[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
ASSESSING THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND FROM AL-QAEDA OPERATIONS IN IRAN
AND SYRIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 22, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-19
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Vacancy
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Brian Higgins, New York
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Jason Chaffetz, Utah William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Chris Stewart, Utah Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry Ann Watkins, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., Associate Director, International
Security and Defense Policy Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Robin Simcox, Research Fellow, The Henry Jackson Society:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Barak Barfi, Research Fellow, New America Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
ASSESSING THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND FROM AL-QAEDA OPERATIONS IN IRAN
AND SYRIA
----------
Wednesday, May 22, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Stewart, and Higgins.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism Intelligence will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
examining the threat to the homeland for al-Qaeda operatives in
Iran and Syria, and want to welcome all of the witnesses, say
thank you for giving us your time, and now I will recognize
myself for an opening statement.
Before I make the statement, I would like to comment on the
fact that we have been advised that there was a shooting in
Florida today, which seems to have some relationship to the
Boston marathon investigation.
The FBI was, as we have been told, interrogating a Chechen
who had an involvement--an alleged involvement with the older
brother and what we are told so far is that the person being
questioned actually pulled a knife and stabbed the FBI agent
and then the assailant was killed on the spot.
So again, I think it shows that the tentacles of these
terrorist connections often go beyond what we first anticipate
and also without pre-judging anything makes me wonder again how
much information we missed by the interrogation being cut short
of the younger brother in Boston at the time.
But I say that only because I think many of us will agree
in many ways it is a seamless web. There are disconnects but
there are also a seamless web among various terrorist groups
and we have to basically, you know, be looking at every
possible threat.
With that, I want to welcome the witnesses today for this
hearing, ``Assessing the Threat to the Homeland From al-Qaeda
Operations in Iran and Syria.''
This hearing continues the Counterterrorism and
Intelligence Subcommittee's plan for the 113th Congress.
I say at the outset that the Ranking Member, Brian Higgins,
and I think are on certainly full agreement as to where the
subcommittee is going. Whether we agree on everything as we go
along, who knows, but we certainly have the same intent and the
same focus and I really look forward to the, you know, this
session.
We will be examining current threats, detecting emerging
threats, and overseeing intelligence sharing between Federal,
State, and local governments.
Today we are examining safe havens in Syria and Iran from
which al-Qaeda could target the homeland, the relationship
between al-Qaeda and Iran, the threat to the United States from
foreign jihadis in Syria, and how Syrian instability may impact
al-Qaeda's capabilities.
On April 22 the RCMP, the Canadian Mounties, arrested two
Islamists, Raed Jaser and Chiheb Esseghaier. I am not sure I
have that exactly right, but you know what we are talking
about.
At the direction of al-Qaeda members in Iran, these men
planned to derail a passenger train from Toronto, as it passed
over Niagara Falls en route to New York City.
I will point out of course they we are talking about
Congressman Higgins' district and a district very close to mine
in New York, and I say that as a preview to what we will say
later on about the lack of information we were given on this.
On May 9 American authorities arrested Ahmed Abassi, an
associate of these men in the United States, who also supported
al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate.
Now, had their terror plot succeeded, American and Canadian
civilian casualties in New York could have been catastrophic.
Let me say up front as I started to mention before, the
Committee on Homeland Security was never briefed, even in
classified settings, about this year-long investigation of a
serious threat against the homeland.
Obviously, a threat against any American is a threat
against all Americans but I think it was particularly egregious
in this case that when you have two Members of Congress from
New York in the area impacted by this that the Department of
Homeland Security--nobody in the intelligence committee, the
law enforcement community, at any time advised me and I don't
think they advised Congressman Higgins during the last year
about this. To me, that is inexcusable.
It is something which we, as Chairman of the committee and
now as Chairman of the counterterrorism subcommittee and
Ranking Member Higgins, we attend weekly, biweekly briefings
from the FBI, from the National Counterterrorism Center, from
the Department of Homeland Security where we are told and
advised of so many possible plots, all of the investigations
that are going on, and yet this one which was so key, we were
never told anything about.
To me, it is just inexcusable and basically I am passing on
to the--all of those agencies and departments of that this is
not going to be tolerated.
It is a--there is no excuse whatsoever for holding back on
this type of information. Also my understanding is that New
York State and local police were not briefed about this plot,
either.
Now, we have seen this pattern for years now, most recently
in the Boston Marathon bombing and the planned follow-up attack
on Times Square and the Fort Hood and Little Rock shootings.
The Federal Government identifies potential terrorists or
attack plans, but does not share the knowledge with State and
local police. Again I would say the fact that in Boston where
the FBI was advised of a possible attack against Time Square
and did not notify the NYPD and their theory was well the plot
was over, the threat had ended, the fact is as we saw with the
killing in Florida today, perhaps that plot was not over and it
had not ended. So again, I just pass on that to the FBI the
importance of information sharing. Turf battles should have
ended on September 11, 2001.
This information sharing was urged by the 9/11 Commission
and ordered by the Homeland Security and Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Acts.
Now, there is much we don't know about the relationship
between Iran and al-Qaeda. As Churchill described Germany and
Stalin with their Union in 1939, it is a ``a riddle, wrapped in
a mystery, inside an enigma.''
The Iranian regime is a state sponsor of terror, and al-
Qaeda is a terror organization. But Tehran's ayatollahs are
Shi'i Muslims and al-Qaeda are Sunni Muslims.
For this reason Iran and al-Qaeda are enemies under some
circumstances. In Syria, Tehran's proxies, the Assad regime and
Hezbollah, fight against the Syrian opposition, which
unfortunately now is a substantial al-Qaeda influence and
presence. Iranian terror proxies and al-Qaeda also fight each
other in Iraq.
On the other hand, since 2001 some senior leaders on al-
Qaeda's management council have resided in Iran. Al-Qaeda uses
Iran as facilitation, finance, and transport hub.
From this sanctuary al-Qaeda ordered attacks against
Westerners in Saudi Arabia in 2003. But our Government's
assumption was that al-Qaeda would not allow al-Qaeda to plot
against America from within Iran.
This latest al-Qaeda plot against New York, hatched from
inside Iran, makes us question this assumption. A similar
reassessment of Iran's intentions was caused by Iran's 2011
plot to partner with a Mexican drug cartel to assassinate a
Saudi ambassador by means of a car bomb here in Washington, DC.
Greatly adding to our concerns are the following facts. Al-
Qaeda in Syria, also known as the Nusra Front, is an outgrowth
of al-Qaeda's vicious Iraqi affiliate. It is responsible for
the vast majority of suicide attacks in Syria.
Among the several thousand members of the Nusra Front are,
according to unclassified sources, a large number of foreign
jihadis with Belgian, Dutch, Danish, Dutch--British, Danish,
Dutch, German, Finnish, French, or Swedish citizenship or
residency.
Europeans constitute as much as 10 percent of this al-
Qaeda's affiliate strength. Canadians, Australians, and perhaps
even Americans have gone to Syria to fight alongside--or even
with--al-Qaeda.
These foreign fighters will likely undergo further Islamist
radicalization as they receive terror training and gain combat
experience before returning home to the West.
The border between Syria and Turkey, a Muslim Brotherhood-
led country which is itself a cause of growing terror concerns,
is porous. It will be difficult for U.S. authorities to
determine, going forward, whether a European or British
Commonwealth citizen or a returning U.S. person may have been
inside Syria.
The Syrian situation is made more dangerous by the
availability--and even use--of military-grade chemical weapons.
If even a fraction of Syria's vast stockpile of poisonous
and toxic gases falls into the hands of terrorist groups, these
weapons of mass destruction will pose a grave threat to
homeland security.
With that want to thank all of the witnesses today;
especially look forward to any testimony you may have involving
bin Laden's son-in-law who was captured and had been spending
time in Iran and what impact that has.
But I would think the witnesses.
Now I am pleased to recognize the Ranking Member, Brian
Higgins, for his opening statement.
Mr. Higgins. I would like to thank Chairman Peter King for
holding this hearing; today's hearing.
I would also like to thank the witnesses for their
testimony.
Assessing the threats the United States from al-Qaeda
operatives in Iran and Syria is uncharted territory for this
subcommittee.
Even though exploring the subject is new to the
subcommittee, I believe it is our responsibility, and I thank
the Chairman for agreeing to hold this hearing.
On April 22, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced
the arrest of two people in connection with plotting a
terrorist attack on a passenger train that travels from Toronto
through Niagara Falls into New York City.
According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the alleged
terrorists were receiving assistance from al-Qaeda elements in
Iran. The RCMP stated that there was no connection to state
sponsorship.
If these allegations are true, it would mark the first time
al-Qaeda elements in Iran directed a plot at the West. Soon
after the news of the arrests of the terrorists broke, Iran's
Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that there was no firm
evidence of any Iranian involvement and such groups as al-Qaeda
have no compatibility with Iran in both political and
ideological fields.
Iran is a Shi'i majority country. Only about 8 to 10
percent of the population is Sunni and al-Qaeda is a Sunni
organization. Even though there are political and ideological
differences between Iran and al-Qaeda, there is a need to look
deeper at their relationships.
Several al-Qaeda operatives have made Iran their home. In
2001, when the United States Government took out the Taliban
government, many of bin Laden's family members and top
lieutenants self-exiled to Iran.
In the past, Iran kept a very close eye on all al-Qaeda
figures in the country. Iranian intelligence services have
access to all communications and contacts.
However, these restrictions have been loosened and this
should raise questions about whether al-Qaeda operatives in
Iran are making trips outside the country to make connections
with a broader terror network.
As we evaluate al-Qaeda's relationship with Iran, we must
be sure not to look at it in a myopic view. We need to evaluate
both al-Qaeda and Iran's relationships with the areas of the
Middle East; especially areas of conflict.
Hezbollah, a terrorist organization supported by Iran has a
growing and active role in the war in Syria. Hezbollah is an
ally of President Assad and is aiding government forces in this
Syrian Civil War.
Al-Qaeda operatives on the other hand have been traveling
to Syria to bring down the Syrian regime. As the violence grows
in Syria it becomes more sectarian bringing Hezbollah and al-
Qaeda fighting face-to-face with each other.
Will the conflict between Iranian-backed Hezbollah and al-
Qaeda elements in Syria have a grave effect on the United
States? What will this conflict do to al-Qaeda's relationship
with Iran?
As the recent Canadian plot brings questions about al-
Qaeda's role in both Iran and Syria, there are still questions
that should be raised about al-Qaeda's effect in the West.
The plot brings the question of whether al-Qaeda operatives
in Iran are looking to Canada as their target for terrorist
activity and recruitment. Canada's being a target for terrorist
activity and recruitment is startling because a successful plot
can cause catastrophic loss to the United States.
In addition to the potential for innocent people in two
countries being killed or injured, or people from two countries
being killed or injured, there is a possibility of grave damage
to critical infrastructure and the economy of western New York
in southern Ontario.
The Peace Bridge in Buffalo is a busy Northern Border
crossing for automobiles in the United States. It is a local
symbol and architectural icon for the Buffalo Niagara region.
It is one of America's busiest corridors for international
travel and trade.
Canada is the United States' No. 1 trading partner. In
2011, over $597 billion of imports and exports were traded with
Canada. Over $30 billion in annual commerce travels through the
Peace Bridge. This Western New York region is the first point
of entry into the United States between Toronto and New York
City where the terrorists were attempting to attack.
The security of our border should be a priority and this
means that first responders who are familiar with the border in
the area should be fully funded to prepare and prevent an
attack.
This also means that information that the Federal
Government has related to a potential attack should be
adequately shared with State and local partners. Having the
information is key to preventing an attack from groups from
both foreign and domestic.
We can expand our knowledge today and I look forward to
hearing today's testimony.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
May 22, 2013
Assessing the threat to the United States from al-Qaeda operatives
in Iran and Syria is unchartered territory for this subcommittee. Even
though exploring this subject is new to the subcommittee, I believe it
is our responsibility and I thank the Chairman for agreeing to hold
this hearing.
On April 22, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced an arrest
of two people in connection with plotting a terrorist attack on a
passenger train that travels from Toronto, through Niagara Falls, into
New York City. According to the RCMP, the alleged terrorists were
receiving assistance from al-Qaeda elements in Iran. The RCMP stated
that there was no connection to state sponsorship. If these allegations
are true, it would mark the first time al-Qaeda elements in Iran
directed a plot at the West.
Soon after the news of the arrests of the terrorists broke, Iran's
Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that there is no firm evidence of any
Iranian involvement and groups such as al-Qaeda have no compatibility
with Iran in both political and ideological fields.
Iran is a Shia majority country, only about 8 to 10 percent of the
population is Sunni and al-Qaeda is a Sunni organization. Even though
there are political and ideological differences between Iran and al-
Qaeda, there is a need to look deeper at their relationships.
Iran is home to al-Qaeda operatives. In 2001, when United States
Government took out the Taliban government in Afghanistan, many of
Osama bin Laden's family members and top lieutenants self-exiled to
Iran. In the past, Iran kept a very close eye on all al-Qaeda figures
in the country. Iranian intelligence services had access to all
communications and contacts.
However, these restrictions have been loosened. This should raise
questions about whether al-Qaeda operatives in Iran are making trips
outside of the country to make connections with the broader terror
network.
As we evaluate al-Qaeda's relationship with Iran, we must be sure
not to look at it in a myopic view. We need to evaluate both al-Qaeda's
and Iran's relationships with other areas of the Middle East,
especially areas of conflict.
Hezbollah, a terrorist organization supported by Iran, has a
growing and active role in war-torn Syria. Hezbollah is an ally of
President Assad and is aiding government forces in Syria. Al-Qaeda
operatives, on the other hand, have been traveling to Syria to bring
down the Syrian regime. As the violence grows in Syria, it becomes more
sectarian, bringing Hezbollah and al-Qaeda fighting face-to-face with
each other.
Will the conflict between Iranian-backed Hezbollah and al-Qaeda
elements in Syria have a grave effect on the United States? What will
this conflict do to al-Qaeda's relationship with Iran? As the recent
Canadian plot brings questions about al-Qaeda's role in both Iran and
Syria, there are still questions that should be raised about al-Qaeda's
effect in the West. The recent plot in Canada also brings the question
of whether al-Qaeda operatives in Iran have a broader terror network,
and if Canada serves as their target for terrorist activity and
recruitment.
Canada being a target for terrorist activity and recruitment is
startling because a successful plot can cause catastrophic loss to the
United States. In addition to the potential for innocent people from
two countries being killed and injured, there is a possibility of grave
damage to critical infrastructure and the economy.
The Peace Bridge in Buffalo is the busiest border crossing for
automobiles in the United States. It is a local symbol and an
architectural icon for the Buffalo Niagara region. It is one of
America's busiest corridors for international travel and trade. Canada
is the United States' No. 1 trading partner. In 2011, over $597.4
billion of imports and exports were traded with Canada. Over $30
billion of annual commerce travels through the Peace Bridge in Buffalo,
Niagara region. This region is the first point of entry into the United
States between Toronto and New York City, where the terrorists were
attempting to attack.
The security of our border should be a priority and this means that
first responders should be fully funded to prepare and prevent an
attack. This also means that information that the Federal Government
has related to a potential attack should be adequately shared with
State and local partners. Having the information is key in preventing
an attack from groups both foreign and domestic. We can expand our
knowledge today.
Mr. King. I thank the Ranking Member for his opening
statement.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
May 22, 2013
Today's hearing is an assessment on the threat from al-Qaeda
operatives in the Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic. Both
Iran and Syria have tense relationships with the United States. The
United States does not consider these countries as allies, is a welcome
criterion for al-Qaeda to operate and thrive in these two regions.
We know that radicalization by the al-Qaeda extremist ideology and
communication with al-Qaeda is widespread and accessible. Vulnerable
areas such as Syria, which is crippling under a civil war, could
potentially be a safe haven for al-Qaeda operatives to radicalize and
train militants.
The Republic of Iran has been home to top al-Qaeda operatives for
over a decade. In the past, the government closely monitored their
dealings within the state. However, recent actions by the Iranian
government illustrate that their interactions with al-Qaeda may have
become laxed. However, it is my hope as we evaluate the threat from al-
Qaeda operatives in these countries, we give a fair, thorough, and
critical assessment. This evaluation should not only include testimony
from today's hearing, but also information that we receive from the
State Department and the intelligence community.
On April 22, 2013, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested two
individuals for plotting a terrorist attack on a passenger rail train
that travels from Toronto, through the Northern Border at Niagara Falls
to New York City. According to authorities, the alleged perpetrators
received assistance from al-Qaeda operatives in Iran. As of today, the
authorities do not see this foiled plot as a link to a plot directed by
the Iranian government. The Iranian government also denies any
involvement in this plot. Even though there is not evidence that shows
that there is a link to the Iranian government and these perpetrators,
Iran, as a state sponsor of terrorism, and its relationship with al-
Qaeda should be evaluated. This thwarted plot also gives rise to other
issues that should be given another thorough evaluation.
First, the threat to mass transit is not novel. According to the
National Counter-Terrorism Center's Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System, from January 2004 to July 2008, 530 terrorist attacks were
waged worldwide against mass transit and passenger rail targets,
resulting in over 2,000 deaths and over 9,000 injuries. In the United
States, a plot to attack the New York City subway system was thwarted
in September 2009. The convicted conspirators stated they were directed
by al-Qaeda. Thirty-four million rail and transit passenger trips are
taken within the United States each weekday. However, the
Transportation Security Administration's budget for surface
transportation security remains less than 2% of TSA's budget.
Another issue that should be evaluated is the Northern Border. To
date, over the last decade, the Department of Homeland Security, with
support from Congress, has made unprecedented investments in border
security. During my time on this committee, I have consistently
advocated for a comprehensive strategy to help guide how border
security funding is utilized.
Last week, the Committee passed H.R. 1417, which requires the DHS
to develop a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for
achieving operational control of our borders. The bill sets a goal for
the Secretary to certify to Congress that operational control of the
border has been achieved in high traffic areas, which includes Northern
Border areas such as Niagara Falls, within 2 years.
Another evaluation to consider is the cost of terrorism. Had this
plot been successful, it could have affected some of the busiest border
crossings in the Nation. The border crossings in along the Northern
Border between New York and Canada are linked to over $200 billion in
annual U.S. sales, income, and Federal taxes. We know that one of the
goals of al-Qaeda is to cause economic disruption.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 did not just result in the deaths
of 2,250 people, it also resulted in nearly $80 billion in economic
damage with about $32.5 billion covered by nearly 150 domestic and
international insurers and reinsurers. In the wake of the attacks,
commercial insurance insurers began excluding terrorism coverage from
policies provided to businesses across the country.
In response, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002 to increase the availability of terrorism risk insurance to at-
risk American businesses by guaranteeing that the Government would
share some of the losses with private insurers should a terrorist
attack occur. Initially authorized for 3 years, the program was refined
and extended in 2005 and 2007. It is scheduled to sunset in 2014.
I have introduced the ``Fostering Resilience to Terrorism Act of
2013,'' which extends the TRIA program 10 years, creating much-needed
stability and predictability for the business community. Finally,
another evaluation should be of community engagement and involvement.
Canadian authorities gave credit to the Canadian Muslim community for
recognizing and identifying the behavior of the alleged perpetrators
and reporting this information to the authorities.
Last Congress, this committee held a series of hearings that
stroked a climate of fear and distrust in the Muslim community. Those
hearings also served as propaganda for fear and distrust of the Muslim
community. In the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings, attempts were
made to revive this climate of fear and distrust. Some said that we
must surveil the Muslim community.
Luckily, this committee served as a platform to counter the
arguments that were perpetuated last Congress. The Boston Police Chief
testified that there is no need to live in a surveillance state and a
former FBI special agent in charge testified that community involvement
is what is necessary to recognize the signs of radicalization and
prevent attacks. These are just a few things that we can evaluate in
this hearing and beyond. I look forward to today's testimony.
Mr. King. We are very pleased to have a distinct panel of
witnesses for us today, Dr. Seth Jones, Mr. Robin Simcox, Mr.
