[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
TERRORIST GROUPS IN SYRIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 20, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-95
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Brian Michael Jenkins, senior adviser to the president, RAND
Corporation.................................................... 5
Mr. Phillip Smyth, Middle East research analyst, University of
Maryland....................................................... 17
Mr. Barak Barfi, research fellow, The New America Foundation..... 25
Mr. Andrew J. Tabler, senior fellow, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 31
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Brian Michael Jenkins: Prepared statement.................... 7
Mr. Phillip Smyth: Prepared statement............................ 18
Mr. Barak Barfi: Prepared statement.............................. 27
Mr. Andrew J. Tabler: Prepared statement......................... 33
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 48
Hearing minutes.................................................. 49
TERRORIST GROUPS IN SYRIA
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions and extraneous materials for the record subject to
the length limitation and the rules. Ranking Member Sherman is
momentarily delayed. He will be here and he will be recognized
for his opening statement as soon as he arrives. I do want to
thank everyone, especially the panelists, for waiting during
the last series of votes. I appreciate your diligence and also
appreciate you being here.
The crisis in Syria is a complicated mess. The poster in
front here and once again on the screen, outlines to some
extent the situation. At the very top of the poster, in yellow,
is the Kurdish intrusion into what is Syria. The red portions
are where the opposition, the rebels, all the rebel groups,
different groups in different areas, but the red is the
opposition controlling certain areas of Syria. The green is
controlled by Assad. The vast majority of the land that is in
white, that is uninhabited areas of Syria.
The butcher Assad has slaughtered countless innocent
civilians and has used chemical weapons on his own people.
Every day Syrians flee the country in thousands to escape the
horror. Assad is supported by the Iranian regime and their Shia
killers Hezbollah. Hezbollah is the main reason why Assad has
remained in power. Without thousands of highly trained
Hezbollah killers it is possible that the regime would have
been toppled by now. The IRGC and Quds Force are actively
propping up Assad to maintain Shia control of Syria and allow
Iran to project its power across the region.
Aside from Hezbollah and Assad's armed forces, there are
irregular militias called Shabihas that are loyal death squads
for the regime. On the other side you have the Sunni fighters
who range from so-called moderates to hard core extremists with
ties to al-Qaeda. The worst of the lot is the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria, ISIS, which is al-Qaeda. ISIS works closely
with al-Qaeda in Iraq to create a safe haven from which they
can conduct their reign of terror. ISIS numbers well into the
thousands, and most of the foreign fighters who have come to
Syria fight with ISIS. I will repeat that. The foreign fighters
that come are those that fight with ISIS.
It isn't just the numbers that are important, it is what
they are fighting for and how effective they are. ISIS sits at
the top of the pyramid and then you have Jabhat al-Nusra, or
JN, which is another jihadist group that shares al-Qaeda's
ideas and objectives. Neither of these groups, in my opinion,
are moderates. Both fund their operations from Gulf country
donations, kidnappings, protection rackets, muscling in on the
oil trade and other illegal means. Then there is another major
Sunni group is Ahrar al-Sham, which many consider to be the
strongest and most effective fighting force in several key
cities. They may not be exactly al-Qaeda, but they are not
exactly good folks either.
So the so-called moderates fight for the Supreme Military
Command Council, or SMC. General Salim Idris is the leader of
this group. If you recall, this is the same group that the
State Department was saying that we should arm to topple Assad.
These fighters were billed as moderates who would keep al-Qaeda
from taking over, but over the last several months a large
faction of the SMC has actually defected to the radical
extremist. It is not even clear if the SMC actually has any
control over its fighters on the ground. It has been said that
these groups were never true secular nationalists but Islamics
from varying degrees.
With so-called moderates fleeing into the arms of al-Qaeda,
it seems that conflict has become a war between radical al-
Qaeda affiliated extremists and a brutal dictator. It is hard
for me to see a clear winner and one that the United States can
support. We don't want the Iranians to dominate in Syria with
their now puppet Assad, we also don't want al-Qaeda taking over
the country and linking Syria with al-Qaeda presence in Iraq.
Left with this impossible choice, it is hard to see how further
U.S. involvement can change the situation for the better.
The regional implications of this conflict are important to
understand and that is why we are here today. It is a
possibility that Assad could be removed and then the rebel
forces commit civil war against each other to see who is going
to control the country. That is yet to be determined. Massive
refugee flows are destabilizing our allies in the region and
threaten to overwhelm large portions of their countries. I was
recently in Turkey, and on the Syrian border with Turkey
visited a refugee camp with over 150,000 Syrians who had fled
the war and now are in Turkey. Refugees are in numerous
countries around the area.
The fear of chemical weapons proliferation to terrorist
groups is a possibility despite weapons inspectors trying to
secure as many as they can. Radical foreign fighters who come
to Syria to fight will eventually return home and may be
motivated to launch attacks at the urging of al-Qaeda. We also
know there are U.S. citizens who have traveled to Syria for
jihad. We need to be on top of their travels and intentions so
they don't come back and attack the United States. It is
important for us to understand these groups that are active in
Syria so we know not only who we are dealing with but what they
plan to do and achieve in their objectives. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses.
I now turn over to my ranking member, Mr. Sherman from
California, for 5 minutes for his opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these
hearings. The scale of violence in Syria is well known to all
of us, 120,000 people have died. Iran and Hezbollah are
providing money, men and munitions to the brutal Assad regime.
Two explosions near the Iranian Embassy in Beirut appear to
have killed 23 people including the Iranian cultural attache to
Lebanon. A Sunni jihadist group said it was behind the attack,
and this of course is not the first time that Sunni jihadists
have carried out deadly attacks inside Hezbollah controlled
areas in Lebanon. The bombing serves as an indicator of a major
spillover from the Syrian conflict into Lebanon, and we don't
have to be reminded what an ethnic and religious tinderbox
Lebanon was from 1975 to 1990.
There are no excellent options involving Syria. Only the
weaker part of the opposition shares with us a dedication to
democracy, human rights or even a pale imitation thereof. But
as reprehensible as some of the Sunni jihadists are, it is the
Assad/Hezbollah/Tehran axis which is a greater threat to the
United States and our interests than even the worst elements, I
would say even the al-Qaeda elements of the opposition, though
trying to choose from between very bad actors is certainly not
something we prefer to do.
