arrest, among other outcomes.
In May 2010, we reported, among other things, that TSA deployed the
SPOT program without validating the scientific basis for identifying
passengers who may pose a threat, TSA was experiencing implementation
challenges at airports, and the SPOT program lacked performance
measures.\2\ We recommended in our 2010 report that DHS take several
actions to address these findings, with which DHS generally concurred
and implemented. Specifically, TSA has taken action on all of the 11
recommendations we made, and as of October 2013, has fully implemented
10 of them.
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\2\ GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA's Passenger
Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist
to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, GAO-10-763
(Washington, DC: May 20, 2010).
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My testimony today highlights the key findings of our November 8,
2013, report on TSA's behavior detection activities. Specifically, like
the report, my statement will address: (1) The extent to which
available evidence supports the use of behavioral indicators to
identify aviation security threats, and (2) whether TSA has data
necessary to assess the effectiveness of the SPOT program in
identifying threats to aviation security.
For the report, we reviewed academic and Government research on
behavior-based deception detection. We also reviewed documentation
related to DHS's April 2011 SPOT validation study, including study
protocols and the final reports, and assessed the study against
established practices for evaluation design and generally accepted
statistical principles.\3\ In addition, we interviewed program managers
at TSA headquarters, and a nongeneralizeable sample of 25 randomly-
selected BDOs at four airports where SPOT was implemented in fiscal
years 2011 and 2012. We analyzed fiscal years 2011 and 2012 data from
the SPOT program, TSA, and the National Finance Center to determine the
extent to which SPOT referrals varied across airports and across BDOs
with different characteristics. We also reviewed documentation
associated with program oversight, including a November 2012
performance metrics plan. Our November 2013 report provides further
details on our scope and methodology.\4\ We conducted this work in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GAO-12-208G
(Washington, DC: Jan. 31, 2012). This publication supersedes Government
Operations: Designing Evaluations, GAO/PEMD-10.1.4 (Washington, DC: May
1, 1991).
\4\ GAO-14-159.
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available evidence does not support whether behavioral indicators can
be used to identify aviation security threats
In November 2013, we reported that: (1) Peer-reviewed, published
research we reviewed did not support whether nonverbal behavioral
indicators can be used to reliably identify deception, (2)
methodological issues limited the usefulness of DHS's April 2011 SPOT
validation study, and (3) variation in referral rates raised questions
about the use of indicators.
Published Research on Behavioral Indicators
In November 2013, we reported that our review of meta-analyses
(studies that analyze other studies and synthesize their findings) that
included findings from over 400 studies related to detecting deception
conducted over the past 60 years, other academic and Government
studies, and interviews with experts in the field, called into question
the use of behavior observation techniques, that is, human observation
unaided by technology, as a means for reliably detecting deception. The
meta-analyses we reviewed collectively found that the ability of human
observers to accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral
cues or indicators is the same as or slightly better than chance (54
percent).\5\ We also reported on other studies that do not support the
use of behavioral indicators to identify mal-intent or threats to
aviation.\6\ In commenting on a draft of our November 2013 report, DHS
stated that one of these studies, a 2013 RAND report, provides evidence
that supports the SPOT program.\7\ However, the RAND report, which
concludes that there is current value and unrealized potential for
using behavioral indicators as part of a system to detect attacks,
refers to behavioral indicators that are defined and used significantly
more broadly than those in the SPOT program.\8\ The indicators reviewed
in the RAND report are not used in the SPOT program, and, according to
the RAND report's findings, could not be used in real time in an
airport environment.\9\
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\5\ M. Hartwig and C.F. Bond, Jr., ``Why Do Lie-Catchers Fail? A
Lens Model Meta-Analysis of Human Lie Judgments,'' Psychological
Bulletin, vol. 137, no. 4 (2011); C.F. Bond, Jr., and B.M. DePaulo,
``Accuracy of Deception Judgments,'' Personality and Social Psychology
Review, vol. 10, no. 3 (2006); M.A. Aamodt and H. Custer, ``Who Can
Best Catch a Liar? A Meta-Analysis of Individual Differences in
Detecting Deception,'' The Forensic Examiner, 15(1) (Spring 2006); and,
B.M. DePaulo, J.J. Lindsay, B.E. Malone, L. Mehlenbruck, K. Charlton,
and H. Cooper, ``Cues to Deception,'' Psychological Bulletin, vol. 129,
no. 1 (2003). The first three meta-analyses found, among other things,
that the accuracy rate for detecting deception was an average of 54
percent. The fourth meta-analysis found that there were no effect sizes
that differed significantly from chance.
\6\ These studies included P.K. Davis, W.L. Perry, R.A. Brown, D.
Yeung, P. Roshan, and P. Voorhies, Using Behavioral Indicators to Help
Detect Potential Violent Acts: A Review of the Science Base. (Santa
Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2013); National Research Council,
Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists: A
Framework for Assessment (Washington, DC: National Academies Press,
2008); JASON, The MITRE Corporation, S. Keller-McNulty, study leader,
The Quest for Truth: Deception and Intent Detection, a special report
prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense, October 2008. For a
complete list, see GAO-14-159.
\7\ Davis and others, Using Behavioral Indicators to Help Detect
Potential Violent Acts: A Review of the Science Base.
\8\ Davis and others, Using Behavioral Indicators to Help Detect
Potential Violent Acts: A Review of the Science Base. In its discussion
of behavioral indicators, the RAND report includes indicators from
``pattern-of-life data''--such as mobile device tracking and monitoring
on-line activity--that can indicate changes in lifestyle patterns, as
well as communication patterns and physiological indicators.
\9\ For example, the RAND report states that coding emotional
expressions for use in scientific studies currently involves a
painstaking process of a frame-by-frame analysis in which hours of
labor are required to analyze seconds of data, and accordingly, the
RAND report found that the process would be too burdensome to use in
real time at checkpoints or other screening areas. The RAND report also
states that technologies to recognize and analyze such emotional
expressions are in their infancy.
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DHS's Validation Study
Further, in November 2013, we found that DHS's April 2011
validation study does not demonstrate effectiveness of the SPOT
behavioral indicators because of methodological weaknesses. The
validation study found, among other things, that some SPOT indicators
were predictive of outcomes that represent high-risk passengers, and
that SPOT procedures, which rely on the SPOT behavioral indicators,
were more effective than a random selection protocol implemented by
BDOs in identifying outcomes that represent high-risk passengers. While
the April 2011 SPOT validation study is a useful initial step and, in
part, addressed issues raised in our May 2010 report, methodological
weaknesses limit its usefulness. Specifically, as we reported in
November 2013, these weaknesses include, among other things, the use of
potentially unreliable data and issues related to one of the study's
outcome measures.
First, the data the study used to determine the extent to which the
SPOT behavioral indicators led to correct screening decisions at
checkpoints were from the SPOT database that we had previously found in
May 2010 to be potentially unreliable.\10\ In 2010, we found, among
other things, that BDOs could not record all behaviors observed in the
SPOT database because the database limited entry to 8 behaviors, 6
signs of deception, and 4 types of serious prohibited items per
passenger referred for additional screening, though BDOs are trained to
identify 94 total indicators.\11\ Although TSA made changes to the
database subsequent to our May 2010 report, the validation study used
data that were collected from 2006 through 2010, prior to TSA's
improvements to the SPOT database. Consequently, the data were not
sufficiently reliable for use in conducting a statistical analysis of
the association between the indicators and high-risk passenger
outcomes.
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\10\ GAO-10-763. The validation study analyzed data collected from
2006 through 2010 to determine the extent to which the indicators could
identify high-risk passengers.
\11\ The 2011 SPOT standard operating procedures lists 94 signs of
stress, fear, and deception, or other related indicators that BDOs are
to look for, each of which is assigned a certain number of points.
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Second, our analysis of the validation study data regarding one of
the primary high-risk outcome measures--LEO arrests--suggests that the
screening process was different for passengers depending on whether
they were selected using SPOT procedures or the random selection
protocol. Specifically, different levels of criteria were used to
determine whether passengers in each group were referred to a LEO,
which is a necessary precondition for an arrest. Because of this
discrepancy between the study groups, the results related to the LEO
arrest metric are questionable and cannot be relied upon to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the SPOT program's behavioral indicators. In
November 2013, we also reported on other methodological weaknesses,
including design limitations and monitoring weaknesses, that could have
affected the usefulness of the validation study's results in
determining the effectiveness of the SPOT program's behavioral
indicators.
Variation in Referral Rates and TSA Efforts to Study Indicators
In November 2013, we reported that variation in referral rates and
subjective interpretation of the behavioral indicators raise questions
about the use of indicators, but TSA has efforts under way to study the
indicators. Specifically, we found that SPOT referral data from fiscal
years 2011 and 2012 indicate that SPOT and LEO referral rates vary
significantly across BDOs at some airports, which raises questions
about the use of SPOT behavioral indicators by BDOs.\12\ The rate at
which BDOs referred passengers for SPOT referral screening ranged from
0 to 26 referrals per 160 hours worked during the 2-year period we
reviewed.\13\ Similarly, the rate at which BDOs referred passengers to
LEOs ranged from 0 to 8 per 160 hours worked.\14\ In November 2013, we
also reported that BDOs and TSA officials we interviewed said that some
of the behavioral indicators are subjective and TSA has not
demonstrated that BDOs can consistently interpret the behavioral
indicators. We found that there is a statistically significant
relationship between the length of time an individual has been a BDO
and the number of SPOT referrals the individual makes. This suggests
that different levels of experience may be one reason why BDOs apply
the behavioral indicators differently. TSA has efforts underway to
better define the behavioral indicators currently used by BDOs, and to
complete an inter-rater reliability study. The inter-rater reliability
study could help TSA determine whether BDOs can consistently and
reliably interpret the behavioral indicators, which is a critical
component of validating the SPOT program's results and ensuring that
the program is implemented consistently. According to TSA, the current
contract to study the indicators and the inter-rater reliability study
will be completed in 2014.
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\12\ Up to three BDOs may be associated with a referral in the SPOT
referral database. According to TSA officials, the BDO in the ``team
member 1'' field is generally the primary BDO responsible for observing
the behaviors required for a referral. To avoid double-counting
referrals, the referral rate is based on the number of referrals for
which a BDO was identified as team member 1. For additional information
see GAO-14-159.
\13\ Specifically, we reported that variation exists in the SPOT
referral rates among 2,199 nonmanager BDOs and across the 49 airports
in our November 2013 review, after standardizing the referral data to
take account of the differences in the amount of time each BDO spent
observing passengers. We standardized the SPOT referral and arrest data
across the 49 airports to ensure an accurate comparison of referral
rates, based on the number of hours each BDO spent performing
operational SPOT activities. For a complete description of our
methodology, see GAO-14-159.