Tom Joscelyn, Mr. Barack Barfi.
Our first witness, Dr. Seth Jones, is the associate
director of the International Security and Defense Policy
Center at the RAND Corporation as well as an adjunct professor
at Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International
Studies.
Previously, Dr. Jones served as the representative for the
Commander U.S. Special Operations Command to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense of Special Operations. Prior to that
position, he served as a plans officer and advisor to the
Commanding General U.S. Special Operations Forces in
Afghanistan.
Dr. Jones specializes in counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism including a focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and al-Qaeda. He has been a source of information and advice to
this committee and we are pleased to welcome him back for this
session as well.
Dr. Jones.
STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER
Mr. Jones. Thank you very much, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee. Thanks for
inviting us on this very important subject.
I am going to focus my remarks predominantly on the Syria
front because I consider that blinking red right now, though I
had written and have a number of comments later on the Iran
component.
In my view with the escalating war in Syria presents a
growing threat to the United States led by Jabhat al-Nusrah,
which is an al-Qaeda-affiliated group and we will touch on that
shortly.
Syria is becoming a training ground for foreign fighters.
As Chairman King mentioned, for the past year, particularly
concerning, an increasing number of fighters have traveled to
Syria from other locations including the West particularly in
Europe to fight against the Assad regime where some have joined
Jabhat al-Nusrah.
Most Westerners appear to be Europeans from such countries
as Belgium, France, and Sweden. There are many others that the
Chairman mentioned as well.
Many of these fighters are gaining valuable experience in
combat, in bomb making, in propaganda, in counterintelligence.
Most are expanding their relationships with other jihadist
networks operating in other regions and are likely becoming
more ideologically committed to the cause.
In addition, this European pipeline is used to transport
money, material, and other things to the Syrian front. While in
my judgment the number of American citizens at the moment
traveling to Syria appears to be limited at least in comparison
to the number of Europeans and others, the increase in
Europeans with potential access to the United States does
present a serious counterterrorism challenge.
I would say it is unclear at the moment whether most of
these fighters will remain in the long run in Syria, whether
they will move to other war zones, or whether they will return
home.
Even if some return home as we have seen with groups like
al-Shabaab it is uncertain whether they will become involved in
plots, recruiting, and fundraising, or become disillusioned.
I would say the trend is fairly straightforward and that is
that Syria is attracting a growing cadre of foreign fighters
including from the West who could potentially return home with
the capability and the intentions to conduct attacks or be
involved in other terrorist activity in the United States.
The rest of my remarks will focus on three issues. The
first is Jabhat al-Nusrah, the second is its capabilities, and
the third is what that means for the homeland.
Let me just briefly mention that it is clear--it is very
important in my view to recognize that Jabhat al-Nusrah or the
al-Nusrah front group out of al-Qaeda and Iraq's logistics and
support network in Syria in late 2011.
When it was created al-Qaeda and Iraq utilized these
established networks to create Jabhat al-Nusrah has an
operational arm. They were much more careful than they have
been in other places to make this not overtly publicized that
relationship so in some cases created confusion on people
covering the Syrian war that maybe the connections weren't as
strong.
I would say at least as I have looked at it, that the
organization was created out of, generally out of al-Qaeda in
Iraq. Its goal fits al-Qaeda's model. It is to establish an
emirate in Syria and potentially the broader region.
I would say one thing very briefly on the trends. After the
April 2013 strain between Jabhat al-Nusrah and al-Qaeda in Iraq
what appears to be a very concerning development is Jabhat al-
Nusrah's increasing close relationship with al-Qaeda's central
leadership in Pakistan.
Meaning that should be a very serious concern for the
United States if we are seeing a dialogue go back to Ayman al-
Zawahiri's central leadership. That has grave implications, I
think, for the United States.
I do think, second on the capabilities; again we are seeing
a fairly robust command-and-control network. I think it is
worth noting that al-Nusrah has been involved in over-running
multiple bases in Syria that are--in gathering extensive
firepower including heavy artillery, heavy weapons, and
aircraft.
Then finally, on threats to the West, let me just say
briefly that I would say at the moment, Jabhat al-Nusrah does
appear to be predominately interested in overthrowing the Assad
regime and possibly launching attacks against Israel, but it is
possible that these intentions could change.
I think it is critical for the United States to keep a very
close watch with its allies including both in Europe and the
region on these individuals getting them on a watch list
because with potential access to Europe, they have got
potential access through the visa waiver program to the United
States.
This is a very serious concern. I think in the long run,
the threat to the United States from Syria will only increase
and so we better deal with this now, and we can talk again
about the substance of that later.
I will conclude my remarks again by thanking you Chairman
King and Ranking Member Higgins and the rest of the committee
for this opportunity. I look forward to the questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Seth G. Jones \1\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
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May 22, 2013
the terrorist threat from syria \2\
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\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT388.html.
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Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today on
this important topic.
The escalating war in Syria presents a growing threat to the United
States. Led by Jabhat al-Nusrah (the Victory Front), an al-Qaeda-
affiliated group, Syria is becoming a consummate training ground for
foreign fighters. Over the past year, an increasing number of fighters
have traveled to Syria from other areas--including the West--to fight
against the Assad regime, where some have joined Jabhat al-Nusrah. Most
Westerners appear to be Europeans from such countries as Belgium,
France, and Sweden. Many of these fighters are gaining valuable
experience in combat, bomb making, propaganda, and counterintelligence.
Most are also expanding their relationships with fighters from other
regions--such as the Persian Gulf, North Africa, and South Asia--and
becoming more ideologically committed. In addition, this European
pipeline is used to transport money and material to the Syrian front.
While the number of American citizens traveling to Syria appears to
be limited, at least at the moment, the increase in Europeans with
potential access to the United States presents a serious
counterterrorism challenge. It is currently unclear whether most of
these fighters will remain in Syria over the long run, move to other
war zones such as North Africa, or return home. And even if some return
to the West, it is uncertain whether these fighters will become
involved in terrorist plots, focus on recruiting and fundraising, or
become disillusioned with terrorism. Still, the trend is clear: Syria
is attracting a growing cadre of foreign fighters from the West, who
could potentially return home with the capability to conduct attacks
against the United States and its allies.
The information for this testimony was gathered from a range of
sources, including jihadist websites and forums, Western websites that
publish jihadist videos and transcripts (such as SITE Intelligence
Group and the Long War Journal), interviews with government officials
from the West and the Middle East, and secondary sources. Yet there are
notable gaps in this analysis, as there are in most assessments of the
Syrian war. It is uncertain, for instance, how many foreign fighters
from the West and other areas have traveled to Syria, why and how they
have radicalized, and what they will do if they leave. Despite these
methodological challenges, there is still sufficient information to
assess the threat from Syria with reasonable accuracy.
This testimony is divided into three sections. The first outlines
the origins of Jabhat al-Nusrah and its evolution since 2011. The
second section assesses Jabhat al-Nusrah's growing capabilities and
presence in Syria, as well as briefly describes other militant groups
operating in Syria. The third examines the threat to the U.S. homeland
and U.S. allies from Syria.
the origins of al-qaeda in syria
Jabhat al-Nusrah grew out of al-Qaeda in Iraq's logistics and
support network in Syria. Beginning as early as 2003, Syria became a
key transit point for foreigners that wanted to fight in Iraq.
According to documents captured in a raid near Sinjar, Iraq, for
instance, foreign fighters in Iraq came from such countries as Saudi
Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, and Syria. Most were young, averaging 24
to 25 years old. Some had been students, while others held full-time
jobs.\3\ Virtually all of the foreign fighters entered Iraq through
Syria with the aid of smuggling and criminal networks.\4\ In short,
Syria became a significant transit hub for al-Qaeda and other terrorist
groups.
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\3\ Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaeda's Foreign Fighters in
Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West Point, NY: Harmony
Project, Combating Terrorism Center, 2007).
\4\ Brian Fishman, ed., Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: Al-
Qaeda's Road In and Out of Iraq (West Point, NY: Harmony Project,
Combating Terrorism Center, 2008), pp. 50, 70.
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As the war in Syria began to intensify in 2011, al-Qaeda in Iraq
leaders utilized these established networks and created Jabhat al-
Nusrah as their operational arm in Syria. Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi (also known as Abu Du'a) explained that ``we laid for
them plans, and drew up for them the policy of work, and gave them what
financial support we could every month, and supplied them with men who
had known the battlefields of jihad, from the emigrants and the
natives.''\5\ Al-Qaeda in Iraq officials chose Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani,
an Iraqi national, as leader (or emir). Jawlani pledged allegiance to
Baghdadi before taking charge of operations in Syria in late 2011. Al-
Qaeda in Iraq then sent small arms and light weapons--including rifles,
light machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades--to its Syrian
contingent. It also sent explosives experts to augment Jabhat al-
Nusrah's bomb-making capabilities and deployed fighters to boost its
ranks. A growing number of donors from the Persian Gulf and Levant
began to send financial support.\6\
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\5\ Audio Statement by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, SITE Intelligence
Group, April 10, 2013.
\6\ Author interview with government officials from Europe and the
Middle East, April and May 2013.
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Jabhat al-Nusrah leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani explained that the
group's goal is to bring ``back the rule of God's law on earth.''\7\ It
is a Salafi-jihadist group committed to establishing an Islamic emirate
in Syria and potentially the broader region. Its leaders have
established a radical interpretation of sharia, or Islamic law, in some
areas they control in Syria. In an important development, however, al-
Qaeda leaders initially decided not to publicize the group's links with
al Qa'ida in Iraq, perhaps out of concern that it would undermine their
support in Syria and draw unwelcome attention from U.S. and other
foreign intelligence agencies.
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\7\ Video Statement by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, January 24, 2012.
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Syria has long been important to al-Qaeda for historical,
religious, and strategic reasons. Known as Bilad al-Sham, or the Land
of the Levantine Peoples, Damascus was the base for the thirteenth
century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, whose book, The Religious and Moral
Concept of Jihad, is a pillar of al-Qaeda's ideology.\8\ The wider
Levant region also includes al-Quds, or Jerusalem, Islam's third-
holiest site after Mecca and Medina. In addition, Syria is
strategically important because it borders two of al-Qaeda's most hated
enemies, Israel and Jordan, and the Assad government's conventional and
unconventional weapons caches may become increasingly available as the
Assad regime loses control of territory.\9\
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\8\ Shaykh ul-Islaam Taqi-ud-Deen Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, The
Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad (Birmingham, England: Maktabah al
Ansaar Publications, 2001).
\9\ The author thanks Bruce Hoffman for making these points.
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By early 2013, however, Jabhat al-Nusrah's relationship with al-
Qaeda in Iraq became strained, pushing Jahbat al-Nusrah closer to al-
Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan. Jabhat al-Nusrah officials were
apparently unhappy when al-Qaeda in Iraq announced in April 2013 their
intention to merge the al-Qaeda's affiliates in Iraq and Syria under a
common name, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. As Jabhat al-
Nusrah established its own sources of funding, fighters, and material,
it became increasingly independent from al-Qaeda in Iraq. A formal
merger would likely have undermined this autonomy. Asserting his
independence from al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jawlani declared his loyalty
directly to al-Qaeda's central leadership in Pakistan. ``This is a
pledge of allegiance from the sons of the al Nusrah Front and their
supervisor general that we renew to the Sheikh of Jihad, Sheikh Ayman
al-Zawahiri, may Allah preserve him,'' Jawlani announced in April.\10\
As discussed later in the testimony, Jabhat al-Nusrah's move toward al-
Qaeda's central leadership in Pakistan makes it a more dangerous enemy
to the United States.
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\10\ Audio Statement by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, SITE Intelligence
Group, April 10, 2013. On the broader debate, also see Thomas Joscelyn,
``Al Nusrah Front Leader Renews Allegiance to al Qaeda, Rejects New
Name,'' Long War Journal, April 10, 2013.
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Understanding the origins of Jabhat al-Nusrah is important for two
reasons. First, al-Qaeda in Iraq operatives helped establish the group,
directly linking it to al-Qaeda. Unlike with other affiliates, such as
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, Syrian operatives
publicly downplayed their ties with al-Qaeda. This was an important
strategic decision and one that al Qa'ida-linked groups may
increasingly do in the future to avoid unwanted monitoring from foreign
governments. Second, this relationship gave Jabhat al-Nusrah access to
money, weapons, fighters, and other material from al-Qaeda in Iraq.
growing capabilities
Since early 2012, Jabhat al-Nusrah has developed a robust command-
and-control network across Syria, conducted a devastating string of
suicide attacks, and orchestrated hundreds of car bombs and
assassinations against the Assad regime. Between November 2011 and
December 2012, for instance, it was involved in nearly 600 attacks in
Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Idlib, and other locations.\11\ It has claimed
credit for many of its attacks in announcements released on jihadist
forums and its Twitter site. Indeed, Jabhat al-Nusrah has established
an advanced propaganda campaign led by its official media arm, the
White Minaret Group.
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\11\ U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Designations of the al-
Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa'ida in Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State, December 2012).
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To organize its operations, Jabhat al-Nusrah appointed a management
council, set up a headquarters, and created regional networks with
military and religious leaders to run operations, manage cross-border
facilitation, and procure weapons and other supplies. In addition, it
has amassed an impressive arsenal of weapons, making it one of al-
Qaeda's best-armed affiliates in the world. It has participated with
other groups in seizing control of several Syrian military bases and
acquired a vast array of armaments to enhance its firepower and endow
it with capabilities more akin to a small army than a rag-tag group of
guerrilla fighters. In February 2013, for example, Jabhat al-Nusrah
fighters helped seize control of the al-Jarrah airbase in Thawra, as
well as two dams in Raqqa. In January, Jabhat al-Nusrah and Ahrar al-
Sham teamed up with the Islamic Vanguard to seize control of Taftanaz,
a key Syrian air force base in Idlib. In December 2012, Jabhat al-
Nusrah and allied groups took control of the Sheikh Suleiman base. In
October, Jabhat al-Nusrah and allied fighters overran a Syrian air
defense and Scud missile base in Aleppo.\12\
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\12\ See, for example, Bill Roggio, `` `Islamist' Factions Seize
Syrian Airbase,'' Long War Journal, February 12, 2013.
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As Figure 1 highlights, Jabhat al-Nusrah has been active in several
areas of Syria. Its most secure sanctuary is likely in the Sunni-
dominated Dayr az-Zawr province, where al-Qaeda in Iraq's foreign
fighter pipeline operated for nearly a decade. A second area is in
northwestern Syria, where Jabhat al-Nusrah has moved fighters,
explosives, and other material across the Turkish border into its
sanctuaries in Halab and Idlib provinces. Reminiscent of groups like
Hezbollah, Jabhat al-Nusrah has set up some humanitarian relief efforts
in these provinces, along with religious courts and schools. Jabhat al-
Nusrah has also established a sanctuary in southwestern Syria in Dar'a
province, near the Jordanian border, as well as in Damascus.\13\
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\13\ Author interview with government officials from Europe and the
Middle East, April and May 2013.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
While Jabhat al-Nusrah is one of the most capable extremist groups
in Syria, it is not the only one. It has conducted joint operations
with over a dozen groups, such as Ahrar al-Sham, Suqur al-Sham, and
Martyrs of Syria. Ahrar al-Sham is perhaps the largest Salafi-jihadist
group operating in Syria.\14\ In 2012, Jabhat al-Nusrah cooperated with
at least nine other groups to create the Mujahideen Shura Council in
Dayr az-Zawr. The council was formed to ``unite the ranks of the jihadi
brigades in the Cause of Allah, organize the efforts and the attacks
against the soldiers of disbelief and apostasy, and distinguish the
ranks of truth from falsehood,'' according a statement released by the
group in December 2012. ``We call upon our sincere mujahideen brothers
all over the strong Levant to unite their ranks in groups, pure of the
filth of suspicious groups and the infiltration of people who have no
qualities or faith, in order to clarify their banner and purify their
path.''\15\ Al-Qaeda in Iraq pursued a similar strategy, forming a
Mujahideen Shura Council in 2006 to coordinate operations among Sunni
militant groups in Iraq.
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\14\ On Syrian opposition groups see Elizabeth O'Bagy, Jihad in
Syria (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, September 2012);
Aron Lund, Syrian Jihadism (Uppsala, Sweden: Swedish Institute of
International Affairs, September 2012).
\15\ Bill Roggio, ``Al Nusrah Front Poised to Take Over Last Major
City on Euphrates River,'' The Long War Journal, March 13, 2013.
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threats to the west
At the moment, Jabhat al-Nusrah and its leaders, including Abu
Muhammad al-Jawlani, appear to be most interested in overthrowing the
Assad regime and possibly launching attacks against Israel. But it is
conceivable that Jawlani's intentions will evolve and Jabhat al-Nusrah
or splinter groups could conduct attacks in the West after--or even
before--the Assad regime falls. Jabhat al-Nusrah's access to foreign
fighters, external network in Europe and other areas, and bomb-making
expertise suggest that it may have the capability to plan and support
attacks against the West.
More broadly, there appears to be a growing contingent of foreign
fighters traveling to--and from--Syria to fight in the war. A
substantial portion of these fighters are coming from the region,
including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. But a significant number also
appear to be coming from the West, especially from Belgium, France, and
Sweden. Extremists have traveled to Syria from other European
countries. According to Spanish officials, for example, a network based
in Spain and Morocco sent approximately two dozen fighters to Jabhat
al-Nusrah over the past year. It is unclear how many of these fighters
have returned to the West, but some have apparently returned to
Germany, Denmark, Spain, and Norway among others. In October 2012,
authorities in Kosovo arrested the extremist Shurki Aliu, who had
traveled from Syria to Kosovo and was involved in recruiting and
providing material to Syrian opposition groups. A small number of
Americans--perhaps less than a dozen--have apparently traveled to Syria
to fight with the Syrian opposition.\16\
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\16\ Author interview with government officials from Europe and the
Middle East, April and May 2013.
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While Turkey is the most common transit country through which
extremist foreign fighters travel before entering Syria, some use
Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. As Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari
acknowledged, ``We have solid information and intelligence that member
of al-Qaeda terrorist networks have gone in the other direction, to
Syria, to help, to carry out attacks.''\17\ There are also indications
that some al-Qaeda members have left Pakistan and traveled to Syria,
including former al-Qaeda senior leader Abu Wafa al-Saudi.
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\17\ ``Iraq Says al-Qaeda Flowing Into Syria,'' Al Jazeera, July 5,
2012.
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These trends pose a threat to the United States. Syria is
attracting a growing cadre of foreign fighters from the West, who could
potentially return with the capability to conduct attacks against the
United States and its allies. Some of these individuals have joined
Jabhat al-Nusrah, which has developed a closer relationship with al-
Qaeda's senior leaders in Pakistan. Just as concerning, some Free
Syrian Army leaders have praised Jabhat al-Nusrah. Colonel Riyad al-
Assad, a founder of the Free Syrian Army, defended Jabhat al-Nusrah as
``our brothers in Islam.'' He continued that they ``might have some
ideological thoughts over which we differ, but the majority of the
people are looking with admiration toward the al Nusrah Front.''\18\
And Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, head of the Syrian Opposition Coalition,
similarly remarked that the U.S. decision in December 2012 to designate
Jahbat al-Nusrah as a terrorist organization ``must be reexamined''
since they shared ``the same goal: to overthrow the criminal regime''
of President Bashar al-Assad.\19\ This defense of Jabhat al-Nusrah is a
short-term deal with the devil. Al-Qaeda's long-term vision of
establishing a radical Islamic emirate in the Levant--and, indeed
further afield wherever it can--is incompatible with the more moderate
religious views of most Syrians.
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\18\ Riyadh made the comments in an undated YouTube video. See, for
example, Bill Roggio, ``Free Syrian Army Commander Praises Al Nusrah
Front as `Brothers,' '' Long War Journal, March 30, 2013.
\19\ ``Syrian Opposition Urges U.S. to Reconsider Al-Nusrah Move,''
Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), December 12, 2012.