In March 2013 I joined with the ranking member of the full
committee, Eliot Engel, and with the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence chairman, Mike Rogers, in introducing
the Free Syria Act which would authorize and direct the
President to provide appropriate assistance including limited
lethal equipment to carefully vetted Syrian opposition members.
Clearly, the number and organization and power of the good
forces in Syria has declined vis-a-vis both the Assad regime
and the Sunni jihadists, yet I still think that working with
the reasonable elements of the opposition is the best of the
bad choices available to us.
We see Jabhat al-Nusra, the ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant, and the rapidly growing Ahrar al-Sham, or free
men of the Levant, growing in power in Syria. We know that at
least two of those groups have pledged their allegiance to al-
Qaeda central, or perhaps we should call it al-Qaeda the
franchisor, and the moderate rebel group, the Free Syrian Army,
has been losing fighters and capacities to the hard core
extremists. If we have to reflect on how brutal those
extremists are, we can see a video that apparently they posted
on YouTube showing themselves killing truck drivers in Iraq
simply because these gentlemen were Alawites and were unable to
successfully pretend to be Sunnis.
The al-Qaeda affiliated groups have brought bomb making and
other war fighting capacities to the Syrian civil war. They
have recruited young men into their ranks, and they are
instilling extremist views. The Saudis and others of our
friends in the Gulf are deeply frustrated of the
administration's lack of ample lethal aid, even nonlethal aid
to the Syrian rebels, but our friends in the Gulf are a little
less concerned about dedication to human rights or even to
peace between nations when they decide which groups in Syria to
support.
Tens of thousands of Hezbollah members fight along Assad,
all with the support of an Iranian Government, and all with the
Iraqi Government that we created allowing planes to go over its
territory carrying IRGC to Damascus. I could go on, but I
should yield back and I do.
Mr. Poe. I thank the ranking member. Are there other
members that wish to be recognized for opening statements? The
chair will recognize the vice chair of this committee, Mr.
Kinzinger, for 1 minute.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses who have come in today. The ongoing conflict in
Syria has rapidly evolved into a historic holy war between
Sunnis and Shiites. This has left us with an atrocity of well
over 115,000 dead, and a conservative estimate of 2.24 million
refugees and IDPs.
I supported President Obama earlier this year in limited
U.S. military strikes as a punishment for chemical weapons use,
but in solving a larger crisis the simple fact is we waited too
long. We waited too long to exert U.S. influence in the region,
thus creating a power vacuum and leaving open the door for al-
Qaeda, Hezbollah, Iran and Russia to fill this void. All groups
that I certainly do not want to exert more influence in the
Middle East.
I am not fully sure what the answer is and I look forward
to hearing what the panel suggests. But what I do know is if
the U.S. continues to sit on the sidelines and present
ourselves as an unreliable partner in the Middle East, we will
lose significant influence in the region and the world. I look
forward to the testimonies of the witnesses, and I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, gentlemen. I will introduce the
witnesses at this time. We have several good witnesses for us
today. Mr. Brian Michael Jenkins is a senior advisor to the
president of the RAND Corporation, author of numerous books,
reports and articles on terrorism related topics. He formerly
served as chair of the political science department at RAND.
Phillip Smyth is a Middle East analyst at the University of
Maryland's Laboratory for Cultural Dynamics where he focuses on
Lebanese, Hezbollah and other regional Iranian Shia proxies. He
was formerly an American based research fellow at the GLORIA
Center.
Mr. Barfi is a research fellow at the New America
Foundation where he specializes in Arab and Islamic affairs.
Previously, Barak was a visiting fellow at the Brookings
Institution. Mr. Andrew Tabler is a senior fellow in the
program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute, where he
focuses on Syria and U.S. policy in the Levant. During 14 years
of residence in the Middle East, Mr. Tabler served most
recently as a consultant on U.S.-Syria relations for the
International Crisis Group, and a fellow at the Institute of
Current World Affairs.
Without objection, all the witnesses' prepared statements
will be made a part of the record. I ask that each witness keep
your presentation to no more than 5 minutes. There is a clock
in front of you somewhere. When you see the yellow light come
on that tells you you have 1 minute, and the red means your 5
minutes are up. I will start with Mr. Jenkins.
STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISER TO THE
PRESIDENT, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jenkins. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, members
of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify. Let me
start with the assertion that other than as a scrap of color on
a map, Syria has ceased to exist. For the foreseeable future,
no government will be able to rule the entire country. With
support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, Syrian Government
forces appear to have stalemated a fragmented rebel movement.
Rebel forces do control large areas of the country where
government forces have withdrawn, but even if Assad falls, they
too will be unable to impose their authority throughout Syria.
Moreover, as you pointed out in your opening statements, the
growing role of jihadist elements has divided the rebel
movement and discouraged Western governments from providing the
rebels with significant military support.
It is against this background that the committee has asked
me to address the role of Sunni and Shia terrorism. On the
Sunni side, Syria represents al-Qaeda's best chance of
establishing a new base in the Middle East from which to
continue its terrorist campaign against the West. Two groups
are directly linked to al-Qaeda--the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant, ISIL--or ISIS, using the term Sham instead of the
Levant--and Jabhat al-Nusra. Through its ferocity on the
battlefield and dramatic suicide bombings, al-Nusra has
attracted financial support and recruits to become what many
regard as the most effective rebel force. ISIS, or ISIL, is
simply the latest incarnation of the al-Qaeda in Iraq that
emerged after the American invasion.
Since the American withdrawal, the group has continued its
terrorist campaign in Iraq while expanding its area of
operations to include Syria. I should point out here just
briefly that Sham, the last word in the title, implies
something much broader than modern-day Syria. It is something
that encompasses Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and of
course Israel. So this is a much broader assertion of a
theater. The rebel forces have attracted between 6,000 and
8,000 foreign fighters. Most of them come from Arab countries,
but an estimated 500 or so come from Western countries.
These numbers will increase as the fighting continues.
Europe, especially, is worried about what may happen when these
fighters return home, possibly to engage in terrorist
activities. It is not an immediate problem, as the flow of
recruits right now is toward Syria, not the other way. However,
arriving volunteers could be recruited by al-Qaeda operatives
to carry out terrorist operations in the West. We have to
recall that Muhammad Atta originally came to fight in
Afghanistan but was then recruited by al-Qaeda and turned
around to lead the 9/11 operation. Insofar as we know,
comparatively few of these foreign fighters have come from the
United States. Some have, but the chatter on the social media
certainly indicates aspirations for others to go.