\14\ The average SPOT referral rate across the 2,199 BDOs who
conducted SPOT at the airports in our November 2013 review was 1.6
referrals per 160 hours worked. Thus, on average, 0.2 percent of a
BDO's time, or roughly the equivalent of 1 work day over a 2-year
period, was spent engaging passengers during SPOT referral screening.
This calculation is based on TSA's estimate that a BDO requires an
average of 13 minutes to complete a SPOT referral. The average LEO
referral rate for BDOs who conducted SPOT at these airports was 0.2 per
160 hours worked, or 1 LEO referral every 800 hours (or approximately
20 weeks).
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tsa has limited information to evaluate spot program effectiveness, but
plans to collect additional performance data
In November 2013, we reported that TSA plans to collect and analyze
additional performance data needed to assess the effectiveness of its
behavior detection activities. In response to a recommendation in our
May 2010 report to develop a plan for outcome-based performance
measures, TSA completed a performance metrics plan in November
2012.\15\ The plan defined an ideal set of 40 metrics within three
major categories that TSA needs to collect to measure the performance
of its behavior detection activities. As of June 2013, TSA had
collected some information for 18 of 40 metrics the plan identified,
but the agency was collecting little to none of the data required to
assess the performance and security effectiveness of its behavior
detection activities or the SPOT program specifically. For example, TSA
did not and does not currently collect the data required to determine
the number of passengers meaningfully assessed by BDOs, BDOs' level of
fatigue, or the impact that fatigue has on their performance.
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\15\ GAO-10-763. Specifically, we recommended that TSA ``establish
a plan that includes objectives, milestones, and time frames to develop
outcome-oriented performance measures to help refine the current
methods used by BDOs for identifying individuals who may pose a risk to
the aviation system.''
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To address these and other deficiencies, the performance metrics
plan identifies 22 initiatives that are under way or planned as of
November 2012. For example, in May 2013, TSA began to implement a new
data collection system, BDO Efficiency and Accountability Metrics,
designed to track and analyze BDO daily operational data, including BDO
locations and time spent performing different activities. According to
TSA officials, these data will allow the agency to gain insight on how
BDOs are utilized, and improve analysis of the SPOT program. However,
according to the performance metrics plan, TSA will require at least an
additional 3 years and additional resources before it can begin to
report on the performance and security effectiveness of its behavior
detection activities or the SPOT program.
Without the data needed to assess the effectiveness of behavior
detection activities or the SPOT program, we reported in November 2013
that TSA uses SPOT referral, LEO referral, and arrest statistics to
help track the program's activities. As shown in figure 1, of the
approximately 61,000 SPOT referrals made during fiscal years 2011 and
2012 at the 49 airports we analyzed, approximately 8,700 (13.6 percent)
resulted in a referral to a LEO. Of the SPOT referrals that resulted in
a LEO referral, 365 (4 percent) resulted in an arrest.\16\
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\16\ The SPOT database identifies six reasons for arrest,
including: (1) Fraudulent documents, (2) illegal alien, (3) other, (4)
outstanding warrants, (5) suspected drugs, and (6) undeclared currency.
The proportion of LEO referrals that resulted in an arrest (arrest
ratio) could be an indicator of the potential relationship between the
SPOT behavioral indicators and the arrest outcome measure because an
individual must display multiple SPOT behavioral indicators, or have
other events occur, such as the discovery of a fraudulent document, for
a LEO referral to occur. If the behavioral indicators were indicative
of a threat to aviation security, a larger proportion of the
individuals referred to a LEO may ultimately be arrested. However, the
arrest ratios per airport ranged from 0 to 17 percent.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
TSA has taken a positive step toward determining the effectiveness
of its behavior detection activities by developing the performance
metrics plan, as we recommended in May 2010. However, as we reported in
November 2013, TSA cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of its behavior
detection activities, and available evidence does not support whether
behavioral indicators can be used to identify threats to aviation
security. According to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance
accompanying the fiscal year 2014 budget, it is incumbent upon agencies
to use resources on programs that have been rigorously evaluated and
determined to be effective, and to fix or eliminate those programs that
have not demonstrated results.\17\ As we concluded in our November 2013
report, until TSA can provide scientifically validated evidence
demonstrating that behavioral indicators can be used to identify
passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security, the agency risks
funding activities that have not been determined to be effective.
Therefore, in our November 2013 report, we recommended that TSA limit
future funding for its behavior detection activities. DHS did not
concur with our recommendation.
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\17\ OMB, Analytical Perspectives--Budget of the U.S. Government,
Fiscal Year 2014. ISBN 978-0-16--1749-3 (Washington, DC: 2013).
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In commenting on a draft of our November 2013 report, DHS
identified two main areas where it disagreed with information presented
in the report: (1) The findings related to the SPOT validation study,
and (2) the findings related to the research literature. With regard to
the findings related to the SPOT validation study, DHS stated that,
among other issues, our methodology for replicating the study's
indicator analysis introduced error and resulted in ``misleading''
conclusions. We disagree with this statement. Our analysis was
consistent in finding that some indicators were positively and
significantly related to the validation study outcome measures;
however, we also found that a roughly equal number of indicators were
negatively and significantly related to the outcome measures--a finding
that the validation study did not report.\18\ Further, as discussed in
the November 2013 report, the validation study's analysis used
unreliable data, which limits the usefulness of the study's findings.
With regard to our findings related to the research literature, DHS
stated that, among other things, we did not consider all the research
that was available. However, as described in the report, in addition to
the meta-analyses of over 400 studies related to detecting deception
conducted over the past 60 years that we reviewed, we also reviewed
several documents on behavior detection research that DHS officials
provided to us, including documents from an unclassified and a
classified literature review that DHS had commissioned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The negatively and significantly related indicators were more
commonly associated with passengers who were not identified as high-
risk, than with passengers who were identified as high-risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, in stating its nonconcurrence with the recommendation to
limit future funding in support of its behavior detection activities,
DHS stated that TSA's overall security program is composed of
interrelated parts, and to disrupt one piece of the multi-layered
approach may have an adverse impact on other pieces. As we reported in
November 2013, TSA has not developed the performance measures that
would allow it to assess the effectiveness of its behavior detection
activities compared with other screening methods, such as physical
screening. As a result, the impact of behavior detection activities on
TSA's overall security program is unknown. Further, not all screening
methods are present at every airport, and TSA has modified the
screening procedures and equipment used at airports over time. These
modifications have included the discontinuance of screening equipment
that was determined to be unneeded or ineffective. Therefore, we
concluded that providing scientifically validated evidence that
demonstrates that behavioral indicators can be used to identify
passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security is critical to
the implementation of TSA's behavior detection activities.
Consequently, we added a matter for Congressional consideration to the
November 2013 report. Specifically, we suggested that Congress consider
the findings in the report regarding the absence of scientifically
validated evidence for using behavioral indicators to identify aviation
security threats when assessing the potential benefits of behavior
detection activities relative to their cost when making future funding
decisions related to aviation security. Such action should help ensure
that security-related funding is directed to programs that have
demonstrated their effectiveness.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared testimony. I look forward to
answering any questions that you may have.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Lord.
Finally, Mr. Charles Edwards is the deputy inspector
general of the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Edwards has
over 20 years of experience in the Federal Government and has
held leadership positions at several Federal agencies.
The Chairman recognizes Mr. Edwards now to testify.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Edwards. Good morning, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member
Richmond, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today.
I would like to take a moment to express my condolences on
the tragic shooting incident at Los Angeles International
Airport, that TSA Officer Gerardo Ismael Hernandez was killed
and other TSA officials were wounded, one of whom is a behavior
detection officer.
Since 2007, TSA has spent an estimated $878 million on its
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program,
commonly called SPOT. As of fiscal year 2012, the program was
operating in 176 airports and employed more than 2,800 behavior
detection officers.
However, TSA has not implemented a strategic plan to assess
or ensure the program's success. My testimony today will
address the need for improvement in two areas: First,
measurement of the effectiveness of the SPOT program; and,
second, the training program for BDOs.
We reported in May of this year that TSA is unable to
accurately assess or evaluate the progress of the SPOT program
because it does not have a finalized strategic plan that
identifies mission goals and objectives needed to develop a
system of performance measures.
The program's standard operating procedures indicate that
its purpose is to identify high-risk individuals who may pose a
threat to transportation security, but TSA has not developed
performance measures for the program. Instead, program staff
collects activity output data, such as the number of passengers
referred, but the data do not provide a measure of program
effectiveness.
For example, TSA documents the identification of prohibited
items, undeclared currency, and illegal aliens, but the SPOT
program has not defined how these outputs support achieving the
SPOT program goal to identify high-risk individuals who are
engaged in some form of deception and fear of discovery.
Additionally, our testing showed that data collected was
not always complete or accurate. TSA has not developed a
training strategy that addresses the goals and objectives of
the SPOT program. Formal BDO training and refresher training is
not consistently provided, and there is no formalized process
to evaluate BDO instructors.
Although acknowledging that observation skills are
perishable, TSA did not start providing refresher training for
currently certified BDOs until May 2011, 5 years after the
start of the program. Of the 88 eligible BDOs we contacted
during our audit, 65, or about 74 percent, had not yet received
the refresher training. BDOs who have not received recent
refresher training may be operating at varying levels of
proficiency.
Furthermore, TSA does not have a program to provide
recurrent training to BDO instructors to ensure these
instructors continue to have the knowledge, skills, and
abilities to instruct BDO classes.
In response to our report and recommendations, TSA
officials have taken numerous steps toward addressing these
issues. For example, TSA officials have provided verification
that comprehensive measures have been implemented to ensure
completeness, accuracy, authorization, and validity of referral
data collected. They have also developed and implemented a plan
to provide recurrent training for BDO instructors and refresher
training for the BDO workforce. Lastly, TSA officials have
completed the BDO communications plan, which contains a number
of workforce engagement tools designed to help the program
office gauge selection, allocation, and performance of BDOs.
In closing, without the implementation of the SPOT
strategic plan that contains appropriate performance measures,
TSA cannot evaluate the performance of the program to ensure
that passengers at U.S. airports are screened in an objective
manner or show that the program is cost-effective or reasonably
justify the program's expansion.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statements, and I
welcome any questions that you or the Members may have. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles K. Edwards
November 14, 2013
Good morning Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members
of the subcommittee: I am Charles Edwards, Deputy Inspector General for
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thank you for inviting me to
testify today about the Transportation Security Administration's
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program, commonly
called SPOT. Our audit report, ``Transportation Security
Administration's Screening of Passengers by Observations Techniques''
(OIG-13-91, May 2013) concluded that, under the SPOT program TSA cannot
ensure that passengers at U.S. airports are screened objectively, show
that the program is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the program's
expansion.