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While the number of American citizens traveling to Syria appears to
be limited, at least at the moment, the increase in Europeans with
potential access to the United States--including through the Visa
Waiver Program--presents a serious counterterrorism challenge. It is
incumbent on the United States and its European allies to continue to
identify the names of these foreign fighters (including variations in
spelling and cover names), share intelligence, ensure they are on
appropriate watch lists, monitor their activities, and capture them if
they return to the West. As suggested by the recent Boston bombers and
several previous terrorists in the United States (such as Faisal
Shahzad and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab), not all radicalized individuals
flying into the United States make it onto watch lists. U.S. and
European intelligence on Syrian extremists is currently spotty, making
it important to increase human and signals intelligence collection
capabilities over the next year to track individuals traveling into--
and out of--Syria.
In the long run, the threat to the United States from Syria will
likely increase. Even if the Assad regime is overthrown, the war will
almost certainly continue in a different form, as sub-state groups like
Jabhat al-Nusrah compete for control of the state and attempt to spread
their ideology across the region.
Again, thank you for allowing me to appear before you today, and
I'd be happy to take your questions.
Mr. King. Thank you very much, Dr. Jones.
Mr. Robin Simcox is a research fellow at the Henry Jackson
Society in London, a bipartisan British-based think tank. I
have had up privilege of attending Henry Jackson Society
meetings in this country and again, an outstanding
organization.
Mr. Simcox's work focuses on terrorism and National
security, specifically al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda-inspired affiliates,
and terrorism trends. He is also the author of ``Al Qaeda in
the U.S.: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses'' and prior
to joining the Henry Jackson Society, Mr. Simcox was a research
fellow at the Center for Social Cohesion, a think tank studying
extremism and terrorism in the United Kingdom.
Mr. Simcox we welcome you here today, and look forward to
your testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HENRY JACKSON
SOCIETY
Mr. Simcox. Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, Members
of the subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting me today
to discuss this issue, which I think is of extreme relevance.
The first thing I want to point out is that even though the
numbers of Western European fighters currently in Syria may be
relatively small, the impact they can have both in the region
and on the U.S. homeland is significant.
Now currently, there has not been any successful attacks in
the United States that have taken place as a result of someone
coming back from Syria, but there is evidence of plotting in
other countries that I think should concern us greatly.
Just last week, the Belgian security services intercepted a
telephone call between an extremist based in Syria and one of
his contacts back in Belgium which discuss the potential attack
on the Brussels Palace of Justice.
Back in October, there was a Jordanian plot that was
disrupted that would have been potentially catastrophic.
Individuals who had fought together in Syria and forged ties
during that time of fighting jihad together in Syria were
planning a series of attacks that would have included an attack
on the U.S. Embassy in Amman.
These individuals were an affiliate with al-Qaeda in Iraq
and I believe it is absolutely impossible to understand what is
going on in Syria and the threat that it poses without
understanding al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Abu Dua who is the amir of that group is now been suggested
as even move into northern parts of Syria to solidify al-Qaeda
in Iraq's control over operations in Syria itself.
Obviously, another country which has a significant stake in
Syria is Iran. The engagement and interaction between
themselves and al-Qaeda I think is established. All I would say
is that I think we shouldn't see it is necessarily a done deal
that these two are going to work together completely
harmoniously in the future.
I don't believe they are especially natural allies and this
plays itself out geopolitically at times. So you have Iran
attempting to prop up Assad in Syria at the same time as al-
Qaeda are trying to overthrow him.
You have al-Qaeda and Iraq who viscerally hate the Shi'i,
target them consistently in regard the current Iraqi government
as almost an Iranian branch or defacto Iranian government.
Zawahiri has spoken on occasion of Iran not as an ally but
as a potential strategic threat and so while the interaction is
there, I think there are still opportunities for the United
States to be able to divide them as well.
I think in terms of Syrians--the Syrian conflict and
members coming back to plot attacks in the United States and
the West generally, I think we should be absolutely mindful of
that.
But there is one caveat I would like to add in my remarks
today. My reports recently--I have written three reports on
terrorism trends in the United Kingdom and the United States
and a statistical analysis of the background of all individuals
who have either been convicted in U.K. or U.S. courts or
committed suicide attacks here.
The vast majority of those who plot serious terrorist
attacks against the West are those that have received training
in foreign countries in Pakistan, Afghanistan, those sorts of
places, but have then been dispatched back for a very specific
operation in mind.
Actually those that have combat experience in Kashmir,
Chechnya, Bosnia, and the sorts of places weren't always the
ones that were most likely to then come back and carry out
terrorist attacks. Now obviously there is no guarantee that
that is going to be the case in the future, but I just think it
is something that is worth bearing in mind.
I also think it is worth bearing in mind that the
U.S.A.'s--the intervention or failure to intervene is going to
be just as much a policy in this as intervention.
Iraq is sometimes seen for example as having a radicalizing
effect on Muslim communities yet Bosnia a war where the United
States was much more reluctant to be involved was used by
ideologues as proof that the West didn't care about the
slaughter of Muslims taken place, in fact it acquiesced in it.
So essentially, America is to deal with the fall-out from
Syria and no matter its policies in the future and no matter
how it decides to deal with this problem of Syrian jihadists
returning.
So I will wrap up there.
Thank you again for hearing my thoughts on this today and I
will be delighted to answer the questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Simcox follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robin Simcox
22nd May 2013
Chairman King, Members of the subcommittee, my sincere thanks for
the opportunity to testify here today on issues which I believe should
concern us all more and more. That concern should be shared not just by
those who live in America, but by non-American citizens who care about
America's security.
syria and the region
The on-going conflict in Syria is quite rightly of significant
concern to the international community. This is not just because tens
of thousands have now died--but because of the presence of significant
amount of jihadist militants, including members of al-Qaeda.
The al-Qaeda group currently operating in Syria is called Jabhat
al-Nusra, which controls parts of eastern Syria and has carried out a
string of suicide bombings.
Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, Jabhat al-Nusra's leader, last month
pledged allegiance to the emir of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
It is estimated that the number of Western fighters operating in
Syria is in the low- to mid-hundreds. Despite these relatively small
numbers, there are a multitude of reasons to be concerned about the
potential fallout from Syria--not just in the region, but how it could
impact the U.S. homeland.
At present there have not been any attempted attacks on the United
States by those who have fought in Syria. However, there is now
evidence of other countries being targeted by those who have.
The first is Belgium. Last week, it was reported that their
security services intercepted a call from an extremist based in Syria,
who was discussing a potential attack on the Brussels Palace of Justice
with a contact in Belgium.
Going further back, it was reported in October of last year that
Jordanian authorities disrupted a significant plot against civilian and
government targets, including potentially the U.S. Embassy in Amman.
The Jordanian cell that connected in Syria was only thought to have
been acquaintances prior to their shared experience fighting there.
Afterwards, they had access to huge amounts of weaponry and explosives,
as well as combat experience and a shared ideological inspiration to
attack a foreign country.
The Jordanian individuals in this plot were connected to al-Qaeda's
affiliate in Iraq, and I believe it is impossible to consider the
threat emanating from this region without considering what is happening
in Iraq.
The State Department has now designated Jabhat al-Nusra as an alias
for al-Qaeda in Iraq. Abu Dua, the emir of that group, announced last
month that Jabhat al-Nusra was simply a ``branch'' of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
It has been reported in recent days that Abu Dua has now entered
northern Syria in order to get an even stronger grip on al-Qaeda's
operations there.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq provides funding to Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as
sharing fighters and the joint aspiration to overthrow Bashar al-Assad.
However, the relationship between the two groups is not entirely
straightforward. Al-Jawlani has distanced himself from Abu Dua's claim
of Jabhat al-Nusra simply being an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Furthermore, al-Jawlani's pledge of allegiance to al-Zawahiri does
not necessarily make Jabhat al-Nusra a formal part of the al-Qaeda
network. For example, members of al-Shabaab in Somalia pledged loyalty
to al-Qaeda's emir--at that stage Osama bin Laden--2\1/2\ years before
they were officially accepted by al-Qaeda as a formal franchise.
iran
The conflict in Syria contains significant influence from Iran, one
of the biggest supporters of the Assad regime.
Iranian links to al-Qaeda have come under review following last
month's foiled train attack in Canada, and the suggestion that the two
plotters were being guided by al-Qaeda elements in Iran.
It would be surprising if the Canadian plot was Iranian government-
sanctioned. Al-Qaeda would not be willing to be used as a proxy by the
Iranian government in the way that, for example, Hizbollah would. There
is too much distrust on both sides. I believe it is more likely that
Iran were either not aware of al-Qaeda's activities with regards to the
Canadian plot, or they were and simply chose to look the other way.
There is some truth in the suggestion that Iran's connections to
al-Qaeda are often largely overlooked. The Shia-Sunni sectarian split
is seen as making any collaboration between the two a non-starter.
However, there is evidence of engagement on some level.
For example, Osama bin Laden met with Imad Mughniyah, a senior
member of Hizbollah, in the early 1990s. It is thought that al-Qaeda
subsequently received explosives training from the group. Furthermore,
Iran facilitated al-Qaeda members' travel in and out of Afghanistan
prior to 9/11. Senior al-Qaeda leaders close to Osama bin Laden fled
there after the invasion of Afghanistan, before being placed under a
form of house arrest by early 2002.
There is the possibility that Iran envisaged using some of these
al-Qaeda operatives as a bargaining chip with the United States, or as
a deterrent against attack on Iranian soil.
Iran and al-Qaeda do also have shared enemies--the United States,
Israel, and Saudi Arabia being the obvious ones. Therefore it is at
least conceivable that Iran would allow al-Qaeda's operatives limited
scope to undertake activities against their shared enemies in return
for not targeting Iran itself.
While many of the al-Qaeda operatives in Iran have now been
released, it is certain that there is still an al-Qaeda presence there.
However, I believe this potential for interaction should not
distract us from the potentially significant differences that do still
exist between the two. These differences have on occasion played
themselves out geopolitically.
In Syria, Iran is supporting Assad at a time al-Qaeda are
attempting to overthrow him. Al-Zawahiri has publicly lambasted Iran's
role in the conflict. The perception of an increasingly influential
Iran is something that al-Zawahiri has been warning of for several
years. Al-Zawahiri has also at times portrayed Iran as a strategic
threat, rather than an ally.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq has a visceral hatred for Iran, which it regards
as being a de facto ruler of the current Iraqi government.
Therefore, despite the interaction that certainly does exist
between the two, there are still question marks concerning the precise
nature of the relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran.
However, there are also differences between franchises within al-
Qaeda itself.
The complex dynamics between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra
mirrors a wider ambiguity as to the precise dynamics between al-Qaeda's
senior leadership and its affiliates.
For example, in the documentation discovered at Abbottabad, the
revulsion that members of al-Qaeda's core feel for their Iraqi
franchise is clear, with suggestions that there is little operational
interaction between the two.
This is evidence of not only the increased importance of localised
autonomy within the al-Qaeda movement today, but also the increased
decentralisation of its leadership structure.
conclusion
To conclude, let me address some of what should be key concerns for
homeland security. In the short term: The impact of Western fighters
returning from Syria. In the long term: The fallout from a perceived
lack of involvement by the West.
I have in recent years co-authored three reports on terrorism
trends from the late 1990s onwards. This includes two editions of a
publication called Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections, and
most recently a publication called Al-Qaeda in the United States: A
Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses. These reports provide a
statistical analysis of the background of all individuals who were
convicted in the United States and United Kingdom for Islamism or al-
Qaeda-related offenses, or who had committed suicide attacks there.
As part of this most recent research I studied which of those who
had fought in conflict zones abroad--for example in Chechnya, Bosnia,
or Kashmir--then went on to attempt mass casualty terrorist attacks
after leaving the battlefield.
Those that have attacked, or tried to attack, the West tended to be
cells who had received terrorist training abroad and then returned to
their country of origin specifically to carry out an operation.
In both the United Kingdom and United States, it was extremely rare
for those with combat experience to try and launch domestic attacks
once they returned home.
This may seem like a glimmer of a silver lining, but it is worth
stressing that there is no guarantee that this will remain the case.
The war in Syria could have other knock-on effects. For example, as
with the jihad of the 1980s and 1990s, Syria will give legitimacy to a
new generation of fighters. Those who have fought there could go on to
become key ideologues, with their experiences in Syria serving as an
inspiration for future generations of aspiring militants. This is
precisely what happened with conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and
Kashmir, and there is no reason to think Syria will be different.
Furthermore, it is worth remembering that inaction can have just as
much impact as intervention. It is often assumed that U.S. intervention
in Iraq had a radicalising effect on Muslim communities. Yet consider
the radicalising impact of a less-discussed war: That in Bosnia. The
West had considerably less involvement in Bosnia than it did in Iraq
and yet, in Europe, ideologues attempted to persuade Muslim communities
that Western inaction meant Western acquiescence in the slaughter of
Bosnian Muslims.
Therefore, there remains a host of things to concern us about the
fallout from Syria in both the short and long term. Thank you all for
listening to my thoughts on this today, and I would be delighted to
answer any questions you may have.
Mr. King. Thank you Mr. Simcox.
I would just mentioned that Chairman McCaul and I jointly
attended in the Henry Jackson Society and both of us were
extremely impressed by your work.
The society in general, but your work in particular,
particularly that volume you put together, which I have to
admit, I am still working my way through. If anyone wants to
see a detailed compilation, well you did it. So, thank you.
Mr. Simcox. Thank you.
Mr. Tom Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for
the Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan institution focused
on National security and foreign policy, which was founded
shortly after the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks. He is
also the senior editor of the Long War Journal.
Mr. Joscelyn is a terrorism analyst and writer whose
research focuses on how al-Qaeda and its affiliates operate
around the world.
Mr. Joscelyn served as senior terrorism advisor for Mayor
Giuliani's 2008 presidential campaign, and in 2006 he was named
one of Claremont Institute's Lincoln Fellows.
He also has been extremely helpful to this committee, has
testified before, and Mr. Joscelyn, welcome you back again
today. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR THE
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, thank you for having me back,
Congressman King and Ranking Member Higgins and other Members
of the subcommittee.
I am going to focus my comments mainly on al-Qaeda and Iran
because this is really I think a pretty widely misunderstood
topic. I think both of your comments were right on the money in
terms of emphasizing that there are numerous areas where they
have divergent interests----
Mr. King. If I could interrupt for just one second to say
that that was certainly the main concern of Ranking Member
Higgins when he came to me with this whole new element of Iran.
So you in particular, we will be looking forward to your
testimony.
Mr. Joscelyn. Sure, sure. Let me give you a little bit of a
historical perspective first because I think in order to
understand how al-Qaeda and Iran collude together despite their
differences, you have to take a longer view. I am going to get
to the more recent plots, but you have to take a longer view.
Going back to the early 1990s, and this is all documented
in the 9/11 Commission report--actually pages 60 to 61, 128,
and 240 to 241--where they discuss in detail how al-Qaeda and
Iran actually forged an agreement to collude against their
common enemies. Okay?
This first agreement was actually forged in late 1992 or
1993 when al-Qaeda was stationed in the Sudan at the time. It
had numerous ramifications for how al-Qaeda evolved.
In fact, part of the agreement led to senior al-Qaeda
operatives traveling--this is again, according to the 9/11
Commission--traveling to both Lebanon and Iran to receive
explosives training which was then used in the 1998 embassy
bombings. Okay? So this is a matter of historical record.
I would say in addition to the 9/11 Commission report when
I look at the long view of the relationship other building
blocks I look to--towards are actually the trial transcripts
that came out of the embassy bombing trial in the spring of
2001 in New York, other documents were produced in the course
of that litigation, I look back to the Clinton administration's
original indictment of al-Qaeda November 4, 1998.
I look back to the CIA's documents that have been
declassified from the 1990s. I look to the FBI's declassified
documents of 1990s. In other words what I am trying to say here
is for the subcommittee is that there is this voluminous
material that you have to look at in order to understand the
relationship over a longer horizon and that even though they
have had diverging interests and have actually come into
conflict at times there are still numerous instances where
actually the two have colluded.
So looking at the current state of al-Qaeda and Iran, this
is a fascinating part of what we focus on at the Long War
Journal is a very granule analysis of individual terrorists so
we have been trying to track who these guys are in Iran, the
senior al-Qaeda leaders in Iran.
Actually the Obama administration's Treasury Department and
State Department going back to July 2011, has laid out in very
great detail how this relationship works.
I think the Treasury Department and the State Department
actually deserve a lot of credit for really blazing the trail
in terms of understanding what is going on inside Iran today.
In a series of designations the Treasury Department, which
is subjected to a very rigorous process came to the conclusion
in July 2011, that in fact al-Qaeda and Iran have an agreement,
have an explicit agreement that allows senior al-Qaeda
operatives to operate inside Iran.
That designation in July 2011 was followed up with a reward
by the State Department in December 2011 of $10 million for the
head of that network, Yasin Al Suri.
It was followed up in February 2012 by designation by the
Treasury Department designating Iran's Ministry of Intelligence
and Security for their support to al-Qaeda. Okay, so this is
again U.S. Government official position at this point.
Then in October 2012 the Treasury Department came back
again and designated the new head of al-Qaeda in Iran in that
network and that the new head of al-Qaeda in Iran right now as
we sit here is a guy named Muhsin al Fadhli who was a Kuwaiti
who actually is so trusted within al-Qaeda he was one of the
few terrorists that actually had foreknowledge of the 9/11
attacks. So this is a guy who was a big fish in the al-Qaeda
world.
Just quickly going through the plots you will see my
testimony would try to do is outline for you, I try to connect
the dots between what the Treasury Department and the State
Government said about al-Qaeda and Iran is a relationship, the
network and how it functions, and actual specific plots that
have gone beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
These are plots that have come at the West and one of the
first things I found was the 2010 plot ordered by Osama bin
Laden, which was intended to have a Mumbai-style attacks on
European cities, actually used the facilitation network in Iran
and according to the New York Times and other credible
reporting, Iran actually provided safe haven to some of the
plotters involved in that attack. Okay?
Going forward to the Canadian plot that you have mentioned
and expressed concern about--and rightfully so, Congressman--
the reporting that has come out says that at least one of those
plotters, not only did they receive direction and guidance from
al-Qaeda members in Iran, but at least one of them traveled,
according to press reporting, to Zahadan, which is in eastern
Iran.
Zahadan is actually a hub for al-Qaeda and Iran, as it long
has been to al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. It is one of their--
basically their transportation nodes that they use to shuttle
fighters around. So that sticks out as a red flag to me.
The third thing I would like to say is that earlier this
month that Egyptian interior minister came out with news that
broke up an al-Qaeda plot against the American Embassy and the
French Embassy in Cairo. These embassies in Cairo.
He didn't provide many details about what actually happened
in the plot but he identified that at least one of the plotters
had trained, received military training in Iran and Pakistan,
and he also named a key al-Qaeda point of contact for them as a
guy named Dawud al Asadi.
Now being the nerd, this actually struck a chord with me
when I saw this because that actually is the alias for the head
of al-Qaeda in Iran today. Okay. It is actually Muhsin al
Fadhli, one of his key aliases.
So what I am saying here is there is a huge Government
literature, U.S. Government literature in the Treasury and
State Department outlining this network inside Iran and the
focus of my testimony is to show how that network has actually
facilitated plots not just in Iraq and Afganistan, but also
abroad in the West and even in our own hemisphere.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Joscelyn
May 22, 2013
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the threat
posed by al-Qaeda's operations inside Iran and Syria. These are complex
topics that require a careful evaluation of the facts, and even then
there is much we do not know. Yet, it is clear that al-Qaeda's networks
in Syria and Iran threaten American interests in various ways.
My testimony can be boiled down to two points. First, al-Qaeda is
fighting to establish a safe haven that covers parts of both Iraq and
Syria and, if the terror network is successful, it will most likely
increase the threat to the U.S. homeland. The effects of al-Qaeda's
growth in Syria have already been felt by neighboring countries. And
European officials have expressed their concern that al-Qaeda's network
inside Syria could be used to launch attacks against their countries.