Hezbollah represents the Shia side of terrorism, although
Hezbollah's forces in Syria are fighting a more conventional
war, bolstering a regime that is worried about the loyalty of
its Sunni troops. Hezbollah is also training the militias that
will bear an increasing portion of the fighting. In my view,
terrorism certainly will be a growing feature of the Syrian
conflict. The rebels are able to take smaller towns, infiltrate
larger cities, and carry out spectacular terrorist attacks. But
as these enclaves are consolidated--as what we might refer to
as the front lines become harder--terrorism will become the
rebels' principal weapon.
On the other side, the Syrian Government's approach to
counterinsurgency is essentially a strategy of terror. It is
marked by intensive aerial and artillery bombardment, razing
entire neighborhoods and towns, deliberately targeting the
civilian population in the rebel zones. This style of fighting
serves the dual purpose of terrorizing supporters of the rebels
while binding Assad's forces to the regime. Local militias are
now probably Syria's best weapons of mass destruction. Backed
by the conventional forces of the Syrian armed forces, they
root out rebel fighters and they carry out ethnic cleansing.
As national institutions are warned away by the continuing
conflict, the militias are going to become the primary
protectors of the regime's enclaves. This has implications for
any future foreign military intervention. You mentioned the
refugees. About a third of Syria's population has either fled
the country or been displaced internally. According to U.N.
estimates, by the end of 2014, more than half of Syria's
population will be living as refugees, a situation conducive to
future terrorism. So what began as a rebellion against the
regime of Bashar al-Assad has become a sectarian war that has
exacerbated the sectarian tensions in Iraq and Lebanon, as well
as in Syria, and increases the likelihood of a wider regional
conflict that will affect diaspora communities as well. One way
or another, we will be dealing with the effluent of Syria's
conflict for decades. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you. Mr. Smyth, the chair recognizes you for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. PHILLIP SMYTH, MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH ANALYST,
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
Mr. Smyth. Chairman Poe and Ranking Minority Member
Sherman, thank you for the opportunity to be able to speak to
the subcommittee. As Syria continues to burn and the United
States attempts to both assess its interests and protect our
existing interests, there is a major player in its proxies
which are often misunderstood and also receive less attention.
In early March 2013, British Foreign Minister William Hague
said and I quote, ``Syria today has become the top destination
for jihadists.'' The jihadists he was referring to are Sunni
Islamists fighting as part of a number of Syrian rebel groups.
However, an often overlooked, growing, well organized and
highly militarily capable jihadist element within Syria is not
only pro-Assad, but it is also Shia Islamist in nature, in
addition to being backed and run by Iran. Shia jihadis, their
movements and the narratives they utilize are highly developed
and form part of a larger Iranian regional strategy.
Tehran's main regional proxies which believe in, promote,
and project Iran's ``Islamic Revolutionary'' ideology are the
main contributors of Shia fighters through Syria. The proxy
groups sending combatants include Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq's
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Organization, Kata'ib Hezbollah,
and smaller Iranian backed splinters from Iraqi Shia radical
leader, Muqtada al-Sadr. Announcing its existence in May,
Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada--this is another Iraq-based Iranian
client organization--claims to have sent some 500 fighters to
Syria, and they are quite brutal.
Starting in mid-October, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq publicly called
for Iraqi Shia volunteers to join the organization's fight in
Syria. For months prior there have also been reports of trained
volunteer fighters who had joined Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asa'ib
Ahl al-Haq and they were then trained in Iran or Lebanon in
Hezbollah's training camps and were then flown to Syria. Some
of the combatants have included the Shia from as far afield as
Saudi Arabia, Cote d'Ivoire and even Afghanistan.
These Shia elements have constituted a key element which
has secured and provided a powerful kinetic force to keep the
Assad regime in power. According to one Lebanese Hezbollah
fighter who was interviewed by Time magazine, and this is a
great quote, ``If we don't defend the Syrian regime it would
fall within 2 hours.''
Without the initial push by Iran and the utilization of its
proxy network, Shia armed involvement via the deployment of
volunteer fighters and trained assets would have likely
constituted a very limited effect on the battlefield. It is
also probable that without Iran's regional network of Shia
Islamist fighters, the Assad regime would have been unable to
mount any of its most recent offensives. Now all these factors
are contributing to a hypersectarianization of the conflict. To
quote an Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq singer--yes, they have propaganda
singers. His name is Ali al-Delfi. ``We are not simply fighting
for Bashar, we fight for Shiism.'' Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smyth follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Mr. Barfi for 5 minutes please.
STATEMENT OF MR. BARAK BARFI, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION
Mr. Barfi. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me to testify today about the various jihadist
groups operating in Syria. Before I begin, I just want to give
a quick shout out to my advisor/professor Richard Bulliet at
Columbia who taught me all the nuances of Islam that Phillip
has just reviewed with me.
Syria has emerged as the number one destination of foreign
jihadists. Pipelines from the Arabian Peninsula, Europe and
North Africa funnel fighters to Syria. Some of these fighters
have allied with homegrown extremists to create the Syrian al-
Qaeda affiliate known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,
or ISIS. Today, ISIS is the strongest brigade in Syria with a
robust presence in many of country's provinces. However,
although media attention is largely focused on ISIS, there are
a number of other Salafist and jihadist brigades organizations
that espouse an anti-modern and anti-Western message that are
active in Syria.
ISIS' roots date back to the January 2012 creation of
Jabhat al-Nusra, or JN, when al-Qaeda's Iraqi affiliate, the
Islamic State in Iraq, or ISI, sought to exploit the Syrian
revolution to establish a regional branch there. On April 8th,
2013, ISI's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced that JN had
been absorbed into ISI to become ISIS. JN's leader rebuffed the
merger and received the support of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri. Nevertheless, within days many JN fighters defected
to ISIS. ISIS also took over a number of JN's compounds.
Moderate members deserted for the rebel-led Free Syrian Army or
FSA. It appeared that JN was on the brink of disintegration.