My testimony today will discuss 4 issues in regard to the SPOT
program, TSA's: (1) Performance management, (2) training strategy, (3)
outreach efforts, and (4) financial plan.
In 2003, TSA developed the Screening of Passengers by Observation
Techniques (SPOT) program with assistance from the Massachusetts State
Police. TSA began operational testing at Logan Airport in Boston, MA,
and later expanded its testing at two other New England airports.
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), in fiscal
year 2007, TSA implemented SPOT, and was authorized 644 Behavior
Detection Officers (BDO) for deployment to 42 airports. According to
TSA, as of fiscal year 2012, more than 3,000 BDOs were authorized for
deployment to 176 U.S. airports. TSA's Behavior Detection and Analysis
Division was responsible for developing strategic plans and program
guidance for the SPOT program. The program emphasizes objective
behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially
high-risk individuals who are engaged in some form of deception and
fear discovery.
BDOs, working in pairs, primarily conduct SPOT at airport screening
checkpoints by having brief verbal exchanges with passengers waiting in
line, while observing passengers' behaviors. A BDO identifies
passengers for additional screening based on an evaluation system of
identified behaviors, which may require a referral to law enforcement.
A law enforcement officer (LEO) may assess the situation by interacting
or engaging the passenger to determine if law enforcement intervention
is necessary. Passengers whose observed behaviors are not resolved
during the referral process may not be permitted to board an aircraft.
TSA BDOs were required to document all relevant information
regarding each passenger referral in a referral report and the
Performance Management Information System (PMIS). However, the SPOT
Standard Operating Procedure prohibited the collection of personally
identifiable information in the referral report or PMIS. Reports on the
results of SPOT operations, such as the SPOT Situation Report
Dashboard--All Airports, were generated from the data entered into
PMIS. According to TSA, SPOT referrals made from October 2011 through
September 2012 resulted in 199 arrests, which included outstanding
warrants, suspected drugs, and illegal aliens.
audit results
Since the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program
began in fiscal year 2007, TSA data indicate that the program has
expanded from $20 million to $205 million in expended costs and the
number of airports with the program has grown from 42 to 176. However,
TSA has not implemented a strategic plan to ensure the program's
success. TSA did not: (1) Assess the effectiveness of the program, (2)
have a comprehensive training program, (3) ensure outreach to its
partners, or (4) have a financial plan. As a result, TSA could not
ensure that passengers at United States airports were screened
objectively, show that the program was cost-effective, or reasonably
justify the program's expansion. In fiscal year 2012, TSA's Behavior
Detection and Analysis Division developed a draft strategic plan that
included a statement of mission, goals, and objectives. However, the
plan had not been approved and implemented at the time of our audit.
performance measurement
TSA could not accurately assess or evaluate the progress of the
SPOT program because it did not have a finalized strategic plan that
identified the mission, goals, and objectives needed to develop a
system of performance measures. Furthermore, TSA did not collect
accurate or complete information about the program's operations.
The SPOT program's Standard Operating Procedure indicates that its
purpose was to identify high-risk individuals who may pose a threat to
transportation security, but TSA has not developed performance measures
for the program. As a result, the program collected data from referral
reports that provided measurable outputs of specific activities;
however, these outputs did not provide a measure of program
effectiveness, because TSA has not established why these outputs
support desired outcomes.
For instance, TSA documented the identification of prohibited
items, undeclared currency, and illegal aliens, but the SPOT program
has not defined how these outputs support achieving the SPOT program
goals. As a result, TSA cannot assess the SPOT program's success
without relative outcome-oriented performance measures. In August 2012,
TSA provided its draft Behavior Detection and Analysis Division
Performance Metrics Plan. This plan was intended to identify current
gaps in performance metrics collection, proposed metrics solutions, and
resource requirements for the next 3 years, but it had not been
approved and implemented at the time of our audit.
Although program operations and outputs from referrals were
recorded in the PMIS, the referral data captured was not always
complete or accurate. BDO managers were required to review and approve
all SPOT referral reports entered into PMIS, but the internal controls
over data entry were ineffective. For example, PMIS was set up to
automatically bypass manager review of a referral report after 72
hours, and the data entry quality assurance measures beyond a BDO
manager review are insufficient. Of the 15 airports tested, 1,420 of
the 18,152 (8 percent) referral reports recorded in fiscal year 2012
bypassed management review. Five of the airports had more than 15
percent of the referral reports bypass management review. Only 1 of the
15 airports tested had 100 percent management review of referral
reports recorded in PMIS.
BDOs were required to document information regarding each referral,
including the reason(s) for a referral, the BDOs involved, and the
resolution. However, passenger-specific data were prohibited from being
recorded.
We assessed more than 110,000 referral records in PMIS from April
1, 2009, through September 30, 2012. Of those records----
7,019 did not identify the primary or secondary BDO;
1,194 did not meet the criteria for a referral;
442 were referral records that were deleted; and
143 did not contain a code for the airport where the
referral was made.
Additionally, we identified duplicate records and one record that
contained personally identifiable information.
Incomplete and inaccurate PMIS SPOT referral data may have been
used to present program results to TSA senior leadership and oversight
officials to illustrate the results of the SPOT program. In fact, 4
months after providing our audit team with PMIS data, the SPOT program
office identified and corrected errors in the database before providing
similar data to our investigators, who were conducting a separate
investigation. We were not informed that the original data we received
had been changed. SPOT program officials said they corrected errors in
the level of LEO involvement and deleted duplicate records.
training
TSA had not developed a training strategy that addresses the goals
and objectives of the SPOT program. A well-designed training program
should be linked to the agency's goals and to the organizational,
occupational, and individual skills and competencies needed for the
agency to effectively perform.\1\ As a result, TSA cannot ensure that
training contributes to the uniform screening of passengers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-04-546G, Human Capital: A
Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the
Federal Government, March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
formal training
TSA did not consistently offer formal refresher training to BDOs.
Beginning in May 2006, all BDOs were required to attend the SPOT Basic
Training course for BDO certification. TSA's training task analysis
emphasized the importance of recurring training when it reported:
`` . . . observation skills are among the perishable variety. They need
to be constantly honed and refocused on some regular basis. Observation
is the single most important task in the entire SPOT Program . . . but
little training is provided to address its importance, and there is
virtually no measurement of the skill in the current testing
program.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Transportation Security Administration, Training Task Analysis
for the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques Program,
December 16, 2011.
TSA did not start providing refresher training for currently
certified BDOs until May 2011. The 3-day refresher training consisted
of a review of SPOT Standard Operating Procedure requirements and
addressed deficiencies in prior basic training courses. TSA determined
that BDOs were not receiving training on 37 of the 63 (approximately 59
percent) required job tasks in the original versions of the basic
training course.
BDOs with a year or more of experience were eligible to complete
TSA's refresher training. According to TSA, 713 of the approximately
2,200 eligible BDOs (approximately 32 percent) received refresher
training in the past 2 years. Of the 101 BDOs we interviewed, 88 were
eligible to receive the refresher training. Of the 88 eligible BDOs, 65
(approximately 74 percent) did not receive the training. The SPOT
program office reported that because of training staffing constraints,
they needed to prioritize the training of new BDOs before conducting
refresher training. As a result, BDOs who have not received the
refresher training may be operating at varying levels of proficiency.
Instructors
BDO instructors provided the only formal classroom training to
BDOs. During July 2012, TSA provided training to BDO instructors and
tested them on their teaching abilities. TSA identified six BDO
instructors who did not have the instructor knowledge, skills, or
abilities to instruct BDO classes. TSA provided remedial instruction to
those instructors in order for them to become qualified to teach.
However, TSA did not evaluate BDO instructors on their instructional
abilities in their Performance Accountability and Standards System.
Additionally, TSA did not have a program to provide recurrent training
to BDO instructors. Therefore, the program office could not ensure that
BDOs were effectively and consistently trained.
outreach
The relationship between BDOs and local LEOs is critical to the
program and needed to be improved. TSA incorporated law enforcement
response as an integral part of the SPOT program. However, the SPOT
program office has not ensured that airports effectively engage local
law enforcement. BDOs and local LEOs at the airports contacted said
there was insufficient understanding of the roles and responsibilities
that each had relative to the SPOT program. For example, LEOs at 7
airports contacted said they had not received clear information about
BDO duties and why referrals from BDOs warranted law enforcement
response. Conversely, BDOs expressed concerns about the consistency of
LEOs' responses to referrals. BDOs said that local LEOs did not
consistently respond to referrals or engage referred passengers. TSA
data show that LEOs did not respond to 2 percent of the referrals
between October 2011 and September 2012.\3\ Additionally, TSA data
indicate that LEOs did not question 13 percent of referred passengers
during that same period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ This information is based on PMIS data, which may be incomplete
and inaccurate due to errors identified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of the 15 airports we contacted, 3 had locally-developed LEO
outreach activities. At the airports using outreach activities, BDOs
and LEOs reported more consistent and effective working relationships.
The success of the program may be affected if BDOs and LEOs do not
collaborate effectively.
financial plan
The SPOT program's financial plan did not include priorities,
goals, objectives, or financial performance measures. According to the
SPOT program office, the program was allocated more than $1 billion
between fiscal years 2007 and 2012. TSA data indicated that the program
expended an estimated $878 million for the program office and SPOT
personnel. OMB Circular A-11 describes budget formulation, development,
and execution requirements that include needs analysis and budget
development, budget execution, and expenditures tracking. Budget
control is an integral part of an entity's planning, implementing,
reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of Government resources
and achieving effective results.\4\ Because the SPOT program did not
have a financial plan that included priorities, goals, objectives, or
measures, TSA could not: (1) Show that SPOT was cost-effective, (2)
identify opportunities for improvement, or (3) justify the program's
expansion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, Standards
for Internal Control in the Federal Government, November 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to fiscal year 2012, the SPOT program office did not fully
determine priorities for future spending or develop an itemized
forecast of future funding and expenditures. Performance information
was not used to assess the effectiveness of program activities to
develop budget priorities. According to program officials, the
program's historical funding was the basis for spending estimates.
Beginning in fiscal year 2012, the Behavior Detection and Analysis
Division developed spend plans that identified project funding
requirements. According to the fiscal year 2013 draft spend plan, the
objective of the spend process was to collect, identify, and document
funding requirements for the budget year with a 5-year forecast.