Second, while Iran's proxies and al-Qaeda are at odds inside Syria,
the two have repeatedly colluded since the early 1990s. Under the Obama
administration, the Treasury and State Departments have repeatedly
highlighted an ``agreement'' between the Iranian regime and al-Qaeda
that allows senior terrorists to operate on Iranian soil.
Al-Qaeda's Iran-based network has not only facilitated the movement
of terrorists to the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, but has also
been implicated in plots against the West and against Western interests
elsewhere. In my testimony today, I am going to highlight three
specific examples: Al-Qaeda's 2010 Mumbai-style plot against European
cities, the al-Qaeda plot broken up in Canada in April, and the foiled
plot against the U.S. and French Embassies in Cairo earlier this month.
In all three instances, there are reported ties between the plotters
and al-Qaeda operatives inside Iran. This does not mean that Iranian
officials planned these acts of terror. But the clear implication is
that Iran's provision of safe haven has allowed al-Qaeda terrorists to
coordinate plots far beyond the Middle East, including just north of
our border.
al-qaeda in syria
Al-Qaeda did not start the Syrian rebellion, which comprises a
number of groups. My written testimony focuses specifically on al-
Qaeda's activities inside Syria. The growth of al-Qaeda's Syrian wing,
the Al Nusrah Front, is alarming. Al-Qaeda has clearly capitalized on
the violence. Al-Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri has repeatedly emphasized
the importance of the effort to topple Bashar al Assad's regime. In
February 2012, for instance, Zawahiri urged jihadists to make their way
to Syria to fight the ``pernicious, cancerous regime.''\1\ Just a few
months earlier, in late 2011, the Al Nusrah Front was established by
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), an al-Qaeda affiliate that has sworn fealty to
al-Qaeda's senior leadership.\2\ In April of this year, Abu Muhammad al
Julani, the head of the Al Nusrah Front, also reaffirmed his oath of
loyalty to Zawahiri in an audio recording.\3\ Make no mistake about it:
The Al Nusrah Front is al-Qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Jason Burke, ``Al-Qaida leader Zawahiri urges Muslim support
for Syrian uprising,'' The Guardian, February 12, 2012. See: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/12/alqaida-zawahiri-support-syrian-
uprising.
\2\ State Department Press Statement, ``Terrorist Designations of
the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa'ida in Iraq,'' December 11,
2012. See: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201759.htm
\3\ State Department Media Note, ``Terrorist Designation of Al-
Nusrah Front Leader Muhammad Al-Jawlani,'' May 16, 2013. See: http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209499.htm. For a discussion of al
Julani's statement, see: Thomas Joscelyn, ``Al Nusrah Front leader
renews allegiance to al-Qaeda, rejects new name,'' The Long War
Journal, April 10, 2013. See: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/
2013/04/al_nusrah_front_lead.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Al Nusrah Front's resources are largely devoted to the
fighting inside Syria, we have already witnessed the effects of al-
Qaeda's expansion beyond Syria's borders. As the Al Nusrah Front has
ramped up its operations, AQI has also increased its operational tempo
inside Iraq.\4\ In other words, AQI's operations in Iraq have not
suffered even as the group has taken on a larger role inside Syria.
This indicates that al-Qaeda's overall capacity for violence has
greatly increased inside both countries since late 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See, for example: Greg Jaffe, ``Iraq attacks raise specter of
al-Qaeda's return,'' The Washington Post, July 23, 2012. See: http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iraq-attacks-raise-
specter-of-al-qaedas-return/2012/07/23/gJQAVgB74W_story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other neighboring states are feeling the effects as well. Consider
just one example. Late last year, AQI plotted a complex series of
attacks inside Jordan, with the ultimate target being the U.S. Embassy.
According to The Washington Post, the plotters had fought inside Syria
and carried their ``new skills and a changed perspective toward their
native country'' back home with them.\5\ AQI's recruiting and
facilitation network inside Jordan plays a significant role in the Al
Nusrah Front's operations, making it likely that returnees will
continue to pose a threat for the foreseeable future. The Al Nusrah
Front poses security challenges for Syria's other neighbors as well.
And the Al Nusrah Front's tentacles stretch far beyond Syria's
immediate neighborhood. The group is pulling in fighters from numerous
other countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Joby Warrick, ``In foiled Jordanian terror plot, officials see
hand of resurgent al-Qaeda in Iraq,'' The Washington Post, December 2,
2012. See: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-
jordanian-terror-plot-officials-see-hand-of-resurgent-al-qaeda-in-iraq/
2012/12/02/43f1698c-3421-11e2-bb9b-288a310849ee_story.html.
\6\ The Al Nusrah Front is being assisted by Chechens and others,
too. There are even credible reports of jihadists from China traveling
to Syria to fight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
European officials have sounded the alarm concerning the Al Nusrah
Front's Western recruits. In an interview with Spiegel Online in April,
German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich said that authorities
were aware ``of calls for those Europeans who have been trained in
battle'' in Syria ``to return home and pursue jihad.''\7\ Friedrich
added, ``We are following this development with great concern.'' Other
European officials have expressed similar concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Matthias Gebauer and Veit Medick, ``Interior Minister: Boston
Points to `Dangerous Phenomenon','' Spiegel Online, April 25, 2013.
See: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-minister-says-
authorities-concerned-about-lone-wolf-terrorists-a-896493-2.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, al-Qaeda's arm in Syria has already impacted the security of
neighboring countries and added a new threat to European nations. But
we've been asked to assess the threat to the U.S. homeland. While I am
not aware of any specific plots against the homeland that have been
tied to al-Qaeda's presence in Syria so far, the lessons of the past
are plain to see. At least three observations concerning the potential
threat emanating from Syria come to mind.
First, the 9/11 Commission stressed in its final report that
sanctuaries are necessary for large-scale terrorist plotting.\8\ ``Many
details . . . illustrate the direct and indirect value of the Afghan
sanctuary to al-Qaeda in preparing the 9/11 attack and other
operations,'' the commission found.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 365-374.
\9\ 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 366.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was for this reason that the commission recommended that the
U.S. Government craft a strategy for disrupting terrorist sanctuaries.
When the commission published its final report in 2004, there was a
palpable fear that Iraq would become the next Afghanistan. ``If, for
example, Iraq becomes a failed state, it will go to the top of the list
of places that are breeding grounds for attacks against Americans at
home,'' the commission wrote.\10\ We could make the same observation
about Syria (and Iraq) today. Al-Qaeda's affiliate is attempting to
establish a safe haven stretching across both countries. If al-Qaeda is
successful, and this is not a certainty at this point, then this will
almost certainly lead to new plots against the U.S. homeland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 367.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, we have already seen the connection between gains made by
al-Qaeda's affiliates on the ground ``over there'' and the threat to
Americans ``over here.''\11\ The most striking example of this can be
found inside Yemen, where al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) made
significant advances beginning in 2009. Yet even as AQAP rose in
prominence, some counterterrorism analysts assumed that the threat to
American interests was confined to inside Yemen. AQAP's attempted
bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas day 2009 changed that thinking. Here
is what the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found in its
analysis of the intelligence failures leading up to that attempted
attack: ``Prior to the 12/25 plot, counterterrorism analysts at NCTC,
CIA, and NSA were focused on the threat of terrorist attacks in Yemen,
but were not focused on the possibility of AQAP attacks against the
U.S. homeland.'' The 12/25 plot is just one of several by AQAP against
the homeland. We should not make the same analytic mistake with respect
to other al-Qaeda affiliates, whether they are in Syria, Iraq, or
elsewhere. This does not mean that these affiliates will immediately
devote resources to attacks on the U.S. homeland, but the potential is
always there.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ This ``over there''-``over here'' dynamic was first used in
the 9/11 Commission's final report. See p. 362.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, a violent rebellion inside Syria has already been tied to a
catastrophic terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland--albeit indirectly.
Consider the following history. One of the paths to 9/11 began in Syria
in the early 1980s, when the Assad family's regime brutally crushed a
rebellion launched by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Members of the
Brotherhood were forced to flee to neighboring states and Europe. Some
of them evolved into elite al-Qaeda operatives.
One such former Syrian Muslim Brother is named Mohammed Zammar, a
key recruiter of al-Qaeda's Hamburg cell, which provided the suicide
hijack pilots for the 9/11 operation. One of Zammar's fellow Syrian
Brothers, Mamoun Darkazanli, has been identified as an important backer
of the Hamburg cell and served as an imam at the mosque where Mohammed
Atta and his fellow hijackers regularly met. Al-Qaeda's cell in Spain
at the time of 9/11 was run by a former Syrian Muslim Brother named
Imad Yarkas, who was convicted on terrorism charges. And one of
Yarkas's minions, also a former Syrian Muslim Brother, may have
performed surveillance on the World Trade Center in 1997 that was used
to plot the 9/11 attack.
Still another former Syrian Brother who rose through al-Qaeda's
ranks is an ideologue named Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (a.k.a. Abu Musab
al Suri), who was tied to al-Qaeda's terrorist plotting inside Europe,
including the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 attacks in
London. Nasar played a prominent role in al-Qaeda's operations prior to
being detained in 2005 and transferred to Syrian custody. Nasar is a
widely influential jihadist thinker and a key advocate of small-scale
terrorist attacks inside the West. He was reportedly freed by the Assad
regime in the wake of the current rebellion.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ David Samuels, ``The New Mastermind of Jihad,'' The Wall
Street Journal, April 6, 2012. See: http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702303299604577323750859163544.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, the Syrian civil war is likely providing new talent for al-
Qaeda's international operations and has led to established threats
like Nasar being freed. We cannot know with certainty if or when al-
Qaeda operatives inside Syria will attempt to launch an attack against
the U.S. homeland. And America's defenses have greatly improved since
9/11, making it more difficult for such an attack to succeed. However,
we should be mindful that the Syrian conflict opens new possibilities
for al-Qaeda, which is always probing our defenses for a weakness.
al-qaeda's network in iran
There is no doubt that Iran and al-Qaeda are on opposite sides of
the Syrian war today. Iran supports Bashar al Assad's crumbling regime,
while al-Qaeda's Al Nusrah Front is one of the leading insurgency
groups opposed to Assad. This obvious conflict of interest must create
new tension between al-Qaeda and Iran. It may very well lead their
relationship in a new direction. However, it would be a mistake to
assume, absent significant evidence, that the fight in Syria will
necessarily end the relationship between the Iranian regime and al-
Qaeda, which has always simultaneously entailed both mistrust and
collusion.
In fact, al-Qaeda and Iran have frequently worked together even in
the face of divergent interests. For example, Iran allowed some al-
Qaeda leaders to operate on its soil following the 9/11 attacks, but
placed them under a form of house arrest in 2003. This reportedly
prompted Osama bin Laden to threaten the Iranians with violence if they
did not release al-Qaeda leaders and al-Qaeda family members from
custody. The Iranians did not release all of the al-Qaeda members from
house arrest, but the two still found common ground for cooperation.
Then, in 2009, al-Qaeda kidnapped an Iranian diplomat, holding him
hostage in order to force the Iranians' hand in freeing these same al-
Qaeda members. This led to a hostage exchange between the two. But
despite such antagonistic episodes, Iran and al-Qaeda have repeatedly
cooperated when it suits their common interests.
Under the Obama administration, the U.S. Treasury Department has
led the way in exposing al-Qaeda's Iran-based network and the agreement
that led to its existence. Since July 2011, the Treasury Department has
issued three separate designations targeting al-Qaeda's Iran-based
network. It is important to note that this network remains active under
an ``agreement'' between Iran and al-Qaeda, even as the two support
opposite sides in the Syrian war. In addition, the State Department has
repeatedly pointed to this same agreement, issuing rewards for al-Qaeda
leaders inside Iran.
The Treasury Department Targets Iran's ``Secret Deal'' With al-Qaeda
On July 28, 2011, the Treasury Department designated six al-Qaeda
members who formed the core of al-Qaeda's Iran-based network at the
time.\13\ Some of the terrorists are based elsewhere, but work with
Iran-based facilitators to move fighters and money. The Treasury
Department explained that this al-Qaeda network is ``headed by Ezedin
Abdel Aziz Khalil, a prominent Iran-based al-Qaeda facilitator,
operating under an agreement between al-Qaeda and the Iranian
government.'' Khalil is otherwise known as Yasin al Suri.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, ``Treasury Targets
Key Al-Qa'ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical
Transit Point,'' July 28, 2011. The press release can be found online
at: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1261.aspx (last accessed May 20, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world
today,'' Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David
S. Cohen said when announcing this designation. ``By exposing Iran's
secret deal with al-Qaeda allowing it to funnel funds and operatives
through its territory, we are illuminating yet another aspect of Iran's
unmatched support for terrorism,'' Cohen explained. He continued:
``Today's action also seeks to disrupt this key network and deny al-
Qaeda's senior leadership much-needed support.''
The Treasury Department described Iran as ``a critical transit
point for funding to support al-Qaeda's activities in Afghanistan and
Pakistan'' and noted that ``Iranian authorities maintain a relationship
with Khalil and have permitted him to operate within Iran's borders
since 2005.'' Khalil's activities included moving ``money and recruits
from across the Middle East into Iran, then on to Pakistan,'' where
they served other senior al-Qaeda leaders.
The Treasury Department hinted at the game Iranian authorities play
in their relationship with al-Qaeda. Khalil ``works with the Iranian
government to arrange releases of al-Qaeda personnel from Iranian
prisons.'' After they are released, ``the Iranian government transfers
them to Khalil, who then facilitates their travel to Pakistan.''
One of the al-Qaeda leaders then working with Khalil and included
in the July 2011 designation was Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who was
subsequently killed in a drone strike the following month, on August
22, 2011 in North Waziristan, Pakistan.\14\ According to the Treasury
Department, Rahman was al-Qaeda's ``overall commander in Pakistan's
tribal areas and as of late 2010, the leader of al-Qaeda in North and
South Waziristan, Pakistan.'' The Treasury Department added: ``Rahman
was previously appointed by Osama bin Laden to serve as al-Qaeda's
emissary in Iran, a position which allowed him to travel in and out of
Iran with the permission of Iranian officials.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Bill Roggio, ``Al Qaeda announces death of Atiyah Abd al
Rahman,'' The Long War Journal, December 1, 2011. See: http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/al_qaeda_-
announces_d.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A little more than two weeks prior to the Treasury Department's
designation, The Wall Street Journal reported that Rahman was al-
Qaeda's ``operations chief'' and was working with bin Laden to assemble
a terrorist cell capable of hitting America on the tenth anniversary of
the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.\15\ According to the newspaper, the
intelligence tying Rahman to the plot was found in communications
recovered during the May 2011 U.S. raid on bin Laden's safe house in
Abbottabad, Pakistan. Anonymous officials told The Wall Street Journal
that the ``plans were only in the discussion phase'' and there were no
``signs the nascent plot ever went beyond the early planning.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Siobhan Gorman, ``Bin Laden Plotted New Attack,'' The Wall
Street Journal, July 15, 2011. See: http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702304521304576446213098582284.html.
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The Treasury Department Designates Iran's MOIS for Supporting al-Qaeda,
Among Other Acts
On February 16, 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) ``for its support
to terrorist groups as well as its central role in perpetrating human
rights abuses against the citizens of Iran and its role in supporting
the Syrian regime as it continues to commit human rights abuses against
the people of Syria.''\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, ``Treasury Designates
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security for Human Rights Abuses
and Support for Terrorism,'' February 16, 2012. See: http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1424.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda and its affiliate, al-Qaeda in Iraq, are among the
terrorist groups supported by the MOIS, which is Iran's chief
intelligence agency. ``Today we have designated the MOIS for abusing
the basic human rights of Iranian citizens and exporting its vicious
practices to support the Syrian regime's abhorrent crackdown on its own
population,'' Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
David S. Cohen explained in a press release. Cohen added: ``In
addition, we are designating the MOIS for its support to terrorist
groups, including al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Hizballah and HAMAS,
again exposing the extent of Iran's sponsorship of terrorism as a
matter of Iranian state policy.''
The MOIS is assisting al-Qaeda in a variety of ways. The Treasury
Department revealed that ``MOIS has facilitated the movement of al-
Qaeda operatives in Iran and provided them with documents,
identification cards, and passports.'' In addition, the MOIS has
``provided money and weapons to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) . . . and
negotiated prisoner releases of AQI operatives.''
The Treasury Department ``Further Exposes'' Iran-al-Qaeda Relationship
On October 18, 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Adel
Radi Saqr al Wahabi al Harbi, who is ``a key member of an al-Qaeda
network operating in Iran and led by Iran-based al-Qaeda facilitator
Muhsin al Fadhli.''\17\ This is the same network that was previously
headed by Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (a.k.a. Yasin al Suri), as revealed
in the Treasury Department's July 2011 designation discussed above. Al
Fadhli took over as chief of al-Qaeda's Iran-based network in late
2011, after the U.S. Government openly identified and offered a reward
for his predecessor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, ``Treasury Further
Exposes Iran-Based Al-Qa'ida Network,'' October 18, 2012. See: http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1741.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S.
Cohen explained that the October 2012 designation built upon the July
2011 designation and ``further exposes al-Qaeda's critically important
Iran-based funding and facilitation network.'' Cohen added: ``We will
continue targeting this crucial source of al-Qaeda's funding and
support, as well as highlight Iran's on-going complicity in this
network's operation.''
Muhsin al Fadhli is a long-time al-Qaeda operative who was
previously designated by the U.S. Government in 2005. Al Fadhli is so
trusted within al-Qaeda that he was one of the few terrorists with
foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. When he was first designated in
2005, al Fadhli was ``considered an al-Qaeda leader in the Gulf'' who
``provided support to Iraq-based fighters for attacks against'' the
U.S.-led Coalition. Al Fadhli was also a ``major facilitator'' for
deceased AQI [al-Qaeda in Iraq] leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi. And prior
to his involvement in the Iraqi insurgency, al Fadhli ``was involved in
several terrorist attacks that took place in October 2002 including the
attacks on the French ship MV Limburg and against U.S. Marines on
Faylaka Island in Kuwait.''
Al Fadhli ``began working with al-Qaeda's Iran-based facilitation
network in 2009 and was later arrested by the Iranians,'' according to
the Treasury Department. Al Fadhli ``was subsequently released by the
Iranians in 2011 and went on to assume the leadership of the
facilitation network from Yasin al Suri later that year.'' Today, al
Fadhli's Iran-based network provides ``funding for al-Qaeda activities
in Afghanistan and Pakistan'', and moves ``fighters and money through
Turkey to support al-Qaeda-affiliated elements in Syria.'' Al Fadhli is
also ``leveraging his extensive network of Kuwaiti jihadist donors to
send money to Syria via Turkey,'' according to Treasury.
Al Harbi serves as al Fadhli's deputy. In that capacity, according
to Treasury, al Harbi ``facilitates the travel of extremists to
Afghanistan or Iraq via Iran on behalf of al-Qaeda, and is believed to
have sought funds to support al-Qaeda attacks.'' Al Harbi joined al-
Qaeda's network in Iran in 2011, but was previously added to Saudi
Arabia's Most Wanted List. The Saudi Ministry of Interior charged al
Harbi with ``traveling to Afghanistan to join al-Qaeda and providing
technical support on the Internet to the terrorist group.''
Explanation of the ``Agreement'' Between Iran and al-Qaeda
The Treasury Department's October 2012 announcement contained new
details concerning the ``agreement'' between Iran and al-Qaeda. ``Under
the terms of the agreement between al-Qaeda and Iran,'' Treasury
reported, ``al-Qaeda must refrain from conducting any operations within
Iranian territory and recruiting operatives inside Iran while keeping
Iranian authorities informed of their activities.''
``In return,'' Treasury continued, ``the Government of Iran gave
the Iran-based al-Qaeda network freedom of operation and uninhibited
ability to travel for extremists and their families.'' If al-Qaeda
members ``violate these terms'' they ``run the risk of being detained
by Iranian authorities.''
The previous head of the network, Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (a.k.a.
Yasin al Suri), ``agreed to the terms of this agreement with Iran with
the knowledge of now-deceased al-Qaeda leader 'Atiyah 'Abd al Rahman.''