But shedding outliers who enflamed internal dissent lead to
a more unified membership and a more cohesive ideology. The
issue of takfirism, or declaring a Muslim an infidel, was
bitterly contested within JN. The leadership was never
comfortable with the extremists who advocated it and were
pleased that they jumped ship to ISIS. In addition, most of the
radicals who left were foreign fighters, allowing JN to present
itself as authentically Syrian. Tensions between ISIS and JN
are illustrated by the events in the city of Raqqa.
After the April merger, JN's leader Abu Sa'd decided not to
join ISIS. Instead, he abandoned JN's compound that is now
under ISIS control with about 30 fighters. After keeping a low
profile for several months as it reorganized, JN reemerged in
September. In the interim, it absorbs units from the rebel-led
Free Syrian Army who felt threatened by ISIS' consolidation of
power. A number of units from the 11th Division such as Thuwar
Raqqa and Muntasir Billah joined JN. But JN's comeback vexed
ISIS, which responded by incarcerating the former leader Abu
Sa'd. In other areas such as Aleppo, ISIS members have defected
back to JN.
Other factors have brought the intra-al-Qaeda conflict to
the fore. On November 8th, al-Zawahiri announced the disbanding
of ISIS, restricting al-Baghdadi's theater to Iraq and
appointing JN as al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate. Given ISIS'
independence from al-Qaeda's Pakistan based leadership, and its
autonomous financial resources, al-Baghdadi has no need to
accept al-Zawahiri's diktats. He has previously rebuffed al-
Zawahiri's Syrian directives and is likely to do so again. As
smaller brigades such as Asifa al-Shamal and Ghuraba al-Sham
are squeezed out of the revolution by their larger
counterparts, it is likely that rebel groups will consolidate
into pro-ISIS and anti-ISIS groups. The anti-ISIS block will
probably in the future be led by organizations such as JN. Such
mergers portend a future battle where JN will play an important
role as the bulwark against ISIS expansion.
ISIS is able to act with impunity because of its
predominance in the Syrian arena. It has a qualitative
superiority over FSA units. Foreign jihadists brought with them
skills learned in other conflicts. In addition, its ideological
dedication to the revolution, often lacking in other FSA
brigades, reflects a commitment that is admired by Syrians of
all stripes. It is not only the organization's martial prowess
that assures its popularity. In a war that has devastated state
institutions, Syrians have few options for judicial
arbitration. Because ISIS' leaders are mainly foreign they can
portray themselves as neutral mediators.
The organization also provides municipal and social
services such as supplying grain to bakeries and establishing
schools and summer camps. Local circumstances often dictate its
relationship with the civilian community. In the areas where
corrupt FSA units or inefficient administrators operated prior
to its arrival, ISIS has been welcomed. But in regions where
local officials have created a modicum of government, ISIS has
received poor grades. ISIS seeks to create an Islamic state
guided by the harshest interpretation of Islamic law that have
little grounding in Islamic history.
The organization has declared that its struggle will not
end with the toppling of the Syrian regime. It plans to take
the fight to other Arab countries in its quest to create a
nebulous caliphate. ISIS cooperates with many FSA and Islamist
brigades. They sponsor joint operations and divide the spoils
between them. But the organization has also clashed with other
rebel groups. When ISIS sought to consolidate its control over
Raqqa, it dispatched a suicide bomber to destroy a compound of
FSA unit Ahfad al-Rasul. In July, ISIS killed Kamal Hamami, a
senior FSA leader in Ltakia. His death sparked FSA promises of
a military riposte that never materialized. Indeed, various FSA
units often boast it will take on ISIS only to back down later.
In some provinces such as Raqqa, the FSA in no longer in a
position to challenge it. In others such as Aleppo----
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barfi follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. The gentleman's time has expired. We do have your
entire statement. Thank you, Mr. Barfi. And Mr. Tabler, you
have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. ANDREW J. TABLER, SENIOR FELLOW, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Tabler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sherman, and to my fellow panelists, thanks for this
opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today. I have
been asked to focus my testimony on U.S. national security
interests in the region affected by the Syria conflict, what it
means for Syria's neighbors, and regional implications. I will
be as brief as I can on three very important questions.
I have been working on Syria for about 13 years, including
living in the country for about seven. To put the current
situation in perspective, historically Syria's primary
importance to the United States is based on its role as the
keystone in the post-Ottoman Middle East state architecture.
Many, if not most of you, remember the 15-year Lebanon war,
where civil strife spawned civil war, terrorism, and the
destruction of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut,
whose 241 killed marked the single largest day death toll for
the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima.
The Lebanon war was horrible, but strategically and
metaphorically, and I don't mean to belittle it, Lebanon was
just the small row house on the end of a block of states carved
out of the Ottoman Empire by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It was
hard for the fighting and sectarianism to spread, most notably
because the forces of the two neighboring row houses, Israel
and a demographically different and more stable Syria under
Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez, that intervened to stop and
contain the sectarian nature of the conflict. Syria, in
comparison, is the big row house in the middle of the block.
And while the United States does not have historic
interests in Syria and spent many years on opposite sides
during the Cold War and the War on Terrorism, almost all of
Syria's neighbors are strategic U.S. allies--Israel, Jordan,
Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon, which is not allied with the United
States, but where Washington has considerable interests and
challenges. What that effectively means is that what happens in
Syria is not going to stay there, and it is difficult to
contain.
What happened in Lebanon during the '70s and '80s is also
occurring in Syria. A similar conflict, but it is happening
much faster and on different levels. Regional sectarian
rivalries are competing in Syria's bloody fight with the
vanguard forces coming from the laundry list of U.S. designated
foreign terrorist organizations. Today Hezbollah, IRGC-Quds
Force and other Iranian backed Shia militias fight alongside
the Assad regime in the west. Salafists and jihadists, some of
whom are al-Qaeda affiliates fight alongside and often against,
these days at least, the Syrian Sunni dominated opposition. And
in Kurdish areas, the Democratic Union Party, the PYD, an
organization closely affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers
Party otherwise known as the PKK, is now dominant.
In a policy sense, the Syrian Arab Republic, which was a
founding member of the 1979 list of State Sponsors of
Terrorism, has devolved into three Syrias in which U.S.
designated terrorist organizations are not only present, but
ascendant. As a result, U.S. national security interests
affected by the Syria conflict are growing in number and in
scale. This is not going to go away any time soon and is going
to be an issue for U.S. foreign policy makers and could also be
an issue on the domestic scene depending on which way the
Syrian conflict goes and the threats that come out of it.