However, the spend plans did not include a comprehensive accounting of
SPOT funding requirements, such as BDO costs and training.
Although TSA had several areas that required improvement, SPOT
officials have taken several steps toward meeting those objectives
since our audit was issued.
For instance, TSA officials have provided verification that
comprehensive measures have been implemented to ensure completeness,
accuracy, authorization, and validity of referral data entered into
PMIS. They have also developed and implemented a plan to provide
recurrent training for Behavior Detection Officer instructors and
refresher training for the BDO workforce. Lastly, TSA officials have
completed the BDO Communications Plan, which contains a number of
workforce engagement tools designed to help the program office gauge
selection, allocation, and performance of BDOs.
In closing, strategic planning is the keystone to a successful
program. Because OMB Circular A-11 guidance identifies requirements for
agency strategic planning, it would be prudent for agency programs to
follow these same principles to help ensure program success and
contribute to the agency's mission. Without the implementation of a
SPOT strategic plan that contains key elements, TSA cannot ensure that
passengers at U.S. airports are screened in an objective manner, show
that the program is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the program's
expansion to ensure that threats to aviation security are effectively
prevented.
I would also like to take this moment to express my condolences on
the tragic shooting incident at Los Angeles International Airport where
TSA Officer Gerardo Hernandez was killed and other TSA officials were
wounded.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome any
questions that you or the Members of the subcommittee may have.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Edwards.
We appreciate you all being here.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask questions.
Administrator Pistole, when we spoke after the shooting, I
was extremely pleased to learn that TSA personnel at LAX had
recently trained for an active-shooter situation. I think we
agree that that training certainly helped that response to the
actual shooting situation. That probably led to saving lives.
They knew exactly what to do and, certainly, as I say, saved
lives as a result.
However, as Chairman McCaul indicated, we have also heard
that the communication between police and TSA when shots were
fired may have broken down, could have been conducted better.
Would you agree that the communication issue is one of the
areas you need to review?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
During the time of the shooting at LAX, were there any BDOs
deployed in Terminal 3 when the shooting took place? If so, do
you know if they witnessed behavior of the shooter before the
incident took place?
Mr. Pistole. There were BDOs deployed in Terminal 3. The
area that the shooting took place was on a lower level before
the actual checkpoint. So the initial officer, Officer
Hernandez, that the shooter encountered, that was just seconds
after the shooter entered the terminal after being dropped off
at curbside there.
So there were no BDOs down at that level, but the BDOs were
stationed--and, in fact, Tony Grigsby, who was injured, was one
of those up there helping passengers after the shooting took
place.
Mr. Hudson. Could you explain for us the protocols that
BDOs follow when they refer a person to local law enforcement,
how that takes place?
Mr. Pistole. Sure. So, obviously, BDOs will compare, so it
is not an isolated incident, and if one BDO makes an
observation, they confer with their partner to see if that is
accurate, if that is what they observed. Then, if they concur
on that, then, dependent on what the suspicious behavior is,
they may engage the passenger themselves, most likely would be
the first response, and to get a sense of that person's--just
who they are and everything.
If it warrants a law enforcement response because of
something that goes beyond the norm, and particularly if they
have referred that person for secondary screening and there is
an issue there, which is sometimes the case, then that is when
law enforcement officers are called in to help resolve that
situation.
Mr. Hudson. Are they able to contact the local law
enforcement through radio communications? Or how does that
communication take place?
Mr. Pistole. So it all depends--you know, from 450
airports, it depends on which airport and what the
communication apparatus is there. They have radios. The people
at--TSA employees at the checkpoints have radios that they can
call in to a command post, which is staffed both--or
coordination center, depending on where you are, that is
staffed either by TSA employees in that coordination center
and/or the airport police if they are on-site. So it depends on
which airport.
So they can make that request. Now, a number of the
airports do have airport police on-site at a podium at the
checkpoint. So, again, it depends on which airport, what would
be the normal response protocol.
Mr. Hudson. Is the local law enforcement required to
respond? If so, how quickly is local law enforcement required
to be present to respond to that referral?
Mr. Pistole. Generally, law enforcement--there are about
330 of the airports that there is a law enforcement
reimbursement agreement that TSA has, where we help pay for the
cost of those police officers to be present. In those airports,
under the aviation security program that TSA has with the
airports, there is an agreed-upon response time, which is
typically 5 minutes.
But now, for example, in some of the smaller airports in
rural areas where there is no dedicated presence, it may be 15
or even 20 minutes because it is a sheriff's deputy, who is not
actually stationed there. So, again, it varies by airport, but
typically it is 5 minutes. That is done by agreement between
the airport police or those first responders and TSA.
Mr. Hudson. Well, in general, do you think this response
time is sufficient?
Mr. Pistole. So, again, that was designed with the idea
that you may find somebody not causing intent to do harm in the
sense of somebody has a gun or something else, prohibited item.
So, obviously, given the shooting, we are evaluating that.
Clearly, even though the Los Angeles Airport Police
responded and neutralized the target within 4 minutes from the
first call, obviously, if the shooter had the intent to cause
much greater harm, there are dozens of passengers that he could
have shot but he just walked right past. You watch the
videotape of all this taking place, and, literally, there are
people right at his feet. When he goes back to shoot Officer
Hernandez the second time, there are literally passengers laid
on the floor right by him he just avoids.
So, clearly, 5 minutes was too long in this case, so that
is something we are looking at as part of our review.
Mr. Hudson. Well, I appreciate that.
My time has expired. The Chairman now recognizes the
Ranking Minority Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just start with Mr. Lord and Mr. Edwards. In your
report--and I don't remember the number so I hope can you give
it to me--how many BDOs did you find had never made a referral
to police?
Mr. Lord. I don't have the specific number at the tip of my
fingers, but it was more than 20, as I recall. Perhaps 25.
Mr. Richmond. I think I am being told somewhere around the
number of 70 to 76, somewhere around there. But how do you
critique or judge someone objectively when all of the things
you would judge them by are in their own head? I don't
understand how we even monitor the program to judge its
effectiveness.
Mr. Lord. Well, it is a difficult proposition, obviously.
That is one of the reason they work in pairs. They like to
confer and make sure they are both seeing the same thing. But
some of the indicators they are honing in on are, quite
frankly, subjective, so it is difficult to measure whether they
are consistently honing in on the same behavioral indicators.
In fact, that is why you see the great variation across BDOs.
We saw an average of zero to 26 referrals per month on average
across different screeners.
Mr. Richmond. Mr. Pistole, first of all, thank you for your
service. Let me ask you, did any of the referrals by our
officers result in an arrest that indicated a terrorist plot or
something of that nature?
Mr. Pistole. Not to my knowledge. They were for other
criminal offenses, whether it is an outstanding warrant, drug
trafficking, money trafficking, being in the country illegally,
things like that. But to my knowledge, just for context, there
has not been a single attempted terrorist to enter a U.S.
airport, aircraft since 9/11.
Mr. Richmond. Any human trafficking?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. There was an instance, for example, last
year in Miami where there were two men with a young woman, and
a BDO observed this situation and interceded, which did result
in the arrest of those two individuals and would have rescued
that woman from human trafficking or at least for that
immediate time.
Mr. Richmond. Let me ask you another question, but before I
ask the question I want to say that--and thank you for your
leadership. When I talk about leadership, it is sometimes the
hard part of leadership when you go down a path and you realize
it is not working, that it may not have been the best decision
to reverse it. That is the hard part of leadership. So thank
you for your decision with the knives and all of those things.
My question would be, can you find a place within your
agency to better spend $200-plus million a year than on this
SPOT program?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you for that question. I have given that
a lot of thought, given the concerns that have been raised,
both by GAO and the IG. Look, under RBS we are achieving
efficiency. So we are a smaller agency today than we were a
year ago, and I believe that trend will continue, primarily
through attrition. So it is not that we are laying people off.
But my concern with those efficiencies is that if we remove
one whole layer of security, that being the BDOs, who, again,
are the least invasive and looking for intent rather than
items, then that gives us an exposure to potential terrorists
that we don't currently have.
The risk-reward equation is difficult, as GAO and IG have
pointed out. Given my experience in law enforcement and
National security, I know behavioral protection works, and so I
am a strong advocate, because I don't want to take away a layer
of security that may identify the next putative terrorist who
may decide they want to try to get into an airport here in the
United States to do something bad.
Mr. Richmond. Well, I would love to have at least a
statement or analysis on our return on investment on that $200-
plus million.
Let me just say this in my final few seconds, because I
know that we have made a lot of statements about the incident
at LAX, and you and I talked on the phone. When we talk about
response time, and when we talk about what could have been done
to do things differently and prevent loss of life, I think the
other side, my colleagues on the other side all the time remind
us that we can't be everything to everybody because we don't
have the money to pay for it.
It is unfortunate that this happened at a checkpoint, it
happened within the airport, but if we just take a moment to
think, if it happened in a parking garage we wouldn't be there.
If it happened curbside we may be there. So at some point we
have to thank the people that put their lives on the line and
do it knowing that they are putting their lives on the line,
but also that we just don't have the capability and we don't
have the resources to make sure that we are on every street
corner, every parking garage, and everyplace else.
So with that in mind, thank you for being very thoughtful
and methodical in where we place people. There are going to be
lessons to be learned from this incident in communications and
all of those things that we need to do better. But we have to
look at other things besides what happens when somebody is
holding a gun to prevent them from having it in the first
place, or that rage to do things.
So thank you for what you do. That is not a shot for my
colleagues on the other side, but we as a society have to work
more on the underlying factors because we just can't be
everywhere. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of
the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Thompson, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Hudson.
Administrator Pistole, can TSOs at LAX communicate with the
Los Angeles Police Department at the airport by radio?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. So there is communication?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. I want to at some point provide you
information that says that that is not the case. I want to make
sure that we are on the same wavelength with that. By
communicate, I am talking about radio, not telephone, not panic
button.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. But radio.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, and that may go through the coordination
center for TSA with the LAWA Police, as opposed to if you are
talking about is there an officer around the corner that they
would have direct contact to. So maybe we can clarify that.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I think the question is, if an incident
occurs, do our TSOs have radios at checkpoints?
Mr. Pistole. The supervisors, yes, or the manager there,
yes.
Mr. Thompson. Was there a supervisor or manager on duty?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Did that supervisor or manager call on the
radio?
Mr. Pistole. No. The supervisor picked up a dedicated line,
literally a red phone to call in, and as they were getting
ready to speak, you can watch in the video, she drops the phone
and runs because the shooter is coming up the escalator, having
just fired additional rounds, and so she did not stay to finish
that call.