Rahman, who was killed in a drone strike in August 2011, is discussed
above. Despite the U.S. Government's efforts, however, Treasury says
that ``Iran continues to allow al-Qaeda to operate a core pipeline that
moves al-Qaeda money and fighters through Iran to support al-Qaeda
activities in South Asia.'' And ``this network also sends funding and
fighters to Syria.''
al-qaeda's network in iran tied to plots against western interests
Under the Obama administration, the Treasury and State Departments
have made it clear that al-Qaeda's network inside Iran plays a vital
role in shuttling terrorists to and from the Middle East and South
Asia. In this section, I am going to extend this analysis, pointing to
ties between this same network and three plots against Western
interests outside of war zones. The first plot was in 2010, when al-
Qaeda sought to launch Mumbai-style attacks against Western cities. The
al-Qaeda operatives selected to take part in the attacks used Iranian
soil to transit to and from northern Pakistan. After the plot was
disrupted, some of them were sheltered inside Iran as well.
The second al-Qaeda plot was foiled by Canadian authorities in
April. Canadian officials revealed that the plotters received
``direction and guidance'' from al-Qaeda members in Iran. The third al-
Qaeda plot was broken up by Egyptian authorities earlier this month.
The cell responsible reportedly targeted the U.S. and French Embassies
in Cairo and received assistance from a senior al-Qaeda leader who may
be the same terrorist who currently heads al-Qaeda's network in Iran.
2010 Mumbai-style Plot Against Europe
In March 2012, an alleged al-Qaeda operative named Ahmad Wali
Siddiqui went on trial in Koblenz, Germany.\18\ Siddiqui was reportedly
slated to take part in one of the final plots ordered by Osama bin
Laden, who wanted to launch Mumbai-style attacks in European cities.
Siddiqui's testimony, as well as other evidence, demonstrated that this
al-Qaeda cell used the very same Iran-based terror network that,
according to the Treasury Department, operates ``under an agreement
between al-Qaeda and the Iranian government.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ This section is based on an article I co-authored for The
Weekly Standard. Benjamin Weinthal and Thomas Joscelyn, ``Al Qaeda's
Network in Iran,'' The Weekly Standard, April 2, 2012. See: http://
www.weeklystandard.com/articles/al-qaeda-s-network-iran_634428.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During his testimony, Siddiqui, a dual German and Afghan citizen,
discussed the time he and his fellow plotters spent at the same mosque
attended by al-Qaeda's 9/11 Hamburg cell, as well as his own
transformation into a violent jihadist. ``We wanted to fight . . .
against Americans,'' Siddiqui told the court. Siddiqui initially joined
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist organization
closely allied with al-Qaeda, in northern Pakistan. He quickly migrated
to al-Qaeda itself. According to the German indictment, senior
terrorists decided to send Siddiqui back to Germany to take part in a
potentially devastating attack intended ``to weaken Europe's economy.''
After Siddiqui was captured in Afghanistan, he revealed the nascent
plot.
In testimony before the court, Siddiqui described how he and his
co-conspirators planned different travel routes in order to avoid
suspicion beginning in early 2009. But their travels had a common
theme: Iran was their principal gateway to jihad.
According to Siddiqui, two of his co-conspirators--Rami Makanesi
and Naamen Meziche--traveled from Vienna to Tehran in order ``to not
get caught.'' Their trip was booked in a Hamburg travel office by an
unknown Iranian. Siddiqui explained that the pair could not travel
directly to Pakistan because they are Arabs. Pakistani authorities
would have questioned the duo's intentions and perhaps detained them,
but by traveling through Iran they avoided such scrutiny.
When Makanesi and Meziche arrived in Tehran, Siddiqui explained,
they called a facilitator known as ``Dr. Mamoud,'' who works for the
IMU. The two were ushered to Zahedan, a city on the eastern border of
Iran, close to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. There, Siddiqui says, Dr.
Mamoud ``welcomed them.''
Zahedan is a well-known hub of al-Qaeda and IMU activity. The IMU
has repeatedly used the city's Makki mosque, the largest Sunni mosque
in Iran, to shuttle fighters into Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda
has an established presence there, too. For instance, before his May
2011 suicide at Guantanamo, an Afghan detainee named Inayatullah
allegedly admitted to authorities that he was al-Qaeda's emir of
Zahedan, from where he delivered recruits to senior al-Qaeda leaders in
Pakistan. Even since Inayatullah's capture, al-Qaeda fighters have
continued to travel through Zahedan, as Makanesi and Meziche did. And,
as explained below, the al-Qaeda plot disrupted in Canada in April
reportedly involved this very same hub in Zahedan.
Meziche has long been known to European counterterrorism officials.
His father-in-law, Mohamed al-Fazazi, was a radical preacher whose
sermons and spiritual advice guided al-Qaeda's 9/11 Hamburg cell.
Meziche was reportedly close to Mohamed Atta, the lead hijacker in the
9/11 attacks, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, al-Qaeda's point man for the 9/11
operation. Bin al-Shibh reportedly tried to call Meziche just days
before the 9/11 attacks. Meziche was later implicated in al-Qaeda in
Iraq's operations after European officials found that he had been
recruiting fighters for the organization.
According to Der Spiegel, senior al-Qaeda terrorists instructed
Meziche and another member of the cell, an Iranian national named
Shahab Dashti, to travel to Iran where ``they would be told where in
Europe they were to be deployed to begin building structures for bin
Laden's organization.''\19\ Once in Iran, Dashti ``was to undergo
facial plastic surgery'' because he had already appeared in a
propaganda video and was therefore recognizable to European
authorities. However, Dashti did not get a chance to fool Western
intelligence officials, because he was killed in a drone strike in
northern Pakistan in early October 2010, after the Mumbai-style plot
was uncovered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Hubert Gude, ``Key Al-Qaida Witness: Hamburg Islamist to Stand
Trial in Germany,'' Spiegel Online, February 28, 2012. See: http://
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/key-al-qaida-witness-hamburg-
islamist-to-stand-trial-in-germany-a-817984.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial reports indicated that Meziche was killed in the same drone
strike, but he survived it and was sheltered by the Iranians before
being captured inside Pakistan. The New York Times reported in January
2012 that Meziche and several other members of the cell are ``waiting
in Iran, trying to return to Europe.''\20\ European authorities were
not eager to see them come back, as they posed obvious security risks.
Anonymous U.S. officials interviewed by the Times described Meziche and
one of his Iran-based compatriots as ``lower mid-level'' al-Qaeda
operatives. ``These two have been involved in al-Qaeda external
operations activities for some time now,'' one official said. Citing
multiple intelligence sources, The New York Times explained that ``Iran
appears to be harboring them in hopes that, when and if they leave,
they will cause trouble in the West.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Souad Mekhennet, ``Hiding in Iran, Raising Suspicions in
Europe,'' The New York Times, January 10, 2012. See: http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/world/middleeast/hiding-in-iran-raising-
suspicions-in-europe.html?_r=0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rami Makanesi, who set off for Tehran with Meziche, was arrested in
Pakistan in 2010 and sentenced to nearly 5 years in prison last year by
a Frankfurt court. Makanesi has his own ties to Iran-based al-Qaeda
operatives. According to Guido Steinberg, a researcher in the Middle
East and North Africa division of the German Institute for
International Security Affairs, Makanesi met a top al-Qaeda operative
known as Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (a.k.a. Yasin al Suri) in February
2010. Khalil is the same al-Qaeda leader who was designated by the
Treasury Department in July 2011. Steinberg, in his analysis brief for
IHS Jane's, a military and intelligence consulting group, explains that
Khalil asked Makanesi to ``accompany him to Iran.'' Makanesi said that
Khalil ``was responsible for funneling money and recruits via Iran and
that he was known to cooperate with the Iranian government.''
When the Treasury Department designated Khalil in 2011, it also
designated several other members of al-Qaeda who utilize the Iran-based
network. As explained above, one of them was Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who
was subsequently killed in a drone strike in northern Pakistan. The
Treasury Department explained: ``Rahman was previously appointed by
Osama bin Laden to serve as al-Qaeda's emissary in Iran, a position
which allowed him to travel in and out of Iran with the permission of
Iranian officials.'' Makanesi seems to have at least known Rahman.
According to Steinberg, Makanesi has explained that Rahman ``was known
to have lived in Iran for many years.''
The evidence in this matter is clear. The al-Qaeda cell that was
selected to take part in one of Osama bin Laden's last plots against
the West was facilitated by the same Iran-based network that the
Treasury and State Departments have repeatedly pointed to as evidence
of collusion between al-Qaeda and the Iranian regime. This does not
mean that Iranian officials orchestrated the plot or were otherwise
directly involved. Then again, we cannot rule out the possibility. At a
minimum, al-Qaeda's network in Iran played a key role.
disrupted plot against trains in the united states and canada
On April 22, 2013, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
announced that they had disrupted an al-Qaeda plot to derail a
passenger train traveling from New York to Toronto.\21\ Canadian
officials directly implicated al-Qaeda in the plot. ``This is the first
known al-Qaeda planned attack that we've experienced in Canada,''
Superintendent Doug Best told reporters.\22\ ``Had this plot been
carried out, it would have resulted in innocent people being killed or
seriously injured,'' Assistant RCMP Commissioner James Malizia said.
RCMP chief superintendent Jennifer Strachan explained that the plot
``was definitely in the planning stage but not imminent.''\23\ Strachan
elaborated: ``We are alleging that these two individuals took steps and
conducted activities to initiate a terrorist attack. They watched
trains and railways.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, ``RCMP Arrests Two Individuals
for Terrorism-related Charges,'' April 22, 2013. See: http://www.rcmp-
grc.gc.ca/news-nouvelles/2013/04-22-ns-sn-eng.htm.
\22\ CBS News and Associated Press, ``2 arrested in terror plot
against Canadian passenger train, police say,'' April 22, 2013. See:
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57580804/2-arrested-in-terror-plot-
against-canadian-passenger-train-police-say/.
\23\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Canadian officials added a key allegation: The plotters received
``direction and guidance'' from al-Qaeda members in Iran.
According to Reuters, investigators think that one of the suspects
``traveled to Iran on a trip that was directly relevant to the
investigation of the alleged plot.''\24\ Reuters added: ``U.S. national
security sources close to the investigation said that was a reference
to a network of low- to middle-level al-Qaeda fixers and `facilitators'
based in the town of Zahedan, close to Iran's borders with Afghanistan
and Pakistan, that moves money and fighters through Iran to support its
activities in South Asia.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Mark Hosenball, ``Canada train plot suspect traveled to Iran:
U.S. officials,'' Reuters, April 25, 2013. See: http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/04/25/us-arrests-iran-idUSBRE93- O1D320130425.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is, once again, the same al-Qaeda network that operates under
an ``agreement'' with the Iranian regime. Canadian officials say they
have not find evidence implicating Iranian officials in the plot. But
Iran's provision of safe haven to al-Qaeda is a significant factor by
itself. More details about the al-Qaeda's cells contacts inside Iran
will hopefully emerge during the forthcoming court proceedings.
disrupted plot against the american and french embassies in cairo
On May 11, 2013, Egyptian interior minister Mohammed Ibrahim
announced that an al-Qaeda plot against a Western embassy and other
targets had been disrupted. The interior minister said that two
suspected terrorists are being held for questioning and a third is
under house arrest. The Egyptian government did not initially say which
embassy the three-man cell targeted. The New York Times reported,
however, that ``a Western official said the Egyptians had privately
identified the embassy as the United States Embassy in Cairo.''\25\
Subsequently, the Egyptians identified both the American and French
Embassies as targets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Ben Hubbard, ``3 Arrested in Plot to Bomb Egyptian Cities and
Embassy,'' The New York Times, May 11, 2013. See: http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/world/middleeast/egypt-arrests-3-in-plot-to-
attack-cities-and-an-embassy.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Egyptian interior ministry revealed three significant details
about the plotters. First, the Egyptians alleged that they had been
trained in the north Sinai, with the intention of fighting inside
Syria. This again demonstrates how the war in Syria is having ripple
effects throughout the region. Second, Ibrahim said the al-Qaeda cell
was in contact with the so-called ``Nasr City Cell,'' which has its own
ties to al-Qaeda. The Nasr City Cell has also been tied to the
September 11, 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya.\26\ Third,
Ibrahim pointed to two ties to al-Qaeda's network inside Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Egyptian interior minister: Al Qaeda cell
plotted suicide attack against Western embassy,'' The Long War Journal,
May 11, 2013. See: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/05/
egyptian_interior_mi.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ibrahim said that one member of the al-Qaeda cell had received
``military training'' inside Iran, as well as Pakistan. The interior
minister also identified a key point of contact for the cell as a
senior al-Qaeda terrorist known as Dawud al Asadi, who told the trio
``to get in touch with a terrorist cell in the Cairo neighborhood of
Nasr City.''\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Ben Hubbard, ``3 Arrested in Plot to Bomb Egyptian Cities and
Embassy,'' The New York Times, May 11, 2013. See: http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/world/middleeast/egypt-arrests-3-in-plot-to-
attack-cities-and-an-embassy.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ibrahim did not offer many details about al Asadi, other than to
describe him as ``the head of al-Qaeda in some west Asian countries,''
which is somewhat vague. Dawud al Asadi is, in fact, one of the aliases
used by Muhsin al Fadhli, the head of al-Qaeda's network in Iran.\28\
Al Fadhli is described above. He was designated as the head of al-
Qaeda's network inside Iran in October 2012. Therefore, if the al Asadi
mentioned by the Egyptian interior minister is in fact Muhsin al
Fadhli, then this is yet another indication that al-Qaeda's leadership
inside Iran is projecting terror far beyond the mullahs' borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ State Department Rewards for Justice, ``Wanted, Information
leading to the location of Muhsin al-Fadhli, Up to $7 Million Reward.''
See: http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=fadhli.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Joscelyn.
Our next witness, Mr. Barack Barfi, is a research fellow at
the New America Foundation and focuses on Arab and Islamic
affairs. Previously Mr. Barfi was a visiting fellow at the
Brookings Doha Center and prior to that was a producer with ABC
News affiliates in the Middle East where he reported from
countries such as Iraq and Lebanon.
Throughout his academic and media careers, Mr. Barfi has
had extensive travel and access to local ears in the Middle
East, has experienced first-hand the dilemmas confronting the
region.
Mr. Barfi, pleased to have you here today. I look forward
to your testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF BARAK BARFI, RESEARCH FELLOW, NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION
Mr. Barfi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Higgins,
and Members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to
testify today about al-Qaeda's operations in Syria.
I would particularly like to commend Chairman King for the
perfect pronunciation of my name, something my teachers could
not do in school.
[Laughter.]
Mr. King. I am good for something, I guess.
Mr. Barfi. After the organization was stripped of its
Afghan sanctuary following the 9/11 attacks, and its core
leadership decimated in Pakistan, the group decided to embrace
a more decentralized model that focused on regional affiliates.
These branches have succeeded in keeping al-Qaeda relevant
even as it absorbs lethal hits around the world.
The Middle East revolutions known as the Arab Spring have
posed new dilemmas for the organization. As the frustrated
youth that was to fuel the al-Qaeda revolutions flocked to the
streets in Egypt and Libya to overthrow long-ruling leaders,
the jihadist narrative the organization parroted seemed
increasingly irrelevant. With dreaded security services
neutered, Arabs could control their own destinies without
resorting to violence.
But as has consistently happened in the decade since the 9/
11 attacks, al-Qaeda has been able to take advantage of events
in the Middle East to reassert its importance.
Today a Syrian civil war that has descended into urban
anarchy has provided the organization a new theater to stage
its operations. In a nation where the government controls less
than a quarter of the country's territory, internal and
external actors have been able to carve out spheres of
influence.
Al-Qaeda created the organization The Support Front for the
People of the Levant, known locally as Jabhat al-Nusra, or JN,
to front its activities in Syria.
Despite its recent emergence, JN has a long history. It
evolved from the networks the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
established when he moved his operations from Afghanistan to
Iraq following the American invasion of Kabul. JN emerged in
January 2012 when a suicide bomber targeted Syrian security
officials.
Since then the group has carried out a number of suicide
bombings, reaching into the regime's innermost sanctum. But it
also has embraced conventional military tactics such as
ambushes and assaults. Today, JN is considered one of the most
effective rebel fighting forces.
Al-Qaeda thrives on instability and establishes its
presence in undergoverned spaces. Such factors have become
basic staples in a country that inches closer to Somalification
with every passing day. The government has receded, armed
groups control much of the countryside, and social welfare no
longer exists outside of a handful of cities and regions.
Nevertheless, other indigenous geo-religious factors
particular to Syria have drawn al-Qaeda there. Syria is ruled
by a small Shi'i offshoot to which President al-Asad and
leaders of the regime belong called Alawis.
Pre-twentieth century Islamic scholars decree the sect's
members heretics. Al-Qaeda's ideology has historically
prioritized fighting Shi'i infidels to combatting Jews and
Christians.
Syria is also located at a strategic crossroads to which no
other Arab state can lay claim. It borders several key
countries including Israel, jihadists' arch foe. While other
al-Qaeda affiliates are located in remote areas on the
periphery of the Middle East, a Levantine branch would have the
ability to expand out in several directions.
While Syria has provided al-Qaeda a new haven, Syrians have
proved receptive to its message. It should be stressed that
much like in other havens, it is not the organization's
ideology which is drawing it admirers. As the international
community has abandoned Syrians to face a regime prepared to
use all the weapons in its arsenal, they are increasingly
willing to accept a lifeline from anyone prepared to offer them
one.
For much of the revolution, Syrians believed the Free
Syrian Army known as the FSA would provide it. But as the armed
struggle has stalled, the FSA has stumbled. Its units are
making little progress on the battlefield. Worse, they have
drawn the ire of a population exhausted by their abuses. Theft,
kidnappings for ransom, and torture have become its motto.
Everyday JN attracts new supporters dissatisfied with the
FSA. They are drawn to its discipline, organization, and
squeaky-clean image. JN's propensity to assist Syrians solve
their problems, whether through mediation or aid, have also
contributed to its popularity.
It runs a social welfare division that provides goods and
services to a war-torn population. These networks are much more
efficient than ones managed by FSA units.
The organization's battlefield successes have won it
admiration as well. JN is the most effective rebel fighting
unit. Its fighters are known for their bravery and dedication
to the cause.
During my latest trip to Syria, Syrians beamed about JN's
contribution to the revolution. These factors make JN the most
admired rebel unit in the field. As the revolution spirals into
a cauldron of chaos, the organization will only win over
Syrians to its cause.
Unlike the FSA, JN's ultimate goal is not the overthrow of
the Syrian regime. It seeks to carve out a new haven for al-
Qaeda where the organization can operate in the heart of the
Arab world. It is also bent on taking the fight to neighboring
Israel.
But any attempt to do so will likely be met by resistance
from FSA units sensitive to Western appeals. As a result, JN
will have to combat other FSA units to ensure its freedom of
mobility. For these reasons, JN does not currently pose a
threat to the American homeland. The organization needs to
focus on consolidating its local position before it can focus
on the far enemy.
JN nevertheless poses problems for American interests in
the Middle East. For Syria is not Las Vegas. What happens in
Syria will not stay in Syria. The violence there is bound to
spill over into neighboring countries, some of which are
American allies. As such, containing JN should be a National
interest.
With that I would be happy to answer any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barfi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Barak Barfi
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me
to testify today about al-Qaeda's operations in Syria. After the
organization was stripped of its Afghan sanctuary following the 9/11
attacks, and its core leadership decimated in Pakistan, the group
decided to embrace a more decentralized model that focused on regional
affiliates. These branches have succeeded in keeping al-Qaeda relevant
even as it absorbs lethal hits around the world.
The Middle East revolutions known as the Arab Spring have posed new
dilemmas for the organization. As the frustrated youth that was to fuel
the al-Qaeda revolutions flocked to the streets in Egypt and Libya to
overthrow long-ruling leaders, the jihadist narrative the organization
parroted seemed increasingly irrelevant. With dreaded security services
neutered, Arabs could control their destinies without resorting to
violence.