Those that I can identify, and I don't claim to speak
absolutely the truth on this, but I have identified five
general areas. One, first, concerns stability of key U.S.
Middle East allies. Thus far, Syrian refugees and cross border
fighting have been the primary security threats to Israel,
Jordan, Turkey as well as Lebanon. With up to half the Syrian
population on the move, or a third, estimates here depend,
those who are taking shelter either inside of Syria or in
neighboring countries, these areas become breeding grounds for
terrorist groups that oppose not only their host countries, but
the United States as well.
Counter terrorism, both sides in the Syria conflict have
moved to the extremes over the last year as my fellow panelists
have outlined. There is now what I call a convergence of
threats in Syria with direct Iranian influence via terrorist
groups at an all-time high in the Levant as a whole, and al-
Qaeda affiliates also spreading among the opposition. It seems
likely that Syria will devolve into a number of what are
increasingly described as ungoverned spaces from which U.S.
designated terrorist organizations could launch operations in
Syria, but across the globe.
There is also energy security as well. The nature of the
Syrian conflict is increasingly sectarian fueled by both sides,
and with the generally Shia forces supported by Iran and the
Sunni forces supported by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. As
this conflict gets more sectarian, it eats down in the
sectarian nature of Syrian society in the region. That would
also have a knock-on effect concerning the price of oil. The
price of oil is not set by source, ladies and gentlemen. It is
a world commodity and it is set by overall risk in the world to
the supplies.
There is also a large step to non-proliferation concerning
chemical weapons which have been addressed via the recent
agreement between Russia and the United Nations and the United
States on its destruction, and of course we have the
humanitarian concerns and the health concerns with a major
outbreak of polio occurring in the middle of the country. I
will just conclude. There are a number of other recommendations
in the written testimony.
What I can say to you in brief is that while the Chemical
Weapons Convention which is recently agreed seemed to have
addressed that aspect of the threat emerging from Syria, on the
other issues that I outlined it seems as if we are just kicking
the can down the road. And as I think my fellow panelists have
outlined, the threats emerging out of Syria will continue for
the foreseeable future with no easy solutions for the United
States or our allies. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tabler follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank all the panelists for their statements. We
will begin the questions. I will recognize myself for 5
minutes.
Carve the scenario out hypothetically, if you can, and I
know it is a hypothetical and it is based on your expertise.
But down the road, as Mr. Tabler says, it is going to be
eventually somebody is going to win and somebody is going to
lose. You have got two terrorist groups on each side. The
entire region is unstable because of what has taken place in
Syria. So assume Assad wins and is able to run the rebels out.
How does that play out? Assume he loses, the rebel groups take
over. Is there civil war? Just kind of look into the future, if
you can, for me. And I will ask that question to all four of
you.
Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. It is a great question. I don't see one side
prevailing in this conflict. Even if Assad were to fall and the
fighting were to continue, Assad's growing power is not going
to be able to, in the foreseeable future, reassert his
authority throughout the country. So I think the premise has to
be one of continuing conflict among a kaleidoscope of ethnic
and sectarian groups in Syria that could go on for many, many
years, and that is really the premise.
In that kind of scenario, the United States, without
significant investment, is really at the margin. So the
question becomes not one of whether we can back Assad or back
the rebels against him, but rather what can we do within that
kind of environment to meet the objectives that Mr. Tabler has
identified in the country? What can we do to best serve our
interests in a continuing conflict? And to even raise the
broader question, although it may sound cynical, I know we,
naturally, as Americans want to get to postwar on this, but
given the nature of the conflict, can we get there? And is it
absolutely vital to U.S. interests that we try to end the
fighting in Syria, or do we simply accept that it will continue
and try to contain it, and, as I say, live with this thing as
it is, as these jihadists and Hezbollah and others tear each
other up inside of the country once known as Syria?
Mr. Poe. Thank you. I am going to change the question
because you are running out of time. Try to make your answers
shorter if you can. Terrorist groups and their influence in
neighboring countries, whether it is the Assad regime or the
rebel groups, their effect on neighbors--Jordan, Lebanon, and
even Israel.
So Mr. Smyth, I will just ask you that question. How do you
see that what has taken place what is the direction of those
groups?
Mr. Smyth. The direction in particular if you want to focus
on the Iranian backed organizations, they are becoming an
extremely professional force and they are very, very tough. We
now have units that could directly attack Israeli interests,
American interests, Saudi interests, and they are building
their power up in Syria. This is kind of like their training
ground in many ways. In fact, Lebanese Hezbollah was sending
its reserve troops into Syria so that they could essentially
train and gain combat skills. And where do you think they are
going to send them afterwards? They are likely going to send
them to South Lebanon. That is usually where they put more of
their trained men. Often they send them other places to create
new Iranian proxy organizations.
In terms of these other groups, Salafi jihadi groups, Sunni
organizations, they too are gaining valuable combat experience.
And it is interesting kind of trying to outline this. Iran has
its own Islamic revolutionary ideology and it is a global
ideology. They really do believe in this kind of Messianic
future. The same thing goes for these Sunni jihadists. And they
are all trying to get to that end. You now have two radical
forms of Islamism fighting each other and this doesn't mean
necessarily that they are going to stop fighting Western
interests or any of their other enemies in the area.
Mr. Poe. All right. My time has expired. I will recognize
the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from California, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Judge. And for those who would take
delight in the fact that Sunni extremists who hate America are
killing Shiite extremists who hate America, we have to reflect
on the fact that they are both learning how to kill. It used to
be even a question whether the Alawites would really part to
the Shiite movement. They are certainly not the Twelver Shiites
that dominate Iran, and there are many different subgroups
within the Sunni community. What we are seeing now is in effect
a regionwide from Iran to Syria, a battle between Shiites and
Sunnis.
Have each group coalesced sufficiently so that the
different flavors of Sunnis all cooperate notwithstanding
theological differences, and Alawites and Twelver Shiites and
other Shiite inspired but theologically different organizations
coalesce, do we see a coming together of two sides?