Mr. Thompson. So the radio was not communicating.
Dr. Gerstein, this validation report you reference, are you
comfortable with the results of that contract for validation?
Mr. Gerstein. Yes, sir. We have looked at the validation
study. We believe that the findings, the 9 times greater the
detection over random is important. When I say 9 times, people
forget, that means 900 percent better, and that is an important
statistic.
Mr. Thompson. So you stand by the validation report?
Mr. Gerstein. The SPOT validation, indeed.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Lord, what is your analysis?
Mr. Lord. Unfortunately, I will have to respectfully
disagree with Mr. Gerstein, in fact. I think it is important to
look at the report itself. It was couched as an initial first
step and made several recommendations going forward to improve
validity, reliability. The technical advisory committee report
that was associated with it raised some similar concerns.
So again, it was useful, you know, it provided some
insights on the program, but we don't think it should be used
to establish the effectiveness of the program. If I could give
you one little example. The indicators, even though we had
concerns about the reliability of the data, we replicated the
results and we did find some positive associations between
behaviors and high-risk individuals, as DHS did. But we also
found some negative associations. That means the BDOs are
potentially honing in on some behaviors more commonly
associated with low-risk passengers, in fact with 20 of the
indicators. So we were concerned that that wasn't included in
the report. So it appeared they perhaps were highlighting the
positive and not accentuating the negative.
Mr. Thompson. So in essence, as you said, you disagree with
this report?
Mr. Lord. Yeah, I don't think it can be used to conclude it
is 9 times more effective than random.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Edwards, can you speak about how training
and evaluation of BDOs is important? I have a concern that we
have a number of people who are BDOs who have never made a
single referral. I would assume they are considered successful
employees. Can you explain people who don't do referrals or
anything for the committee?
Mr. Edwards. Well, thank you, sir. TSA has to take a number
of steps, including collecting reliable data, but regarding
training and refresher training, you know, 5 years after the
program came into existence, you know, they started the
refresher training. Out of the folks that we had interviewed,
you know, out of the 88 people that we interviewed, a number of
them, 713 out of the 2,800 BDOs were ready for the refresher
training in 2 years.
The other problem is this refresher training was held in a
classroom and the BDOs are not able to practice that, what they
learn in class, until they come back to their home airport. Not
having this consistent refresher training across the board, not
everybody is referring what they need to refer because the
varying levels of training that one has gotten and not gotten.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
The Chairman will now recognize other Members of the
committee for questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. In
accordance with our committee rules and practices, I plan to
recognize Members who were present at the start of the hearing
by seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be
recognized in the order of arrival.
At this time, the Chairman will recognize the gentlelady
from Indiana, Ms. Brooks, for any questions she might have.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing in such a timely way.
I want to just speak to Administrator Pistole and offer my
condolences to your officer and to those who were injured and
to the entire workforce. I applaud the fact that you reminded
us that since 9/11 we have not had an incident, a terrorist
incident at an airport or on any of our aircraft, in large
part, not that there haven't been attempts occasionally on
aircraft, but that TSA has been doing what it was founded to
do.
I was U.S. attorney at the time TSA was started, and I want
to talk with you and a couple of other panelists about, you
know, behavior detection, which is the heart of law
enforcement. Whether you are a local law enforcement officer or
whether you are--which is what TSA is really all about, is it
not, about behavior detection, whether they are coming through
checkpoints, whether they are, you know, informing airport
police officers.
With your FBI background prior to TSA, can you talk a bit
more about behavior detection and its importance, not only for
BDOs, but also what are the TSA officers and the supervisors,
you know, if we were to--I believe it is hard to study, because
I believe that it is something that--but it is the heart of
what these officers are trained to do.
You know, I am interested in hearing more about the
importance of behavior detection, how you were training on it,
as has been discussed, but yet how officers learn over time,
and based on the time that they are there. Can you just talk
about behavior detection, specifically in law enforcement, but
in the role of TSA, which are not, you know, specifically law
enforcement?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congresswoman Brooks, and thank you
for your kind words.
Sure, some of this is, frankly, common sense that is just
human nature, what people do every day in assessing others that
they come in contact with. Is that other person demonstrating
stress, fear, or deception in some way? So it is just human
nature. Of course, with a law enforcement background, a lot of
this discussion is difficult to quantify, to say, well, what
does your gut tell you about that person you are talking to or
that you are observing? I could give a number of anecdotes from
my FBI days. I won't do that. But just that notion that it
really becomes a survival skill, particularly for front-line
police officers who are out on the street every day engaging
people.
So what we in TSA have done is taken that basic training,
looked at what the Israelis did, continue to do in terms of
their assessment of people through behavior detection officers,
and to say: How can we apply that in the airport environment?
Then trained, again within our budgets and everything, to say,
here is what we will do to equip our officers on those front
lines from making that non-invasive, non-intrusive assessment
that can either help identify somebody who may be high-risk,
such as these human traffickers, not that they are terrorists.
But what we are doing now under risk-based security is also
making the other side of the equation identifying low-risk
individuals. So we, where I mentioned earlier, that 80,000
passengers on Monday alone went through expedited physical
screening, that is because the behavior detection officers did
not detect suspicious behavior.
So how do you quantify that? What is the return on
investment? Well, if you asked those 80,000 people, they would
probably say, hey, I appreciate those BDOs making a judgment
about me that I got through expedited physical screening,
basically TSA PreCheck. So GAO didn't have a chance to address
that, because that is an evolution of RBS, just one of the
different manifestations.
But it really is one of those key enablers for us as we
transition from one-size-fits-all to risk-based, intelligence-
driven, and how can we employ all of the tools that are
available? So the concern is, if you think of a mesh or a web
or something, why would we take one of those layers of security
off to allow possible terrorists to try to get through if they
have either an underwear bomb or, you know, there has been
intelligence in the past about surgically implanted devices
that technology probably won't pick up. So we rely on our BDOs
to make assessments about people who may manifest some
suspicious behavior. So that is all part of the background.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you very much.
Just very briefly, Dr. Gerstein, it is my understanding
that Customs and Border and FLETC also utilize. Is S&T involved
in assisting those agencies with developing their behavior
detection tools and techniques?
Mr. Gerstein. We have a number of on-going initiatives with
both FLETC and primarily Customs and Border, but none of them
to my knowledge are directly related to the behavioral
detection analysis or operations. We go where we are asked by
our partners, and so if that is an area that they want to get
into we certainly would assist with that.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
At this time the Chairman will recognize the gentlelady
from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for any questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for
holding this hearing. As I indicated previously, publicly,
again, my deepest sympathy to Mr. Hernandez's family and the
entire community, and to thank the law enforcement community of
that area for the most passionate and dignified tribute to him.
It was enormously heartwarming to see the law enforcement
community both at the airport and the surrounding area come
together and acknowledge the service of Mr. Hernandez as a law
enforcement officer. Which again, I join with my Ranking
Member, Mr. Thompson to acknowledge that I hope that concludes
forever any comment that TSOs are not first responders or
dealing with the security of this Nation, and put to rest any
ideas of privatization as a substitute for a professional
Federal workforce. So let me thank you again for that.
Let me also, Mr. Pistole, thank you for meeting with the
aviation stakeholders. As you well know, that was an important
issue led by our Ranking Member of the full committee, and
hopefully that was a productive meeting, and that you will
continue to do so vigorously.
I have toured the Bush Intercontinental Airport with the
FSB and chief of police and other law enforcement walking
through our airport after this tragic incident and looking at
the TSA areas, the security areas in at least four of our
terminals there, and will continue to dialogue with them.
I raise this question about how we can be effective with
respect to the perimeter security, which I think has been put
off on airports. I think it is a question of no one knowing who
is responsible for it.
One of the issues I think is important to the Chairman is
the idea or the concept of reimbursement for added security in
the perimeter area. As a frequent traveller, I view the
perimeter area, meaning the external and ticketing areas, as a
concern leading up to the secured area, where our TSOs are.
My question to you is: What proposition could you put
before with respect to funding on reimbursement to local law
enforcement for enhanced security that many of the TSOs--all of
them, I move, that you have had a chance to speak to--have
suggested should occur?
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, first, Congresswoman, for
your gestures of condolence and for your call, and appreciate
that, and pass that on, obviously, to Officer Hernandez's wife.
So what you address is one of the things that the working
group that we established internally, and then in discussing
with the ASAC, the Aviation Screening Advisory Council, and the
broader community, what would those costs look like? So I don't
have that for you right now, but that is something we are
looking at.
If we, for example, reduce the response time from 5 minutes
to 3 minutes, how much additional would that cost, and how much
of that should be borne by the Federal Government in terms of
we call it the LEO reimbursement agreements, and then how much
would be borne by the local airports? Of course, budgets are
tight everywhere, so the question is: How do we best buy down
risk? Part of that discussion that we had last week was how do
we ramp up the unpredictable random patrols by armed officers
at and through checkpoints that may now be doing other things?
So there is a number of things that I have to get back with you
on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me make a formal request that that
inquiry be made, but more importantly, that that reimbursement
structure be put in place. It is no doubt that the presence and
the quicker response of armed law enforcement is part of the
solution. Certainly, the solution is not armed TSO officers in
the very small areas that they have to deal with innocent
traveling passengers.
Let me quickly ask GAO, did you detect any racial profiling
in the work of the BDO, and are you not suggesting that the 12
points that they are finishing would improve it? Are you
suggesting that there should be other improvements? Are you
also suggesting that the program should be slimmed down?
I think Mr. Pistole makes a point on layering, but I would
be appalled and in great opposition if there was racial
profiling. I think one of the issues of the BDO is that the
overall impact is not immediately detectable because it is sort
of a floating issue, if you will, of whether or not there is
safety. So could you answer that? Then the enhanced training,
would that have an improvement? I would be willing to look at
enhanced training, slimming down the program to get where GAO
thinks it needs to be, to be able to have it as a complementary
layering of security at airports. Mr. Lord.
Mr. Hudson. The Chairman is happy to let Mr. Lord answer
that even though the gentlelady's time has expired. Please go
ahead.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman for his generosity.
Mr. Lord. Okay, thank you for the question.
In terms of racial profiling, of course, you are aware that
the IG did a separate study at the allegations involving Boston
Logan, and found in their study there was no evidence of racial
profiling. I believe they interviewed all of the behavior
detection officers on site. Although they did note, which is
one interesting thing, they did note in some cases there was
what they termed appearance profiling. So I am not sure to what
extent that overlaps with racial profiling, or how they define
that, but that was one notable finding perhaps Mr. Edwards can
respond to.