But as has consistently happened in the decade since it rose to
international prominence, al-Qaeda has been able to take advantage of
events in the Middle East to reassert its importance. Today a Syrian
civil war that has descended into urban anarchy has provided the
organization a new theater to stage its operations. In a nation where
the Government controls less than a quarter of the country's territory,
internal and external actors have been able to carve out spheres of
influence.
One of those is al-Qaeda. The organization's leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri has released several videos offering encouragement for Syria's
revolution, while urging foreign jihadists to fight there. His appeals
seem to be working. In March, British Foreign Minister William Hague
said that ``Syria today has become the top destination for jihadists.''
al-qaeda in syria
Al-Qaeda created the organization The Support Front for the People
of the Levant, known locally as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), to front its
activities in Syria. The late al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden
recommended that the organization establish groups that did not bear
its name because of the negative connotation associated with it in the
aftermath of its Iraqi debacle.
Despite its recent emergence, JN has a long history. It evolved
from the networks the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established when
he moved his operations from Afghanistan to Iraq following the American
invasion of Kabul. He established cells in Levantine countries to
funnel foreigners to Iraq. Following the outbreak of the Syrian
revolution in March 2011, al-Qaeda's Iraqi affiliate sent between 150-
200 operatives to Syria to establish a local infrastructure.
JN emerged in January 2012 when a suicide bomber targeted Syrian
security officials. Since then the group has carried out a number of
suicide bombings, reaching into the regime's innermost sanctums. But it
also has embraced conventional military tactics such as ambushes and
assaults. Today, JN is considered one of the most effective rebel
fighting forces numbering between 1,500-5,000. Though the group has
drawn members from Iraq, Jordan, and the Caucus Mountain states, the
majority of its foot soldiers are nevertheless Syrians. In April, its
leader known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda,
an act which has sown some divisions within the organization.
why syria?
Al-Qaeda thrives on instability and establishes its presence in
ungoverned spaces. Such factors have become basic staples in a country
that inches closer to Somalification with every passing day. The
government has receded, armed groups control much of the countryside
and social welfare no longer exists outside a handful of cities and
regions.
Nevertheless, other indigenous geo-religious factors particular to
Syria have drawn al-Qaeda there. Syria is ruled by a small Shi'i
offshoot known as Alawis to which President Bashar al-Asad belongs.
Pre-twentieth century Islamic scholars decreed the sect's members
heretics. Al-Qaeda'a ideology has historically prioritized fighting
Shi'i infidels to combatting Jews and Christians. Moreover, by
highlighting the sectarian nature of the conflict, JN can depict itself
as protecting Sunnis from a Shi'i onslaught.
Syria is located at a strategic crossroads to which no other Arab
nation can lay claim. It borders several key countries including Saudi
Arabia and Israel, jihadists' arch foe. While other al-Qaeda affiliates
are located in remote areas on the periphery of the Middle East, a
Levantine branch would have the ability to expand out in several
directions.
Syria will have no government for years at it increasingly becomes
a Middle Eastern Somalia. JN's successes will allow al-Qaeda to carve
out a sphere of influence unimpeded by a regime's attempts to
neutralize it.
Syria has an eschatological significance. Medieval Islamic
literature predicts many apocalyptic battles will occur there, thus
convincing jihadists seeking the ultimate martyrdom to flock to Syria.
why jn appeals to syrians
While Syria has provided al-Qaeda a new haven, Syrians have proved
receptive to its message. It should be stressed that much like in other
theaters, it is not the organization's ideology which is drawing it
admirers. As the international community has abandoned Syrians to face
a regime prepared to use all the weapons in its arsenal, they are
increasingly willing to accept a lifeline from anyone willing to offer
them one.
For much of the revolution, Syrians believed the rebel-led Free
Syrian Army (FSA) would provide it. But as the armed struggle has
stalled, the largely nationalist FSA has stumbled. Its units are making
little progress on the battlefield. Worse, they have drawn the ire of a
population exhausted by their abuses. Theft, kidnappings for ransom,
and torture have become their motto.
Everyday JN attracts new supporters dissatisfied with the FSA. They
are drawn to its discipline, organization, and squeaky-clean image.
JN's propensity to assist Syrians solve their problems, whether through
mediation or aid, have also contributed to its popularity. It runs a
social welfare division that provides goods and services to a war-torn
population. These networks are much more efficient and responsive than
ones managed by FSA units.
The organization's battlefield successes have won it admiration as
well. JN is the most effective rebel unit. Its fighters are known for
their bravery and dedication to the cause. During my latest visit to
Syria, Syrians beamed about JN's contribution to the revolution. These
factors make JN the most admired rebel unit in the field. And as the
revolution spirals into a cauldron of chaos, the organization will only
win over Syrians to its cause.
modus operandi
JN has established a hierarchical organization that comprises
military, political, and religious committees. It is highly
compartmentalized with members often not knowing those in other cells.
It subjects prospective candidates to a rigorous initiation process,
imbuing its members with a sense of duty and belonging.
JN's operational influence in Syria is mixed. Though it pioneered
the use of suicide bombings, most FSA units have eschewed such attacks.
JN has been more successful in persuading rebel groups to embrace
improvised explosive devices.
Though JN has refused to join the FSA or other more Islamist-
orientated organizations, it nevertheless cooperates with rebel units.
It participates in joint operations and amicably divides the spoils
between them.
Like other FSA units, JN operates in the open, hanging its shingle
on the door. During a recent visit to Aleppo, I lived in the building
next door to the one JN was occupying. Its fighters buzzed around the
complex. Though it maintains operational secrecy and largely avoids the
international media, it nevertheless maintains an open presence
throughout Syria.
turning a new page
Al-Qaeda's widespread bloodletting in Iraq tarnished the
organization's image. The organization and other jihadists have sought
to draw lessons from their failed Iraq experience. Their treatises are
full of exhortations to avoid killing individuals from Syrian
minorities allied to the regime. JN has heeded this advice. It has not
targeted Alawi civilians, instead focusing on those who work for the
regime. And unlike in Iraq, JN focuses exclusively on military targets,
thus minimizing civilian casualties.
The organization's religio-political program is purposefully vague
to avoid alienating certain constituencies. It has not delineated a
vision for a post-Asad Syria. In contrast, other puritanical groups
known as Salafis have been much more explicit about the type of state
they plan to build on the rubble of the one being destroyed. JN has
nevertheless employed some vice squads in areas under its control.
In embracing this middle path, JN seeks to avoid the pitfalls that
sank its Iraqi sibling. The organization is cognizant that its success
depends on ingratiating itself with the local population rather than
ensuring its grip on society through a reign of terror. It remains to
be seen if this is a short-term tactical shift or a permanent turn.
Once JN has accomplished its transitional goal of overthrowing the
regime it may seek to impose its views on its subjects.
the day after
Unlike the FSA, JN's ultimate goal is not the overthrow of the
Syrian regime. It seeks to carve out a new haven for al-Qaeda where the
organization can operate in the heart of the Arab world. It is also
bent on taking the fight to neighboring Israel. But any attempt to do
so will likely be met by resistance from FSA units sensitive to Western
appeals. As a result, JN will have to combat other FSA units to ensure
its freedom of mobility. For these reasons, JN does not currently pose
a threat to the American homeland. The organization needs to focus on
consolidating its local position before it can focus on the far enemy.
JN nevertheless poses problems for American interests in the Middle
East. For Syria is not Las Vegas. What happens in Syria will not stay
in Syria. The violence there is bound to spill over into neighboring
countries, some of which are American allies. As such, containing JN
should be a national interest.
Mr. King. We thank, thank all of you for your testimony.
I will begin the questioning.
First on Syria, on the issue of foreign fighters, and with
the porous borders particularly through Turkey, and with the
threat of these foreign fighters returning to Europe and then
coming to the United States with British passports, EU
passports, visa waiver policies.
What more do you think we should be doing? Do you believe
that the European countries are as concerned about this as they
should be? What do you see as the level of cooperation between
Europe and the United States particularly regarding these, you
know, the foreign fighters?
To start we can go down, Dr. Jones, Mr. Simcox, Mr.
Joscelyn, Mr. Barfi. If anyone cares to comment.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, I think in my
conversations with several European ambassadors including from
this town and then other government officials from Europe, I
think they are extremely concerned about the both departure and
then the inflow of foreign fighters coming to their countries
from Europe. I do not believe however that they have in all
cases a good reign on who they are and the total number of
individuals coming in and coming out.
Once they leave German soil or Swedish soil they may not
have a particularly good insight about what is happening inside
of Syria. So I think in this case, it is contingent on the
United States to get information from sources on the ground in
Syria. That does include any covert units from other countries
whether they are from Jordan or from Saudi Arabia or from
Turkey or from the United Arab Emirates that are actually on
the ground in Syria.
I think this is the biggest black hole for fighters going
into and out of Syria is what are they doing and who are they
talking to and what are their intentions based on what they are
doing in Syria.
I think that is where we have our biggest vagaries on what
is going on and so in that sense I think probably not enough is
being done in country to collect on and patch information on
what is going on in Syria and the United States has very little
eyes on in country.
Again, I think that is a very big weakness of the United
States--its inability to understand what is going on at Syria.
Mr. King. Before we go on to the witnesses on this
question, I make the maybe overly-generalized statement but my
experience has been I know in our negotiations with Europeans
often our European partners think we are too concerned about
terror watch list, too concerned about who is coming over on
planes to the United States.
Is that diminished at all, and how is that going to affect
something which is even more vague right now: Who is coming
from Syria and who is not? I will ask if all of you can address
that.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, again I can only tell you what I
have heard from several European ambassadors who are concerned
about those numbers.
Still, I think their external agencies and their external
agency's presence in Syria in some cases especially with some
of Nordic countries is not that good.
So they may be concerned about individuals that they have a
sense of, but they don't know the specifics in general what
they are doing, which is why they come to people like me.
Do you have any sense of what they are doing when they get
to Syria? If they are asking me that question, they don't know.
Mr. King. Well, we are asking you too, so----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Simcox.
Mr. Simcox. First of all, you mentioned that the Europeans
believe that the Americans are too worried about--Europeans
aren't worried enough would be the way I look at it.
We have no reason to be complacent in Europe about
terrorism taking place within the European borders and we have
no reason to be complacent about terrorism from Europe being
exported to the States.
European security agencies are extremely concerned though
about what will happen to these fighters when they return. The
other thing I think that is a big concern for them is what--how
does this end in Syria and how does it impact in Europe in the
long run? In terms of if there is a series of mini fiefdoms in
the eastern parts of Syria, the al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-
affiliated groups control is that then a new safe haven that
Europeans are going to be able to go and train in--obviously
via Turkey, ideally giving them access to training camps in a
way that hasn't been possible probably since prior to 9/11.
My sense is that unfortunately we are truly in guesswork
when it comes to how many people are there from Europe and what
they are doing and their intentions are when they get back. I
think we are flying blind on that.
Mr. King. Mr. Joscelyn, I know you are focused on Iran,
going to come back to that in my second round if you want to--
--
Mr. Barfi.
I am sorry--you want to----
Mr. Joscelyn. Actually I would, if I could, just something
I----
Mr. King. Absolutely.
Mr. Joscelyn. I totally agree with what Seth and Robin were
saying about the potential for new talent going to Syria. I
think they are right on the money in what they say.
I want to highlight something from my testimony too, which
is what I call the return of old talent to the battlefield
because of one of my concerns in all of this is there is
credible threat reporting, credible press reporting, I am
sorry, about a guy named Abu Musab al Suri, is his nom de
guerre, otherwise known as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, who is a
chief al-Qaeda ideologue.
He is known in al-Qaeda circles and in jihadist circles as
one of the preeminent thinkers for how to come after the West.
He was imprisoned in Syria before the rebellion there.
I actually don't agree with the decision to send him to
Syria for imprisonment and for reasons just like this, and
there is credible reporting that he has been freed.
This is the type of guy who I would be very concerned about
if I were on your committee because he is a guy who has written
at great length about creative ways to attack the West.
There is all sorts of reporting that he was deeply involved
with al-Qaeda in Europe prior to him being detained in 2005.
There is a lot of credible reporting that he was involved in
the Madrid train bombings in 2004, also the attacks in July
2005 in London.
So this is the return of what I will call old talent to the
game for as a consequence of what is happening inside Syria.
Another name I just want to throw out there, and this has not
appeared anywhere publicly and this is just my own sort of
nerdism, I guess, is a guy named Mohammad Zammar was a key
recruiter for the Hamburg cell for 9/11.
He was detained and shipped off to Syria and imprisoned by
the Assad regime. I would take a keen interest in trying to
find out if I were sitting in your shoes where he is today and
if there is any classified information which I am not privy to
about where he is and where he is going because Zummar was
directly involved in
9/11, he was imprisoned in Syria, and I would take a deep
concern about where he is today.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Mr. Barfi.
Mr. Barfi. The problem with Europeans going to Syria is we
just can't get a handle on it. Once they leave their home
countries they are pretty much going to fall off the radar. If
you go to Turkey it is not like traveling to Pakistan. I mean
it doesn't raise red flags, why are you going to Turkey? I want
to see Europe or I want to go check out some nice islands,
check out some ruins.
Another problem is once they go to Turkey, you don't even
know how they are going to cross. Are they going to cross using
the official crossings or they going to cross orchard groves
and across orchard groves and fields, which is a lot of people
do that.
I crossed legally on a trip to Syria. Some of the Syrians
that I was with that took me in some parts of their family did
not have passports so they could not leave the country
officially from Syria to Turkey so they crossed through the
fields and they came back through the fields when I went in. I
crossed legally and they went to the fields.
This is a phenomenon you will see all the time so you won't
even see these people with any stamps and their passports that
they have even been to Syria. So they are going to fall off the
radar.
I personally have not met any of these Europeans but I know
a lot of people who have. You show up in these towns in these
border towns in Turkey--I have a good friend to the taxi driver
he said, ``Yes, I took a few French guys across the border the
other day.''
It is a big problem. We are not going to be able to find
out what they are doing, what units they are hooking up with.
All we are going to find out is a martyrdom notice on a
jihadist website; XX so-and-so died fighting in so-and-so
battle and he was from France or he was from Belgium.
So it is a big problem. What are they doing there? What is
going to happen when they come back? Are they going to
radicalize others in the West? Are they going to bring back
bomb-making training or whatnot and this is something we are
going to have to understand when the blowback comes back, not
when they are inside because it is just too hard to find out
answers to those questions at this point in time.
Mr. King. Mr. Barfi, in your testimony you say that you
don't see any direct threat from JN to the United States. I
would ask if the others if that is their consensus and is the
main threat from foreign fighters and also are any of you aware
of any support or any elements of this country who would
support a Syrian al-Qaeda movement?
Is there anything, any community in this country or any
elements of support, for Syria al-Qaeda or JN in particular
other than people just maybe radicalized generally, any
particular support in this country for JN?
Mr. Barfi. We haven't seen any incidences of this in the
Muslim communities in America. As you know, most almost if not
all the community here is moderate.
We have not had the same radicalization problems as you
have in Britain and to a lesser extent France and in the period
since
9/11, you have seen several attacks in--you have seen the
bombing, the London bombings, the Madrid bombings and then I
think your last year we had this lone wolf in France.
We haven't had that other than the Boston bombing and these
were guys who were lone wolf. They were not radicalized in a
mosque and this is very important. They didn't go to a mosque.
They didn't hear a preacher. There was no networks that
followed them to certain places.
They did this all on their own. So there was not a
community to give them an infrastructure and the network. That
is what is very important about the Boston bombings that we
have to take away, sir.
Mr. King. The main threat then you see from Syria would be
the foreign fighters coming back through Europe and the United
States, primarily, that should be our main homeland security
focus right now. Do you agree with that?.
Mr. Barfi. The problem--I am sorry, did you want to----
Mr. King. Actually, the whole panel and I will end on that
and I will go to the----
Mr. Barfi. Then I will let the others handle it.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, if I could just come in on this. I
heard from reliable sources, although I take this with a grain
of salt, probably no more than a dozen or so Americans have
gone to Syria to fight possibly some with Jabhat al-Nusrah.
That is concerning. The fact that we have had some is of
concern. I think especially as the war continues as the Assad
regime falls I would expect those numbers to go up rather than
down.
It is unclear what they will do when they leave, whether
they will come back, whether they will go to North Africa,
whether they will die in country, but I think the fact that we
do have some Americans and we don't know the percentage. We
know roughly a dozen out of 17, is it a dozen out of 50?
We don't know the percentage of the total mass of fighters
that have left the United States. But I would still say the
fact that we have some of the facts, that that is probably
going to increase because that has been the trend. It's because
the war is likely to get worse before it gets better. It is a
troubling trend and I don't believe we have the coverage over
that as well as we should.
Mr. Simcox. In regard to whether Jabhat al-Nusrah would
look to attack the United States or members of that group
coming back, I mean of course it would be--you could never
dismiss it. It is an entirely rational and logical thing to
fear.
All I would say is that of the plots that have been against
the United States and the United Kingdom and I have looked at
them all in my research, the people who have attempted to
attack the homeland have actually been those who didn't fight
but trained in these areas and were then sent back with a very
specific operation in mind.
I think there is a couple of reasons why that may be. I
think first of all may be in terms of those that are aspiring
to attack the homeland now al-Qaeda has more--it doesn't have
interest in using them as cannon fodder in local conflicts.
The individuals that can travel back to the homeland and
carry out operations are perhaps are of greater value to them
than they were before. Maybe some of the individuals who fight
in places like Syria but then don't go on to try and attack the
homeland, maybe they feel they have done their stint that the
time they fight, spend fighting jihadist abroad was their
contribution to the overall effort and they don't have the same
interest in attacking the homeland.
I mean that is speculation and I think it is worth bearing
in mind that we haven't seen a huge amount of people who fought
abroad carry out attacks in the homeland.
Briefly on the subject of radicalization in the United
States, I mean it is true, there is no doubt about it, that
Britain and Western Europe generally has had much greater
problem with radicalization, our integration strategy to be
frank just doesn't work as well as the American one.
I don't think there is much doubt about that but at the
same time in the research that I did recently, 54 percent of
individuals who have been convicted in the United States or
carried out suicide attacks were American citizens.
So I would encourage that there is not complacency about
this issue because even though there aren't the same networks
as there are in Europe, there is still problems of
radicalization in this country and I think it is one that we
should always be wary of.
Mr. Joscelyn. Just on the question of the potential threat
of the Nusrah front to the homeland, I just want to interject a
couple quick points, which I think it is right as Barak says
here that basically most of the Nusrah Front is concentrated on
fighting locally in the insurgency right now trying to
consolidate its hold in inside Syria.
My one interjection to that is to always be careful that
al-Qaeda routinely uses these local insurgencies, these local
fights, and then basically coalesces them into their global
jihad. That is part of their strategy and given the head of all
al-Nusrah front's ties to the head of al-Qaeda, I mean, al-
Zawahiri's allegiance to them and various other indications,
you can never downplay the possibility that some portion of
their assets even it is small compared to the overall effort
will be used against us.
I just want to interject one further thought along those
lines. We have seen as you have talked about many times,
Congressman, about the threat from al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula in Yemen against the homeland.
Well, prior to the Christmas day bomb plot in of December
2009, there was a widespread assumption and I produced it in my
testimony here for you, amongst the--in the intelligence
community from the NCTC, CIA, NSA, and others of that the AQAP
was going to be focused on--they were focused on the threat of
terrorist sects in Yemen but were not focused on the
possibility of AQAP attacks against the U.S. homeland.
Well, AQAP was waging a local insurgency there in Yemen,
still is, trying to consolidate its hold over territory and
trying to come back from its getting knocked down and yet
during all of that it still managed to come after us.
So I don't know of any specific threats against U.S.
homeland right now from the Nusrah front, I am just saying that
we shouldn't assume that--including--when you have guys like I
mentioned before senior al-Qaeda talent now back in the game in
Syria, we shouldn't assume that they won't think about that at
some point in time.
Mr. King. I have gone way over. We are coming back for a
second round.