Mr. Barfi. So when we look at Alawis, Alawism starts in the
10th century. It is basically an offshoot of the 11th Shia
Imam, and they are what is known as Ghuluww, or they are very
extreme in their dedication to Ahl is to the point where he
becomes a god or a deity. They were outside the pale of Shiism
for centuries. Both the Sunnis, the Sunnis considered them
infidels. Into the 19th century they were seen as worse than
the Jews and Christians. They couldn't give testimony in courts
in Syria. The Shia had no relationship with them historically.
It starts to change in the early 20th century under French and
Turkish influence. That really doesn't go anywhere because they
tried to impose the Jafari or Twelver school of law. Later some
Alawi scholars go to Iran and Iraq and they bring back books
and some scholars. That made a little bit more progress.
But the Alawis, they don't pray in mosques. They are
antinomian, which means they don't abide by any of the precepts
of Islam--fasting during Ramadan, five prayers, abstaining from
drinking alcohol. So there is----
Mr. Sherman. Are you saying the Alawis drink alcohol and
don't fast during Ramadan?
Mr. Barfi. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. And don't do all of the various things that
some of us associate with Islam, and yet there seems to be a
very solid bond. One of the other witnesses talks about how
someone says I am not dying for Assad, I am dying for Shia.
Yes, and I am sure that was an Alawite who is now ready to die
for Shiitism. Have the Alawites and the Twelver and other
Shiites come together? Mr. Smyth?
Mr. Smyth. Well, first of all, that singer is actually an
Iraqi Shia. He sings for Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq. So that is a
special group that the Alliance created. However, you are
hitting on something very, very important. Iran is trying to
coalesce Shia as a whole, especially Twelver Shia, behind the
Iranian mantle. We are your protectors. This is the message----
Mr. Sherman. Yes, they protect Twelver Shiites, they now
seem to be protecting a group that generations ago they might
not have accepted as even being Islam. But I do want to move on
to another question. Who is financing the Sunni extremists in
Syria? Does that money come from well connected people in Saudi
Arabia, and do the Saudis happen to know that al-Qaeda likes
blowing up things associated with the royal family?
Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. For the groups that are not the hard core al-
Qaeda groups that we have identified, certainly Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, and the other Gulf monarchies are providing support to
those groups. For those that have been identified as al-Qaeda-
linked, it appears to be that their funding is coming from
private donations primarily in the Gulf monarchies.
Mr. Sherman. And these private citizens, they are not the
salt of the earth. They are very rich individuals who are well
connected and allowed to do this?
Mr. Jenkins. They are wealthy individuals, and there is a
curious relationship in which a number of the rebel groups in a
sense emerged during the rebellion and declared themselves on
social media in order to seek foreign patrons. A little bit
like football teams in a sense except you create the team first
and you look for a wealthy backer, and then you brag about your
numbers and your exploits in order to keep that flow of support
coming. There is a lot of that taking place, and it involves
extremely wealthy individuals.
Mr. Sherman. So there are people in Syria who would want to
kill us who are financed by well connected folks in the Gulf,
and I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Sherman yields back. The chair recognizes the vice
chair, Mr. Kinzinger, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again thank you
all for being here. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
there is no really good answer here. And I think it was well
said that when the chairman asked to game out both options,
rebels win or Assad wins, what does it look like, and the
answer is, well, there is always going to be lawlessness in
Syria. This is in essence Afghanistan pre-9/11 now. And so I
think it is difficult.
But with that said, I want to pose to each of you the
question of--again, I have been critical of the administration
in saying we should have been out there more. We should have
been engaged early, when this was a handleable situation. But
we are where we are today, and unfortunately I haven't found
the time machine yet. If I do you will know about it because I
will go back and maybe we will never even talk about it then.
But I will start with you, Mr. Tabler. If you want to just
talk about, briefly, what is the U.S.'s option here and how
should we be more involved in order to see an outcome? And
again, whether it is Assad stays or Assad goes, how can we have
a more peaceful outcome with U.S. involvement? I want to hear
your thoughts on this.
Mr. Tabler. A very good question. There are various
methods. We have so many policy objectives running at the same
time in Syria now it would very hard to achieve them all. Since
the summer of 2011, August 2011 to be specific, the position of
the United States is that Assad should step aside and lead to a
transitional governing body which is outlined in the Geneva
Accord of June 2012.
Mr. Kinzinger. I think it is safe to say too, that was
before we had an intense amount of extremist groups.
Mr. Tabler. That is right. And so what has happened over
time is that the ability to pursue those ends via state means
has gone down. It was one of the downsides of a hands-off, lead
from behind policy, as has been described, or the light
footprint. There are several definitions for this and I am not
claiming to know which one it is. So what has happened over
time is that as the conflict has morphed and grown in scale and
the state has been destroyed, and I think Mr. Jenkins outlined
that and the other panelists as well, the question is, how do
you then confront this convergence of threats that are coming
out of Syria, both on the Iranian side and on the overall Sunni
side and the extremist nature of the fight?
There are two primary areas. One is through direct
intervention, and that was most recently debated concerning the
Assad regime's use, according to U.S. intelligence estimates,
of sarin gas inside of Syria. The President did not go down
that road, and that would have been a limited strike. Those
kind of options are still on the table, and the White House
continues to say that they are on the table. I don't know
anybody that really sees how that might play out anytime soon,
but we simply don't know.
The other way to arrest this, in the case of the CW
incident it was concerning the regime, going forward you could
launch ground strikes or other kinds of direct strikes on
various terrorist groups. It is possible. Usually not done
without the permission of the state itself, and I don't think
the Assad regime would appreciate us bombing their associated
forces. They might prefer if we bombed the rebels.
Then there is indirect intervention. And indirect
intervention involves essentially like in Iraq, the Sahwa. It
involves working with politically and militarily with groups on
the ground to peel them away from the extremists. It is a much
more slower, much more intelligent and sometimes precise way of
defeating terrorists. The problem with that is it is very
difficult to have a hands-off, lead from behind light footprint
policy and to do that covertly.
Mr. Kinzinger. And I think just to tag on, it is basically
the U.S. has to get more involved or the U.S. has to accept the
chaos that is going to follow.
Mr. Tabler. Right. It would be hard to see how the
situation in Syria gets better toward our interest without more
American involvement. The question is what is the degree of
that involvement? And that is where, until now it is still
hotly debated. But what we can definitely say is that what we
are doing until now is not working in terms of pursuing our
interests, whether they are getting Assad to step aside or to
undermine extremism in the region or a lot of other issues that
we pursue in the region as a whole. So the question is what to
do next.