In terms of limiting funding in our recommendation,
obviously, as I said in my opening remarks, I believe there is
value in focusing resources on screening for potential bad
actors at the airport through behavioral detection techniques.
The question is: How do you go about it? I think as part of our
review of SPOT, we believe it is a very complicated scoring
process. We believe it could be streamlined, simplified,
perhaps focus more on passengers deemed high-risk. I mean, some
passengers come to the airport, they are already preselected
for secondary screening, and TSA is developing on this new risk
methodology to supplement that.
So perhaps that may be a way to do it rather than trying to
do it on this mass stand-off surveillance basis, which is very
difficult, because as the report notes, each passenger on
average is screened for 30 seconds or less. So it is really
difficult to do that to every single person coming in the
airport without interacting with them. So we think there is a
way to make them more interactive, more risk-based, more
simplified, and that is essentially what we are referring to in
our report. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman.
Thank the gentlelady for her questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. The Chairman will now recognize the gentleman
from South Carolina, Mr. Sanford, for any questions he may
have.
Mr. Sanford. Yes, sir. I appreciate the testimony of each
of you.
Gordon Sullivan, a retired general, wrote a book a long
time ago entitled ``Hope is Not a Method.'' It just seems to me
when I look at the fundamentals of the SPOT program it seems
that it is built on that foundation. It seems to be a cart out
before the horse because, indeed, you do have deployment before
you have validation of effectiveness. So the whole idea of
spending $1 billion and having 3,000 folks employed in this
endeavor while, you know, from a statistical standpoint the
results are about 50/50, seems to be not a good use of taxpayer
money.
But I want to zero in on what my associate Bennie Thompson
was touching on just a moment ago. I think that there is a real
civil liberty component to what is going on here that I think
is a real challenge. I tell my boys all the time, guys, have
the wisdom to know what you don't know. Mr. Richmond was
touching on this notion of how do you get inside somebody's
head just a moment ago. I think it is a very difficult place to
be.
So you have a system set up wherein, as I read here the
notes, you are going to look for behaviors that indicate
stress, fear, or deception. But I would ask you, Mr. Pistole,
you know, if you were a young kid that maybe got the off the
track at an earlier age, you served some time but you paid your
price to society, but you do have a criminal record, if a law
enforcement fellow was standing before you asking you
questions, do you believe that you would exhibit stress or
fear?
Mr. Pistole. It all depends on the individual. Yeah, sure,
potentially.
Mr. Sanford. Okay. What if you were a staunch right-wing
conspiracist with very strong anti-Government leanings, you had
posted things that probably weren't the best to post on the
internet, but you had the security of invisibility that goes
with the internet, but now you have got law enforcement
probing, asking you questions, would you exhibit stress or
fear?
Mr. Pistole. Again, it depends on the individual, but
potentially, sure.
Mr. Sanford. If you were an immigrant whose dad and mom
perhaps had come here illegally, would you exhibit stress or
fear if somebody was asking you questions?
Mr. Pistole. All situational, again.
Mr. Sanford. Let's say you were a, you know, a wife whose
husband has been beating her and you are just trying to get on
airplane to get the heck out of town, would you exhibit stress
or fear if somebody was going into interrogation on some front?
Mr. Pistole. Again, situational.
Mr. Sanford. Which I think raises the question that the GAO
report has brought, and what Mr. Lord testified, which is,
again, entirely situational. But the question is in this
instance, you know, the difference with a front-line officer
who is there on the street, you pull up to a car, you don't
know what they got in the car. You don't know who they are. You
have nothing that insulates you as an officer, and you better
be, you know, cueing in on nonverbal cues.
But in this case you go through a screening system that
essentially undresses somebody. You send their equipment,
whatever they have, through radar detection and other device.
It is a very different environment. The question is, I think,
from a civil liberties standpoint, given those other tests that
have been made with regard to, you know, who this person is, do
you, in addition, have to go through a screening process based
on somebody's interpretation of what they think might be inside
your brain?
Mr. Pistole. I mean you raise good points, Congressman. Let
me address a couple of things. I would have loved to have
behavioral detection officers in Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam
on Christmas day 2009 to see how Abdulmutallab, the 24-year-old
with the underwear bomb, would have appeared. We don't have
that on CCTV. Most notably----
Mr. Sanford. But what if he had been a cool customer and
you wouldn't know?
Mr. Pistole. But that gives us another opportunity. So
there is no perfect science. There is no perfect art of this.
Mr. Sanford. Well, to your point, how many underwear bombs
have been detected with these 3,000 officers?
Mr. Pistole. Zero, because I believe they have served--what
we have done in TSA in the United States has served as a
deterrent. I know we have a Classified briefing next week where
we can talk in a little more detail, but what we do in the
United States----
Mr. Sanford. But we have got to look at cost-effectiveness
in the program.
Mr. Pistole. Okay.
Mr. Sanford. I mean, how many surgically-implanted bombs
have they found?
Mr. Pistole. Fortunately, there haven't been any deployed
that we are aware of.
Mr. Sanford. Zero and zero in terms of result, but $1
billion of cost.
Mr. Pistole. So if we look at that in the context, this has
been over 7 years, and we have screened by observation over 4
billion passengers. It actually comes out to less than 50 cents
in some instances; 25 per passenger is the cost for BDOs to
observe. So you are right----
Mr. Sanford. Or you could say it in reverse, you could say
$1 billion with no results.
Mr. Pistole. Well, I would say there is a result from the
standpoint of deterrence.
Mr. Sanford. I see my time is coming to an end, and I think
we could argue that point, but I think that there is a bigger
civil liberty point, which is whether there has or hasn't been
deterrence GAO raises questions on. They say it is flip of a
coin.
But on the opposite side of the equation, in addition to
possible redeployment of those 3,000 folks and the taxpayer
cost associated with that, there is a big civil liberty
question of, to get on an airplane, does it require more than
in essence undressing and having all your equipment checked,
but now a second level of screening based on somebody's
interpretation of what they think is inside your head.
Mr. Hudson. The gentleman's time has expired. If you want
to briefly respond.
Mr. Pistole. Yeah, I would. Thank you, Chairman.
So there is only a very small percentage of people who are
referred for additional screening by BDOs. That is one point.
Another is that the whole impetus of the risk-based security
initiative, RBS, with TSA PreCheck, DOD, 75 and over, 12 and
under, all of those things are designed to address some of
those concerns about the invasiveness and intrusiveness of the
one-size-fits-all approach.
So I get your point on that. The idea is how can we work
collaboratively to have multiple layers of security, that we
can expedite those that we have greater confidence in without
ever profiling. So the notion about profiling, I agree strongly
with the Ranking Member that we will not tolerate in TSA. If we
find any person, any employee who is profiling based on race,
ethnicity, national origin, any of those things we will take
appropriate action.
Mr. Sanford. I think--I mean, I have run out of time--but I
think Mr. Lord raised the question of the type of profiling
that in fact does occur. The guy in the business suit generally
isn't going to be the most suspicious-looking guy.
Mr. Hudson. Unfortunately, I will need to cut this off. We
will do a second round of questions, but I would like to move
on to other Members.
At this point I will recognize the gentleman from Nevada,
Mr. Horsford, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you very much, Chairman Hudson, and to
the Ranking Member, Mr. Richmond, to the Ranking Member of the
full committee, Mr. Thompson, for allowing me to participate in
this hearing today. Thank you to our panelists.
I just want to associate myself with the comments of the
Ranking Members and the other panelists who have talked about
the need to both protect our National security while preserving
Americans' right to privacy and our civil liberties, and to
underscore the statements by the prior representative who
asked, you know: What is the return on investment for $1
billion? To somehow suggest from the GAO report that there is
not profiling I think deserves some more analysis and review.
Administrator Pistole, I also wanted to extend my personal
condolences to the TSA officer, Mr. Hernandez, and to his
family, for giving his life in the protection of the American
public. The TSA forms the front line of our Nation's aviation
security and their work is not only critical, but also
appreciated. I think in light of the resent tragic events at
the Los Angeles airport, airport security is once again in the
fore.
Based on the review that we have received that your agency
conducted, it is my understanding that the shooter entered
through the exit lane of that airport. So I am concerned that
the actions and policies adopted by the TSA may have some
unintended consequences, particularly because they are being
made without the input of stakeholders who may have particular
expertise on the topic.
I recently offered an amendment to Ranking Member
Thompson's bill, the Aviation Security Stakeholder
Participation Act, which will form the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee, and my amendment added the issue of exit
lane security to the scope of the advisory committee's
responsibilities. This was done prior to the tragic events at
the Los Angeles airport.
So, Administrator Pistole, isn't it true that your plan to
transfer responsibility of exit lanes from the TSA to local
airport authorities has been met with near universal resistance
from local airports?
Mr. Pistole. First, Congressman, thank you for your kind
words earlier.
So the context for the exit lanes are that airports
currently in the United States provide exit lane staffing in
two-thirds of all of the airports in the United States where
TSA has a presence. So we are only talking about one-third of
the airports. So there is 155, approximately, airports that TSA
provides some type of staffing.
Now, we will still do the staffing as it relates to
screening of law enforcement officers, known crew members,
pilots, flight attendants, and things like that. We will still
do that screening function. The issue with the exit lanes is on
access control.
Mr. Horsford. Right.
Mr. Pistole. The exit lane is one of dozens of access
control points around the airport that TSA does not provide
any, that is an airport function. So in shifting this
responsibility, I understand the concerns that airports have
expressed because of the costs associated with this. The bottom
line for us in a time of reduced budgets for TSA, we have to
find cost savings to focus under a risk-based security approach
on the security screening functions as opposed to access
control.
Mr. Horsford. Yeah, and I respect that, however it can't be
done in a vacuum.
Mr. Pistole. I agree.
Mr. Horsford. You have got to do it with the inputs of your
stakeholders and with Congress, which signed legislation
putting this responsibility under the TSA. We haven't changed
that from a policy standpoint. So to have the TSA take this up
without direction from Congress, I also think may be
inappropriate from a regulatory standpoint.
One of the other issues that I have is with the TSA
procurement procedures for both vendors and airports, because
they assume tremendous risk when they begin the process of
adopting new technologies. The airport closest to my district,
McCarran International Airport, recently won approval for TSA
for a technology solution to the problem of exit lane
monitoring, for which I am, you know, very excited. But my
question is: How does TSA expect airports to take the risk of
designing, purchasing, and installing these technologies within
the time frames presented and without TSA preapproval of that
technology?
Mr. Hudson. The gentleman's time has expired, but I will
allow the administrator to respond if you would like.
Mr. Pistole. Yeah, thank you, Chairman. So we are not
dictating to the airports how they do the exit lane security.