I would just say, Mr. Barfi, I am not certain yet on the
Boston attack. That is still open on whether or not there was
any radicalization within Boston. We don't know. We have gotten
some other reports, but again, it is too preliminary. I
wouldn't rule it out, that is all I am saying at this stage.
With that, I would recognize the very patient Ranking
Member, Mr. Higgins, for as much time as he wants.
Mr. Higgins. No, I enjoyed it.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent for the
gentlelady from Texas to sit for the purpose of questioning and
receiving testimony.
Mr. King. Without objection.
Mr. Higgins. We know from the 9/11 report that senior al-
Qaeda figures maintain close ties to Iranian security officials
and had frequently traveled across Iran's border.
At least 8 of the 14 Saudi operatives selected for 9/11
operations traveled through Iran in the months before the
attack. In recent years, Iran's ties to al-Qaeda has increased.
In 2010, Iran reportedly began releasing detained al-Qaeda
operatives.
Furthermore, as many as 20 members of the bin Laden family
have lived in the compound in Iran since September 11, 2001,
while bin Laden's son and high-ranking advisors to his father
have been able to easily slip in and out of the country.
When the terrorists' train plot was thwarted before it was
executed in Canada, Iran's foreign minister spokesman stated
that there was no firm evidence of any Iranian involvement and
groups such as al-Qaeda have no compatibility with Iran in both
political and ideological fields.
Well, I don't believe the foreign minister spokesperson. I
don't believe the foreign minister. I don't believe the Iranian
president, Ahmadinejad because they have a mutual enemy and it
is us and Westerners.
We need just to look at 9/11 and the death and destruction
that was exacted on the United States in New York City, the
murder of John Granville, a United States Agency for
International Development Diplomat, in the Sudanese capital of
Khartoum in 2009. He was targeted for one reason because he was
an American and he was a Westerner. The thwarted a New York
City subway plot in 2009 and most recently the Canadian train
plot.
You know, we are asking the question rhetorically in this
committee as to whether or not al-Qaeda operatives pose any
threat to the United States. I think we should get beyond the
question and just insert the way it should be. The answer is
yes.
The question is: How imminent is that threat? In previous
hearings--we had a hearing here about the Hezbollah presence
which you know, acts as a proxy for Iran, Syria, and Venezuela,
a violent jihadist group had a presence in Latin America.
But in the hearing, it was disclosed that they also have a
presence in 15 American cities and four major cities in Canada.
We were told that we shouldn't be too concerned because that
terrorist activity was limited to fundraising.
Well, if you are a terrorist organization bent on
destruction of Israel and the West and you are raising money, I
don't see the distinction between raising money and actual
terrorist plots because that money presumably is used to
finance the terrorist plots that are directed at us.
So I would just like to try to again, get beyond the
pleasantries and the, you know, the subtleties of, you know, of
whether or not al-Qaeda poses any threat and that is just to
accept that they do and let's talk honestly and directly about
how imminent that threat is.
See, al-Qaeda is an organization much like Nazi Germany.
You know, Nazis swore a personal oath to Adolf Hitler and it
was thought that when he died that it ended. Same is true with
al-Qaeda, but the problem is this: The post-bin Laden al-Qaeda
is younger, more tech-savvy, more aggressive, and found in
places where we previously never thought they were.
Like we found in the investigation regarding the Boston
Marathon bombers. So I just like to get beyond, you know, the
niceties and let's deal with the black and white, and I would
start with Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Very good points, Mr. Higgins.
Briefly I would make two comments. One is, my personal
assessment is when one looks at the al-Qaeda threat to the U.S.
homeland the most severe threats today are coming from
Pakistan, Yemen, and a few other locations.
Not Iran, but on your question about whether the threat is
imminent, I have looked carefully over the last several years
and written on it, I do think the Iran contingent is
significant to monitor. I would say it is not as imminent as it
appears in several other places but I wanted to say a few other
things.
One is the fact that they have got Yasin Al Suri in Iranian
territory is of concern. He has been involved in al-Qaeda
plotting. He is a member of bin Laden's inner Shi'I; he is is
still there. Yasin Al Suri, Muhsin al Fadhli, and a range of
others, these are core al-Qaeda operatives in Iran that does
present a threat.
What is in it for Iran? I think the most dangerous prospect
frankly from al-Qaeda's contingent in Iran is if there were to
be a U.S. or Israeli strike against Iranian interests, that
would probably increase my assessment of Iran's interest in
using and encouraging Iranian al-Qaeda--proxies in Iran to
attack.
My sense is that they have been pretty cautious on this
about getting involved, getting al-Qaeda involved in an attack
for that very reason, not to encourage--increase the impetus
for U.S. or Israeli strike. I think that would be one key issue
to watch. A strike or greater tension might trigger Iran to
even close its relationship with them.
Just one last point. Again, I do think it is worth noting
that there has been some tension between al-Qaeda and Iran on
al-Qaeda and Iraq targeting of Shi'i which has been consistent
and on the Jabhat al-Nusrah's attacks against Hezbollah and
Iranians in Syria.
So there have been tensions. The situation is complex. On
your question about whether it is imminent, I would say no, not
compared to other cases right now, but situations could change
including elevation of the Israeli/U.S. and Iranian conflict
which would make it more imminent in my view.
Mr. Simcox. I would echo some of--much of Dr. Jones'
comments and I think that the severe imminent threats do come
from Yemen and Pakistan.
What concerns me though about Iran in comparison to those
countries is that we have a good working relationship with the
Yemeni government in terms of intelligence sharing and those we
target.
Similarly in Pakistan the drone strikes have has helped
degrade al-Qaeda's operations there. The problem is we don't
have that with Iran and we don't--there is too much we don't
know I feel about what is going on in Iran to be able to make a
completely thorough assessment of how imminent the threat is.
Now I would suggest that the main threat is still from
Pakistan and Yemen but I wouldn't say that that is gonna be
necessarily the case for the next 5 to 10 years because we know
so little about their involvement in Iran, because obviously
the relations between the United States and Iran are what they
are.
One other thing I would suggest is the interaction between
al-Qaeda and Iran is also not--it doesn't necessarily have to
be this way. There are opportunities I believe for the West to
sow division and Dr. Jones mentioned the al-Qaeda and Iraq and
Iranian hatred and I do believe it is a visceral hatred and the
fact that in Syria at the moment obviously they are on
competing sites.
So extremely complex and not an easy one for the United
States to figure out an effective response to, but I think
there are both great threats but also potential opportunities.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, I come after it from a little bit of a
different perspective in that there absolutely are numerous
areas where the two are at loggerheads especially in Syria
today, Iran and al-Qaeda and elsewhere.
But I think again if you look back at the historical record
what comes out over and over again since the early 1990s that
these these two have been able to come to agreement on areas
they can collude.
That is the official position of the Obama administration,
which as I said has really paved the way through the Treasury
Department and the State Department to expose the current
agreement which allows yes, you know, Syrians and others to
operate inside Iran.
I just want to read for the record what the Treasury
Department said in its October 2012 announcement that says,
``Under the terms of the agreements between al-Qaeda and Iran,
al-Qaeda must refrain from conducting any operations within
Iranian territory and recruiting operatives inside Iran while
keeping Iranian authorities informed of their activities. In
return--'' this is what the Treasury Department said, ``The
government of Iran gave the Iran-based al-Qaeda network freedom
of operation and the uninhibited ability to travel for
extremists in their family.
The threat to the al-Qaeda members there because Iran
doesn't want to allow them to do whatever they want to do, they
want to have some say in how this all goes is that if al-Qaeda
members violate these terms they then run the risk of being
detained by Iranian authorities.
So again, this is part of the official U.S. Government
record now directly contradicting exactly all of those quotes
of the Congressman Higgins read off from the senior Iranian
officials.
Just pointing out that the Treasury Department, State
Department, the Obama administration have already come out and
said what they are saying, the Iranian officials are saying
that this is wrong.
One other quick note about al-Qaeda and Iraq, this is where
this gets really so complicated. One of the things in all of
this is yet absolutely true that Iran and and al-Qaeda were on
the opposite sides in terms of the killings of Shiites within
Iraq and that there is animosity there absolutely.
But look back to February 2012 when the Treasury Department
released its second designation of the Iran al-Qaeda
relationship. The Treasury Department came out and said
specifically that Iran's ministry of intelligence and security
actually provided assistance not just for al-Qaeda but also
members of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
So they are a very duplicitous bunch who play double games
in all these areas and you can't just assume away that
differences of opinion are going to prevent collusion.
Mr. Barfi. When we first heard reports that al-Qaeda
operatives had moved to Iran, we were basically--analysts were
basically puzzled because of the ideological constraints
between the two sides.
Al-Qaeda is very Shi'i and the Shi'i grows out of Salafi/
Wahhabi theology. The Iranian regime is a Shi'i theocracy, but
over time, we have seen that Iran has used al-Qaeda as a tool
and we don't know how far it will go to extend the use of that
tool, and will it use it to bleed the West and particularly the
United States?
We have seen not only al-Qaeda core operatives active in
Iran but we have also had reports that al-Qaeda affiliates have
had relations with the Iranians, specifically AQAP.
Specifically, a defector said that there was a lot of activity
going back and forth between Iran and the organization.
Again we see an ideological problem because we have now
reports that the Iranian government is funding the Houthi
rebellion in northern Yemen that has led by a Shi'i offshoot.
That is much closer to Sunniism than the Shi'i who rule Iran.
So we see ideological problems but we do also see pragmatic
understandings or cooperation between the organizations and we
will probably see that in the time to come also because there
is a lot of senior operatives in al-Qaeda and remember the al-
Qaeda core has been decimated in Pakistan but those people in
Iran, there is no drones flying over there, so they are not
being killed.
Mr. Higgins. Just a final thought. On April 22, 1 month
ago, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced the arrest of
two people in connection with plotting a terrorist attack on a
passenger train, high-impact target, it travels from Toronto,
90 miles from Buffalo through Niagara Falls, 20 miles from
Buffalo, and into New York City, a place that has known the
cruel fate of a terrorist attack.
According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the alleged
terrorists were receiving assistance from al-Qaeda elements in
Iran.
With all due respect, gentlemen, that to me, is an imminent
threat.
I will yield back.
Mr. King. Oh, I am sorry. Yield back?
Mr. Higgins. Yes.
Mr. King. I now recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr.
Stewart, who as a new Member of the committee has really shown
extreme interest in this issue and I commend him for that and I
now recognize him for his questioning.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I speak for many
when we recognize that you have been a National leader on this
for many years and we appreciate that.
To the witnesses, thank you for being with us today. Thanks
for the sacrifice in being here and what you have told us and
the expertise that you hold is important and so we appreciate
an opportunity to spend a few minutes with you.
Although I have to say it frustrates me just a little bit
and I will explain what I mean by that and I don't mean it in a
negative way but it illustrates that we live in a complicated
world and this is a very complicated part of the world.
It is dangerous, it is unpredictable, and it is frankly
hard to sort out the good guys from the bad which is I think
you have illustrated and talked about that today. You have JN,
FSA, al-Qaeda, you talked about now Westerners who have gone in
and joined the fight and that is even more complicated and more
difficult when you try to predict the future because the
reality is a very dynamic part of the world and that
allegiances and loyalties can change and shift quickly and you
may not know what the lay of the land is going to look like
tomorrow even let alone a year or several years down the road.
I was a pilot in the Air Force for 14 years. I have I think
a general sense of the situation there but not any specific
sense and so I want to ask you just very simply are there any
rebel groups in Syria right now that you would recommend that
we could trust, that we could you know in in any fashion
consider an ally to us and sharing values or someone we could
have a strategic alliance with, with any degree of comfort?
Mr. Barfi. I was hoping you would ask that question. I
spent a lot of time with Lewa Al-Tawhid, it is the biggest
rebel group fighting in the province of Aleppo.
I have spent time with the foot soldiers from the villages,
I spent time with the leadership. These people are thoroughly
nationalists. They are not secular. We have to take the
difference between what it means to be secular, nationalist,
and jihadist.
These people believe in the Syrian state. They want to
fight for an independent Syrian state where they have the
freedoms that they want. They don't want to take the fight
anywhere else. They don't believe in global jihad. They don't
want to fight the Israelis. They just want the regime to leave
them alone and have a chance to succeed.
These guys do not speak of radicalism. They are not calling
the Alawis heretics. They are trying to build a democratic
state where everybody has the freedom and you respect the
minorities and these are the types of groups that our
intelligence communities needed to vet and get the training and
get the arms through because they are the best opportunity to
overthrow the regime to strengthen the nationalists at the
expense of the jihadists and to instill confidence in the
Syrians that the western nations in the international community
is doing something for them and that they do not have to turn
to the jihadists and Islamists who are the best fighters on the
battlefields, sir.
Mr. Stewart. I appreciate you sharing that with us. Let me
challenge you just a little if I could and I am not disagreeing
with you like just sincerely want to know. We said the same
thing about some of the participants in Libya for example or in
Egypt and it turned out that they weren't nearly as democratic
nor as friendly to the Western ideals as we thought they were
at one time. Do you think that might be the case here as well?
Mr. Barfi. Basically the problem you had in Egypt was there
was no fighting in Egypt and you moved very quickly. There was
no transition. You deposed Hosni Mubarak who was a secular
authoritarian leader. He was president for 30 years.
There was not a lot of democracy in Egypt. Elections were
rigged. There was a tolerated opposition but they could do
nothing. They had no freedoms. So once you had the fall of the
regime and the quick elections who could benefit?
Only the Islamists because you can organize in the mosque
but you cannot organize in the streets so they had some type of
organization. So they were able to win and as we see the
problems of Muslim brotherhood.
What happened in Libya is we did not directly arm the
militias. What we did is we subcontracted it to the Qataries.
The Qataries had different--and I spent 6 months in Libya
during the revolution so I was able to meet with the leaders--
the politicians and the military leaders.
What happened is the Qataries did not choose--they don't
have the same ideals and ideology as we do. They are playing
also to their own domestic constituencies and a lot of their
domestic constituencies espouse what we would consider
intolerant ideas and intolerant groups, so they funded those
militias during the campaigns specifically February 17 brigade
which was an Islamic brigade.
We did not work with the defectors, the army defectors who
had an army units specifically Asayahiah, which were the
special forces under Abdul Fatah Younis who was the interior--
he was the interior minister under Kadafi. He participated in
the 1969 revolution. He moved up to military ranks.
He knew what a military organization was, and he was
assassinated by the Islamists. We never helped them or his
people. We never funded them. So we subcontracted. That was the
problem there.
If we work directly here in Syria and we are doing the same
thing. We are subcontracting with the Qataries and the Saudi's
again in Syria. If we deal directly. If we vet directly. If we
used our intelligence agencies directly, if they go on the
field and see: (A) The capability of these people and (B), what
their ideology is we won't have those problems, Mr.
Congressman.
Mr. Stewart. Mr. Chairman, do we have some latitude with
time then? Yes?
I have a second question I think it will be a little easier
to answer but before I do, from other witnesses, do you--is
there a consensus among you that this is a group that we can
form an alliance with or do you have some hesitation in that?
Mr. Jones. I have some hesitation. I have some hesitation
because I think polling done before the war did show that most
Syrians do not support al-Qaeda's ideology. That there appears
to be pretty good data on that.
But, the one concern I have is hearing from some senior
free Syrian army officials that the United States putting
Jabhat al-Nusrah on the foreign terrorist organization list was
unhelpful and that they actually were playing a role in the
opposition was a concerning remark.
Because in that sense that is a very--I see that is a very
short-term comment where they can be helpful in overthrowing
the regime but again my biggest concern though is Jabhat al-
Nusrah is getting stronger and it has a some support from the
opposition leadership. That is where I would pause.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. I am going to move on but before you let
me just make a quick comment regarding this if I could I mean
American----
Mr. King. I would just say to the gentleman, and don't
worry about time. Just ask your questions. Don't worry about
it.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The American people, by nature, we want to help. When you
see, you know, the death among civilians particularly in Syria
and I spent a couple of nights ago with some officials from
Tunisia and Egypt and Morocco and Libya, and it was encouraging
for me to hear them talk about their revolution.
This wasn't just a change in government. They viewed this
as our revolution just like we viewed 1776 as our revolution
and that was, I said, encouraging to me, but again I am
extraordinarily cautious in forming alliances there or
supposing that we can form alliances that it is going to have
significant outcome and then wonder what happens in the future,
but having said that, let me move on if I could.
Mr. Joscelyn, you have talked, to steal your phrase, you
mentioned ``creative ways to attack'' and I would like to look
at that, if we could, you know as devastating as a conventional
attack is it certainly a tragedy and it is one that we have to
be aware of and guard against in every way, but reality is is
that there are much more destructive outcomes that could
potentially happen to us.
Pakistan has obviously a large number of nuclear weapons.
Syria, Iran, and Iraq have possession of, or groups there have
perhaps access, to you know other weapons of mass destruction,
particularly chemical weapons. I just wondered how you view
that threat, the threat of an attack with weapons of mass
destruction.
Does it appear to be something that they are aggressively
moving towards or is it not--is that too big of an apple for
them? Is this something they don't really want to undertake at
this time? If you could just share your feelings on, you know,
that threat because if that happens of course that is a world-
changing event. Any thoughts on that from many of the panel?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, I will say this: I don't think, you
know, I don't know of any detail or intelligence that they are
currently in possession of any kind of weapons like that, but I
think you need to take it very seriously the long-standing
rhetoric to come out of----
Mr. Stewart. Well, could I interrupt just to clarify. I
mean when you say they, you mean some of the rebel groups or
terrorists?
Mr. Joscelyn. Yes, exactly. You were mentioning to me new
talk about there is a friend in Syria who clearly has an
interest in obtaining the chemical weapons and other weapons
there; has already been receiving higher--more heavy armaments
from captured bases and the like.
You talk about in Pakistan there is this elaborate game in
Pakistan, which is really worth a whole 'nother hearing about
how al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups have even attacked
nuclear installations as part of their elaborate game to try
and sort of free up the security around those arms.
What I would say is I don't know of any intelligence right
now that these groups have these weapons. What I would say that
I am concerned about is that it is something they talked about
now for well more than a decade, that they want to get these
weapons.
You talk about--Chairman King mentioned Abu Ghaith earlier
who was previously in Iran and then you know was arrested and
detained after he left Iran.
One of the things that Abu Ghaith actually spoke about, he
was a close spokesman for Osama bin Laden after 9/11, and
inside Iran in 2002 he actually spoke openly about the
necessity of acquiring these weapons, and he is only one of
many of these al-Qaeda ideologues who talk along these lines.
So part of the downside I would say of taking a hands-off
approach for example to Syria or something along those lines is
we are not being proactive in trying to figure out a way to
prevent them from achieving that goal.
I think Mr. Barfi here said it far better than I could,
that basically subcontracting out to others to do this type of
work runs all sorts of risks in and of itself.
Mr. Stewart. Yes, anyone else?
Mr. Simcox.
Mr. Simcox. Sure, yes. I think that if they--I don't know
if they--I mean--I don't believe at the moment I have not seen
anything to suggest they do have weapons, al-Qaeda or these
affiliated groups, but if they got them, I believe they would
use them without a shadow of a doubt.
I mean let's--it is different personalities but the same
group:
9/11 killed 3,000. If it was 30, great, from our point of view.
I don't see any evidence to suggest that they would hold back.
In terms of and the Syrian question, it is extremely
difficult. I guess I would just always return to the point that
America's involvement or its lack of it--it won't be thanked
either way.
I think America wants to help. It tries to do good. It gets
involved in Iraq. It is--by many it is hated for it. It doesn't
get involved in Bosnia; by many, it is hated for it. Syria, I
think it is going to be the same.
Mr. Stewart. Yes, I would agree with that. Maybe I will
just close with this comment.
It is clearly their objective. They would clearly look to
have access to those, any weapons of mass destruction, whatever
they might be. As that area becomes less and less stable and
less and less predictable, I don't think we can imagine what
the command and control of those weapons might eventually in
whose hands they might reside including Pakistan with their
nuclear warheads and one day an event in Pakistan could shift
the world as far as how we view that threat.