Mr. Kinzinger. I don't think anybody really knows what our
policy is right now.
Mr. Tabler. There is extreme confusion even among those of
us that have followed this for a long time and even those that
have contact with the administration about how the
administration would pursue and achieve its conflicting goals.
That is true.
Mr. Kinzinger. And there is a lot of confusion among our
allies as well, which is just as disheartening.
Mr. Tabler. And anger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes. With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield
back. Thank you. Right on time too.
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman for watching the clock. The
chair recognizes the other gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling this hearing. Mr. Barfi, I will start with you. Do you
have a sense of how many organizations or groups are inside
Syria fighting either on the side of the regime or against the
regime? Ballpark number.
Mr. Barfi. There is hundreds of units and brigades. Some of
them such as Liwa al-Tawhid is a very big brigade composed of
different units numbering in the thousands. They are based in a
province such as Aleppo. Then you have a Salafist brigade like
Ahrar al-Sham, they are in several provinces and we are talking
10,000, 15,000, 20,000 fighters. Very strong. Then you have
smaller groups like Amr ibn al-As which has a couple hundred
fighters. But what is happening is it is a Pac-Man approach.
Those larger brigades are slowly eating up the smaller
brigades.
Mr. Schneider. So this summer I read a report that there
was as many as 1,200 different groups fighting inside Syria.
Has that number decreased at this point, expanded or stayed
fairly constant?
Mr. Barfi. You would think that there is going to be a
decrease as you have mergers and integrations. However, you are
also seeing the emergence of new groups like Katibat al Nur in
Aleppo. It is created by intellectuals and financed by
businessmen because they thought that the FSA was giving the
revolution a bad name.
Mr. Schneider. Is a sense, I heard someone else use this
context. The fighters coming in from the outside this gentleman
described as fierce, and they are to fight to the death and
even continue fighting after any negotiated agreement that
might be possible, whereas, I would imagine businessmen coming
together are not going to have the same fierceness of fight
that some of these extremist groups have. Is that a fair
characterization or am I jumping to a conclusion?
Mr. Barfi. Well, I am sorry. Maybe I wasn't so clear. The
businessmen are funding the brigade. But what you see is the
people that come from abroad they are much more ideological in
the reasons that they fight for. Some of these other units,
they were created by criminal gangs. They were just bored and
had nothing to do. The revolution came, hey, let us get
together and make our criminal gang a rebel brigade and we can
show that we are defending society and then steal cars under
that banner instead.
Mr. Schneider. As I look at Syria, and other people have
described this, that any military victory for either side would
be a catastrophe for Syria. One side overtaking the other and
the subsequent massacres and things you might expect. With all
these groups fighting and fighting each other with the Pac-Man
strategy taking, do any of you all, and I will leave this up to
the entire panel, does anyone think there is a prospect for a
political resolution to the civil war?
Mr. Jenkins. I certainly don't. I think the increasingly
given nature of the tactics on both sides has now turned this
into an existential contest for all concerned. That is, among
the participants in the conflict none of them can clearly see a
way in which they would survive under a regime that was
dominated by another. And there is just an accumulation of too
much bloodshed and too many calls for revenge to bring them
together. I don't think a political solution is on. That is my
view.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Tabler, I saw you are looking to answer.
Mr. Tabler. A political solution to put Syria, the Syrian
Arab Republic as it is officially known, back together in the
foreseeable future, I think it would be very difficult to
achieve. The administration is determined to start that process
in talks in Geneva. I think those are now going to take place
in January. There was a rumor that they might take place on
December 12th. It would be very difficult to achieve those
objectives. What I think we will have for the foreseeable
future is, well, we will have a du jour Syria on a map, which
is the one that is in front of us here, and in a de facto sense
it will be divided into those three general areas that I
outlined in my presentation. The problem is that the lines of
control, the contours of control will not be clear. It will be
more like a mosaic.
The other major problem is, especially in the opposition
groups that in the face of such bloodshed we expected their
elites to congeal, to come together more under a national
banner. For a variety of reasons not just foreign sponsorship
but also some, historically from my own work some historical
proclivities within Syria that occur when people come out of an
authoritarian system like that it gives way to grandiosity
among leaders. It is not uncommon among politicians of course,
but only if in the end--yes, present company excepted--but only
in the end if it leads to the destruction of a nation. And I
think what we are going to have to deal with is a divided Syria
for the foreseeable future.
Mr. Schneider. I am sorry. I see I am out of time. If you
could subsequently maybe touch on the fact with that as a
statement, as a policy guidance, should the United States lean
in and try to affect what is happening on the ground in Syria
or should we stand back and try to contain everything within
Syria? And I will yield.
Mr. Tabler. Would you like me, I can answer that?
Mr. Poe. Very quickly.
Mr. Tabler. Sure. I think that containing it within Syria
is not working. We have to deal with the disease itself. We
have to just decide whether that involves the de facto
partition of the country and how we deal with it. And then I
think that will make it easier to deal with the different
threats that I outlined. Trying to put the two sides back
together at this point and have kind of a viable solution seems
at the moment a pipe dream.
Mr. Poe. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. The chair
recognizes the gentleman from California, Colonel Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to go back to the
issue of chemical weapons. And obviously there is still a
number of them in the country and everything, and the danger
posed by falling into one of the, I don't know how many groups
you have listed. I lost track. I didn't update my scorecard.
But the scenarios there are just intriguing and horrific
because they would go to any means whatsoever in their
employment of it, do you have any comment on the possibility
that that could be a military target of not just the sarin gas,
but even more of the VX agents?
Mr. Jenkins. The chemical weapons are a potential target
for all of the parties concerned simply because they are a
prize that will give any of the units leverage and make them
more important players than they are. In other words, when you
get your hands on them, you are more important. But also,
interestingly, Assad's agreement to get rid of the chemical
weapons in a certain sense is a strategy that helps the Assad
regime survive, because it is a major logistics enterprise to
both protect and move those weapons and to ultimately dismantle
or disarm them. Doing that in the midst of a conflict is very,
very difficult, and so there is going to be extreme pressure on
the rebel forces to not interfere with the disarmament process.