If they want to staff somebody, put a person there as TSA has,
that is fine. We just ask the airport authorities to work with
the local Federal security director to have some acceptable
solutions. So for the technology solution, that is great, we
just ask that we be given insight into what that is, and then
we will review and presumably approve if it meets standards,
but we are not in the business of dictating, saying this is
what you will do. We are just saying we are out of that
business----
Mr. Horsford. Can I just clarify? Can you approve in a pre-
approved qualified vendor list so that once they are selected,
they know that the project can come to fruition?
Mr. Pistole. We have not taken that approach for various
reasons which I can get into more detail later, but, no, we
have not done that.
Mr. Hudson. We will do a second round if the committee so
chooses or so desires.
Now I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
Swalwell, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our
witnesses.
Administrator Pistole, I first want to thank you for
engaging with me and Members on this committee during the
knives on planes discussion. I really appreciate you working
with the ASAC on that and continuing to engage with me. I
appreciate the policy revisions that were made.
I also want to express to you, administrator, how sorry,
deeply sorry I am about the shooting at LAX. I want to pass
along my condolences to the family of Officer Hernandez. I am
the son of a retired police officer and the brother of a police
officer who serves today. I want to wish well the
transportation security officers who were shot, James Speer and
Tony Grigsby, as well as passenger, Brian Ludmer.
You know, as far as Federal workers go, TSOs in the Federal
workforce, the transportation security officers, they are some
of the newest employees we have in our Federal agencies. You
know, they have been around now since right after September 11.
But I think it is easy to forget that they are relatively new
compared to how many Federal employees we have, and they are
still learning their job and growing in their job, and we
shouldn't take that for granted, and they are among the last
lines of defense between a person who wishes to do harm and
passengers and crew on an airplane.
In many ways, as Mr. Hernandez and the others who were
shot, they are heroes, but too often unsung. Unfortunately, I
think too many people, and I have seen this in this Congress,
continually attack and denigrate the work at the TSA. Recently,
in 2012, the Republican National Committee's platform called
for de-Federalizing the TSA and privatizing the TSA.
I think we need to all just take a step back in our
comments about the TSA and just attacks in general on the
Federal workforce. I mean, these people are doing a public
service. They are doing it oftentimes at much less money than
they would receive in the private sector. Again, they are the
last line of defense. I don't think our comments are well-
served and I think they can create a culture of hate toward
people who are working in very stressful environments dealing
with the passengers, myself included, who are not always on our
best behavior as we are rushed trying to make our plane. It is
a very difficult job, and I hope we can all just be mindful of
that job.
In light of that, administrator, I do want to talk about--
Ranking Member Thompson had some concerns with his questioning
about radio communication capability between TSOs and law
enforcement personnel, particularly armed law enforcement who
are at the airports. So my question to clarify: At LAX and most
of the airports across the country, is there radio
communication that can take place between a TSO and law
enforcement personnel, or is it only phone communication that
can take place?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, and thank you for your kind comments,
Congressman.
So it depends, airport-by-airport. So out of the 450
airports, I don't have the figures here in front of me, which I
will get, most of the communication would be between the TSA
employees and a coordination center, which may be jointly
staffed, depending on which airport, between TSA and airport
police, or just TSA, the coordination center. I am not aware of
ones where it is a direct link into a radio contact into the
police, but I am sure there are some. I am just not aware of
those off-hand.
Mr. Swalwell. Do you think that could have helped with what
happened at LAX and for future scenarios that you could
envision or training that you have gone through, would it be
better if we had a radio system where police and TSOs were on
the same channel?
Mr. Pistole. Well, I think that is clearly one of the
things that we are looking at as part of our review, but just
for awareness, for example, if you are at LAX and you call 9-1-
1, that doesn't go to the Los Angeles Police.
Mr. Swalwell. CHP, right?
Mr. Pistole. Yeah. So that goes elsewhere. You have to dial
7-9-1-1 to get into the airport police. So there are some
quirks in there that go, you know, beyond TSA and just law
enforcement, but it really does come down to airport-by-
airport.
Mr. Swalwell. Okay, thank you.
Also, as far as behavioral or behavior detection, what have
you learned from what happened at LAX and, you know, the
behavior detection officers? Is there anything that they could
have detected? I know you are still investigating, but, you
know, clearly, this was a situation that happened and unfolded
rapidly and a behavior detection officer was one of the
officers that was shot. Is this something that you believe
under prime circumstances the behavior detection team could
have detected this person earlier?
Mr. Hudson. The gentleman's time has expired, but I will
allow the witness to answer.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman.
Again, possibly, given the configuration of terminal 3 at
LAX with the document checker on the lower level and then
escalators up to where the checkpoint is, there were actually
just two TSA employees there, and so there were no BDOs that
would observe. But the shooter, again, for the time he was
dropped off at the curb to the time he walked literally, I
walked this on Tuesday, walked a few steps, and then took out
his assault rifle and opened fire, I mean, it is just a matter
of seconds. It is possible that a BDO, if the officer would
have seen something, you can actually see on the video an
airport employee pointing at the gunman. You don't see the
gunman in the video, but you see this person pointing, and then
the shots are fired. So somebody could have, and somebody did,
but given that configuration there were no BDOs present at that
actual point.
Mr. Swalwell. Great, thank you. I yield back my time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra time.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
At this point the Chairman will recognize the gentleman
from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I first would like to acknowledge our condolences to your
organization for its loss.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Just want to bring light to a few things. I am
sure being last I am possibly going to ask something that has
already been asked, but I feel it is important. You know, the
GAO report released yesterday cites an incident where a BDO
manager at Newark Liberty International Airport, which is my
home airport, gave inappropriate direction to behavior
detection officers regarding profiling of passengers and made
racial comments. It is my understanding that that BDO has been
fired.
It has also been brought to my attention that the BDOs have
been promoted based on the number of referrals they have made,
which have encouraged BDOs to racially profile to increase
their referral rate.
So what degree of confidence do you have that other BDO
managers aren't encouraging or directing racial profiling
through the SPOT program?
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Congressman Payne. So our
clear instruction, and one of the lessons learned from these
multiple reviews that have been done is we could have done a
better job in terms of training and retraining and ensuring
that there is no notion of profiling taking place. In fact, as
part of our retraining that we have done since these reports
have been done, is to require every BDO to take a pledge
against profiling, which I have and can share with the
subcommittee, and every BDO other than those who are out on
extended leave or something have taken that pledge to ensure
that they understand that profiling has absolutely no place in
a BDO's work. It is not good law enforcement. It is not good
security work from our perspective. It is unconstitutional. So
anybody who is found to be profiling, will be investigated and
dealt with appropriately.
So we have put that message out very clearly. I can talk
about the Newark situation in detail if you would like. But
that being said, any time there is an allegation, in fact, that
is what happened in Boston last year, the allegations came into
us. I saw them. I take them very seriously. So I asked the
Inspector General to conduct the investigation rather than TSA
because this was National news. It was in the New York Times.
So they conducted the review, and obviously you heard from
Mr. Edwards in terms of their findings, there was not
discrimination that was found or profiling. But we take it very
seriously, and I know from my background that that is just
unacceptable, and so any violation of somebody's civil rights
or civil liberties is a significant, significant issue for us
and just undermines the entire program. So that is why we don't
tolerate it.
Mr. Payne. I hope it is not a culture that has been
created. Because let me say, I don't know if it is the right
word, but I am sensitive to this issue. Being from a State
where my uncle is the author of the racial profiling bill in
New Jersey, we have had many instances where this problem is
just out of proportion. So to see this here, it harkens back to
issues that we have been dealing with in New Jersey, and now
this at Newark Airport is troubling.
You know, to Mr. Horsford's point, you know, that there
needs to be maybe more analysis of whether or not this is going
on, what steps has TSA taken to begin collecting racial
information on passengers in order to be able to measure
quantitatively whether racial profiling has occurred?
Mr. Pistole. Yeah, that has been a challenging issue for us
because we in collecting the information, does it then promote
either the actual or the appearance of profiling? So we have
been doing a feasibility study to assess that. Of course, when
an individual is referred to law enforcement, they collect that
data, but then that is not necessarily passed back to us. So
that is part of our challenge. Is it the appearance of
somebody? Of course, that it is an imperfect art of defining
somebody. So those are the challenges that we are working
through, but I am sensitive to the point you are making.
Mr. Payne. Yeah. You know, the point of BDOs being promoted
based on the number of referrals----
Mr. Pistole. Yes, that is not----
Mr. Payne. You know, growing up I went to school in a town
where the population was changing and people were resistant to
it. So they had someone that worked for the board of education
that would go to homes to make sure people actually lived
there. What subsequently I found out years later is that for
every person he could prove didn't live there, he was paid. So,
you know, these referrals kind of harken to that type of thing.
So I am very concerned about that.
Mr. Hudson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Pistole. Chairman, may I respond to that?
Mr. Hudson. Sure.
Mr. Pistole. From the standpoint of, I think there was a
perception among some BDOs, and I believe the inspector general
found this in their review in Boston, that BDOs may be promoted
more readily if they made a higher number of referrals. That is
not the case, but there was a perception. So we have gone back
to retrain and clarify that that is not the case. So we don't
want people referring, we don't want BDOs referring because
they think they will be more readily promoted.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you for that answer.
At this point, we will start a second round. I have just
got one question. I am not planning to take my entire 5
minutes, and maybe we can get through this round pretty
quickly. But I appreciate the indulgence of the witnesses here.
My question is for both Mr. Gerstein and Mr. Lord. In your
testimony you said that there were several foreign countries
who have implemented this type of behavioral detection program.
In fact, I visited Ben Gurion Airport myself and have seen
first-hand how they implement that program. So my question to
both of you, or anyone who wants to respond, is there a body of
scientific studies that support the effectiveness of some of
these foreign programs? If so, how can this information be
better leveraged and used as we examine what we do here?
Mr. Lord. I guess I can start. You typically hear the
Israelis operate a similar system. I think it is really
important to note that there are as many dissimilarities as
similarities in their system. First, you are allowed to
racially profile under their system. As Mr. Pistole explained
that is prohibited under our system. They also, their system is
much smaller in scale. You know, one major international hub,
number of aircraft is less than 100 in their national fleet.
They essentially will take the time and interview every single
passenger getting on an aircraft. We can't do it under our
system at 1.8 million passengers a day. The entire system would
come screeching to a halt. So I think you have to be really
careful about drawing parallel with the Israelis.