So with that, Mr. Chairman I back and thank you.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee is recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman of the committee
and the Ranking Member and also thank the Chairman and Ranking
Member for what have been a series of very instructive and very
important hearings on this issue.
Allow me to apologize for not being here at the beginning
as we were laying a wreath at the women's war memorial as we
approach Memorial Day, which reminds us of the sacrifice of
many of the men and women of the United States military in
battles of yesteryear and battles of today.
I wanted to ask both Dr. Jones and Dr. Barfi, as I have
listened--and Mr. Barfi--as I have listened to the testimony
just this question: What preparation should the United States
be engaged in on the basis of what we are listening to in terms
of what the world is today? Whether we speak of al-Qaeda,
whether we speak of others, what should the United States be
doing?
Dr. Jones and Mr. Barfi.
Mr. Jones. Very briefly, I think we: (A) Must recognize
that there is in my view a growing threat from Salafi jihadist
groups that has existed in North Africa and the Levant areas we
have talked about through Persia, Iran, and down into South
Asia and potentially other areas.
I think as we have seen in a few places like Iraq, large
numbers of American forces are probably not the answer. So I
think what we are looking at is clandestine units from the
Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. intelligence
organizations, U.S. special operations forces that need to be
able to do to things as we just talked about on the chemical
side, if it becomes clear that Jabhat al-Nusrah has access to
chemical weapons.
We need organizations like Delta to be able to go in and
seize control over those kinds of materials before or after,
ideally before, somebody gets their hands--but I think this is
the kind of struggle that we are talking about.
I do think the biggest weakness that we have along these
lines is our cutting and funding for a number of years and
actually eliminating the U.S. Information Agency which was so
effective in combating the Soviet Union's ideology during the
Cold War.
I don't think our inner agencies' coordination on pushing
back against this ideology is what it should be. I don't think
it is funded as well as it should be, and again I don't think
it is as coordinated as well as it should be.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that has been very constructive.
Mr. Barfi. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Barfi. The biggest problem, Congresswoman, is that we
have a new frontier, a new front in the Arab world, after these
Arab Springs. We used to have--we had a long-term working
relationships with intelligence agencies in the Middle East
specifically with the Egyptians.
We had redlines to Omar Souleyman who headed the
intelligence agencies and a great friend of the United States.
He was a right-hand man of Mubarak. We no longer have those
access and those channels and those lines open.
We need to develop new relationships. In Libya we had a man
named, Musa Kusa that we worked with. He defected. He is now
sitting in Qatar; hangs out in hotels all day. He is no longer
giving us any more information.
So we had to figure out how to get this information. Who is
going to tell us what these guys are doing on the ground? There
are several ways you can do that. You can either: (A) Develop
your own intelligence sources and own contacts on the ground,
or you develop new relationships with the organizations.
In Egypt, it is going to be specifically difficult because
we have a new front. That is another problem that we have in
the Arab Spring. We have these new fronts. We saw what happened
in Benghazi. Sinai, Congresswoman, is a big problem. We have
seen jihadists gather there not only from Egypt but from other
countries. They have already attacked Egyptian soldiers in the
desert.
They have already had cross-border raids into Israel and
they are using sophisticated weapons. We are not just seeing
small arms. We are seeing surface-to-air missiles that have
been smuggled in. These are big problems.
So we need to develop these new relationships with these
people. Also, and the problem that with Egypt is: What are you
going to do? The Egyptian forces do not have the
counterterrorism training.
There is an organization called the Central Security Forces
that works in the, in the Sinai Peninsula after the Camp David
Accords, these are rejects. These are military rejects. In
Egypt you need to have conscription.
These are people that are largely illiterate. They couldn't
get into the Armed Forces so they have this outlet into Central
Security Forces. So we need to figure out what are we going to
do. Are we going to train these guys? Are we going to try to
train some new counterterrorism people? Those are the big
problems that we have moving forward.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
That is expansive--let me raise the question on the role of
the Canadian Mounted Police April 22 and these proposed efforts
by individuals that would attack a train that was leaving
Toronto going into New York.
Again, obviously as my Chairman has often said, one of the
targets that they believe draws the most international
attention. I have two questions that I would like to pose to
Mr. Simcox and Dr. Jones.
Do you think al-Qaeda is operating in Iran as they turn
their head without governmental intervention or support? Do you
believe that--in the instance of the April 22 incident that the
Iranian government may have known about the incident, proposed
incident, and chose to look the other way?
Is this not disturbing, given our relationship with Iran? I
think it builds on what Mr. Barfi has indicated about getting
new sources and that certainly concerns me, and again, what do
you suggest that the United States do in focusing on this
relationship with Iran knowing that these operatives are living
there but in particular, did they turn their heads and is al-
Qaeda living there with complete protection, if you will,
because the government looks the other way?
Dr. Jones. And Mr. Simcox.
Mr. Jones. Very good questions. If I understood your two
questions correctly, in my assessment in looking at this issue
to some degree, the Iranian government is aware of al-Qaeda's
role there.
It has been aware from the beginning. It had conversations
in Afghanistan before they left in 2001. So yes, they are
aware. Yes, they have provided support.
My understanding is they have been a little bit cautious on
encouraging external attacks outside of Iran against Western
countries.
I was actually suspicious at first of that, there was a
connection with this particular Canadian plot that went back to
al-Qaeda in Iran. I was wrong. I went back and looked more
carefully at this particular situation and there does appear to
have been al-Qaeda in Iran involvement in the plot in several
respects including operatives along the Iranian Afghanistan
border where, it is worth noting, the United States is
downsizing if not withdrawing entirely from Afghanistan.
I have seen no evidence that the Iranian government was
involved or aware. It is possible. I have seen in talking
extensively with a range of peoples who should know. I have
seen no evidence that they were aware. I would be surprised if
the Iranian government was involved in the attack.
Again, I don't know whether they were aware--they are
monitoring these people very closely. It is certainly possible
that they saw something along these lines. Again, they are
monitoring them. I think in terms of what to do--look, I think
the Iranian government needs to be pressured to get rid of
these guys; return them to their home countries.
They do appear--and they don't like a public discussion
along these lines. I think the more we talk about this in
forums like this, the more pressure it puts them on because I
think most Shi'i are not going to be happy with an al-Qaeda
Sunni presence in Iran--in Iran, not something I think they are
going to want more talk about publicly. So I encourage her
questions along these lines because I do think it makes them
uncomfortable.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Simcox.
Mr. Simcox. I certainly believe that al-Qaeda is operating
in Iran. I think Iran certainly knows the whereabouts of these
individuals. I think there is a support that is going on
between the two.
It has been a--Iran has been a safe haven almost for some
of these individuals that went there after the fall of the
Taliban in the immediate post-9/11 world.
My sense is that the Iranian government--I also haven't
seen evidence to suggest the Iranian government was involved in
the Canadian plot. I would also suggest that they would have to
be--to get involved in that kind of planning and the attention
it would bring would be a grave strategic mistake on their
part.
Now that doesn't mean they haven't made a grave strategic
mistake, it is entirely possible. But I would be a little bit
skeptical to suggest they knew about it. It is possible they
didn't look the other way, but in terms of actual operational
involvement, I am a little more skeptical.
I would suggest that if they did know, it was more about
letting it happen as opposed to actively forcing it. In terms
of the United States--what the United States can do with Iran,
I don't see a whole host of great options here, because the
United States has reached out to Iran very, very publicly under
the Obama administration especially after he had just been
elected, this hasn't been reciprocated in any way shape or form
as far as I can tell by the Iranian government.
My sense is that they--the presence of al-Qaeda operatives
on their soil is something they see as a potentially useful
bargaining chip down the line in terms of any negotiations that
may be going on with, for example, the Iranian nuclear program.
So that is essentially how I see it but I certainly think
there is going to be--there is no reason at the moment for Iran
to rein in the activities of al-Qaeda and that seems to me to
be quite a big problem.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If the Chairman would allow me one last
question, I would appreciate it. Thank you very much.
I will pose it to Dr. Jones and Mr. Barfi if some others
want to comment. Does Syria have--let me ask the obvious--
chemical warfare capacity? But will Dr. Assad use it and what
other elements in Syria might use or might have access to these
chemical weapons?
Dr. Jones, and if someone else wants to comment.
Thank you very much. I will just conclude as I am listening
to your answer is that sometimes people would argue that
information is a negative element.
I frankly believe that we are now poised with what is
happened at the Boston Marathon to not turn any moment to get
information and to act and react, or to act proactively than
right now, and so I thank the Chairman for this hearing.
But would you please----
Mr. Jones. Yes. I think the answer to your question is the
Syrian government does have access, does have stockpiles of
especially chemical materials. It has likely used to them in
some capacity and I suspect as long as it stays a danger, will
have an impetus to potentially use them.
I think if one looks at the involvement of Jabhat al-Nusrah
and other organizations in seizing control of the al-Jara
airbase, of dam facilities, of an Air Force base in Iblib, and
a number of other locations, assuming the Syrian regime does
collapse eventually, I think there is a decent likelihood that
this material will not be secured and organizations that are in
the opposition may have the ability to control it.
So I think there is a very serious danger of this material
getting outside of the government's hands and potentially
outside of other states-in-the-regions' hands. This I would say
is a very serious--I have already heard some potential
indications of some opposition groups essentially getting their
hands on small amounts of chemical material, which is a very
disturbing.
Mr. Barfi. So the problem with Syria is it has, I think,
the third or fourth largest arsenal of chemical weapons in the
world. Basically, the president's father, Bashar's father,
Hafez, created this as a turn against an Israeli first strike.
It was not supposed to be used in offensive capacity.
Now that the regime is under is under threat and may lose
power, we have seen the regime and resort to small uses of it
as it increases its use of its weapons of its arsenal, it has
gotten to the point where it has used its most lethal ones,
chemical weapons, in very small amounts.
I think we will see it because if there is no response to
an international community, there is no reason to believe that
the regime will not increase its use of the weapons on more
wide-scale levels that will result in higher levels of civilian
casualties.
The problem with the weapons falling outside the control of
the regime is it is a very hard if you don't have expertise in
these weapons to use them. It is not like MacGyver, the A Team,
you mix a couple of substances and you are going to be able to
use it.
The problem is: How are you going to deliver it? What are
you going to put it on? These people cannot put these weapons
on a rocket. You need very sophisticated people and it is not
something that you can learn on the internet like the Boston
bombers how to build a bomb in the kitchen of your mom.
You need experts in that and we don't see that these people
have those experts at this time. They would love to get their
hands on these weapons but they would--even if they did, they
wouldn't know how to use them and they would see casualties on
their own side before they were even able to to put these into
play.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank all the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. King. The gentlelady yields back.
I just have a few follow-up questions.
Mr. Joscelyn, to give bipartisan credit, throughout your
statement you seem to give the Obama administration credit for
both the State Department and the Treasury Department for
recognizing and focusing in on the threat of al-Qaeda and Iran.
Is there anything else you think the administration should be
doing that it is not regarding the al-Qaeda elements in Iran?
Mr. Joscelyn. You know, it is tough to say. Seth here
mentioned that sunlight in asking these questions plays a big
role and I totally agree with that.
As a result of the Treasury Department designating Yasin Al
Suri as the head of al-Qaeda's network in Iran, he was
basically sidelined and what they did was they allowed Muhsin
al Fadhli who was the current head of al-Qaeda and Iran to come
out of prison to take over the network.
So that sunlight I think that Seth is mentioning has direct
effects on their behavior. So the more you expose the facts of
what is going on, the better it is.
I just want to interject one quick thing on the idea of the
Canada plots and whether or not Iranian officials were
involved. Like the other witnesses, I haven't seen any specific
evidence saying that any Iranian officials were involved.
My only hesitation is I don't think we really know one way
or another and part of the reason for that is the way the
Treasury Department has described the agreement between Iran
and al-Qaeda, it says explicitly that al-Qaeda must keep
Iranian authorities informed of their activities otherwise if
they violate these terms they run the risk of being detained by
Iranian authorities.
I don't know the answer to this question, in the wake of
the Canada plots, I don't know of any al-Qaeda operatives
inside Iran who were detained or arrested. Maybe some were, I
don't know of any and I think that would be indicative one way
or another of either tacitly turning a blind eye and approving
of something like that or possibly just, you know, basically
looking the other way as the Congresswoman asked.
The other thing I would say about that is that where one of
these platters went for training and to meet in Zahadan Eastern
Iran is also a major hub for the Iranian Quds Force. The RGC
Quds Force.
They traffic drugs through there. They traffic arms through
there illicitly. It is basically crawling with Quds Force
operatives who report right up to the regime.
It is one of those towns--Zahadan is one of those towns
where the collusion between these various parties is quite
evident. So I don't know the answer to that question whether
Iranian authorities were involved in the Canada plots either, I
just say that there are good reasons to actually keep pressing
the inquiry.
Mr. King. With the apprehension of bin Laden's son-in-law,
I know the questioning was stopped after I think 22 hours, but
what is the potential do you see from him from obtaining
information about the al-Qaeda presence in Iran?
How close was he once he was in Iran? How much access do
you think he would have had to knowledge as to what the true
relationship is? The complexity of the relationship?
Mr. Joscelyn. I think it is a good question. I think you
can have quite a bit.
I mean, here is the complexity of all of this, right? What
happens after 9/11 is that Abu Ghaith turns into this chief
spokesman for bin Laden. He sitting next to him within days of
the plot on a video, right? Days of the 9/11 attack on a video.
He then, some time in early 2002 according to press
reporting, flees into Iran. Now I have previously reported and
I have put together a string of facts of what he did inside of
Iran in 2002 including threatening the United States, including
a cell that he was tied to in an attack on U.S. Marines in the
Failaka Islands off of Kuwait.
There is a whole string of things that were tied to him
basically as he is on Iranian soil in 2002. Then in 2003 he is
placed under house arrest. Basically I think the Iranians were
spooked by a number of things; one were these international
plots were tied to al-Qaeda's Iranian presence where there were
complaints from the Saudi's and U.S. Government, back to Seth's
point, the transparency and sunshine does have an effect on
their behavior.
So he and others are put under house arrest. Now here is
where this just turns again is that we know from the Treasury
Department that by 2005 the Iranians had now cut a deal with
other al-Qaeda operatives to allow them to freely operate
inside Iran and some of those operatives include guys who were
tied to Abu Ghaith.
So I would say the unpacking all of this in figuring out
what he knows about all of this is crucial for kind of
understanding--he is one of few eyewitnesses that we would have
in custody that actually could tell us how all of this unfolded
and sort of the double game and the sort of inconsistent
behaviors people have seen of the Iranian regime toward all of
this.
Mr. King. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one remark.
My understanding of the lay down in Iran is that there is some
compartmentalization of individuals that have been under house
arrest so I do think the interrogation can be quite useful.
It won't give a big--a complete picture of the relationship
with Iran because I do think it is somewhat compartmentalized,
but it will give a portion.
You know, there are other places where there would be
useful access to information. The bin Laden documents I
understand that have still not been released have plenty of
information about al-Qaeda's involvement in Iran and vice
versa. Whether that gets released or not is obviously
administration decision.
Mr. Joscelyn. I totally agree with that. I would urge
transparency as much as possible with the bin Laden documents.
As I have reported, hundreds of thousands of documents and
files were recovered during the May 2011 raid in Abbattabad.
The administration has released a grand total of 17 of them
out of hundreds of thousands. This was announced in a speech at
the Wilson Center by current CIA director John Brennan.
Ironically enough, he was promoting transparency on behalf of
the Obama administration and government.
I think we can hold them to that and say if you really want
to be transparent, you should release as many of these
documents as possible including all documents, not just some,
all documents dealing with Iran's collusion with al-Qaeda.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Mr. Barfi, this will be my final question and Mr. Barfi and
any of you can comment on it.
Assuming we can't find a group in Syria that can be trusted
that we feel is no jihadist threat, and we supply them with
weapons, and Assad is overthrown, at the end of the day, is JN
though the one best place to take over that movement in order
to have a successful revolution, have elements at least
reasonably favorable to the West, bring that about, but then
have JN take over the revolution?
Mr. Barfi. The problem there, Congressman, is that JN has a
strategic vision of not what it wants to do right now in the
revolution, but it wants to do in the day after.
It knows that the big fight is not now against Assad, it is
what the future of Syria is. So what are they doing? They are
taking over infrastructure.
They have taken over the grains, the granaries. So they
have grain supply so they can bring the bread to win over the
confidence of the people; the hearts and the minds.
They control strategic roads and access points in Syria
that link certain very important areas when you need to bring
final fighters and you need to bring final provisions in.
You take control of the oil installation in the northeast.
They are controlling all of this infrastructure, and they can
squeeze people for things that they want later on.
What will likely happen after the fall of the regime is we
will see local warlords pop up in certain regions. It will be
very cantanized in Syria; focused on cities. There will be five
brigades fighting for al-Ethel. Another six fighting for Hama
and Homs. This is the way the revolution will play out, these
warlords will fight each other.
What needs to be done is that JN cannot sit on the
sidelines, hide the weapons--this is another problem is JN--and
this is, I know from talking to people who have raided bases
with them. They are very good--they are put in charge sometimes
in dividing the spoils.
So they get the first choice of what they want when they
take a base and they get the weaponry. So they have all these
things. So the problem is the day after. What does JN do?
Does JN sit on the sidelines and watch these nationalist
brigades fight amongst themselves while it strengthens itself,
it strengthens its ties to the community?--and you have to
understand, Congressman, JN is very, very popular.
I was in Zelepos when they were designated terrorist
organization in the front of al-Qaeda in Iran, and a lot of
people asked me why did America do this? Why does America hate
JN so much? You have to understand their popularity is very
high and it is not because people like al-Qaeda.
They are not talking about other ideology. They are talking
about what they do for society. Every day people line up at the
entrance to JN's headquarters and ask them for help in solving
problems and they do it in an organized way. So that is
something we have to worry about.
So, the day after these brigades are going to fight amongst
themselves. What is JN going to do? Are they going to stand on
the sidelines? Is it going to throw its weight with certain
brigades?
What needs to be done and what we need to encourage is the
day after these brigades turn on JN first and then they solve
their problems. They weaken JN before they weaken themselves
and that is what we need to focus on.
Mr. King. Would they be willing to consolidate their
position against JN or would each be like an individual warlord
unwilling to share? In other words, can there be that sense of
coordination among the other elements?
Mr. Barfi. You need to use your leverage. If you are
funding certain brigades, if you are the United States and you
are funneling aid in weapons to certain brigades, you then have
influence over them and you can use that influence to achieve
your goals.
If you are not playing the game with people, there is no
reason for them to help you. So if we can fund the strike
brigades and we tell them we want X, Y, and Z and you take a
hands-off approach and see--we don't get involved too many
cooks in the broth there--you can get the goals that you want.
You can achieve that saying hey, the day after this is what you
should do to worry about what you need.
Mr. King. I have to watch what I say, but let me ask you.
Do you think we are asserting that now? Are we paving the way
to assert that or are we just dealing through subcontractors?
We can't do it through Qatar.
Mr. Barfi. Yes, I think that we need to get more directly
involved at this point in time. Look, nobody wants to send our
boys overseas to put them in harm's way. We want to focus on
rebuilding the homeland after all these years where our forces
have been away, but we need to deny al-Qaeda a new safe haven.
They are on the run in Pakistan. They are on the run in
Yemen. Why give them a new opportunity in the heart of the Arab
world? You have got to keep them on the run and we need to deny
them that. That is why we need to get more involved at this
point in time, and if we don't, we will have this haven and we
will have other actors that aren't our friends being involved
funneling aid to the wrong organizations.
Mr. King. I think we are on the same page.
Anybody else want to comment on that?
Okay.
Well, let me thank all of the witnesses. This has really
been a very illuminating hearing. I want to thank all of you
for your expertise over the years and for sharing it with us
today.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions
for you and we will ask you to respond to these in writing and
probably the only negative part of this is because you have
always performed so well, we may ask you back again and tie up
some more of your time, but thank you very much.
And without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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