In other words, it is a way in which we are obliged to accept
the legitimacy of the Assad regime and the primacy of it and to
lean on the rebels to allow the disarmament process to take
place, because if the conflict continues at its current
intensity, it is very, very difficult to get those weapons out
of there.
Mr. Cook. Just to continue on that very quickly. You are
talking about some extremist groups, obviously they kill
people, take the hearts out and organs, and eat them, and
obviously publicize that which, I think, was in the spring of
this year--very, very shocking videos--that the ends achieve
the means. And sooner or later they are going to look at that
as a weapon of opportunity and that is why I mentioned that.
But I don't want to run out of time. The Chechen rebels and any
connections to the groups there, would this explain partly the
Russian role in there other than its traditional support of the
Assad regime or the fear of training Sunni extremists that we
go back to Chechnya and blow up parts of Russia?
Mr. Barfi. Not at all. Putin sees this as a cold war. It is
just a game in the cold war. He doesn't want to let the United
States have anymore assets in the region. Some people think
that it is because of the naval base at Tartus. He doesn't need
that naval base. He can't bring frigates in there. He can't
have long stays of the sailors in there. This is just a cold
war mentality. He does not want the United States to win.
Mr. Cook. So you are saying he is not worried about the
Chechen rebels and perhaps this ecumenical tie to the ones in
this--I had kind of gotten a different impression when I was in
Russia that what was going on in Chechnya and North and South
Ossetia and everything else, the tremendous fear, almost a
purge of any of the extremists, and they would go to any means,
including a former terrorist leader that is now in charge of
Chechnya.
Mr. Barfi. If he felt like that then he would support the
rebels to try to end the war. Because the rebels, the Chechens
of Jaish al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar are part of the radical
opposition that came about just in the last 2 years. Early on
you had more nationalist moderate means.
Mr. Cook. Absolutely. Okay, thank you. I yield.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time. I want to
thank all of our panelists for being here.
Did you have another question?
Mr. Sherman. Only if you will indulge me.
Mr. Poe. I will recognize the ranking member.
Mr. Sherman. We have seen Assad win some victories on the
ground. Are you folks pretty convinced that Assad isn't going
to win this thing? Mr. Smyth?
Mr. Smyth. Well, these victories that you are actually
watching, the recent ones, these are due to the Shia militias
and the Iranian involvement.
Mr. Sherman. Well, that is one way to win.
Mr. Smyth. But going back to will he win, we keep
continuing this paradigm that one side is going to win over the
other. And Syria is a multi-polar conflict. I am actually
using----
Mr. Sherman. But the Assad family has been able to impose
its will on all of Syria for a long time and they are making a
little progress toward returning to that. Are you confident
they can't put this Humpty Dumpty back together again?
Mr. Smyth. Frankly, I don't think that they can. A lot of
these advancements that they have made, they haven't been able
to hold on to certain large tracts of territory.
Mr. Sherman. Does anybody on the panel have a different
view? Anybody betting on Assad? Okay. I feel like a croupier.
Lebanon is an analogy here, but Lebanon went through a
violent phase of its kaleidoscope. On a less violent stage now
it is being affected by Syria. We saw some peace in Lebanon 5
years ago, 10 years ago, in spite of the fact that you didn't
have one government in control equally of all the territory.
You had different groups in control with their own militias.
Sounds like a peaceable version of today's Syria. But one
difference is, in Lebanon, whatever group lived in an area had
control of the area. There was a certain fairness to their
allocation of the territory.
In Syria, the Alawites are 15 percent and have
traditionally had the whole country and today hold a big, big
chunk of it. Can there be, what should I say, less violent
status in Syria, some sort of acceptance of a militia
controlled status quo in different regions, or does the fact
that the Alawites own over half the pie and ``deserve'' only 15
percent mean that they have to keep fighting until it is over?
Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. First of all, in sorting things out in
Lebanon, the civil war went on for 15 years. So if we get into
two or three decades, different scenarios open up after people
exhaust themselves. And second, the fighting in Lebanon, while
it was intense, did not achieve the intensity that the fighting
in Syria has, nor did it produce the kind of displacement in
terms of refugees and so on. And so while it is possible, I
think that we will see consolidation of these enclaves that
could lead to some sort of a stasis, and there will continue to
be pushing and shoving around the edges. But that may turn out
to be, in the sense of a spectrum of poor outcomes, one of the
least poor--that is, accepting the de facto partition of Syria
into a kaleidoscope of enclaves and attempting to simply reduce
both the internal violence and the potential spillover in terms
of international terrorism that it would create.
Mr. Poe. All right. I have another question. One last
question. While this is taking place, all these countries that
surround Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, are we going to see an influx
into those countries of the groups that are in Syria whether
they are on Assad's side or whether they are on the rebel side,
are these militias going to move into these other countries?
Mr. Smyth. I will speak for the Assad side. The Shia
militia organizations are already based in Iraq. They already
have political influence there. Lebanese Hezbollah is a very,
very big player in Lebanon and essentially run the show in most
cases.
Mr. Poe. The Iranians want to take over the whole region.
Mr. Smyth. Well, of course they do.
Mr. Poe. And eliminate Israel in the process.
Mr. Smyth. Well, that is one of the cores of their
ideological structure.
Mr. Poe. Okay. What about the other side? What about the
folks fighting on the rebel side? Anybody want to weigh in on
that? Mr. Barfi, I will let you answer that last question.
Mr. Barfi. Let us just take a quick look at Jordan. We know
hundreds of Jordanians have gone. Some get caught, some end up
dead and some are still there. This is a Zarqawi network. These
are the same Salafi leaders that piped people into Iraq. They
are now coming back. Look at Lebanon. This is one of the
biggest bombings we have seen in years in Lebanon of the
Iranian Embassy. I mean, you are already seeing this blowback.
And we know there is a lot of Salafis. We know there is
jihadists in Lebanon. They were there before. But you are
getting now the blowback, and what are they going to do? They
are going to take the war to the infidel, Shia Hezbollah in
there, and in Jordan they may try to destabilize the regime. It
is very, very bad this blowback and spillover.
Mr. Poe. I want to thank all of you. Your testimony was
excellent. Your written statements were excellent. So without
objection, all members will have 5 days to submit statements,
and there may be more questions that we would like for you to
answer in writing, and extraneous materials for the record
subject to the limitation in the rules. Thank you once again.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
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