Also in our report, we did cite another country report. We
are not allowed to disclose the name of the country, it is
considered sensitive security information. But the phase one of
the study found some merit in the use of behavior indicators,
but they did another follow-up study, same country, same
process, phase two found that there was no, you know, they
changed the conclusion and concluded it was not a really
effective use of their resources. So there are some other
country studies out there, but I think you have to be really
careful about citing them as evidence to support the use of
behavior detection.
Mr. Gerstein. I would agree with Mr. Lord with respect to
Israel. I think, you know, they rely on it heavily but it is a
difference in scale. It is certainly not something that we
would want to engage in here.
On the other hand, when I went to Australia, I thought that
their program is very robust. We walked what I call the last
200 meters, if you will, from the time somebody goes through
their passport, and then goes through and gets their luggage
and is finally checked out. They have a very robust system.
The one thing that I did not see in comparing it to ours
was the same sort of checklist scoring of the indicators. But,
you know, they rely on this heavily, and they think it works.
I would also like to say that we have evidence that many of
the indicators that we have within the TSA methodology on SPOT
have been validated through Department of Defense work. For
example, person-borne IEDs. So they have looked at it and they
came up in one of the studies that 24 indicators that have been
identified in TSA overlap with what was in this Department of
Defense-sponsored study.
You know, likewise, there was a recent workshop--well,
somewhat recent, 2011--with Federal, local law enforcement,
DOD, private sector, in which they found 32 of the indicators
were overlapping. So there is work on-going to try to better
understand the questions that surround behavioral science and
to try to get better at it.
You know, the one thing about this program I think is
really interesting, though, is that, you know, most of what we
do when we talk screening is based on capabilities. In other
words, can I X-ray it and determine is there an explosive? Or
do I put something through a magnetometer or one of the AIT
machines?
SPOT is really the premier program for trying to get at
this question of behavioral issues and can you identify people
who are in stressful situations and, therefore, should be
brought aside for secondary screening? I would add that that is
a very low-risk outcome to be secondarily screened. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that.
At this point, I will recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Swalwell for a second round.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Pistole, yesterday the committee received a
letter from a behavior detection officer--actually officers--at
Boston's Logan Airport expressing concerns about retaliation
for exposing profiling, to follow up on the gentleman from New
Jersey's question. Can you assure our committee that employees
who come forward and report any wrongdoing or the suspicion of
wrongdoing in the behavior detection program, whether it is
profiling or otherwise, that they would be protected against
retaliation?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Mr. Swalwell. Great, thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Horsford. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Swalwell. I will yield, if it is okay, to the gentleman
from Nevada.
Mr. Hudson. Without objection.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you. I will defer to the gentlelady. I
just had some additional questions, but----
Mr. Hudson. Well, I am happy to get to the gentleman in
order. If the gentlelady is next then I am happy to recognize
you for 5 minutes----
Mr. Horsford. That is fine.
Mr. Hudson [continuing]. If that is appropriate.
Okay. At this point then I will recognize the gentlelady
from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for a second round.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I thank the gentleman from
Nevada for his courtesy.
I wanted to pursue the line of questioning that goes to
whether we keep or whether we do not keep the SPOT program. So
let me first go to this issue, Mr. Lord, that you indicated in
your past report, though I will not hold that as the final
answer, that you saw no racial profiling--but we have just
heard of concerns from Boston--but you saw the idea of attire.
So I guess, Mr. Lord and Mr. Edwards, what do you mean by
that, and how is that not effectively racial profiling if
someone is wearing a head dress, someone is wearing braids,
someone is wearing their hair natural, how does that not fall
into the category of profiling?
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, ma'am. We looked at the Logan
International Airport in our report investigation. Mr. Pistole
had asked me to look into it. We interviewed the BDOs, we
interviewed the BDO supervisors, we also interviewed some
passengers, not to go on a fishing expedition, but we
interviewed some passengers as well. What we found was there
was not racial profiling, but in the interviews some of the
BDOs alleged a practice of appearance profiling.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. So my question is: You found that.
What does that mean, and how do we fix that or how do we
improve that? Because it is certainly, I think, very much
connected.
Mr. Edwards. So in general terms, appearance profiling, you
know, it is identifying individuals exhibiting certain types of
characteristics that may be different from the general
population. I can come in a non-public setting and explain to
you my understanding of what this appearance profiling is. I am
just uncomfortable elaborating that at this public setting.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Mr. Lord, did you find any form of discriminatory
assessments being made by BDOs?
Mr. Lord. Well, first of all, we started our review, we
always coordinate with the IG. Since they were looking at these
racial profiling allegations in Boston, we deferred to them on
this issue. But as part of our work, since we had already
started the work, we did interview 25 behavior detection
officers across four airports; 20 of the 25 said they had not
personally witnessed any racial profiling, but 5 of them
indicated there was, in their view, based on a personal
observation, some profiling. Again, that is a very small number
over 3,000 behavior detection officers.
We tried to substantiate it looking at the data, since, you
know, that is a hallmark of how we do our work, and at the time
TSA didn't have the data systems that would allow us to
substantiate that, but as Mr. Pistole just noted, they have a
pilot, a feasibility study under way.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Lord. They are going to think about better ways to do
that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much.
Mr. Pistole, let me conclude with you, please. There have
been several, I think, constructive points being made at this
hearing. Would you go back and look at this program, this
service as it may be better refined through streamlining,
through looking at the at-risk concept that I think you adhere
to, through the idea of--I even like the idea, because of the
LAX tragedy, of expanding in the outer areas in an area
surrounding the perimeters, so as passengers enter, it might be
an appropriate executive fix. Are you willing to go back and
look at this program constructively?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Congresswoman. That is part of our
review. Clearly we want to make sure we are deploying BDOs and
the entirety of the workforce in the highest-risk, most return-
on-investment places, times, and situations. So that is clearly
what we are doing.
As part of the BDO program we are looking at refining the
number of indicators. Is it too complicated, is it confusing,
how can we streamline, to your point, how can we simplify the
whole process to give the greatest return on investment?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, if I may just put a question
on the record and ask you, let me thank you and the Ranking
Member for this hearing. I would offer a thought based upon Mr.
Edwards' comment and some more pointed questions that I would
like to ask that we have a Classified briefing on the BDO
pursuant to or in light of LAX and a lot of our concerns about
the exterior. Meaning, when I say the exterior, there are the
perimeters, people driving up, that is one issue, but I am
talking about the lead-up to the TSA area, the ticketing area,
people walking up, which is where this gentleman was. So he had
to walk somewhere, and the question was: Was there some officer
other than the law enforcement who deals with the actual
activity of violence or activity, but someone watching that
area?
So, again, no determinations here, no commitments here.
Prefer not in open setting. But I would like to have the
opportunity, if we could, to have that discussion.
Mr. Hudson. I would be happy to work with you on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much. Again, thank you for your service.
Thank the gentleman from Nevada as well.
Mr. Hudson. At this point, I will recognize the gentleman
from Nevada, Mr. Horsford, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask the administrator if he could go ahead
and answer the question about the TSA not being able to have a
preapproved vendor list, what the challenges are to
implementing the process.
Mr. Pistole. We looked at doing a qualified products list
to say we would recommend or we would accept if you bought
these particular pieces of technology from these manufacturers.
We are trying to be open to all vendors, all providers, so it
is not like we are preselecting one and saying you must go with
this one. So McCarran may have contact with a vendor that has
one solution, LAX may have contacts with another vendor with a
different solution. So we are tried not to be prescriptive in
that regard; tried to be completely open to whatever vendors
and solutions that airports would provide.
So what we have done is provide a template to say, here are
some recommended solutions, and then if you work within those
parameters just make sure you coordinate that with your local
Federal security director, these more likely than not would be
approved; as opposed to saying from a qualified product list,
here is the exact product you have to use.
Mr. Horsford. So I would like to ask if I can follow up
with you and someone from your office in that regard to make
sure that that process is clear to the local airport----
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Mr. Horsford [continuing]. Directors? Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Yep.
Mr. Horsford. Also, administrator, in fiscal year 2014 TSA
reduced the number of airports where the SPOT program operates
from 176 airports down to 121, a reduction of 55 airports. So
the agency did this despite your own analysis that said you
actually needed to increase the number of behavior detection
officers. So first my question: Are the airports where the SPOT
program has been removed less secure today because they don't
have the BDO? If not, why not?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. So this goes back to actually a GAO, the
2010 report, that recommended that we assess our deployment of
BDOs across the risk landscape--my words. So under a risk-based
security approach, what we have done is looked at those 175 and
made a judgment that our return on investment in terms of being
able to see and observe the greatest number of passengers in
the highest-risk airports would be better-suited by reducing
the footprint from across the country, basically the peanut
butter approach, just spreading resources equally around the
country, to those higher-risk and higher-passenger airports.
So that is what we have done under this Risk-Based Security
initiative to say we will be in generally the 121 busiest
airports around the country, so we will be observing over 80,
maybe as high as 90 percent of all passengers so we get a
better return on investment.
In an ideal world, yes, I would have BDOs at virtually
every airport. So there is some argument to be made that those
airports have less security. But we are not in a time, as you
know, of unlimited budget, so I have to make a risk-based
decision based on our budget, and so that is why we have made
that to coincide with the GAO recommendation.
Mr. Horsford. So on that exit lane issue which I raised
earlier with you, and your point was you guys can't afford it
so you are going to shift that burden to local airports, local
airports have budget constraints, too. So, again, all I would
ask is that you not make these decisions in a vacuum, that you
involve the local stakeholders so that they can help you inform
how to best maintain security. We can't make the Federal budget
problems local and State problems. I was a former State senator
before coming to Congress. So shifting the burden down isn't a
solution either. So I would just ask that you continue to get
their input.
Can I just ask one final question, maybe Mr. Edwards or Mr.
Lord? Is there any data of those passengers who have been
screened of their race, ethnicity, religion? Is any information
like that captured?
Mr. Lord. Yeah, there is some, but it wasn't systemic or
sufficient for us to do a good analysis. For example, when they
make a referral that ultimately goes to a law enforcement
officer, the law enforcement community does in some cases keep
good demographic data, but it really varies by airport. So it
is spotty, but there is some data out there.
Mr. Horsford. Okay. That is something we need to follow up
on, because it is done more effectively in law enforcement
outside of airport, and if we are going to continue to have
these type of profiling strategies, we need to make sure that
it is not disproportionately impacting, you know, based on
race, ethnicity, and religion. You don't know that unless you
collect the data.
Mr. Lord. Yeah. To TSA's credit, they are very sensitive to
that, and they already have a project under way to gather
better data to help answer that question.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman. I thank the witnesses
for their testimony to Members' questions today. Members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions that they want
to submit in writing. We ask the witnesses that you do respond
to these.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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